MTC

1
The facts are as follows:

Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts/Circuit Trial Courts
BP 129, as amended by RA 7691, Secs. 2 to 4

Section 2. Scope. - The reorganization herein provided shall include
the Court of Appeals, the Court of First Instance, the Circuit Criminal
Courts, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts, the Courts of
Agrarian Relations, the City Courts, the Municipal Courts, and the
Municipal Circuit Courts.
CHAPTER I
COURT OF APPEALS
Section 3. Organization. - There is hereby created a Court of
Appeals which consists of a Presiding Justice and fifty Associate
Justice who shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines.
The Presiding Justice shall be so designated in his appointment, and
the Associate Justice shall have precedence according to the dates
of their respective appointments, or when the appointments of two
or more of them shall bear the same date, according to the order in
which their appointments were issued by the President. Any
member who is reappointed to the Court after rendering service in
any other position in the government shall retain the precedence to
which he was entitled under his original appointment, and his
service in the Court shall, for all intents and purposes, be
considered as continuous and uninterrupted. (as amended by Exec.
Order No. 33,, July 28, 1986.)
Section 4. Exercise of powers and functions. - The Court Appeals
shall exercise its powers, functions, and duties, through seventeen
(17) divisions, each composed of three (3) members. The Court
may sit en banc only for the purpose of exercising administrative,
ceremonial, or other non-adjudicatory functions. (as amended by
Exec. Order No. 33,.)
Sps. Fajardo v. Anita Flores, G.R. No. 167891, 610 SCRA 167, 15
January 2010
Before us is a petition for review of the Decision[1] of the Court of
Appeals (CA) dated October 28, 2004 and its Resolution dated April
19, 2005, denying the motion for reconsideration thereof.
Leopoldo delos Reyes owned a parcel of land, denominated as Lot

No. 2351 (Cad. 320-D), with an area of 25,513 square meters (sq
m), located in Barangay Sumandig in Hacienda Buenavista, San
Ildefonso, Bulacan. In 1963, he allowed petitioner Jesus Fajardo to
cultivate said land. The net harvests were divided equally between
the two until 1975 when the relationship was converted to
leasehold tenancy. Per Order[2] from the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR), Regional Office, Region III, San Fernando, Pampanga,
rent was provisionally fixed at 27.42 cavans per year, which Jesus
Fajardo religiously complied with. From the time petitioner
cultivated the land, he was allowed by Leopoldo delos Reyes to
erect a house for his family on the stony part of the land, which is
the subject of controversy.
On January 26, 1988, Leopoldo delos Reyes died. His daughter and
sole heir, herein respondent Anita Flores, inherited the property.
On June 28, 1991, Anita Flores and Jesus Fajardo executed an
agreement, denominated as "KASUNDUAN NG PAGHAHATI NG LUPA
AT PAGTATALAGA NG DAAN UKOL SA MAGKABILANG PANIG."[3] This
was followed by another agreement, "KASUNDUAN SA HATIAN SA
LUPA," executed on July 10, 1991, wherein the parties agreed to
deduct from Lot No. 2351 an area of 10,923 sq m, allotting the
same to petitioner. Apparently, there was a conflict of claims in the
interpretation of the Kasunduan between Anita Flores and Jesus
Fajardo, which was referred to the DAR, Provincial Agrarian Reform
Office, Baliuag, Bulacan.[4] In the Report and Recommendation
dated May 3, 2000, the Legal Officer advised the parties to
ventilate their claims and counterclaims with the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), Malolos, Bulacan.[5]
On December 22, 2000, a complaint for ejectment was filed by
herein respondent Anita Flores, assisted by her husband Bienvenido
Flores, against petitioners with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC), San
Ildefonso, Bulacan. In the complaint, she alleged that, as the sole
heir of the late Leopoldo delos Reyes, she inherited a parcel of land
consisting of stony land, not devoted to agriculture, and land
suitable and devoted to agriculture located in Barangay Sumandig,
San Ildefonso, Bulacan; that, sometime in the 1960s, during the
lifetime of Leopoldo delos Reyes, Jesus Fajardo requested the
former to allow him to work and cultivate that portion of land
devoted to agriculture; that Jesus Fajardo was then allowed to erect
2
a house on the stony part of the land, and that the use and
occupation of the stony part of the land was by mere tolerance
only; and that the land, which was divided equally between the two
parties, excluded the stony portion. In February 1999, respondent
approached petitioners and verbally informed them of her intention
to repossess the stony portion, but petitioners refused to heed the
request.
Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss, alleging that Lot No. 2351,
with an area of 25,513 sq m, was agricultural land; that they had
been continuously, uninterruptedly, and personally cultivating the
same since 1960 up to the present; that the MTC had no jurisdiction
over the case, considering that the dispute between the parties,
regarding the Kasunduan, was referred to the DARAB; and that the
assumption by the DARAB of jurisdiction over the controversy
involving the lot in question therefore precluded the MTC from
exercising jurisdiction over the case.
Resolving the Motion to Dismiss, the MTC ruled that, while at
first glance, the court did not have jurisdiction over the case,
considering that it was admitted that petitioner was allowed to
cultivate the land, a closer look at the Kasunduan, however,
revealed that what was divided was only the portion being tilled.
By contrast, the subject matter of the complaint was the stony
portion where petitioners' house was erected. Thus, the court ruled
that it had jurisdiction over the subject matter.[6]
On April 25, 2001, the MTC rendered judgment in favor of
respondent. The dispositive portion reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of plaintiff (respondent), ORDERING defendants
(petitioners) 1)
and all persons claiming rights under them to VACATE
the subject premises where they have erected their house, which is
a portion of Lot No. 2351, Cad-320-D situated [in] Barangay
Sumandig, San Ildefonso, Bulacan;
2)
to DEMOLISH their house on the subject premises;
3)
to PAY plaintiff the sum of P400.00 a month by way of
reasonable compensation for their use and occupation of the
subject premises starting [in] June 2000 and every month

thereafter until they finally vacate the same; and
4)
suit.[7]
to PAY attorney's fees of P10,000.00 and the cost of
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 16, Third Judicial
Region, Malolos, Bulacan, affirmed the MTC Decision in toto upon a
finding that no reversible error was committed by the court a quo in
its Decision[8] dated August 29, 2002.
On motion for reconsideration, however, the RTC issued an Order
on December 10, 2002, reversing its decision dated August 29,
2002. The RTC found that the issue involved appeared to be an
agrarian dispute, which fell within the contemplation of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, and thus ordered the dismissal of the
case for lack of jurisdiction.
A petition for review was then filed by respondents with the CA to
annul the Order of the RTC dated December 10, 2002.
On October 28, 2004, the CA rendered the assailed decision, which
reinstated the MTC decision. It disagreed with the findings of the
RTC and ruled that the part of Lot No. 2351 where petitioners'
house stood was stony and residential in nature, one that may not
be made to fall within the ambit of the operation of Philippine
agrarian laws, owing to its non-agriculture character. The CA
explained that, on the strength of the two instruments, the parties
made a partition and divided the agricultural portion of Lot No.
2351 equally among themselves. By virtue of said division, the
parties effectively severed and terminated the agricultural
leasehold/tenancy relationship between them; thus, there was no
longer any agrarian dispute to speak of. Fajardo had already
acquired the benefits under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law when one-half of the agricultural portion of Lot No. 2351 was
allotted to him. Petitioners cannot, therefore, be allowed to
continue possession of a part of the stony portion, which was not
included in the land he was cultivating.[9] The dispositive portion
of the CA Decision reads as follows:
3
WHEREFORE, premises considered, finding that the court a
quo seriously erred when it reversed itself, its Order dated
December 10, 2002 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the
Decision dated April 25, 2001 of the MTC of San Ildefonso, Bulacan
is hereby REINSTATED.[10]
The subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied; hence, this
petition.
The issue in this case is whether it is MTC or the DARAB which has
jurisdiction over the case.
There is no dispute that, on June 28, 1991, the parties executed an
agreement, denominated as "KASUNDUAN NG PAGHAHATI NG LUPA
AT PAGTATALAGA NG DAAN UKOL SA MAGKABILANG PANIG."
Therein, it was admitted that Jesus Fajardo was the tiller of the
land. This Kasunduan was subsequently followed by another
agreement, "KASUNDUAN SA HATIAN SA LUPA," whereby an area of
10,923 sq m of Lot No. 2351 was given to petitioners. The portion
of the land where petitioners' house is erected is the subject of the
instant case for unlawful detainer. Respondent argues that this
portion is not included in the deed of partition, while petitioners
insist that it is.
An agrarian dispute[13] refers to any controversy relating to

tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship, or
otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes
concerning farmworkers' associations or representation of persons
in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange
terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements. It includes any
controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under this
Act and other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from
landowner to farmworkers, tenants, and other agrarian reform
beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the proximate
relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or
lessor and lessee. It relates to any controversy relating to, inter
alia, tenancy over lands devoted to agriculture.[14]
Undeniably, the instant case involves a controversy regarding
tenurial arrangements. The contention that the Kasunduans, which
allegedly terminated the tenancy relationship between the parties
and, therefore, removed the case from the ambit of R.A. No. 6657,
is untenable. There still exists an agrarian dispute because the
controversy involves the home lot of petitioners, an incident arising
from the landlord-tenant relationship.
.Amurao v. Villalobos is quite instructive:
We agree with the RTC when it clearly pointed out in its Order dated
December 10, 2002 that the resolution of this case hinges on the
correct interpretation of the contracts executed by the parties. The
issue of who has a better right of possession over the subject land
cannot be determined without resolving first the matter as to whom
the subject property was allotted. Thus, this is not simply a case
for unlawful detainer, but one that is incapable of pecuniary
estimation, definitely beyond the competence of the MTC.[11]
The instant case undeniably involves a controversy involving

tenurial arrangements because the Kasulatan will definitely modify,
nay, terminate the same. Even assuming that the tenancy
relationship between the parties had ceased due to the Kasulatan,
there still exists an agrarian dispute because the action involves an
incident arising from the landlord and tenant relationship.
More importantly, the controversy involves an agricultural land,

which petitioners have continuously and personally cultivated since
the 1960s. In the Kasunduan, it was admitted that Jesus Fajardo
was the tiller of the land. Being agricultural lessees, petitioners
have a right to a home lot and a right to exclusive possession
thereof by virtue of Section 24, R.A. No. 3844 of the Agricultural
Land Reform Code.[12] Logically, therefore, the case involves an
agrarian dispute, which falls within the contemplation of R.A. No.
6657, or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.
[I]t is safe to conclude that the existence of prior agricultural

