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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, PUBLIC OFFICERS & ELECTION LAW| ATTY. LA VIA| CASE DIGESTS| G01| BATCH 4| 1
HELD: No.
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Again, the high court noted that defining these parties or groups, one
from the others, could only mean that they are not one and the
same.
Previous rulings reversed by Atong Paglaum
As earlier stated, there are previous rulings on the party-list system
in the case of Ang Bagong Bayani v. Comelec and BANAT v.
Comelec
In Ang Bagong Bayanis parameters for the party-list system,
guideline 2 states that while even major political parties are
expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the Constitution to participate in
the party-list system, they must comply with the declared statutory
policy of enabling Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors to be elected to the House of
Representatives.'
However, in its latest Decision, in Atong Paglaum, the high court
pointed out that there was an inherent inconsistency in the Ang
Bagong Bayani guidelines since the requirement that the major
political parties should represent the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors essentially automatically disqualified
these major parties from the party-list system.
As for BANAT, the high court said that the guidelines in this ruling
merely formalized the prevailing practice when it prohibited major
political parties from participating in the party-list elections even if
through their allied sectoral organizations.
Petition granted and remanded to COMELEC.
The party-list groups and organizations covered by the 41 petitions
that obtained mandatory injunction orders from the high court still
stand a chance to make it to the 2013 party-list race as the high court
ordered the poll body to determine whether petitioners are qualified
to register under the party-list system and to participate in the 13
May 2013 party-list elections under the new parameters set forth in
the Decision. The rest, meaning, the 13 other petitions, were
remanded to the poll body merely for purposes of determining
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PREMATURE CAMPAIGNING
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(D) The Courts 11 September 2009 Decision also reversed Lanot vs.
COMELEC
(G.R.
No. 164858; 16 November 2006). Lanot was decided on the ground
that
one
who
files
a
certificate of candidacy is not a candidate until the start of the
campaign period. This ground was based on the deliberations of the
legislators who explained that the early deadline for filing certificates
of candidacy under R.A. 8436 was set only to afford time to prepare
the machine-readable ballots, and they intended to preserve the
existing election periods, such that one who files his certificate of
candidacy to meet the early deadline will still not be considered as a
candidate.When Congress amended R.A. 8436, Congress decided
to expressly incorporate the Lanot doctrine into law, thus, the
provision in Section 15 of R.A. 8436 that a person who files his
certificate of candidacy shall be considered a candidate only at the
start of the campaign period. Congress wanted to insure that no
person filing a certificate of candidacy under the early deadline
required by the automated election system would be disqualified or
penalized for any partisan political act done before the start of the
campaign period. This provision cannot be annulled by the Court
except on the sole ground of its unconstitutionality. The assailed
Decision, however, did not claim that this provision is
unconstitutional. In fact, the assailed Decision considered the entire
Section 15 good law. Thus, the Decision was self-contradictory
reversing Lanot but maintaining the constitutionality of the said
provision.
CASE
4:
PENERA
v.
COMELEC
(MOTION
FOR
RECONSIDERATION) (November 2009)- NINA TABALINGCOS
FACTS: Petitioner and private respondents were candidates for
mayor of the Municipality of Sta.Monica, Surigao del Norte in the last
May 2007 elections. The former filed her certificate of candidacy on
the day before the prescribed campaign period. When she went to
the COMELEC Office for filing she was accompanied by her party
mates. Thereafter, they had a motorcade which was consist of two
trucks and ten motorcycles running around the municipality
convincing the residents to vote for her and the other candidates of
their political party. Due to this, private respondent filed a petition
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HELD: No.
RATIO: First, the HRET does not acquire jurisdiction over the issue
of petitioners qualifications, as well as over the assailed COMELEC
Resolutions, unless a petition is duly filed with said tribunal.
Petitioner has not averred that she has filed such action.
Second, the jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the candidate
is considered a Member of the House of Representatives, as stated
in Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution: The Senate and the
House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal
which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of
their respective Members.
To be considered a Member of the House of Representatives, there
must be a concurrence of the following requisites: (1) a valid
proclamation, (2) a proper oath, and (3) assumption of office.
Indeed, in some cases, this Court has made the pronouncement that
once a proclamation has been made, COMELECs jurisdiction is
already lost and, thus, its jurisdiction over contests relating to
elections, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRETs own
jurisdiction begins. However, it must be noted that in these cases,
the doctrinal pronouncement was made in the context of a
proclaimed candidate who had not only taken an oath of office, but
who had also assumed office.
Here, the petitioner cannot be considered a Member of the House of
Representatives because, primarily, she has not yet assumed office.
To repeat what has earlier been said, the term of office of a Member
of the House of Representatives begins only at noon on the thirtieth
day of June next following their election.28 Thus, until such time, the
COMELEC retains jurisdiction.
In her attempt to comply with the second requirement, petitioner
attached a purported Oath of Office taken before Hon. Feliciano
Belmonte Jr. on 5 June 2013. However, this is not the oath of office
which confers membership to the House of Representatives.
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II. CITIZEN
RIGHTS
PARTICIPATION
AND
ELECTORAL
HELD: No.
RATIO: The COMELEC was well within its right to do so pursuant to
the clear provisions of Section 8, RA 8189 which provides that no
voters registration shall be conducted within 120 days before the
regular election. The right of suffrage is not absolute. It is regulated
by measures like voters registration which is not a mere statutory
requirement. The State, in the exercise of its inherent police power,
may then enact laws to safeguard and regulate the act of voters
registration for the ultimate purpose of conducting honest, orderly
and peaceful election, to the incidental yet generally important end,
that even pre-election activities could be performed by the duly
constituted authorities in a realistic and orderly manner one which
is not indifferent and so far removed from the pressing order of the
day and the prevalent circumstances of the times. RA 8189 prevails
over RA 8436 in that RA 8189s provision is explicit as to the
prohibition. Suffice it to say that it is a pre-election act that cannot be
reset.
Further, even if what is asked is a mere two-day special registration,
COMELEC has shown in its pleadings that if it is allowed, it will
substantially create a setback in the other pre-election matters
because the additional voters from the special two day registration
will have to be screened, entered into the book of voters, have to be
inspected again, verified, sealed, then entered into the computerized
voters list; and then they will have to reprint the voters information
sheet for the update and distribute it by that time, the May 14, 2001
elections would have been overshot because of the lengthy
processes after the special registration. In short, it will cost more
inconvenience than good. Further still, the allegation that youth
voters are disenfranchised is not sufficient. Nowhere in AKBAYANYouths pleading was attached any actual complaint from an
individual youth voter about any inconvenience arising from the fact
that the voters registration has ended on December 27, 2001. Also,
AKBAYAN-Youth et al admitted in their pleading that they are asking
an extension because they failed to register on time for some
reasons, which is not appealing to the court. The law aids the vigilant
and not those who slumber on their rights.
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POSTPONEMENT OF ELECTION
SEC. 5, OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE
CASE 10: DIMAPORO v. COMELEC- PATRICIA CAALITA
NOTE: Case cannot be found.
CASE 11: BASHER v. COMELEC (April 2000)- JIMUEL MATIAS
FACTS: Petitioner Hadji Rasul Batador Basher and Private
Respondent Abulkair Ampatua were both candidates for the position
of Punong Barangay in Barangay Maidan, Tugaya, Lanao del Sur
during the May 12, 1997 barangay election. The election was
declared a failure and a special one was set for June 12, 1997.
Again, the election failed and was reset to August 30, 1997.
According to the Comelec, the voting started only around 9:00 p.m.
on August 30, 1997 because of the prevailing tension in the said
locality. Election Officer Diana DatuImam reported that she was
allegedly advised by some religious leaders not to proceed with the
election because "it might trigger bloodshed." She also claimed that
the town mayor, "being too hysterical, yelled and threatened me to
declare a failure of election in Maidan. The armed followers of the
mayor pointed their guns at her and her military escorts, who
responded in like manner towards the former.
The parties were then pacified at the PNP headquarters. With the
arrival of additional troops, the election officer proceeded to Maidan
to conduct the election starting at 9:00 p.m. until the early morning of
the following day. The holding of the election at that particular time
was allegedly announced "over the mosque."
The tally sheet for the said "election" showed the following results:
Ampatua 250 votes; Basher 15 votes; and Abdul Razul, a third
candidate 10 votes. Ampatua was proclaimed winner.
Petitioner filed a Petition before the Comelec praying that the
election be declared a failure. Alleging that no election was
conducted in the place and at the time prescribed by law, petitioner
narrated that there was a dispute that day among the candidates
regarding the venue of the election in the lone voting precinct of the
barangay. In order to avoid bloodshed, they ultimately agreed that no
election would be conducted.
The election officer turned over for safekeeping the ballot box
containing election paraphernalia to the acting station commander of
the PNP. The following day, petitioner and the third candidate were
surprised to learn that the election officer had directed the Board of
Election Tellers to conduct the election and to fill up the election
returns and certificates of canvass on the night of August 30, 1997 at
the residence of the former mayor. Petitioner also stated that no
announcement to hold the election at the former mayors house that
night was ever made.
