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I.

LANDMARK CONTROVERSIAL DECISIONS


CONSTITUTIONALITY OF IPSO FACTO RESIGNATION
PROVISIONS
CASE 1: QUINTO v. COMELEC (February 2010)- JOYCE
BAYLON
FACTS: Pursuant to its constitutional mandate to enforce and
administer election laws, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8678, the
Guidelines on the Filing of Certificates of Candidacy (CoC) and
Nomination of Official Candidates of Registered Political Parties in
Connection with the May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections.
Based on Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369, Sections 4 and 5 of
Resolution No. 8678 provide:
SEC. 4. Effects of Filing Certificates of Candidacy.a) Any person
holding a public appointive office or position including active
members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and other officers
and employees in government-owned or controlled corporations,
shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing
of his certificate of candidacy.
b) Any person holding an elective office or position shall not be
considered resigned upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy for
the same or any other elective office or position.
Alarmed that they will be deemed ipso facto resigned from their
offices the moment they file their CoCs, petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto
and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr., who hold appointive positions in the
government and who intend to run in the coming elections, filed the
instant petition for prohibition and certiorari, seeking the declaration
of the afore-quoted Section 4(a) of Resolution No. 8678 as null and
void. Petitioners also contend that Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369, the
basis of the assailed COMELEC resolution, contains two conflicting
provisions. These must be harmonized or reconciled to give effect to
both and to arrive at a declaration that they are not ipso facto
resigned from their positions upon the filing of their CoCs.

ISSUE: WON Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution 8678, Section


13 of RA 9369 and Section 66(3) of the Omnibus Election Code
violate the equal protection clause.
HELD: Yes. Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution 8678, Section 13
of RA 9369 and Section 66(3) of the Omnibus Election Code violate
the equal protection clause.
RATIO: No. Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution 8678, Section 13
of RA 9369 and Section 66(3) of the Omnibus Election Code does
not violate the equal protection clause. Thus, they are Constitutional.
In Farinas et.al. vs. Executive Secretary et.al, the petitioners
contended that the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election
Code pertaining to elective officials gives undue benefit to such
officials as against the appointive ones and violates the equal
protection clause of the constitution. The Court ruled that: The equal
protection of the law clause in the Constitution is not absolute, but is
subject to reasonable classification. If the groupings are
characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences,
one class may be treated and regulated differently from the other"
Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and
appointive officials. The former occupy their office by virtue of the
mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite
term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions.
On the other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of
their designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some appointive
officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to
security of tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing
authority.
Another substantial distinction between the two sets of officials is that
under Section 55, Chapter 8, Title I, Subsection A. Civil Service
Commission, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive
Order No. 292), appointive officials, as officers and employees in the
civil service, are strictly prohibited from engaging in any partisan
political activity or take (sic) part in any election except to vote. Under
the same provision, elective officials, or officers or employees

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holding political offices, are obviously expressly allowed to take part


in political and electoral activities.

ISSUE: WON the party-list system includes the marginalized sector


only

By repealing Section 67 in the Farinas case, but retaining Section 66


of the Omnibus Election Code, the legislators deemed it proper to
treat these two classes of officials differently with respect to the effect
on their tenure in the office of the filing of the certificates of
candidacy for any position other than those occupied by them. Again,
it is not within the power of the Court to pass upon or look into the
wisdom of this classification.

HELD: No.

NOTE: The aforesaid legislations passed the Equal Protection Test


developed by jurisprudence. Its requisites are:
(1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions
(2) It is germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.

PARTY LIST NOT ONLY FOR THE MARGINALIZED


CASE 2: ATONG PAGLAUM ET AL v. COMELEC (April 2013)CHEYENNE YU
FACTS: 52 party-list groups and organizations filed separate
petitions totalling 54 with the Supreme Court in an effort to reverse
various resolutions by the Commission on Elections disqualifying
them from the May 2013 party-list race. The Comelec, in its assailed
resolutions issued in October, November and December of 2012,
ruled that these party-list groups and organizations failed to
represent a marginalized and underrepresented sector, their
nominees do not come from a marginalized and underrepresented
sector, and/or some of the organizations or groups are not truly
representative of the sector they intend to represent in Congress.
Petitioners argued that the poll body committed grave abuse of
discretion in denying some of the petitioners application for
accreditation and cancelling the existing accreditation of the rest.
They also lamented the poll bodys denial to accord them due
process in the evaluation proceedings.

RATIO: The Decision identified three groups that may participate in


the party-list system: (1) national parties or organizations, (2)
regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or
organizations.
On the part of national parties or organizations and regional parties
or organizations which intend to participate in the party-list race, the
new guidelines state that these parties do not need to organize
along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any marginalized
or underrepresented sector.'
As for political parties, they may participate in the party-list race by
registering under the party-list system and no longer field
congressional candidates. These parties, if they field congressional
candidates, however, are not barred from participating in the partylist elections; what they need to do is register their sectoral wing or
party under the party-list system. This sectoral wing shall be
considered an independent sectoral party linked to a political party
through a coalition.
Purely sectoral parties or organizations may either represent
marginalized and underrepresented constituencies or those
lacking well-defined political constituencies. The marginalized and
underrepresented sectors are: labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and
overseas workers. The sectors that lack well-defined political
constituencies include professionals, the elderly, women, and the
youth.
The rule on nominees and members coming from the sector they
intend to represent also applies only to the sectoral parties or
organizations. The high court ruled that it is enough that [a] majority
of the members of the sectoral parties or organizations must
belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector they

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represent.' The same is true for those who lack well-defined


political constituencies.
As for the nominees of these sectoral parties and organizations, the
new guidelines provide that they must either be members of the
sector or have a track record of advocacy for their sector.
Should some of the nominees of these national, regional, and
sectoral parties or organizations be disqualified, the party or
organization itself will not be disqualified provided that they have at
least one nominee who remains qualified.
The party-list system, according to the the framers of the 1987
Constitution, did not intend to leave out non-sectoral parties in the
party-list system and exclusively limit it to sectoral groups. The
sectoral parties are to constitute a part, but not the entirety, of the
party-list system.
Sec. 5(1), Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution, provides: The House of
Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred
and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be
elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces,
cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the
number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform
and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be
elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional,
and sectoral parties or organizations.
Sec. 3 of Republic Act (RA) No. 7941, also known as the Party-list
System Act:
(b) A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a
coalition of parties
(c) A political party refers to an organized group of citizens
advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the
general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate
means of securing their adoption,
regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members
as candidates for public office
(d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging
to any of the sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal
advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector

Again, the high court noted that defining these parties or groups, one
from the others, could only mean that they are not one and the
same.
Previous rulings reversed by Atong Paglaum
As earlier stated, there are previous rulings on the party-list system
in the case of Ang Bagong Bayani v. Comelec and BANAT v.
Comelec
In Ang Bagong Bayanis parameters for the party-list system,
guideline 2 states that while even major political parties are
expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the Constitution to participate in
the party-list system, they must comply with the declared statutory
policy of enabling Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors to be elected to the House of
Representatives.'
However, in its latest Decision, in Atong Paglaum, the high court
pointed out that there was an inherent inconsistency in the Ang
Bagong Bayani guidelines since the requirement that the major
political parties should represent the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors essentially automatically disqualified
these major parties from the party-list system.
As for BANAT, the high court said that the guidelines in this ruling
merely formalized the prevailing practice when it prohibited major
political parties from participating in the party-list elections even if
through their allied sectoral organizations.
Petition granted and remanded to COMELEC.
The party-list groups and organizations covered by the 41 petitions
that obtained mandatory injunction orders from the high court still
stand a chance to make it to the 2013 party-list race as the high court
ordered the poll body to determine whether petitioners are qualified
to register under the party-list system and to participate in the 13
May 2013 party-list elections under the new parameters set forth in
the Decision. The rest, meaning, the 13 other petitions, were
remanded to the poll body merely for purposes of determining

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whether they may be granted accreditation under the new


parameters but may not participate in the May 2013 elections.

omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the


start of such campaign period.

PREMATURE CAMPAIGNING

Thus, applying said law:


(1) The effective date when partisan political acts become unlawful
as to a candidate is when the campaign period starts. Before the
start of the campaign period, the same partisan political acts are
lawful.

CASE 3: PENERA v. COMELEC (September 2009)- FLOYD


MAGO
FACTS: On 11 September 2009, the Supreme Court affirmed the
COMELECs decision to disqualify petitioner Rosalinda Penera
(Penera) as mayoralty candidate in Sta. Monica, Surigao del Norte,
for engaging in election campaign outside the campaign period
(premature campaigning), in violation of Section 80 of Batas
Pambansa
Blg.
881
(the
Omnibus
Election
Code).
Penera moved for reconsideration, arguing that she was not yet a
candidate at the time of the supposed premature campaigning, since
under Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436 (the law authorizing the
COMELEC to use an automated election system for the process of
voting, counting of votes, and canvassing/consolidating the results of
the national and local elections), as amended by Republic Act No.
9369, one is not officially a candidate until the start of the campaign
period.
ISSUE: WON Peneras disqualification for engaging in premature
campaigning should be reconsidered.
HELD: No.
RATIO: Granting Peneras motion for reconsideration, the Supreme
Court En Banc held that Penera did not engage in premature
campaigning and should, thus, not be disqualified as a mayoralty
candidate. The Court said (A) The Courts 11 September 2009
Decision (or the assailed Decision) considered a person who files a
certificate of candidacy already a candidate even before the start of
the campaign period. This is contrary to the clear intent and letter of
Section 15 of Republic Act 8436, as amended, which states that a
person who files his certificate of candidacy will only be considered a
candidate at the start of the campaign period, and unlawful acts or

(2) Accordingly, a candidate is liable for an election offense only for


acts done during the campaign period, not before. In other words,
election offenses can be committed by a candidate only upon the
start of the campaign period. Before the start of the campaign period,
such election offenses cannot be so committed. Since the law is
clear, the Court has no recourse but to apply it. The forum for
examining the wisdom of the law, and enacting remedial measures,
is not the Court but the Legislature. (B) Contrary to the assailed
Decision, Section 15 of R.A. 8436, as amended, does not
provide that partisan political acts done by a candidate before the
campaign period are unlawful, but may be prosecuted only upon the
start of the campaign period. Neither does the law state that partisan
political acts done by a candidate before the campaign period are
temporarily lawful, but becomes unlawful upon the start of the
campaign period. Besides, such a law as envisioned in the Decision,
which defines a criminal act and curtails freedom of expression and
speech, would be void for vagueness.
(C) That Section 15 of R.A. 8436 does not expressly state that
campaigning before the start of the campaign period is lawful, as the
assailed Decision asserted, is of no moment. It is a basic principle of
law that any act is lawful unless expressly declared unlawful by law.
The mere fact that the law does not declare an act unlawful ipso
facto means that the act is lawful. Thus, there is no need for
Congress to declare in Section 15 of R.A. 8436 that partisan political
activities before the start of the campaign period are lawful. It is
sufficient for Congress to state that any unlawful act or omission
applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the
campaign period. The only inescapable and logical result is that the
same acts, if done before the start of the campaign period, are
lawful.

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(D) The Courts 11 September 2009 Decision also reversed Lanot vs.
COMELEC
(G.R.
No. 164858; 16 November 2006). Lanot was decided on the ground
that
one
who
files
a
certificate of candidacy is not a candidate until the start of the
campaign period. This ground was based on the deliberations of the
legislators who explained that the early deadline for filing certificates
of candidacy under R.A. 8436 was set only to afford time to prepare
the machine-readable ballots, and they intended to preserve the
existing election periods, such that one who files his certificate of
candidacy to meet the early deadline will still not be considered as a
candidate.When Congress amended R.A. 8436, Congress decided
to expressly incorporate the Lanot doctrine into law, thus, the
provision in Section 15 of R.A. 8436 that a person who files his
certificate of candidacy shall be considered a candidate only at the
start of the campaign period. Congress wanted to insure that no
person filing a certificate of candidacy under the early deadline
required by the automated election system would be disqualified or
penalized for any partisan political act done before the start of the
campaign period. This provision cannot be annulled by the Court
except on the sole ground of its unconstitutionality. The assailed
Decision, however, did not claim that this provision is
unconstitutional. In fact, the assailed Decision considered the entire
Section 15 good law. Thus, the Decision was self-contradictory
reversing Lanot but maintaining the constitutionality of the said
provision.
CASE
4:
PENERA
v.
COMELEC
(MOTION
FOR
RECONSIDERATION) (November 2009)- NINA TABALINGCOS
FACTS: Petitioner and private respondents were candidates for
mayor of the Municipality of Sta.Monica, Surigao del Norte in the last
May 2007 elections. The former filed her certificate of candidacy on
the day before the prescribed campaign period. When she went to
the COMELEC Office for filing she was accompanied by her party
mates. Thereafter, they had a motorcade which was consist of two
trucks and ten motorcycles running around the municipality
convincing the residents to vote for her and the other candidates of
their political party. Due to this, private respondent filed a petition

against her alleging premature campaigning as provided in the


Omnibus Election Code Section 80 which says: Election or partisan
political activity outside campaign period.--- It shall be unlawful for
any person, whether or not a voter or candidate, or for any party, or
association of persons, to engage in an election campaign or
partisan political activity except during the campaign period. She
argued that she is not guilty since she was not yet a candidate at that
time and the campaign period has not yet started when the
motorcade was conducted. While the petition was pending in the
COMELEC, she was voted as mayor and took her office thereafter.
The COMELEC Second Division decided in favor of the complainant
and found her guilty of premature campaigning. Likewise, when she
appealed in the COMELEC En Banc, the previous decision was
affirmed. Subsequently, she filed with the Supreme Court which
decided against her. It held that the conduct of the motorcade is a
form of election campaign or partisan political activity, falling under
Section 79(b)(2) of the Omnibus Election Code which says: holding
political caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades, or other
similar assemblies, for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or
undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or against a
candidate. Furthermore, it was held that she should vacate the
position. Now, she comes for a motion for reconsideration using the
same arguments.
ISSUE: WON petitioner guilty of premature campaigning.
HELD: No.
RATIO: Any act is lawful unless expressly declared unlawful by law.
It is enough that Congress stated that any unlawful act or omission
applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the
campaign period. So, it is lawful if done before the start of the
campaign period. This plain language of the law need not be
construed further.
On the day of the motorcade, she was not yet a candidate for. As
what was decided in the Lanot Case which says that prior to the
campaign period, even if the candidate has filed his/her certificate of
candidacy, he/she is not yet considered as a candidate for purposes
other than the printing of ballots. Hence, she cannot be guilty of

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premature campaigning for in the first place there is no candidate to


talk about. What she did was an exercise of her freedom of
expression.
CASE 5: JALOSJOS v. COMELEC- FRANCES BUBAN
FACTS: On November 16, 2001, the Court promulgated its Decision
convicting petitioner by final judgment of two 2 counts of statutory
rape and six 6 counts of acts of lasciviousness. He was sentenced
the principal penalties of reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal
for each count, which carried the accessory penalty of perpetual
absolute disqualification pursuant to Article 41 of the RPC. On April
30, 2007, then President Arroyo issued an order commuting his
prison term to 16 years, 3 months and 3 days. After serving the
same, he was issued a Certificate of Discharge From Prison on
March 18, 2009.
On April 26, 2012, petitioner applied to register as a voter in
Zamboanga City. However, because of his previous conviction, his
application was denied by the Acting City Election Officer of the
Election Registration Board, prompting him to file a Petition for
Inclusion before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Zamboanga
City. Pending resolution of the same, he filed a CoC on October 5,
2012, seeking to run as mayor for Zamboanga City in the upcoming
local elections scheduled on May 13, 2013.
In his CoC, petitioner stated that he is eligible for the said office and
that he is a registered voter of Barangay Tetuan, Zamboanga City.
On October 18, 2012, the MTCC denied his Petition for Inclusion on
account of his perpetual absolute disqualification which in effect,
deprived him of the right to vote in any election. Such denial was
affirmed by the RTC which, pursuant to Section 138 of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 881, as amended, otherwise known as the
Omnibus Election Code (OEC), was immediately final and
executory. Meanwhile, 5 petitions were lodged before the
COMELECs First and Second Divisions, praying for the denial of
due course to and/or cancellation of petitioners CoC. Pending
resolution, the COMELEC resolved to CANCEL and DENY due
course the Certificate of Candidacy filed by Romeo G. Jalosjos as
Mayor of Zamboanga City in the May 13, 2013 National and Local

Elections due to his perpetual absolute disqualification as well as his


failure to comply with the voter registration requirement. As basis, the
COMELEC En Banc relied on the Courts pronouncement in the
consolidated cases of Dominador Jalosjos, Jr. v. COMELEC and
Agapito Cardino v. COMELEC.
ISSUE: WON the petitioners perpetual absolute disqualification to
run for elective office had already been removed by Section 40(a) of
RA 7160 aka Local Government Code of 1991
HELD: No.
RATIO: In the present case, petitioner was sentenced to suffer the
principal penalties of reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal
which, pursuant to Article 41 of the RPC, carried with it the accessory
penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification and in turn, pursuant to
Article 30 of the RPC, disqualified him to run for elective office. As
discussed, Section 40(a) of the LGC would not apply to cases
wherein a penal provision such as Article 41 in this case directly
and specifically prohibits the convict from running for elective office.
Hence, despite the lapse of 2 years from petitioners service of his
commuted prison term, he remains bound to suffer the accessory
penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification which consequently,
disqualifies him to run as mayor for Zamboanga City.
Notably, Article 41 of the RPC expressly states that one who is
previously convicted of a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua or
reclusion temporal continues to suffer the accessory penalty of
perpetual absolute disqualification even though pardoned as to the
principal penalty, unless the said accessory penalty shall have been
expressly remitted in the pardon. In this case, the same accessory
penalty had not been expressly remitted in the Order of
Commutation or by any subsequent pardon and as such, petitioners
disqualification to run for elective office is deemed to subsist. Further,
it is well to note that the use of the word perpetual in the
aforementioned accessory penalty connotes a lifetime restriction and
in this respect, does not depend on the length of the prison term
which is imposed as its principal penalty.

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CASE 6: REYES v. COMELEC- NORIEL ALEJANDRO

HELD: No.

FACTS: On 31 October 2012, respondent Joseph Socorro Tan, a


registered voter and resident of the Municipality of Torrijos,
Marinduque, filed before the COMELEC an Amended Petition to
Deny Due Course or to Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy (COC) of
petitioner
on
the
ground
that
it
contained
material
misrepresentations, specifically: (1) that she is single when she is
married to Congressman Herminaldo I. Mandanas of Batangas; (2)
that she is a resident of Brgy. Lupac, Boac, Marinduque when she is
a resident of Bauan, Batangas which is the residence of her
husband, and at the same time, when she is also a resident of 135
J.P. Rizal, Brgy. Milagrosa, Quezon City as admitted in the Directory
of Congressional Spouses of the House of Representatives;(3) that
her date of birth is 3 July 1964 when other documents show that her
birthdate is either 8 July 1959 or 3 July 1960; (4) that she is not a
permanent resident of another country when she is a permanent
resident or an immigrant of the United States of America; and (5) that
she is a Filipino citizen when she is, in fact, an American citizen.

RATIO: First, the HRET does not acquire jurisdiction over the issue
of petitioners qualifications, as well as over the assailed COMELEC
Resolutions, unless a petition is duly filed with said tribunal.
Petitioner has not averred that she has filed such action.

On 27 March 2013, the COMELEC First Division issued a


Resolution12 cancelling petitioners COC.Four days thereafter or on
18 May 2013, petitioner was
proclaimed winner of the 13 May 2013 Elections. On 5 June 2013,
the COMELEC En Banc issued a Certificate of Finality declaring the
14 May 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc final and
executory, considering that more than twenty-one (21) days have
elapsed from the date of promulgation with no order issued by this
Court restraining its execution.
On same day, petitioner took her oath of office before Feliciano R.
Belmonte Jr., Speaker of the House of Representatives. Petitioner
has yet to assume office, the term of which officially starts at noon of
30 June 2013.
ISSUE: WON Respondent Comelec is without jurisdiction over
Petitioner who is a duly proclaimed winner and who has already
taken her oath of office for the position of Member of the House of
Representatives for the lone congressional district of Marinduque.

Second, the jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the candidate
is considered a Member of the House of Representatives, as stated
in Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution: The Senate and the
House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal
which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of
their respective Members.
To be considered a Member of the House of Representatives, there
must be a concurrence of the following requisites: (1) a valid
proclamation, (2) a proper oath, and (3) assumption of office.
Indeed, in some cases, this Court has made the pronouncement that
once a proclamation has been made, COMELECs jurisdiction is
already lost and, thus, its jurisdiction over contests relating to
elections, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRETs own
jurisdiction begins. However, it must be noted that in these cases,
the doctrinal pronouncement was made in the context of a
proclaimed candidate who had not only taken an oath of office, but
who had also assumed office.
Here, the petitioner cannot be considered a Member of the House of
Representatives because, primarily, she has not yet assumed office.
To repeat what has earlier been said, the term of office of a Member
of the House of Representatives begins only at noon on the thirtieth
day of June next following their election.28 Thus, until such time, the
COMELEC retains jurisdiction.
In her attempt to comply with the second requirement, petitioner
attached a purported Oath of Office taken before Hon. Feliciano
Belmonte Jr. on 5 June 2013. However, this is not the oath of office
which confers membership to the House of Representatives.

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Consequently, before there is a valid or official taking of the oath it


must be made (1) before the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, and (2) in open session. Here, although she made
the oath before Speaker Belmonte, there is no indication that it was
made during plenary or in open session and, thus, it remains unclear
whether the required oath of office was indeed complied with.

SUPREME COURTS DECISIONS AGAINST COMELEC


LIMITING AIRTIME OF POLITICAL ADS, MONEY BAN AND
EXTENDED LIQUOR BAN IN THE 2013 MAY MIDTERM
ELECTIONS

II. CITIZEN
RIGHTS

PARTICIPATION

AND

ELECTORAL

THE RIGHT TO VOTE


CASE 7: BETITO v. BENIPAYOO (March 2001)- JENNIFER
BALMEO
FACTS: On January 25, 2001, AKBAYAN-Youth, together with other
youth movements sought the extension of the registration of voters
for the May 2001 elections. The voters registration has already
ended on December 27, 2000. AKBAYAN-Youth asks that persons
aged 18-21 be allowed a special 2-day registration. The Commission
on Elections (COMELEC) denied the petition. AKBAYAN-Youth the
sued COMELEC for alleged grave abuse of discretion for denying
the petition. AKBAYAN-Youth alleged that there are about 4 million
youth who were not able to register and are now disenfranchised.
COMELEC invoked Section 8 of Republic Act 8189 which provides
that no registration shall be conducted 120 days before the regular
election. AKBAYAN-Youth however counters that under Section 28
of Republic Act 8436, the COMELEC in the exercise of its residual
and stand-by powers, can reset the periods of pre-election acts
including voters registration if the original period is not observed.
ISSUE: WON the COMELEC exercised grave abuse of discretion
when it denied the extension of the voters registration.

HELD: No.
RATIO: The COMELEC was well within its right to do so pursuant to
the clear provisions of Section 8, RA 8189 which provides that no
voters registration shall be conducted within 120 days before the
regular election. The right of suffrage is not absolute. It is regulated
by measures like voters registration which is not a mere statutory
requirement. The State, in the exercise of its inherent police power,
may then enact laws to safeguard and regulate the act of voters
registration for the ultimate purpose of conducting honest, orderly
and peaceful election, to the incidental yet generally important end,
that even pre-election activities could be performed by the duly
constituted authorities in a realistic and orderly manner one which
is not indifferent and so far removed from the pressing order of the
day and the prevalent circumstances of the times. RA 8189 prevails
over RA 8436 in that RA 8189s provision is explicit as to the
prohibition. Suffice it to say that it is a pre-election act that cannot be
reset.
Further, even if what is asked is a mere two-day special registration,
COMELEC has shown in its pleadings that if it is allowed, it will
substantially create a setback in the other pre-election matters
because the additional voters from the special two day registration
will have to be screened, entered into the book of voters, have to be
inspected again, verified, sealed, then entered into the computerized
voters list; and then they will have to reprint the voters information
sheet for the update and distribute it by that time, the May 14, 2001
elections would have been overshot because of the lengthy
processes after the special registration. In short, it will cost more
inconvenience than good. Further still, the allegation that youth
voters are disenfranchised is not sufficient. Nowhere in AKBAYANYouths pleading was attached any actual complaint from an
individual youth voter about any inconvenience arising from the fact
that the voters registration has ended on December 27, 2001. Also,
AKBAYAN-Youth et al admitted in their pleading that they are asking
an extension because they failed to register on time for some
reasons, which is not appealing to the court. The law aids the vigilant
and not those who slumber on their rights.

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CASE 8: NICOLAS-LEWIS ET AL v. COMELEC (August 2006)JOSHUA BAGOTSAY


FACTS: Nicolas-Lewis and other petitioners are successful
applicants for recognition of Philippine citizenship under PA 9225 or
the Citizenship Retention and Re Acquisition Act of 2003 which
accords them the right of suffrage, among others. They are now
living in the USA and also a citizen of the latter country
Long before the May 2004 national and local elections, Lewis et al
sought registration and certification as "overseas absentee voter"
only to be advised by the Philippine Embassy in the United States
that, per a COMELEC letter to the Department of Foreign Affairs,
they have yet no right to vote in such elections owing to their lack of
the one-year residence requirement prescribed by the Constitution.
Faced with the prospect of not being able to vote in the May 2004
elections, Lewis et al filed on April 1, 2004 this petition for certiorari
and mandamus.
ISSUE: WON Lewis et al, who might have meanwhile retained
and/or reacquired Philippine citizenship pursuant to R.A. 9225, may
vote as absentee voter under R.A. 9189.
HELD: Yes.
RATIO: Sections 1 and 2 of Article V of the Constitution, respectively
reading as follows: SECTION 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all
citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who are
at least eighteen years of age, and who shall have resided in the
Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein they
propose to vote for at least six months immediately preceding the
election. xxx SEC 2. The Congress shall provide a system for
absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad.
Section 1 prescribes residency requirement as a general eligibility
factor for the right to vote. On the other hand, Section 2 authorizes
Congress to devise a system wherein an absentee may vote,
implying that a non resident may, as an exception to the residency
prescription in the preceding section, be allowed to vote.

However, Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 (Overseas Absentee Voting


Act of 2003) specifically disqualifies an immigrant or permanent
resident who is recognized as such in the host country because
immigration or permanent residence in another country implies
renunciation of one's residence in his country of origin.
However, same Section allows an immigrant and permanent resident
abroad to register as voter for as long as he/she executes an
affidavit to show that he/she has not abandoned his domicile in
pursuance of the constitutional intent expressed in Sections 1 and 2
of Article V that all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise
disqualified by law must be entitled to exercise the right of suffrage
and, that Congress must establish a system for absentee voting; for
otherwise, if actual, physical residence in the Philippines is required,
there is no sense for the framers of the Constitution to mandate
Congress to establish a system for absentee voting. R.A. 9189 aims,
in essence, to enfranchise as much as possible all overseas Filipinos
who, save for the residency requirements exacted of an ordinary
voter under ordinary conditions, are qualified to vote.
CASE 9: US v. SANCUYA- DON TUTAAN
FACTS: Defendants, inspectors of election, refused to permit Rufino
Isturis to register as an elector. Isturis claimed the right by virtue of
his ownership of real property worth P500, as prescribed in
subsection (b), section 13, of Act No. 1582.
ISSUE: WON the inspectors of election can refuse registration of an
unqualified voter.
HELD: Yes.
RATIO: When an elector claims the right to vote by virtue of the
above provision of law the inspectors are authorized to exercise a
quasi-judicial power in deciding the question involved and unless
they knowingly, willfully, and maliciously refuse to register a qualified
voter they are not criminally liable. Evidence presented is insufficient
to sustain conviction. Judgment reversed and defendants acquitted.

