RIGHT AGAINST SELF INCRIMINATION

Section 17, Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution provides that no person shall be compelled to be a witness against
himself.
This privilege applies only to evidence that is communicative in essence taken under duress (People vs. Olvis, 154
SCRA 513, 1987). The Supreme Court has ruled that the right against self-incrimination is just a prohibition on the
use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communication (testimonial evidence) from a defendant, not an
exclusion of evidence taken from his body when it may be material. As such, a defendant can be required to submit
to a test to extract virus from his body (as cited in People vs. Olvis, Supra); the substance emitting from the body of
the accused was received as evidence for acts of lasciviousness (US vs. Tan Teng, 23 Phil. 145); morphine forced
out of the mouth was received as proof (US vs. Ong Siu Hong, 36 Phil. 735); an order by the judge for the witness to
put on pair of pants for size was allowed (People vs. Otadora, 86 Phil. 244); and the court can compel a woman
accused of adultery to submit for pregnancy test (Villaflor vs. Summers, 41 Phil. 62), since the gist of the privilege
is the restriction on testimonial compulsion.

Hot Pursuit Arrests Rule 113, Section

5(b) of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure
Posted on November 26, 2012 by Intentional Lacunae
Picture this scenario:
One dark, gloomy October evening, the silence of
your sleepy barangay was broken by four gunshots and a scream. Aroused
by the noise, SPO1 Eseng rushes to the house where the noises came from.
The distinct smell of gunpowder and blood permeate the rustic October air.
When SPO1 Eseng arrives at the scene of the crime, barangay tanods have
already gathered on the houses patio. They inform him that three members
of the akyat bahay gang have robbed and killed the unfortunate owners of
the house. Suddenly, a loud crash is heard, the backdoor of the house flies
through the air and four dark figures dash through the hedges behind the
house. SPO1 Eseng and the two of the tanods run after the felons.
The chase leads them to a populated street busy with night-goers. They lose
sight of the three hooded figures when they make a blind turn in aneskinita.
And arising from the darkness of the unlit alley, the law enforcers behold
three men, walking calmly along the side of the street, wearing hooded
jackets similar to the ones worn by the akyat bahay members, with their
hands tucked inside their baggy pants pockets as if they were hiding
something. They were unable to see the faces of the cold-hearted gang
members, and the only distinct if you can even call it distinct
characteristic that they remember about the suspects was that they were

wearing jackets. Can SPO1 Eseng and the barangay tanods lawfully arrest
the three shady characters?
Distraught in my desk, my poor undergraduate self kept wondering what
Rule 113, Section 5(b) meant by personal knowledge. It was what we law
students called a shotgun question owing to the quick reloading
mechanism of the pump-barrel shotgun that law enforcement employs for its
high stopping power and one that our Criminal Law professor employed
effectively in his other classes. We were somewhat fortunate to have
gathered intel informing us that we would be asked about the meaning of
personal knowledge as contemplated by Rule 113, Section 5 (a) and (b), but
we had yet to come up with a decent answer for the question.
Rule 113, Section 5, of the Rules of Court enumerates the three instances in
which an arrest can be made without a warrant. It reads:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant when lawful. A peace officer or private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person;
(a)
When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b)
When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and
(c)
When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from
a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
Paragraph A requires no further exposition. What the law meant by in his
presence is that the arresting officer or the citizen making an arrest should
have perceived by any of his senses (6th sense not included) that a crime has
been committed, and he goes to the scene of the crime to effect the arrest.
Thus when a blind person walking at 3pm across Carriedo Street hears three
gunshots coming from the right side of the road at a distance of
approximately 4 meters from his position, then the crime has been

committed in his presence. Or when a blind and deaf person perceives

through his well-trained olfactory sense that a large amount of gunpowder is
present in the air, then he knows that a crime has been committed not far
from where he is standing. Clearly, there ispersonal knowledge of the facts
and circumstances of the crime in Paragraph A.
But what of section B? does it speak of the same personal knowledge?
Simply put, personal knowledge pertains to cognizance of a circumstance or
fact gained directly through firsthand experience or observation. An affidavit
is a declaration based on personal knowledge, unless expressly stated
otherwise.
In his dissent in Sayo v. Chief of Police[1], Justice Tuazon remarks:

A police officer can seldom make arrest with

personal knowledge of the offense and of the identity of
the person arrested sufficient in itself to convict. To
require him to make an arrest only when the evidence
he himself can furnish proves beyond reasonable doubt
the guilt of the accused, would endanger the safety of
society. It would cripple the forces of the law to the
point of enabling criminals, against whom there is only
moral conviction or prima facie proof of guilt, to escape.
Yet persons arrested on necessarily innocent so that the
prosecuting attorney should release them. Further and
closer investigation not infrequently confirm the
suspicion or information.
A wise observation indeed! For how many barangay tanods and police men
are actually on active duty, ready to respond to the cries of the helpless
during the ungodly hours of the night? Most of them are already cozy in their
houses, over dosing on telenovelas, or indulging on a grande bottle of Red
Horse. Why, even at just 4 in the afternoon, one can HARDLY see any law
enforcement authorities surveying the most dangerous streets of Manila,
which is practically a haven for crimes. You judge, dear reader, from personal
experience.