COMELEC dismissed the petition stating that there was no failure of
election because the two conditions laid down in Mitmug v.
Comelec were not established. It held that the "election was
conducted on the scheduled date. The precinct functioned. Actual
voting took place, and it resulted not in a failure to elect."
ISSUE: WON the election held on the date, at the time and in the
place other than those officially designated by the law and by the
COMELEC was valid.
HELD: No.
RATIO: The peculiar set of facts in the present case show not merely
a failure of election but the absence of a valid electoral exercise. The
disputed election was illegal, irregular and void.
Datu-Imam did not follow the procedure laid down by law for election
postponement or suspension or the declaration of a failure of
election. She narrated the circumstances surrounding her declaration
as follows:
"When I returned to ascertain the situation in Maidan, the Mayor,
being too hysterical, yelled and threatened me to declare [a] failure
of elections in Maidan. When I insisted to personally confirm the
probable cause of bloodshed (at Maidan), his armed
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FAILURE OF ELECTION
SEC. 6, OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE
CASE 12: BASHER v. COMELEC (April 2000)- JOANNA
SARIBONG
FACTS: Petitioner Hadji Rasul Batador Basher and Private
Respondent Abulkair Ampatua were both candidates for the position
of Punong Barangay in Barangay Maidan. The barangay election
was declared a failure and a special one was scheduled. Again, the
election failed and was reset to August 30, 1997.
The voting started only around 9:00 p.m because there was a
tension in the said locality. With the arrival of troops, the election
officer proceeded to Maidan to conduct the election starting at 9:00
p.m. until the early morning of the following day. The holding of the
election at that particular time was allegedly announced "over the
mosque." Ampatua was proclaimed winner.
Batador then filed a Petition before the Comelec praying that the
election be declared a failure. Alleging that no election was
conducted in the place and at the time prescribed by law, as there
was a dispute that day among the candidates regarding the venue of
the election. In order to avoid bloodshed, they ultimately agreed that
no election would be conducted.
The following day, Batador was surprised to learn that election officer
had directed the Board of Election Tellers to conduct the election and
to fill up the election returns and certificates of canvass on the night
of August 30, 1997 at the residence of the former mayor. Batador
also stated that no announcement to hold the election at the former
mayors house that night was ever made.
The Comelec dismissed the petition because a failure of election
requires the concurrence of two conditions as laid down in Mitmug v
COMELEC, (1) no voting took place in the precinct on the date fixed
by law, or even if there was voting, the election resulted in a failure to
elect; and (2) the votes not cast would have affected the result of the
election. It ruled that these requirements were not met. It held that
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nearby barangay about 8:30 p.m. did the election officers proceed to
Barangay Maidan. Arriving at Maidan, they allegedly proceeded to
conduct the election "after announcing it over the mosque."Such
abbreviated announcement "over the mosque" at such late hour did
not constitute sufficient notice to the electorate.
CASE 13: HASSAN v. COMELEC (November 1996)- JEAN
GUECO
HELD: No.
RATIO: First, the place where the voting was conducted was
illegal. Section 42 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that "the
chairman of the board of election tellers shall designate the public
school or any other public building within the barangay to be used as
polling place in case the barangay has one election precinct ." Board
of Election Tellers for Barangay Maidan claimed that the election was
held "in Barangay Maidan." But failed to specify the exact venue.
Second, the voting time was irregular. The law provides that "the
casting of votes shall start at 7am and shall end at 3pm. However,
the "election" for Barangay Maidan officials was supposed to have
been held after 9 p.m. of August 30, 1997 until the wee hours of the
following day. Certainly, such schedule was not in accordance with
law or the Comelec Rules.
Third, the election date was invalid. Election Officer practically
postponed the election in Barangay Maidan from the official original
schedule of 7:00 a.m. However, as election officer, she has no
authority to declare a failure of election. Indeed, only the Comelec
itself has legal authority to exercise such power.
Fourth, election postponement was invalid. Election officer did not
conduct any proceeding, summary or otherwise, to find out whether
any of the legal grounds for the suspension or postponement or the
declaration of failure of the election actually existed in the barangay.
Fifth, the notice was irregular. The electorate of Barangay Maidan
was not given due notice that the election would push through after
9:00 p.m. that same day. Apparently, the election officer's decision to
hold the election on the night of August 30, 1997 was precipitate.
Only after additional military troops had arrived at their site in a
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1,098
879
833
341
185
cry fraud and terrorism. However, the COMELEC cannot turn a blind
eye to the fact that terrorism was so prevalent in the area. Elections
had to be set for the third time because no members of the BEI
reported for duty due to impending threats of violence in the area.
This in fact prompted COMELEC to deploy military men to act as
substitute members just so elections could beheld; and to thwart
these threats of violence, the COMELEC team, moreover, decided to
transfer the polling places to Liangan Elementary School which was
15 kilometers away from the polling place. The peculiar situation of
this case cannot be overstated. The notice given on the afternoon of
the day before the scheduled special elections and transferring the
venue of the elections 15 kilometers away from the farthest
barangay/school was too short resulting to the disenfranchisement of
voters. Out of the 1,546 registered voters in the five (5) precincts,
only 328 actually voted. It was quite sweeping and illogical for the
COMELEC to state that the votes uncast would not have in any way
affected the results of the elections. While the difference between the
two candidates is only 219 out of the votes actually cast, the
COMELEC totally ignored the fact that there were more than a
thousand registered voters who failed to vote.
CASE 14: SANGCAD BAO v. COMELEC (December 2003)- JC
PAJO
FACTS: Petitioner Sangcad S. Bao sought re-election as mayor of
Butig, Lanao del Sur in the May 14, 2001 elections. On May 25,
2001, Bao filed before the COMELEC a Very Urgent Petition for
Suspension of Counting of Votes by [the] B[oard of] E[lection]
I[nspectors], Canvass of Election Returns and Proclamation of
Winners by [the Municipal Board of Canvassers], and Declaration of
Failure of Election in Butig, Lanao del Sur
Bao later filed on May 29, 2001 an Additional Submission containing
Casidars Narrative Report on the Conduct of [the] May 14, 2001
National and Local Elections in the Municipality of Butig, Lanao del
Sur reading verbatim:
1. Per my instruction, the BEIs immediately started the election.
2. While the election was going on, at around 2 pm, several
bombings occurred almost in the area where the election was held
which caused commotion.
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3. due to the incident and fear, the BEIs assigned in some other
precincts locked their ballot boxes and brought them to the Municipal
Hall while others continued the casting of votes [until] the last hour.
4. . . . the electors and some other candidates were forcing and/or
convincing me to open the ballot boxes brought to the Municipal Hall
to continue the election which I refused as it was already too late.
5. . . . due to intimidation and force shown or displayed by some of
the supporters and candidates themselves, I failed to decide on time
as it will endanger my life and other civilians in the area.
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HELD: Yes.
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The aggrieved party may appeal the decision of the board to the
Commission and said appeal shall be heard and decided by the
Commission en banc. Section 5, however of the same rule states
that a petition for correction of manifest error may be filed directly
with the Commission en banc provided that such errors could not
have been discovered during the canvassing despite the exercise of
due diligence and proclamation of the winning candidate had already
been made.
Petitioner's final contention that in any event SPC No. 95-198 must
be considered rendered moot and academic by reason of his
proclamation and assumption of office is untenable. The short
answer to this is that petitioner's proclamation was null and void and
therefore the COMELEC was not barred from inquiring into its nullity.
The petition is partially GRANTED by annulling the resolutions dated
August 1, 1995 and September 26, 1995 of the Commission on
Elections. The COMELEC is instead DIRECTED to reconvene the
Municipal Board of Canvassers or, if this is not feasible, to constitute
a new Municipal Board of Canvassers in Giporlos, Eastern Samar
and to order it to revise with deliberate speed the Statement of Votes
on the basis of the election returns from all precincts of the
Municipality of Giporlos and thereafter proclaim the winning
candidate on the basis thereof.
CASE 18: FAELNAR v. COMELEC (May 2000)- FRANCIS
TORRES
FACTS: On April 8, 1997, petitioner Eugenio Faelnar filed a
certificate of candidacy for the position of Barangay Chairman of
Barangay Guadalupe, Cebu City in the May 12, 1997 barangay
elections.
The following day, on April 9, 1997, a basketball
tournament, dubbed the "2nd JING-JING FAELNARS CUP," opened
at the Guadalupe Sports Complex and lasted up to April 30, 1997.
This gave rise to a complaint for electioneering filed against
petitioner and Cecilio Gillamac by Antonio Luy.
The complaint alleged that the basketball tournament was actually a
campaign gimmick staged outside the campaign period which
officially started on May 1, 1997, in violation of the Omnibus Election
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HELD: No.
On April 10, 1992, private respondent filed his Petition (Special Civil
Action No. 465) before the court a quo against petitioners to prohibit
and restrain them from pursuing or prosecuting certain public works
projects as it violates the 45-day ban on public works imposed by the
Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881) because
although they were initiated few days before March 27, 1992, the
date the ban took effect, they were not covered by detailed
engineering plans, specifications or a program of work which are
preconditions for the commencement of any public works project.
