Danzig - The Political Character of Aristotelian Reciprocity PDF

The Political Character of Aristotelian Reciprocity
Author(s): Gabriel Danzig

Source: Classical Philology, Vol. 95, No. 4 (Oct., 2000), pp. 399-424
Published by: The University of Chicago Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/270514 .
Accessed: 31/01/2015 09:38
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
The University of Chicago Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to
Classical Philology.
http://www.jstor.org
This content downloaded from 132.208.246.237 on Sat, 31 Jan 2015 09:38:43 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
THE POLITICAL CHARACTER OF

ARISTOTELIAN RECIPROCITY
GABRIEL
DANZIG
IN
bookof theNicomacheanEthics,after
THE FIFTH CHAPTER of thefifth
and corhavingdiscussedtwoformsof particular
justice (distributive
rective),Aristotlediscussessomething
he calls avtuCtn&ovO6;,
usually
This chapterhas alwayspresentedproblemsof intranslated
"reciprocity."
It has neverbeen clearwhatreciprocity
is or how it is related
terpretation.'
to theoveralltopicof justice.Is it a formof justice,as itspositionin Book
5 wouldsuggest,or a law of economics,as thecontentsof thechaptermay
seem to indicate?Even morepuzzlingis Aristotle's
famousexchangeratio:
"As housebuilderis to shoemaker,so mustso manyshoes be to a house"
(1 133a22-24). This does notmakemuchsenseto anyone;and manywould
agreewiththejudgementsof M. I. Finleyand H. H. Joachim,
whodeclared
thediscussionunintelligible.2
This chapterhas been analyzedrecentlyby ScottMeikle3and Lindsay
Judson4
in twoimpressive
to explainAristotle's
attempts
theoryof economic
value.Butin theend,theytoo areforcedto acknowledgethatAristotledoes
notsucceed:he cannotfindwhathe appearsto be seeking,namelya theoreticalmethodforcalculatingthe relativevalues of qualitatively
different
himselfdoes notseemat all botheredby thisfailgoods.And yet,Aristotle
ure.Attheendof thechapterhe has no troubleat all calculatingtherelative
values of beds and houses: one house is accordingto himworthfivebeds.
This researchwas supportedby The Israel Science Foundationfoundedby the Israel Academyof
Sciences and Humanities.I wish to expressmygratitudeto David Schaps forthegenerosity,
as yetunreciprocated,whichhe displayedin introducing
me to theintricaciesof ancienteconomics.Obviously,he is
notresponsibleforany remainingmisconceptions
I may have. I would also like to thankthetwo anonymousreadersforCP forcommentsthathave improvedthispapersignificantly.
1. Even theauthorof theMagna Moralia, in theearliestknownattemptto interpret
thispassage, was
able to succeed in presenting
an intelligiblepictureonlyby radicallyalteringthemaincomponentsof the
Eth. Nic. discussion.Insteadof a genuinefour-term
exchangeratiobetweenproducersand products,the
Mag. Mor. (1.33) offersus: "as farmeris to housebuilder,so is housebuilderto farmer.And similarlyto
shoemaker,weaver,and all theothers.... "
2. M. I. Finley("Aristotleand EconomicAnalysis,"P&P [1970]: 33) says it is "not one of Aristotle's
moretransparent
discussions."H. H. JoachiminAristotle,
the "NicomacheanEthics" (Oxford,1951), 150,
confessesthattheexchangeratiois "in theend unintelligible
to me." See further
in S. Meikle,
references
Aristotle's
EconomicThought(Oxford,1995),7.
3. See previousnote.
4. L. Judson,
"Aristotle
on FairExchange,"in OxfordStudiesinAncientPhilosophy,
vol. 15 (Oxford,1997).
Classical Philology95 (2000): 399-424

[? 2000 by The University
of Chicago. All rightsreserved]0009-837X/00/9504-0002$02.00
399

400
GABRIEL DANZIG
Aristotleaccomplishesthis,moreover,
withoutapplyinganytheoretical
formula,butsimplybyrecording
somehypothetical
or actualmarketprices.As
E. Roll comments,
"whatbeginswiththepromiseof beinga theoryof value
endsup witha merestatement
of theaccountingfunction
of money."5
Perhaps,then,we shouldconsiderthepossibility
thatAristotle
is notseekingthetheoretical
methodthathe neverfinds,andthatappearsto be forhim
superfluous.
To understand
whathe is doing,however,will requirerethinking some assumptionsabout Aristotle'smethodand goals in the Ethics.
ReadersassumethatAristotle
is doingthekindof philosophy
we expecthim
tobe doing:solvingtheoretical
problems.Here,theonlytheoretical
problem
thatone couldplausiblyimaginethathe is considering
is theproblemof the
relativevalues of different
products,or how to determine
on a theoretical
basis (withoutsimplycheckingthepricesat thelocal market)whatthings
are reallyworth.But thishe clearlydoes notaccomplish:hencethedisapIn facthis aims are farless theoretical.
pointment.
Aristotledoes notalwaysaim to solve theoretical
problems.His discussion of the ethicalvirtues,in Books 3 and 4 of theEthics,forexample,
does notsolve anyobvioustheoretical
problem.Neitherdoes his discussion
of distributive
justicein Book 5. In thelatterdiscussion,Aristotledoes not
provideany adequatemethodfordetermining
how to arrangea fairdistribution.He arguesthatthedistribution
shouldbe made in accordancewith
thedesertsof thepeople,buthe does notexplainwho deservesmore,who
less, or by how much.6This crucialquestionis leftopen because, as he
explains,different
regimesevaluatepeople differently.
The questionis leftopennotbecauseAristotlehas no viewson theworth
of humanbeings.He surelydoes: as he tells us laterin the Ethics,one
as
shouldhonorphilosophersas one honorsparentsand gods,by offering
much as one possiblycan (1 164b2-6). But thisis not mentionedin his
justice.Here he aims at themodestgoal of prodiscussionof distributive
vidingan analysisflexibleenoughthatitis applicableto anyof a varietyof
evaluationsof humanworth.In any of these
regimes,withtheirdifferent
can do so justly.So long as
regimes,a personmakinga publicdistribution
he makeshis evaluationsin accordancewiththeprinciplesof theregimein
he will,in Aristotle's
whichhe is makingthedistribution,
view,be performing an act of distributive
justice,despitethefactthatwerehe to makethe
in a citysubjectto different
identicaldistribution
principles,the same act
wouldconstitute
injustice.Distributive
justice,in otherwords,is a formof
whatAristotlelatercalls conventionalpoliticaljustice (1 134b18-24).
Aristotleis notconThe situationis similarin thecase of reciprocity.
cernedwithprovidingan analysisof whatproductsare "really"worth,inHis analysisstartsafter
dependentof theiractualpricesin themarketplace.
in themarketplace,
and it aims to show how
priceshave been determined
5. E. Roll, A Historyof EconomicThought,3d ed. (London, 1954), 35, citedby Finley,"Economic
Analysis,"p. 11,n. 34.
6. His latercommenton this(1 131b29-3 1) does notsolve thisproblemeither.Therehe says thatthe
made by theindividualsconcerned.But
shouldbe made in accordancewiththecontributions
distribution
worthmorethananother.
he does notsay whatmakesone contribution