tenancy relationship, if true, will divest the MCTC of its jurisdiction
the previous juridical tie compels the characterization of the
controversy as an "agrarian dispute." x x x Even if the tenurial
arrangement has been severed, the action still involves an incident
arising from the landlord and tenant relationship. Where the case
involves the dispossession by a former landlord of a former tenant
of the land claimed to have been given as compensation in
consideration of the renunciation of the tenurial rights, there clearly
In Teresita S. David v. Agustin Rivera, this Court held that:
4
exists an agrarian dispute. On this point the Court has already
ruled:
"Indeed, section 21 of the Republic Act No. 1199, provides that 'all
cases involving the dispossession of a tenant by the landlord or by
a third party and/or the settlement and disposition of disputes
arising from the relationship of landlord and tenant . . . shall be
under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian
Relations.' This jurisdiction does not require the continuance of the
relationship of landlord and tenant-at the time of the dispute. The
same may have arisen, and often times arises, precisely from the
previous termination of such relationship. If the same existed
immediately, or shortly, before the controversy and the subjectmatter thereof is whether or not said relationship has been lawfully
terminated, or if the dispute springs or originates from the
relationship of landlord and tenant, the litigation is (then)
cognizable by the Court of Agrarian Relations . . ."
In the case at bar, petitioners' claim that the tenancy relationship
has been terminated by the Kasulatan is of no moment. As long as
the subject matter of the dispute is the legality of the termination
of the relationship, or if the dispute originates from such
relationship, the case is cognizable by the DAR, through the DARAB.
The severance of the tenurial arrangement will not render the
action beyond the ambit of an agrarian dispute.[15]
Furthermore, the records disclose that the dispute between the
parties, regarding the interpretation of the Kasunduan, was, in fact,
raised and referred to the DAR, which in turn referred the case to
the DARAB.[16] In view of the foregoing, we reiterate Hilario v.
Prudente,[17] that:
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction precludes the courts from
resolving a controversy over which jurisdiction has initially been
lodged with an administrative body of special competence. For
agrarian reform cases, jurisdiction is vested in the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR); more specifically, in the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB).
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated October 28, 2004 of the

Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Order of the
Regional Trial Court dated December 10, 2002 is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Vda De Barrera et al. v. Heirs of Vicente Legaspi, G.R. No. 174346,
565 SCRA 192, 12 September 2008
Under review before this Court is the July 31, 2006 Decision of the
Court of Appeals,[1] which affirmed that of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 16, of Tangub City in Civil Case No. TC-97-001, ordering the
defendants-petitioners herein, Fernanda Geonzon vda. de Barrera
and Johnny Oco. Jr. to return possession of the subject property to
the plaintiffs-herein respondents, Heirs of Vicente Legaspi.
On October 1, 1996, petitioner Johnny Oco Jr. (Oco), said to be a
"peace officer connected with the PNP," accompanied by
"unidentified CAFGU members," forced his way into respondents'
0.9504-hectare irrigated farmland located at Liloan, Bonifacio,
Misamis Occidental. After dispossessing respondents of the
property, Oco and company used a tractor to destroy the planted
crops, took possession of the land, and had since tended it.[2]
Respondents thus filed on February 7, 1997 a complaint before the
Regional Trial Court of Tangub City for Reconveyance of Possession
with Preliminary Mandatory Injunction and Damages[3] against
petitioners.
In their Answer, petitioners claimed that the subject land forms part
of a three-hectare property described in OCT No. P-447 issued on
February 10, 1956 in the name of Andrea Lacson who sold a 2hectare portion thereof to Eleuterio Geonzon who, in turn, sold
1.1148 thereof to his sister petitioner Fernanda Geonzon vda. de
Barrera (Fernanda).[4]
Respondents, on the other hand, asserted that the land was
occupied, possessed and cultivated by their predecessor-in-interest
Vicente Legaspi and his wife Lorenza since 1935;[5] after a
subdivision survey was conducted in November 30, 1976, it was
found out that the land formed part of the titled property of Andrea
Lacson;[6] and despite this discovery, they never filed any action to
recover ownership thereof since they were left undisturbed in their
5
possession,[7] until October 1, 1996 when petitioners forced their
way into it.
Petitioners raised the issue of ownership as a special affirmative
defense.[8] In their Memorandum, however, they questioned the
jurisdiction of the RTC over the subject matter of the complaint, the
assessed value of the land being only P11,160,[9] as reflected in
Tax Declaration No. 7565.[10]
By Decision of November 27, 1998, the trial court found for
respondents, disposing as follows:
cancels [T]ax [D]eclaration No. 5454 covering the bigger portion of

the land under which the land described under [T]ax [D]eclaration
No. 7565 is part and parcel thereof [sic]; the present estimated
value being P50,000."[11] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Petitioners thereupon appealed to the Court of Appeals which
affirmed the trial court's disposition of the issue of jurisdiction over
the subject matter.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs

[herein respondents] and against the defendants [-herein
petitioners]:
On the merits, the appellate court affirmed too the trial court's
decision, finding that "both testimonial and documentary evidence
on record established that appellees, through their predecessors-ininterest, have been in peaceful, continuous, public and actual
possession of the property in dispute even before the year
1930."[12]
1. Ordering the latter to return the possession of the land in

question to the plaintiffs and
The appellate court emphasized that in an accion publiciana, the

only issue involved is the determination of possession de jure.[13]
2. Ordering the latter to desist from further depriving and

disturbing plaintiffs' peaceful possession thereof, unless there be
another court judgment to the contrary.
Hence, the present petition for review which raises the following
issues:
SO ORDERED.
On the issue of jurisdiction over the subject matter, the trial court,
maintaining that it had, held:
The Court is not persuaded by [the defendants'] arguments. What
determines the nature of the action as well as the jurisdiction of the
[c]ourt are the facts alleged in the complaint and not those alleged
in the answer of the defendants.
xxxx
In [p]ar. 2 of plaintiffs' complaint, the land in question was
described as a riceland "situated at Liloan, Bonifacio, Misamis Occ.
and declared under [T]ax [D]eclaration No. 7564 in the name of
Vicente Legaspi and bounded on the north by a creek, on the east
Sec. 12, on the south Lot No. 007 and on the west also by Lot No.
007 which tax declaration cancels former [T]ax [D]eclaration No.
12933 under the name of Lorenza Bacul Legaspi which likewise
I. . . . WHETHER OWNERSHIP AND TITLE CANNOT BE AN ISSUE TO

DETERMINE WHO HAS A BETTER RIGHT [TO] THE PORTION
LITIGATED; AND
II. WHETHER . . . THE NATURE OF THE ACTION AS WELL AS THE
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT DEPEND ON THE FACTS AS ALLEGED
IN THE COMPLAINT.[14]
For obvious reasons, the issue of lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter shall be first considered.
Section 33 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, (the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980), as amended by Republic Act No. 7691
provides for the jurisdiction of metropolitan trial courts, municipal
trial courts and municipal circuit trial courts, to wit:
xxxx
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve
title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein
6
where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does
not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions
in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of
whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs:
Provided, That in cases of land not declared for taxation purposes,
the value of such property shall be determined by the assessed
value of the adjacent lots. (Emphasis, italics and underscoring
supplied)
Before the amendments introduced by Republic Act No. 7691, the
plenary action of accion publiciana was to be brought before the
regional trial court.[15] With the modifications introduced by R.A.
No. 7691 in 1994, the jurisdiction of the first level courts has been
expanded to include jurisdiction over other real actions where the
assessed value does not exceed P20,000, P50,000 where the action
is filed in Metro Manila. The first level courts thus have exclusive
original jurisdiction over accion publiciana and accion
reivindicatoria where the assessed value of the real property does
not exceed the aforestated amounts. Accordingly, the jurisdictional
element is the assessed value of the property.
Assessed value is understood to be "the worth or value of property
established by taxing authorities on the basis of which the tax rate
is applied. Commonly, however, it does not represent the true or
market value of the property."[16]
The subject land has an assessed value of P11,160 as reflected in
Tax Declaration No. 7565, a common exhibit of the parties. The
bare claim of respondents that it has a value of P50,000 thus fails.
The case, therefore, falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of
the municipal trial court.
It was error then for the RTC to take cognizance of the complaint
based on the allegation that "the present estimated value [of the
land is] P50,000," which allegation is, oddly, handwritten on the
printed pleading. The estimated value, commonly referred to as
fair market value,[17] is entirely different from the assessed value
of the property.
Lack of jurisdiction is one of those excepted grounds where the
court may dismiss a claim or a case at any time when it appears
from the pleadings or the evidence on record that any of those