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POSTPONEMENT OF ELECTION
SEC. 5, OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE
CASE 10: DIMAPORO v. COMELEC- PATRICIA CAALITA
NOTE: Case cannot be found.
CASE 11: BASHER v. COMELEC (April 2000)- JIMUEL MATIAS
FACTS: Petitioner Hadji Rasul Batador Basher and Private
Respondent Abulkair Ampatua were both candidates for the position
of Punong Barangay in Barangay Maidan, Tugaya, Lanao del Sur
during the May 12, 1997 barangay election. The election was
declared a failure and a special one was set for June 12, 1997.
Again, the election failed and was reset to August 30, 1997.
According to the Comelec, the voting started only around 9:00 p.m.
on August 30, 1997 because of the prevailing tension in the said
locality. Election Officer Diana DatuImam reported that she was
allegedly advised by some religious leaders not to proceed with the
election because "it might trigger bloodshed." She also claimed that
the town mayor, "being too hysterical, yelled and threatened me to
declare a failure of election in Maidan. The armed followers of the
mayor pointed their guns at her and her military escorts, who
responded in like manner towards the former.
The parties were then pacified at the PNP headquarters. With the
arrival of additional troops, the election officer proceeded to Maidan
to conduct the election starting at 9:00 p.m. until the early morning of
the following day. The holding of the election at that particular time
was allegedly announced "over the mosque."
The tally sheet for the said "election" showed the following results:
Ampatua 250 votes; Basher 15 votes; and Abdul Razul, a third
candidate 10 votes. Ampatua was proclaimed winner.
Petitioner filed a Petition before the Comelec praying that the
election be declared a failure. Alleging that no election was
conducted in the place and at the time prescribed by law, petitioner

narrated that there was a dispute that day among the candidates
regarding the venue of the election in the lone voting precinct of the
barangay. In order to avoid bloodshed, they ultimately agreed that no
election would be conducted.
The election officer turned over for safekeeping the ballot box
containing election paraphernalia to the acting station commander of
the PNP. The following day, petitioner and the third candidate were
surprised to learn that the election officer had directed the Board of
Election Tellers to conduct the election and to fill up the election
returns and certificates of canvass on the night of August 30, 1997 at
the residence of the former mayor. Petitioner also stated that no
announcement to hold the election at the former mayors house that
night was ever made.
COMELEC dismissed the petition stating that there was no failure of
election because the two conditions laid down in Mitmug v.
Comelec were not established. It held that the "election was
conducted on the scheduled date. The precinct functioned. Actual
voting took place, and it resulted not in a failure to elect."
ISSUE: WON the election held on the date, at the time and in the
place other than those officially designated by the law and by the
COMELEC was valid.
HELD: No.
RATIO: The peculiar set of facts in the present case show not merely
a failure of election but the absence of a valid electoral exercise. The
disputed election was illegal, irregular and void.
Datu-Imam did not follow the procedure laid down by law for election
postponement or suspension or the declaration of a failure of
election. She narrated the circumstances surrounding her declaration
as follows:
"When I returned to ascertain the situation in Maidan, the Mayor,
being too hysterical, yelled and threatened me to declare [a] failure
of elections in Maidan. When I insisted to personally confirm the
probable cause of bloodshed (at Maidan), his armed

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followers/escorts pointed their guns to me and my escorts. Likewise


my military escorts pointed their guns to the mayor and his men
'Man to Man'. The Datus and religious leaders pacified us at the
PNP Headquarters.
"After a couple of hours, the military officers and I agreed to adapt
another strategy just to pursue with the elections in Maidan [by] hook
or by crook. Considering that they forcibly took away from us the
ballot box containing paraphernalia of Maidan, I didn't have any
recourse but give them. I turned-over the ballot box to the Acting
Chief of Police, Malik Bantuas with proper receipt, taking away from
the box the CEF 2 & 2-A, declaring verbally a failure of elections in
Maidan just to ease their aggression and so that we could pull-out of
the place freely."
It clearly appears from the very report of Datu-Imam to the Comelec
that she did not conduct any proceeding, summary or otherwise, to
find out whether any of the legal grounds for the suspension or
postponement or the declaration of failure of the election actually
existed in the barangay concerned.
Election Officer Diana Datu-Imam of Tugaya, Lanao del Sur
practically postponed the election in Barangay Maidan from the
official original schedule of 7:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. of August 30, 1997
to 10:00 p.m. of August 30, 1997 until the early morning of August
31, 1997. She attempted to justify her postponement of the election
by citing threats of violence and bloodshed in the said barangay.
Allegedly because of the tension created by armed escorts of the
municipal mayor and the military, Datu-Imam declared a failure of
election in order "to ease their aggression." However, as election
officer, she has no authority to declare a failure of election. Indeed,
only the Comelec itself has legal authority to exercise such awesome
power. An election officer alone, or even with the agreement of the
candidates, cannot validly postpone or suspend the elections.

FAILURE OF ELECTION
SEC. 6, OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE
CASE 12: BASHER v. COMELEC (April 2000)- JOANNA
SARIBONG
FACTS: Petitioner Hadji Rasul Batador Basher and Private
Respondent Abulkair Ampatua were both candidates for the position
of Punong Barangay in Barangay Maidan. The barangay election
was declared a failure and a special one was scheduled. Again, the
election failed and was reset to August 30, 1997.
The voting started only around 9:00 p.m because there was a
tension in the said locality. With the arrival of troops, the election
officer proceeded to Maidan to conduct the election starting at 9:00
p.m. until the early morning of the following day. The holding of the
election at that particular time was allegedly announced "over the
mosque." Ampatua was proclaimed winner.
Batador then filed a Petition before the Comelec praying that the
election be declared a failure. Alleging that no election was
conducted in the place and at the time prescribed by law, as there
was a dispute that day among the candidates regarding the venue of
the election. In order to avoid bloodshed, they ultimately agreed that
no election would be conducted.
The following day, Batador was surprised to learn that election officer
had directed the Board of Election Tellers to conduct the election and
to fill up the election returns and certificates of canvass on the night
of August 30, 1997 at the residence of the former mayor. Batador
also stated that no announcement to hold the election at the former
mayors house that night was ever made.
The Comelec dismissed the petition because a failure of election
requires the concurrence of two conditions as laid down in Mitmug v
COMELEC, (1) no voting took place in the precinct on the date fixed
by law, or even if there was voting, the election resulted in a failure to
elect; and (2) the votes not cast would have affected the result of the
election. It ruled that these requirements were not met. It held that

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the "election was conducted on the scheduled date. The precinct


functioned. Actual voting took place, and it resulted not in a failure to
elect."
ISSUE: WON the "election" held on the date, at the time and in the
place other than those officially designated by the law and by the
Comelec was valid.

nearby barangay about 8:30 p.m. did the election officers proceed to
Barangay Maidan. Arriving at Maidan, they allegedly proceeded to
conduct the election "after announcing it over the mosque."Such
abbreviated announcement "over the mosque" at such late hour did
not constitute sufficient notice to the electorate.
CASE 13: HASSAN v. COMELEC (November 1996)- JEAN
GUECO

HELD: No.
RATIO: First, the place where the voting was conducted was
illegal. Section 42 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that "the
chairman of the board of election tellers shall designate the public
school or any other public building within the barangay to be used as
polling place in case the barangay has one election precinct ." Board
of Election Tellers for Barangay Maidan claimed that the election was
held "in Barangay Maidan." But failed to specify the exact venue.
Second, the voting time was irregular. The law provides that "the
casting of votes shall start at 7am and shall end at 3pm. However,
the "election" for Barangay Maidan officials was supposed to have
been held after 9 p.m. of August 30, 1997 until the wee hours of the
following day. Certainly, such schedule was not in accordance with
law or the Comelec Rules.
Third, the election date was invalid. Election Officer practically
postponed the election in Barangay Maidan from the official original
schedule of 7:00 a.m. However, as election officer, she has no
authority to declare a failure of election. Indeed, only the Comelec
itself has legal authority to exercise such power.
Fourth, election postponement was invalid. Election officer did not
conduct any proceeding, summary or otherwise, to find out whether
any of the legal grounds for the suspension or postponement or the
declaration of failure of the election actually existed in the barangay.
Fifth, the notice was irregular. The electorate of Barangay Maidan
was not given due notice that the election would push through after
9:00 p.m. that same day. Apparently, the election officer's decision to
hold the election on the night of August 30, 1997 was precipitate.
Only after additional military troops had arrived at their site in a

FACTS: Hadji Nor Basher L. Hassan, and Mangondaya P. Hassan


Buatan, were candidates for Vice-Mayor in Madalum, Lanao del Sur.
In the May 8 elections, the results for the Office of the Vice-Mayor
were as follows:
1. MANGONDAYA HASSAN
884
2. OSOP KIRAM
816
3. PETITIONER HASSAN 801
4. ESRA S. ANGNI 340
5. IBRAHIM ALAWI 185
However, due to threats of violence and terrorism in the area, there
was a failure of elections in 6 out of 24 precincts. In one of the
precincts, the ballot boxes were burned, while in the other 5
precincts, the members of the BEI failed to report to their respective
polling places. The COMELEC team, headed by Virgilio Garcillano,
recommended the holding of special elections in said precincts and
scheduled it. The members of the BEI again failed to report. The
COMELEC team rescheduled the elections in Liangan Elementary
School, which was 15 kilometers away from the designated polling
places. The members of the BEI once more did not report for duty.
This constrained the COMELEC team to appoint police/military
personnel to substitute for the BEI.
In the May 29 special elections held in Precinct Nos. 9, 9-A, 10, 13
and 14 the following votes were obtained.
1. M. HASSAN
214
2. OSOP KIRAM
17
3. N. HASSAN
78
4. ANGNI ESRA
1
5. IBRAHIM ALAWI 0

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Hence the final results are as follows:


1. MANGONDAYA HASSAN
2. PETITIONER NOR HASSAN 3. OSOP KIRAM
4. ANGNI ESRA
5. IBRAHIM ALAWI
-

1,098
879
833
341
185

Hassan filed a petition with the COMELEC assailing the validity of


the re-scheduled special election. COMELEC en banc denied the
petition for a declaration of failure of the elections and ordered the
Board of Canvassers to proclaim Private Respondent as the winning
vice-mayoralty candidate. Thus, this petition.
ISSUE: WON there was a failure of elections.
HELD: Yes.
RATIO: SEC. 6. Failure of election. If, on account of force
majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes the
election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed, or
had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of
the voting, or after the voting and during the preparation and the
transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass
thereof, such election results in a failure to elect, and in any of such
cases the failure or suspension of election would affect the result of
the election, the Commission shall, on the basis of a verified petition
by any interested party and after due notice and hearing, call for the
holding or continuation of the election not held, suspended or which
resulted in a failure to elect on a date reasonably close to the date of
the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to
elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause of
such postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect.
(Sec. 7, 1978 EC)
It is true that as a rule, terrorism may not as a rule be invoked to
declare a failure of elections and to disenfranchise the greater
number of the electorate through the misdeeds of only a relative few.
Otherwise elections will never be carried out with the resultant
disenfranchisement of the innocent voters, for the losers will always

cry fraud and terrorism. However, the COMELEC cannot turn a blind
eye to the fact that terrorism was so prevalent in the area. Elections
had to be set for the third time because no members of the BEI
reported for duty due to impending threats of violence in the area.
This in fact prompted COMELEC to deploy military men to act as
substitute members just so elections could beheld; and to thwart
these threats of violence, the COMELEC team, moreover, decided to
transfer the polling places to Liangan Elementary School which was
15 kilometers away from the polling place. The peculiar situation of
this case cannot be overstated. The notice given on the afternoon of
the day before the scheduled special elections and transferring the
venue of the elections 15 kilometers away from the farthest
barangay/school was too short resulting to the disenfranchisement of
voters. Out of the 1,546 registered voters in the five (5) precincts,
only 328 actually voted. It was quite sweeping and illogical for the
COMELEC to state that the votes uncast would not have in any way
affected the results of the elections. While the difference between the
two candidates is only 219 out of the votes actually cast, the
COMELEC totally ignored the fact that there were more than a
thousand registered voters who failed to vote.
CASE 14: SANGCAD BAO v. COMELEC (December 2003)- JC
PAJO
FACTS: Petitioner Sangcad S. Bao sought re-election as mayor of
Butig, Lanao del Sur in the May 14, 2001 elections. On May 25,
2001, Bao filed before the COMELEC a Very Urgent Petition for
Suspension of Counting of Votes by [the] B[oard of] E[lection]
I[nspectors], Canvass of Election Returns and Proclamation of
Winners by [the Municipal Board of Canvassers], and Declaration of
Failure of Election in Butig, Lanao del Sur
Bao later filed on May 29, 2001 an Additional Submission containing
Casidars Narrative Report on the Conduct of [the] May 14, 2001
National and Local Elections in the Municipality of Butig, Lanao del
Sur reading verbatim:
1. Per my instruction, the BEIs immediately started the election.
2. While the election was going on, at around 2 pm, several
bombings occurred almost in the area where the election was held
which caused commotion.

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3. due to the incident and fear, the BEIs assigned in some other
precincts locked their ballot boxes and brought them to the Municipal
Hall while others continued the casting of votes [until] the last hour.
4. . . . the electors and some other candidates were forcing and/or
convincing me to open the ballot boxes brought to the Municipal Hall
to continue the election which I refused as it was already too late.
5. . . . due to intimidation and force shown or displayed by some of
the supporters and candidates themselves, I failed to decide on time
as it will endanger my life and other civilians in the area.

and in any of such cases the failure or suspension of election would


affect the result of the election, the Commission shall, on the basis of
a verified petition by any interested party and after due notice and
hearing, call for the holding or continuation of the election not held,
suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect on a date
reasonably close to the date of the election not held, suspended or
which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after
the cessation of the cause of such postponement or suspension of
the election or failure to elect.

On June 4, 2001, petitioner filed a Very Urgent Motion to Defer


Canvass of Election Returns and Suspend Proclamation,[4reiterating
the arguments in his previous petition. On June 8, 2001, Langco
(petitioner-intervenor), filed a petition-in intervention adopting the
allegations of petitioner and further alleging the occurrence of other
irregularities during the conduct of the elections, to wit:
1. Watchers were not allowed to escort the ballot boxes and witness
the distribution of ballots;
2. A member of the Philippine Army was putting inside the ballot box
official ballots already filled up;
3. Around 11:20 a.m., there were simultaneous explosions causing
the voters to scamper away which resulted to low voter turn-out;
4. The casting of votes was stopped at 1:30 p.m.;
5. The clustering made by the COMELEC based on the convenience
and safety of the voters was not followed;
6. The casting of votes was done in public as there were no voting
booths;

In Mitmug v. COMELEC, this court held that before the COMELEC


can act on a verified petition seeking to declare to declare a failure of
election, 2 conditions must concur: first, no voting has taken place in
the precinct or precincts on the date fixed by law or, even if there
was voting, the election nonetheless results in failure to elect; and
second, the votes not cast would affect the result of the election.

ISSUE: WON the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in


not declaring a failure of elections.
HELD: No.
RATIO: Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code provides: If, on
account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other
analogous causes the election in any polling place has not been held
on the date fixed, or had been suspended before the hour fixed by
law for the closing of the voting, or after the voting and during the
preparation and the transmission of the election returns or in the
custody or canvass thereof, such election results in failure to elect,

Furthermore in Typoco v. COMELEC, there are only three instances


where a failure of election may be declared, namely: (a) the election
in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed on account
of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous
causes; (b) the election in any polling place had been suspended
before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting on account
of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous
causes; (c) after the voting and during the preparation and
transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass
thereof, such election results in failure to elect on account of force
rnajeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes. In all
instances there must have been a failure to elect; this is obvious in
the first scenario, where the election was not held and second where
the election was suspended. As to the third scenario, the preparation
and transmission of election returns which give rise to the
consequence of failure to elect must as aforesaid be literally
interpreted to mean that nobody emerged as winner.
In the present case, the allegations-bases of both the petition and
Langcos petition-in-intervention before the COMELEC are mostly
grounds for an election contest, not for a declaration of failure of
election. While there are allegations which may be grounds for failure

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of election, they are supported by mere affidavits and the narrative


report of the election officer.

III. ELECTION OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS


ELECTION OF PRESIDENT AND VICE-PRESIDENT

IV. THE COMELEC


COMPOSITION
ART. IX-C, 1987 CONSTITUTION
EN BANC AND DIVISION CASES

SECS. 13-20, OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE

ELECTION OF MEMBERS OF CONGRESS


ART. XVIII, SECS. 1 & 2, 1987 CONSTITUTION

ELECTION OF LOCAL OFFICIALS


SEC. 1, ART. XVIII, 1987 CONSTITUTION
SEC. 8, ART. X, 1987 CONSTITUTION

CASE 15: SARMIENTO v. COMELEC (August 1992)- ANNESIR


KADJIM
FACTS: Nine (9) special civil actions for certiorari, hereby jointly
resolved, seek to set aside the resolutions of respondent COMELEC.
Petitioners impugn the challenged resolutions above specified as
having been issued with grave abuse of discretion in that, inter alia,
the Commission, sitting en banc, took cognizance of and decided the
appeals without first referring them to any of its Divisions.

ELECTION OF BARANGAY OFFICIALS

ISSUE: WON challenged resolutions were issued with grave abuse


of discretion.

LAWS POSTPONING BARANGAY ELECTIONS (EVER


CHANGING SCHEDULE OF BARANGAY ELECTIONS)

HELD: Yes.

R.A. No. 6653


R.A. No. 6679
R.A. No. 8524
R.A. No. 9164
R.A. No. 9340

RATIO: Election cases:


1. SEC.3. , Subdivision C, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution
expressly provides that the Commission on Elections may sit en
banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure
in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including preproclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard
and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of
decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc.
2. Election cases include pre-proclamation controversies and as
such, must be heard and decided by a Division of the Commission.
3. The Commission, sitting en banc, does not have the authority to
hear and decide the same cases at the first instance.

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4. In the COMELEC rules of procedure, pre-proclamation cases are


classified as special cases and by its very nature, the two Divisions
of the Commission are vested with the authority to hear and decide
these special cases.
Hearing of cases by COMELEC Division :
5. SEC.9, Rule 27 of the COMELEC Rules of procedure provides
that appeals from rulings of the Board of Canvassers are cognizable
by any of the Divisions to which they are assigned and not by the
Commission en banc.
Decision of COMELEC En Banc:
6. Appeals are deemed pending before the Commission for proper
referral to a Division.
7. However, R.A. 7166 provides that all pre-proclamation cases
pending before a Division shall be deemed terminated at the
beginning of the term of the office involved.
CASE 16: ZARATE v. COMELEC (November 1999)- KELVIN
HUNG
FACTS: During the 1996 Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) elections,
Julian Lallave, Jr. won over Marivic Zarate by one vote. Barangay
Board of Canvassers declared Lallave the duly elected SK
Chairman. Julian Lallave- 46 votes; Marivic Zarate: 45 votes
Zarate filed an election protest before the MTC of Malasiqui,
Pangasinan where he alleged that the Board of Election Tellers
counted, credited and/ or declared valid 3 or more votes that read
JL in favor of Lallave when they should have been voided.
That the JL votes were stray votes and were therefore null and
void. There was no candidate with a name or nickname JL. Such
votes were irregular, anomalous and void.
MTC annulled and set aside Lallaves proclamation. 8 out of the 46
votes were marked. Hence, Lallave only had 38 votes. On the other

hand, one of Zarates votes was invalidated. Zarate, with 44 votes,


was declared duly elected SK Chairman.
Dissatisfied, Lallave appealed to COMELEC. He alleged that the
names written in the ballots sufficiently identify him. He was the only
candidate with the JL initials. De real is his middle name while
Nono is his nickname.
Zarate maintained that MTC was correct in its decision, pursuant to
paragraph 14, Section 211 of the Omnibus Election Code.
COMELEC en banc came out with a decision annulling and setting
aside the decision of MTC. The JL initials were valid since they
sufficiently identify Lallave. Lallave was the only candidate with the
initials JL.
ISSUE: WON COMELEC en banc in taking cognizance of the
election protest acted with grave abuse of discretion.
HELD: Yes.
RATIO: Section 3 (C), Article IX of the Constitution
Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two
divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to
expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation
controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in
division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall
be decided by the Commission en banc.
Sarmiento vs. Commission on Elections
The Commission, sitting en banc, does not have the authority to
hear and decide the same (election cases
including preproclamation controversies) at the first instance.
SEC. 9. Appeals from rulings of Board of Canvassers. - (a) A party
aggrieved by an oral ruling of the board of canvassers who had
stated orally his intent to appeal said ruling shall, within five days
following receipt of a copy of the written ruling of the board of

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canvassers, file with the Commission a verified appeal, furnishing a


copy thereof to the board of canvassers and the adverse party.
(b) The appeal filed with the Commission shall be docketed by the
Clerk of Court concerned.
(c) The answer/opposition shall be verified.
(d) The Division to which the case is assigned shall immediately set
the case for hearing.
COMELEC en banc, in not referring the case to any of its divisions
and taking cognizance of the election protest raised by Lallave, acted
with grave abuse of discretion.
CASE 17: RAMIREZ v. COMELEC (March 1997)- REGINALD
LAMPITOC
FACTS: Petitioner Jose C. Ramirez and private respondent Alfredo I.
Go were candidates for vice mayor of Giporlos, Eastern Samar in the
election of May 8, 1995. Petitioner was proclaimed winner by the
Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBC) on the basis of results
showing that he obtained 1,367 votes against private respondent's
1,235 votes.
On May 16, 1995, private respondent filed in the COMELEC a
petition for the correction of what he claimed was manifest error in
the Statement of Votes (SPC No. 95-198). He alleged that, based on
the entries in the Statement of Votes, he obtained 1,515 votes as
against petitioner's 1,367 votes but that because of error in addition,
he was credited with 1,235 votes.
In his Answer with Counter-Protest, Jose C. Ramirez disputed
private respondent's claim. He said that instead of the total of the
votes for Alfredo Go, it was actually the entries relating to the number
of votes credited to him in Precinct Nos. 11, 11-A, 6, 1, 17, 7, and 10
which were erroneously reflected in the Statement of Votes.
According to petitioner, the entries in the Statement of Votes actually
referred to the number of votes obtained by Rodito Fabillar, a
mayoralty candidate, and not to the votes obtained by private
respondent. Petitioner alleged that, as shown in the Certificate of
Votes prepared by the Board of Election Inspectors.

On August 1, 1995, the COMELEC en banc issued its first


questioned resolution, directing the MBC to reconvene and recompute the votes in the Statement of Votes and proclaim the
winning candidate for vice mayor of Giporlos, Eastern Samar
accordingly. Jose C. Ramirez and public respondent Municipal Board
of Canvassers filed separate "motions for clarification." On
September 26, 1995, the COMELEC en banc issued its second
questioned resolution, reiterating its earlier ruling. It rejected the
MBC's recommendation to resort to election returns. Hence this
petition for certiorari and mandamus seeking the annulment of the
two resolutions.
ISSUE: WON the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction over SPC No.
95-198 because the case was resolved by it without having been first
acted upon by any of its divisions.
HELD: Yes.
RATIO: Although in Ong, Jr. v. COMELEC it was said that "By now it
is settled that election cases which include pre-proclamation
controversies must first be heard and decided by a division of the
Commission" and a petition for correction of manifest error in the
Statement of Votes, like SPC No. 95-198 is a pre-proclamation
controversy in none of the cases cited to support this proposition
was the issue the correction of a manifest error in the Statement of
Votes under 231 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881) or
15 of R.A. No. 7166. On the other hand, Rule 27, Section 5 of the
1993 Rules of the COMELEC expressly provides that preproclamation controversies involving, inter alia, manifest errors in the
tabulation or tallying of the results may be filed directly with the
COMELEC en banc.
The authority to rule on petitions for correction of manifest error is
vested in the COMELEC en banc. Section 7 of Rule 27 of the 1993
COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides that if the error is
discovered before proclamation, the board of canvassers may motu
proprio, or upon verified petition by any candidate, political party,
organization or coalition of political parties, after due notice and
hearing, correct the errors committed.

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The aggrieved party may appeal the decision of the board to the
Commission and said appeal shall be heard and decided by the
Commission en banc. Section 5, however of the same rule states
that a petition for correction of manifest error may be filed directly
with the Commission en banc provided that such errors could not
have been discovered during the canvassing despite the exercise of
due diligence and proclamation of the winning candidate had already
been made.
Petitioner's final contention that in any event SPC No. 95-198 must
be considered rendered moot and academic by reason of his
proclamation and assumption of office is untenable. The short
answer to this is that petitioner's proclamation was null and void and
therefore the COMELEC was not barred from inquiring into its nullity.
The petition is partially GRANTED by annulling the resolutions dated
August 1, 1995 and September 26, 1995 of the Commission on
Elections. The COMELEC is instead DIRECTED to reconvene the
Municipal Board of Canvassers or, if this is not feasible, to constitute
a new Municipal Board of Canvassers in Giporlos, Eastern Samar
and to order it to revise with deliberate speed the Statement of Votes
on the basis of the election returns from all precincts of the
Municipality of Giporlos and thereafter proclaim the winning
candidate on the basis thereof.
CASE 18: FAELNAR v. COMELEC (May 2000)- FRANCIS
TORRES
FACTS: On April 8, 1997, petitioner Eugenio Faelnar filed a
certificate of candidacy for the position of Barangay Chairman of
Barangay Guadalupe, Cebu City in the May 12, 1997 barangay
elections.
The following day, on April 9, 1997, a basketball
tournament, dubbed the "2nd JING-JING FAELNARS CUP," opened
at the Guadalupe Sports Complex and lasted up to April 30, 1997.
This gave rise to a complaint for electioneering filed against
petitioner and Cecilio Gillamac by Antonio Luy.
The complaint alleged that the basketball tournament was actually a
campaign gimmick staged outside the campaign period which
officially started on May 1, 1997, in violation of the Omnibus Election

Code. Luy alleged that: (1) during the tournament, a streamer


bearing petitioners name was placed on the facade of the
Guadalupe Sports Complex; (2) petitioners name was repeatedly
mentioned over the microphone during the games; (3) the
tournament was widely published in the local newspaper; and (4) a
raffle sponsored by Cecilio Gillamac was held with home appliances
given away as prizes.
Petitioner denied participation in the tournament and claimed that its
major sponsor was Gillamac Marketing, Inc. He contended that the
same was purely a sporting event for the benefit of the youth. The
complaint was investigated by the election officer of Cebu City, who
later recommended the dismissal of the charges against petitioner
and Gillamac. On the other hand, the Law Department of the
COMELEC recommended the filing of a case against petitioner and
Gillamac for violation of 80, in relation to 262, of the Omnibus
Election Code, and 50 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2888, in
relation to 12 of Republic Act No. 6679.
In its Resolution, the COMELEC en banc resolved to dismiss the
case. However, on motion of Antonio Luy, the COMELEC
reconsidered its action and ordered the filing of the necessary
Informations against petitioner and Gillamac. Accordingly, petitioner
and Gillamac were formally charged in the RTC of Cebu City.
Petitioner moved to quash the information or, in the alternative, for
reinvestigation of the case, contending that the said Resolution,
which dismissed the complaint against him, was immediately
executory, it was no longer within the power of the COMELEC to
reconsider. And that Luys MOR was a prohibited pleading under the
Commissions rules of Procedure.
Petitioners motion was denied by the trial court. He moved for
reconsideration, but his motion was likewise denied by the court.
Hence this petition.
ISSUE: WON the resolution of the COMELEC dismissing the
criminal complaint for violation of the election laws immediately final
and executory.

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HELD: No.

office in the said synchronized elections and the Regional Chairman


of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) in Region X.

RATIO: Section 1, Rule 13 of Comelecs Rules of Procedure states,


the following pleadings are not allowed, (d) motion for
reconsideration of an en banc ruling, resolution, order or decision
except in election offense cases; . . .
Under the present rule, therefore, a motion for reconsideration of a
ruling, resolution or decision of the COMELEC en banc is allowed in
cases involving election offenses.
Here, there is no question that what is involved is a resolution of the
COMELEC en banc in an election offense. Hence, a motion for
reconsideration of such resolution is allowed under the Rules of
Procedure of the COMELEC.
It was also held that the Comelec en banc is the one that determines
the existence of probable cause in an election offense. But it may
also be delegated to the State Prosecutor or to the Provincial or City
Fiscal but may still be reviewed by the Comelec.

POWERS AND FUNCTIONS


CASE 19: GALLARDO v. TABAMO (January 1993)- ARJUNA
GUEVARA
FACTS: Petitioner Gallardo seeks to prohibit, restrain and enjoin
respondent Judge Tabamo from continuing with the proceedings in a
petition for injunction, prohibition and mandamus with a prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction and restraining order filed as a taxpayers suit. At the time
of filing both the special civil action and the instant petition, petitioner
was the incumbent Governor of the Province of Camiguin and was
seeking re-election in the May 11, 1992 synchronized elections.
Petitioners Arevalo, Echavez, Aranas, and Sia are the provincial
treasurer, provincial auditor, provincial engineer, and provincial
budget officer of Camiguin. Their co-petitioners Rambuyon, Primo
and Noel Navarro are all government project laborers. On the other
hand, the private respondent was the incumbent Congressman of
the lone Congressional district of Camiguin, a candidate for the same

On April 10, 1992, private respondent filed his Petition (Special Civil
Action No. 465) before the court a quo against petitioners to prohibit
and restrain them from pursuing or prosecuting certain public works
projects as it violates the 45-day ban on public works imposed by the
Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881) because
although they were initiated few days before March 27, 1992, the
date the ban took effect, they were not covered by detailed
engineering plans, specifications or a program of work which are
preconditions for the commencement of any public works project.
The questioned projects are classified into two (2) categories: (a)
those that are Locally-Funded, consisting of 29 different projects for
the maintenance or concreting of various roads, the rehabilitation of
the Katibawasan Falls and the construction of the Capitol Building,
and (b) those designated as Foreign-Assisted, consisting of fifteen
(15) projects which include the construction of Human Development
Center, various Day Care cum Production Centers and water works
systems; the extension and renovation of various buildings; the
acquisition of hospital and laboratory equipment; and the
rehabilitation of office and equipment. On the same day, respondent
Judge issued the question TRO.
In the same order, he directed the petitioners to file their Answer
within 10 days from receipt of notice and set the hearing on the
application for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction for
April 24, 1992. Instead of filing the Answer, the petitioners filed the
special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a
writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order. They
contend that the case principally involves an alleged violation of the
Omnibus Election Code thus the jurisdiction is exclusively vested in
the Comelec, not the Regional Trial Court.
ISSUE: WON the trial court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of
Special Civil Action No.465.
HELD: No.