401
payingthepriceis performing
an act of (conventionalpolitical)justice.In
his view,pricesin the marketplacecontainan implicitsocial or political
evaluationof theworthsof different
producers.For thisreasonpayingthe
priceis bothan act of local justiceand a meansof respecting
and strengtheningtheKolvOtia (community)
of thecity.
In thispaper,I will firstexaminea formalquestion:is av-cTurEcovO6;
a
formof justiceor is thediscussiona digressionon a nonethical
or economic
subject?In sectionI, I believethatI showthatit is theformer.
I thentryto
show(sectionII) thatdvturvirovO6;
is bestconceivednotas a thirdformof
justice,butas a formof corrective
justice-correctivejustice in voluntary
transactions.
I thenargue(sectionIII) thatthismakessenseif av'cutR6rovO6q
is conceivedof as the"correction"
of a social imbalance:thepaymentof a
debt.This idea of repayment
fitsthepoliticalfunction
of av-uuccirovO;,
and
itsrolein maintaining
theKolvOVtfaof thecity(sectionIV).
One is actingin accordancewiththe moralvirtueof justice whenone
makesan appropriate
But in orderto perform
repayment.
an act of justice
in thecity,one does notneed to makeanydifficult
abstractcalculationof
the absolutevalues of different
products,one merelyneeds to repaythe
marketvalue of the goods one has received(sectionsV-VI). Although
such a methodof repaymentmay seem unfair,since some professions7
chargemorethanothers,it is fairso long as one positsthattheinequality
in earningsis an expressionof an inequalityin "worth,"as definedby the
values of the city,values thatare in turnreflectedin the prices of the
marketplace(sectionVII). This "political"contextualanalysisis characteristicof Aristotelian
ethical-political
science,butis notalwaysgiventhe
properweightby studentsof Aristotle(sectionVIII).
RRECIPROCITY AND CORRECTIVE JUSTICE
I
Perhapsthemostprominent
view of thechapteron reciprocity
holds that
Aristotleis concernedwithan economicissue, namelythe laws of economicexchange,ratherthanthemoralvirtueof justice.He has oftenbeen
viewed as endorsinga "market-theory
of value,"in whichthe value of a
productis determined
by thelaws of supplyand demand,8ratherthan,say,
a "labor-theory"
of value in whichthetruevalue is the amountof labor
investedin an item.More recently,
Meikle has arguedthatAristotleis involved in the preliminary
metaphysical
investigations
thatwould make it
possibleto calculatetherelativevaluesof qualitatively
different
productson
a theoretical
basis. The questionhe is askingis whetherthereis any valid
theoretical
methodfordoingso, andtheanswerhe reachesis a negativeone.
But all thisis highlyspeculative.As is well known,the Greeksnever
developed an independentscience of economics.9What they called
7. The wordprofessionis obviouslyanachronistic
in thiscontext,buttheword"trade,"whichI initially
used,createstoo manyconfusions,
sinceitis has thesame spellingas a verbused frequently
in thispaper.
8. See, forexample,E. Barker,Political ThoughtofPlato and Aristotle(London, 1906), p. 379, n. 2.
9. See Finley,"EconomicAnalysis,"and also TheAncientEconomy(Berkeleyand Los Angeles,1973).

402
GABRIEL
DANZIG
oiKovo0ltKl referredto estate management,and not to a theoreticalscience
concerninghumaneconomicbehavior.Althoughtheywere aware of the

1and
law of supplyanddemand,'0of threeof thebasic functions
of money,"
developedcomplexeconomicbehavior,'2theydid notview economicactivityas an independent
realm,distinctfrompoliticallife,and capable of
providingan independent
basis forthe analysisof humanbehavior.'3To
theextentthateconomicissueswerediscussed,theywereusuallydiscussed
in the contextof politicalscience (Plato's Republicand Laws; Aristotle's
Ethics and Politics). And where the termsotiKovO%tKTior oiKovoptKoq do
appearas thetitleof a work,thesubjectis noteconomicsperse, butrather

estatemanagement,
or money-making
schemes.'4For thisreason,it would
be surprising
if anyAristotelian
investigation
wereconcernedprimarily
with
economicsin themodernsense.
A secondproblem:any"economic"interpretation
mustmaketheimplausibleassumption
thatthechapteris outof place in itspresentcontext.After
all, thesubjectof Book 5 is justice,andtheEthicsas a wholeis, as itsname
suggests,an ethical (or ethical-political)work.Misled by the economic
viewof reciprocity,
somescholarshaveconcludedthattheentirediscussion
is a digression.Some collectionsof Aristotle's
ethicalwritings
haveomitted
thediscussionof reciprocity
Andin theirinfluential
entirely.'5
commentary,
R. A. GauthierandJ.Y. JolifarguedthatAristotle
intothe
bringsreciprocity
in orderto providea responseto thePythagdiscussionas an afterthought,
is justiceentire.16
He respondsto the
oreanview thatholdsthatreciprocity
on thisview,by arguingthatreciprocity
is nota formof jusPythagoreans,
to neitherdistributive
norcorrective
tice at all, sinceit corresponds
justice
(1 132b23-25). He goes on to explaintheactualnatureof reciprocity
merely
in orderto showthathis theory"reprendsous une formeplus parfaitetout
ce qu'on a pu direde juste avantlui."''7But thisdoes notmeanthatArisit is a "natural
is itselfa formof justice.On thecontrary,
totle'sreciprocity
law" notorganicallyconnectedto thelargerdiscussionof justiceor evento
theethicaltreatisein whichit is found.'8
10. See Xen. Poroi 4.6, forexample.
as a
itself(Eth.Nic. 5.5) Aristotlerecognizesthatmoneyfunctions
11. In thediscussionof reciprocity
as a meansof
mediumof exchangeand a standardof value. In thePolitics(1.3) he notesalso its function
storingvalue.
W. Cohen,AthenianEconomyand Society(Princeton,1992).
12. See recently
on Economicsand Politics,"in
of Aristotle's
Politics:Aristotle
13. See A. Shulsky,"The 'Infrastructure'
Essays on theFoundationsofAristotelianPolitical Science,ed. C. Lord and D. O'Connor(Berkeleyand
of his
economicsin theinterest
subordinates
Los Angeles,1991). ShulskyarguesthatAristotledeliberately
politicalandethicalconcerns.
and Xenophon'sOeconomicus.
Oikonomike
14. See thepseudo-Aristotelian
Ethics(London,1973) and fromhis NewAristotle
15. J.L. Ackrillomittedit bothfromhis Aristotle's
Reader(Oxford,1987).
- 16. R. A. Gauthierand J. Y. Jolif,L'tthique a Nicomaque (Louvain, 1970), 371. Finley,although
the"economic"approach,also viewsthechapteras a digression;see "EconomicAnalysis,"7.
rejecting
17. Gauthierand Jolif,L'tthique 371.
Subdivisionsof 'Particular
Justice,"'CR 8
18. Gauthierand Jolif,followingD. G. Ritchie("Aristotle's
de la cite,elle
et necessaire'a la constitution
[1894]: 187-88) call it "une sortede droitnaturelanterieur
this
linehas been
371)
and
(L'tthique,
ou corrective"
memerequisepourl'exercicede la justice,distributive
is a formof correcthat&vT1nFtovO06
rulesoutthepossibility
followedbymanyscholars.Joachimexplicitly
tivejustice forjust thisreason:"Rightsof redress-what is just in a 6t6pOouxtq-arenot,or notalways,