In answering our question, we shall resolve to cutting the provision piece by

piece. Lets begin with the elements of a lawful arrest under Rule 113,
Section 5(b). They are:
1. That a crime has been committed
2. That the arresting officer has probable cause to make the arrest
3. That such probable cause is due to his personal knowledge of the
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed
the crime

That a crime has been committed is a pre-condition because the law

expressly makes it so. No further questions asked. Thus, a police officer
cannot make an arrest because the shady character of a person has led him
to believe that the latter might have committed a crime. The crime must
come first. The second element, probably cause, is an actual belief or
reasonable grounds for suspicion. It is also defined as facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably prudent and discreet
man to believe that a crime has been committed and that
objects/person sought in connection to the crime are located in the
place sought to be searched[2]. Note that suspicion is not the same
probable cause. Suspicion is based merely on assumption probable cause is
based on facts.
And finally, the personal knowledge of the facts. In the case of People v.
Burgos, it was held that:

The fact of the commission of the offense must be

undisputed. The test of reasonable ground applies only
to the identity of the perpetrator.
Moreover, in previous cases such as People v. Tonog, Jr.[3] and and Posadas
v. Ombudsman[4] that personal knowledge of such facts maybe gained
by the officer during the course of his investigation. Quoting Tonog Jr.:
It may be that the police officers were not armed with a warrant when they
apprehended Accused-appellant. The warrantless arrest, however, was
justified under Section 5 (b), Rule 133 (sic) of the 1985 Rules of Criminal

Procedure providing that a peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a

person when an offense has in fact just been committed and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed
it. In this case, Pat. Leguarda, in effecting the arrest of Accusedappellant, had knowledge of facts gathered by him personally in the
course of his investigation indicating that Accused-appellant was
one of the perpetrators.
However, information simply relayed to the arresting officers is
notpersonal knowledge. In People v. Burgos, a certain Masamlok (I LOVE
HIS NAME) informed police authorities that the appellant was involved in
subversive activities. Acting on the strength of such information and without
securing a judicial warrant, the police proceeded to appellants house to
arrest him. There, they also allegedly recovered an unlicensed firearm and
subversive materials. There was no personal knowledge since the
information came from dear beloved Masamlok, a civilian. At the time of
Burgos arrest, he was not involved in subversive activities nor committing
any illegal acts.
And in People v. Encinada[5], where law enforcement authorities made an
arrest based on an intelligence report that they received, stating: appellant
who was carrying marijuana would arrive the next morning aboard M/V
Sweet Pearl. The Court categorically stated that such [r]aw intelligence
information is not a sufficient ground for a warrantless arrest. And since, at
the time of his arrest, no act or fact demonstrating a felonious enterprise
could be ascribed to appellant, there was no valid justification for his arrest.
Thus, Hot Pursuit Arrests or those lawful arrests contemplate by Rule 113,
Sec. 5(B), as Justice Panganiban stated in his concurring opinion in People v.
Florencia Doria[6]:

While the law enforcers may not actually

witness the execution of acts constituting the offense,
they must have direct knowledge or view of the crime
right after its commission. They should know for a fact
that a crime was committed. AND they must also
perceive acts exhibited by the person to be arrested,

indicating that he perpetrated the crime. Again, mere

intelligence information that the suspect committed the
crime will not suffice. The arresting officers themselves
must have personal knowledge of facts showing that
the suspect performed the criminal act. Personal
knowledge means actual belief or reasonable grounds
of suspicion, based on actual facts, that the person to
be arrested is probably guilty of committing the crime.
Let me illustrate: Patrolman Fernando of the Sta Ana police precinct receives
a complaint about a stabbing incident in the Sta Ana Market. The complaint
came from a concerned tindera who witnessed the stabbing. This is the
normal course of events in a criminal investigation the police
investigators receive information in the form of a complaint/witness
testimony from a third person. The first element of a hot pursuit:
That a crime has been committed is hearsay evidence.
However, the second and most important element namely, the facts
constituting probable cause that the person to be arrested has committed
the crime complained of should have been gained PERSONALLY. How is
this gained? by conducting investigations, surveillance, or perceiving acts
of the accused which leads the arresting officer to believe that he
should rightfully be arrested.