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RATIO: The material operative facts alleged in the petition therein inexorably link
the private respondent's principal grievance toalleged violations of paragraphs (a),
(b), (v) and (w), Section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg.
881).There is particular emphasis on the last two (2) paragraphs which read:
Sec. 261. Prohibited Acts. - The following shall be guilty of an
election offense:
(a)Vote-buying and vote-selling .
xxx xxx xxx
(b)Conspiracy to bribe voters.
xxx xxx xxx
(v)Prohibition against release, disbursement or
expenditure of public funds. Any public official or
employee including barangay officials and those of
government-owned or controlled corporations and
their subsidiaries, who, during forty-five days before
a regular election and thirty days before a special
election, releases, disburses or expends any public
funds for:
(1) Any and all kinds of public works, except the
following:
xxx xxx xxx
(w) Prohibition against construction of public works,
delivery of materials for public works and issuance of
treasury warrants and similar devices.During the
period of forty-five days preceding a regular election
and thirty days before aspecial election, any person
who (a) undertakes the construction of any public
works, except for projects or works exempted in the
preceding paragraph; or (b) issues, uses or avails of
treasury warrants or any device undertaking future

delivery of money, goods or other things of value


chargeable against public funds.
Essentially, therefore, Civil Case No. 465 before the trial court is for
the enforcement of laws involving the conduct of elections; corollarily,
the issue that is logically provoked is whether or not the trial court
has jurisdiction over the same.
Zaldivar vs. Estenzo, decided by this Court on 3 May 1968, had
squarely resolved the issue above posed. Speaking through then
Associate Justice Enrique Fernando (who later became Chief
Justice), the Court explicitly ruled that considering that the
Commission on Elections is vested by the Constitution with exclusive
charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to
the conduct of elections, the assumption of jurisdiction by the trial
court over a case involving the enforcement of the Election Code "is
at war with the plain constitutional command, the implementing
statutory provisions, and the hospitable scope afforded such grant of
authority so clear and unmistakable in recent decisions."
The court ruled that the Comelec has jurisdiction to enforce and
administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections. The1987
Constitution implicitly grants the Commission the power to
promulgate such rules and regulations as provided in Section 2 of
Article IX-C. Moreover, the present Constitution also invests the
Comission with the power to investigate and where appropriate,
prosecute cases of violations of election law, including acts or
omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices. It
is not true that, as contended by the petitioners, the jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court under the election laws is limited to criminal
actions for violations of the Omnibus Election Code. The Constitution
itself grants to it exclusive original jurisdiction over contests involving
elective municipal officials.
Neither can the Court agree with the petitioners' assertion that the
Special Civil Action filed in the RTC below involves the prosecution
of election offenses; the said action seeks some reliefs incident to or
in connection with alleged election offenses; specifically, what is
sought is the prevention of the further commission of these offenses
which, by their alleged nature, are continuing. There is as well no
merit in the petitioners' claim that the private respondent has no legal

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standing to initiate the filing of a complaint for a violation of


the Omnibus Election Code. There is nothing in the law to prevent
any citizen from exposing the commission of an election offense and
from filing a complaint in connection therewith. On the contrary,
under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, initiation of complaints for
election offenses may be done motu propio by the Commission on
Elections or upon written complaint by any citizen, candidate or
registered political party or organization under the party-list system or
any of the accredited citizens arms of the Commission.
However, such written complaints should be filed with the "Law
Department of the Commission; or with the offices of the Election
Registrars, Provincial Election Supervisors or Regional Election
Directors, or the State Prosecutor, Provincial Fiscal or City Fiscal."
As earlier intimated, the private respondent was not seriously
concerned with the criminal aspect of his alleged grievances. He
merely sought a stoppage of the public works projects because of
their alleged adverse effect on his candidacy. Indeed, while he may
have had reason to fear and may have even done the right thing, he
committed a serious procedural misstep and invoked the wrong
authority.
The court, therefore, has no alternative but to grant this petition on
the basis their resolution of the principal issue. Nevertheless, it must
be strongly emphasized that in so holding that the trial court has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of Special Civil Action No. 465, the Court
is not to be understood as approving of the acts complained of by the
private respondent. If his charges for the violation of paragraphs (a),
(b), (v) and (w), Section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code are true,
then no one should be spared from the full force of the law. No
government official should flout laws designed to ensure the holding
of free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections or make a
mockery of our electoral processes. The bitter lessons of the past
have shown that only elections of that nature or character can
guarantee a peaceful and orderly change. It is then his duty to
respect, preserve and enhance an institution which is vital in any
democratic society.

CASE
20:
TELECOMMUNICATIONS
AND
BROADCAST
ATTORNEYS OF THE PHILIPPINES v. COMELEC (April 1998)KAMAE CRUZ
FACTS: Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the
Philippines, Inc. (TBAP) is an organization of lawyers of radio and
television broadcasting companies suing as citizens, taxpayers and
registered voters. GMA Network, Inc. (GMA) operates radio and
television broadcasting stations throughout the Philippines under a
franchise granted by Congress.
Sec. 92 of BP 881 requires radio and television broadcast stations in
the Philippines to provide free airtime to the COMELEC for the use of
candidates for campaign and other political purposes.
TBAP and GMA challenge the validity of Sec. 92 of BP 881 because:
(1) it takes property without due process of law and without just
compensation, (2) it denies radio and television broadcast
companies the equal protection of the laws because it singles radio
and televisions stations out to provide free airtime as other forms of
media, such as newspapers and magazines, are not similarly
required to provide free time, and (3) it is in excess of the power
given to the COMELEC by Art. 9-C, Sec. 4 of the Constitution to
supervise or regulate the operation of media of communication or
information during the period of election because the power to
regulate does not include the power to prohibit.
GMA claimed that Sec. 92 of BP 881 is an invalid amendment of RA
7252 which granted GMA a franchise for the operation of radio and
television broadcasting stations. It argued that although Sec. 5 of RA
7252 gives the government the power to temporarily use and operate
GMA stations or to authorize such use and operation, the exercise of
this right must be compensated.
TBAP and GMA claimed that they suffered losses running to several
million pesos in providing COMELEC time in connection with the
1992 presidential election and the 1995 senatorial election and that
they stood to suffer even more should it be required to so again.

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ISSUE: WON COMELEC is allowed to require broadcast stations to


give it free time for election purposes.
HELD: Yes.
RATIO: (1) To give COMELEC free time is not taking property
without due process of law without just compensation. All
broadcasting, whether by radio or by television stations, is licensed
by the government. Airwave frequencies have to be allocated as
there are more individuals who want to broadcast than there are
frequencies to assign. A franchise is thus a privilege subject, among
other things, to amendment by Congress in accordance with the
constitutional provision that any such franchise or right
grantedshall be subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by the
Congress when the common good requires.
In truth, radio and television broadcasting companies, which are
given franchises, do not own the airwaves and frequencies through
which they transmit broadcast signals and images. They are merely
given the temporary privilege of using them. Since a franchise is a
mere privilege, the exercise of the privilege may reasonably be
burdened with the performance by the grantee of some form of
public service.
As held in Osmea v. COMELEC, Sec. 11 (b) of RA 6646 and Sec.
92 of BP 881 are part and parcel of a regulatory scheme designed to
equalize the opportunity of candidates in an election in regard to the
use of mass media for political campaigns. Airing of COMELEC time
is therefore a reasonable condition to grant GMAs franchise.
Sec. 11 of Art. 12 of the Constitution authorizes the amendment of
franchises for the common good. The common good contemplated in
the free COMELEC time is to allow the candidates and the public to
be fully informed of the issues in an election. Even in the USA, such
practice is endorsed to ensure diversity of views and attention to
public affairs to further the system of free expression.
As held in PLDT v. NTC, such regulation of the use and ownership of
telecommunications systems is in the exercise of the plenary police
power of the State for the promotion of the general welfare. In the

granting of the privilege to operate broadcast stations and thereafter


supervising radio and television stations, the State spends
considerable public funds in licensing and supervising such stations,
hence, it is only usual that the granted licenses require the stations to
render public service by giving free airtime.
GMA is wrong to assume that the provision for COMELEC time
constitutes the use and operation of the stations. Under Sec. 92 of
BP 881, the COMELEC does not take over the operation of radio
and television stations but only the allocation of airtime to the
candidates for the purpose of ensuring, among other things, equal
opportunity, time, and the right to reply as mandated by the
Constitution.
(2) The differential treatment for free speech purposes of radio and
television stations from other forms of media is justified. Because of
the physical limitations of the broadcast spectrum, the government
must, of necessity, allocate broadcast frequencies to those wishing
to use them. There is no similar justification for government
allocation and regulation of the print media. The government spends
public funds for the allocation and regulation of the broadcast
industry, which it does not with print media. To require free airtime for
the COMELEC is a fair exchange for what the industry gets.
Also, because of the unique and pervasive influence of the broadcast
media, it is necessary that the freedom of television and radio
broadcasting is somewhat lesser in scope than the freedom
accorded to newspaper and print media.
(3) The requirement of COMELEC time is a reasonable exercise of
the States power to regulate use of franchises. The COMELEC is
authorized to supervise or regulate by Art. 9-C, Sec. 4 of the
Constitution the use by media of information of their franchises or
permits, while the Congress, not the COMELEC, prohibits the sale or
donation of print space or airtime for political ads. In short, the object
of supervision or regulation is different from the object of prohibition.
The failure to provide airtime unless paid by the government would
clearly deprive the people of their right to know.

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CASE 21: MONTEJO v. COMELEC- RALPH VILLANUEVA


FACTS:
The province of Leyte is composed of
5
legislative
districts. Biliran, located in the third district of Leyte, was made its
sub-province by virtue of RA 2141. When Biliran was converted into
a regular province, 8 municipalities of the third district composed the
new province.
As a consequence, the composition of the third district was reduced
to 5 municipalities. To remedy the resulting inequality in the
distribution of inhabitants, voters and municipalities in Leyte, the
COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2736 where it transferred
the municipality of Capoocan of
the
second
district
and
the municipality of Palompon of the fourth district to the third district
of Leyte.
ISSUE: WON the COMELEC has the power to transfer municipalities
from one legislative district to another legislative district
HELD: NO.
RATIO: The COMELEC relies on the Ordinance appended to the
1987 Constitution as the source of its power of redistricting which is
traditionally regarded as part of the power to make laws. But based
on the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, it denied to
the COMELEC the major power of legislative apportionment as it
itself exercised the power. Section 2 of the Ordinance only
empowered the COMELEC to make minor adjustments of the
reapportionment made.Consistent with the limit of its power to make
minor adjustments, Sec. 3 of the Ordinance did not also give the
COMELEC any authority to transfer municipalities from one
legislative district to another district.
It may well be that the conversion of Biliran from a sub-province to a
regular province brought about an imbalance in the distribution of
voters and inhabitants in the 5 legislative districts of Leyte. But the
issue involves
a
problem
of
reapportionment
of
legislative districts and
petitioners
remedy
lies
with Congress. Section 5(4), Art. VI of the Constitution categorically
gives Congress the power to reapportion. The Court held that

COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack


of jurisdiction when it promulgated a resolution transferring
the municipality of Capoocan of the second district and the
municipality of Palompon of the fourth district to the third district of
Leyte.
CASE 22: SANDOVAL v. COMELEC (January 2000)- DIANA DE
LEON
FACTS: The petition at bar assails the order of the Commission on
Elections(COMELEC) en banc dated June 2, 1998 nullifying and
setting aside the proclamation of petitioner Federico S. Sandoval as
congressman-elect for the Malabon-Navotas legislative district.
Sandoval and private respondent, Oreta, were among the candidates
who vied for the congressional seat for the Malabon-Navotas
legislative district during the election held on May 11,1998.
After the votes have been cast and counted in the various precincts
in the two municipalities, their respective board of canvassers
convened to canvass the election returns forwarded by the board of
election inspectors.
On May 16, 1998, counsels for Oreta made a written request upon
Malabon Election Officer Armando Mallorca to furnish them with a
complete list of the statement of votes from the municipal board of
canvassers.
On May 17, 1998, the Malabon municipal board issued a certificate
of canvass of votes stating that it canvassed 804 out of 805 precincts
in the municipality. The certificate of canvass showed that Oreta
obtained the highest number of votes in Malabon with 57,760 votes,
with Sandoval coming in second with 42,892 votes. On the same
day, Greta, thru his representative, wrote to the COMELEC chairman
allegeing that several election returns were not included in the
canvass conducted by the Malabon municipal board of canvassers.
On May 23, 1998, Greta filed with the COMELEC an Urgent Petition
entitled "In re: Petition to Correct Manifest Error in Tabulation of
Election Returns by the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Malabon.

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It alleged that while the certificate of canvass showed that 804


election returns were canvassed and tabulated, only 790 election
returns were actually canvassed. Oreta contended that there was a
manifest error in the non-recording or copying of the results in 19
election returns from 19 precincts into the statement of votes. Gretas
point is that, these 19 election returns are material to the outcome of
the election.
Oreta filed another motion with the COMELEC praying that the
canvass of the results of the congressional election by the district
board of canvassers be suspended until the alleged manifest error in
his first motion is corrected.
Oreta also requested from the board of canvassers that the
canvassing be suspended until the Commission has resolved their
petition for correction of manifest error in the certificate of canvass of
Malabon. The district board of canvassers however denied the
request. Sandoval was then declared duly elected congressman of
the legislative district of Malabon-Navotas.
Greta immediately, filed with the COMELEC an urgent appeal
praying for the nullification of Sandovals proclamation as
congressman.
On June 2, 1998, the COMELEC en banc issued an order setting
aside the proclamation of Sandoval. The COMELEC ruled that the
proclamation by the district board of canvassers was void because:
(1) it was made in defiance of the verbal order by the COMELEC
Chairman to suspend the proclamation of the winner in the
congressional election until the Commission has resolved private
respondent's petition for correction of manifest error in the certificate
of canvass; and (2) it was based on an incomplete canvass.
This COMELEC order was contended by the Solicitor General saying
it was null and void for the following reasons: 1. For grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and violated
petitioner's right to due process; 2. The COMELEC has no
jurisdiction over Oretas petitions.

ISSUES:
1. WON the COMELEC has the power to take cognizance of Oretas
petitions; and
2. WON the nullification of Sandovals proclamation was invalid
HELD:
1. Yes.
2. Yes.
RATIO: On COMELECs power to take cognizance of Oretas
petitions.
The COMELEC has exclusive jurisdiction over all pre-proclamation
controversies. The second sentence of Section 15 allows the filing of
petitions for correction of manifest errors in the certificate of canvass
or election returns even in elections for president, vice- president and
members of the House of Representatives for the simple reason that
the correction of manifest error will not prolong the process of
canvassing nor delay the proclamation of the winner in the election.
This rule is consistent with and complements the authority of the
COMELEC under the Constitution to, "enforce and administer all
laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an, election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall"and its power to "decide,
except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting
elections.
The COMELEC has jurisdiction over Oretas petitions. These
petitions essentially allege that there exists a manifest error in said
certificate of canvass as the board failed to include several election
returns in the canvassing. Private respondent prays that the board
be reconvened to correct said error. Section 15 of RA 7166 vests the
COMELEC with jurisdiction over cases of this nature. We reiterate
the long-standing rule that jurisdiction is conferred by law and is
determined by the allegations in the petition regardless of whether or
not the petitioner is entitled to the relief sought.
The authority to rule on petitions for correction of manifest error is
vested in the COMELEC en banc. Section 7 of Rule 27 of the 1993
COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides that if the error is
discovered before proclamation, the board of canvassers may motu

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proprio, or upon verified petition by any candidate, political party,


organization or coalition of political parties, after due notice and
hearing, correct the errors committed. The aggrieved party may
appeal the decision of the board to the Commission and said appeal
shall be heard and decided by the Commission en banc. Section 5,
however of the same rule states that a petition for correction of
manifest error may be filed directly with the Commission en banc
provided that such errors could not have been discovered during the
canvassing despite the exercise of due diligence and proclamation
of, the winning candidate had already been made.
On Sandovals nullified proclamation.
The Court held in this case that COMELECs exercise of its
jurisdiction is tainted with illegality, saying that its order to set aside
the proclamation of petitioner is invalid for having been rendered
without due process of law. Procedural due process demands prior
notice and hearing. Then after the hearing, it is also necessary that
the tribunal show substantial evidence to support its ruling. In other
words, due process requires that a party be given an opportunity to
adduce his evidence to support his side of the case and that the
evidence should be considered in the adjudication of the case. The
facts show that COMELEC set aside the proclamation of Sandoval,
without the benefit of prior notice and hearing and it rendered the
questioned order based solely on Oreta's allegations.
In the case at bar, COMELEC was required to act as an arbiter. It
behooves the Commission to hear both parties to determine the
veracity of their allegations and to decide whether the alleged error is
a manifest error. Hence, the resolution of this issue calls for the
exercise by the COMELEC of its quasi- judicial power. It has been
said that where a power rests in judgment or discretion, so that it is
of judicial nature or character, but does not involve the exercise of
functions of a judge, or is conferred upon an officer other than a
judicial officer, it is deemed quasi-judicial. The COMELEC therefore,
acting as quasi-judicial tribunal, cannot ignore the requirements of
procedural due process in resolving the petitions filed by Oreta.

V. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF DECISIONS


CASE 23: ARATUC v. COMELEC (February 1979)- REBECCA
FLORES
FACTS: On April 7, 1978, election for the position of Representative
to the Batasang Pambansa were held throughout the Philippines.
The cases at bar concern only the results of the elections in Region
XII which comprises the provinces of Lanao Del Sur, Lanao Del
Norte, Maguindanao, North Cotabato and Sultan Kudarat, and the
cities of Marawi, Iligan and Cotabato.
Tomatic Aratuc sought the suspension of the canvass being
undertaken by Regional Board of Canvassers in Cotabato City and in
which, the returns in 1,966 out of 4,107 voting centers in the whole
region had already been canvassed showing partial results. A
Supervening Panel headed by Commissioner of Election Hon.
Venancio S. Duque had conducted the hearings of the complaints of
the petitioners therein of the alleged irregularities in the election
records of the mentioned provinces.
On July 11, 1978, respondent Board terminated its canvass and
declared the result of the voting. The Regional Board of Canvassers
issued a Resolution, over the objection of the Konsensiya ng Bayan
candidates, declaring all the eight (8) Kilusan ng Bagong Lipunan
candidates elected. Appeal was taken by the KB candidates to the
Comelec.
The petitioners brought the resolution of respondent Board to the
Comelec. Hearing was held on April 25, 1978, after which, the case
was declared submitted for decision.
In order to enable the Commission to decide the appeal properly:
a. It will have to go deeper into the examination of the voting records
and registration records and in the case of voting centers whose
voting and registration records which have not yet been submitted for
the Commission to decide to open the ballot boxes; and
b. To interview and get statements under oath of impartial and
disinterested persons from the area to determine whether actual

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voting took place on April 7, 1978, as well as those of the military


authorities in the areas affected.
On January 13, 1979, the Comelec issued its questioned resolution
declaring seven (7) KBL candidates and one (1) KB candidate as
having obtained the first eight (8) places, and ordering the Regional
Board of Canvassers to proclaim the winning candidates.
ISSUE: WON there is grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction on the part of COMELEC.
HELD: No.
RATIO: Under Section 168 of the Revised Election Code of 1978,
"the Commission (on Elections) shall have direct control and
supervision over the board of canvassers" and that relatedly, Section
175 of the same Code provides that it "shall be the sole judge of all
pre-proclamation controversies."
The fact of the matter is that the authority of the Commission in
reviewing actuations of board of canvassers does not spring from
any appellate jurisdiction conferred by any specific provision of law,
for there is none such provision anywhere in the Election Code, but
from the plenary prerogative of direct control and supervision
endowed to it by the above-quoted provisions of Section 168. And in
administrative law, it is a too well settled postulate to need any
supporting citation here, that a superior body or office having
supervision and control over another may do directly what the latter
is supposed to do or ought to have done.
We cannot fault respondent Comelec for its having extended its
inquiry beyond that undertaken by the Board of Canvass. On the
contrary, it must be stated that Comelec correctly and commendably
asserted its statutory authority born of its envisaged constitutional
duties vis-a-vis the preservation of the purity of elections and
electoral processes and in doing what petitioner it should not have
done.
On judicial review of decisions doctrine (Certiorari jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court):

It was pointed out, inter alia, that "the certiorari jurisdiction" of this
Court "over orders, rulings and decisions of the Comelec is not as
broad as it used to be" and "should be confined to instances of grave
abuse of discretion amounting to patent and substantial denial of due
process." Accordingly, We have "invariably followed" this principle:
"in the absence of jurisdictional infirmity or error of law of the utmost
gravity, the conclusion reached by respondent Commission on a
matter that falls within its competence is entitled to utmost respect,"
as succinctly stated in the case of Sidro by the learned Chief Justice.
And, according to the 1978 Election Code, the decisions, orders or
rulings of the Commission in pre-proclamation controversies are
"final and executory."
CASE 24: FILIPINA ENGINEERING AND MACHINE SHOP v.
FERRER- JOSHUA SALTERAS
FACTS: In preparation for the national elections of November 11,
1969, then respondent Commissioners of the Commission on
Elections
(COMELEC)
issued
an INVITATION TO
BID on
September 16, 1969 calling for the submission of sealed proposals
for the manufacture and delivery of 1 1,000 units of voting booths,
among the 17bidders , two bidders responded to the said invitation
the Filipinas and ACME steel ,ACME steel bid was rejected by
COMELEC bidding committee due to low quality of samples, hence
the commission recommended to award to Filipinas the contract to
manufacture and supply the voting boots, after final inspection of all
the samples by COMELEC Commissioners, they have note that
ACME submitted lower bid and improves the sample submitted
according
to the
specification
required
by
COMELEC,
COMELEC issued final resolution awarding the contract and issued
purchase order to ACME.FILIPINAS filed an injunction suit with the
court of the first instance of Manila against COMELEC and
ACME The courts decision that lower court has no jurisdiction
over the nature of the suit and complaint state no cause of action.
ISSUE/S: WON the lower court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of
a suit involving an order of the COMELEC dealing with an award of
contract arising from its invitation to bid.
HELD: No.

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RATIO: It has been consistently held that it is the Supreme Court


has exclusive jurisdiction to review on certiorari; final decisions,
orders or rulings of the COMELEC relative to the conduct of elections
and enforcement of election laws.
The COMELEC resolution awarding the contract in favor of Acme
was not issued pursuant to its quasi-judicial functions but merely as
an incident of its inherent administrative functions over the conduct of
elections, and hence, the said resolution may not be deemed as a
"final order" reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme Court. Being
non-judicial in character, no contempt may be imposed by the
COMELEC from said order, and no direct and exclusive appeal
by certiorari to this Tribunal lie from such order. Any question arising
from said order may be well taken in an ordinary civil action before
the trial courts.
What is contemplated by the term "final orders, rulings and
decisions" of the COMELEC reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme
Court as provided by law are those rendered in actions or
proceedings before the COMELEC and taken cognizance of by the
said body in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers.
CASE 25: AMBIL v. COMELEC (October 2000)- VITO SALES
FACTS: Petitioner Ruperto A. Ambil, Jr. and respondent Jose T.
Ramirez were candidates for the position of Governor, Eastern
Samar, during the May 11, 1998 elections. On May 16, 1998, the
Provincial Board of Canvassers proclaimed Ruperto A. Ambil, Jr. as
the duly elected Governor, Eastern Samar, having obtained 46,547
votes, the highest number of votes in the election returns. However,
Respondent filed with the COMELEC a protest challenging the
results.
Petitioner and Respondent received a purported resolution
promulgated on February 14, 2000, disclosing that it was
Respondent who was declared winner by a margin of 1,176 votes.
On June 15, 2000, the Comelec, First Division, through
Commissioner Julio F. Desamito, issued an order setting the

promulgation of the resolution in the case on June 20, 2000, at 2:00


oclock in the afternoon
Without waiting for the promulgation of the resolution, on June 19,
2000, petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition
with preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order seeking to
nullify the order dated June 15, 2000 of the Commission on Elections
(Comelec), First Division, giving notice to the parties of the
promulgation of the Guiani Resolution.
ISSUE: WON the Supreme Court may take cognizance of the
petition filed by the petitioner.
HELD: No.
RATIO: Under Article IX, Section 7 of the 1987 Constitution is the
power of the Supreme Court to review decisions of the COMELEC.
However, the Supreme Court may only review final orders, rulings,
and decsions of the COMELEC rendered in the exercise of its
adjudicatory or quasi-judicial functions. This decision must be a final
decision or resolution of the Comelec en banc, not of a division. The
Supreme Court has no power to review via certiorari, an interlocutory
order or even a final resolution of a Division of the Commission on
Elections.
The mode by which a decision, order or ruling of the Comelec en
banc may be elevated to the Supreme Court is by the special civil
action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court,
now expressly provided in Rule 64, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended.
Rule 65, Section 1, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,
requires that there be no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. A motion for reconsideration is
a plain and adequate remedy provided by law. Failure to abide by
this procedural requirement constitutes a ground for dismissal of the
petition.
In like manner, a decision, order or resolution of a division of the
Comelec must be reviewed by the Comelec en banc via a motion for

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reconsideration before the final en banc decision may be brought to


the Supreme Court on certiorari. The pre-requisite filing of a motion
for reconsideration is mandatory.
In a long line of cases, this Court has held consistently that before a
party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a precondition that he should have availed of all the means of
administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the
administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the
administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a
matter that comes within his jurisdiction, then such remedy should be
exhausted first before the courts judicial power can be sought. The
premature invocation of courts intervention is fatal to ones cause of
action.
This is the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies. A motion
for reconsideration then is a pre-requisite to the viability of a special
civil action for certiorari, unless the party who avails of the latter can
convincingly show that his case falls under any of the following
exceptions to the rule: (1) when the question is purely legal, (2)
where judicial intervention is urgent, (3) where its application may
cause great and irreparable damage, (4) where the controverted acts
violate due process, (5) failure of a high government official from
whom relief is sought to act on the matter, and seeks when the issue
for non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered
moot.
This doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was not
without its practical and legal reasons, for one thing, availment of
administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a
speedier disposition of controversies. It is no less true to state that
the courts of justice for reasons of comity and convenience will shy
away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has
been completed and complied with so as to give the administrative
agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error and to
dispose of the case. However, we are not amiss to reiterate that the
principal of exhaustion of administrative remedies as tested by a
battery of cases is not an ironclad rule. This doctrine is a relative one
and its flexibility is called upon by the peculiarity and uniqueness of
the factual and circumstantial settings of a case. Hence, it is

disregarded (1) when there is a violation of due process, (2) when


the issue involved is purely a legal question, (3) when the
administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, (4) when there is estoppel on the part of the
administrative agency concerned, (5) when there is irreparable
injury, (6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts
as an alter ego of the president bears the implied and assumed
approval of the latter, (7) when to require exhaustion of
administrative remedies would be unreasonable, (8) when it would
amount to a nullification of a claim, (9) when the subject matter is a
private land in land case proceedings, (10) when the rule does not
provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and (11) when there
are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention. The
administrative authorities must be given an opportunity to act and
correct the errors committed in the administrative forum. Only after
administrative remedies are exhausted may judicial recourse be
allowed.
This case does not fall under any of the exceptions and indeed, as
heretofore stated, the exceptions do not apply to an election case
within the jurisdiction of the Comelec in Division.
Hence, the petition at bar must be dismissed for prematurity. Failure
to exhaust administrative remedies is fatal to a party's cause of
action and a dismissal based on that ground is tantamount to a
dismissal based on lack of cause of action.

VI. VOTERS QUALIFICATION AND REGISTRATION


R.A. No. 8189 (VOTERS REGISTRATION ACT OF 1996)
CASE 26: ROMUALDEZ v. RTC- VIKTOR GUTIERREZ
FACTS: Philip G. Romualdez is a natural born citizen of the
Philippines and a son of a former governor of Leyte Benjamin
Kokoy and sole nephew of First lady Imelda Marcos. He served as
a barangay captain of the said place during snap election in 1986.He
fled the country and went to U.S. and sought asylum, took special
studies in the development of Leyte-Samar with International
business studies as well.

