GOODYEAR PHILIPPINES, INC. AND REMEGIO M. RAMOS v. MARINA L.

ANGUS
G.R. No. 185449, November 12, 2014

For: Claim for Retirement and Separation Pay

Facts:
Angus was employed by Goodyear and occupied the position of Secretary to
the Manager of Quality and Technology. In order to maintain the viability of its
operation in the midst of economic reversals, Goodyear implemented cost-saving
measures which included the streamlining of its workforce. On Sept. 19, 2011,
Angus received from Ramos, the HR Director of Goodyear a termination letter due to
redundancy of her position. Considering the length of her employment in the
Company, the Management has decided to grant her an early retirement. After
several exchanges of letters, Angus finally accepted the check for her retirement
pay.
On Feb. 5, 2002, Angus filed with the Labor Arbiter a complaint for illegal
dismissal with claims for separation pay, damages and Attoryneys fees.
The LA upheld the validity of her dismissal and it declared likewise that the
amounts she received from the company was actually payment of separation pay
due to redundancy. CA partly granted Angus petition, it declared that Angus is
entitled to separation pay in addition to the retirement pay she already received.
Issue:
Whether or not Angus is entitled to both separation pay and early retirement
benefit.
Ruling:
The Court held that Angus is entitled to both separation pay and retirement
benefit due to the absence of a specific provision in the CBA prohibiting recovery of
both. Retirement benefits and separation pay are not mutually exclusive. Retirement
benefits are a form of reward for an employee's loyalty and service to an employer
and are earned under existing laws, CBAs, employment contracts and company
policies. On the other hand, separation pay is that amount which an employee
receives at the time of his severance from employment, designed to provide the
employee with the wherewithal during the period that he is looking for another
employment and is recoverable only in instances enumerated under Articles 283
and 284 of the Labor Code or in illegal dismissal cases when reinstatement is not
feasible.41 In the case at bar, Article 283 clearly entitles Angus to separation pay
apart from the retirement benefits she received from petitioners.

Douglas Baldado
BERNARDINA P. BARTOLOME, v. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM AND SCANMAR
MARITIME SERVICES, INC.,
G.R. No. 192531, November 12, 2014
For: Death Benefit Beneficiary
Facts:
John Colcol (John), born on June 9, 1983, was employed as electrician by
Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc., since February 2008. As such, he was enrolled
under the government's Employees' Compensation Program (ECP). Unfortunately,
on June 2, 2008, an accident occurred on board the vessel whereby steel plates fell
on John, which led to his untimely death. John was, at the time of his death,
childless and unmarried. Thus, petitioner Bernardina P. Bartolome, John's biological
mother and, allegedly, sole remaining beneficiary, filed a claim for death benefits
under PD 626 with the Social Security System (SSS). However, the SSS denied the
claim because she is no longer considered the parent of John as he was legally
adopted by Cornelio Colcol when he when he was still 2 years old.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to the death benefits claim as a lawful
beneficiary.
Ruling:
Yes. The Court said that when Cornelio, in 1985 adopted John, petitioners
parental authority over John was severed. However, let it be overlooked one key
detail ECC missed, aside from Cornelios death, was that when the adoptive parent
died less than 3 years after the adoption decree, John was still a minor at about 4
years old.
John's minority at the time of his adopter's death is a significant factor in the
case at bar. Under such circumstance, parental authority should be deemed to have
reverted in favor of the biological parents. Otherwise, taking into account Our
consistent ruling that adoption is a personal relationship and that there are no
collateral relatives by virtue of adoption, [21 who was then left to care for the minor
adopted child if the adopter passed away?
Art. 984. In case of the death of an adopted child, leaving no children or
descendants, his parents and relatives by consanguinity and not by adoption, shall
be his legal heirs.