403
But thisview is notcompelling.Aristotlesays explicitlythatreciprocity

is a formof justice (1 132b32; see also 1134a24),and thereis no reasonto
discounthis statement.
Anyotherview wouldbe almostincredible.If reciprocitywerenota formof justice,notonlywouldthepassage be a digression,butwe wouldbe missinga crucialformof justice:justicein business
transactions
and in therepayment
of debts.It is heremorethananywhere
thata privatepersonhas theopportunity
to displayjustice or its opposite.
The otherformsof particular
areapplied
andcorrective,
justice,distributive
in specialcircumstances
for
by specialists:eitherjudgesorthoseresponsible
to
makinga distribution.
Ordinarycitizenshave virtuallyno opportunity
displayanyformof particular
and even this
justice otherthanreciprocity,
wouldbe takenaway fromthemon the"digression"theory.
In fact,in Aristotle's
in thecontextof
view,justiceis displayedprimarily
theexchangeof goods.Whenhe firstdiscussestheacquisitionof thevirtue
of (unqualified)
justice,in Book 2, he sayssimplythatitis acquiredthrough
makingtransactions
(1 103b14-16). Obviouslyhe is thinking
of
primarily
what he latercalls reciprocity.19
This was the usual view of justice. In
Plato'sRepublic,just and unjustmendisplaythemselvesabove all in business transactions
(343d, 362b). Similarly,whenthe authorof theMagna
Moralia (1.33.8-14) presentshis discussionof particular
justice he offers
no accountof eitherdistributive
or corrective
justice.Aristotle's
discussion
of reciprocity
aloneformsalmosttheentirebasis of hisdiscussion.Clearly,
is a formof justice.
then,reciprocity
II
Once we recognizethatreciprocity
is a formof justice it becomes more
difficult
to dismissthediscussionas a digression.But thisin turnforcesus
to face a difficult
problem:how is reciprocity
formally
relatedto theother
two formsof justice Aristotlediscusses?Aristotledoes notmentionreciprocitywhenhe dividesparticular
justiceintoits parts,and forthisreason
one mightassume thatit is simplya thirdformof justice-distinctfrom
bothdistributive
andcorrective
justice-which Aristotlesomehowforgotto
mentionwhenhe dividedparticular
justiceintoitsparts.This makessome
sense in view of the factthatAristotlestatesexplicitlyin one place that
"reciprocityis not fittingto eitherdistributiveor correctivejustice"
(1 132b23-25).
But it is somewhathard(althoughnotimpossible)to imaginethatAristotlesimplyforgotto mentionreciprocity
in his initialdivisionof particular
justice,or thathe had notyetthought
of it. As we have seen,he referred
to
thiskindof justice earlierin theEthics,if onlyimplicitly(1 103b14-16),
determined
on theprincipleof simplerequital....." (Ethics, 148). On thissubject,even K. Polanyiis in
the consensus ("AristotleDiscovers the Economy,"in Primitive,Archaic and Modern Economies,ed.
G. Dalton (New York,1968). Judsonis exceptionalin treatingreciprocity
as a formof justice.
19. See also 1178al2. I presumethathe is notspeakingsolelyof involuntary
transactions,
as thoughwe
all becomejust or unjustthrough
ourparticipation
in crime.The term uvevakkXiypaia,
withoutqualification,
generallyrefersto voluntary
transactions.
See Eth.Nic. 1135b29;Pol. 1300b23,1317b28et alia.

404
GABRIEL DANZIG
and it is a centrallyimportant
formof justice,and one to whichhe refers
again laterin theEthics(1 163b34) and in thePoliticsas well (1261a3133). Moreover,Aristotleclearlytreatshis divisionof justiceintotwoparts
as comprehensive:
whenhe concludeshis discussionof distributive
justice
and turnsto thediscussionof corrective
justice,he refersto it as "theone
remainingformof justice" (1 131b25).
It would seem to be worthwhile,
then,to see how reciprocity
mightfit
intotheschemeAristotlehas laid out. Attempts
have been made to assimilate reciprocity
eitherto distributive
justice20or to correctivejustice.21
as we shall see, reciprocity
Substantively,
sharesfeaturesof bothdistributiveand corrective
justice.But formally,
thereare good reasonsto see it as
a formof corrective
justice. Unlikedistributive
justice,corrective
justice
(6topO-ctKOv) is dividedintotwoparts:one to deal withinvoluntary
transactions,such as crimes,and theotherto deal withvoluntary
transactions,
such as buyingand selling(1 130b34-1131a9):
?v 6RT6
1V ?t
pOp 66o. TOV yap cuvakkayJV lat Tlcx6c otov