grounds exists, even if they were not raised in the answer or in a
motion to dismiss.[18] That the issue of lack of jurisdiction was
raised by petitioners only in their Memorandum filed before the trial
court did not thus render them in estoppel.
En passant, the Court notes that respondents' cause of action accion publiciana is a wrong mode. The dispossession took place
on October 1, 1996 and the complaint was filed four months
thereafter or on February 7, 1997. Respondents' exclusion from
the property had thus not lasted for more than one year to call for
the remedy of accion publiciana.
In fine, since the RTC has no jurisdiction over the complaint filed by
respondents, all the proceedings therein as well as the Decision of
November 27, 1998, are null and void. The complaint should
perforce be dismissed. This leaves it unnecessary to still dwell on
the first issue.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The challenged July
31, 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE. The
decision of Branch 16 of the Regional Trial Court of Tangub City in
Civil Case No. TC-97-001 is declared NULL and VOID for lack of
jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.
Ouano v. PGTT, G.R. No. 134230, 384 SCRA 589, 7 July 2002
PGTT International Investment Corporation (PGTT), respondent, is a
corporation duly organized under existing laws, with address at
YASCO Bldg., M. J. Cuenco Ave., Cebu City.
On December 11, 1997, PGTT filed with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 20, Cebu City, a verified complaint against Jovenal
Ouano, petitioner, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB- 21319, entitled
"PGTT INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT CORPORATION, Plaintiff, vs.
JUVENAL OUANO, Defendant," for "Recovery of Ownership and
Possession of Real Property and Damages."[1] In its complaint,
PGTT alleged that it is the owner of Lot Nos. 1-10, Block 2 of the
Sunnymeade Crescent Subdivision located at Pit-os, Talamban,
Cebu City. Sometime in October of 1996, PGTT found that Ouano
uprooted the concrete monuments of the said lots, plowed them
and planted corn thereon. Despite PGTT's demand that he vacate
the lots and restore them to their original condition, Ouano refused,
7
claiming he is the owner and lawful possessor of the 380 square
meters he occupied. Due to Ouano's wrongful act, PGTT was
deprived of the use of its property and suffered damages in the
amount of P100,000.00 a year. Likewise, PGTT was constrained to
file the subject action and hired the services of his counsel for
P100,000.00. PGTT prayed:
"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, it is most respectfully
prayed that after due notice and hearing, judgment be rendered
ordering defendant (Jovenal Ouano) to vacate the premises and
restore the lots to their original condition; pay plaintiff (PGTT)
P100,000.00 as damages per year, beginning October, 1996 until
he shall have vacated the premises and restored the lots to their
original condition; pay P100,000.00 as attorney's fees; and pay
P50,000.00 as expenses of litigation.
"Plaintiff prays for such other reliefs and remedies, just and
equitable under the premises."[2]
On February 5, 1998, Ouano filed a motion to dismiss the complaint
on the ground that it is the Municipal Trial Court (MTC), not the RTC,
which has jurisdiction over it considering that the assessed value of
the lots involved is only P2,910, as indicated in the latest tax
declaration,[3] citing Section 19 (paragraph 2) and Section 33
(paragraph 3) of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 (The Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980), as amended by Republic Act No.
7691.[4]
In its opposition to Ouano's motion, PGTT contends that the RTC has
jurisdiction since the market value of the lots is P49,760.00.[5]
Besides, the complaint is not only an action for recovery of
ownership and possession of real property, but also for damages
exceeding P100,000.00, over which claim the RTC has exclusive
original jurisdiction under Section 19 (paragraph 8) of the same
law.
On March 6, 1998, the RTC, presided by Judge Ramon G. Codilla, Jr.,
issued an Order denying the motion to dismiss, holding that:
"This court believes that this court has jurisdiction to try this case
considering that the real properties consist of ten parcels of land in
a subdivision and the court takes note that there is a discrepancy
somewhere by the Office of the City Assessor in the Assessment of
the parcels of land for only less than P2,000.00 and that the
government is very much at a loss by these unrealistic
valuation."[6]
Ouano filed a motion for reconsideration but was likewise denied by
the RTC in its Order dated May 27, 1998. The trial court ruled it has
jurisdiction over the case because "(i)t is of judicial knowledge that
the real properties situated in Cebu City command a higher
valuation than those indicated in the tax declaration. The
observation of plaintiff's (PGTT's) counsel as to the issue on
damages is likewise sustained considering that, being a
corporation, it may have incurred damages in the form of
unrealized profits."[7]
Hence the present petition for certiorari filed by Ouano under Rule
65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, assailing the
Orders of respondent judge dated March 6, 1998 and May 27, 1998
as having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction.
At the outset, it is necessary to stress that a direct recourse to this
Court is highly improper, for it violates the established policy of
strict observance of the judicial hierarchy of courts.[8] We need to
reiterate, for the guidance of petitioner, that this Court's original
jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari (as well as prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction) is
concurrent with the Court of Appeals (CA), as in the present case,
and with the RTCs in proper cases within their respective regions.
[9] However, this concurrence of jurisdiction does not grant a party
seeking any of the extraordinary writs the absolute freedom to file
his petition with the court of his choice. This Court is a court of last
resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the
functions assigned to it by the Constitution and immemorial
tradition.[10] The hierarchy of courts determines the appropriate
forum for such petitions. Thus, petitions for the issuance of such
extraordinary writs against the first level ("inferior") courts should
be filed with the RTC, and those against the latter, with the CA.[11]
A direct invocation of this Court's original jurisdiction to issue these
writs should be allowed only when there are special and important
reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition.
This is the established policy. It is a policy that is necessary to
prevent inordinate demands upon this Court's time and attention
which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive
8
jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of its docket.[12]
Unfortunately, the instant petition does not allege any special and
compelling reason to justify a direct recourse to this Court.
However, we deem it more appropriate and practical to resolve the
controversy in order to avoid further delay, but only in this
instance.
The lone issue for our resolution is whether the RTC has jurisdiction
over Civil Case No. CEB-21319.
The complaint seeks to recover from private respondent the
ownership and possession of the lots in question and the payment
of damages. Since the action involves ownership and possession of
real property, the jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim is
determined by the assessed value, not the market value, thereof,
pursuant to Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. 7691.
Section 33 (paragraph 3) of the said law provides:
"Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
x x x.
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve
title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein
where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does
not exceed Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions
in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of
whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs:
Provided, That in cases of land not declared for taxation purposes,
the value of such property shall be determined by the assessed
value of the adjacent lots.
x x x." (Emphasis ours)
Likewise, Section 19 (paragraph 2) of the same law reads:
"Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. - The Regional Trial Court shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
x x x.
(2) In all civil actions, which involve the title to, or possession of,
real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of
the property involved exceeds Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00)
or, for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into
and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over
which is conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;
x x x." (Emphasis ours)
It is undisputed that the assessed value of the property involved, as
shown by the corresponding tax declaration, is only P2,910.00. As
such, the complaint is well within the MTC's P20,000.00
jurisdictional limit.
The finding of respondent judge that the value of the lots is higher
than that indicated in the tax declaration and that, therefore, the
RTC has jurisdiction over the case is highly speculative. It is
elementary that the tax declaration indicating the assessed value
of the property enjoys the presumption of regularity as it has been
issued by the proper government agency.
Respondent judge further held that since the complaint also seeks
the recovery of damages exceeding P100,000.00, then it is within
the competence of the RTC pursuant to Section 19 (paragraph 8) of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. 7691, which states:
"SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. - Regional Trial Courts shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
xxx
"(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest,
damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and
costs or the value of the property in controversy exceeds One
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) or, in such other cases in
Metro Manila, where the demand, exclusive of the above mentioned
items exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00)."
(Emphasis ours)
9
The above provision does not apply to the instant case. It is
applicable only to "all other cases" other than an action involving
title to, or possession of real property in which the assessed value
is the controlling factor in determining the court's jurisdiction.
Besides, the same provision explicitly excludes from the
determination of the jurisdictional amount the demand for "interest,
damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and
costs". The exclusion of such damages is reiterated in Section 33,
paragraph 3 of the same Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended,
quoted earlier. The said damages are merely incidental to, or a
consequence of, the main cause of action for recovery of ownership
and possession of real property. In this connection, this Court
issued Administrative Circular No. 09-94 setting the guidelines in
the implementation of R.A. 7691. Paragraph 2 states:
"2. The exclusion of the term 'damages of whatever kind' in
determining the jurisdictional amount under Section 19 (8) and
Section 33 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. 7691, applies to
cases where the damages are merely incidental to or a
consequence of the main cause of action. However, in cases where
the claim for damages is the main cause of action, or one of the
causes of action, the amount of such claim shall be considered in
determining the jurisdiction of the court." (Emphasis ours)
We thus find that in issuing the assailed orders denying petitioner's
motion to dismiss, thus taking cognizance of the case, the RTC
committed grave abuse of discretion.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Orders
issued by respondent RTC on March 6, 1998 and May 27, 1998 in
Civil Case No. CEB-21319 are SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the
complaint is ordered DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Barangay Lupon
RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991) Secs 399-422
CHAPTER VII
Katarungang Pambarangay
Section 399. Lupong Tagapamayapa. -
(a) There is hereby created in each barangay a lupong

tagapamayapa, hereinafter referred to as the lupon, composed of
the punong barangay, as chairman and ten (10) to twenty (20)
members. The lupon shall be constituted every three (3) years in
the manner provided herein.
(b) Any person actually residing or working, in the barangay, not
otherwise expressly disqualified by law, and possessing integrity,
impartiality, independence of mind, sense of fairness, and
reputation for probity, may be appointed a member of the lupon.
(c) A notice to constitute the lupon, which shall include the names
of proposed members who have expressed their willingness to
serve, shall be prepared by the punong barangay within the first
fifteen (15) days from the start of his term of office. Such notice
shall be posted in three (3) conspicuous places in the barangay
continuously for a period of not less than three (3) weeks;
(d) The punong barangay, taking into consideration any opposition
to the proposed appointment or any recommendations for
appointment as may have been made within the period of posting,
shall within ten (10) days thereafter, appoint as members those
whom he determines to be suitable therefor. Appointments shall be
in writing, signed by the punong barangay, and attested to by the
barangay secretary.
(e) The list of appointed members shall be posted in three (3)
conspicuous places in the barangay for the entire duration of their
term of office; and
(f) In barangays where majority of the inhabitants are members of
indigenous cultural communities, local systems of settling disputes
through their councils of datus or elders shall be recognized without
prejudice to the applicable provisions of this Code.
Section 400. Oath and Term of Office. - Upon appointment, each
lupon member shall take an oath of office before the punong
barangay. He shall hold office until a new lupon is constituted on
the third year following his appointment unless sooner terminated
by resignation, transfer of residence or place of work, or withdrawal
of appointment by the punong barangay with the concurrence of
the majority of all the members of the lupon.
10
Section 401. Vacancies. - Should a vacancy occur in the lupon for
any cause, the punong barangay shall immediately appoint a
qualified person who shall hold office only for the unexpired portion
of the term.
Section 402. Functions of the Lupon. - The lupon shall:
(a) Exercise administrative supervision over the conciliation panels
provided herein;
(b) Meet regularly once a month to provide a forum for exchange of
ideas among its members and the public on matters relevant to the
amicable settlement of disputes, and to enable various conciliation
panel members to share with one another their observations and
experiences in effecting speedy resolution of disputes; and
(c) Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and
functions as may be prescribed by law or ordinance.
Section 403. Secretary of the Lupon. - The barangay secretary shall
concurrently serve as the secretary of the lupon. He shall record
the results of mediation proceedings before the punong barangay
and shall submit a report thereon to the proper city or municipal
courts. He shall also receive and keep the records of proceedings
submitted to him by the various conciliation panels.
Section 404. Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo. (a) There shall be constituted for each dispute brought before the
lupon a conciliation panel to be known as the pangkat ng
tagapagkasundo, hereinafter referred to as the pangkat, consisting
of three (3) members who shall be chosen by the parties to the
dispute from the list of members of the lupon.
Should the parties fail to agree on the pangkat membership, the
same shall be determined by lots drawn by the lupon chairman.
(b) The three (3) members constituting the pangkat shall elect from
among themselves the chairman and the secretary. The secretary
shall prepare the minutes of the pangkat proceedings and submit a
copy duly attested to by the chairman to the lupon secretary and to
the proper city or municipal court. He shall issue and cause to be