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When Romualdez came back in the Philippines and run in National


Congress the Commission on Election allowed him to vote and have
him registered on precinct 9 of Tolosa, Malbog Leyte where he had
resided. However, Advincula filed a petition questioning the
registration of Romualdez to the said Municipality in MTC. The
former allege that Romualdez was not a resident of the said
municipality because he leave the country and resided in U.S.
Massachussets. He just recently arrive here and didnt acquired 1
year residency here yet.
The MTC denied the petition of Advincula in the Registration of
Romuladez on the said precinct and the right to suffrage. But the
RTC reverse the discretion and disqualified the voter registration of
Romualdez favoring the petitioner.The respondent prayed that the
MTCs discretion over questioning his right to suffrage will be
affirmed.
ISSUE: WON petitioner is qualified to be a registered voter in
Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte despite his sudden departure to the U.S?
HELD: Yes.
Stating that, the political situation brought about by peoples Power
Revolution must have caused great fear to the Romualdezes, and as
having concern over the safety of their families, their self-exile is
understandable. Moreover, their sudden departure cannot be
described as voluntary or abandonment of residence.
It must be emphasized that the right to vote is a most precious
political right; a bounden duty of every citizen enabling them to
participate in the government process to ensure the will of the
people.
CASE 27: KABATAAN PARTY-LIST v. COMELEC (December
2009)- ASTER CARRILLO
FACTS: COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8585 on February 12,
2009 adjusting the deadline of voter registration for the May 10, 2010
national and local elections to October 31, 2009, instead of
December 15, 2009 as previously fixed by Resolution No. 8514. The

intense public clamor for an extension of the October 31, 2009


deadline notwithstanding, the COMELEC stood firm in its decision
not to extend it, arguing mainly that it needs ample time to prepare
for the automated elections. Via the present Petition for Certiorari
and Mandamus filed on October 30, 2009, petitioners challenge the
validity of COMELEC Resolution No. 8585 and seek a declaration of
its nullity.
ISSUE: WON the Comelec is justified in fixing another date for
continuing registration in this case.
HELD: No.
RATIO: The clear text of the law thus decrees that voters be allowed
to register daily during regular offices hours, except during the period
starting 120 days before a regular election and 90 days before a
special election. Both R.A. No. 6646, Section 29 and R.A. No. 8436,
Section 28 grant the COMELEC the power to fix other periods and
dates for pre-election activities only if the same cannot be reasonably
held within the period provided by law. This grant of power, however,
is for the purpose of enabling the people to exercise the right of
suffrage the common underlying policy of RA 8189, RA 6646 and
RA 8436.
In the present case, the Court finds no ground to hold that the
mandate of continuing voter registration cannot be reasonably held
within the period provided by RA 8189, Sec. 8 daily during office
hours, except during the period starting 120 days before the May 10,
2010 regular elections. There is thus no occasion for the COMELEC
to exercise its power to fix other dates or deadlines therefor.
CASE 28: BAYAN v. COMELEC (February 2003)- OLIVE
CACHAPERO
FACTS: Petitioners Reynato Baytan, Reynaldo Baytan and Adrian
Baytan were on their way to register for the May 1998 elections when
they met the newly elected Barangay Captain, Roberto Ignacio, in
Barangay 18, Zone II of Cavite City. Ignacio led petitioners to
register in Precinct No. 83-A of Barangay 18. Petitioners registered
in this precinct.

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When petitioners returned home, they wondered why the registrants


in this precinct looked unfamiliar to them. This prompted petitioners
to return to the registration center to study the precinct map of
Barangay 18. They then realized that their residence is situated
within the jurisdiction of Barangay 28. Thus, petitioners proceeded to
Precinct 129-A of Barangay 28 and registered anew.
Subsequently, petitioners sent a letter to the election registrar
requesting for advice on how to cancel their previous
registration. They also explained the reason and circumstances of
their second registration and expressed their intention to redress the
error.
In Minute Resolution, the COMELEC en banc affirmed the
recommendation of the investigating officer. The COMELEC thus
directed its Law Department to file an information for double
registration against petitioners for violation of Article XXII, SEC. 261
(y) (5) of the Election Code which reads:
SEC. 261. Prohibited Acts. The following shall be guilty of an
election offense:
(y) On Registration of Voters:
(5) Any person who, being a registered voter, registers anew without
filing an application for cancellation of his previous registration.
Petitioners insist they are innocent of any wrongdoing in their act of
registering twice on different days in two different precincts. They
claim they made the first registration because of the intervention and
instigation of Ignacio. They theorize that their letter to the election
registrar of Cavite City informing him of the lapse and asking how to
rectify the same constitutes substantial compliance with the Omnibus
Election Codes requirement of cancellation of prior registration.
ISSUE: WON the criminal cases should be dismissed on the ground
of lack of intent and substantial compliance with the requirement of
cancellation of previous registration.

the COMELEC to assure the people of free, orderly, honest,


peaceful and credible elections. This grant is an adjunct to the
COMELECs constitutional duty to enforce and administer all election
laws. Failure by the COMELEC to exercise this power could result in
the frustration of the true will of the people and make an idle
ceremony of the sacred right and duty of every qualified citizen to
vote.
There is no question that petitioners registered twice on different
days and in different precincts without canceling their previous
registration. The COMELEC noted that petitioners wrote down their
address in Precinct No. 83-A of Barangay 18 as No. 709 T. Gomez
Extension St., Barangay 18-Maya, Cavite City. However, in Precinct
No. 129-A of Barangay 28, petitioners registered as residents of No.
709 Magcawas St., Barangay 28-Taurus, Caridad, Cavite City. The
COMELEC noted further that the affidavits submitted by petitioners
contained glaring inconsistencies. Petitioners claimed that Ignacio
led them to the wrong precinct to register. However, Ignacios
affidavit stated that while he led them to the voting precinct of
Barangay 18, he immediately left the area not knowing that
petitioners registered in the wrong barangay. Contrary to petitioners
sworn statements, Aurora Baytan, mother of petitioners, had another
version. She claimed in her affidavit that Ignacio went to their house
to inform them about the redefinition of their barangays territorial
jurisdiction. Right then and there, Ignacio brought her sons to
Barangay 18 to register.
The COMELEC also pointed out that since double registration
is malum prohibitum, petitioners claim of lack of intent to violate the
law is inconsequential. Neither did the COMELEC consider
petitioners letter as an application to cancel their previous
registration. The COMELEC explained that this letter was sent after
their second registration was accomplished and after the election
officer of Cavite City had already reported their act of double
registration to a higher official.

HELD: No.
RATIO. The grant by the Constitution to the COMELEC of the power
to investigate and prosecute election offenses is intended to enable

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VII. POLITICAL PARTIES AND PARTY LIST SYSTEM


R.A. No. 7941 (PARTY LIST SYSTEM ACT)
CASE 29: VETERANS FEDERATION PARTY v. COMELEC
(October 2000)- RONWELL LIM
FACTS: On March 3, 1995, the Congress Enacted RA 7941. Section
11(b), thereof states that: The parties, organizations, and coalitions
receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the
party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each; Provided, That
those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be
entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of
votes; Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or coalition
shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats
On May 11, 1998, the party-list election was held simultaneously with
the national election. A total of 123 parties, organizations and
coalitions participated. However, the COMELEC proclaimed only 14
party list representatives from 13 different parties who obtained at
least 2% of the total number of votes cast as member of the House
of Rep. Upon petition by other party-list organization, the COMELEC
further proclaimed another 38 additional party representatives
although they received less than 2% of the votes. According to the
COMELEC, under Article VI Sec. 5 of the Constitution, it is
mandatory that at least 20%, equivalent to 52 seats, of the members
of House of Representatives must come from the party list
representatives.
Moreover, COMELEC contends that the two percent vote
requirement in RA 7941 is unconstitutional, because its strict
application would make it mathematically impossible to fill up the
House party-list complement.
ISSUES:
1. WON 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution is mandatory where at
least 20% of the members of the House of Representatives must
come from the said party list system or representatives? In other
words, should the twenty percent allocation for party-list be filled up
completely and all the time; and

2. WON the 2% threshold requirement and the three-seat limit


provided in Section 11 (b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
HELD:
1. No.
2. Yes.
RATIO:
1. No. It merely provides a ceiling for party list seats in the House of
Representatives. The Congress is vested with power to define and
prescribe the mechanics of the party-list system of representation.
2. Yes. In imposing a two percent threshold, Congress wanted to
ensure that only those parties, organizations and coalitions having a
sufficient number of constituents deserving of representation are
actually represented in Congress. This intent can be gleaned from
the deliberations on the proposed bill. The two percent threshold is
consistent not only with the intent of the framers of the Constitution
and the law, but with the very essence of "representation." Under a
republican or representative state, all government authority
emanates from the people, but is exercised by representatives
chosen by them. But to have meaningful representation, the elected
persons must have the mandate of a sufficient number of people.
Otherwise, in a legislature that features the party-list system, the
result might be the proliferation of small groups which are incapable
of contributing significant legislation, and which might even pose a
threat to the stability of Congress. Thus, even legislative districts are
apportioned according to "the number of their respective inhabitants,
and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio" to ensure
meaningful local representation.
CASE 30- ANG BAGONG BAYANI- OFW LABOR PARTY v.
COMELEC (June 2001)- EDWARD MATIAS
FACTS: During the 2001 elections, the COMELEC received several
petitions for registration filed by sectoral parties, organizations and
political parties. Verifications were made as to the status and
capacity of these parties and organizations and hearings were
scheduled day and night. With the number of petitions, the
observance of the legal and procedural requirements and

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deliberations of the petitions takes a longer process to arrive at a


decision.
Before the February 12, 2001 deadline set by COMELEC Resolution
No. 3426 dated December 22, 2000, the registered parties and
organizations filed their respective Manifestations, stating their
intention to participate in the party-list elections. Still other registered
parties filed their Manifestations beyond the deadline. Thus, on
March 26, 2001, COMELEC gave due course and approved the
Manifestations of 154 parties and organizations but denied others on
its assailed Omnibus Resolution No. 3785.
Because of this, on April 10, 2001, Akbayan Citizens action Party
filed before the COMELEC a Petition praying that the names of
[some of the respondents] be deleted for the Certified List of Political
Parties/Sectoral Parties/ Organizations/ Coalitions Participating in the
Party List System for the May 14, 2001 Elections and that the said
certified list be accordingly amended. On April 11, 2001, Bayan
Muna and Bayan Muna-Youth also filed a Petition for Cancellation of
Registration and Nomination against some of herein respondents.

RATIO
1. Under the Constitution and R.A. No. 7941, private respondents
cannot be disqualified from the party-list elections, merely on the
ground that they are political parties. Section 5, Article VI of the
Constitutions provides that members of the House of
Representatives may be elected through a party-list system of
registered national, regional, and sectoral parties and organizations.
Furthermore, under Sections 7 and 8, Article IX (C) of the
Constitution, political parties may be registered under the party-list
system.
Sec. 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization, or
coalition shall be valid, except for those registered under the partylist system, as provided in this Constitution.
Sec. 8. Political parties, or organizations or coalitions registered
under the party-list system, shall not be represented in the voters
registration boards, boards of election inspectors, boards of
canvassers, or other similar bodies. However, they shall be entitled
to appoint poll watchers in accordance with law.

COMELEC required the respondents in the two disqualification cases


to file comments but during the hearing, Commissioner Ralph C.
Lantion merely directed the parties to submit their respective
memoranda. Dissatisfied, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Party Labor
Party and Bayan Muna filed a petition before the Supreme Court
assailing the COMELEC Resolution No. 3785. It added that the
COMELEC may proceed with the counting and canvassing of votes
cast for the party-list elections, but barred the proclamation of any
winner therein, until further orders of the Court.

Section 2 of R.A. No. 7941 also provides for a party-list system of


registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or
coalitions thereof, x x x. Section 3 expressly states that a party is
either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties.
The law defines political party as an organized group of citizens
advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the
general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate
means of securing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports
certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office.

ISSUES:
1. WON political parties may participate in the party list elections.
2. WON the party-list system is exclusive to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors and organizations.

Finally, Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941 leaves no doubt as to the


participation of political parties in the party list system which provides
that for purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major
political parties on the basis of party representation in the House of
Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress of the Philippines
shall not be entitled to participate in the party-list system. Hence,
political parties even the major ones may participate in the party
list elections.

HELD:
1. Yes.
2. Yes.

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2. Section 2 of R.A. No. 7941 mandates a state policy or promoting


proportional representation by means of the Filipino-style party-list
system, which will enable the election to the House of
Representatives of Filipino citizens,
a. Who belong to marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties; and
b. Who lack well-defined constituencies; but
c. Who could contribute to the formulation and enactment or
appropriate legislation that will benefit the nations as a whole.

underrepresented disregard the clear statutory policy. Its claim that


even the super-rich and overrepresented can participate desecrates
the spirit of the party list system. Thus, allowing the non-marginalized
and overrepresented to vie for the remaining seats under the partylist system would not only dilute, but also prejudice the chance of the
marginalized and underrepresented, contrary to the intention of the
law to enhance it. The party list system is a tool for the benefit if the
underprivileged; the law could not have given the same tool to
others, to the prejudice of the intended beneficiaries.

The key words in this policy are proportional representation,


marginalized and underrepresented, and lack [of] well-defined
constituencies.

CASE 31: PHILIPPINE GUARDIANS BROTHERHOOD, INC. v.


COMELEC (April 2010) - JOYCE BAYLON

Proportional representation refers to the representation of the


marginalized and underrepresented as exemplified but the
enumeration in Section 5 of the law; namely, labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly,
handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and
professionals. However, the party-list organization or party must
factually and truly represent the marginalized and underrepresented
constituencies. Concurrently, the persons nominated by the party-list
candidate-organization must be Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and
parties.
Finally, lack of wee-defined constituenc[y] refers to the absence of
a traditionally identifiable electoral group, like voters of a
congressional district or territorial unit of government. Rather, it
points again to those with disparate interests identified with the
marginalized or underrepresented. Thus, the role of the COMELEC
is to see to it that only those Filipinos who are marginalized and
underrepresented become members of Congress under the partylist system, Filipino-style.
The party-list system seeks to enable certain Filipino citizens
specifically those belonging to marginalized and underrepresented
sectors, organizations and parties to be elected to the House of
Representatives, and the assertion of the Office of Solicitor General
that the party list system is not exclusive to the marginalized and

FACTS: COMELEC delisted PGBI, a party list organization, from the


roster of registered national, regional or sectoral parties,
organizations or coalitions under the party-list system through
Resolution No. 9679, denying also the latters motion for
reconsideration, in accordance with Section 6(8) of Republic Act No.
7941 (RA 7941), otherwise known as the Party-List System Act,
which provides:
Section 6. Removal and/or Cancellation of
Registration. The COMELEC may motu proprio or
upon verified complaint of any interested party,
remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the
registration of any national, regional or sectoral party,
organization or coalition on any of the following
grounds:
x x x x
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding
elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum
(2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in
the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in
which it has registered.
PGBI was delisted because it failed to get 2% of the votes cast in
2004 and it did not participate in the 2007 elections. PGBI filed its
opposition to the resolution citing among others the misapplication in
the ruling of MINERO v. COMELEC, but was denied for lack of merit.

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PGBI elevated the matter to SC showing the excerpts from the


records of Senate Bill No. 1913 before it became the law in question.
ISSUES:
1. WON there is legal basis for delisting PGBI; and
2. WON PGBIs right to due process was violated.
HELD:
1. There is no legal basis for delisting PGBI. The Courts ruling in
Minero v. Comelec, where the Court allowed the removal of
Minero as a party-list for failing to get at least 2% of the votes in
the 2001 elections and failing to join the 2004 elections, is
manifestly erroneous and cannot be sustained.
2. However, PGBIs right to due process was not violated.
RATIO:
1. First, the law is clear the COMELEC may motu proprio or upon
verified complaint of any interested party, remove or cancel, after
due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or
sectoral party, organization or coalition if it: (a) fails to participate in
the last two (2) preceding elections; or (b) fails to obtain at least two
per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the
two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has
registered. The plain, clear and unmistakable language of the law
provides for two (2) separate reasons for delisting.

or ruling complained of. A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all


times and in all instances essential. The requirement is satisfied
where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to
explain their side of the controversy at hand. PGBI was not denied
due process.
CASE 32: OFW LABOR PARTY v. COMELEC (June 2001)CHEYENNE YU
FACTS: Petitioner under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court challenges
the Omnibus Resolution No. 3785 issued by the COMELEC,
approving the participation of 154 organizations and parties and
denying several others.
Petitioners seek to disqualify the private respondents from
participating in the party-list election on the ground that it was
intended to benefit the marginalized and underrepresented; and not
the mainstream political parties, the non-marginalized or
overrepresented.
ISSUE: WON COMELEC committed a grave abuse of discretion in
promulgating Omnibus Resolution No. 3785.
HELD: Yes.
RATIO: Guidelines for screening party-list participants:

DEFECT IN MINERO RULING: its characterization of the nonparticipation of a party-list organization in an election as similar to a
failure to garner the 2% threshold party-list vote. A delisting based
on a mixture or fusion of these two different and separate grounds for
delisting is a strained application of the law in jurisdictional terms, it
is an interpretation not within the contemplation of the framers of the
law and hence is a gravely abusive interpretation of the law.
2. On the due process issue, PGBIs right to due process was not
violated for PGBI was given an opportunity to seek, as it did seek, a
reconsideration of Resolution No. 8679. The essence of due
process is simply the opportunity to be heard; as applied to
administrative proceedings, due process is the opportunity to explain
ones side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action

1. The political party, sector, organization or coalition must represent


the marginalized and underrepresented groups identified in Section 5
of RA 7941. In other words, it must show through its constitution,
articles of incorporation, bylaws, history, platform of government and
track record that it represents and seeks to uplift marginalized and
underrepresented sectors. Verily, majority of its membership should
belong to the marginalized and underrepresented. And it must
demonstrate that in a conflict of interests, it has chosen or is likely to
choose the interest of such sectors.
2. While even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA
7941 and the Constitution to participate in the party-list system, they
must comply with the declared statutory policy of enabling Filipino

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citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors x x


x to be elected to the House of Representatives. In other words,
while they are not disqualified merely on the ground that they are
political parties, they must show, however, that they represent the
interests of the marginalized and underrepresented.
3. The religious sector may not be represented in the party-list
system.
4. A party or an organization must not be disqualified under Section
6 of RA 7941.
5. The party or organization must not be an adjunt of, or a project
organized or an entity funded or assisted by, the government.
6. The party must not only comply with the requirements of the law;
its nominees must likewise do so.
7. Not only the candidate party or organization must represent
marginalized and underrepresented sectors; so also must its
nominees. To repeat, under Section 2 of RA 7941, the nominees
must be Filipino citizens who belong to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties.
8. As previously discussed, while lacking a well-defined political
constituency, the nominee must likewise be able to contribute to the
formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit
the nation as a whole.
CASE 33: BANAT v. COMELEC (April 2009)- FLOYD MAGO
FACTS: In July and August 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the
National Board of Canvassers, made a partial proclamation of the
winners in the party-list elections which was held in May 2007.
In proclaiming the winners and apportioning their seats, the
COMELEC considered the following rules:

1. In the lower house, 80% shall comprise the seats for legislative
districts, while the remaining 20% shall come from party-list
representatives (Sec. 5, Article VI, 1987 Constitution);
2. Pursuant to Sec. 11b of R.A. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, a
party-list which garners at least 2% of the total votes cast in the
party-list elections shall be entitled to one seat;
3. If a party-list garners at least 4%, then it is entitled to 2 seats; if it
garners at least 6%, then it is entitled to 3 seats this is pursuant to
the 2-4-6 rule or the Panganiban Formula from the case of Veterans
Federation Party vs COMELEC.
4. In no way shall a party be given more than three seats even if if
garners more than 6% of the votes cast for the party-list election (3
seat cap rule, same case).
The Barangay Association for National Advancement and
Transparency (BANAT), a party-list candidate, questioned the
proclamation as well as the formula being used. BANAT averred that
the 2% threshold is invalid; Sec. 11 of RA 7941 is void because its
provision that a party-list, to qualify for a congressional seat, must
garner at least 2% of the votes cast in the party-list election, is not
supported by the Constitution. Further, the 2% rule creates a
mathematical impossibility to meet the 20% party-list seat prescribed
by the Constitution.
BANAT also questions if the 20% rule is a mere ceiling or is it
mandatory. If it is mandatory, then with the 2% qualifying vote, there
would be instances when it would be impossible to fill the prescribed
20% share of party-lists in the lower house. BANAT also proposes a
new computation (which shall be discussed in the HELD portion of
this digest).
On the other hand, BAYAN MUNA, another party-list candidate,
questions the validity of the 3 seat rule (Section 11a of RA 7941). It
also raised the issue of whether or not major political parties are
allowed to participate in the party-list elections or is the said elections
limited to sectoral parties.

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ISSUES:
1. How is the 80-20 rule observed in apportioning the seats in the
lower house?
2. WON the 20% allocation for party-list representatives mandatory
or a mere ceiling.
3. WON the 2% threshold to qualify for a seat valid.
4. How are party-list seats allocated?
5. WON major political parties are allowed to participate in the partylist elections.
6. WON the 3 seat cap rule (3 Seat Limit Rule) is valid.
HELD AND RATIO:
1. The 80-20 rule is observed in the following manner: for every 5
seats allotted for legislative districts, there shall be one seat allotted
for a party-list representative. Originally, the 1987 Constitution
provides that there shall be not more than 250 members of the lower
house. Using the 80-20 rule, 200 of that will be from legislative
districts, and 50 would be from party-list representatives. However,
the Constitution also allowed Congress to fix the number of the
membership of the lower house as in fact, it can create additional
legislative districts as it may deem appropriate. As can be seen in the
May 2007 elections, there were 220 district representatives, hence
applying the 80-20 rule or the 5:1 ratio, there should be 55 seats
allotted for party-list representatives.
How did the Supreme Court arrive at 55? This is the formula:
(Current Number of Legislative DistrictRepresentatives 0.80) x
(0.20) = Number of Seats Available to Party-List Representatives
Hence,
(220 0.80) x (0.20) = 55
2. The 20% allocation for party-list representatives is merely a ceiling
meaning, the number of party-list representatives shall not exceed
20% of the total number of the members of the lower house.
However, it is not mandatory that the 20% shall be filled.
3. No. Section 11b of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. There is no
constitutional basis to allow that only party-lists which garnered 2%
of the votes cast are qualified for a seat and those which garnered

less than 2% are disqualified. Further, the 2% threshold creates a


mathematical impossibility to attain the ideal 80-20 apportionment.
The Supreme Court explained:
To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there
are 50 million votes cast for the 100 participants in the party list
elections. A party that has two percent of the votes cast, or one
million votes, gets a guaranteed seat. Let us further assume that the
first 50 parties all get one million votes. Only 50 parties get a seat
despite the availability of 55 seats. Because of the operation of the
two percent threshold, this situation will repeat itself even if we
increase the available party-list seats to 60 seats and even if we
increase the votes cast to 100 million. Thus, even if the maximum
number of parties get two percent of the votes for every party, it is
always impossible for the number of occupied party-list seats to
exceed 50 seats as long as the two percent threshold is present.
It is therefore clear that the two percent threshold presents an
unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2),
Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of the
broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests
in the House of Representatives.
4. Instead, the 2% rule should mean that if a party-list garners 2% of
the votes cast, then it is guaranteed a seat, and not qualified. This
allows those party-lists garnering less than 2% to also get a seat.
But how? The Supreme Court laid down the following rules:
1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the
highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered
during the elections.
2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two
percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be
entitled to one guaranteed seat each.
3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the
ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats in

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proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional seats
are allocated.
4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more
than three (3) seats.
In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no
longer be included because they have already been allocated, at one
seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining available
seats for allocation as additional seats are the maximum seats
reserved under the Party List System less the guaranteed seats.
Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A.
No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats.
In short, there shall be two rounds in determining the allocation of the
seats. In the first round, all party-lists which garnered at least 2% of
the votes cast (called the two-percenters) are given their one seat
each. The total number of seats given to these two-percenters are
then deducted from the total available seats for party-lists. In this
case, 17 party-lists were able to garner 2% each. There are a total
55 seats available for party-lists hence, 55 minus 17 = 38 remaining
seats. (Please refer to the full text of the case for the tabulation).
The number of remaining seats, in this case 38, shall be used in the
second round, particularly, in determining, first, the additional seats
for the two-percenters, and second, in determining seats for the
party-lists that did not garner at least 2% of the votes cast, and in the
process filling up the 20% allocation for party-list representatives.
How is this done?
Get the total percentage of votes garnered by the party and multiply
it against the remaining number of seats. The product, which shall
not be rounded off, will be the additional number of seats allotted for
the party list but the 3 seat limit rule shall still be observed.

Example:
In this case, the BUHAY party-list garnered the highest total vote of
1,169,234 which is 7.33% of the total votes cast for the party-list
elections (15,950,900).
Applying the formula above: (Percentage of vote garnered) x
(remaining seats) = number of additional seat
Hence, 7.33% x 38 = 2.79
Rounding off to the next higher number is not allowed so 2.79
remains 2. BUHAY is a two-percenter which means it has a
guaranteed one seat PLUS additional 2 seats or a total of 3 seats.
Now if it so happens that BUHAY got 20% of the votes cast, it will still
get 3 seats because the 3 seat limit rule prohibits it from having more
than 3 seats.
Now after all the tw0-percenters were given their guaranteed and
additional seats, and there are still unoccupied seats, those seats
shall be distributed to the remaining party-lists and those higher in
rank in the voting shall be prioritized until all the seats are occupied.
5. No. By a vote of 8-7, the Supreme Court continued to disallow
major political parties (the likes of UNIDO, LABAN, etc) from
participating in the party-list elections.
Although the ponencia (Justice Carpio) did point out that there is no
prohibition either from the Constitution or from RA 7941 against
major political parties from participating in the party-list elections as
the word party was not qualified and that even the framers of the
Constitution in their deliberations deliberately allowed major political
parties to participate in the party-list elections provided that they
establish a sectoral wing which represents the marginalized (indirect
participation), Justice Puno, in his separate opinion, concurred by 7
other justices, explained that the will of the people defeats the will of
the framers of the Constitution precisely because it is the people who
ultimately ratified the Constitution and the will of the people is that
only the marginalized sections of the country shall participate in the

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party-list elections. Hence, major political parties cannot participate in


the party-list elections, directly or indirectly.
6. Yes, the 3 seat limit rule is valid. This is one way to ensure that no
one party shall dominate the party-list system.

RATIO: The new guidelines are as follows:


I. Parameters. In qualifying party-lists, the COMELEC must use the
following parameters:

CASE 34: ATONG PAGLAUM ET AL v. COMELEC (April 2013)NINA TABALINGCOS

1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list


system: (1) national parties or organizations, (2) regional
parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or
organizations.

FACTS: A few weeks before the elections, the Supreme Court in


Atong Paglaum Inc. vs. Commission on Electionsreinterpreted
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution and reversed its own ruling in
Ang Bagong Bayani andBarangay Association for National
Advancement and Transparency v. Commission on Elections
(BANAT).

2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or


organizations do not need to organize along sectoral lines
and do not need to represent any marginalized and
underrepresented sector.

In granting the petition of 52 party list groups and organizations


which were disqualified by the Commission onElection from
participating in the May 13, 2013 party list elections because they
allegedly do not represent themarginalized and underrepresented
sector of society, the majority is of the view that the party list
systemincludes not only sectoral parties but also non-sectoral
parties.Hence, contrary to the Ang Bagong Bayani, the party-list
system is not the exclusive domain of sectoralrepresentatives
belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors but
may be participated in by non-sectoral parties as well who do not
need to represent marginalized and underrepresented sector.
ISSUE: WON Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in
following prevailing decisions of thiscourt in disqualifying petitioners
from participating in the coming 13 may 2013 party-list elections
HELD: No.