tpamc, WVq,
VicvaXkkdy7Pact
(
6tOpOOvltK6v. -co6-cou &
PJTOV Tl PJV CKOU61td ?C1t Tl 6' cKOUfltc, CKOU6G
6aVwicp67, y77yu, Xpi[ct,
JTctpctKctTclOlKll,Piicxtw.
cKO6ucta6k X?7Eat
6nI iPX
TCOV
cT)VQXk(X7yclTO)V TOUTOV cKOU0nOS, TOV 6 6tKOU(YTOVla&P?V kXaOpctict,otOV KXOlt1,
iu, 6okopovia, iYU6ojiaptupia,
la6t& Pima,
IOtX1)ia, Dpap UaKdiL, tpoU7ywo7ycian,60ouXa
otov
QiKiQ,
6ECT,O6, OdvaUTo, dpJtQy7, intP1Wpo, KaKMryopia,JTpon1aKucTpo6.
It is important
to noticethatAristotledoes notmerelysay thatcorrective
justiceis concernedwithtwokindsof transactions.
Ratherhe dividesit into
twodistinctparts,so that,includingdistributive
justice,we now have three
withits own distinctnature.22
Aristotle
kindsof justice,each, presumably,
aftercondoes notnamethetwopartsof corrective
justice.Nevertheless,
cludinghis discussionof distributive
justice,he does discusstwoadditional
Correctivejustice, as
formsof justice: correctivejustice and reciprocity.
he discusses it in Book 5.4, is primarily,
perhapsexclusively,concerned
transactions.
as he discussesit in Book 5.5,
withinvoluntary
Reciprocity,
withvoluntary
transactions.
The
is concernedprimarily,
perhapsexclusively,
is the second partof
obvious solution,it would seem, is thatreciprocity
transactions.
corrective
justice,thatpartwhichis concernedwithvoluntary
This approachhas themeritof providingnamesforthetwopartsof correctivejustice mentionedby Aristotlebut otherwiseunnamed:corrective
20. J. Stewart, Notes on the "Nicomachean Ethics" of Aristotle, vol. 1 (Oxford, 1892) argues that recijustice (pp. 432-33, 449) butin places appearsto regardit as no formof
procityis a formof distributive
justiceat all (p. 442). Few have acceptedhis conclusions,and I will notreopentheissue.
(The "Ethics"ofAristotle
21. FollowingSt. ThomasAquinas(SummaTheologica2a Q. 61), JohnBuumet
justice in voluntary
suppliesthemissingdiscussionof corrective
[London,1900]), arguedthatreciprocity
couldbe conceivedas a formof corrective
justice.He
and he triedto explainhow reciprocity
transactions,
thancorrection,
whichcan be madeduringan exchange,rather
arguedthat6tOp0OTtK6vmeans"adjustment,"
of prices
in a courtroom
thenwouldbe theadjustment
situation.Reciprocity
whichis doneonlyafterwards,
littleto backup
of just exchangethatAristotlelaysout.But Burnetoffered
in accordancewiththestandards
his claim,and it has notbeen widelyaccepted(butsee H. Rackham'sside-noteon p. 279 of his Loeb transMA, 1934]). But Burnet'sexplanationdoes notreallywork,
lationof theNicomacheanEthics[Cambridge,
could
transactions
standardsof just exchangeby whichordinary
becauseAristotleprovidesno independent
to Book 5 (p. 203) andhis noteon 6tOpOTtKOv (1 131a1,p. 213), with
be adjusted.See Burnet'sintroduction
theresponseof GauthierandJolif(L'tthique, 358-59).
transactions
into violentand stealthyis not said to resultin
divisionof involuntary
22. The further
additional"parts"of justice.

405
justice is thetermforthefirstpartof corrective

justice,23and reciprocity
is thetermforthesecondhalf.Moreover,thisapproachhelps accountfor
fromAristotle'sdiscussion
transactions
theapparentabsence of voluntary
transactions
of corrective
justiceproper,andhis de-emphasisof involuntary
in thediscussionof reciprocity.
We can even explainwhyAristotlefailed
to mentionreciprocity
whenhe firstdividedjusticeintoitsparts:as he tells
of thetermav-ctcatovO6s
us, he does not accept theusual understanding
(1 132b21-31). So it wouldhave been confusingto use thetermin an unqualifiedway whenhe firstdividesjustice; and to explainit therewould
have been a digression.Aristotlewiselydelaystheuse of thetermuntilhe
reachesthediscussionin whichhe will defineit.
Thereis, however,a seriousobjectionto theidentification
of reciprocity
withthe secondhalf of corrective
justice. Our argument
assumesthatthe
discussionof corrective
justice(in Book 5.4) is concernedonlywiththatpart
of corrective
or crimes.But
justicethatdeals withinvoluntary
transactions,
thisis notat all clear.In theverybeginningof thediscussion,Aristotleindicatesthatthe subjectis corrective
justice as a whole,and thatit applies
also to voluntarytransactions:To 6' kOt6'v iv -c6&pOP0TlK6v, 'O yiv?-at ?V
Toi5 cYUVa7XaypXaLct Kat TOti EKOUctOlt
Kat Totg aKoDYtolo (1131b25-36).
This statement
seemsto indicateclearlythattheensuingdiscussionin Book
5.4 concernscorrective
justiceas a whole,as itappliestobothvoluntary
and
transactions.
involuntary
This in turnimpliesthatavTutcatovOo6
cannotbe
thesecondhalfof corrective
justice,sincecorrective
justiceas a wholehas
alreadybeen discussed.And AristotleexcludesavTUtcatovO6s
fromthediscussion even more clearly when he says: TO 6' ?v Toi;
ouvaXX&ypauz
6LKaLov
?GTltHIcV tCGOV
Tt, KaL TO a 6KoV avtGov, aX' o0 KaTal
aVcVaXoytav
CKCLVTV
aXkkX ata TiiV a'pO%rTitK iv (113 lb33-32a2). Thisstatementexcludes avTl-
iwtov0O6, because, as we will see, dvTutcaovO6;does work according to
avakoy7a. For these two reasons, then,it would seem thatthe discussion here
concernscorrective
justiceas a whole,as itappliesto bothvoluntary
andinvoluntary
transactions,
and thatavTUtEt[ovO6;
is a separatematter.
But if we examinethecontentsof thechapter,we may get a somewhat
different
As thechapterproceeds,Aristotleseemsslowlyto forimpression.
get his promiseto deal withvoluntary
transactions.
He mentionsonlytwo
examples of transactionsin this discussion: oCO'v 7y&p6taippci ?i ?Jt?CKTs

f pa6koP5o?JtilKll, o%' ?i?0otX&Ucv
(packovcaL?ccTCp1TcYLav
? KT5 il pPaXkog
CJTiV
(1 132a 2-4). M1otX&6o
meanstocommitadultery.
Itis a secretiveinvoluntary
or crime(and is listedas suchin thepreviousquotation),since

transaction,
thevictimis thehusband.a' ocaTcp&w
meansto rob,despoil,defraud,or fail
to pay a debt,butit is noteasy to decidehow to classifyit,and it was not
listedon anyof Aristotle's
earlierlists.Whenitrefersto robbery
and suchit
is clearlyan involuntary
transaction.
But whataboutnonpayment
of debt?
23. Aristotleoftenuses a singletermfora class and a prominent

memberof thatclass. Sometimeshe
does thisexplicitly,
as in thedistinction
betweenuniversaland particular
justicein Book 5 of theEthics.In
otherplaces he is notexplicit.So forexamplethetermXprTgTrrsVKTin Book 1 of thePoliticsmeanseither
1) thewholeartof acquisition,2) theunsoundformor,rarely,3) thesoundform.See W. L. Newman,The
"Politics"ofAristotle,
vol. 2 (Oxford,1887), 165,repeatedby F Susemihland D. R. Hicks,The "Politics"
ofAristotle(London,1894).