served notices to the parties concerned.
The lupon secretary shall issue certified true copies of any public
record in his custody that is not by law otherwise declared
confidential.
Section 405. Vacancies in the Pangkat. - Any vacancy in the
pangkat shall be chosen by the parties to the dispute from among
the other lupon members. Should the parties fail to agree on a
common choice, the vacancy shall be filled by lot to be drawn by
the lupon chairman.
Section 406. Character of Office and Service of Lupon Members. (a) The lupon members, while in the performance of their official
duties or on the occasion thereof, shall be deemed as persons in
authority, as defined in the Revised Penal Code.
(b) The lupon or pangkat members shall serve without
compensation, except as provided for in Section 393 and without
prejudice to incentives as provided for in this Section and in Book IV
of this Code. The Department of the Interior and Local Government
shall provide for a system of granting economic or other incentives
to the lupon or pangkat members who adequately demonstrate the
ability to judiciously and expeditiously resolve cases referred to
them. While in the performance of their duties, the lupon or
pangkat members, whether in public or private employment, shall
be deemed to be on official time, and shall not suffer from any
diminution in compensation or allowance from said employment by
reason thereof.
Section 407. Legal Advice on Matters Involving Questions of Law. The provincial, city legal officer or prosecutor or the municipal legal
officer shall render legal advice on matters involving questions of
law to the punong barangay or any lupon or pangkat member
whenever necessary in the exercise of his functions in the
administration of the katarungang pambarangay.
Section 408. Subject Matter for Amicable Settlement; Exception
Thereto. - The lupon of each barangay shall have authority to bring
together the parties actually residing in the same city or
municipality for amicable settlement of all disputes except:
11
(a) Where one party is the government, or any subdivision or
instrumentality thereof;
(b) Where one party is a public officer or employee, and the dispute
relates to the performance of his official functions;
(c) Offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding one (1) year or
a fine exceeding Five thousand pesos (P5,000.00);
(d) Offenses where there is no private offended party;
(e) Where the dispute involves real properties located in different
cities or municipalities unless the parties thereto agree to submit
their differences to amicable settlement by an appropriate lupon;
(f) Disputes involving parties who actually reside in barangays of
different cities or municipalities, except where such barangay units
adjoin each other and the parties thereto agree to submit their
differences to amicable settlement by an appropriate lupon;
(g) Such other classes of disputes which the President may
determine in the interest of Justice or upon the recommendation of
the Secretary of Justice.
The court in which non-criminal cases not falling within the
authority of the lupon under this Code are filed may, at any time
before trial motu propio refer the case to the lupon concerned for
amicable settlement.
Section 409. Venue. (a) Disputes between persons actually residing in the same
barangay shall be brought for amicable settlement before the lupon
of said barangay.
(b) Those involving actual residents of different barangays within
the same city or municipality shall be brought in the barangay
where the respondent or any of the respondents actually resides, at
the election of the complaint.
(c) All disputes involving real property or any interest therein shall
be brought in the barangay where the real property or the larger
portion thereof is situated.
(d) Those arising at the workplace where the contending parties are
employed or at the institution where such parties are enrolled for
study, shall be brought in the barangay where such workplace or
institution is located.
Objections to venue shall be raised in the mediation proceedings
before the punong barangay; otherwise, the same shall be deemed
waived. Any legal question which may confront the punong
barangay in resolving objections to venue herein referred to may be
submitted to the Secretary of Justice, or his duly designated
representative, whose ruling thereon shall be binding.
Section 410. Procedure for Amicable Settlement. (a) Who may initiate proceeding - Upon payment of the appropriate
filing fee, any individual who has a cause of action against another
individual involving any matter within the authority of the lupon
may complain, orally or in writing, to the lupon chairman of the
barangay.
(b) Mediation by lupon chairman - Upon receipt of the complaint,
the lupon chairman shall within the next working day summon the
respondent(s), with notice to the complainant(s) for them and their
witnesses to appear before him for a mediation of their conflicting
interests. If he fails in his mediation effort within fifteen (15) days
from the first meeting of the parties before him, he shall forthwith
set a date for the constitution of the pangkat in accordance with
the provisions of this Chapter.
(c) Suspension of prescriptive period of offenses - While the dispute
is under mediation, conciliation, or arbitration, the prescriptive
periods for offenses and cause of action under existing laws shall
be interrupted upon filing the complaint with the punong barangay.
The prescriptive periods shall resume upon receipt by the
complainant of the complainant or the certificate of repudiation or
of the certification to file action issued by the lupon or pangkat
secretary: Provided, however, That such interruption shall not
exceed sixty (60) days from the filing of the complaint with the
punong barangay.
12
(d) Issuance of summons; hearing; grounds for disqualification The pangkat shall convene not later than three (3) days from its
constitution, on the day and hour set by the lupon chairman, to
hear both parties and their witnesses, simplify issues, and explore
all possibilities for amicable settlement. For this purpose, the
pangkat may issue summons for the personal appearance of
parties and witnesses before it. In the event that a party moves to
disqualify any member of the pangkat by reason of relationship,
bias, interest, or any other similar grounds discovered after the
constitution of the pangkat, the matter shall be resolved by the
affirmative vote of the majority of the pangkat whose decision shall
be final. Should disqualification be decided upon, the resulting
vacancy shall be filled as herein provided for.
(e) Period to arrive at a settlement - The pangkat shall arrive at a
settlement or resolution of the dispute within fifteen (15) days from
the day it convenes in accordance with this section. This period
shall, at the discretion of the pangkat, be extendible for another
period which shall not exceed fifteen (15) days, except in clearly
meritorious cases.
Section 411. Form of settlement. - All amicable settlements shall be
in writing, in a language or dialect known to the parties, signed by
them, and attested to by the lupon chairman or the pangkat
chairman, as the case may be. When the parties to the dispute do
not use the same language or dialect, the settlement shall be
written in the language known to them.
Section 412. Conciliation. (a) Pre-condition to Filing of Complaint in Court. - No complaint,
petition, action, or proceeding involving any matter within the
authority of the lupon shall be filed or instituted directly in court or
any other government office for adjudication, unless there has been
a confrontation between the parties before the lupon chairman or
the pangkat, and that no conciliation or settlement has been
reached as certified by the lupon secretary or pangkat secretary as
attested to by the lupon or pangkat chairman or unless the
settlement has been repudiated by the parties thereto.
(b) Where Parties May Go Directly to Court. - The parties may go
directly to court in the following instances:
(1) Where the accused is under detention;

(2) Where a person has otherwise been deprived of personal liberty
calling for habeas corpus proceedings;
(3) Where actions are coupled with provisional remedies such as
preliminary injunction, attachment, delivery of personal property
and support pendente lite; and
(4) Where the action may otherwise be barred by the statute of
limitations.
(c) Conciliation among members of indigenous cultural
communities. - The customs and traditions of indigenous cultural
communities shall be applied in settling disputes between
members of the cultural communities.
Section 413. Arbitration. (a) The parties may, at any stage of the proceedings, agree in
writing that they shall abide by the arbitration award of the lupon
chairman or the pangkat. Such agreement to arbitrate may be
repudiated within five (5) days from the date thereof for the same
grounds and in accordance with the procedure hereinafter
prescribed. The arbitration award shall be made after the lapse of
the period for repudiation and within ten (10) days thereafter.
(b) The arbitration award shall be in writing in a language or dialect
known to the parties. When the parties to the dispute do not use
the same language or dialect, the award shall be written in the
language or dialect known to them.
Section 414. Proceedings Open to the Public; Exception. - All
proceedings for settlement shall be public and informal: Provided,
however, That the lupon chairman or the pangkat chairman, as the
case may be, may motu proprio or upon request of a party, exclude
the public from the proceedings in the interest of privacy, decency,
or public morals.
Section 415. Appearance of Parties in Person. - In all katarungang
pambarangay proceedings, the parties must appear in person
without the assistance of counsel or representative, except for
13
minors and incompetents who may be assisted by their next-of-kin
who are not lawyers.
Section 416. Effect of Amicable Settlement and Arbitration Award. The amicable settlement and arbitration award shall have the force
and effect of a final judgment of a court upon the expiration of ten
(10) days from the date thereof, unless repudiation of the
settlement has been made or a petition to nullify the award has
been filed before the proper city or municipal court.
However, this provision shall not apply to court cases settled by the
lupon under the last paragraph of Section 408 of this Code, in
which case the compromise or the pangkat chairman shall be
submitted to the court and upon approval thereof, have the force
and effect of a judgment of said court.
Section 417. Execution. - The amicable settlement or arbitration
award may be enforced by execution by the lupon within six (6)
months from the date of the settlement. After the lapse of such
time, the settlement may be enforced by action in the appropriate
city or municipal court.
Section 418. Repudiation. - Any party to the dispute may, within ten
(10) days from the date of the settlement, repudiate the same by
filing with the lupon chairman a statement to that effect sworn to
before him, where the consent is vitiated by fraud, violence, or
intimidation. Such repudiation shall be sufficient basis for the
issuance of the certification for filing a complaint as hereinabove
provided.
Section 419. Transmittal of Settlement and Arbitration. - Award to
the Court. - The secretary of the lupon shall transmit the settlement
or the arbitration award to the appropriate city or municipal court
within five (5) days from the date of the award or from the lapse of
the ten-day period repudiating the settlement and shall furnish
copies thereof to each of the parties to the settlement and the
lupon chairman.
Section 420. Power to Administer Oaths. - The punong barangay, as
chairman of the lupong tagapamayapa, and the members of the
pangkat are hereby authorized to administer oaths in connection
with any matter relating to all proceedings in the implementation of
the katarungang pambarangay.
Section 421. Administration; Rules and Regulations. - The city or