3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided


they register under the party-list system and do not field
candidates in legislative district elections. A political party,
whether major or not, that fields candidates in legislative
district elections can participate in party-list elections only
through its sectoral wing that can separately register under
the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an
independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party
through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be marginalized
and underrepresented or lacking in well-defined political
constituencies. It is enough that their principal advocacy
pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector.
The sectors that are marginalized and underrepresented
include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas
workers. The sectors that lack well-defined political
constituencies include professionals, the elderly, women,
and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or
organizations that represent the marginalized and
underrepresented must belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented sector they represent. Similarly, a

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majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations


that lack well-defined political constituencies must belong to
the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties
or organizations that represent the marginalized and
underrepresented, or that represent those who lack welldefined political constituencies, either must belong to their
respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy
for their respective sectors. The nominees of national and
regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide members
of such parties or organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall
not be disqualified if some of their nominees are disqualified,
provided that they have at least one nominee who remains
qualified.
II. In the BANAT case, major political parties are disallowed, as
has always been the practice, from participating in the party-list
elections. But, since theres really no constitutional prohibition nor
a statutory prohibition, major political parties can now participate
in the party-list system provided that they do so through their
bona fide sectoral wing (see parameter 3 above). Allowing major
political parties to participate, albeit indirectly, in the party-list
elections will encourage them to work assiduously in extending
their constituencies to the marginalized and underrepresented
and to those who lack well-defined political constituencies.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court gave weight to the deliberations of
the Constitutional Commission when they were drafting the partylist system provision of the Constitution. The Commissioners
deliberated that it was their intention to include all parties into the
party-list elections in order to develop a political system which is
pluralistic and multiparty. (In the BANAT case, Justice Puno
emphasized that the will of the people should defeat the intent of
the framers; and that the intent of the people, in ratifying the 1987
Constitution, is that the party-list system should be reserved for
the marginalized sectors.)
III.The Supreme Court also emphasized that the party-list system
is NOT RESERVED for the marginalized and underrepresented
or for parties who lack well-defined political constituencies. It is

also for national or regional parties. It is also for small ideologybased and cause-oriented parties who lack well-defined political
constituencies. The common denominator however is that all of
them cannot, they do not have the machinery unlike major
political parties, to field or sponsor candidates in the legislative
districts but they can acquire the needed votes in a national
election system like the party-list system of elections. If the partylist system is only reserved for marginalized representation, then
the system itself unduly excludes other cause-oriented groups
from running for a seat in the lower house. As explained by the
Supreme Court, party-list representation should not be
understood to include only labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans,
overseas workers, and other sectors that by their nature are
economically at the margins of society. It should be noted that
Section 5 of Republic Act 7941 includes, among others, in its
provision for sectoral representation groups of professionals,
which are not per se economically marginalized but are still
qualified as marginalized, underrepresented, and do not have
well-defined political constituencies as they are ideologically
marginalized.
CASE 35: LIBERAL PARTY v. COMELEC- FRANCES BUBAN
FACTS: On July 14, 2009, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution
No. 8646 setting August 17, 2009 as the last day for the filing of
petitions for registration of political parties. On January 21, 2010,
the COMELEC promulgated another resolution providing for the rules
for the filing of petitions for accreditation for the determination of the
dominant majority party, the dominant minority party, ten major
national parties, and two major local parties for the May 10, 2010
elections. Resolution No. 8752 also set the deadline for filing of
petitions for accreditation on February 12, 2010 and required that
accreditation applicants be registered political parties, organizations
or coalitions. On February 12, 2010, the LP filed with the COMELEC
its petition for accreditation as dominant minority party. On the same
date, the Nacionalista Party (NP) and the Nationalist Peoples
Coalition (NPC) filed a petition for registration as a coalition (NPNPC) and asked that it be recognized and accredited as the
dominant minority party for purposes of the May 10, 2010 elections.

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It held that the NP-NPC satisfactorily submitted all the documentary


requirements to prove the mergers validity. It opined that if the
Constitution and By-Laws of either the NP or the NPC was violated
by the merger, the representatives or members of either party
possess the legal standing to question the coalition; the LP, a
stranger to the internal dynamics of both parties, does not have this
required standing. LP then assailed the comelec resolution.
Petitioner attached the Sworn Affidavits of two prominent members
of the NPC, namely: Atty. Sixto S. Brillantes (the current NPC Legal
Counsel) and Daniel Laogan (a member of the NPCs National
Central Committee) to show that the NP-NPC was entered into
without consultations; much less, the approval of the NPCs National
Convention which was not even convened.
COMELEC Resolution No. 8752 requires that only political parties
duly registered with the COMELEC may seek accreditation as a
dominant party. At the time the NP-NPC filed its petition for
accreditation on February 12, 2010, it was still seeking registration as
a coalition of political parties. By filing the petition, both the NP and
the NPC admitted that the COMELEC had not extended any
recognition to their coalition; without the requisite recognition and
registration, the NP-NPC could not seek accreditation as the
dominant minority party for the May 10, 2010 elections.
ISSUE: WON registered political parties still have to register
separately if they want to be registered coalitions
WON they can be accredited before registration
HELD: Yes.
RATIO: (1) Political coalitions, even if composed of registered
political parties, need to register separately in accordance with
established norms and procedures, if they are to be recognized as
such and be given the benefits accorded by law to registered
coalitions. Registered political parties carry a different legal
personality from that of the coalition they may wish to establish with
other registered parties. If parties want to coalesce with one another
without the formal registration of their coalition, they can do so on
their own in the exercise of their and their members democratic

freedom of choice, but they cannot receive official recognition for


their coalition.
(2) The present petition has openly stated its objective of forestalling
the accreditation of the respondent NP-NPC; the petition expressly
and frontally sought the issuance of a writ of prohibition and
restraining order to prevent the COMELEC from accrediting a
coalition that is not registered as a party. The combination of a
petition for certiorari and for prohibition under the circumstances of
the present case is fully justified, as the registration and the
accreditation that the petition covers are linked with and in fact
sequentially follow one another. Accreditation can only be granted to
a registered political party, organization or coalition; stated otherwise,
a registration must first take place before a request for accreditation
can be made. Once registration has been carried out, accreditation is
the next natural step to follow.

VIII.
CANDIDATES
CANDIDACY

AND

CERTIFICATES

OF

QUALIFICATIONS
SECS. 63-78, OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE
CASE 36: FRIVALDO v. COMELEC- NORIEL ALEJANDRO
FACTS: Petitioner was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of
Sorsogon on January 22, 1988. On October 27, 1988, respondents
filed with the COMELEC a petition for the annulment of petitioners
election and proclamation on the ground that he was a naturalized
American citizen and had not reacquired Philippine citizenship on the
day of the election on January 18, 1988. He was therefore not
qualified to run for and be elected governor.
Petitioner insisted that he was a citizen of the Philippines because
his naturalization as an American citizen was not impressed with
voluntariness. His oath in his COC that he was a natural-born citizen
should be a sufficient act of repatriation. Additionally, his active
participation in the 1987 congressional elections had divested him of

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American citizenship under the laws of the US, thus restoring his
Philippine citizenship.
The Solicitor General contends that petitioner was not a citizen of the
Philippines and had not repatriated himself after his naturalization as
an American citizen. As an alien, he was disqualified for public office
in the Philippines. His election did not cure of this defect because the
electorate could not amend the Constitution, the Local Government
Code and the Omnibus Election Code.
ISSUE: WON petitioner was qualified to run for public office.

St. Pauls College now Divine Word University also in


Tacloban. Subsequently, she taught in Leyte Chinese School still in
Tacloban. She went to manila during 1952 to work with her cousin,
the late speaker Daniel Romualdez in his office in the House of
Representatives. In 1954, she married late President Ferdinand
Marcos when he was still a Congressman of Ilocos Norte and was
registered there as a voter. When Pres. Marcos was elected as
Senator in 1959, they lived together in San Juan, Rizal where she
registered as a voter. In 1965, when Marcos won presidency, they
lived in Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel
Manila. She served as member of the Batasang Pambansa and
Governor of Metro Manila during 1978.

HELD: No.
RATIO: Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements
and must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or
election or assumption of office but during the officers entire tenure.
Once any of the required qualifications is lost, his title may be
seasonably challenged.

ISSUEL WON petitioner has satisfied the 1year residency


requirement to be eligible in running as representative of the First
District of Leyte.

CASE 37: MARCOS v. COMELEC- JENNIFER BALMEO

RATIO: Residence is used synonymously with domicile for election


purposes. The court are in favor of a conclusion supporting
petitoners claim of legal residence or domicile in the First District of
Leyte despite her own declaration of 7 months residency in the
district for the following reasons:

FACTS: Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was running for the position of


Representative of the First District of Leyte for the 1995
Elections. Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the
First District of Leyte and also a candidate for the same position, filed
a Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification" with the Commission
on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional
requirement for residency. The petitioner, in an honest
misrepresentation, wrote seven months under residency, which she
sought to rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in her
Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy filed on March 29, 1995
and that "she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile
or residence. She arrived at the seven months residency due to the
fact that she became a resident of the Municipality of Tolosa in said
months.
Imelda established her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte where she
studied and graduated high school in the Holy Infant Academy from
1938 to 1949. She then pursued her college degree, education, in

HELD: Yes.

1. A minor follows domicile of her parents. Tacloban became


Imeldas domicile of origin by operation of law when her father
brought them to Leyte;
2. Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual removal or
change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former
residence and establishing a new one, and acts which correspond
with the purpose. In the absence and concurrence of all these,
domicile of origin should be deemed to continue.
3. A wife does not automatically gain the husbands domicile
because the term residence in Civil Law does not mean the same
thing in Political Law. When Imelda married late President Marcos in

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1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home
and not domicilium necessarium.
4. Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her marriage
and acquired right to choose a new one only after the death of Pres.
Marcos, her actions upon returning to the country clearly indicated
that she chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of
choice. To add, petitioner even obtained her residence certificate in
1992 in Tacloban, Leyte while living in her brothers house, an act,
which supports the domiciliary intention clearly manifested. She
even kept close ties by establishing residences in Tacloban,
celebrating her birthdays and other important milestones.
CASE 38: AQUINO v. COMELEC (September 1995)- JOSHUA
BAGOTSAY
FACTS: Petitioner Agapito Aquino filed his certificate of candidacy
for the position of Representative for the Second District of Makati
City. Private respondents Move Makati, a duly registered political
party, and Mateo Bedon,Chairman of LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of
Brgy.Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify petitioner on
the ground that the latter lacked the residence qualification as a
candidate for congressman which, under Sec. 6, Art. VI of the
Constitution, should be for a period not less than 1 year immediately
preceding the elections.

indicated that he was also a registered voter of the same district. His
birth certificate places Concepcion, Tarlac as the birthplace of his
parents. What stands consistently clear and unassailable is that his
domicile of origin of record up to the time of filing of his most recent
certificate of candidacy for the 1995 elections was Concepcion,
Tarlac.
The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is
evident in his leasing a condominium unit instead of buying one.
While a lease contract maybe indicative of petitioners intention to
reside in Makati City, it does notengender the kind of permanency
required to prove abandonment of onesoriginal domicile.
Petitioners assertion that he has transferred his domicile from Tarlac
to Makatiis a bare assertion which is hardly supported by the facts.
To successfully effecta change of domicile, petitioner must prove an
actual removal or an actualchange of domicile; a bona fide intention
of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new
one and definite acts which correspond withthe purpose. In the
absence of clear and positive proof, the domicile of originshould be
deemed to continue.

DISQUALIFICATIONS
SECS. 12 & 68, OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE

ISSUE: WON the petitioner lacked the residence qualification as a


candidate for congressman as mandated by Sec. 6, Art.VI of the
Constitution.

SEC. 40, LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE

HELD: Yes.

FACTS: The instant special civil action for certiorari and prohibition
impugns the resolution of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) en banc in SPA No. 95-212 dated July 31, 1996,
dismissing petitioner's motion for reconsideration of an earlier
resolution rendered by the COMELEC's First Division on October 6,
1995, which also dismissed the petition for disqualification filed by
petitioner Wilmer Grego against private respondent Humberto Basco.

RATIO: In order that petitioner could qualify as a candidate for


Representative of the Second District of Makati City, he must prove
that he has established not just residence but domicile of choice.
Petitioner, in his certificate of candidacy for the 1992 elections,
indicated not only that he was a resident of San Jose, Concepcion,
Tarlac in 1992 but that he was a resident of the same for 52 years
immediately preceding that elections. At that time, his certificate

CASE 39: GREGO v. COMELEC- DON TUTAAN

On October 31, 1981, before the effectivity of the Local Government


Code of 1991, private respondent Humberto Basco was removed

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from his position as Deputy Sheriff by no less than the Supreme


Court upon a finding of serious misconduct in an administrative
complaint.
Subsequently, Basco ran as a candidate for councilor in the Second
District of the City of Manila in the January 18, 1988 local elections.
He won and assumed office. He was successfully re-elected in 1992
and 1995. After his term, Basco sought re-election in the May 11,
1992 synchronized national elections. Again, he succeeded in his bid
and he was elected as one of the six (6) City Councilors. However,
his victory this time did not remain unchallenged. In the midst of his
successful re-election, he found himself besieged by lawsuits of his
opponents in the polls who wanted to dislodge him from his position.
It was his latest re-election which is the subject of the present petition
on the ground that he is disqualified under Section 40(b) of the LGC
of 1991. Sec 40 (b) of Republic Act 7160 (the Local Government
Code) which took effect on January 1, 1992, disqualifies a person for
any elective position on the ground that had been removed from
office as a result of an administrative case. Under said section,
those removed from office as a result of an administrative case are
disqualified to run for any elective local position. Respondent
contends that the petitioner is not entitled to the said relief because
Section 40 par. b of the LGC may not be validly applied to persons
who were dismissed prior to its effectivity. To do so would make it ex
post facto, bill of attainder, and retroactive legislation which impairs
vested right.
ISSUE: Does Section 40(b) of the Local Government Code of 1991
apply retroactively to those removed from office before it took effect
on January 1, 1992?
HELD AND RATIO: The Supreme Court held that its refusal to give
retroactive application to the provision of Section 40(b) is already a
settled issue and there exist no compelling reason for the Court to
depart therefrom. That the provision of the Code in question does not
qualify the date of a candidates removal from office and that it is
couched in the past tense should not deter the Court from applying
the law prospectively. A statute, despite the generality in its
language, must not be so construed as to overreach acts, events or
matters which transpired before its passage. Well-settled is the

principle that while the Legislature has the power to pass retroactive
laws which do not impair the obligation of contracts, or affect
injuriously vested rights, it is equally true that statutes are not to be
construed as intended to have a retroactive effect so as to affect
pending proceedings, unless such intent is expressly declared or
clearly and necessarily implied from the language of the
enactment. That the provision of the Code in question does not
qualify the date of a candidate's removal from office and that it is
couched in the past tense should not deter us from applying the law
prospectively. The basic tenet in legal hermeneutics that laws
operate only prospectively and not retroactively provides the
qualification sought by petitioner. A statute, despite the generality in
its language, must not be so construed as to overreach acts, events
or matters which transpired before its passage. Lex prospicit, non
respicit. The law looks forward, not backward. Thus, in Miners
Association of the Philippines, Inc. v. Factoran, Jr., the Court ruled
that: We reiterate the principle that the power of administrative
officials to promulgate rules and regulations in the implementation of
a statute is necessarily limited only to carrying into effect what is
provided in the legislative enactment. The principle was enunciated
as early as 1908 in the case ofUnited States v. Barrias. The scope of
the exercise of such rule-making power was clearly expressed in the
case of United States v. Tupasi Molina, decided in 1914, thus: "Of
course, the regulations adopted under legislative authority by a
particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the
law, and for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general
provisions. By such regulations, of course, the law itself can not be
extended. So long, however, as the regulations relate solely to
carrying into effect the provision of the law, they are valid.
Recently, the case of People v. Maceren gave a brief delineation of
the scope of said power of administrative officials: Administrative
regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular
department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and
should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general
provisions. By such regulations, of course, the law itself cannot be
extended (U.S. v. Tupasi Molina, supra). An administrative agency
cannot amend an act of Congress (Santos v. Estenzo, 109 Phil. 419,
422; Teoxon vs. Members of the Board of Administrators, L-25619,
June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 585; Manuel vs. General Auditing Office, L-

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28952, December 29, 1971, 42 SCRA 660; Deluao v. Casteel, L21906, August 29, 1969, 29 SCRA 350). The rule-making power
must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceeding to
carry into effect the law as it has been enacted. The power cannot be
extended to amending or expanding the statutory requirements or to
embrace matters not covered by the statute. Rules that subvert the
statute cannot be sanctioned (University of Santo Tomas v. Board of
Tax Appeals, 93 Phil. 376, 382, citing 12 C.J. 845-46. As to invalid
regulations, see Collector of Internal Revenue v. Villaflor, 69 Phil.
319; Wise & Co. v. Meer, 78 Phil. 655, 676; Del Mar v. Phil. Veterans
Administration, L-27299, June 27, 1973, 51 SCRA 340, 349).
Obviously, he may not be declared a winner. In the first place, Basco
was a duly qualified candidate pursuant to our disquisition above.
Furthermore, he clearly received the winning number of votes which
put him in sixth place. Thus, petitioner's emphatic reference to Labo
v. COMELEC, where we laid down a possible exception to the rule
that a second placer may not be declared the winning candidate,
finds no application in this case. The exception is predicated on the
concurrence of two assumptions, namely: (1) the one who obtained
the highest number of votes is disqualified; and (2) the electorate is
fully aware in fact and in law of a candidate's disqualification so as to
bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety but would
nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the ineligible candidate. Both
assumptions, however, are absent in this case. Petitioner's allegation
that Basco was well-known to have been disqualified in the small
community where he ran as a candidate is purely speculative and
conjectural, unsupported as it is by any convincing facts of record to
show notoriety of his alleged disqualification. In sum, we see the
dismissal of the petition for disqualification as not having been
attended by grave abuse of discretion. There is then no more legal
impediment for private respondent's continuance in office as City
Councilor for the Second District of Manila. office as City Councilor
for the Second District of Manila.
CASE 40: MERCADO v. MANZANO (1999)- GC PILLENA
FACTS: Mercado and Manzano were candidates for vice mayor of
Makati City in the 1998 elections. Manzano won against Mercado by
2,959 votes. However, his proclamation was suspended when a

certain Mamaril, a registered voter of Makati City, instituted a


disqualification proceeding on the ground of dual citizenship under
Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code or RA 7160, which
provides, Those holding dual citizenship are disqualified from
running for any elective local position.
When there had been no proclamation of the winner, Mercado filed a
Motion for Leave to File Intervention. His purpose was to have
Manzano disqualified to hold office of vice mayor of Makati City.
ISSUES:
1. WON the one who placed second to the disqualified candidate
may be declared the winner; and
2. WON dual citizenship can be a ground for disqualification.
HELD:
1. Yes.
2. Yes. However, this case refers to dual allegiance, and Manzano
effectively repudiated his American citizenship.
RATIO:
1. Under the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, one who placed second
has the right to intervene for the disqualification against the
disqualified candidate. Intervention may be allowed in proceedings
for disqualification even after election if there has yet been no final
judgment rendered.
There had been no proclamation at that time. Certainly, Mercado
had, and still has, an interest in outing Manzano from the race. If a
registered voter such as Mamaril was competent to bring the action,
so was Mercado since he was a rival candidate.
2. By declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino
citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of another
country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the
Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he
does so without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as
the laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his
American citizenship and anything which he may have said before as
a dual citizen.

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The phrase dual citizenship in RA 7160 must be understood as


referring to dual allegiance. Consequently, persons with mere dual
citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with
dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with
respect to the termination of their status, for candidates with dual
citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of
candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status
as persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the
unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states.

TERM LIMITS
CASE 41: ABUNDO v. COMELEC (January 2013)- PATRICIA
CAALITA
FACTS: For 4 successive elections, national and local, Abundo vied
for the position of municipal mayor of Viga Catanduanes. In both
2001 and 2007 elections he won as mayor and served his term In
the 2004 election, one Torres was proclaimed winner and performed
the function as mayor. Abundo protested Torres' election and
proclamation and he succeeded. Abundo was then proclaimed as
mayor. He assumed office starting May 9, 2006 until the end of the
2004-2007 term on June 30, 2007.
In the 2010 elections Abundo and Torres again opposed each other.
Torres sought to disqualify Abundo invoking the 3-consecutive term
limit rule. Despite the disqualification case against him, Abundo was
proclaimed winner. Before Comelec could resolve the adverted
disqualification case, herein private respondent Vega commenced a
quo warranto action before RTC of Virac to unseat Abundo on
essentially the same grounds Torres raised in his petition to
disqualify.
RTC ruled against Abundo and proclaimed him as ineligible to serve
as municipal mayor. RTC found Abundo already served three
consecutive terms. COMELEC likewise ruled against Abundo. It held
that, with regard to the service of Abundo as mayor when he won
over election protest filed by him against Torres in 2004 elections,
service of an unexpired term is equivalent to service of a full term

within the contemplation of the 3-term limit rule. Hence, the present
petition.
ISSUE: WON Abundo is deemed to have served three consecutive
terms.
HELD: No.
RATIO: The consecutiveness of what would have been Abundo's
three successive continuous mayorship was effectively broken during
2004-2007 term when he was initially deprived of title to an office
which he, after due proceedings was eventually declared to have
been the rightful choice of the electorate.
Section 8, Art. X of the 1987 Constitution expressly provides for the
3-term limit rule. It expresses that voluntary renunciation of the office
for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in
the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.
It was held that there are two requisites to be considered as a
disqualification to run for the election pursuant to the above stated
rule:
1.) that the official concerned has been elected for 3 consecutive
terms
in
the
same
local
government
post
2.) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.
The intention behind the three-term limit rule was not only to
abrogate the "monopolization of political power" and prevent elected
officials from breeding propriety interest in their position but also to
enhance the people's freedom of choice. The Court held that the
two-year period during which his opponent Torres was serving as
mayor shall be considered as an interruption, which effectively
removed Abundo's case from the ambit of the 3-term limit rule. This
constitutes an involuntary interruption of Abundo's mayoralty. The
Constitution only provides for voluntary renunciation not to be
considered as interruption in the service of ones term of office.
A "term" as defined in Appari v. CA means in a legal sense "a fixed
and definite period of time which the law describes that an officer
may hold an office." It also means the "time during which the officer

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may claim to hold office as a matter of right, and fixes the interval
after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another". In
the present case, during the period of one year and ten months,
Abundo cannot plausibly claim, even if he wanted to, that he could
hold office of the mayor as a matter of right. This is because at that
time title to hold office and the right to such still belonged to his
opponent, Torres, as proclaimed election winner. Abundo only held
office upon declaration when he filed an election protest. Abundo's
service of Torres' unexpired term shall not be considered as one full
term. The service of Torres shall be considered as an involuntary
interruption of Abundo's service.
CASE 42: BORJA v. COMELEC- JIMUEL MATIAS
FACTS: Private respondent Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected vicemayor of Pateros on January 18, 1988 for a term ending June 30,
1992. On September 2, 1989, he became mayor, by operation of
law, upon the death of the incumbent, Cesar Borja. On May 11,
1992, he ran and was elected mayor for a term of three years which
ended on June 30, 1995. On May 8, 1995, he was reelected mayor
for another term of three years ending June 30, 1998.
Private respondent Capco filed a certificate of candidacy for mayor of
Pateros relative to the May 11, 1998 elections. Petitioner Benjamin
U. Borja, Jr., who was also a candidate for mayor, sought Capcos
disqualification on the theory that the latter would have already
served as mayor for three consecutive terms by June 30, 1998 and
would therefore be ineligible to serve for another term after that.
The Second Division of the Commission on Elections ruled in favor of
petitioner and declared private respondent Capco disqualified from
running for reelection as mayor of Pateros. However, on motion of
private respondent, the COMELEC en banc, voting 5-2, reversed the
decision and declared Capco eligible to run for mayor in the May 11,
1998 elections.
Private respondent was voted for in the elections. He received
16,558 votes against petitioners 7,773 votes and was proclaimed
elected by the Municipal Board of Canvassers.

ISSUE: WON Capco who succeeds to the office of mayor by


operation of law and serves the remainder of the term is considered
to have served a term in that office for the purpose of the three-term
limit.
HELD: No
RATIO: Article X, Sec. 8 of the Constitution provides that the term
of office of elective local officials shall be three years and no
such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the
full term for which he was elected.
Not only historical examination but textual analysis as well supports
the ruling of the COMELEC that Sec. 8 Art. 10 contemplates service
by local officials for three consecutive terms as a result of
election. The first sentence speaks of the term of office
of elective local officials and bars such officials from serving for more
than three consecutive terms. The second sentence, in explaining
when an elective local official may be deemed to have served his full
term of office, states that voluntary renunciation of the office for any
length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of his service for the full term for which he was
elected. The term served must therefore be one for which the official
concerned was elected. The purpose of this provision is to prevent a
circumvention of the limitation on the number of terms an elective
official may serve. Conversely, if he is not serving a term for which
he was elected because he is simply continuing the service of the
official he succeeds, such official cannot be considered to have fully
served the term now withstanding his voluntary renunciation of office
prior to its expiration.
This provision is restated in par. 43(b) of the Local Government Code
which states that no local elective official shall serve for more than
3 consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of
the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the
elective official concerned was elected.

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The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the
right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective
position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has
served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must
also have been elected to the same position for the same number of
times before the disqualification can apply.
To consider Capco to have served the first term in full and therefore
ineligible to run a third time for reelection would be not only to falsify
reality but also to unduly restrict the right of the people to choose
whom they wish to govern them. If the vice-mayor turns out to be a
bad mayor, the people can remedy the situation by simply not
reelecting him for another term. But if, on the other hand, he proves
to be a good mayor, there will be no way the people can return him
to office if his service of the first term is counted as one of the
purpose of applying the term limit. To consider Capco as eligible for
reelection would be in accord with the understanding of the
Constitutional Commission that while the people should be protected
from the evils that a monopoly of political power may bring about,
care should be taken that their freedom of choice is not unduly
curtailed.

CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY
SEC. 7, R.A. No. 7166
SECS. 73-78, OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE
CASE 43: GADOR v. COMELEC (January 1980)- GABRIEL
ABLOLA
FACTS: The petition alleges that the petitioner is a candidate for the
Office of Mayor of the City of Ozamiz as Independent this coming
January 30, 1980 local election. He filed his certificate of candidacy
with the Election Registrar of Ozamis City on January 7, 1980
because of the news in the Bulletin Today. The said news stated that
the respondent COMELEC issued a resolution for the extension of
time for filing COC. However, the President denied said resolution.
Therefore, respondent COMELEC informed the petitioner that his
name might not be included in the list of candidates for mayor

because

of

the

said

incident.

Thus,

this

petition.

ISSUE: WON the certificate of candidacy is valid.


HELD: No.
RATIO: A certificate of candidacy filed beyond reglementary period
is void. Section 7, Batasang Pambansa Bilang 52, provides that
"The sworn certificate of candidacy shall be filed in triplicate not later
than January 4, 1980." It is a fact admitted by the petitioner that the
President had not extended the period within which to file the
certificate of candidacy.
This Court is powerless to grant the remedy prayed for in the petition.
Having been filed beyond January 4, 1980, the certificate of
candidacy of the petitioner is void.
CASE 44: SINACA v. MULA (September 1999)- JOANNA
SARIBONG
FACTS: The two opposing factions of the ruling party LAKAS filled in
separate candidates for the position of mayor of the Municipality of
Malimano, Surigao del Norte. One faction which is the BARBERS
Wing nominated Grachil G. Canoy, while the other group
MATUGAS Wing endorsed the candidacy of Teodoro F. Sinaca, Jr.
Miguel H. Mula, a candidate for vice-mayor and belonging to the
BARBERS Wing, filed before the COMELEC a petition for
disqualification against Teodoro and cancellation of his certificate of
candidacy because of prior conviction of bigamy.
Petitioner Emmanuel D. Sinaca, an independent candidate, withdrew
his certificate of candidacy for Sangguniang Bayan Member, became
a member of the LAKAS party and was nominated by the LAKAS
MATUGAS Wing as the substitute mayoralty candidate.
On the basis of said nomination, Emmanuel filed his certificate of
candidacy attached thereto is his certificate of nomination as LAKAS
mayoralty candidate signed by Governor Francisco T. Matugas, as

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party provincial chairman together


acceptance of the partys nomination.

with

Emmanuels

written

Mula filed another petition for disqualification against Emmanuel. He


contended that the nomination of Emmanuel as substitute candidate
is illegal on the ground that Emmanuel, before he filed his Certificate
of Candidacy as LAKAS candidate, was an independent
candidate. Being so, he cannot rightfully substitute the disqualified
one. The Comelec dismissed the petition and upheld the candidacy
of Emmanuel.
Mula filed a motion for reconsideration alleging that the nomination of
Emmanuel is void since he was an independent candidate prior to
his nomination. The Comelec disqualified Emmanuel on the ground
that he was an independent candidate for councilor at the time he
filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor as a substitute of a
disqualified candidate. Thus, he did not belong to the same political
party as the substituted candidate.
ISSUE: WON Emmanuel is disqualified as a substitute candidate
HELD: No.
RATIO: The Comelec disqualified Emmanuel solely on the basis that
he was an independent candidate prior to his nomination as a
substitute candidate.
The rule on substitution of an official candidate of a registered or
accredited political party who dies, withdraws or is disqualified for
any cause after the last day for the filing of certificates of candidacy
is governed by Sec. 77 of the Omnibus Election Code which
provides: If after the last day for the filing of certificates of candidacy,
an official candidate of a registered or accredited political party dies,
withdraws or is disqualified for any cause, only a person belonging
to, and certified by, the same political party may file a certificate of
candidacy to replace the candidate who died, withdrew or was
disqualified. The substitute candidate nominated by the political
party concerned may file his certificate of candidacy for the office
affected in accordance with the preceding sections not later than
mid-day of the day of the election. If the death, withdrawal or
disqualification should occur between the day before the election and

mid-day of election day, said certificate maybe filed with any board of
election inspectors in the political subdivision where he is a
candidate, or, in the case of candidates to be voted for by the entire
electorate of the country, with the Commission.
Thus, under the said provision it is necessary that the substitute
candidate must be of the same political party as the original
candidate and must be duly nominated as such by the political party.
The certificate of candidacy of Emmanuel permitted the placing of his
name before the electorate. It constituted an authorized badge,
which the voter could scrutinize before casting his ballot. Thus, with
the declaration of Emmanuel in his certificate of candidacy that he is
affiliated with the LAKAS party, he was effectively voted by the
electorate not as an independent candidate, but as a member of the
LAKAS party. His allegation in the certificate of candidacy as to
political party to which he belongs is sufficient to make the electorate
conscious of the platform of the said political party.