406
GABRIEL DANZIG
residingin a gray
of debtis a uniquekindof transaction,
Nonpayment
It maybe classifiedas inand theinvoluntary.
area betweenthevoluntary
of paymentis done againstthewill of the
sincethewithholding
voluntary,
if consideredas part
But it mightalso be classifiedas voluntary,
creditor.24
(be it purchase,rental,or loan) led to the
transaction
of whatevervoluntary
creationof the debt. Aristotle'schoice of thisexampleseems extremely
can come
transaction"
in whicha "voluntary
careful:thisis theonlysituation
justiceas Aristotlediscussesit in this
to courtand be subjectto corrective
one,
thatis treatedas an involuntary
transaction
chapter.It is a voluntary
element.
because,in thefinalanalysis,it containsan involuntary
has indicatedquiteclearlythatnonpayment
JoachimarguesthatAristotle
In explaining
transaction.
of debtis to be classifiedas a partof a voluntary
Aristotlesays,'KO'(YcL 6' X?y7cacOTtf dPXi
whathe meansby voluntary,
understands
IcTO)V TOvTOVCKOUGtOS( 1 3 1a5-6). As Joachim
t(iv GuvaaVXXUa7
thata defaultedagreementthat
this,Aristotleis hereexplicitlyaffirming
Butthisis reading
transaction.25
endsincourtis stillclassifiedas a voluntary
differs
transaction
words.All he saysis thata voluntary
a lotintoAristotle's
one in thatit is entereduponwillingly.
froman involuntary
But it is clear fromotherevidencethatAristotledoes referto thenonof a
transaction
subjectto theintervention
paymentof debtas a voluntary
courtof law. Elsewherein his writings,Aristotledoes not divide transbut uses the termYuvaLXXdyaTa
actionsinto voluntaryand involuntary,
So whenhe says in
transactions.
to referto voluntary
withoutqualification
thePoliticsthattherearetwokindsof courtsthatdeal with YVuaXX6y'IcaTa
of thedisputesthatarise
(1300b15-36; see 1317b28)he is clearlythinking
arises about the
a
Whenever
disagreement
transactions.
voluntary
from
to court,
thecase couldbe brought
transaction,
of a voluntary
nonfulfillment
and adjudicatedin themannerin whichanyothercrimeis adjudicated.This
could surelybe called correctivejustice as it applies to voluntarytransactions.26Thereforeone can easily arguethatthediscussionof corrective
and voluntary
justice properin Book 5.4 has dealt withbothinvoluntary
discussionof
and thatthereis no reasonto expectanyfurther
transactions,
corrective
justice.
In cases of thissort,thejudge will notneedto evaluatethenatureof the
or to takeregardof thesortsof personsinvolved.All that
initialagreement
In thissense
is fulfilled.
thejudge has to do is makesurethattheagreement
what
transactions
is to voluntary
transactions
corrective
justicein voluntary
is to distributive
transactions
justice: it
correctivejustice in involuntary
Notes,1:438-39,andBurnet,"Ethics,"223, 226; rejectedbyJoachim("Ethics,"p. 138,
24. See Stewart,
n. 1).
25. "Ethics,"p. 137,n. 2.
in cases of breachof contract
transactions
justiceis applicableto voluntary
26. The viewthatcorrective
is endorsedby H. Jackson(The FifthBook ofthe "NicomacheanEthics" [Cambridge,18791,76), followed
by Ritchie("ParticularJustice,"188-89) and Rackham("NicomacheanEthics,"266-67). Finleytakesthis
viewas being"beyonddispute"("EconomicAnalysis,"6).
jusjustice,arguedthatcorrective
to distributive
to assimilatereciprocity
Notes,1:415-16, trying
Stewart,
whentheseare unfair.Butthereis no evidencethatAristotlewas
transactions
ticeis applicableto voluntary
enteredinto are valid,as did
concernedwiththisissue. He appearsto grantthatagreementsvoluntarily
to thefactthatthelaw grants&&?ta in cases of
Athenianlaw. At 1132b11-16 Aristotlerefersapprovingly
in Books 8 and 9 (1162b29-31. 1164b12-15).
andhe makessimilarcomments
transactions
voluntary

407
intothejusticeof thatdiswithoutinquiring
restoresa previousdistribution
The treatment
of thiscase does notdifferin any important
way
tribution.
thisformof
and therefore
of an involuntary
transaction,
fromthetreatment
corrective
justiceis identicalwiththatwhichdeals withothercrimes.
justice?We may objectthaton this
But is thisall thereis to corrective
his promiseto discusstwodifferent
accountAristotlehas stillnotfulfilled
justicethattreats
kindsof corrective
justice.27On thisaccount,thecorrective
transactions
is identicalto thecorrective
justicethattreatsinvolvoluntary
justice,thereare no partsof
untaryones. If thisis all thereis to corrective
corrective
justiceat all. We wouldhaveto concludethatdespitehiswordsall
divisionof crimesintotwo
Aristotle
intendedto do was to offera gratuitous
and thosethatdo not.
kinds:thosethatariseafteran agreement,
justicecomes
This lack of anydiscussionof thetwopartsof corrective
treatsthese
Aristotle
transactions.
attheexpenseof thevoluntary
specifically
element.
and onlyinsofaras theycontainan involuntary
onlyaccidentally,
andnotthataspectwhich
transactions,
He treatsonlyone aspectof voluntary
When Aristotlelisted
transactions.
makes themdistinctfrominvoluntary
and
he listedthingslikebuying,selling,renting,
thevoluntary
transactions,
on a loan.We mayfeelthatthesehavenot
lending,notthingslikedefaulting
been treatedat all.
As theexamplesshow,theinitialdivisionof corrective
justiceintotwo
difference
partsseems to reflectAristotle'sawarenessof the fundamental
and thosegoverninga courtof
betweentherulesgoverninga marketplace
justicein detail(in Book
law. Andyet,whenhe comesto discusscorrective
voluntary
transactions
only
5.4), he appearsto assimilatethetwo,treating
aboutvolunaspect.Has he forgotten
insofaras theycontainan involuntary
tarytransactions
per se?
jusApparently
not.As Aristotleconcludeshis discussionof corrective
andinvolbetweenvoluntary
tice,he remindsus of theessentialdistinction
He points out thatthe termshe has been using to
untarytransactions.
describethegain or loss awardedby thecourt(K?p6o0and 4fhita) are borrowedfromtherealmof voluntary
per se: thingslike buying
transactions
and sellingand renting.
This remindsus thatup to now we have notreally
been discussingvoluntarytransactionsat all. Aristotlemakes this even
clearerat theendof thechapterwhenhe concludeshisdiscussionof correctivejustice properby saying (1132b18-19): 64(GTEKEp60U TtVO6 KOcL4qHlk
TJ
mIEGoV0t 6iKcltV GCt
TIOV
aXpa T1 CKOVcIOV ("hencejusticeininvoluntary
transactions
is a meanbetweengainand loss in a sense" [trans.Rackham]).
In thissummation
of thechapter,Aristotlerefersto theentirepreviousdiscussionof corrective
of debt,
justice,includinganycase of thenonpayment
as concernedwithinvoluntary
transactions.
At thispointin thediscussion,
Aristotlerecognizesthatthepreviousdiscussiondid notconcernvoluntary
For itis withthis
transactions
perse at all, and thisis thepointthatmatters.
of thelimitation
turns
of thepreviousdiscussionthatAristotle
understanding
to thetopicof reciprocity.
It wouldseem,then,thathis discussionof reciwhichconcernspreciselythesekindsof transactions,
is intendedas
procity,
27. As Ritchieargues,Aristotledoes notalwaysfulfillsuchpromises("ParticularJustice,"188).