municipal mayor, as the case may be, shall see to the efficient and
effective implementation and administration of the katarungang
pambarangay. The Secretary of Justice shall promulgate the rules
and regulations necessary to implement this Chapter.
Section 422. Appropriations. - Such amount as may be necessary
for the effective implementation of the katarungang pambarangay
shall be provided for in the annual budget of the city or
municipality concerned.
Leo Wee v. George de Castro et al., G.R. No. 176405, 562 SCRA 695,
20 August 2008
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule
45 of the Revised Rules of Court filed by petitioner Leo Wee,
seeking the reversal and setting aside of the Decision2 dated 19
September 2006 and the Resolution3 dated 25 January 2007 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 90906. The appellate court, in its
assailed Decision, reversed the dismissal of Civil Case. No. 1990, an
action for ejectment instituted by respondent George de Castro, on
his own behalf and on behalf of Annie de Castro, Felomina de
Castro Uban and Jesus de Castro4 against petitioner, by the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Alaminos City, which was affirmed by
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 54, Alaminos City,
Pangasinan; and, ruling in favor of the respondents, ordered the
petitioner to vacate the subject property. In its assailed Resolution
dated 25 January 2007, the Court of Appeals refused to reconsider
its earlier Decision of 19 September 2006.
In their Complaint5 filed on 1 July 2002 with the MTC of Alaminos
City, docketed as Civil Case No. 1990, respondentsalleged that they
are the registered owners of the subject property, a two-storey
building erected on a parcel of land registered under Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 16193 in the Registry of Deeds of
Pangasinan, described and bounded as follows:
A parcel of land (Lot 13033-D-2, Psd-01550-022319, being a portion
of Lot 13033-D, Psd-018529, LRC Rec. No. ____) situated in Pob.,
Alaminos City; bounded on the NW. along line 1-2 by Lot 13035-D-1
of the subdivision plan; on the NE. along line 2-3 by Vericiano St.;
on the SE. along line 3-4 by Lot 13033-D-2 of the subdivision plan;
on the SW. along line 4-1 by Lot 575, Numeriano Rabago. It is
14
coverd by TCT No. 16193 of the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan
(Alaminos City) and declared for taxation purposes per T.D. No.
2075, and assessed in the sum of P93,400.00.6
Respondents rented out the subject property to petitioner on a
month to month basis for P9,000.00 per month.7 Both parties
agreed that effective 1 October 2001, the rental payment shall be
increased from P9,000.00 to P15,000.00. Petitioner, however, failed
or refused to pay the corresponding increase on rent when his
rental obligation for the month of 1 October 2001 became due. The
rental dispute was brought to the Lupon Tagapagpamayapa of
Poblacion, Alaminos, Pangasinan, in an attempt to amicably settle
the matter but the parties failed to reach an agreement, resulting
in the issuance by the Barangay Lupon of a Certification to file
action in court on 18 January 2002. On 10 June 2002, respondent
George de Castro sent a letter to petitioner terminating their lease
agreement and demanding that the latter vacate and turn over the
subject property to respondents. Since petitioner stubbornly
refused to comply with said demand letter, respondent George de
Castro, together with his siblings and co-respondents, Annie de
Castro, Felomina de Castro Uban and Jesus de Castro, filed the
Complaint for ejectment before the MTC.
It must be noted, at this point, that although the Complaint stated
that it was being filed by all of the respondents, the Verification and
the Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping were signed by respondent
George de Castro alone. He would subsequently attach to his
position paper filed before the MTC on 28 October 2002 the Special
Powers of Attorney (SPAs) executed by his sisters Annie de Castro
and Felomina de Castro Uban dated 7 February 2002 and 14 March
2002 respectively, authorizing him to institute the ejectment case
against petitioner.
Petitioner, on the other hand, countered that there was no
agreement between the parties to increase the monthly rentals and
respondents' demand for an increase was exorbitant. The agreed
monthly rental was only for the amount of P9,000.00 and he was
religiously paying the same every month. Petitioner then argued
that respondents failed to comply with the jurisdictional
requirement of conciliation before the Barangay Lupon prior to the
filing of Civil Case. No. 1990, meriting the dismissal of their
Complaint therein. The Certification to file action issued by the
Barangay Lupon appended to the respondents' Complaint merely
referred to the issue of rental increase and not the matter of

ejectment. Petitioner asserted further that the MTC lacked
jurisdiction over the ejectment suit, since respondents' Complaint
was devoid of any allegation that there was an "unlawful
withholding" of the subject property by the petitioner.8
During the Pre-Trial Conference9 held before the MTC, the parties
stipulated that in May 2002, petitioner tendered to respondents the
sum of P9,000.00 as rental payment for the month of January 2002;
petitioner paid rentals for the months of October 2001 to January
2002 but only in the amount of P9,000.00 per month; respondents,
thru counsel, sent a letter to petitioner on 10 June 2002 terminating
their lease agreement which petitioner ignored; and the Barangay
Lupon did issue a Certification to file action after the parties failed
to reach an agreement before it.
After the submission of the parties of their respective Position
Papers, the MTC, on 21 November 2002, rendered a Decision10
dismissing respondents' Complaint in Civil Case No. 1990 for failure
to comply with the prior conciliation requirement before the
Barangay Lupon. The decretal portion of the MTC Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premised considered, judgment is hereby rendered
ordering the dismissal of this case. Costs against the [herein
respondents].
On appeal, docketed as Civil Case No. A-2835, the RTC of Alaminos,
Pangasinan, Branch 54, promulgated its Decision11 dated 27 June
2005 affirming the dismissal of respondents' Complaint for
ejectment after finding that the appealed MTC Decision was based
on facts and law on the matter. The RTC declared that since the
original agreement entered into by the parties was for petitioner to
pay only the sum of P9.000.00 per month for the rent of the subject
property, and no concession was reached by the parties to increase
such amount to P15.000.00, petitioner cannot be faulted for paying
only the originally agreed upon monthly rentals. Adopting
petitioner's position, the RTC declared that respondents' failure to
refer the matter to the Barangay court for conciliation process
barred the ejectment case, conciliation before the Lupon being a
condition sine qua non in the filing of ejectment suits. The RTC
likewise agreed with petitioner in ruling that the allegation in the
Complaint was flawed, since respondents failed to allege that there
was an "unlawful withholding" of possession of the subject
15
property, taking out Civil Case No. 1990 from the purview of an
action for unlawful detainer. Finally, the RTC decreed that
respondents' Complaint failed to comply with the rule that a coowner could not maintain an action without joining all the other coowners. Thus, according to the dispositive portion of the RTC
Decision:
WHEREFORE the appellate Court finds no cogent reason to disturb
the findings of the court a quo. The Decision dated November 21,
2002 appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO.12
Undaunted, respondents filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari13
with the Court of Appeals where it was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
90906. Respondents argued in their Petition that the RTC gravely
erred in ruling that their failure to comply with the conciliation
process was fatal to their Complaint, since it is only respondent
George de Castro who resides in Alaminos City, Pangasinan, while
respondent Annie de Castro resides in Pennsylvania, United States
of America (USA); respondent Felomina de Castro Uban, in
California, USA; and respondent Jesus de Castro, now substituted
by his wife, Martiniana, resides in Manila. Respondents further
claimed that the MTC was not divested of jurisdiction over their
Complaint for ejectment because of the mere absence therein of
the term "unlawful withholding" of their subject property,
considering that they had sufficiently alleged the same in their
Complaint, albeit worded differently. Finally, respondents posited
that the fact that only respondent George de Castro signed the
Verification and the Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping attached to
the Complaint was irrelevant since the other respondents already
executed Special Powers of Attorney (SPAs) authorizing him to act
as their attorney-in-fact in the institution of the ejectment suit
against the petitioner.
On 19 September 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision
granting the respondents' Petition and ordering petitioner to vacate
the subject property and turn over the same to respondents. The
Court of Appeals decreed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is
GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated June 27, 2005 issued by the
RTC of Alaminos City, Pangasinan, Branch 54, is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. A new one is hereby rendered ordering [herein petitioner]
Leo Wee to SURRENDER and VACATE the leased premises in
question as well as to pay the sum of P15,000.00 per month

reckoned from March, 2002 until he shall have actually turned over
the possession thereof to petitioners plus the rental arrearages of
P30,000.00 representing unpaid increase in rent for the period from
October, 2001 to February, 2002, with legal interest at 6% per
annum to be computed from June 7, 2002 until finality of this
decision and 12% thereafter until full payment thereof. Respondent
is likewise hereby ordered to pay petitioners the amount of
P20,000.00 as and for attorney's fees and the costs of suit.14
In a Resolution dated 25 January 2007, the appellate court denied
the Motion for Reconsideration interposed by petitioner for lack of
merit.
Petitioner is now before this Court via the Petition at bar, making
the following assignment of errors:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
DECLARING THAT CONCILIATION PROCESS IS NOT A
JURISDICTIONAL REQUIREMENT THAT NON-COMPLIANCE
THEREWITH DOES NOT AFFECT THE JURISDICTION IN EJECTMENT
CASE;
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
UPHOLDING THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE ALLEGATIONS IN THE
COMPLAINT FOR EJECTMENT DESPITE THE WANT OF ALLEGATION
OF "UNLAWFUL WITHOLDING PREMISES" (sic) QUESTIONED BY
PETITIONER;
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING
THAT THE FILING OF THE COMPLAINT OF RESPONDENT GEORGE DE
CASTRO WITHOUT JOINING ALL HIS OTHER CO-OWNERS OVER THE
SUBJECT PROPERTY IS PROPER;
IV.
16
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT
APPLYING SUPREME COURT CIRCULAR NO. 10 WHICH DIRECTS A
PLEADER TO INDICATE IN HIS PLEADINGS HIS OFFICIAL RECEIPT OF
HIS PAYMENT OF HIS IBP DUES.15
Petitioner avers that respondents failed to go through the
conciliation process before the Barangay Lupon, a jurisdictional
defect that bars the legal action for ejectment. The Certification to
file action dated 18 January 2002 issued by the Barangay Lupon,
appended by the respondents to their Complaint in Civil Case No.
1990, is of no moment, for it attested only that there was
confrontation between the parties on the matter of rental increase
but not on unlawful detainer of the subject property by the
petitioner. If it was the intention of the respondents from the very
beginning to eject petitioner from the subject property, they should
have brought up the alleged unlawful stay of the petitioner on the
subject property for conciliation before the Barangay Lupon.
The barangay justice system was established primarily as a means
of easing up the congestion of cases in the judicial courts. This
could be accomplished through a proceeding before the barangay
courts which, according to the one who conceived of the system,
the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, is essentially arbitration in
character; and to make it truly effective, it should also be
compulsory. With this primary objective of the barangay justice
system in mind, it would be wholly in keeping with the underlying
philosophy of Presidential Decree No. 1508 (Katarungang
Pambarangay Law), which would be better served if an out-of-court
settlement of the case is reached voluntarily by the parties.16 To
ensure this objective, Section 6 of Presidential Decree No. 1508
requires the parties to undergo a conciliation process before the
Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo as a
precondition to filing a complaint in court subject to certain
exceptions. The said section has been declared compulsory in
nature.17
Presidential Decree No. 1508 is now incorporated in Republic Act
No. 7160 (The Local Government Code), which took effect on 1
January 1992.
The pertinent provisions of the Local Government Code making
conciliation a precondition to the filing of complaints in court are
reproduced below:
SEC. 412. Conciliation. - (a) Pre-condition to filing of complaint in

court. - No complaint, petition, action, or proceeding involving any
matter within the authority of the lupon shall be filed or instituted
directly in court or any other government office for adjudication,
unless there has been a confrontation between the parties before
the lupon chairman or the pangkat, and that no conciliation or
settlement has been reached as certified by the lupon secretary or
pangkat secretary as attested to by the lupon or pangkat chairman
or unless the settlement has been repudiated by the parties
thereto.
(b) Where parties may go directly to court. - The parties may go
preliminary injunction, attachment, delivery of personal property,
and support pendente lite; andcralawlibrary
limitations.
SEC. 408. Subject Matter for Amicable Settlement; Exception
Thereto. - The lupon of each barangay shall have authority to bring
(a) Where one party is the government or any subdivision or
17
to authorize the respondents to institute the ejectment suit against

petitioner.
The Court rules affirmatively.