IX. DISQUALIFICATION OF CANDIDATES; GROUNDS,


PROCEDURE AND EFFECTS OF
CASE 45: TORAYNO v. COMELEC (August 2000)- JEAN GUECO
FACTS: During the 1995 elections, Vicente Y. Emano ran for, was
elected, and proclaimed provincial governor of Misamis Oriental. It
was his third consecutive term as governor of the province. In his
Certificate of Candidacy dated March 12, 1995, his residence was
declared to be in Tagoloan, Misamis Oriental.
On June 14, 1997, while still the governor of Misamis Oriental,
Emano executed a Voter Registration Record in Cagayan de Oro
City (geographically located in the Province of Misamis Oriental), a
highly urbanized city, in which he claimed 20 years of residence. On
March 25, 1998, he filed his Certificate of Candidacy for mayor of the
city, stating therein that his residence for the preceding two years
and five months was at 1409 San Jose Street, Capistrano
Subdivision, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City.
Among those who ran for the mayorship of the city in 1998, along
with Emano, was Erasmo B. Damasing, counsel of herein

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petitioners. On May 15, 1998, Petitioners Rogelio M. Torayno Sr.,


Generoso Q. Eligan and Jacqueline M. Serio, all residents of
Cagayan de Oro City, filed a Petition before the Comelec, in which
they sought the disqualification of Emano as mayoral candidate, on
the ground that he had allegedly failed to meet the one-year
residence requirement. Prior to the resolution of their Petition, the
Comelec proclaimed private respondent as the duly elected city
mayor. Thus, on May 29, 1998, petitioners filed another Petition
before the Comelec, this time for quo warranto, in which they sought
(1) the annulment of the election of private respondent; and (2) the
proclamation of Erasmo B. Damasing, who had garnered the next
highest number of votes, as the duly elected mayor of the city.
Comelec ruled that "[t]he records clearly show that the respondent is
an actual resident of Cagayan de Oro City for such a period of time
necessary to qualify him to run for mayor therein. This fact is clearly
established by the respondent having a house in the city which has
been existing therein since 1973 and where his family has been
living since then." And that "There is nothing in the law which bars an
elected provincial official from residing and/or registering as a voter
in a highly urbanized city whose residents are not given the right to
vote for and be elected to a position in the province embracing such
highly urbanized city as long as he has complied with the
requirements prescribed by law in the case of a qualified voter.
ISSUES:
1. WON private respondent had duly established his residence in
Cagayan de Oro City at least one year prior to the May 11, 1998
elections to qualify him to run for the mayorship thereof; and
2. If not, WON Erasmo Damasing, the candidate who had received
the second highest number of votes, should be proclaimed mayor of
the city.
HELD:
1. Yes.
2. No.
RATIO:SEC. 39. Qualifications. - (a) An elective local official must
be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay,
municipality, city, or province x x x where he intends to be elected; a

resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the
day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other
local language or dialect.
Petitioners claim that in discharging his duties as provincial governor,
private respondent remained a resident of the province. They aver
that residence is a continuing qualification that an elective official
must possess throughout his term. Thus, private respondent could
not have changed his residence to Cagayan de Oro City while he
was still governor of Misamis Oriental.
Petitioners further contend that the following were not sufficient to
constitute a change of domicile: having a house in Cagayan de Oro
City, residing therein while exercising one's office as governor (the
city being the seat of government of the province), securing a
residence certificate and registering as voter therein.
Generally, in requiring candidates to have a minimum period of
residence in the area in which they seek to be elected, the
Constitution or the law intends to prevent the possibility of a
"stranger or newcomer unacquainted with the conditions and needs
of a community and not identified with the latter from [seeking] an
elective office to serve that community. Such provision is aimed at
excluding outsiders "from taking advantage of favorable
circumstances existing in that community for electoral
gain." Establishing residence in a community merely to meet an
election law requirement defeats the purpose of representation: to
elect through the assent of voters those most cognizant and
sensitive to the needs of the community. This purpose is "best met
by individuals who have either had actual residence in the area for a
given period or who have been domiciled in the same area either by
origin or by choice.
In the case at bar, the Comelec found that private respondent and
his family had actually been residing in Capistrano Subdivision,
Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City, in a house he had bought in
1973. Furthermore, during the three terms (1988-1998) that he was
governor of Misamis Oriental, he physically lived in that city, where
the seat of the provincial government was located. In June 1997, he
also registered as voter of the same city. Based on our ruling
in Mamba-Perez, these facts indubitably prove that Vicente Y.

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Emano was a resident of Cagayan de Oro City for a period of time


sufficient to qualify him to run for public office therein. Moreover, the
Comelec did not find any bad faith on the part of Emano in his choice
of residence.
Petitioners put much emphasis on the fact that Cagayan de Oro City
is a highly urbanized city whose voters cannot participate in the
provincial elections. Such political subdivisions and voting
restrictions, however, are simply for the purpose of parity in
representation. The classification of an area as a highly urbanized or
independent component city, for that matter, does not completely
isolate its residents, politics, commerce and other businesses from
the entire province -- and vice versa -- especially when the city is
located at the very heart of the province itself, as in this case.
Undeniably, Cagayan de Oro City was once an integral part of
Misamis Oriental and remains a geographical part of the
province. Not only is it at the center of the province; more important,
it is itself the seat of the provincial government. As a consequence,
the provincial officials who carry out their functions in the city cannot
avoid residing therein; much less, getting acquainted with its
concerns and interests. Vicente Y. Emano, having been the
governor of Misamis Oriental for three terms and consequently
residing in Cagayan de Oro City within that period, could not be said
to be a stranger or newcomer to the city in the last year of his third
term, when he decided to adopt it as his permanent place of
residence.
Private respondent was actually and physically residing in Cagayan
de Oro City while discharging his duties as governor of Misamis
Oriental. He owned a house in the city and resided there together
with his family. He even paid his 1998 community tax and registered
as a voter therein. To all intents and purposes of the Constitution
and the law, he is a resident of Cagayan de Oro City and eligible to
run for mayor thereof.
To petitioners' argument that Emano could not have continued to
qualify as provincial governor if he was indeed a resident of Cagayan
de Oro City, we respond that the issue before this Court is whether
Emano's residence in the city qualifies him to run for and be elected

as mayor, not whether he could have continued sitting as governor of


the province. There was no challenge to his eligibility to continue
running the province; hence, this Court cannot make any
pronouncement on such issue. Considerations of due process
prevent us from adjudging matters not properly brought to us. On
the basis, however, of the facts proven before the Comelec, we hold
that he has satisfied the residence qualification required by law for
the mayorship of the city.
We stress that the residence requirement is rooted in the desire that
officials of districts or localities be acquainted not only with the metes
and bounds of their constituencies but, more important, with the
constituents themselves -- their needs, difficulties, aspirations,
potentials for growth and development, and all matters vital to their
common welfare. The requisite period would give candidates the
opportunity to be familiar with their desired constituencies, and
likewise for the electorate to evaluate the former's qualifications and
fitness for the offices they seek.
In other words, the actual, physical and personal presence of herein
private respondent in Cagayan de Oro City is substantial enough to
show his intention to fulfill the duties of mayor and for the voters to
evaluate his qualifications for the mayorship. Petitioners' very
legalistic, academic and technical approach to the residence
requirement does not satisfy this simple, practical and commonsense rationale for the residence requirement.
There is no question that private respondent was the overwhelming
choice of the people of Cagayan de Oro City. He won by a margin of
about 30,000 votes. Thus, we find it apt to reiterate the principle that
the manifest will of the people as expressed through the ballot must
be given fullest effect. In case of doubt, political laws must be
interpreted to give life and spirit to the popular mandate.
Corollary Issue: Effect of Disqualification of Winner on Second
Placer
With the resolution of the first issue in the positive, it is obvious that
the second one posited by petitioners has become academic and
need not be ruled upon.

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CASE 46: VILLABER v. COMELEC (November 2001)- JC PAJO


FACTS: Petitioner Villaber and respondent Douglas R. Cagas were
rival candidates for a congressional seat in the First District of Davao
del Sur during the May 14, 2001 elections. Villaber filed his certificate
of candidacy for Congressman on February 19, 2001, while Cagas
filed his on February 28, 2001. On March 4, 2001, Cagas filed with
the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor of COMELEC Davao
del Sur, a consolidated petition to disqualify Villaber and to cancel
the latters certificate of candidacy due to the fact that Villaber was
convicted by the RTC for violation of BP22 and was sentenced to
suffer 1 year imprisonment. The check that bounced was in the sum
of P100, 000.00. Cagas further alleged that this crime involves moral
turpitude; hence, under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code, he
is disqualified to run for any public office. On appeal, the CA affirmed
the RTC Decision. Undaunted, Villaber filed with this Court a petition
for review on certiorari assailing the CAs Decision. However, in its
Resolution of October 26, 1992, this Court (Third Division) dismissed
the petition. On February 2, 1993, our Resolution became final and
executory. Cagas also asserted that Villaber made a false material
representation in his certificate of candidacy that he is Eligible for
the office I seek to be elected which false statement is a ground to
deny due course or cancel the said certificate pursuant to Section 78
of the Omnibus Election Code.
In his answer to the disqualification suit, Villaber countered mainly
that his conviction has not become final and executory because the
affirmed Decision was not remanded to the trial court for
promulgation in his presence. Furthermore, even if the judgment of
conviction was already final and executory, it cannot be the basis for
his disqualification since violation of B.P. Blg. 22 does not involve
moral turpitude. After the opposing parties submitted their respective
position papers, the case was forwarded to the COMELEC, Manila,
for resolution. On April 30, 2001, the COMELEC finding merit in
Cagas petition, issued the challenged Resolution declaring Villaber
disqualified as a candidate for and from holding any elective public
office and canceling his certificate of candidacy. The COMELEC
ruled that a conviction for violation of B.P Blg. 22 involves moral
turpitude following the ruling of this Court en banc in the
administrative case of People vs. Atty. Fe Tuanda. Villaber filed a

motion for reconsideration but was denied by the COMELEC en banc


in a Resolution.
ISSUE: WON a violation of B.P. Blg. 22 involves moral turpitude.
HELD: Yes.
RATIO: The COMELEC believes it is. In disqualifying petitioner
Villaber from being a candidate for Congressman, the COMELEC
applied Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code which provides:
Sec. 12. Disqualifications Any person who has been declared by
competent authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced
by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion, or for any
offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than
eighteen months, or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be
disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has
been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.The disqualifications
to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed upon
the declaration by competent authority that said insanity or
incompetence had been removed or after the expiration of a period
of five years from his service of sentence, unless within the same
period he again becomes disqualified.
As to the meaning of moral turpitude, we have consistently adopted
the definition in Blacks Law Dictionary as an act of baseness,
vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his
fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and
customary rule of right and duty between man and woman, or
conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. In In
re Vinzon,the term moral turpitude is considered as encompassing
everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, or good
morals.
We, however, clarified in Dela Torre vs. Commission on Elections
that not every criminal act involves moral turpitude, and that as to
what crime involves moral turpitude is for the Supreme Court to
determine. We further pronounced therein that: in International
Rice Research Institute vs. NLRC, the Court admitted that it cannot
always be ascertained whether moral turpitude does or does not
exist by merely classifying a crime as malum in se or as malum

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prohibitum. In the final analysis, WON a crime involves a moral


turpitude is ultimately a question of fact and frequently depends on
the circumstances surrounding the case.
In the case at bar, petitioner does not assail the facts and
circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime. In effect, he
admits all the elements of the crime for which he was convicted.
At any rate, the question of whether or not the crime involves moral
turpitude can be resolved by analyzing its elements alone, as we did
in Dela Torre which involves the crime of fencing punishable by a
special law.

The presence of the second element manifests moral turpitude. We


held that a conviction for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 imports deceit and
certainly relates to and affects the good moral character of a
person.Thus, paraphrasing Blacks definition, a drawer who
issues an unfunded check deliberately reneges on his private duties
he owes his fellow men or society in a manner contrary to accepted
and customary rule of right and duty, justice, honesty or good morals.

X.
CAMPAIGN;
ELECTION
PROPAGANDA;
CONTRIBUTIONS AND EXPENDITURES

Petitioner was charged for violating B.P. Blg. 22 under the following
Information: That on or about February 13, 1986, in the City of
Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously make or draw and issue to Efren D. Sawal
to apply on account or for value Bank of Philippine Islands (Plaza
Cervantes, Manila) Check No. 958214 dated February 13, 1986
payable to Efren D. Sawal in the amount of P100,000.00, said
accused well knowing that at the time of issue he did not have
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for payment of such
check in full upon its presentment, which check, when presented for
payment within ninety (90) days from the date thereof, was
subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of
funds, and despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, said accused
failed to pay said Efren D. Sawal the amount of said check or to
make arrangement for full payment of the same within five (5)
banking days after receiving said notice.

SECS. 79-112

The elements of the offense under the above provision are:


1. The accused makes draws or issues any check to apply to
account or for value;
2. The accused knows at the time of the issuance that he or she
does not have sufficient funds in, or credit with, the drawee bank for
the payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and
3. The check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds or credit, or it would have been dishonored for
the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason,
ordered the bank to stop payment.

Section 21 (f) of the same resolution provides: Prohibited forms of


election propaganda. It is unlawful:
(f) To draw, paint, inscribe, post, display or publicly exhibit
any election propaganda in any place, whether public or
private, mobile or stationary, except in the COMELEC
common posted areas and/or billboards

CASE 47: ADIONG v. COMELEC (March 1992)- ANNESIR


KADJIM
FACTS: On January 13, 1992, the COMELEC promulgated
Resolution No. 2347 pursuant to its powers granted by the
Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code, Republic Acts Nos. 6646
and 7166 and other election laws.
Section 15(a) of the resolution provides: Lawful Election
Propaganda. The following are lawful election propaganda:
(a) Pamphlets, leaflets, cards, decals Provided, That
decals and stickers may be posted only in any of the
authorized posting areas provided in paragraph (f) of Section
21 hereof.

Petitioner Blo Umpar Adiong, a senatorial candidate in the May 11,


1992 elections assails the COMELEC's Resolution insofar as it
prohibits the posting of decals and stickers in "mobile" places like
cars and other moving vehicles. According to him such prohibition is

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violative of Section 82 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 11


(a) of RA 6646.
ISSUE: WON COMELEC may prohibit the posting of decals and
stickers on "mobile" places, public or private, and limit their location
or publication to the authorized posting areas that it fixes.
HELD: No.
RATIO: The portion of Section 15 (a) of Resolution No. 2347 of the
COMELEC providing that "decals and stickers may be posted only in
any of the authorized posting areas provided in paragraph (f) of
Section 21 hereof" is DECLARED NULL and VOID.
The COMELEC's prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on
"mobile" places whether public or private except in designated areas
provided for by the COMELEC itself is null and void on constitutional
grounds. The prohibition unduly infringes on the citizen's
fundamental right of free speech enshrined in the Constitution (Sec.
4, Article III). Significantly, the freedom of expression curtailed by the
questioned prohibition is not so much that of the candidate or the
political party. The regulation strikes at the freedom of an individual
to express his preference and, by displaying it on his car, to convince
others to agree with him.
Also, the questioned prohibition premised on the statute (RA 6646)
and as couched in the resolution is void for overbreadth. The
restriction as to where the decals and stickers should be posted is so
broad that it encompasses even the citizen's private property, which
in this case is a privately-owned vehicle (The provisions allowing
regulation are so loosely worded that they include the posting of
decals or stickers in the privacy of one's living room or bedroom.) In
consequence of this prohibition, another cardinal rule prescribed by
the Constitution would be violated. Section 1, Article III of the Bill of
Rights provides that no person shall be deprived of his property
without due process of law. (The right to property may be subject to a
greater degree of regulation but when this right is joined by a "liberty"
interest, the burden of justification on the part of the Government
must be exceptionally convincing and irrefutable. The burden is not
met in this case.)

Additionally, the constitutional objective to give a rich candidate and


a poor candidate equal opportunity to inform the electorate as
regards their candidacies, mandated by Article II, Section 26 and
Article XIII, section 1 in relation to Article IX (c) Section 4 of the
Constitution, is not impaired by posting decals and stickers on cars
and other private vehicles. It is to be reiterated that the posting of
decals and stickers on cars, calesas, tricycles, pedicabs and other
moving vehicles needs the consent of the owner of the vehicle.
Hence, the preference of the citizen becomes crucial in this kind of
election propaganda not the financial resources of the candidate.
In sum, the prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on "mobile"
places whether public or private except in the authorized areas
designated by the COMELEC becomes censorship which cannot be
justified by the Constitution.
The petition is hereby GRANTED.
CASE 48: NATIONAL PRESS CLUB v. COMELEC (March 1992)KELVIN HUNG
FACTS: Petitioners in these cases consist of representatives of the
mass media which are prevented from selling or donating space and
time for political advertisements; two (2) individuals who are
candidates for office (one for national and the other for provincial
office) in the coming May 1992 elections; and taxpayers and voters
who claim that their right to be informed of election issues and of
credentials of the candidates is being curtailed.
It is principally argued by petitioners that Section 11 (b) of Republic
Act No. 6646 invades and violates the constitutional guarantees
comprising freedom of expression. Petitioners maintain that the
prohibition imposed by Section 11 (b) amounts to censorship,
because it selects and singles out for suppression and repression
with criminal sanctions, only publications of a particular content,
namely, media-based election or political propaganda during the
election period of 1992. It is asserted that the prohibition is in
derogation of media's role, function and duty to provide adequate
channels of public information and public opinion relevant to election
issues. Further, petitioners contend that Section 11 (b) abridges the

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freedom of speech of candidates, and that the suppression of mediabased campaign or political propaganda except those appearing in
the COMELEC space of the newspapers and on COMELEC time of
radio and television broadcasts, would bring about a substantial
reduction in the quantity or volume of information concerning
candidates and issues in the election thereby curtailing and limiting
the right of voters to information and opinion.
Section 11 (b) reads:
Sec. 11 Prohibited Forms of Election
Propaganda. In addition to the forms of
election propaganda prohibited under Section 85
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, it shall be unlawful;
xxx xxx xxx
b) for any newspapers, radio broadcasting or
television station, other mass media, or any
person making use of the mass media to sell or to
give free of charge print space or air time for
campaign or other political purposes except to the
Commission as provided under Sections 90 and
92 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881. Any mass media
columnist,
commentator,
announcer
or
personality who is a candidate for any elective
public office shall take a leave of absence from
his work as such during the campaign period.
(Emphasis supplied)

Article IX (C)(4) provides:


Sec. 4. The Commission [on Elections] may,
during the election period, supervise or regulate
the enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or
permits for the operation of transportation and
other public utilities, media of communication or
information, all grants, special privileges, or
concessions granted by the Government or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including any government-owned or controlled
corporation or its subsidiary. Such supervision or
regulation shall aim to ensure equal opportunity,
time, and space, and the right to reply, including
reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public
information campaigns and forums among
candidates in connection with the objective of
holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and
credible elections.
This Constitutional provision grants COMELEC supervisory and
regulatory authority to secure equal opportunity among candidates.
ISSUE: WON Section 11 (b) of RA 6646 has gone beyond
permissible supervision or regulation of media operations so as to
constitute unconstitutional repression of freedom of speech and
freedom of the press.
HELD: No.

Accordingly, the objective of the law is to equalize the


situations of rich and poor candidates by preventing the
rich from enjoying undue advantage offered by huge
campaign war chests. The Omnibus election code require
COMELEC to procure COMELEC space in newspapers
of general circulation in every city or province and
COMELEC time on radio and television stations.
COMELEC must allocate the COMELEC space and time
on a free of charge, equal, and impartial basis among
candidates within the area served by the newspaper and
television station involved.

RATIO: The rights of free speech and free press are not unlimited
rights for they are not the only important and relevant values even in
the most democratic of polities. In our own society, equality of
opportunity to proffer oneself for public office, without regard to the
level of financial resources that one may have at one's disposal, is
clearly an important value. One of the basic state policies given
constitutional rank by Article II, Section 26 of the Constitution is the
egalitarian demand that "the State shall guarantee equal access to
opportunities for public service and prohibit political dynasties as may
be defined by law.

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It is important to note that the restrictive impact upon freedom of


speech and freedom of the press of Section 11 (b) is circumscribed
by certain important limitations.
Firstly, Section 11 (b) is limited in the duration of its applicability and
enforceability. By virtue of the operation of Article IX (C) (4) of the
Constitution, Section 11 (b) is limited in its applicability in time to
election periods. By its Resolution No. 2328 dated 2 January 1992,
the Comelec, acting under another specific grant of authority by the
Constitution (Article IX [C] [9]), has defined the period from 12
January 1992 until 10 June 1992 as the relevant election period.
Secondly, and more importantly, Section 11 (b) is limited in its scope
of application. Analysis of Section 11 (b) shows that it purports to
apply only to the purchase and sale, including purchase and sale
4
disguised as a donation, of print space and air time for "campaign
or other political purposes." Section 11 (b) does not purport in any
way to restrict the reporting by newspapers or radio or television
stations of news or news-worthy events relating to candidates, their
qualifications, political parties and programs of government.
Moreover, Section 11 (b) does not reach commentaries and
expressions of belief or opinion by reporters or broadcasters or
editors or commentators or columnists in respect of candidates, their
qualifications, and programs and so forth, so long at least as such
comments, opinions and beliefs are not in fact advertisements for
particular candidates covertly paid for. In sum, Section 11 (b) is not
to be read as reaching any report or commentary other coverage
that, in responsible media, is not paid for by candidates for political
office. We read Section 11 (b) as designed to cover only paid political
advertisements of particular candidates.
Comelec is commanded by statute to buy or "procure" "Comelec
time" and "Comelec space" in mass media, and it must be presumed
that Comelec will carry out that statutory duty in this connection, and
if it does fail to do so, once again, the candidate or candidates who
feel aggrieved have judicial remedies at their disposal.
Section 11 (b) does, of course, limit the right of free speech and of
access to mass media of the candidates themselves. The limitation,
however, bears a clear and reasonable connection with the

constitutional objective set out in Article IX(C) (4) and Article II (26) of
the Constitution. For it is precisely in the unlimited purchase of print
space and radio and television time that the resources of the
financially affluent candidates are likely to make a crucial difference.
Here lies the core problem of equalization of the situations of the
candidates with deep pockets and the candidates with shallow or
empty pockets that Article IX(C) (4) of the Constitution and Section
11 (b) seek to address. That the statutory mechanism which Section
11 (b) brings into operation is designed and may be expected to
bring about or promote equal opportunity, and equal time and space,
for political candidates to inform all and sundry about themselves,
cannot be gainsaid.
CASE 49: PILLAR v. COMELEC (July 1995)- REGINALD
LAMPITOC
FACTS: On March 22, 1992, petitioner Juanito C. Pilar filed his
Certificate of Candidacy for the position of member of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Isabela. 3 days after,
petitioner withdrew his Certificate of Candidacy.
The COMELEC imposed upon Juanito Pilar the fine of Php
10,000.00 for failure to file his statement of contributions and
expenditures pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 2348, in turn
implementing R.A. 7166 which provides that:
Section 14. Statement of Contributions and
Expenditures: Effect of Failure to File Statement.
Every candidate and treasurer of the political party
shall, within thirty (30) days after the day of the
election, file in duplicate with the offices of the
Commission the full, true and itemized statement
of all contributions and expenditures in connection
with the election.
Pillar argues that he cannot be held liable for failure to file a
statement of contributions and expenditures because he was a noncandidate, having withdrawn his certificates of candidacy three days
after its filing. Pilar posits that it is clear from the law that a

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candidate must have entered the political contest, and should have
either won or lost.

may have incurred. Pilars withdrawal of candidacy did not


extinguish his liability for the administrative fine.

COMELEC denied the motion for reconsideration of petitioner and


deemed final its first decision. Pilar went to the COMELEC En Banc
(UND No. 94-040), which denied the petition. Hence, Pilar filed a
petition for certiorari.

CASE 50: PERALTA v. COMELEC (March 1978)- FRANCIS


TORRES

ISSUE: WON Juanito Pilars withdrawal of his candidacy extinguish


his liability for the administrative fine.
HELD: No.
RATIO: Well-recognized is that where the law does not distinguish,
courts should not distinguish (ubi lex non distinguit nec nos
distinguere debemus).
In the case at bench, as the law makes no distinction or qualification
as to whether the candidate pursued his candidacy or withdrew the
same, the term every candidate must be deemed to refer not only
to a candidate who pursued his campaign, but also to one who
withdrew his candidacy. Furthermore, Section 14 of RA 7166 uses
the word shall. As a general rule, the use of the word shall in a
statute implies that the statute is mandatory, and imposes a duty
which may be enforced, particularly if public policy is in favor of this
meaning or where public interest is involved. The general rule should
apply.
Also, Section Section 13 of Resolution No. 2348 categorically refers
to all candidates who filed their certificates of candidacy. It is not
improbable that a candidate who withdrew his candidacy has
accepted contributions and incurred expenditures, even in the short
span of his campaign. The evil sought to be prevented by the law is
not all too remote.
Lastly, under the fourth paragraph of Section 73 of the B.P. Blg. 881
or the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines, it is provided that
[t]he filing or withdrawal of certificate of candidacy shall not affect
whatever civil, criminal or administrative liabilities which a candidate

FACTS: Peralta was an independent candidate in the April 1978


Interim Batasang Pambansa Elections. He, along with others,
assailed the constitutionality of PD 1269 or the 1978 Election Code.
Sections 140 and 155, sub-paragraphs 26 to 28, of the 1978 Election
Code, grants the voter the option to vote either for individual
candidates by filling in the proper spaces in the ballot the names of
the candidates he desires to elect, or to vote for all the candidates of
a political party, group or aggrupation by simply writing in the space
provided for in the ballot the name of the political party, group or
aggrupation (office-block ballot).
Peralta was vehement in contending that the optional block voting
scheme is violative of this provision of the Constitution: Bona fide
candidates for any public office shall be free from any form of
harassment and discrimination. He sought the shelter of its
protection for himself and other independent candidates who,
according to him, would be thus made to suffer if the assailed
provision is not nullified. Essentially, in terms of individual rights, he
would raise a due process and equal protection question.
The main objection of Peralta against the optional straight party
voting provided for in the Code is that an independent candidate
would be discriminated against because by merely writing on his
ballot the name of a political party, a voter would have voted for all
the candidates of that party, an advantage which the independent
candidate does not enjoy. In effect, it is contended that the candidate
who is not a party-member is deprived of the equal protection of the
laws, as provided in Sec 1 of Article IV, in relation to Sec 9 of Article
XII, of the 1973 Constitution.
ISSUE: WON
protection.

the 1978 Election Code is violative of equal

HELD: No.

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RATIO: Before a voter prepares his ballot, the voter will be able to
read all the names of the candidates. No candidate will receive more
than one vote, whether he is voted individually or as a candidate of a
party group or aggrupation. The voter is free to vote for the individual
candidates or to vote by party, group or aggrupation. The choice is
his. No one can compel him to do otherwise. In the case of
candidates, the decision on whether to run as an independent
candidate or to join a political party, group or aggrupation is left
entirely to their discretion.
Certainly, before filing his certificate of candidacy, a candidate is
aware of the advantages under the law accruing to candidates of a
political party or group. If he wishes to avail himself of such alleged
advantages as an official candidate of a party, he is free to do so by
joining a political party group or aggrupation. In other words, the
choice is his. In making his decision, it must be assumed that the
candidate had carefully weighed and considered the relative
advantages and disadvantages of either alternative. So long as the
application of the rule depends on his voluntary action or decision,
he cannot, after exercising his discretion, claim that he was the victim
of discrimination.
CASE 51: PENERA v. COMELEC (September 2009)- ARJUNA
GUEVARA
FACTS: On 2 April 2007, respondent Andanar filed before the Office
of the Regional Election Director (ORED), Caraga Region (Region
XIII), a Petition for Disqualification against petitioner Penera, as well
as the candidates for Vice-Mayor and Sangguniang Bayan who
belonged to her political party, for unlawfully engaging in election
campaigning and partisan political activity prior to the
commencement of the campaign period. The petition was docketed
as SPA No. 07-224.
Respondent claimed that a day before the start of the authorized
campaign period, Petitioner and her partymates went around the
different barangays in Sta. Monica, announcing their candidacies
and requesting the people to vote for them on the day of the
elections. Attached to the Petition were the Affidavits of individuals
who witnessed the said incident.