The questioned projects are classified into two (2) categories: (a)
those that are Locally-Funded, consisting of 29 different projects for
the maintenance or concreting of various roads, the rehabilitation of
the Katibawasan Falls and the construction of the Capitol Building,
and (b) those designated as Foreign-Assisted, consisting of fifteen
(15) projects which include the construction of Human Development
Center, various Day Care cum Production Centers and water works
systems; the extension and renovation of various buildings; the
acquisition of hospital and laboratory equipment; and the
rehabilitation of office and equipment. On the same day, respondent
Judge issued the question TRO.
In the same order, he directed the petitioners to file their Answer
within 10 days from receipt of notice and set the hearing on the
application for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction for
April 24, 1992. Instead of filing the Answer, the petitioners filed the
special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a
writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order. They
contend that the case principally involves an alleged violation of the
Omnibus Election Code thus the jurisdiction is exclusively vested in
the Comelec, not the Regional Trial Court.
ISSUE: WON the trial court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of
Special Civil Action No.465.
HELD: No.
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RATIO: The material operative facts alleged in the petition therein inexorably link
the private respondent's principal grievance toalleged violations of paragraphs (a),
(b), (v) and (w), Section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg.
881).There is particular emphasis on the last two (2) paragraphs which read:
Sec. 261. Prohibited Acts. - The following shall be guilty of an
election offense:
(a)Vote-buying and vote-selling .
xxx xxx xxx
(b)Conspiracy to bribe voters.
xxx xxx xxx
(v)Prohibition against release, disbursement or
expenditure of public funds. Any public official or
employee including barangay officials and those of
government-owned or controlled corporations and
their subsidiaries, who, during forty-five days before
a regular election and thirty days before a special
election, releases, disburses or expends any public
funds for:
(1) Any and all kinds of public works, except the
following:
xxx xxx xxx
(w) Prohibition against construction of public works,
delivery of materials for public works and issuance of
treasury warrants and similar devices.During the
period of forty-five days preceding a regular election
and thirty days before aspecial election, any person
who (a) undertakes the construction of any public
works, except for projects or works exempted in the
preceding paragraph; or (b) issues, uses or avails of
treasury warrants or any device undertaking future
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CASE
20:
TELECOMMUNICATIONS
AND
BROADCAST
ATTORNEYS OF THE PHILIPPINES v. COMELEC (April 1998)KAMAE CRUZ
FACTS: Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the
Philippines, Inc. (TBAP) is an organization of lawyers of radio and
television broadcasting companies suing as citizens, taxpayers and
registered voters. GMA Network, Inc. (GMA) operates radio and
television broadcasting stations throughout the Philippines under a
franchise granted by Congress.
Sec. 92 of BP 881 requires radio and television broadcast stations in
the Philippines to provide free airtime to the COMELEC for the use of
candidates for campaign and other political purposes.
TBAP and GMA challenge the validity of Sec. 92 of BP 881 because:
(1) it takes property without due process of law and without just
compensation, (2) it denies radio and television broadcast
companies the equal protection of the laws because it singles radio
and televisions stations out to provide free airtime as other forms of
media, such as newspapers and magazines, are not similarly
required to provide free time, and (3) it is in excess of the power
given to the COMELEC by Art. 9-C, Sec. 4 of the Constitution to
supervise or regulate the operation of media of communication or
information during the period of election because the power to
regulate does not include the power to prohibit.
GMA claimed that Sec. 92 of BP 881 is an invalid amendment of RA
7252 which granted GMA a franchise for the operation of radio and
television broadcasting stations. It argued that although Sec. 5 of RA
7252 gives the government the power to temporarily use and operate
GMA stations or to authorize such use and operation, the exercise of
this right must be compensated.
TBAP and GMA claimed that they suffered losses running to several
million pesos in providing COMELEC time in connection with the
1992 presidential election and the 1995 senatorial election and that
they stood to suffer even more should it be required to so again.
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ISSUES:
1. WON the COMELEC has the power to take cognizance of Oretas
petitions; and
2. WON the nullification of Sandovals proclamation was invalid
HELD:
1. Yes.
2. Yes.
RATIO: On COMELECs power to take cognizance of Oretas
petitions.
The COMELEC has exclusive jurisdiction over all pre-proclamation
controversies. The second sentence of Section 15 allows the filing of
petitions for correction of manifest errors in the certificate of canvass
or election returns even in elections for president, vice- president and
members of the House of Representatives for the simple reason that
the correction of manifest error will not prolong the process of
canvassing nor delay the proclamation of the winner in the election.
This rule is consistent with and complements the authority of the
COMELEC under the Constitution to, "enforce and administer all
laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an, election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall"and its power to "decide,
except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting
elections.
The COMELEC has jurisdiction over Oretas petitions. These
petitions essentially allege that there exists a manifest error in said
certificate of canvass as the board failed to include several election
returns in the canvassing. Private respondent prays that the board
be reconvened to correct said error. Section 15 of RA 7166 vests the
COMELEC with jurisdiction over cases of this nature. We reiterate
the long-standing rule that jurisdiction is conferred by law and is
determined by the allegations in the petition regardless of whether or
not the petitioner is entitled to the relief sought.
The authority to rule on petitions for correction of manifest error is
vested in the COMELEC en banc. Section 7 of Rule 27 of the 1993
COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides that if the error is
discovered before proclamation, the board of canvassers may motu
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It was pointed out, inter alia, that "the certiorari jurisdiction" of this
Court "over orders, rulings and decisions of the Comelec is not as
broad as it used to be" and "should be confined to instances of grave
abuse of discretion amounting to patent and substantial denial of due
process." Accordingly, We have "invariably followed" this principle:
"in the absence of jurisdictional infirmity or error of law of the utmost
gravity, the conclusion reached by respondent Commission on a
matter that falls within its competence is entitled to utmost respect,"
as succinctly stated in the case of Sidro by the learned Chief Justice.
And, according to the 1978 Election Code, the decisions, orders or
rulings of the Commission in pre-proclamation controversies are
"final and executory."
CASE 24: FILIPINA ENGINEERING AND MACHINE SHOP v.
FERRER- JOSHUA SALTERAS
FACTS: In preparation for the national elections of November 11,
1969, then respondent Commissioners of the Commission on
Elections
(COMELEC)
issued
an INVITATION TO
BID on
September 16, 1969 calling for the submission of sealed proposals
for the manufacture and delivery of 1 1,000 units of voting booths,
among the 17bidders , two bidders responded to the said invitation
the Filipinas and ACME steel ,ACME steel bid was rejected by
COMELEC bidding committee due to low quality of samples, hence
the commission recommended to award to Filipinas the contract to
manufacture and supply the voting boots, after final inspection of all
the samples by COMELEC Commissioners, they have note that
ACME submitted lower bid and improves the sample submitted
according
to the
specification
required
by
COMELEC,
COMELEC issued final resolution awarding the contract and issued
purchase order to ACME.FILIPINAS filed an injunction suit with the
court of the first instance of Manila against COMELEC and
ACME The courts decision that lower court has no jurisdiction
over the nature of the suit and complaint state no cause of action.
ISSUE/S: WON the lower court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of
a suit involving an order of the COMELEC dealing with an award of
contract arising from its invitation to bid.
HELD: No.
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HELD: No.
RATIO. The grant by the Constitution to the COMELEC of the power
to investigate and prosecute election offenses is intended to enable
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RATIO
1. Under the Constitution and R.A. No. 7941, private respondents
cannot be disqualified from the party-list elections, merely on the
ground that they are political parties. Section 5, Article VI of the
Constitutions provides that members of the House of
Representatives may be elected through a party-list system of
registered national, regional, and sectoral parties and organizations.
Furthermore, under Sections 7 and 8, Article IX (C) of the
Constitution, political parties may be registered under the party-list
system.
Sec. 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization, or
coalition shall be valid, except for those registered under the partylist system, as provided in this Constitution.
Sec. 8. Political parties, or organizations or coalitions registered
under the party-list system, shall not be represented in the voters
registration boards, boards of election inspectors, boards of
canvassers, or other similar bodies. However, they shall be entitled
to appoint poll watchers in accordance with law.
ISSUES:
1. WON political parties may participate in the party list elections.
2. WON the party-list system is exclusive to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors and organizations.
HELD:
1. Yes.
2. Yes.
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DEFECT IN MINERO RULING: its characterization of the nonparticipation of a party-list organization in an election as similar to a
failure to garner the 2% threshold party-list vote. A delisting based
on a mixture or fusion of these two different and separate grounds for
delisting is a strained application of the law in jurisdictional terms, it
is an interpretation not within the contemplation of the framers of the
law and hence is a gravely abusive interpretation of the law.