While it is true that the Certification to file action dated 18 January

2002 of the Barangay Lupon refers only to rental increase and not
to the ejectment of petitioner from the subject property, the
submission of the same for conciliation before the Barangay Lupon
constitutes sufficient compliance with the provisions of the
Katarungang Pambarangay Law. Given the particular circumstances
of the case at bar, the conciliation proceedings for the amount of
monthly rental should logically and reasonably include also the
matter of the possession of the property subject of the rental, the
lease agreement, and the violation of the terms thereof.

determine in the interest of justice or upon the recommendation of
There is no question that the parties to this case appeared before
the Barangay Lupon for conciliation proceedings. There is also no
dispute that the only matter referred to the Barangay Lupon for
conciliation was the rental increase, and not the ejectment of
petitioner from the subject property. This is apparent from a perusal
of the Certification to file action in court issued by the Barangay
Lupon on 18 January 2002, to wit:
CERTIFICATION TO FILE COMPLAINTS
This is to certify that:
1. There was personal confrontation between parties before the
barangay Lupon regarding rental increase of a commercial building
but conciliation failed;
2. Therefore, the corresponding dispute of the above-entitled case
may now be filed in Court/Government Office.18 (Emphasis ours.)
The question now to be resolved by this Court is whether the
Certification dated 18 January 2002 issued by the Barangay Lupon
stating that no settlement was reached by the parties on the
matter of rental increase sufficient to comply with the prior
conciliation requirement under the Katarungang Pambarangay Law
We now proceed to discuss the meat of the controversy.

The contract of lease between the parties did not stipulate a fixed
period. Hence, the parties agreed to the payment of rentals on a
monthly basis. On this score, Article 1687 of the Civil Code
provides:
Art. 1687. If the period for the lease has not been fixed, it is
understood to be from year to year, if the rent agreed upon is
annual; from month to month, if it is monthly; from week to week, if
the rent is weekly; and from day to day, if the rent is to be paid
daily. However, even though a monthly rent is paid, and no period
for the lease has been set, the courts may fix a longer term for the
lease after the lessee has occupied the premises for over one year.
If the rent is weekly, the courts may likewise determine a longer
period after the lessee has been in possession for over six months.
In case of daily rent, the courts may also fix a longer period after
the lessee has stayed in the place for over one month. (Emphasis
supplied.)
The rentals being paid monthly, the period of such lease is deemed
terminated at the end of each month. Thus, respondents have
every right to demand the ejectment of petitioners at the end of
each month, the contract having expired by operation of law.
Without a lease contract, petitioner has no right of possession to
the subject property and must vacate the same. Respondents, thus,
18
should be allowed to resort to an action for ejectment before the
MTC to recover possession of the subject property from petitioner.
benefit of the plaintiff alone, such that he claims possession for

himself and not for the co-ownership, the action will not prosper.
(Emphasis added.)
Corollarily, petitioner's ejectment, in this case, is only the

reasonable consequence of his unrelenting refusal to comply with
the respondents' demand for the payment of rental increase agreed
upon by both parties. Verily, the lessor's right to rescind the
contract of lease for non-payment of the demanded increased
rental was recognized by this Court in Chua v. Victorio19:
In the more recent case of Carandang v. Heirs of De Guzman,21

this Court declared that a co-owner is not even a necessary party
to an action for ejectment, for complete relief can be afforded even
in his absence, thus:
The right of rescission is statutorily recognized in reciprocal

obligations, such as contracts of lease. In addition to the general
remedy of rescission granted under Article 1191 of the Civil Code,
there is an independent provision granting the remedy of rescission
for breach of any of the lessor or lessee's statutory obligations.
Under Article 1659 of the Civil Code, the aggrieved party may, at
his option, ask for (1) the rescission of the contract; (2) rescission
and indemnification for damages; or (3) only indemnification for
damages, allowing the contract to remain in force.
In sum, in suits to recover properties, all co-owners are real parties

in interest. However, pursuant to Article 487 of the Civil Code and
the relevant jurisprudence, any one of them may bring an action,
any kind of action for the recovery of co-owned properties.
Therefore, only one of the co-owners, namely the co-owner who
filed the suit for the recovery of the co-owned property, is an
indispensable party thereto. The other co-owners are not
indispensable parties. They are not even necessary parties, for a
complete relief can be afforded in the suit even without their
participation, since the suit is presumed to have been filed for the
benefit of all co-owners.
Payment of the rent is one of a lessee's statutory obligations, and,

upon non-payment by petitioners of the increased rental in
September 1994, the lessor acquired the right to avail of any of the
three remedies outlined above. (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner next argues that respondent George de Castro cannot
maintain an action for ejectment against petitioner, without joining
all his co-owners.
Article 487 of the New Civil Code is explicit on this point:
ART. 487. Any one of the co-owners may bring an action in
ejectment.
Moreover, respondents Annie de Castro and Felomina de Castro

Uban each executed a Special Power of Attorney, giving respondent
George de Castro the authority to initiate Civil Case No. 1990.
A power of attorney is an instrument in writing by which one
person, as principal, appoints another as his agent and confers
upon him the authority to perform certain specified acts or kinds of
acts on behalf of the principal. The written authorization itself is the
power of attorney, and this is clearly indicated by the fact that it
has also been called a "letter of attorney."22
This article covers all kinds of action for the recovery of possession,
i.e., forcible entry and unlawful detainer (accion interdictal),
recovery of possession (accion publiciana), and recovery of
ownership (accion de reivindicacion). As explained by the renowned
civilist, Professor Arturo M. Tolentino20:
Even then, the Court views the SPAs as mere surplusage, such that
the lack thereof does not in any way affect the validity of the action
for ejectment instituted by respondent George de Castro. This also
disposes of petitioner's contention that respondent George de
Castro lacked the authority to sign the Verification and the
Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping. As the Court ruled in Mendoza
v. Coronel23 :
A co-owner may bring such an action, without the necessity of

joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs, because the suit is
deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all. If the action is for the
We likewise hold that the execution of the certification against

forum shopping by the attorney-in-fact in the case at bar is not a
violation of the requirement that the parties must personally sign
19
the same. The attorney-in-fact, who has authority to file, and who
actually filed the complaint as the representative of the plaintiff coowner, pursuant to a Special Power of Attorney, is a party to the
ejectment suit. In fact, Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court
includes the representative of the owner in an ejectment suit as
one of the parties authorized to institute the proceedings.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Failure by respondent George de Castro to attach the said SPAs to
the Complaint is innocuous, since it is undisputed that he was
granted by his sisters the authority to file the action for ejectment
against petitioner prior to the institution of Civil Case No. 1990. The
SPAs in his favor were respectively executed by respondents Annie
de Castro and Felomina de Castro Uban on 7 February 2002 and 14
March 2002; while Civil Case No. 1990 was filed by respondent
George de Castro on his own behalf and on behalf of his siblings
only on 1 July 2002, or way after he was given by his siblings the
authority to file said action. The Court quotes with approval the
following disquisition of the Court of Appeals:
Moreover, records show that [herein respondent] George de Castro
was indeed authorized by his sisters Annie de Castro and Felomina
de Castro Uban, to prosecute the case in their behalf as shown by
the Special Power of Attorney dated February 7, 2002 and March
14, 2002. That these documents were appended only to
[respondent George de Castro's] position paper is of no moment
considering that the authority conferred therein was given prior to
the institution of the complaint in July, 2002. x x x.24
Respondent deceased Jesus de Castro's failure to sign the
Verification and Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping may be excused
since he already executed an Affidavit25 with respondent George
de Castro that he had personal knowledge of the filing of Civil Case
No. 1990. In Torres v. Specialized Packaging Development
Corporation,26 the Court ruled that the personal signing of the
verification requirement was deemed substantially complied with
when, as in the instant case, two out of 25 real parties-in-interest,
who undoubtedly have sufficient knowledge and belief to swear to
the truth of the allegations in the petition, signed the verification
attached to it.
In the same vein, this Court is not persuaded by petitioner's
assertion that respondents' failure to allege the jurisdictional fact
that there was "unlawful withholding" of the subject property was

fatal to their cause of action.
It is apodictic that what determines the nature of an action as well
as which court has jurisdiction over it are the allegations in the
complaint and the character of the relief sought. In an unlawful
detainer case, the defendant's possession was originally lawful but
ceased to be so upon the expiration of his right to possess. Hence,
the phrase "unlawful withholding" has been held to imply
possession on the part of defendant, which was legal in the
beginning, having no other source than a contract, express or
implied, and which later expired as a right and is being withheld by
defendant.27
In Barba v. Court of Appeals,28 the Court held that although the
phrase "unlawfully withholding" was not actually used by therein
petitioner in her complaint, the Court held that her allegations,
nonetheless, amounted to an unlawful withholding of the subject
property by therein private respondents, because they continuously
refused to vacate the premises even after notice and demand.
In the Petition at bar, respondents alleged in their Complaint that
they are the registered owners of the subject property; the subject
property was being occupied by the petitioner pursuant to a
monthly lease contract; petitioner refused to accede to
respondents' demand for rental increase; the respondents sent
petitioner a letter terminating the lease agreement and demanding
that petitioner vacate and turn over the possession of the subject
property to respondents; and despite such demand, petitioner
failed to surrender the subject property to respondents.29 The
Complaint sufficiently alleges the unlawful withholding of the
subject property by petitioner, constitutive of unlawful detainer,
although the exact words "unlawful withholding" were not used. In
an action for unlawful detainer, an allegation that the defendant is
unlawfully withholding possession from the plaintiff is deemed
sufficient, without necessarily employing the terminology of the
law.30
Petitioner's averment that the Court of Appeals should have
dismissed respondents' Petition in light of the failure of their
counsel to attach the Official Receipt of his updated payment of
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) dues is now moot and
academic, since respondents' counsel has already duly complied
20
therewith. It must be stressed that judicial cases do not come and
go through the portals of a court of law by the mere mandate of
technicalities.31 Where a rigid application of the rules will result in
a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice, technicalities should be
disregarded in order to resolve the case.32
Finally, we agree in the ruling of the Court of Appeals that
petitioner is liable for the payment of back rentals, attorney's fees
and cost of the suit. Respondents must be duly indemnified for the
loss of income from the subject property on account of petitioner's
refusal to vacate the leased premises.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is DENIED.
The Decision dated 19 September 2006 and Resolution dated 25
January 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 90906 are
hereby AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Aquino v. Aure, G.R. No. 153567, 546 SCRA 71, 18 February 2008
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari2 under Rule
45 of the Revised Rules of Court filed by petitioner Librada M.
Aquino (Aquino), seeking the reversal and the setting aside of the
Decision3 dated 17 October 2001 and the Resolution4 dated 8 May
2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 63733. The
appellate court, in its assailed Decision and Resolution, reversed
the Decision5 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City,
Branch 88, affirming the Decision6 of the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC) of Quezon City, Branch 32, which dismissed respondent
Ernesto Aure's (Aure) complaint for ejectment on the ground, inter
alia, of failure to comply with barangay conciliation proceedings.
The subject of the present controversy is a parcel of land situated
in Roxas District, Quezon City, with an area of 449 square meters
and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 205447
registered with the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City (subject
property).7
Aure and E.S. Aure Lending Investors, Inc. (Aure Lending) filed a
Complaint for ejectment against Aquino before the MeTC docketed
as Civil Case No. 17450. In their Complaint, Aure and Aure Lending
alleged that they acquired the subject property from Aquino and
her husband Manuel (spouses Aquino) by virtue of a Deed of Sale8
executed on 4 June 1996. Aure claimed that after the spouses