408
GABRIEL DANZIG
a completion
of theuntilnowincomplete
consideration
of corrective
justice.
As we shallsee, it playsthisroleratherwell.
III
This formalargumentis of interestonlyinsofaras it helps elucidatethe
meaningof reciprocity
in Aristotle's
discussion.As I willtryto show,reciprocityconforms
to whatwe shouldexpectof a treatment
of thesecondpart
of corrective
justice:itconcernsvoluntary
transactions
perse, and it shows
how to correctthesocial imbalancecreatedby one-sidedvoluntary
transactions in a mannerstrictlyparallel to thatby whichcorrectivejustice
propercorrectstheimbalancecreatedby an involuntary
transaction.
Aristotle'sdiscussionhere is concernedprimarily
withanalogousreciprocityin voluntary
transactions.
He uses an exampleof an officer
striking
a citizenand vice-versasimplybecause it providesa vividexampleof the
factthatarithmetical
(i.e., egalitarian)reciprocity
is not alwaysjust, and
hencelendssupportto his contention
thatreciprocity
mustbe analogous.28
Aftermakingthis point,he reaches the followingstarting-point
for his
discussion: dXX' ?v p?'V TtaL KOlVOViclh TOaL a0lXXcKlKTlit cTUVEXEt TO
IoIoVIov
6tiKltOV, TO dvXVTVIovO',
KXT'
cLvVXXoyicLvKai
If KaXT icotrlna
(1 132b32-33). His discussionconcernsvoluntary

transactions,
and forthis
of corrective
reasonit fillsthegap leftin thetreatment
justice.
frombothcorrective
As Aristotlesays,reciprocity
differs
justice,as he
discusseditin thepreviouschapter,and fromdistributive
justice(1 132b23fromdistributive
25). It differs
justice in an obviousway: it concernsthe
of goods and servicesbetweencitizens,nota govredistribution
voluntary
fromthesortof corrective
also differs
ernmental
distribution.
Reciprocity
hasjustfinished
justicethatAristotle
discussing,whichaddressesitselfonly
Unlikecorrective
transactions.29
to involuntary
(or partlyinvoluntary)
jusis nota judicialprocessdesignedto correctan act of
ticeproper,reciprocity
crime,and it is analogous(Kar' avaXoyiav),takingintoaccounttheworths
of thepersonsinvolved.
and corrective
And yetreciprocity
containselementsof bothdistributive
justice.Insofaras it takesaccountof theworthsof thepersonsinvolved,it
an officer
could surely
thecase of a citizenstriking
28. Whiletreatedhereas an exampleof reciprocity,
justice proper,and in such a case, thejudge would take into
come to courtand be treatedby corrective
earlierin the
Thisdoes notconflictwiththeprincipleof equalitymentioned
accountthestatusof theofficer.
justice (1 132al-4). ThereAristotlesaid merelythatthe moralcharacterof the
discussionof corrective
wouldgetthesame treatment.
Anypersonwho is an officer
in assessingthepunishment.
agentis irrelevant
Here,his pointis thatthelegal statusof thepersonis relevant,and it is equally applicableto corrective
between
thatcorrective
justice does takeaccountof some status-baseddifferences
justice.Note therefore
is similarin ignoringmoralcharacter.It takesaccountof professional
people. As we will see, reciprocity
status,however.
notreciprocreciprocity,
he is speakingof is Pythagorean
29. In fact,itis also truethatthereciprocity
does notfit
ityas he definesit (see Ritchie,"ParticularJustice,"185-86). Aristotlearguesthatreciprocity
reciprocity
justice because it takes no accountof persons.Pythagorean
eithercorrectiveor distributive
clearlydoes so (1 133al6-19). Judson("Fair
takes no accountof persons,but Aristotelianreciprocity
Exchange,"pp. 153-54, n. 16) implicitlyacknowledgesthispointwhenhe pointsoutthaton theaccepted
does notfit
thatreciprocity
of thepassage, whichhe challenges,"Aristotle'sstarting-point,
interpretation
justice . . . is . . . supportedeitherby no argumentor by a bad one." But as we have
withrectificatory
justice as a whole.
(or corrective)
fromrectificatory
reciprocity
argued,he neverintendedto distinguish

409
resemblesdistributive
justice. I will discuss this aspect of reciprocity
at
lengthlaterin thepaper.
But it is important
to see how reciprocity
resemblescorrectivejustice.
On thesurfaceit is hardto see theconnection.Corrective
justiceis usually
thoughtto be the act of a judge who restoresequalityafterit has been
disturbed.But in reciprocity
thereis no need fora judge, and thereis no
"wrongdoing"to correct.Reciprocityis accomplishedwhen two parties
exchangegoods fairly:"correction"seems to have nothingto do withit.
But thisobjectionis based entirely
on thediscussionof corrective
justice
in Book 5.4, a discussionthatonly takes accountof corrective
justice in
involuntary
cases in whicha judge acts
transactions,
to "correct"theresultsof a crime.Obviously,such a modelis notappropriateto explainingthejusticeat workin purelyvoluntary
transactions.
To understand
thenatureof reciprocity,
and its connectionwithcorrectivejustice,we needto look morecloselyat whatAristotlemeansby transactions (GYvvaXX6yta-ra).Aristotle uses this term in a technical sense to
refernot only to voluntarytransactionsor contracts,which is its usual