2. On the due process issue, PGBIs right to due process was not
violated for PGBI was given an opportunity to seek, as it did seek, a
reconsideration of Resolution No. 8679. The essence of due
process is simply the opportunity to be heard; as applied to
administrative proceedings, due process is the opportunity to explain
ones side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action
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1. In the lower house, 80% shall comprise the seats for legislative
districts, while the remaining 20% shall come from party-list
representatives (Sec. 5, Article VI, 1987 Constitution);
2. Pursuant to Sec. 11b of R.A. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, a
party-list which garners at least 2% of the total votes cast in the
party-list elections shall be entitled to one seat;
3. If a party-list garners at least 4%, then it is entitled to 2 seats; if it
garners at least 6%, then it is entitled to 3 seats this is pursuant to
the 2-4-6 rule or the Panganiban Formula from the case of Veterans
Federation Party vs COMELEC.
4. In no way shall a party be given more than three seats even if if
garners more than 6% of the votes cast for the party-list election (3
seat cap rule, same case).
The Barangay Association for National Advancement and
Transparency (BANAT), a party-list candidate, questioned the
proclamation as well as the formula being used. BANAT averred that
the 2% threshold is invalid; Sec. 11 of RA 7941 is void because its
provision that a party-list, to qualify for a congressional seat, must
garner at least 2% of the votes cast in the party-list election, is not
supported by the Constitution. Further, the 2% rule creates a
mathematical impossibility to meet the 20% party-list seat prescribed
by the Constitution.
BANAT also questions if the 20% rule is a mere ceiling or is it
mandatory. If it is mandatory, then with the 2% qualifying vote, there
would be instances when it would be impossible to fill the prescribed
20% share of party-lists in the lower house. BANAT also proposes a
new computation (which shall be discussed in the HELD portion of
this digest).
On the other hand, BAYAN MUNA, another party-list candidate,
questions the validity of the 3 seat rule (Section 11a of RA 7941). It
also raised the issue of whether or not major political parties are
allowed to participate in the party-list elections or is the said elections
limited to sectoral parties.
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ISSUES:
1. How is the 80-20 rule observed in apportioning the seats in the
lower house?
2. WON the 20% allocation for party-list representatives mandatory
or a mere ceiling.
3. WON the 2% threshold to qualify for a seat valid.
4. How are party-list seats allocated?
5. WON major political parties are allowed to participate in the partylist elections.
6. WON the 3 seat cap rule (3 Seat Limit Rule) is valid.
HELD AND RATIO:
1. The 80-20 rule is observed in the following manner: for every 5
seats allotted for legislative districts, there shall be one seat allotted
for a party-list representative. Originally, the 1987 Constitution
provides that there shall be not more than 250 members of the lower
house. Using the 80-20 rule, 200 of that will be from legislative
districts, and 50 would be from party-list representatives. However,
the Constitution also allowed Congress to fix the number of the
membership of the lower house as in fact, it can create additional
legislative districts as it may deem appropriate. As can be seen in the
May 2007 elections, there were 220 district representatives, hence
applying the 80-20 rule or the 5:1 ratio, there should be 55 seats
allotted for party-list representatives.
How did the Supreme Court arrive at 55? This is the formula:
(Current Number of Legislative DistrictRepresentatives 0.80) x
(0.20) = Number of Seats Available to Party-List Representatives
Hence,
(220 0.80) x (0.20) = 55
2. The 20% allocation for party-list representatives is merely a ceiling
meaning, the number of party-list representatives shall not exceed
20% of the total number of the members of the lower house.
However, it is not mandatory that the 20% shall be filled.
3. No. Section 11b of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. There is no
constitutional basis to allow that only party-lists which garnered 2%
of the votes cast are qualified for a seat and those which garnered
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proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional seats
are allocated.
4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more
than three (3) seats.
In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no
longer be included because they have already been allocated, at one
seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining available
seats for allocation as additional seats are the maximum seats
reserved under the Party List System less the guaranteed seats.
Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A.
No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats.
In short, there shall be two rounds in determining the allocation of the
seats. In the first round, all party-lists which garnered at least 2% of
the votes cast (called the two-percenters) are given their one seat
each. The total number of seats given to these two-percenters are
then deducted from the total available seats for party-lists. In this
case, 17 party-lists were able to garner 2% each. There are a total
55 seats available for party-lists hence, 55 minus 17 = 38 remaining
seats. (Please refer to the full text of the case for the tabulation).
The number of remaining seats, in this case 38, shall be used in the
second round, particularly, in determining, first, the additional seats
for the two-percenters, and second, in determining seats for the
party-lists that did not garner at least 2% of the votes cast, and in the
process filling up the 20% allocation for party-list representatives.
How is this done?
Get the total percentage of votes garnered by the party and multiply
it against the remaining number of seats. The product, which shall
not be rounded off, will be the additional number of seats allotted for
the party list but the 3 seat limit rule shall still be observed.
Example:
In this case, the BUHAY party-list garnered the highest total vote of
1,169,234 which is 7.33% of the total votes cast for the party-list
elections (15,950,900).
Applying the formula above: (Percentage of vote garnered) x
(remaining seats) = number of additional seat
Hence, 7.33% x 38 = 2.79
Rounding off to the next higher number is not allowed so 2.79
remains 2. BUHAY is a two-percenter which means it has a
guaranteed one seat PLUS additional 2 seats or a total of 3 seats.
Now if it so happens that BUHAY got 20% of the votes cast, it will still
get 3 seats because the 3 seat limit rule prohibits it from having more
than 3 seats.
Now after all the tw0-percenters were given their guaranteed and
additional seats, and there are still unoccupied seats, those seats
shall be distributed to the remaining party-lists and those higher in
rank in the voting shall be prioritized until all the seats are occupied.
5. No. By a vote of 8-7, the Supreme Court continued to disallow
major political parties (the likes of UNIDO, LABAN, etc) from
participating in the party-list elections.
Although the ponencia (Justice Carpio) did point out that there is no
prohibition either from the Constitution or from RA 7941 against
major political parties from participating in the party-list elections as
the word party was not qualified and that even the framers of the
Constitution in their deliberations deliberately allowed major political
parties to participate in the party-list elections provided that they
establish a sectoral wing which represents the marginalized (indirect
participation), Justice Puno, in his separate opinion, concurred by 7
other justices, explained that the will of the people defeats the will of
the framers of the Constitution precisely because it is the people who
ultimately ratified the Constitution and the will of the people is that
only the marginalized sections of the country shall participate in the
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also for national or regional parties. It is also for small ideologybased and cause-oriented parties who lack well-defined political
constituencies. The common denominator however is that all of
them cannot, they do not have the machinery unlike major
political parties, to field or sponsor candidates in the legislative
districts but they can acquire the needed votes in a national
election system like the party-list system of elections. If the partylist system is only reserved for marginalized representation, then
the system itself unduly excludes other cause-oriented groups
from running for a seat in the lower house. As explained by the
Supreme Court, party-list representation should not be
understood to include only labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans,
overseas workers, and other sectors that by their nature are
economically at the margins of society. It should be noted that
Section 5 of Republic Act 7941 includes, among others, in its
provision for sectoral representation groups of professionals,
which are not per se economically marginalized but are still
qualified as marginalized, underrepresented, and do not have
well-defined political constituencies as they are ideologically
marginalized.
CASE 35: LIBERAL PARTY v. COMELEC- FRANCES BUBAN
FACTS: On July 14, 2009, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution
No. 8646 setting August 17, 2009 as the last day for the filing of
petitions for registration of political parties. On January 21, 2010,
the COMELEC promulgated another resolution providing for the rules
for the filing of petitions for accreditation for the determination of the
dominant majority party, the dominant minority party, ten major
national parties, and two major local parties for the May 10, 2010
elections. Resolution No. 8752 also set the deadline for filing of
petitions for accreditation on February 12, 2010 and required that
accreditation applicants be registered political parties, organizations
or coalitions. On February 12, 2010, the LP filed with the COMELEC
its petition for accreditation as dominant minority party. On the same
date, the Nacionalista Party (NP) and the Nationalist Peoples
Coalition (NPC) filed a petition for registration as a coalition (NPNPC) and asked that it be recognized and accredited as the
dominant minority party for purposes of the May 10, 2010 elections.
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VIII.
CANDIDATES
CANDIDACY
AND
CERTIFICATES
OF
QUALIFICATIONS
SECS. 63-78, OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE
CASE 36: FRIVALDO v. COMELEC- NORIEL ALEJANDRO
FACTS: Petitioner was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of
Sorsogon on January 22, 1988. On October 27, 1988, respondents
filed with the COMELEC a petition for the annulment of petitioners
election and proclamation on the ground that he was a naturalized
American citizen and had not reacquired Philippine citizenship on the
day of the election on January 18, 1988. He was therefore not
qualified to run for and be elected governor.
Petitioner insisted that he was a citizen of the Philippines because
his naturalization as an American citizen was not impressed with
voluntariness. His oath in his COC that he was a natural-born citizen
should be a sufficient act of repatriation. Additionally, his active
participation in the 1987 congressional elections had divested him of
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American citizenship under the laws of the US, thus restoring his
Philippine citizenship.