Aquino received substantial consideration for the sale of the subject
property, they refused to vacate the same.9
In her Answer,10 Aquino countered that the Complaint in Civil Case
No. 17450 lacks cause of action for Aure and Aure Lending do not
have any legal right over the subject property. Aquino admitted
that there was a sale but such was governed by the Memorandum
of Agreement11 (MOA) signed by Aure. As stated in the MOA, Aure
shall secure a loan from a bank or financial institution in his own
name using the subject property as collateral and turn over the
proceeds thereof to the spouses Aquino. However, even after Aure
successfully secured a loan, the spouses Aquino did not receive the
proceeds thereon or benefited therefrom.
On 20 April 1999, the MeTC rendered a Decision in Civil Case No.
17450 in favor of Aquino and dismissed the Complaint for
ejectment of Aure and Aure Lending for non-compliance with the
barangay conciliation process, among other grounds. The MeTC
observed that Aure and Aquino are residents of the same barangay
but there is no showing that any attempt has been made to settle
the case amicably at the barangay level. The MeTC further
observed that Aure Lending was improperly included as plaintiff in
Civil Case No. 17450 for it did not stand to be injured or benefited
by the suit. Finally, the MeTC ruled that since the question of
ownership was put in issue, the action was converted from a mere
detainer suit to one "incapable of pecuniary estimation" which
properly rests within the original exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC.
The dispositive portion of the MeTC Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, let this case be, as it is, hereby
ordered DISMISSED. [Aquino's] counterclaim is likewise
dismissed.12
On appeal, the RTC affirmed the dismissal of the Complaint on the
same ground that the dispute was not brought before the Barangay
Council for conciliation before it was filed in court. In a Decision
dated 14 December 2000, the RTC stressed that the barangay
conciliation process is a conditio sine qua non for the filing of an
ejectment complaint involving residents of the same barangay, and
failure to comply therewith constitutes sufficient cause for the
dismissal of the action. The RTC likewise validated the ruling of the
MeTC that the main issue involved in Civil Case No. 17450 is
21
incapable of pecuniary estimation and cognizable by the RTC.
Hence, the RTC ruled:
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the appealed judgment,
it is hereby affirmed in its entirety.13
Aure's Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the RTC in an
Order14 dated 27 February 2001.
Undaunted, Aure appealed the adverse RTC Decision with the Court
of Appeals arguing that the lower court erred in dismissing his
Complaint for lack of cause of action. Aure asserted that misjoinder
of parties was not a proper ground for dismissal of his Complaint
and that the MeTC should have only ordered the exclusion of Aure
Lending as plaintiff without prejudice to the continuation of the
proceedings in Civil Case No. 17450 until the final determination
thereof. Aure further asseverated that mere allegation of ownership
should not divest the MeTC of jurisdiction over the ejectment suit
since jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and
should not depend on the defenses and objections raised by the
parties. Finally, Aure contended that the MeTC erred in dismissing
his Complaint with prejudice on the ground of non-compliance with
barangay conciliation process. He was not given the opportunity to
rectify the procedural defect by going through the barangay
mediation proceedings and, thereafter, refile the Complaint.15
On 17 October 2001, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision,
reversing the MeTC and RTC Decisions and remanding the case to
the MeTC for further proceedings and final determination of the
substantive rights of the parties. The appellate court declared that
the failure of Aure to subject the matter to barangay conciliation is
not a jurisdictional flaw and it will not affect the sufficiency of
Aure's Complaint since Aquino failed to seasonably raise such issue
in her Answer. The Court of Appeals further ruled that mere
allegation of ownership does not deprive the MeTC of jurisdiction
over the ejectment case for jurisdiction over the subject matter is
conferred by law and is determined by the allegations advanced by
the plaintiff in his complaint. Hence, mere assertion of ownership
by the defendant in an ejectment case will not oust the MeTC of its
summary jurisdiction over the same. The decretal part of the Court
of Appeals Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED

- and the decisions of the trial courts below REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Let the records be remanded back to the court a quo for
further proceedings - for an eventual decision of the substantive
rights of the disputants.16
In a Resolution dated 8 May 2002, the Court of Appeals denied the
Motion for Reconsideration interposed by Aquino for it was merely a
rehash of the arguments set forth in her previous pleadings which
were already considered and passed upon by the appellate court in
its assailed Decision.
Aquino is now before this Court via the Petition at bar raising the
following issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE BARANGAY
CONCILIATION PROCEEDINGS IS A JURISDICTIONAL DEFECT THAT
WARRANTS THE DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT ALLEGATION OF OWNERSHIP OUSTS THE MeTC
OF ITS JURISDICTION OVER AN EJECTMENT CASE.
The barangay justice system was established primarily as a means
of easing up the congestion of cases in the judicial courts. This
could be accomplished through a proceeding before the barangay
courts which, according to the conceptor of the system, the late
Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, is essentially arbitration in character,
and to make it truly effective, it should also be compulsory. With
this primary objective of the barangay justice system in mind, it
would be wholly in keeping with the underlying philosophy of
Presidential Decree No. 1508, otherwise known as the Katarungang
Pambarangay Law, and the policy behind it would be better served
if an out-of-court settlement of the case is reached voluntarily by
the parties.17
The primordial objective of Presidential Decree No. 1508 is to
reduce the number of court litigations and prevent the
deterioration of the quality of justice which has been brought by
the indiscriminate filing of cases in the courts.18 To ensure this
22
objective, Section 6 of Presidential Decree No. 150819 requires the
parties to undergo a conciliation process before the Lupon
Chairman or the Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo as a precondition to
filing a complaint in court subject to certain exceptions20 which are
inapplicable to this case. The said section has been declared
compulsory in nature.21

SEC. 408. Subject Matter for Amicable Settlement; Exception
Therein. - The lupon of each barangay shall have authority to bring
Presidential Decree No. 1508 is now incorporated in Republic Act

No. 7160, otherwise known as The Local Government Code, which
took effect on 1 January 1992.
(a) Where one party is the government or any subdivision or

The pertinent provisions of the Local Government Code making

conciliation a precondition to filing of complaints in court, read:
SEC. 412. Conciliation.- (a) Pre-condition to filing of complaint in

court. - No complaint, petition, action, or proceeding involving any
matter within the authority of the lupon shall be filed or instituted
directly in court or any other government office for adjudication,
unless there has been a confrontation between the parties before
the lupon chairman or the pangkat, and that no conciliation or
settlement has been reached as certified by the lupon secretary or
pangkat secretary as attested to by the lupon chairman or pangkat
chairman or unless the settlement has been repudiated by the
parties thereto.

(b) Where parties may go directly to court. - The parties may go

preliminary injunction, attachment, delivery of personal property,
and support pendente lite; and
limitations.

determine in the interest of justice or upon the recommendation of
There is no dispute herein that the present case was never referred
to the Barangay Lupon for conciliation before Aure and Aure
Lending instituted Civil Case No. 17450. In fact, no allegation of
such barangay conciliation proceedings was made in Aure and Aure
Lending's Complaint before the MeTC. The only issue to be resolved
is whether non-recourse to the barangay conciliation process is a
jurisdictional flaw that warrants the dismissal of the ejectment suit
filed with the MeTC.
Aquino posits that failure to resort to barangay conciliation makes
the action for ejectment premature and, hence, dismissible. She
23
likewise avers that this objection was timely raised during the pretrial and even subsequently in her Position Paper submitted to the
MeTC.
We do not agree.
after having submitted herself voluntarily thereto. We have

scrupulously examined Aquino's Answer before the MeTC in Civil
Case No. 17450 and there is utter lack of any objection on her part
to any deficiency in the complaint which could oust the MeTC of its
jurisdcition.
It is true that the precise technical effect of failure to comply with

the requirement of Section 412 of the Local Government Code on
barangay conciliation (previously contained in Section 5 of
Presidential Decree No. 1508) is much the same effect produced by
non-exhaustion of administrative remedies -- the complaint
becomes afflicted with the vice of pre-maturity; and the
controversy there alleged is not ripe for judicial determination. The
complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss.22
Nevertheless, the conciliation process is not a jurisdictional
requirement, so that non-compliance therewith cannot affect the
jurisdiction which the court has otherwise acquired over the subject
matter or over the person of the defendant.23
We thus quote with approval the disquisition of the Court of

Appeals:
As enunciated in the landmark case of Royales v. Intermediate

Appellate Court24:
By Aquino's failure to seasonably object to the deficiency in the

Complaint, she is deemed to have already acquiesced or waived
any defect attendant thereto. Consequently, Aquino cannot
thereafter move for the dismissal of the ejectment suit for Aure and
Aure Lending's failure to resort to the barangay conciliation
process, since she is already precluded from doing so. The fact that
Aquino raised such objection during the pre-trial and in her Position
Paper is of no moment, for the issue of non-recourse to barangay
mediation proceedings should be impleaded in her Answer.
Ordinarily, non-compliance with the condition precedent prescribed

by P.D. 1508 could affect the sufficiency of the plaintiff's cause of
action and make his complaint vulnerable to dismissal on ground of
lack of cause of action or prematurity; but the same would not
prevent a court of competent jurisdiction from exercising its power
of adjudication over the case before it, where the defendants, as in
this case, failed to object to such exercise of jurisdiction in their
answer and even during the entire proceedings a quo.
Moreover, the Court takes note that the defendant [Aquino] herself
did not raise in defense the aforesaid lack of conciliation
proceedings in her answer, which raises the exclusive affirmative
defense of simulation. By this acquiescence, defendant [Aquino] is
deemed to have waived such objection. As held in a case of similar
circumstances, the failure of a defendant [Aquino] in an ejectment
suit to specifically allege the fact that there was no compliance with
the barangay conciliation procedure constitutes a waiver of that
defense. x x x.25
As provided under Section 1, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil

Procedure:
While petitioners could have prevented the trial court from

exercising jurisdiction over the case by seasonably taking exception
thereto, they instead invoked the very same jurisdiction by filing an
answer and seeking affirmative relief from it. What is more, they
participated in the trial of the case by cross-examining respondent
Planas. Upon this premise, petitioners cannot now be allowed
belatedly to adopt an inconsistent posture by attacking the
jurisdiction of the court to which they had submitted themselves
voluntarily. x x x (Emphasis supplied.)
Sec. 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. - Defenses and

objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the
answer are deemed waived. However, when it appears from the
pleadings or the evidence on record that the court has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is another action
pending between the same parties for the same cause, or that the
action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations, the
court shall dismiss the claim. (Emphasis supplied.)
In the case at bar, we similarly find that Aquino cannot be allowed

to attack the jurisdiction of the MeTC over Civil Case No. 17450
While the aforequoted provision applies to a pleading (specifically,

an Answer) or a motion to dismiss, a similar or identical rule is
24
provided for all other motions in Section 8 of Rule 15 of the same
Rule which states:
Sec. 8. Omnibus Motion. - Subject to the provisions of Section 1 of
Rule 9, a motion attacking a pleading, order, judgment, or
proceeding shall include all objections then available, and all
objections not so included shall be deemed waived.
The spirit that surrounds the foregoing statutory norm is to require
the party filing a pleading or motion to raise all available
exceptions for relief during the single opportunity so that single or
multiple objections may be avoided.26 It is clear and categorical in
Section 1, Rule 9 of the Revised Rules of Court that failure to raise
defenses and objections in a motion to dismiss or in an answer is
deemed a waiver thereof; and basic is the rule in statutory
construction that when the law is clear and free from any doubt or
ambiguity, there is no room for construction or interpretation.27 As
has been our consistent ruling, where the law speaks in clear and
categorical language, there is no occasion for interpretation; there
is only room for application.28 Thus, although Aquino's defense of
non-compliance with Presidential Decree No. 1508 is meritorious,
procedurally, such defense is no longer available for failure to plead
the same in the Answer as required by the omnibus motion rule.
Neither could the MeTC dismiss Civil Case No. 17450 motu proprio.
The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provide only three instances
when the court may motu proprio dismiss the claim, and that is
when the pleadings or evidence on the record show that (1) the
court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter; (2) there is
another cause of action pending between the same parties for the
same cause; or (3) where the action is barred by a prior judgment
or by a statute of limitations. Thus, it is clear that a court may not
motu proprio dismiss a case on the ground of failure to comply with
the requirement for barangay conciliation, this ground not being
among those mentioned for the dismissal by the trial court of a
case on its own initiative.
Aquino further argues that the issue of possession in the instant
case cannot be resolved by the MeTC without first adjudicating the
question of ownership, since the Deed of Sale vesting Aure with the
legal right over the subject property is simulated.
Again, we do not agree. Jurisdiction in ejectment cases is

determined by the allegations pleaded in the complaint. As long as
these allegations demonstrate a cause of action either for forcible
entry or for unlawful detainer, the court acquires jurisdiction over
the subject matter. This principle holds, even if the facts proved
during the trial do not support the cause of action thus alleged, in
which instance the court -- after acquiring jurisdiction -- may
resolve to dismiss the action for insufficiency of evidence.
The necessary allegations in a Complaint for ejectment are set forth
in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
SECTION 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. - Subject to
the provisions of the next succeeding section, a person deprived of
the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat,
strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person
against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully
withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold
possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the
legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee,
or other person may at any time within one (1) year after such
unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action
in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons
unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or
persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession,
together with damages and costs.
In the case at bar, the Complaint filed by Aure and Aure Lending on
2 April 1997, alleged as follows:
2. [Aure and Aure Lending] became the owners of a house and lot
located at No. 37 Salazar Street corner Encarnacion Street, B.F.
Homes, Quezon City by virtue of a deed of absolute sale executed
by [the spouses Aquino] in favor of [Aure and Aure Lending]
although registered in the name of x x x Ernesto S. Aure; title to the
said property had already been issued in the name of [Aure] as
shown by a transfer Certificate of Title , a copy of which is hereto
attached and made an integral part hereof as Annex A;
3. However, despite the sale thus transferring ownership of the
subject premises to [Aure and Aure Lending] as above-stated and
consequently terminating [Aquino's] right of possession over the
subject property, [Aquino] together with her family, is continuously
25
occupying the subject premises notwithstanding several demands
made by [Aure and Aure Lending] against [Aquino] and all persons
claiming right under her to vacate the subject premises and
surrender possession thereof to [Aure and Aure Lending] causing
damage and prejudice to [Aure and Aure Lending] and making
[Aquino's] occupancy together with those actually occupying the
subject premises claiming right under her, illegal.29
intertwined with the issue of ownership. It finds no proper

application where it is otherwise, that is, where ownership is not in
issue, or where the principal and main issue raised in the
allegations of the complaint as well as the relief prayed for make
out not a case for ejectment but one for recovery of ownership.
It can be inferred from the foregoing that Aure, together with Aure
Lending, sought the possession of the subject property which was
never surrendered by Aquino after the perfection of the Deed of
Sale, which gives rise to a cause of action for an ejectment suit
cognizable by the MeTC. Aure's assertion of possession over the
subject property is based on his ownership thereof as evidenced by
TCT No. 156802 bearing his name. That Aquino impugned the
validity of Aure's title over the subject property and claimed that
the Deed of Sale was simulated should not divest the MeTC of
jurisdiction over the ejectment case.30
Thus, an adjudication made therein regarding the issue of

ownership should be regarded as merely provisional and, therefore,
would not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties
involving title to the land. The foregoing doctrine is a necessary
consequence of the nature of forcible entry and unlawful detainer
cases where the only issue to be settled is the physical or material
possession over the real property, that is, possession de facto and
not possession de jure."
As extensively discussed by the eminent jurist Florenz D. Regalado

in Refugia v. Court of Appeals31:
As the law on forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases now
stands, even where the defendant raises the question of ownership
in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved
without deciding the issue of ownership, the Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
nevertheless have the undoubted competence to resolve the issue
of ownership albeit only to determine the issue of possession.
x x x. The law, as revised, now provides instead that when the
question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the
issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to
determine the issue of possession. On its face, the new Rule on
Summary Procedure was extended to include within the jurisdiction
of the inferior courts ejectment cases which likewise involve the
issue of ownership. This does not mean, however, that blanket
authority to adjudicate the issue of ownership in ejectment suits
has been thus conferred on the inferior courts.
At the outset, it must here be stressed that the resolution of this
particular issue concerns and applies only to forcible entry and
unlawful detainer cases where the issue of possession is intimately
Apropos thereto, this Court ruled in Hilario v. Court of Appeals32:
In other words, inferior courts are now "conditionally vested with

adjudicatory power over the issue of title or ownership raised by
the parties in an ejectment suit." These courts shall resolve the
question of ownership raised as an incident in an ejectment case
where a determination thereof is necessary for a proper and
complete adjudication of the issue of possession.33
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is DENIED.
The Court of Appeals Decision dated 17 October 2001 and its
Resolution dated 8 May 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 63733 are hereby
AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

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1

The facts are as follows:

BP 129, as amended by RA 7691, Secs. 2 to 4

Leopoldo delos Reyes owned a parcel of land, denominated as Lot

to DEMOLISH their house on the subject premises;

subject premises starting [in] June 2000 and every month

to PAY attorney's fees of P10,000.00 and the cost of

An agrarian dispute[13] refers to any controversy relating to

The instant case undeniably involves a controversy involving

More importantly, the controversy involves an agricultural land,

[I]t is safe to conclude that the existence of prior agricultural

In Teresita S. David v. Agustin Rivera, this Court held that:

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated October 28, 2004 of the

cancels [T]ax [D]eclaration No. 5454 covering the bigger portion of

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs

1. Ordering the latter to return the possession of the land in

The appellate court emphasized that in an accion publiciana, the

2. Ordering the latter to desist from further depriving and

I. . . . WHETHER OWNERSHIP AND TITLE CANNOT BE AN ISSUE TO

from the pleadings or the evidence on record that any of those

(a) There is hereby created in each barangay a lupong

the proper city or municipal court. He shall issue and cause to be

(1) Where the accused is under detention;

Section 421. Administration; Rules and Regulations. - The city or

referred to the issue of rental increase and not the matter of

question as well as to pay the sum of P15,000.00 per month

SEC. 412. Conciliation. - (a) Pre-condition to filing of complaint in

to authorize the respondents to institute the ejectment suit against

(d) Offenses where there is no private offended party;

The Court rules affirmatively.

(e) Where the dispute involves real properties located in different

While it is true that the Certification to file action dated 18 January

(f) Disputes involving parties who actually reside in barangays of

We now proceed to discuss the meat of the controversy.

benefit of the plaintiff alone, such that he claims possession for

Corollarily, petitioner's ejectment, in this case, is only the

In the more recent case of Carandang v. Heirs of De Guzman,21

The right of rescission is statutorily recognized in reciprocal

In sum, in suits to recover properties, all co-owners are real parties

Payment of the rent is one of a lessee's statutory obligations, and,

Moreover, respondents Annie de Castro and Felomina de Castro

A co-owner may bring such an action, without the necessity of

We likewise hold that the execution of the certification against

that there was "unlawful withholding" of the subject property was

executed on 4 June 1996. Aure claimed that after the spouses

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED

communities shall be applied in settling disputes between

Presidential Decree No. 1508 is now incorporated in Republic Act

(a) Where one party is the government or any subdivision or

The pertinent provisions of the Local Government Code making

SEC. 412. Conciliation.- (a) Pre-condition to filing of complaint in

(c) Offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding one (1) year or

(b) Where parties may go directly to court. - The parties may go

(d) Offenses where there is no private offended party;

after having submitted herself voluntarily thereto. We have

It is true that the precise technical effect of failure to comply with

We thus quote with approval the disquisition of the Court of

As enunciated in the landmark case of Royales v. Intermediate

By Aquino's failure to seasonably object to the deficiency in the

Ordinarily, non-compliance with the condition precedent prescribed

As provided under Section 1, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil

While petitioners could have prevented the trial court from

Sec. 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. - Defenses and

In the case at bar, we similarly find that Aquino cannot be allowed