meaning,butalso to crimessuchas theftand murder.30
Aristotletakesthis
bizarrestep,apparently,
because he has in mindsome essentialsimilarity
betweena crimeand a businesstransaction.
Whatdo theyhave in common?It is worthnotingthatneitherformof
transaction
is necessarilyan exchange.This is mostobviousin thecase of
a crime:thevictimdoes notnecessarilyreceiveanybenefitfromor inflict
anyharmon thewrongdoer.
In voluntary
a repayment
transactions,
of some
sortis usuallyexpected,buteven herethisis notstrictly
necessary.The gift
of a freelunch,weretheresuch a thing,wouldalso be a voluntary
"transaction."AmongtheexamplesAristotleoffersof voluntary
in
transactions,
additionto sellingand buyingand renting,
he also includestwo termsfor
loans (8avct6ygk and XpiVlxt).
The act of makinga loan is clearlydistinct
fromtheact of repayment
thatis to follow.But it is stilla transaction.
Because of thealmostinevitably
one-sidednatureof involuntary
transactions,an act of corrective
justiceis neededin each and everycase in order
torestorebalanceto thesocialrelationsbetweenthetwopartiesinvolved.As
thecrimewas performed
againstthewillof thevictim,so tootherestoration
is performed
againstthewill of thewrong-doer.31
The situationis similar
withrespectto voluntary
transactions.
In Aristotle's
conception,
a voluntary
transaction
is just as one-sidedas an involuntary
one. Therefore,
everyvoluntarytransaction
mustbe balancedby an offsetting
act of justiceto restore
thebalance.In a voluntary
transaction,
itis theactof repayment
orpayment,
mosteasilyillustrated
in thecase of a loan,butalso in principlean element
in anyactof sellingorbuyingorrenting.
If I giveyoua product,
thatcreates
a social imbalancewhichcan be corrected
onlyif yougiveme something
of
30. I have foundno otherauthoror textthatuses auvaWi7ypaTato referto crimes.
31. H. D. P. Lee ("The Legal Backgroundof Two Passages in theNicomacheanEthics,"CQ 31 [19371:
129-40) takestheviewthatthetransactions
arecalled involuntary
becausethecriminalis unwillingto repay
thedebthis crimehas created.It is truethattherepayment
of unwillingtransactions
is performed
unwillingly,and requirestheintervention
of a judge, whilereciprocity
is performed
willingly.
However,Aristotle
liststhecrimesthemselves,
nottherepayments,
as involuntary
transactions;
see 1130b33-1131a9.

410
GABRIEL DANZIG
In thissense,and onlyin thissense,is

value.This is reciprocity.
appropriate
justice.Justas thejudge corrects
itpossibleto viewitas a formof corrective
octransaction
the imbalancewhenan involuntary
an imbalancewhenhe paysa debt,or
curs,so too theprivatecitizenrectifies
simplypays forsomething.
is evidentfromthebasic meaningof
of reciprocity
This understanding
thetermdvti etovO6k,whichdoes notof coursereferto a two-way"exof an
Properlyspeaking,theinitiator
change,"butto an actof repayment.32
exchange,theone who firstextendshis serviceor product,is notinvolved
at all, butonlytheone who,havingreceivedsomething,
in avtiicc7rtov006
to makea repayment.33
attempts
is also reflectedin the meaningof the term
But this understanding
justice. Termsderivedfrom6Iop06o have a wide
6opOovTlKov,corrective
of theconuses themtorefertothesettingstraight
varietyof uses. Aristotle
or laws of a state(Pol. 1317a35), to fixinga buildingor a road
stitution
(Pol. 1321b21), to correctinga manuscript(Soph. el. 166b4). The term
one's character(Eth.Nic. 1172al12).But it
&IopO6omayreferto improving
For
can also be used to meanpayinga debtor simplymakinga payment.34
not only as a
thisreason,it is entirelyappropriateto referto repayment
justice.
of corrective
butalso as a sub-form
formof reciprocity,
In an involunjusticeworkin itstwoinstantiations?
How does corrective
a wrongdoerhas injuredsomeoneor takenhis property
tarytransaction,
to thevictim
againsthiswill.In thiscase, thejudge mustcalculateandreturn
betweenwhat he has and what he had beforethe crime
the difference
the
(1 132a7-11, 1132a25-1132bl3). Sincea thiefwillbe obligatedtoreturn
verygoodshe stole,if possible,therewillbe inprincipleno needtocalculate
a
or "reciprocity,"
theirequivalentvalue. On theotherhand,in repayment
Herethecalculationof theequivprivatecitizenmakeshis ownrepayment.
theyoften
alentvalueis of theessence,sincewhenpeoplemakerepayments,
repay with somethingotherthan the verythingtheyreceived.For this
thediscussionof correcsupplements
reason,thediscussionof reciprocity
tivejusticeby providingsome guidanceforhow to calculatethevalues of
different
products.The discussionwouldbe uselessif it concludedthatno
guidancein making
suchcalculationwas possible,orif itwereunabletooffer
a just act of
suchcalculations.In sucha case, no one couldactuallyperform
willtellus howto makethiscalculation.
Aristotle
So, inevitably,
reciprocity.
dependson thecalculationof therelativevaluesof
But althoughreciprocity
products,this is not its essence. Reciprocityis the act of makinga just
it is a formof themoralvirtue,
justice.
and therefore
repayment,
is clear fromall theexamplesof &VTlJtCIOVOOc
This idea of repayment
an officer
thatAristotlementions.He offerstheexampleof a man striking
see Gauthierand Jolif,L'Ethique,372-73.
32. On thevariousmeaningsof dvrtnitenovO6g
33. That we are speakingof the voluntaryextendingof a serviceor productis statedclearlyat the
beginningof thechapter,whenAristotlecommentson therole of theGraces in encouragingbothrepaymentand theinitialextendingof favor(1 133a2-6).
34. I have not foundany clear examplesof thisusage in Aristotle,but it is well attestedin thirdcenturyGreek,at least; see theHibeh Papyrus,ed. B. P. Grenfelland A. S. Hunt(London, 1906), 1.63.13.

ARISTOTELIANRECIPROCITY
411
in returnfor a blow he has received(1 132b28-30). He explainsthatro
avwtotoIv helpsmaintainthecity,because people desireto avengewrongs
and repaybenefits(1132b33-1133a2). He explainsthe importanceof the