The Solicitor General contends that petitioner was not a citizen of the
Philippines and had not repatriated himself after his naturalization as
an American citizen. As an alien, he was disqualified for public office
in the Philippines. His election did not cure of this defect because the
electorate could not amend the Constitution, the Local Government
Code and the Omnibus Election Code.
ISSUE: WON petitioner was qualified to run for public office.
HELD: No.
RATIO: Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements
and must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or
election or assumption of office but during the officers entire tenure.
Once any of the required qualifications is lost, his title may be
seasonably challenged.
HELD: Yes.
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1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home
and not domicilium necessarium.
4. Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her marriage
and acquired right to choose a new one only after the death of Pres.
Marcos, her actions upon returning to the country clearly indicated
that she chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of
choice. To add, petitioner even obtained her residence certificate in
1992 in Tacloban, Leyte while living in her brothers house, an act,
which supports the domiciliary intention clearly manifested. She
even kept close ties by establishing residences in Tacloban,
celebrating her birthdays and other important milestones.
CASE 38: AQUINO v. COMELEC (September 1995)- JOSHUA
BAGOTSAY
FACTS: Petitioner Agapito Aquino filed his certificate of candidacy
for the position of Representative for the Second District of Makati
City. Private respondents Move Makati, a duly registered political
party, and Mateo Bedon,Chairman of LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of
Brgy.Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify petitioner on
the ground that the latter lacked the residence qualification as a
candidate for congressman which, under Sec. 6, Art. VI of the
Constitution, should be for a period not less than 1 year immediately
preceding the elections.
indicated that he was also a registered voter of the same district. His
birth certificate places Concepcion, Tarlac as the birthplace of his
parents. What stands consistently clear and unassailable is that his
domicile of origin of record up to the time of filing of his most recent
certificate of candidacy for the 1995 elections was Concepcion,
Tarlac.
The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is
evident in his leasing a condominium unit instead of buying one.
While a lease contract maybe indicative of petitioners intention to
reside in Makati City, it does notengender the kind of permanency
required to prove abandonment of onesoriginal domicile.
Petitioners assertion that he has transferred his domicile from Tarlac
to Makatiis a bare assertion which is hardly supported by the facts.
To successfully effecta change of domicile, petitioner must prove an
actual removal or an actualchange of domicile; a bona fide intention
of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new
one and definite acts which correspond withthe purpose. In the
absence of clear and positive proof, the domicile of originshould be
deemed to continue.
DISQUALIFICATIONS
SECS. 12 & 68, OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE
HELD: Yes.
FACTS: The instant special civil action for certiorari and prohibition
impugns the resolution of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) en banc in SPA No. 95-212 dated July 31, 1996,
dismissing petitioner's motion for reconsideration of an earlier
resolution rendered by the COMELEC's First Division on October 6,
1995, which also dismissed the petition for disqualification filed by
petitioner Wilmer Grego against private respondent Humberto Basco.
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principle that while the Legislature has the power to pass retroactive
laws which do not impair the obligation of contracts, or affect
injuriously vested rights, it is equally true that statutes are not to be
construed as intended to have a retroactive effect so as to affect
pending proceedings, unless such intent is expressly declared or
clearly and necessarily implied from the language of the
enactment. That the provision of the Code in question does not
qualify the date of a candidate's removal from office and that it is
couched in the past tense should not deter us from applying the law
prospectively. The basic tenet in legal hermeneutics that laws
operate only prospectively and not retroactively provides the
qualification sought by petitioner. A statute, despite the generality in
its language, must not be so construed as to overreach acts, events
or matters which transpired before its passage. Lex prospicit, non
respicit. The law looks forward, not backward. Thus, in Miners
Association of the Philippines, Inc. v. Factoran, Jr., the Court ruled
that: We reiterate the principle that the power of administrative
officials to promulgate rules and regulations in the implementation of
a statute is necessarily limited only to carrying into effect what is
provided in the legislative enactment. The principle was enunciated
as early as 1908 in the case ofUnited States v. Barrias. The scope of
the exercise of such rule-making power was clearly expressed in the
case of United States v. Tupasi Molina, decided in 1914, thus: "Of
course, the regulations adopted under legislative authority by a
particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the
law, and for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general
provisions. By such regulations, of course, the law itself can not be
extended. So long, however, as the regulations relate solely to
carrying into effect the provision of the law, they are valid.
Recently, the case of People v. Maceren gave a brief delineation of
the scope of said power of administrative officials: Administrative
regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular
department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and
should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general
provisions. By such regulations, of course, the law itself cannot be
extended (U.S. v. Tupasi Molina, supra). An administrative agency
cannot amend an act of Congress (Santos v. Estenzo, 109 Phil. 419,
422; Teoxon vs. Members of the Board of Administrators, L-25619,
June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 585; Manuel vs. General Auditing Office, L-
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28952, December 29, 1971, 42 SCRA 660; Deluao v. Casteel, L21906, August 29, 1969, 29 SCRA 350). The rule-making power
must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceeding to
carry into effect the law as it has been enacted. The power cannot be
extended to amending or expanding the statutory requirements or to
embrace matters not covered by the statute. Rules that subvert the
statute cannot be sanctioned (University of Santo Tomas v. Board of
Tax Appeals, 93 Phil. 376, 382, citing 12 C.J. 845-46. As to invalid
regulations, see Collector of Internal Revenue v. Villaflor, 69 Phil.
319; Wise & Co. v. Meer, 78 Phil. 655, 676; Del Mar v. Phil. Veterans
Administration, L-27299, June 27, 1973, 51 SCRA 340, 349).
Obviously, he may not be declared a winner. In the first place, Basco
was a duly qualified candidate pursuant to our disquisition above.
Furthermore, he clearly received the winning number of votes which
put him in sixth place. Thus, petitioner's emphatic reference to Labo
v. COMELEC, where we laid down a possible exception to the rule
that a second placer may not be declared the winning candidate,
finds no application in this case. The exception is predicated on the
concurrence of two assumptions, namely: (1) the one who obtained
the highest number of votes is disqualified; and (2) the electorate is
fully aware in fact and in law of a candidate's disqualification so as to
bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety but would
nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the ineligible candidate. Both
assumptions, however, are absent in this case. Petitioner's allegation
that Basco was well-known to have been disqualified in the small
community where he ran as a candidate is purely speculative and
conjectural, unsupported as it is by any convincing facts of record to
show notoriety of his alleged disqualification. In sum, we see the
dismissal of the petition for disqualification as not having been
attended by grave abuse of discretion. There is then no more legal
impediment for private respondent's continuance in office as City
Councilor for the Second District of Manila. office as City Councilor
for the Second District of Manila.
CASE 40: MERCADO v. MANZANO (1999)- GC PILLENA
FACTS: Mercado and Manzano were candidates for vice mayor of
Makati City in the 1998 elections. Manzano won against Mercado by
2,959 votes. However, his proclamation was suspended when a
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TERM LIMITS
CASE 41: ABUNDO v. COMELEC (January 2013)- PATRICIA
CAALITA
FACTS: For 4 successive elections, national and local, Abundo vied
for the position of municipal mayor of Viga Catanduanes. In both
2001 and 2007 elections he won as mayor and served his term In
the 2004 election, one Torres was proclaimed winner and performed
the function as mayor. Abundo protested Torres' election and
proclamation and he succeeded. Abundo was then proclaimed as
mayor. He assumed office starting May 9, 2006 until the end of the
2004-2007 term on June 30, 2007.
In the 2010 elections Abundo and Torres again opposed each other.
Torres sought to disqualify Abundo invoking the 3-consecutive term
limit rule. Despite the disqualification case against him, Abundo was
proclaimed winner. Before Comelec could resolve the adverted
disqualification case, herein private respondent Vega commenced a
quo warranto action before RTC of Virac to unseat Abundo on
essentially the same grounds Torres raised in his petition to
disqualify.
RTC ruled against Abundo and proclaimed him as ineligible to serve
as municipal mayor. RTC found Abundo already served three
consecutive terms. COMELEC likewise ruled against Abundo. It held
that, with regard to the service of Abundo as mayor when he won
over election protest filed by him against Torres in 2004 elections,
service of an unexpired term is equivalent to service of a full term
within the contemplation of the 3-term limit rule. Hence, the present
petition.
ISSUE: WON Abundo is deemed to have served three consecutive
terms.
HELD: No.
RATIO: The consecutiveness of what would have been Abundo's
three successive continuous mayorship was effectively broken during
2004-2007 term when he was initially deprived of title to an office
which he, after due proceedings was eventually declared to have
been the rightful choice of the electorate.
Section 8, Art. X of the 1987 Constitution expressly provides for the
3-term limit rule. It expresses that voluntary renunciation of the office
for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in
the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.
It was held that there are two requisites to be considered as a
disqualification to run for the election pursuant to the above stated
rule:
1.) that the official concerned has been elected for 3 consecutive
terms
in
the
same
local
government
post
2.) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.