Douglas Baldado
CONCHITA J. RACELIS, v. UNITED PHILIPPINE LINES, INC. AND/OR HOLLAND
AMERICA LINES, INC., FERNANDO T. LISING
G.R. No. 198408, November 12, 2014
For: Death Benefits under POEA
Facts:
On January 15, 2008, Rodolfo L. Racelis (Rodolfo) was recruited and hired by
respondent United Philippine Lines, Inc. (UPL) for its principal, respondent Holland
America Lines, Inc. (HAL) to serve as Demi Chef De Partie on board the vessel MS
Prinsendam. The Contract of Employment6 was for a term of four (4) months,
extendible for another two (2) months upon mutual consent. After complying with
the required pre-employment medical examination where he was declared fit to
work, Rodolfo joined the vessel on January 25, 2008. Prior thereto, Rodolfo was
repeatedly contracted by said respondents and was deployed under various
contracts since December 17, 1985.
In the course of his last employment contract, Rodolfo experienced severe
pain in his ears and high blood pressure causing him to collapse while in the
performance of his duties. He consulted a doctor in Argentina and was medically
repatriated on February 20, 2008 for further medical treatment. Upon arrival in
Manila, he was immediately brought to Medical City, Pasig City, where he was seen
by a company-designated physician, and was diagnosed to be suffering from
Brainstem (pontine) Cavernous Malformation. He underwent surgery twice for the
said ailment but developed complications and died on March 2, 2008.
Issue:
Whether or not the death of seafarer is work-related, thus entitling his
beneficiary the benefits under POEA-SEC.
Ruling:
The Court held that, as a general rule, the principle of work-relation requires
that the disease in question must be one of those listed as an occupational disease
under Sec. 32-A of the POEA-SEC. Nevertheless, should it be not classified as
occupational in nature, Section 20 (B) paragraph 4 of the POEA-SEC provides that
such diseases are disputed are disputably presumed as work-related.
While it is true that Brainstem (pontine) Cavernous Malformation is not listed
as an occupational disease under Section 32-A of the 2000 POEA-SEC, Section 20
(B) (4) of the same explicitly provides that [t[he liabilities of the employer when the
seafarer suffers work-related injury or illness during the term of his contract are as

follows: (t)hose illnesses not listed in Section 32 of this Contract are disputably
presumed as work related. In other words, the 2000 POEA-SEC has created a
disputable presumption in favor of compensability [,] saying that those illnesses not
listed in Section 32 are disputably presumed as work-related. This means that even
if the illness is not listed under Section 32-A of the POEA-SEC as an occupational
disease or illness, it will still be presumed as work-related, and it becomes
incumbent on the employer to overcome the presumption. This presumption should
be overturned only when the employers refutation is found to be supported by
substantial evidence, which, as traditionally defined is such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as sufficient to support a conclusion. As held in the
case of Magsaysay Maritime Services v. Laurel

Douglas Baldado
BAHIA SHIPPING SERVICES, INC., FRED OLSEN CRUISE LINE, AND MS. CYNTHIA
C. MENDOZA, v. JOEL P. HIPE, JR.
G.R. No. 204699, November 12, 2014

For: Disability Claims

Facts:
Hipe had been continuously hired by petitioner Bahia Shipping Services, Inc.
(Bahia) for its foreign principal, Fred Olsen Cruise Line (Olsen), and deployed to the
latters various vessels under seven (7) consecutive contracts. On June 22, 2008, in
the course of the performance of his duties as plumber, he sustained a back injury
while carrying heavy equipment for use in his plumbing job. After one (1) month,
however, he claimed that his condition worsened and, upon his request, he was
repatriated to Manila. Upon Hipes arrival, he was examined by the companydesignated physician, Dr. Robert Lim (Dr. Lim). On October 2, 2008, Dr. Lim issued a
medical assessment that [Hipe] still has had considerable improvement with less
pain and negligible tenderness at the lumbosacral area, and that, per advise of the
attending orthopedic surgeon, Hipe was to continue his rehabilitation and
medications. Subsequently, or on February 25, 2009, 17 Hipe, however, sought a
second opinion from Dr. Venancio P. Garduce, Jr. (Dr. Garduce) of the UP-PGH Medical
Center18 who (a) opined that he was suffering from + Tenderness on low back
area, + Straight leg raising test @ Associated with numbness and weakness of both
lower extremities, (b) declared him unfit to work as seaman-plumber, and (c)
assessed his disability rating at Grade 5.
Issue:
Whether or not the seafarer is entitled to disability benefits under POEA-SEC.
Ruling:
Two (2) elements must concur for an injury or illness of a seafarer to be
compensable: (a) the injury or illness must be work-related; and (b) that the work-