Petitioner averred that the charge of premature campaigning was not


true. Although Petitioner admitted that a motorcade did take place,
she explained that it was simply in accordance with the usual
practice in nearby cities and provinces, where the filing of certificates
of candidacy (COCs) was preceded by a motorcade, which
dispersed soon after the completion of such filing. In fact, Petitioner
claimed, in the motorcade held by her political party, no person made
any speech, not even any of the candidates. Instead, there was only
marching music in the background and a grand standing for the
purpose of raising the hands of the candidates in the
motorcade. Finally, Petitioner cited Barroso v. Ampig in her
defense, wherein the Court supposedly ruled that a motorcade held
by candidates during the filing of their COCs was not a form of
political campaigning.
While SPA No. 07-224 was pending before the COMELEC Second
Division, the 2007 elections took place and, as a result thereof,
Petitioner was proclaimed the duly elected Mayor of Sta.
Monica. Petitioner soon assumed office on 2 July 2002.
On 24 July 2007, the COMELEC Second Division issued its
Resolution in SPA No. 07-224 which disqualified Petitioner from
continuing as a mayoralty candidate in Sta. Monica, for engaging in
premature campaigning, in violation of Sections 80 and 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code.
ISSUES:
1. WON Petitioner has engaged in an election campaign or partisan
political activity outside the campaign period
2. WON Petitioner is already considered a candidate at the time she
committed the alleged offense.
HELD:
1. Yes.
2. Yes.
RATIO:
1. The prohibited act of premature campaigning is defined under
Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code, to wit:

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SECTION 80. Election campaign or partisan


political activity outside campaign period. It shall
be unlawful for any person, whether or not a voter or
candidate, or for any party, or association of
persons, to engage in an election campaign or
partisan political activity except during the campaign
period: Provided, That political parties may hold
political conventions or meetings to nominate their
official
candidates
within thirty
days before the commencement of the campaign
period and forty-five days for Presidential and VicePresidential election.
If the commission of the prohibited act of premature campaigning is
duly proven, the consequence of the violation is clearly spelled out in
Section 68 of the said Code, which reads:
SECTION. 68. Disqualifications. - Any candidate
who, in an action or protest in which he is a party is
declared by final decision of a competent court guilty
of, or found by the Commission of having xxx
(e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261,
paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, subparagraph 6, shall
be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if
he has been elected, from holding the office. Any
person who is a permanent resident of or an
immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified
to run for any elective office under this Code, unless
said person has waived his status as permanent
resident or immigrant of a foreign country in
accordance with the residence requirement provided
for in the election laws.
In the case at bar, it had been sufficiently established, not just by
respondents evidence, but also those of Petitioner herself, that
Petitioner and her partymates, after filing their COCs, participated in
a motorcade which passed through the different barangays of Sta.
Monica, waived their hands to the public, and threw candies to the
onlookers.

Penera proffered the excuse that the motorcade was already part of
the dispersal of the supporters who spontaneously accompanied
Penera and her partymates in filing their COCs. The said supporters
were
already
being
transported
back
to
their
respective barangays after the COC filing. Penera stressed that no
speech was made by any person, and there was only background
marching music and a grand standing for the purpose of raising the
hands of the candidates in the motorcade. As previously noted,
Penera and her witnesses admitted that the vehicles, consisting of
two jeepneys and ten motorcycles, were festooned with multi-colored
balloons; the motorcade went around three barangays in Sta.
Monica; and Penera and her partymates waved their hands and
threw sweet candies to the crowd. With vehicles, balloons, and even
candies on hand, Penera can hardly persuade us that the motorcade
was spontaneous and unplanned.
2. Under Section 79(a) of the Omnibus Election Code, a candidate is
any person aspiring for or seeking an elective public office, who has
filed a certificate of candidacy by himself or through an accredited
political party, aggroupment, or coalition of parties.
According to the Dissenting Opinion, even if Peneras acts before the
start of the campaign period constitute election campaigning or
partisan political activities, these are not punishable under Section
80 of the Omnibus Election Code given that she was not yet a
candidate at that time. On the other hand, Peneras acts, if
committed within the campaign period, when she was already a
candidate, are likewise not covered by Section 80 as this provision
punishes only acts outside the campaign period.
The Dissenting Opinion ultimately concludes that because of Section
15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, the prohibited act of
premature campaigning in Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code,
is practically impossible to commit at any time.
The Court disagrees. Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code
remains relevant and applicable despite Section 15 of Republic Act
No. 8436, as amended.

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A close reading of the entire Republic Act No. 9369, which amended
Republic Act No. 8436, would readily reveal that that it did not
contain an express repeal of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election
Code. An express repeal is one wherein a statute declares, usually
in its repealing clause, that a particular and specific law, identified by
its number or title, is repealed. Absent this specific requirement, an
express repeal may not be presumed.
Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code, on premature
campaigning, explicitly provides that [i]t shall be unlawful for any
person, whether or not a voter or candidate, or for any party, or
association of persons, to engage in an election campaign or
partisan political activity, except during the campaign period. Very
simply, premature campaigning may be committed even by a person
who is not a candidate.
Pursuant to Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, even
after the filing of the COC but before the start of the campaign
period,
a
person
is
not
yet
officially
considered
a candidate. Nevertheless, a person, upon the filing of his/her
COC, already explicitly declares his/her intention to run as a
candidate in the coming elections. The commission by such a
person of any of the acts enumerated under Section 79(b) of the
Omnibus Election Code (i.e., holding rallies or parades, making
speeches,etc.) can, thus, be logically and reasonably construed as
for the purpose of promoting his/her intended candidacy.
When the campaign period starts and said person proceeds with
his/her candidacy, his/her intent turning into actuality, we can already
consider his/her acts, after the filing of his/her COC and prior to the
campaign period, as the promotion of his/her election as a candidate,
hence, constituting premature campaigning, for which he/she may be
disqualified. Also, conversely, if said person, for any reason,
withdraws his/her COC before the campaign period, then there is no
point to view his/her acts prior to said period as acts for the
promotion of his/her election as a candidate. In the latter case, there
can be no premature campaigning as there is no candidate, whose
disqualification may be sought, to begin with.
In connection with the preceding discussion, the line in Section 15 of
Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, which provides that any

unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall take


effect only upon the start of the campaign period, does not mean
that the acts constituting premature campaigning can only be
committed, for which the offender may be disqualified, during the
campaign period. Contrary to the pronouncement in the from
campaign period is lawful, such that the offender may freely carry out
the same with impunity.
As the Court has observed at the beginning, Peneras Petition is
essentially grounded on questions of fact. Penera herself never
raised the argument that she can no longer be disqualified for
premature campaigning under Section 80, in relation to Section 68,
of the Omnibus Election Code, since the said provisions have
already been, in the words of the Dissenting Opinion, rendered
inapplicable, repealed, and done away with by Section 15 of
Republic Act No. 8436, as amended. This legal argument was
wholly raised by the Dissenting Opinion.
Penera should be disqualified from holding office as Mayor of Sta.
Monica for having committed premature campaigning when, right
after she filed her COC, but still a day before the start of the
campaign period. Despite the disqualification of Penera, we cannot
grant Andanars prayer to be allowed to assume the position of
Mayor of Sta. Monica. The well-established principle is that the
ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle the
candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared
elected.
CASE
52:
PENERA
v.
COMELEC
(MOTION
RECONSIDERATION) (November 2009)- KAMAE CRUZ

FOR

FACTS: In support of her motion for reconsideration, Penera submits


the following arguments:
1. Penera was not yet a candidate at the time of the incident
under Section 11 of RA 8436 as amended by Section 13 of
RA 9369.
2. The petition for disqualification failed to submit convincing and
substantial evidence against Penera for violation of Section
80 of the Omnibus Election Code.
3. Penera never admitted the allegations of the petition for

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disqualification and has consistently disputed the charge


of premature campaigning.
4. The admission that Penera participated in a motorcade is not
the same as admitting she engaged in premature election
campaigning.
The Decision states that [w]hen the campaign period starts and [the
person who filed his certificate of candidacy] proceeds with his/her
candidacy, his/her intent turning into actuality, we can already
consider his/her acts, after the filing of his/her COC and prior to the
campaign period, as the promotion of his/her election as a candidate,
hence, constituting premature campaigning, for which he/she may be
disqualified.
Under the Decision, a candidate may already be liable for premature
campaigning after the filing of the certificate of candidacy but even
before the start of the campaign period. From the filing of the
certificate of candidacy, even long before the start of the campaign
period, the Decision considers the partisan political acts of a person
so filing a certificate of candidacy as the promotion of his/her election
as a candidate. Thus, such person can be disqualified for premature
campaigning for acts done before the start of the campaign
period. In short, the Decision considers a person who files a
certificate of candidacy already a candidate even before the start of
the campaign period.
ISSUE: WON Peneras Motion for Reconsideration must be granted.
HELD: Yes.
RATIO: As held in Lanot v. COMELEC, a person who files a
certificate of candidacy is not a candidate until the start of the
campaign period. Thus, the essential elements for violation of Section
80 of the Omnibus Election Code are: (1) a person engages in an
election campaign or partisan political activity; (2) the act is designed
to promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate or
candidates; (3) the act is done outside the campaign period.
The second element requires the existence of a candidate. Under
Section 79(a), a candidate is one who has filed a certificate of

candidacy to an elective public office. Unless one has filed his


certificate of candidacy, he is not a candidate. The third element
requires that the campaign period has not started when the election
campaign or partisan political activity is committed.
Under Section 11 of RA 8436, the only purpose for the early filing of
certificates of candidacy is to give ample time for the printing of official
ballots. Since the intention of this provision is just to afford the
Comelec enough time to print the ballots, this provision does not
intend to change the campaign periods as presently, or rather election
periods as presently fixed by existing law.
Lanot was decided on the ground that one who files a certificate of
candidacy is not a candidate until the start of the campaign period.
This ground was based on the deliberations of the legislators who
explained the intent of the provisions of RA 8436, which laid the legal
framework for an automated election system. There was no express
provision in the original RA 8436 stating that one who files a certificate
of candidacy is not a candidate until the start of the campaign period.
When Congress amended RA 8436, Congress decided to expressly
incorporate the Lanot doctrine into law, realizing that Lanot merely
relied on the deliberations of Congress in holding that
The clear intention of Congress was to preserve the election periods
as x x x fixed by existing law prior to RA 8436 and that one who files
to meet the early deadline will still not be considered as a candidate.
Congress wanted to insure that no person filing a certificate of
candidacy under the early deadline required by the automated
election system would be disqualified or penalized for any partisan
political act done before the start of the campaign period. Thus, in
enacting RA 9369, Congress expressly wrote the Lanot doctrine into
the second sentence, third paragraph of the amended Section 15 of
RA 8436, thus:
Congress elevated the Lanot doctrine into a statute by specifically
inserting it as the second sentence of the third paragraph of the
amended Section 15 of RA 8436, which cannot be annulled by this
Court except on the sole ground of its unconstitutionality. The
Decision cannot reverse Lanot without repealing this second

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sentence, because to reverse Lanot would mean repealing this


second sentence.

R.A. No. 9189 (THE OVERSEAS ABSENTEE VOTING ACT OF


2003)

The assailed Decision, however, in reversing Lanot does not claim


that this second sentence or any portion of Section 15 of RA 8436, as
amended by RA 9369, is unconstitutional. In fact, the Decision
considers the entire Section 15 good law. Thus, the Decision is selfcontradictory reversing Lanot but maintaining the constitutionality
of the second sentence, which embodies the Lanot doctrine. In so
doing, the Decision is irreconcilably in conflict with the clear intent
and letter of the second sentence, third paragraph, Section 15 of RA
8436, as amended by RA 9369.

R.A. No. 8436, AMENDED BY R.A. No. 9369

Congress has laid down the law a candidate is liable for election
offenses only upon the start of the campaign period. This Court has
no power to ignore the clear and express mandate of the law that any
person who files his certificate of candidacy within [the filing] period
shall only be considered a candidate at the start of the campaign
period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy. Neither can this
Court turn a blind eye to the express and clear language of the law
that any unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall take
effect only upon the start of the campaign period.

XI. ELECTION; BOARD OF ELECTION INSPECTORS


(BEI); WATCHERS
SEC. 13, R.A. No. 6646 (THE ELECTORAL REFORMS LAW OF
1987)
SECS. 164-180, OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE
SEC. 26, R.A. No. 7166

XII. CASTING OF VOTES AND ABSENTEE VOTING


SEC. 200, B.P. BLG. 881
SEC. 195-196, B.P. BLG. 881

CASE 53: MACALINTAL v. COMELEC- RALPH VILLANUEVA


FACTS: Romulo Macalintal, as a lawyer and a taxpayer, questions
the validity of the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 (R.A.
9189). He questions the validity of the said act on the following
grounds, among others:
1. That the provision that a Filipino already considered an
immigrant abroad can be allowed to participate in absentee
voting provided he executes an affidavit stating his intent to
return to the Philippines is void because it dispenses of the
requirement that a voter must be a resident of the Philippines for
at least one year and in the place where he intends to vote for at
least 6 months immediately preceding the election;
2. That the provision allowing the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) to proclaim winning candidates insofar as it affects
the canvass of votes and proclamation of winning candidates for
president and vice-president, is unconstitutional because it
violates the Constitution for it is Congress which is empowered
to do so.
ISSUE: WON Macalintals arguments are correct.
HELD: No.
RATIO: There can be no absentee voting if the absentee voters are
required to physically reside in the Philippines within the period
required for non-absentee voters. Further, as understood in election
laws, domicile and resident are interchangeably used. Hence, one is
a resident of his domicile (insofar as election laws is concerned). The
domicile is the place where one has the intention to return to. Thus,
an immigrant who executes an affidavit stating his intent to return to
the Philippines is considered a resident of the Philippines for
purposes of being qualified as a voter (absentee voter to be exact). If
the immigrant does not execute the affidavit then he is not qualified
as an absentee voter.

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The said provision should be harmonized. It could not be the


intention of Congress to allow COMELEC to include the proclamation
of the winners in the vice-presidential and presidential race. To
interpret it that way would mean that Congress allowed COMELEC to
usurp its power. The canvassing and proclamation of the presidential
and vice presidential elections is still lodged in Congress and was in
no way transferred to the COMELEC by virtue of RA 9189.
CASE 54: LIBANAN v. HRET- DIANE DE LEON
FACTS: Petitioner Libanan and Respondent Ramirez were among
the candidates for the lone congressional seat of Eastern Samar in
the May 1995 elections. After the canvass of the returns was made
on 13 May 1995, the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Eastern
Samar proclaimed respondent Ramirez to have been duly elected
Representative of the District with a total of forty-one thousand five
hundred twenty-three (41,523) votes, compared to petitioner's forty
thousand eight hundred sixty-nine (40,869) votes, or a margin of six
hundred fifty-four (654) votes over those of petitioner.
Linanan filed an election protest before the HRET saying that the
election held was marred by massive electoral irregularities. That
that the election returns and/or ballots in certain precincts were
tampered with, substituted, or systematically marked in favor of
respondent Ramirez.
Libanan claims the presence of spurious ballots. HRET negated this
claim explaining that, "No spurious ballot was found in this case. For
a ballot to be rejected for being spurious, the ballot must not have
any of the following authenticating marks: a) the COMELEC
watermark; b) the signatures or initial of the BEI Chairman at the
back of the ballot; and c) red and blue fibers. In the present case, all
the ballots examined by the Tribunal had COMELEC watermarks.
HRET then ruled in favor Ramirez.
Libanans main position here is that the purpose of the law in
requiring the BEI Chairman to affix his signature at the back of the
ballot when he issues it to the voter is "to authenticate" the ballot
and, absent that signature, the ballot must be considered spurious.

ISSUE: WON the ballots not containing the signature of the BEI
chairman are considered spurious
HELD: No.
RATIO: HRET has been consistent with its rulings for considering
ballots as spurious. To be considered be valid, ballots must contain
ANY of the following: (1) Comelec watermark, or (2) signature of BEI
chairman, or (3) red and blue fibers in case the Comelec watermark
is blurred. In this case, all the unsigned ballots contain the Comelec
watermarks, which makes them valid.
The specific provision about not being able to sign the ballots (sec 24
of RA 7166) penalizes the BEI chairman, but not the voter. It wasn't
the fault of the voter that the BEI chairman forgot to put his signature,
and would impede on his right of suffrage if his vote would be
considered spurious. There is really nothing in the above law to the
effect that a ballot, which is not so authenticated, shall thereby be
deemed spurious. The law merely renders the BEI Chairman
accountable for such failure. The courts may not, in the guise of
interpretation, enlarge the scope of a statute and embrace situations
neither provided nor intended by the lawmakers. Where the words
and phrases of a statute are not obscure and ambiguous, the
meaning and intention of the legislature should be determined from
the language employed, and where there is no ambiguity in the
words, there should be no room for construction.
Libanan raised the question about the stringent requirement of
having the BEI chairman signature on ballots for a barangay
elections citing the BP 222 or the Bgy. Elections Act. The Court
explained that the difference is that the ballots used for the barangay
elections are chosen by the municipality, and may easily be exploited
that's why the BEI chairman signature is required, else it is spurious.
In the case of a congressional seat, any of the 3 requirements above
would make the ballot valid.
The difference in the rules may not be too difficult to discern. The
stringent requirements in B.P. Blg. 222 should be justifiable
considering that the official barangay ballots would be provided by
the city or municipality concerned with the COMELEC merely

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prescribing their size and color. Thus, the official ballots in B.P. Blg.
222, being supplied and furnished by the local government
themselves, the possibility of the ballots being easily counterfeited
might not have been discounted. The absence of authenticating
marks prescribed by law, i.e., the signature of the chairman of the
Board of Election Tellers at the back of the ballot, could have well
been really thought of to be fatal to the validity of the ballot.
Section 24 of R.A. No. 7166, upon the other hand, contains no
similar stringent provisions such as that seen in Section 36(f) of
COMELEC Resolution No. 1539. The pertinent part in Resolution
No. 2676 on the requirement of the signature of the chairman is
found in Section 73 thereof which merely provides:
"Sec. 73. Signature of chairman at the back of every ballot. -- In
every case, the chairman of the board shall, in the presence of the
voter, authenticate every ballot by affixing his signature at the back
thereof before delivering it to the voter. FAILURE TO SO
AUTHENTICATE SHALL BE NOTED IN THE MINUTES OF THE
BOARD AND SHALL CONSTITUTE AN ELECTION OFFENSE."
The Court declared: "The cardinal objective in the appreciation of the
ballots is to discover and give effect to the intention of the
voter. That intention would be nullified by the strict interpretation of
the said section as suggested by the petitioner for it would result in
the invalidation of the ballot even if duly accomplished by the voter,
and simply because of an omission not imputable to him but to the
election officials. The citizen cannot be deprived of his constitutional
right of suffrage on the specious ground that other persons were
negligent in performing their own duty, which in the case at bar was
purely ministerial and technical, by no means mandatory but a mere
antecedent measure intended to authenticate the ballot. A contrary
ruling would place a premium on official ineptness and make it
possible for a small group of functionaries, by their negligence - or,
worse, their deliberate inaction - to frustrate the will of the
electorate."

XIII. CANVASSING AND PROCLAMATION


SECS. 20, 21, 23, 28, R.A. No. 6646
SECS. 222-240, OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE
CASE 55: CASIMIRO v. COMELEC (March 1989)- REBECCA
FLORES
FACTS: In January 1988 local elections, Gabriel P. Casimiro a
UNIDO candidate for Mayor of Las Pinas, Metro Manila with other
UNIDO party member filed various petitions before the COMELEC
which among others was the petition to enjoin board of canvassers
from canvassing of votes or tabulating unofficial election returns. The
COMELEC in resolving the aforesaid cases rendered a consolidated
decision dismissing the petition declaring that they acquired no
jurisdiction over the petitions.
With the lifting of the restraining order previously issued, respondent
Riguera and other winning candidates were proclaimed.
COMELEC en banc denied a motion for reconsideration of the
aforesaid decision.
On August of 1988, petitioner Casimiro and UNIDO party files an
instant petition for certiorari and mandamus against the COMELEC
and Rosalino Riguera as principal respondent alleging that the
canvass proceedings in the COMELEC central office were illegal for
having been made without prior notice to them as to the date and
time of canvassing for which reason they the left the proceedings
and that many election returns were canvassed more than once,
tampered with, padded and were spurious relying on the affidavit of
their own head watcher/representative.
ISSUE: WON there is illegality in the canvass.
HELD: No.
RATIO: The court ruled that no grave abuse of discretion could be
attributed to the COMELEC in upholding the validity of the

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canvassing at its main office. The letter having clearly referred also
to transfer of the venue of the canvass, petitioner cannot justifiably
claim the notice was lacking or the said notice was meant only for the
transfer of election returns. If petitioner were absent during the
canvassing it was because they have opted to leave the proceedings
for reasons of their own.

Petitioner filed a case for annulment of the proclamation on the


ground that he was not represented when the canvass of the election
returns was resumed, as he was not notified of the time and place of
the resetting of the canvassing.

Furthermore, the evidence relied upon mainly by petitioners to


support their charges of fraud and irregularities in the election returns
and in the canvassing consisted of affidavits prepared by their own
representatives. As this court has pronounced reliance should not be
placed on mere affidavits.

HELD: Yes.

Finally, it must be stressed that private respondent Rosalino Riguera


and the other winning candidates bad already been proclaimed and
bad assumed office. The Petitions below had ceased to be preproclamation controversies. As held in a numner of cases, a preproclamation controversy is no longer viable at this point of time and
should be dismissed, the proper remedy being an electoral protest
before the proper forum. Instead of the submission of mere affidavits,
the parties would be able to present witnesses subject to the right of
confrontation. Recourse to such a remedy would settle the matters in
controversy conclusively and once and for all.
Wherefore, petitions are hereby dismissed.
CASE 56: QUILALA v. COMELEC- JOSHUA SALTERAS
FACTS: Petitioner Cirilo M. Quilala was KBL candidate for Mayor in
the Municipality of Currimao, Ilocos Norte while private respondent
Wilbur Go was the official administration candidate for the same
position in Jan. 18, 1988 elections. The Municipal Board of
Canvassers completed its canvass in the afternoon of Jan. 19, and
immediately thereafter proclaimed the winning candidate in the
person of Wilbur C. Go. On Jan. 21, 1988, petitioner filed a petition
with the COMELEC principally anchored on allegation that petitioner
was
not
represented
in
the
canvassing
of
election
returns. Respondent COMELEC issued its decision dismissing the
petition and confirming the validity of the proceeding of the Board of
Canvassers.

ISSUE: WON the canvassing and proclamation are valid.

RATIO: Petitioner may not claim ignorance of the aforesaid


provisions as these are matters directly affecting his political fortune.
Consequently, with or without notice, it was the duty of the petitioner
and all candidates for that matter to assign their watchers or
representatives in the counting of votes and canvassing of election
returns in order to insure the sanctity and purity of the ballots.
CASE 57: CARUNCHO v. COMELEC (September 1999)- VITO
SALES
FACTS: Petitioner Emiliano R. Caruncho III was the candidate of the
Liberal Party for the congressional seat in the lone district of Pasig
City at the May 11, 1998 synchronized elections. The other
candidates were: Arnulfo G. Acedera, Jr. (Lakas-NUCD-UMDP);
Marcelino P. Arias (Nacionalista Party); Roberto C. Bassig
(Independent); Esmeraldo T. Batacan (PDR-LM Coalition); Henry P.
Lanot (LAMMP); Francisco C. Rivera, Jr. (PRP/PDR); Elpidio G.
Tuason (Independent), and Raoul V. Victorino (Liberal
Party/LAMMP).
At exactly 6:00 oclock in the evening of May 14, 1998, General
Acedera and his supporters stormed the Caruncho Stadium in San
Nicolas, Pasig City, where the canvassing of election returns was
being conducted. They allegedly forced themselves into the
canvassing area, breaking a glass door in the process. As
pandemonium broke loose, the police fired warning shots causing
those present in the canvassing venue, including the members of the
Board and canvassing units, to scamper for safety. The canvassing
personnel exited through the backdoors bringing with them the
Election Returns they were canvassing and tallying as well as the
Statement of Votes that they were accomplishing. They entrusted

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these documents to the City Treasurers Office and the Pasig


Employment Service Office (PESO). Election documents and
paraphernalia were scattered all over the place when the intruders
left.
The following day, the sub-canvassing units recovered the twentytwo (22) Election Returns and the Statement of Votes from the
Treasurers Office and the PESO. However, page 2 of each of the
22 election returns, which contained the names of candidates for
congressmen, had been detached and could not be found.
The Board, satisfied that it had finished canvassing the 1,491
election returns from as many clustered precincts, proclaimed Henry
P. Lanot as the winner in the congressional race for the lone district
of Pasig. The votes obtained by the leading three candidates
were: Henry P. Lanot 60,914 votes; Emiliano R. Boy Caruncho III
42,942 votes, and Arnulfo Acedera 36,139 votes. The winner,
Lanot, led his closest rival, Caruncho, by 17,971 votes.
Petitioner Caruncho filed a Motion to Nullify Proclamation on the
Basis of Incomplete Returns with the COMELEC. He alleged that
the Board had proceeded with the proclamation of Henry Lanot as
the winning congressional candidate even though one hundred fortyseven (147) election returns involving about 30,000 votes, were still
not canvassed. He prayed that the COMELEC en banc declare the
proclamation null and void and that the Board of Canvassers be
directed to convene and reopen the ballot boxes to recount the votes
of the candidates for the House of Representatives and thereupon
proclaim the winner.
The Board of Canvassers asserted that there were only twenty-two
(22) election returns, not 147 as claimed by Caruncho, that were
missing but these were eventually recovered.
COMELEC declared that the proclamation of the winning
congressional candidate of Pasig City as NULL AND VOID.
However, the COMELEC en banc promulgated a Resolution dated
October 1, 1998 reconsidering the Resolution of the COMELEC
Second Division and dismissing petitioners amended motion

(petition) to nullify the proclamation on the basis of incomplete


returns for lack of merit.
ISSUE: WON the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion in
granting the proclamation without taking into account the 22 election
returns.
HELD: No.
RATIO: Granting that the proclamation was made without taking into
account the twenty-two (22) election returns, still, the COMELEC did
not abuse its discretion. The election returns represented only 4,400
votes. That number cannot affect the result of the election because
Henry Lanots lead over his closest rival, herein petitioner, was
17,971 votes. As the second paragraph of Section 233 of the
Omnibus Election Code aforequoted states, the Board of Canvassers
could have totally disregarded the twenty-two (22) election returns
and legally proclaimed Lanot as the winner in the election in Pasig
City for Member of the House of Representatives.
SEC. 233. When the election returns are delayed, lost or destroyed.
In case its copy of the election returns is missing, the board of
canvassers shall, by messenger or otherwise, obtain such missing
election returns from the board of election inspectors concerned, or if
said returns have been lost or destroyed, the board of canvassers,
upon prior authority of the Commission, may use any of the authentic
copies of said election returns or a certified copy of said election
returns issued by the Commission, and forthwith direct its
representative to investigate the case and immediately report the
matter to the Commission.
An incomplete canvass of votes is illegal and cannot be the basis of
a subsequent proclamation. A canvass cannot be reflective of the
true vote of the electorate unless all returns are considered and none
is omitted. However, this is true only where the election returns
missing or not counted will affect the results of the election. It bears
stressing that in the case at bar, the COMELEC has categorically
found that the election returns which were not counted by
respondent canvassers represented only 4,400 votes. To be sure,

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this number will not affect the result of the election considering that
Lanots lead over petitioner was already 17,971 votes.

XIV. PRE-PROCLAMATION CONTROVERSY


SECS. 241-248, OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE
SEC. 245, REPEALED BY SEC. 39, R.A. No. 7166
SECS. 15-17 ETC, R.A. No. 7166
CASE 58: LAUDENIO v. COMELEC (1997)- VIKTOR GUTIERREZ
FACTS: Felipe L. Laodenio, Petitioner, and Rogelio
respondent, were candidates for the position of Mayor of
Northern Samar, on the May 8, 1995 election. On May
Longcop was proclaimed winner by the Municipal
Canvassers.