The intention behind the three-term limit rule was not only to
abrogate the "monopolization of political power" and prevent elected
officials from breeding propriety interest in their position but also to
enhance the people's freedom of choice. The Court held that the
two-year period during which his opponent Torres was serving as
mayor shall be considered as an interruption, which effectively
removed Abundo's case from the ambit of the 3-term limit rule. This
constitutes an involuntary interruption of Abundo's mayoralty. The
Constitution only provides for voluntary renunciation not to be
considered as interruption in the service of ones term of office.
A "term" as defined in Appari v. CA means in a legal sense "a fixed
and definite period of time which the law describes that an officer
may hold an office." It also means the "time during which the officer
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may claim to hold office as a matter of right, and fixes the interval
after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another". In
the present case, during the period of one year and ten months,
Abundo cannot plausibly claim, even if he wanted to, that he could
hold office of the mayor as a matter of right. This is because at that
time title to hold office and the right to such still belonged to his
opponent, Torres, as proclaimed election winner. Abundo only held
office upon declaration when he filed an election protest. Abundo's
service of Torres' unexpired term shall not be considered as one full
term. The service of Torres shall be considered as an involuntary
interruption of Abundo's service.
CASE 42: BORJA v. COMELEC- JIMUEL MATIAS
FACTS: Private respondent Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected vicemayor of Pateros on January 18, 1988 for a term ending June 30,
1992. On September 2, 1989, he became mayor, by operation of
law, upon the death of the incumbent, Cesar Borja. On May 11,
1992, he ran and was elected mayor for a term of three years which
ended on June 30, 1995. On May 8, 1995, he was reelected mayor
for another term of three years ending June 30, 1998.
Private respondent Capco filed a certificate of candidacy for mayor of
Pateros relative to the May 11, 1998 elections. Petitioner Benjamin
U. Borja, Jr., who was also a candidate for mayor, sought Capcos
disqualification on the theory that the latter would have already
served as mayor for three consecutive terms by June 30, 1998 and
would therefore be ineligible to serve for another term after that.
The Second Division of the Commission on Elections ruled in favor of
petitioner and declared private respondent Capco disqualified from
running for reelection as mayor of Pateros. However, on motion of
private respondent, the COMELEC en banc, voting 5-2, reversed the
decision and declared Capco eligible to run for mayor in the May 11,
1998 elections.
Private respondent was voted for in the elections. He received
16,558 votes against petitioners 7,773 votes and was proclaimed
elected by the Municipal Board of Canvassers.
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The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the
right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective
position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has
served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must
also have been elected to the same position for the same number of
times before the disqualification can apply.
To consider Capco to have served the first term in full and therefore
ineligible to run a third time for reelection would be not only to falsify
reality but also to unduly restrict the right of the people to choose
whom they wish to govern them. If the vice-mayor turns out to be a
bad mayor, the people can remedy the situation by simply not
reelecting him for another term. But if, on the other hand, he proves
to be a good mayor, there will be no way the people can return him
to office if his service of the first term is counted as one of the
purpose of applying the term limit. To consider Capco as eligible for
reelection would be in accord with the understanding of the
Constitutional Commission that while the people should be protected
from the evils that a monopoly of political power may bring about,
care should be taken that their freedom of choice is not unduly
curtailed.
CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY
SEC. 7, R.A. No. 7166
SECS. 73-78, OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE
CASE 43: GADOR v. COMELEC (January 1980)- GABRIEL
ABLOLA
FACTS: The petition alleges that the petitioner is a candidate for the
Office of Mayor of the City of Ozamiz as Independent this coming
January 30, 1980 local election. He filed his certificate of candidacy
with the Election Registrar of Ozamis City on January 7, 1980
because of the news in the Bulletin Today. The said news stated that
the respondent COMELEC issued a resolution for the extension of
time for filing COC. However, the President denied said resolution.
Therefore, respondent COMELEC informed the petitioner that his
name might not be included in the list of candidates for mayor
because
of
the
said
incident.
Thus,
this
petition.
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with
Emmanuels
written
mid-day of election day, said certificate maybe filed with any board of
election inspectors in the political subdivision where he is a
candidate, or, in the case of candidates to be voted for by the entire
electorate of the country, with the Commission.
Thus, under the said provision it is necessary that the substitute
candidate must be of the same political party as the original
candidate and must be duly nominated as such by the political party.
The certificate of candidacy of Emmanuel permitted the placing of his
name before the electorate. It constituted an authorized badge,
which the voter could scrutinize before casting his ballot. Thus, with
the declaration of Emmanuel in his certificate of candidacy that he is
affiliated with the LAKAS party, he was effectively voted by the
electorate not as an independent candidate, but as a member of the
LAKAS party. His allegation in the certificate of candidacy as to
political party to which he belongs is sufficient to make the electorate
conscious of the platform of the said political party.
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resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the
day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other
local language or dialect.
Petitioners claim that in discharging his duties as provincial governor,
private respondent remained a resident of the province. They aver
that residence is a continuing qualification that an elective official
must possess throughout his term. Thus, private respondent could
not have changed his residence to Cagayan de Oro City while he
was still governor of Misamis Oriental.
Petitioners further contend that the following were not sufficient to
constitute a change of domicile: having a house in Cagayan de Oro
City, residing therein while exercising one's office as governor (the
city being the seat of government of the province), securing a
residence certificate and registering as voter therein.
Generally, in requiring candidates to have a minimum period of
residence in the area in which they seek to be elected, the
Constitution or the law intends to prevent the possibility of a
"stranger or newcomer unacquainted with the conditions and needs
of a community and not identified with the latter from [seeking] an
elective office to serve that community. Such provision is aimed at
excluding outsiders "from taking advantage of favorable
circumstances existing in that community for electoral
gain." Establishing residence in a community merely to meet an
election law requirement defeats the purpose of representation: to
elect through the assent of voters those most cognizant and
sensitive to the needs of the community. This purpose is "best met
by individuals who have either had actual residence in the area for a
given period or who have been domiciled in the same area either by
origin or by choice.
In the case at bar, the Comelec found that private respondent and
his family had actually been residing in Capistrano Subdivision,
Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City, in a house he had bought in
1973. Furthermore, during the three terms (1988-1998) that he was
governor of Misamis Oriental, he physically lived in that city, where
the seat of the provincial government was located. In June 1997, he
also registered as voter of the same city. Based on our ruling
in Mamba-Perez, these facts indubitably prove that Vicente Y.
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X.
CAMPAIGN;
ELECTION
PROPAGANDA;
CONTRIBUTIONS AND EXPENDITURES
Petitioner was charged for violating B.P. Blg. 22 under the following
Information: That on or about February 13, 1986, in the City of
Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously make or draw and issue to Efren D. Sawal
to apply on account or for value Bank of Philippine Islands (Plaza
Cervantes, Manila) Check No. 958214 dated February 13, 1986
payable to Efren D. Sawal in the amount of P100,000.00, said
accused well knowing that at the time of issue he did not have
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for payment of such
check in full upon its presentment, which check, when presented for
payment within ninety (90) days from the date thereof, was
subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of
funds, and despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, said accused
failed to pay said Efren D. Sawal the amount of said check or to
make arrangement for full payment of the same within five (5)
banking days after receiving said notice.
SECS. 79-112
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freedom of speech of candidates, and that the suppression of mediabased campaign or political propaganda except those appearing in
the COMELEC space of the newspapers and on COMELEC time of
radio and television broadcasts, would bring about a substantial
reduction in the quantity or volume of information concerning
candidates and issues in the election thereby curtailing and limiting
the right of voters to information and opinion.
Section 11 (b) reads:
Sec. 11 Prohibited Forms of Election
Propaganda. In addition to the forms of
election propaganda prohibited under Section 85
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, it shall be unlawful;
xxx xxx xxx
b) for any newspapers, radio broadcasting or
television station, other mass media, or any
person making use of the mass media to sell or to
give free of charge print space or air time for
campaign or other political purposes except to the
Commission as provided under Sections 90 and
92 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881. Any mass media
columnist,
commentator,
announcer
or
personality who is a candidate for any elective
public office shall take a leave of absence from
his work as such during the campaign period.
(Emphasis supplied)
RATIO: The rights of free speech and free press are not unlimited
rights for they are not the only important and relevant values even in
the most democratic of polities. In our own society, equality of
opportunity to proffer oneself for public office, without regard to the
level of financial resources that one may have at one's disposal, is
clearly an important value. One of the basic state policies given
constitutional rank by Article II, Section 26 of the Constitution is the
egalitarian demand that "the State shall guarantee equal access to
opportunities for public service and prohibit political dynasties as may
be defined by law.
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constitutional objective set out in Article IX(C) (4) and Article II (26) of
the Constitution. For it is precisely in the unlimited purchase of print
space and radio and television time that the resources of the
financially affluent candidates are likely to make a crucial difference.
Here lies the core problem of equalization of the situations of the
candidates with deep pockets and the candidates with shallow or
empty pockets that Article IX(C) (4) of the Constitution and Section
11 (b) seek to address. That the statutory mechanism which Section
11 (b) brings into operation is designed and may be expected to
bring about or promote equal opportunity, and equal time and space,
for political candidates to inform all and sundry about themselves,
cannot be gainsaid.