related injury or illness must have existed during the term of the seafarers
employment contract. In the present case, the injury suffered by Hipe was a workrelated injury and his eventual repatriation on August 5, 2008, for which he was
treated/rehabilitated can only be considered as a medical repatriation. Nonetheless,
Hipe was subsequently declared fit to work by the company-designated physician
on October 9, 2008, or merely 65 days after his repatriation, thus negating the
existence of any permanent disability for which compensability is sought. The thirddoctor-referral provision of the POEA-SEC, it appears to us, has been honored more
in the breach than in the compliance. This is unfortunate considering that the
provision is intended to settle disability claims voluntarily at the parties level where
the claims can be resolved more speedily than if they were brought to court. Given
the circumstances under which Hipe pursued his claim, especially the fact that he
caused the non-referral to a third doctor, the company doctors fit-to-work
certification must be upheld. In fine, given that Hipes permanent disability was not
established through substantial evidence, the claim for disability benefits must
necessarily fail, as in this case.

Douglas Baldado
PEAK VENTURES CORPORATION AND/OR EL TIGRE SECURITY AND
INVESTIGATION AGENCY, v. HEIRS OF NESTOR B. VILLAREAL
G.R. No. 184618, November 19, 2014
For: Illegal Dismissal
Facts:
On June 16, 1989, Peak Ventures hired Villareal as security guard and
assigned him at East Greenhills Village. On May 14, 2002, however, he was relieved
from duty without any apparent reason. Villareal was later informed by the
management that he would no longer be given any assignment because of his age.
At that time, he was 42. His repeated requests for a new posting during the months
of June and July of 2002 were likewise declined. Due to his prolonged lack of
assignment and dwindling resources, Villareal was constrained to claim his security
bond deposits from petitioners. However, he was advised to first tender a letter of
resignation before the same could be released to him. Out of sheer necessity,
Villareal submitted a letter of resignation. He stated therein that he was constrained
to resign effective July 31, 2002 since he cannot expect to be given any assignment
for another one and a half months and that he can no longer afford the fare going to
petitioners office. Villareal alleged that the tenor of his resignation letter was not
acceptable to petitioners, who required him to submit another one stating that his
resignation is voluntary.
Issue:
Whether or not Villareal was illegaly dismissed.
Ruling:

Yes. Petitioners anchor their claim of voluntary resignation on Villareals

resignation letter, the Talaan ng Pakikipagpanayam sa Pagbibitiw accomplished by
him, and his notarized clearance. However, the circumstances surrounding the
execution of these documents prove otherwise. When Villareal was relieved from
duty, he was placed on floating status. A floating status requires the dire exigency
of the employers bona fide suspension of operation, business or undertaking. It
takes place when the security agencys clients decide not to renew their contracts
with the agency and also in instances where contracts for security services
stipulate that the client may request the agency for the replacement of the guards
assigned to it. In the latter case, the employer should prove that there are no posts
available to which the employee temporarily out of work can be assigned. As
pointed out by the labor tribunals, petitioners failed to discharge the burden of
proving that there were no other posts available for Villareal after his recall from his
last assignment. Villareals backwages must be computed from the time of his
unjustified relief from duty up to his actual reinstatement; the award of separation
pay must be deleted. Records reveal that Villareal was actually reinstated. As shown
by his duly signed DTRs. The award of separation pay must be deleted because as
mentioned, separation pay is only granted as an alternative to reinstatement.

Douglas Baldado