Longcop,
Mapanas,
15, 1995,
Board of

On May 20, 1995, Laodenio filed a petition with respondent


COMELEC to annul the proclamation of Longcop and to declare
illegal the constitution of the Municipal Board of Canvassers as well
as its proceedings. Petitioner alleged that the Board made unjustified
adjournments in its proceedings thereby improperly prolonging them.
On May 25, 1995, petitioner filed an election protest before the
Regional Trial Court.
On August 28, 1995, respondent COMELEC dismissed the petition
of Laodenio for lack of merit. COMELEC was of the view that the
adjournments were justified and the proceedings were not improperly
prolonged. Laodenio was in fact deemed to have agreed to the new
composition of the Municipal Board of Canvassers when he actively
participated in the proceedings therein and, on the authority of
Padilla v. COMELEC,the pre-proclamation controversy was no
longer viable since Longcop had already been proclaimed and had
assumed office. Laodenios motion for reconsideration was denied.
Laodenio claims that a petition may be filed directly with COMELEC
pursuant to Rule 27, Sec. 4 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure

when the issue involves the illegal composition of the Board of


Canvassers or the canvassing was predetermined and manipulated.
Laodenio argues that the Board was illegally constituted because the
new Chairman was appointed merely by the Provincial Election
Supervisor and not by respondent COMELEC, in violation of Sec. 10
of COMELEC Resolution No. 2756. Also, the Board proceeded
illegally when it canvassed tampered election returns in violation of
Sec. 235 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Sec. 17.Pre-proclamation Controversies; How Commenced.
Questions affecting the composition or proceedings of the board of
canvassers may be initiated in the board or directly with the
Commission. However, matters raised under Sections 233, 234, 235
and 236 of the Omnibus Election Code in relation to the preparation,
transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of the election
returns, and the certificates of canvass shall be brought in the first
instance before the board of canvassers only.
ISSUE: WON the pre-proclamation controversy of Laodenio will
prosper.
HELD: No.
RATIO: Laodenios argument is devoid of merit. Although Sec. 17 of
R.A. 7166 and Sec. 5, par. (a)(1) of Rule 27 of the COMELEC Rules
of Procedure allow filing of a petition directly with COMELEC when
the issue involves the illegal composition of the Board, Sec. 5, par.
(b) of the same rule requires that it must be filed immediately when
the Board begins to act as such, or at the time of the appointment of
the member whose capacity to sit as such is objected to if it comes
after the canvassing of the Board, or immediately at the point where
the proceedings begin to be illegal. In the present case, the petition
was filed five days after respondent Longcop had been proclaimed
by the Board. Laodenio is deemed to have agreed to the new
composition of the Board when he actively participated in the
proceedings.
Finally, Laodenio argues that the election protest was filed ad
cautelam or as a precautionary measure to preserve his rights which
did not thereby oust COMELEC of jurisdiction. He claims that the

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election protest he filed ad cautelam was an exception to the rule laid


down by the Supreme Court in a number of cases that after a
proclamation has been made, a pre-proclamation case before the
COMELEC is no longer viable. Petitioner invokes Agbayani v.
COMELEC (186 SCRA 484) where the Court found that petitioners
real intention in filing the election protest ad cautelam was to insure
the preservation of all the ballot boxes used in the local elections
CASE 59: ALLARDE v. COMELEC (March 1988)- ASTER
CARRILLO
FACTS: Judge Allarde, a congressional candidate, filed with the
Comelec a petition praying for the suspension of the canvassing of
votes and the annulment of the results of the canvass in the Las
Pias Muntinlupa congressional district due to alleged (1) massive
fraud; (2) falsified, incomplete election returns; (3) the zero votes he
received in more than 907 precincts in Las Pias and Muntinlupa is
not only statistically improbable but inherently impossible; (4)
irregularities in the conduct of canvassing; and (5) massive votebuying.
On a motion to dismiss filed by Filemon C. Aguilar, another
congressional candidate who won the elections, the Comelec after
trial issued the questioned order, dismissing the petition of Judge
Allarde and lifted the restraining order issued by the Comelec for the
suspension of the proclamation of the winning candidate and ordered
the Board of Canvassers to reconvene for the purpose of proclaiming
the winning candidate in the Congressional District of Las Pias
Muntinlupa.
Allarde filed for a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the
Comelec.
Hence, this petition for prohibition and mandamus filed by Judge
Allarde.
ISSUES:
1. WON the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in ruling
against Judge Allarde and proceeding with the proclamation of
winners; and

2. WON the massive vote buying and massive fraud are valid
grounds that maybe invoked in a pre-proclamation controversy.
HELD:
1. No
2. No.
RATIO:
1. The Commission on Elections did not commit any grave abuse of
discretion in ruling against Judge Allarde and proceeding with the
proclamation of winners. Records of the case reveal that the
procedural objections of petitioner in support of his allegation of
denial of his right to due process of law were painstakingly discussed
by the Comelec.
2. It is apparent from the records of the case that the other grounds
relied upon by petitioner in seeking relief from the Comelec, i.e.
massive fraud an massive vote-buying, are proper grounds for an
election protest which fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
House Electoral Tribunal and are not the proper issues that may be
raised in a pre-proclamation controversy under Section 243 of the
Omnibus Election Code. While it is true that the other grounds cited
by petitioner, i.e. election returns which were falsified, incomplete, or
contain material defects, or appear to be tampered with or are not
authentic copies, are proper grounds for a pre-proclamation
controversy under Section 243 of the Omnibus Election Code, the
reliefs sought cannot nevertheless be granted considering that
during the canvassing of the election returns, petitioner admittedly
did not raise his objections against the election returns before the
Board of Canvassers of Las Pias Muntinlupa District which is an
essential mandatory pre-requisite under Section 245 of the Omnibus
Election Code.
Besides, as reaffirmed by the Court in Robles vs. Comelec, "the
Court has consistently maintained that election returns of certain
precincts may only be excluded and set aside at the cost of
disenfranchising the voters only on the clearest and compelling
showing of their nullity." Petitioner failed to establish such essential
requisite in this petition.

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Furthermore, considering that Filemon C. Aguilar had already been


proclaimed the winner and had taken his oath and assumed the
office, a pre-proclamation controversy is no longer viable. (Syjuco vs.
Comelec)
CASE 60: DIPATUAN
CACHAPERO

v.

COMELEC

(May

1990)-

OLIVE

FACTS:Petitioner Dimangadap Dipatuan and private respondent


Aleem Hosain Amanoddin were candidates for Mayor of Bacolod
Grande in the February 1988 special local elections in Lanao del
Sur.
On 21 February 1988, the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Bacolod
Grande, chaired by Samuel Minalang, finished canvassing the votes
but did not proclaim the winning candidates. It did so on 29 February
1988, when private respondent Amanoddin was proclaimed winner
and elected Mayor.
Earlier, on 25 February 1988, petitioner Dipatuan was proclaimed
Mayor by a separate Board of Canvassers headed by one
Mamacaog Manggray, after the said Board had excluded the election
returns from Precincts Nos. 15, 17 and 21 from its canvass.
The COMELEC En Banc set aside both (a) the proclamation made
by the Minalang Board for being premature, the candidates not
having been given the opportunity to appeal, and (b) the
proclamation by the Manggray Board on the ground that the latter
Board had not been properly constituted. A Special Board of
Canvassers ("Special Board") was therefore convened in Manila by
the COMELEC to recanvass the election returns from Bacolod
Grande, Lanao del Sur.
During the recanvass, petitioner objected to the inclusion of the
election returns from Precincts Nos. 15 and 17, contending that the
returns from the 2 precincts were "obviously manufactured" within
the meaning of Section 243 (c) of the Omnibus Election Code and
that therefore a pre-proclamation controversy existed which must be
resolved before proclamation of the winning candidates Petitioner

contended the following irregularities had attended at the Bacolod


Grande local elections:
1) In Precinct No. 15. of the 248 persons who actually voted, 187
arrived in the precinct and voted; of the 187 voters, 81 were
illiterates but had suddenly learned how to write their names in
the voting list; many persons whose faces were covered by veils
were allowed to vote without their identities being verified.
2) In Precinct No. 17, of the 93 voters listed, 45 illiterate voters
suddenly learned to write their names in the voting records; many
persons with their faces covered were allowed to vote without
confirmation of their identities.
3) In both Precincts Nos. 15 and 17, there were discrepancies
between the signatures of voters appearing in the voter's
affidavits and the signatures appearing in the voting record; and
members of the Boards of Election Inspectors falsified the voting
records by making it appear that many or most of the registered
voters had voted when in fact they had not.
Both the Comelec Division and the Comelec En Banc, in sustaining
the Special Board's action ordering the inclusion of the questioned
returns in the recanvass, held that the assailed returns were not
"obviously manufactured" such that petitioner's contentions had not
generated a pre-proclamation controversy and that petitioner's
proper recourse was rather the bringing of an election contest where
his contentions in respect of the assailed returns could be properly
ventilated and examined in detail.
ISSUE: WON the questioned returns from Precincts Nos. 15 and
were "obviously manufactured" such that the propriety or legality of
their inclusion in the canvass by the Special Board presented a preproclamation controversy to be resolved before proclamation of this
writing candidates.
HELD: No.
RATIO: We start by noting that the COMELEC (both Second Division
and the Commission En Banc) correctly emphasized that, under the
regime of the Omnibus Election Code, pre-proclamation
controversies are properly limited to challenges directed against the

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Board of Canvassers and proceedings before such Board of


Canvassers, and not the Board of Election Inspectors nor
proceedings before such latter Board and that such challenges
should relate to particular election returns to which petitioner should
have made specific verbal objection subsequently confirmed in
writing. In a pre-proclamation controversy it is axiomatic that the
the COMELEC is not to look beyond or behind election returns which
returns which are on their face regular and authentic returns. A party
A party seeking to raise issues the resolution of which would compel
compel the COMELEC to pierce the veil, so to speak, of election
election returns prima facie regular, has his proper remedy in a
a regular election protest. By their nature, and given the obvious
obvious public interest in the speedy determination of the results of
results of elections, pre-proclamation controversies are to be
resolved in summary proceedings. The delicate policy equilibrium
equilibrium here involved was explained by the Court in the following
following terms in Alonto v. Commission on Elections:
[P]re-proclamation controversies should be summarily decided,
consistent with the law's desire that the canvass and proclamation be
delayed as little as possible . . . [and that the Comelec and the courts
should guard both against proclamation grabbing through tampered
returns as well as against attempts to paralyze canvassing and
proclamation in order to prolong hold-overs.
Section 243 of the Omnibus Election Code provides, in relevant part:
Sec. 243. Issues that may be raised in pre-proclamation controversy.
The following shall be the proper issues that may be raised in a
pre-proclamation controversy:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) The election returns were prepared under duress,
threats, coercion, or intimidation, or they are
obviously manufactured or not authentic; and . . .
Thus, in principle, the issues raised by petitioner do constitute issues
properly raised in pre-proclamation controversies. That the assailed
returns were "obviously manufactured" must, however, be evident
from the face of the election returns themselves. In the case at bar,
petitioner does not claim that the election returns from Precincts Nos.
15 and 17 had not been made or issued by the Board of Election

Inspectors or that they had been manufactured by some unknown


third party or parties; petitioner does not, in other words, claim that
the returns themselves were not authentic. What petitioner in effect
contends is that where election returns, though genuine or authentic
in character, are reflective of fraudulent acts done before or carried
out by the Board of Election Inspectors, the returns should be
deemed as "obviously manufactured."
The COMELEC Second Division held that the apparent alphabetical
and chronological sequence in the voting was not necessarily proof
of fraud that would justify the exclusion of the assailed returns. In
some Precincts in Lanao del Sur, alphabetical voting is imposed to
promote an orderly election.
Petitioner's complaints about supposed irregularities involving
illiterate voters appear to assume that it is improper or unlawful for a
third person e.g., the assistor who had helped the illiterate to cast
his vote 10 write the name of the assisted illiterate in the voting
record. As the Comelec pointed out, however, the proper procedure
for indicating that illiterate voters have cast their votes has not been
specifically set out in the Omnibus Election Code:
The citation of signatures of alleged illiterate voters is not clear. For
the procedure that the Board of Election Inspectors followed with
respect to them is not established. The law itself is not too clear as to
how it is to record the fact that an illiterate voter actually votes, i.e., to
do so by thumbmarking the voting record, or to allow the assistor to
sign the name of the illiterate voter. Sec. 196, B.P. Blg. 881. Again,
the evidence is ambiguous and we are bound by law to presume
regularity. In addition, it must be pointed out that the illiterate voters
in the two questioned precincts are outnumbered by literate voters
whose valid votes will be invalidated by the setting aside of the
returns. The disenfranchisement of voters through the misdeeds of a
few should be avoided.
Turning to the Affidavits relied upon by the petitioner Dipatuan, we
need note only that they do not appear to be the direct and
conclusive evidence considering that said Affidavits had been
executed by affiants allegedly closely connected to petitioner and
therefore expected to support his position, rather than by

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independent and impartial witnesses. In any case, as pointed out in


the decision of the COMELEC Second Division, to require the
comparison of signatures and thumbmarks appearing in the voting
records and the voter's list and voter's affidavits would necessitate,
not a summary pre-proclamation proceeding, but a regular election
protest.

XV. ELECTION CONTESTS


SEC. 17, ART. VI, 1987 CONSTITUTION
THE 2010
TRIBINAL

RULES

OF

THE

PRESIDENTIAL

ELECTORAL

THE 2011 RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES


ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
SEC. 254, OMNIBUS ELECTION
ELECTION CONTESTS)

CODE

(PROCEDURE

IN

RULE 28, PART V, COMELEC RULES OF PROCEDURE


RULE 35, PART VI, COMELEC RULES OF PROCEDURE
COMELEC
REGIONAL OFFICIALS
PROVINCIAL OFFICIALS
CITY OFFICIALS (SEC. 2 [2], ART. IX-C, 1987 CONSTITUTION;
SEC. 251, B.P. BLG. 881, MeTC, MCTC, MTC)

FACTS: In 1995, Jimmy De Castro was proclaimed as the mayor of


Gloria, Oriental Mindoro. Amando Medrano was declared as the vice
mayor. Later, an election protest was filed against De Castro by his
rival candidate, Nicolas Jamilla. While the case was pending, Jamilla
died. The trial court then dismissed the election protest on the
ground that the death of Jamilla has extinguished the case because
the action is personal in nature.
Medrano filed a motion to intervene with reconsideration. The court
denied his motion. He then filed a petition for certiorari and
mandamus with the Commission on Elections which granted his
petition. De Castro opposed the petition as he argues that the action
is personal to Jamilla and that Medrano is not a proper party.
ISSUE: WON the election protest case was distinguished when
Jamilla, the primary contestant thereto, died?
HELD: No.

RULE 20, PART V, COMELEC RULES OF PROCEDURE

BARANGAY OFFICIALS (SEC. 2 [2], ART. IX-C,


CONSTITUTION; SEC. 252, B.P. BLG. 881)
SANGGUNIANG KABATAAN (SEC. 1, R.A. No. 7166)

CASE 61: DE CASTRO v. COMELEC- RONWELL LIM

1987

RATIO: It is true that a public office is personal to the public officer


and is not a property transmissible to his heirs upon death. Thus,
applying the doctrine of actio personalis moritur cum persona, upon
the death of the incumbent, no heir of his may be allowed to continue
holding his office in his place. But nevertheless, an election contest
involves both the private interests of the rival candidates and the
public interest in the final determination of the real choice of the
electorate, and for this reason, an election contest necessarily
survives the death of the protestant or the protestee. There is a
paramount need to remove the cloud and the uncertainty as to the
real choice of the electorate, and this cannot be resolved if the
election protest is dismissed simply because a party thereto died.
As regards the issue of whether or Medrano is a proper party, a vice
mayor elect has the status of a real party in interest in the
continuation of the proceedings and is entitled to intervene therein.
For if the protest succeeds and the Protestee is unseated, the ViceMayor succeeds to the office of Mayor that becomes vacant if the
one duly elected cannot assume the post.

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CASE 62: POE, JR. v. ARROYO, PET CASE (March 2005)EDWARD MATIAS

ISSUE: WON a widow may substitute/intervene for the protestant


who died during the pendency of the latters protest case?

FACTS: Past midnight in the early hours of June 24, 2004, the
Congress as the representatives of the sovereign people and acting
as the National Board of Canvassers, in a near-unanimous roll-call
vote, proclaimed Mrs. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) the duly
elected President of the Philippines. She obtained 12,905,808 votes,
as against 11, 782,232 votes for the second-placer, the movie actor
Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ). She took her oath of office before the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court on June 30, 2004.

HELD: No.

Refusing to concede defeat, the second-placer in the elections, Mr.


FPJ, filed seasonably an election protest before the Supreme Court
acting as the Presidential Electoral Tribunal on July 23, 2004. Mrs.
GMA filed her Answer with Counter Protest of August 5, 2004.
However, on December 14, 2004, the protestant died in the course
of his medical treatment at St. Lukes Hospital cause by cardiopulmonary arrest, secondary to cerebral infarction.
On January 10, 2005, a MANIFESTATION with URGENT
PETITION/MOTION to INTERVENE AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR
DECEASED PROTESTANT FPJ, was submitted by the widow, Mrs.
Jesusa Sonora Poe, who signed the verification and certification
therein. Mrs. FPJ claims that because of the untimely demise of her
husband and in representation not only of her deceased husband but
more so because of the paramount interest if the Filipino people,
there is an urgent need for her to continue and substitute for her late
husband in the lection protest initiate by him to ascertain the true and
genuine will of the electorate in the 2004 elections. In support of her
assertion, she cites De Castro v. COMELEC and Lomugdang v.
Javier, to the effect that the death of the protestant does not
constitute a ground for the dismissal of the contest not oust of the
train court of the jurisdiction to decide the election contest.
However, Mrs. GMA, relying on Vda. de De Mesa v. Mencias and
subsequent cases decided by the HRET asserts that the widow of a
deceased candidate is not the proper party to replace the deceased
protestant since a public office is personal and not a property that
passes on to the heirs.

RATIO: The fundamental rule applicable in a presidential election


protest is Rule 14 of the PET Rules. It provides,
Rule 14. Election Protest.Only the registered
candidate for President or for Vice-President of the
Philippines who received the second or third highest
number of votes may contest the election of the
President or the Vice-President, as the case may be,
by filing a verified petition with the Clerk of the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal within thirty (30) days
after the proclamation of the winner.
nd

rd

Pursuant to this rule, only two persons, the 2 and 3 placers, may
contest the election. By this express enumeration, the rule makers
have in effect determined the real parties in interest concerning an
on-going election contest. It envisioned a scenario where, if the
declared winner had not been truly voted upon by the electorate, the
nd
rd
candidate who received that 2 or the 3 highest number of votes
would be the legitimate beneficiary in a successful election contest.
Rule 3, Section 16 is the rule on substitution in the Rules of
Court. This rule allows substitution by a legal representative. It can
be gleaned from the citation of this rule that movant/intervenor seeks
to appear before this Tribunal as the legal representative/substitute
of the late protestant prescribed by said Section 16. However, in our
application of this rule to an election contest, we have every time
ruled that a public office is personal to the public officer and not a
property transmissible to the heirs upon death. Thus, we consistently
rejected substitution by the widow or the heirs in election contests
where the protestant dies during the pendency of the protest. In Vda.
de De Mesa v. Mencias, we recognized substitution upon the death
of the protestee but denied substitution by the widow or heirs since
they are not the real parties in interest. Similarly, in the later case
of De la Victoria v. Commission on Elections, we struck down the
claim of the surviving spouse and children of the protestee to the
contested office for the same reason. Even in analogous cases

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before other electoral tribunals, involving substitution by the widow of


a deceased protestant, in cases where the widow is not a real party
in interest, we denied substitution by the wife or heirs.
While the right to a public office is personal and exclusive to the
public officer, an election protest is not purely personal and exclusive
to the protestant or to the protestee such that the death of either
would oust the court of all authority to continue the protest
proceedings. Hence, we have allowed substitution and intervention
but only by a real party in interest. A real party in interest is the party
who would be benefited or injured by the judgment, and the party
who is entitled to the avails of the suit. In Vda. de De Mesa v.
Mencias and Lomugdang v. Javier, we permitted substitution by the
vice-mayor since the vice-mayor is a real party in interest considering
that if the protest succeeds and the protestee is unseated, the vicemayor succeeds to the office of the mayor that becomes vacant if the
one duly elected cannot assume office. In contrast, herein
movant/intervenor, Mrs. FPJ, herself denies any claim to the august
office of President. Thus, given the circumstances of this case, we
can conclude that protestants widow is not a real party in interest to
this election protest.
CASE 63: TECSON v. COMELEC (March 2004)- JOYCE BAYLON
FACTS: On 31 December 2003, Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known
as Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ), filed his certificate of candidacy for the
position of President of the Republic of the Philippines under the
Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the 2004
national elections. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing
himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, stated his
name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to
be 20 August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila.
Victorino X. Fornier, (GR 161824) initiated, on 9 January 2004, a
petition (SPA 04-003) before the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel
his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a
natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his
parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an

American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being
the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, Fornier
asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not
have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an
illegitimate child of an alien mother. Fornier based the allegation of
the illegitimate birth of FPJ on two assertions: (1) Allan F. Poe
contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his
marriage to Bessie Kelley and, (2) even if no such prior marriage had
existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth
of FPJ.
On 23 January 2004, the COMELEC dismissed SPA 04-003 for lack
of merit. 3 days later, or on 26 January 2004, Fornier filed his motion
for reconsideration. The motion was denied on 6 February 2004 by
the COMELEC en banc. On 10 February 2004, Fornier assailed the
decision of the COMELEC before the Supreme Court conformably
with Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure. The petition likewise prayed for a temporary restraining
order, a writ of preliminary injunction or any other resolution that
would stay the finality and/or execution of the COMELEC resolutions.
The other petitions, later consolidated with GR 161824, would
include GR 161434 and GR 161634, both challenging the jurisdiction
of the COMELEC and asserting that, under Article VII, Section 4,
paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, only the Supreme Court had
original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue on the
case.
ISSUE: WON FPJ was a natural born citizen, so as to be allowed to
run for the office of the President of the Philippines.
HELD:
RATIO: Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses that
"No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at
least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of
the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such
election." The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to include
"those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to
perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship."

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Herein, the date, month and year of birth of FPJ appeared to be 20


August 1939 during the regime of the 1935 Constitution.
Through its history, four modes of acquiring citizenship naturalization, jus soli, res judicata and jus sanguinis had been in
vogue. Only two, i.e., jus soli and jus sanguinis, could qualify a
person to being a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. Jus soli,
per Roa vs. Collector of Customs (1912), did not last long. With the
adoption of the 1935 Constitution and the reversal of Roa in Tan
Chong vs. Secretary of Labor (1947), jus sanguinis or blood
relationship would now become the primary basis of citizenship by
birth.
Considering the reservations made by the parties on the veracity of
some of the entries on the birth certificate of FPJ and the marriage
certificate of his parents, the only conclusions that could be drawn
with some degree of certainty from the documents would be that (1)
The parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley; (2) FPJ
was born to them on 20 August 1939; (3) Allan F. Poe and Bessie
Kelley were married to each other on 16 September, 1940; (4) The
father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe; and (5) At the time of his
death on 11 September 1954, Lorenzo Poe was 84 years old. The
marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley, the birth
certificate of FPJ, and the death certificate of Lorenzo Poe are
documents of public record in the custody of a public officer.

XVI. ELECTION OFFENSES


SECS. 261-269, OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE

form of letter from petitioner accusing respondent of utilizing


government properties in his campaign and praying for the latter's
immediate disqualification. Another letter dated was addressed to the
COMELEC Regional Director of Region II (without paying the docket
fee), reiterating petitioner's prayer while alleging that respondent and
his men committed acts of terrorism and violated the gun ban.
Finally, on May 11, 1995, an Amended Petition was filed with the
Clerk of Court of the Commission containing substantially the same
allegations as the previous letters but supported by affidavits and
other documentary evidence. Trinidad, on the other hand, opted not
to submit any evidence at all. Meanwhile, the election results showed
that Trinidad garnered the highest number of votes, while Sunga
trailed second. On 10 May 1995 Sunga moved for the suspension of
the proclamation of Trinidad.
However, notwithstanding the motion, Trinidad was proclaimed the
elected mayor, prompting Sunga to file another motion to suspend
the effects of the proclamation. Both motions were not acted upon by
the COMELEC 2nd Division and thereafter dismissed the case.
ISSUES:
1. WON COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion for
dismissing the disqualification case; and
2. WON Sunga should be proclaimed as the Mayor.
HELD:
1. Yes.
2. No.

FACTS: Petitioner Manuel C. Sunga was one of the candidates for


the position of Mayor in the Municipality of Iguig, Province of
Cagayan, in the May 1995 elections. Private respondent Ferdinand
B. Trinidad, then incumbent mayor, was a candidate for re-election in
the same municipality.

RATIO: 1. COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion for


dismissing the disqualification case. The Amended Petition
retroacted to such earlier dates of the letter of complaint, an
amendment which merely supplements and amplifies facts originally
alleged in the complaint relates back to the date of the
commencement of the action and is not barred by the statute of
limitations which expired after the service of the original complaint.

Sunga filed with the COMELEC a complaint on April 22, 1995. The
case came to the attention of this Commission on April 26, 1995 in a

Before final judgment: If for any reason a candidate is not declared


by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is

CASE 64: SUNGA v. COMELEC- CHEYENNE YU

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voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election
the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of
the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or
any intervenor, may, during the pendency thereof, order the
suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the
evidence of guilt is strong. (Sec. 6, RA 6646) A candidate guilty of
election offenses would be undeservedly rewarded, instead of
punished, by the dismissal of the disqualification case against him
simply because the investigating body was unable, for any reason
caused upon it, tod etermine before the election if the offenses were
indeed committed by the candidate sought to be disqualified. All that
the erring aspirant would need to do is to employ delaying tactics so
that the disqualification case based on the commission of election
offenses would not be decided before the election. This scenario is
productive of more fraud which certainly is not the main intent and
purpose of the law.
The purpose of a disqualification proceeding is to prevent the
candidate from running or, if elected, from serving, or to prosecute
him for violation of election laws. The fact that a candidate has been
proclaimed and had assumed the position to which he was elected
does not divest the COMELEC of authority and jurisdiction to
continue the hearing and eventually decide the disqualification. The
COMELEC should not dismiss the case simply because the
respondent has been proclaimed.(Also, the fact that no docket fee
was initially paid is not fatal. The Procedural defect as cured by the
subsequent payment of the docket fee.)
2. Sunga should not be proclaimed as the Mayor notwithstanding the
fact that the disqualification case may proceed. The wreath of victory
cannot be transferred from the disqualified winner to the repudiated
loser because the law then as now only authorizes a declaration of
election in favor of the person who has obtained a plurality of votes
to be declared elected. If the winner is ineligible, the candidate who
got the highest number of votes cannot be proclaimed elected as he
did not get the majority or plurality of the votes (Note that Trinidad
was not yet declared disqualified before election).
As provided in Sec. 44, RA No. 7160 and echoed in Art. 83 of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of theLocal Government Code

of 1991, the language of the law is clear, explicit and unequivocal,


accordingly, in the event that Trinidad is adjudged to be disqualified,
a permanent vacancy will be created for failure of the elected mayor
to qualify for the said office. In such eventuality, the duly elected
vice-mayor shall succeed as provided by law.
CASE 65: DE JESUS v. PEOPLE (April 1983)- FLOYD MAGO
FACTS: After the local elections of January 18, 1980, Ananias Hibo,
defeated candidate of the Nacionalista Party for the office of mayor
of the Municipality of Casiguran, Sorsogon filed with the COMELEC
a complaint charging petitioner Rogelio de Jesus, then COMELEC
registrar of Casiguran, with violation of the 1978 Election Code. Asst.
Fiscals Manuel Genova and Delfin Tarog, in their capacity as
deputized Tanodbayan prosecutors, conducted an investigation. A
prima facie case against petitioner for violation of section 89 and
sub-sections [x] and [mm] of Section 178 of the Election Code of
1978 was found to exist. The following information, was filed before
the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner filed a motion to quash the information, contending that
neither the Tanodbayan nor the Sandiganbayan has the authority to
investigate, prosecute and try the offense. In its opposition, the
prosecution maintained the Tanodbayans exclusive authority to
investigate and prosecute offenses committed by public officers and
employees in relation to their office, and consequently, the
Sandiganbayans jurisdiction to try and decide the charges against
petitioner.
ISSUE: WON the Tanodbayan and the Sandiganbayan have the
power to investigate, prosecute, and try election offenses committed
by a public officer in relation to his office.
HELD: No.
RATIO: The evident constitutional intendment in bestowing the
power to enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of
election and the concomittant authority to investigate and prosecute
election offenses to the COMELEC is to insure the free, orderly and
honest conduct of elections, failure of which would result in the

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frustration of the true will of the people and make a mere idle
ceremony of the sacred right and duty of every qualified citizen to
vote. To divest the COMELEC of the authority to investigate and
prosecute offenses committed by public officials in relation to their
office would thus seriously impair its effectiveness in achieving this
clear constitutional mandate. From a careful scrutiny of the
constitutional provisions relied upon by the Sandiganbayan, We
perceive neither explicit nor implicit grant to it and its prosecuting
arm, the Tanodbayan, of the authority to investigate, prosecute and
hear election offenses committed by public officers in relation to their
office, as contradistinguished from the clear and categorical bestowal
of said authority and jurisdiction upon the COMELEC and the courts
of first instance under Sections 182 and 184, respectively, of the
Election Code of 1978.

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