CASE 49: PILLAR v. COMELEC (July 1995)- REGINALD
LAMPITOC
FACTS: On March 22, 1992, petitioner Juanito C. Pilar filed his
Certificate of Candidacy for the position of member of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Isabela. 3 days after,
petitioner withdrew his Certificate of Candidacy.
The COMELEC imposed upon Juanito Pilar the fine of Php
10,000.00 for failure to file his statement of contributions and
expenditures pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 2348, in turn
implementing R.A. 7166 which provides that:
Section 14. Statement of Contributions and
Expenditures: Effect of Failure to File Statement.
Every candidate and treasurer of the political party
shall, within thirty (30) days after the day of the
election, file in duplicate with the offices of the
Commission the full, true and itemized statement
of all contributions and expenditures in connection
with the election.
Pillar argues that he cannot be held liable for failure to file a
statement of contributions and expenditures because he was a noncandidate, having withdrawn his certificates of candidacy three days
after its filing. Pilar posits that it is clear from the law that a
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candidate must have entered the political contest, and should have
either won or lost.
HELD: No.
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RATIO: Before a voter prepares his ballot, the voter will be able to
read all the names of the candidates. No candidate will receive more
than one vote, whether he is voted individually or as a candidate of a
party group or aggrupation. The voter is free to vote for the individual
candidates or to vote by party, group or aggrupation. The choice is
his. No one can compel him to do otherwise. In the case of
candidates, the decision on whether to run as an independent
candidate or to join a political party, group or aggrupation is left
entirely to their discretion.
Certainly, before filing his certificate of candidacy, a candidate is
aware of the advantages under the law accruing to candidates of a
political party or group. If he wishes to avail himself of such alleged
advantages as an official candidate of a party, he is free to do so by
joining a political party group or aggrupation. In other words, the
choice is his. In making his decision, it must be assumed that the
candidate had carefully weighed and considered the relative
advantages and disadvantages of either alternative. So long as the
application of the rule depends on his voluntary action or decision,
he cannot, after exercising his discretion, claim that he was the victim
of discrimination.
CASE 51: PENERA v. COMELEC (September 2009)- ARJUNA
GUEVARA
FACTS: On 2 April 2007, respondent Andanar filed before the Office
of the Regional Election Director (ORED), Caraga Region (Region
XIII), a Petition for Disqualification against petitioner Penera, as well
as the candidates for Vice-Mayor and Sangguniang Bayan who
belonged to her political party, for unlawfully engaging in election
campaigning and partisan political activity prior to the
commencement of the campaign period. The petition was docketed
as SPA No. 07-224.
Respondent claimed that a day before the start of the authorized
campaign period, Petitioner and her partymates went around the
different barangays in Sta. Monica, announcing their candidacies
and requesting the people to vote for them on the day of the
elections. Attached to the Petition were the Affidavits of individuals
who witnessed the said incident.
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Penera proffered the excuse that the motorcade was already part of
the dispersal of the supporters who spontaneously accompanied
Penera and her partymates in filing their COCs. The said supporters
were
already
being
transported
back
to
their
respective barangays after the COC filing. Penera stressed that no
speech was made by any person, and there was only background
marching music and a grand standing for the purpose of raising the
hands of the candidates in the motorcade. As previously noted,
Penera and her witnesses admitted that the vehicles, consisting of
two jeepneys and ten motorcycles, were festooned with multi-colored
balloons; the motorcade went around three barangays in Sta.
Monica; and Penera and her partymates waved their hands and
threw sweet candies to the crowd. With vehicles, balloons, and even
candies on hand, Penera can hardly persuade us that the motorcade
was spontaneous and unplanned.
2. Under Section 79(a) of the Omnibus Election Code, a candidate is
any person aspiring for or seeking an elective public office, who has
filed a certificate of candidacy by himself or through an accredited
political party, aggroupment, or coalition of parties.
According to the Dissenting Opinion, even if Peneras acts before the
start of the campaign period constitute election campaigning or
partisan political activities, these are not punishable under Section
80 of the Omnibus Election Code given that she was not yet a
candidate at that time. On the other hand, Peneras acts, if
committed within the campaign period, when she was already a
candidate, are likewise not covered by Section 80 as this provision
punishes only acts outside the campaign period.
The Dissenting Opinion ultimately concludes that because of Section
15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, the prohibited act of
premature campaigning in Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code,
is practically impossible to commit at any time.
The Court disagrees. Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code
remains relevant and applicable despite Section 15 of Republic Act
No. 8436, as amended.
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A close reading of the entire Republic Act No. 9369, which amended
Republic Act No. 8436, would readily reveal that that it did not
contain an express repeal of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election
Code. An express repeal is one wherein a statute declares, usually
in its repealing clause, that a particular and specific law, identified by
its number or title, is repealed. Absent this specific requirement, an
express repeal may not be presumed.
Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code, on premature
campaigning, explicitly provides that [i]t shall be unlawful for any
person, whether or not a voter or candidate, or for any party, or
association of persons, to engage in an election campaign or
partisan political activity, except during the campaign period. Very
simply, premature campaigning may be committed even by a person
who is not a candidate.
Pursuant to Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, even
after the filing of the COC but before the start of the campaign
period,
a
person
is
not
yet
officially
considered
a candidate. Nevertheless, a person, upon the filing of his/her
COC, already explicitly declares his/her intention to run as a
candidate in the coming elections. The commission by such a
person of any of the acts enumerated under Section 79(b) of the
Omnibus Election Code (i.e., holding rallies or parades, making
speeches,etc.) can, thus, be logically and reasonably construed as
for the purpose of promoting his/her intended candidacy.
When the campaign period starts and said person proceeds with
his/her candidacy, his/her intent turning into actuality, we can already
consider his/her acts, after the filing of his/her COC and prior to the
campaign period, as the promotion of his/her election as a candidate,
hence, constituting premature campaigning, for which he/she may be
disqualified. Also, conversely, if said person, for any reason,
withdraws his/her COC before the campaign period, then there is no
point to view his/her acts prior to said period as acts for the
promotion of his/her election as a candidate. In the latter case, there
can be no premature campaigning as there is no candidate, whose
disqualification may be sought, to begin with.
In connection with the preceding discussion, the line in Section 15 of
Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, which provides that any
FOR
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Congress has laid down the law a candidate is liable for election
offenses only upon the start of the campaign period. This Court has
no power to ignore the clear and express mandate of the law that any
person who files his certificate of candidacy within [the filing] period
shall only be considered a candidate at the start of the campaign
period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy. Neither can this
Court turn a blind eye to the express and clear language of the law
that any unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall take
effect only upon the start of the campaign period.
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ISSUE: WON the ballots not containing the signature of the BEI
chairman are considered spurious
HELD: No.
RATIO: HRET has been consistent with its rulings for considering
ballots as spurious. To be considered be valid, ballots must contain
ANY of the following: (1) Comelec watermark, or (2) signature of BEI
chairman, or (3) red and blue fibers in case the Comelec watermark
is blurred. In this case, all the unsigned ballots contain the Comelec
watermarks, which makes them valid.
The specific provision about not being able to sign the ballots (sec 24
of RA 7166) penalizes the BEI chairman, but not the voter. It wasn't
the fault of the voter that the BEI chairman forgot to put his signature,
and would impede on his right of suffrage if his vote would be
considered spurious. There is really nothing in the above law to the
effect that a ballot, which is not so authenticated, shall thereby be
deemed spurious. The law merely renders the BEI Chairman
accountable for such failure. The courts may not, in the guise of
interpretation, enlarge the scope of a statute and embrace situations
neither provided nor intended by the lawmakers. Where the words
and phrases of a statute are not obscure and ambiguous, the
meaning and intention of the legislature should be determined from
the language employed, and where there is no ambiguity in the
words, there should be no room for construction.
Libanan raised the question about the stringent requirement of
having the BEI chairman signature on ballots for a barangay
elections citing the BP 222 or the Bgy. Elections Act. The Court
explained that the difference is that the ballots used for the barangay
elections are chosen by the municipality, and may easily be exploited
that's why the BEI chairman signature is required, else it is spurious.
In the case of a congressional seat, any of the 3 requirements above
would make the ballot valid.
The difference in the rules may not be too difficult to discern. The
stringent requirements in B.P. Blg. 222 should be justifiable
considering that the official barangay ballots would be provided by
the city or municipality concerned with the COMELEC merely
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prescribing their size and color. Thus, the official ballots in B.P. Blg.
222, being supplied and furnished by the local government
themselves, the possibility of the ballots being easily counterfeited
might not have been discounted. The absence of authenticating
marks prescribed by law, i.e., the signature of the chairman of the
Board of Election Tellers at the back of the ballot, could have well
been really thought of to be fatal to the validity of the ballot.
Section 24 of R.A. No. 7166, upon the other hand, contains no
similar stringent provisions such as that seen in Section 36(f) of
COMELEC Resolution No. 1539. The pertinent part in Resolution
No. 2676 on the requirement of the signature of the chairman is
found in Section 73 thereof which merely provides:
"Sec. 73. Signature of chairman at the back of every ballot. -- In
every case, the chairman of the board shall, in the presence of the
voter, authenticate every ballot by affixing his signature at the back
thereof before delivering it to the voter. FAILURE TO SO
AUTHENTICATE SHALL BE NOTED IN THE MINUTES OF THE
BOARD AND SHALL CONSTITUTE AN ELECTION OFFENSE."
The Court declared: "The cardinal objective in the appreciation of the
ballots is to discover and give effect to the intention of the
voter. That intention would be nullified by the strict interpretation of
the said section as suggested by the petitioner for it would result in
the invalidation of the ballot even if duly accomplished by the voter,
and simply because of an omission not imputable to him but to the
election officials. The citizen cannot be deprived of his constitutional
right of suffrage on the specious ground that other persons were
negligent in performing their own duty, which in the case at bar was
purely ministerial and technical, by no means mandatory but a mere
antecedent measure intended to authenticate the ballot. A contrary
ruling would place a premium on official ineptness and make it
possible for a small group of functionaries, by their negligence - or,
worse, their deliberate inaction - to frustrate the will of the
electorate."
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canvassing at its main office. The letter having clearly referred also
to transfer of the venue of the canvass, petitioner cannot justifiably
claim the notice was lacking or the said notice was meant only for the
transfer of election returns. If petitioner were absent during the
canvassing it was because they have opted to leave the proceedings
for reasons of their own.
HELD: Yes.
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this number will not affect the result of the election considering that
Lanots lead over petitioner was already 17,971 votes.
Longcop,
Mapanas,
15, 1995,
Board of
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2. WON the massive vote buying and massive fraud are valid
grounds that maybe invoked in a pre-proclamation controversy.
HELD:
1. No
2. No.
RATIO:
1. The Commission on Elections did not commit any grave abuse of
discretion in ruling against Judge Allarde and proceeding with the
proclamation of winners. Records of the case reveal that the
procedural objections of petitioner in support of his allegation of
denial of his right to due process of law were painstakingly discussed
by the Comelec.
2. It is apparent from the records of the case that the other grounds
relied upon by petitioner in seeking relief from the Comelec, i.e.
massive fraud an massive vote-buying, are proper grounds for an
election protest which fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
House Electoral Tribunal and are not the proper issues that may be
raised in a pre-proclamation controversy under Section 243 of the
Omnibus Election Code. While it is true that the other grounds cited
by petitioner, i.e. election returns which were falsified, incomplete, or
contain material defects, or appear to be tampered with or are not
authentic copies, are proper grounds for a pre-proclamation
controversy under Section 243 of the Omnibus Election Code, the
reliefs sought cannot nevertheless be granted considering that
during the canvassing of the election returns, petitioner admittedly
did not raise his objections against the election returns before the
Board of Canvassers of Las Pias Muntinlupa District which is an
essential mandatory pre-requisite under Section 245 of the Omnibus
Election Code.
Besides, as reaffirmed by the Court in Robles vs. Comelec, "the
Court has consistently maintained that election returns of certain
precincts may only be excluded and set aside at the cost of
disenfranchising the voters only on the clearest and compelling
showing of their nullity." Petitioner failed to establish such essential
requisite in this petition.
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v.
COMELEC
(May
1990)-
OLIVE
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RULES
OF
THE
PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTORAL
CODE
(PROCEDURE
IN
1987
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CASE 62: POE, JR. v. ARROYO, PET CASE (March 2005)EDWARD MATIAS
FACTS: Past midnight in the early hours of June 24, 2004, the
Congress as the representatives of the sovereign people and acting
as the National Board of Canvassers, in a near-unanimous roll-call
vote, proclaimed Mrs. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) the duly
elected President of the Philippines. She obtained 12,905,808 votes,
as against 11, 782,232 votes for the second-placer, the movie actor
Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ). She took her oath of office before the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court on June 30, 2004.
HELD: No.
rd
Pursuant to this rule, only two persons, the 2 and 3 placers, may
contest the election. By this express enumeration, the rule makers
have in effect determined the real parties in interest concerning an
on-going election contest. It envisioned a scenario where, if the
declared winner had not been truly voted upon by the electorate, the
nd
rd
candidate who received that 2 or the 3 highest number of votes
would be the legitimate beneficiary in a successful election contest.
Rule 3, Section 16 is the rule on substitution in the Rules of
Court. This rule allows substitution by a legal representative. It can
be gleaned from the citation of this rule that movant/intervenor seeks
to appear before this Tribunal as the legal representative/substitute
of the late protestant prescribed by said Section 16. However, in our
application of this rule to an election contest, we have every time
ruled that a public office is personal to the public officer and not a
property transmissible to the heirs upon death. Thus, we consistently
rejected substitution by the widow or the heirs in election contests
where the protestant dies during the pendency of the protest. In Vda.
de De Mesa v. Mencias, we recognized substitution upon the death
of the protestee but denied substitution by the widow or heirs since
they are not the real parties in interest. Similarly, in the later case
of De la Victoria v. Commission on Elections, we struck down the
claim of the surviving spouse and children of the protestee to the
contested office for the same reason. Even in analogous cases
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American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being
the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, Fornier
asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not
have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an
illegitimate child of an alien mother. Fornier based the allegation of
the illegitimate birth of FPJ on two assertions: (1) Allan F. Poe
contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his
marriage to Bessie Kelley and, (2) even if no such prior marriage had
existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth
of FPJ.
On 23 January 2004, the COMELEC dismissed SPA 04-003 for lack
of merit. 3 days later, or on 26 January 2004, Fornier filed his motion
for reconsideration. The motion was denied on 6 February 2004 by
the COMELEC en banc. On 10 February 2004, Fornier assailed the
decision of the COMELEC before the Supreme Court conformably
with Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure. The petition likewise prayed for a temporary restraining
order, a writ of preliminary injunction or any other resolution that
would stay the finality and/or execution of the COMELEC resolutions.
The other petitions, later consolidated with GR 161824, would
include GR 161434 and GR 161634, both challenging the jurisdiction
of the COMELEC and asserting that, under Article VII, Section 4,
paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, only the Supreme Court had
original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue on the
case.
ISSUE: WON FPJ was a natural born citizen, so as to be allowed to
run for the office of the President of the Philippines.
HELD:
RATIO: Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses that
"No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at
least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of
the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such
election." The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to include
"those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to
perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship."
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Sunga filed with the COMELEC a complaint on April 22, 1995. The
case came to the attention of this Commission on April 26, 1995 in a
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voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election
the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of
the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or
any intervenor, may, during the pendency thereof, order the
suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the
evidence of guilt is strong. (Sec. 6, RA 6646) A candidate guilty of
election offenses would be undeservedly rewarded, instead of
punished, by the dismissal of the disqualification case against him
simply because the investigating body was unable, for any reason
caused upon it, tod etermine before the election if the offenses were
indeed committed by the candidate sought to be disqualified. All that
the erring aspirant would need to do is to employ delaying tactics so
that the disqualification case based on the commission of election
offenses would not be decided before the election. This scenario is
productive of more fraud which certainly is not the main intent and
purpose of the law.
The purpose of a disqualification proceeding is to prevent the
candidate from running or, if elected, from serving, or to prosecute
him for violation of election laws. The fact that a candidate has been
proclaimed and had assumed the position to which he was elected
does not divest the COMELEC of authority and jurisdiction to
continue the hearing and eventually decide the disqualification. The
COMELEC should not dismiss the case simply because the
respondent has been proclaimed.(Also, the fact that no docket fee
was initially paid is not fatal. The Procedural defect as cured by the
subsequent payment of the docket fee.)
2. Sunga should not be proclaimed as the Mayor notwithstanding the
fact that the disqualification case may proceed. The wreath of victory
cannot be transferred from the disqualified winner to the repudiated
loser because the law then as now only authorizes a declaration of
election in favor of the person who has obtained a plurality of votes
to be declared elected. If the winner is ineligible, the candidate who
got the highest number of votes cannot be proclaimed elected as he
did not get the majority or plurality of the votes (Note that Trinidad
was not yet declared disqualified before election).
As provided in Sec. 44, RA No. 7160 and echoed in Art. 83 of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of theLocal Government Code
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frustration of the true will of the people and make a mere idle
ceremony of the sacred right and duty of every qualified citizen to
vote. To divest the COMELEC of the authority to investigate and
prosecute offenses committed by public officials in relation to their
office would thus seriously impair its effectiveness in achieving this
clear constitutional mandate. From a careful scrutiny of the
constitutional provisions relied upon by the Sandiganbayan, We
perceive neither explicit nor implicit grant to it and its prosecuting
arm, the Tanodbayan, of the authority to investigate, prosecute and
hear election offenses committed by public officers in relation to their
office, as contradistinguished from the clear and categorical bestowal
of said authority and jurisdiction upon the COMELEC and the courts
of first instance under Sections 182 and 184, respectively, of the
Election Code of 1978.
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