therepayment
of favors(1 133a3templeof theGracesfortheirencouraging
5). He saysthatfirstone mustestablishproportional
equalityand thenavl-tRERoV06,can occur(1133alO-14), and thatdv-cmmcmovOo&
occurswhenthe
productshave been equalized (1 133a31-32), implyingthatit is nottheprocess of equalizationitself,butsomething
thatoccursaftertwoproductshave
beenequalized.He saysthatwithout
therewouldbe no KOt&v-tcmzov0'vat
vcovia(1133b5-6).
Theseuses makeitclearthat v-ICMRovOS6
refersnottotheprocessof calculatingrelativevalues,or even to a jointact of exchange,butto theact of
makinga repayment.
It is theindividual,
notthejudge,whoperforms
theact
of reciprocity;
and thisactis easilyconceivedas a formof themoralvirtue,
justice.The chapteris no digression,
then,butratheran integralpartof Aristotle'sdiscussionof justice.
THE POLITICALDIMENSION
IV
This idea of repayment
is an important
one to Aristotle,
andhe returns
to it
in thesomewhatdifferent
contextof friendship
in Books 8 and 9. Therehe
discussesat lengththequestionof how one shouldrepaya favorthathas
beendonebya friendor someonethought
tobe a friend(1 162b21-1163a23,
1163b32-1164b21).The twodiscussionsdiffer
in theway in whichfriendfrompoliticalcommunity:
shipdiffers
in thelaterdiscussion,forexample,
thequestionariseswhether
one shouldhaveto repaya friendat all. Butboth
concernrepayment,
andin bothcases thecentralconcernis thenatureof the
relationship
betweenthepeople: repayment
is conceivednotmerelyas an
abstractethicalobligation,butas a social or politicalone as well.
As is well known,the Ethics is a workbelongingto politicalscience
(1094a27-b28), and thediscussionof justiceas a whole,and of reciprocity
in particular,
has an especiallypoliticalcharacter.Aristotleremindsus of
politicsfrequently
by referring
to thecity,its officers,
and above all to the
of maintaining
importance
KOVOVcW'a
(community).
Kotvcovtais in factthe
underlyingprinciple of the discussion. Aristotleuses the termsix times in

the chapter,and makes it clear thatfromhis point of view KOtVOVWLa
is one
of the main goals of reciprocityand exchange.35 Reciprocity is important
because it holds communities together (1132b31-34, 1133al-2, 11, 24,
26-28, 1133b5-8, 15-16), and thereforethe shrine of the Graces has been
established in order to encourage reciprocal benefaction (1 133a3-4).
Kotvovwia
is so important
thatAristotlesuggestsextendingmonetization
by assigningprices to itemsthatdo not usuallyhave them(he does not
35. See, forexample,1133b5-6, "If itwerenotpossibleforreciprocation
to proceedthus,therewould
be no koinonia,"and at 1133bl5-16, "In thiswaytherewill alwaysbe exchange,and if so, koinonia";see
also 1t.Will, "De l'aspect6thiquedes originesgrecquesde la monnaie,"RH 212 (1954): 7-22.

412
GABRIEL DANZIG
of) in orderthatthereshouldbe moreof it

say whatitemshe is thinking
(1 133b14-16). This shouldhelp balance thepictureof Aristotleas an opand thecorruptprofit
ponentof "unnatural"retailtrade,themarketplace,
seekingtheyfoster.It is theconcernforKOtVcOVla thatencouragesAristotle
expressedin Book 1 of
aboutthemarketplace
to overcomehis reservations
and thisitselfis
thePoliticsand to suggesttheextensionof monetization,
politicalcharacterof
one of theclearestindicationsof thefundamentally
And whenAristotlerefersback to thediscusthediscussionof reciprocity.
he refersto it notas an economicdiscussion,noras an
sion of reciprocity
ethicalone,butas a politicalone (1 163b34).It is one of thefewsubjectsin
theEthicsto whichhe refersexplicitlyin thePolitics(1261a301-3) and he
between
social harmony
itsrolein maintaining
does so in orderto highlight
classes in the city.In thisrespecthe followsPlato, who in the
different
elementin the
exchangeas a fundamental
Republic(369b-371e) also treated
of thecity.
construction
Because of
The politicalcharacterof thediscussionaffectseverything.
it wouldnot
thecommunity,
in maintaining
thepoliticalroleof reciprocity
forAristotleto ignoretheroleof social factorsin determinbe appropriate
products,or to engage in theoretical
ing the exchangevalues of different
speculationabout the truevalues of products.The politicalrole of reciprocityactuallyhelpsexplainwhyhe is willingto avoid askingtheoretical
or thecalculationof "fairprice."
questionsaboutcommensurability
As I hope will become clear,Aristotleis not concernedat all withthe
butwithitsfairnesswithinthecontext
"absolute"fairnessof a repayment,
of a givencity.It is closelyrelatedto whatAristotleshortlycalls convenbe
thatrepayment
tionalpoliticaljustice(1 134bl8-l 135al5). It is important
unitesthemembersof thecity.Repaymentis
fair,because fairrepayment
forthesepricesare a
fairwhenit respectsthepricesof the marketplace,
of social relationswithinthe city.Aristotle'sexchangeratiois
reflection
therefore
designedto reflectand respectthe existingvalues in the city,
whatevertheymaybe. But to see thisclearlywe need to takea close look
at theratioitself.
THE EXCHANGE RATIO
V
Buthow does one calculatetheamountto repay?

is repayment.
Reciprocity
Aristotle'sanswerto thisquestionis incrediblypedestrianand obviously
right.He says thatone mustrepaythe same monetaryvalue as one has
received.36As we will see, thispedestrianansweractuallyinvolvesa soof pricewithinthecontextof the
of thefunction
understanding
phisticated
city.But on thesurface,theanswerseems so trivialthatscholarshave felt
methodof calculating
fora moretheoretical
compelledto search,fruitlessly,
value.37
36. This is theimplicationof his calculationof theratiobetweenbeds and houses(1 133b20-26).
37. And yet Aristotlehas a habitof sayingextremelyobvious things:his discussionof corrective
forexample,concludesthatthewrongedpartyshouldreceivetheexact
transactions,
justice in involuntary
amountof whichit has been unjustlydeprived.

413
Attempts
have been made to explainAristotle'sexchangeratioeitheras
of exchange(Meikle)
an investigation
intothemetaphysical
underpinnings
bothapproaches
or as an ethicaltheory(Judson).Despitetheirdifferences,
assumethatAristotleis trying
to comeup witha formulaforthetheoretical
commodities.
calculationof therelativevaluesof different
If so, thediscussion is clearlywanting,forAristotledoes notdo this.Accordingto Meikle
thisis Aristotle's
point:therecan be no genuinebasis forsuchcalculation.
For Judsonsuch a basis does exist-it is objectivelydetermined
human
needorxpEia.ButJudsonstillhas to acknowledgethatAristotlehas no idea
how to calculaterelativevalues on thisbasis. Accordingto eitherof these
views, therefore,
could neverguide the actionof any human
reciprocity
being,howevervirtuoushe mightbe.
In a crucialpassage(1133bl3-15),Aristotle
states,
Tf. g?V
d63VVaTOV la
TOGOITOV 6tap?poVTn
G(4tggETpa
?YV?iOai,
OVV dXaOit
ipO& 6? TInV Xp?iav
so much
itis impossiblethatthingsdiffering
("Now intruth
ev6XETat' iKaVCOS
butwithreference
shouldbecomecommensurate,
to demand[or:need]they
maybecomeso sufficiently"
[trans.Ross]). In Meikle'saccountof thearguis theculmination
ment,thisstatement
of an extendedinvestigation
intothe
possibilityof findingan adequategroundingforthe commensurability
of
different
qualitatively
products.HereAristotle
acknowledgesdefeat.Meikle
explainsthatthe impossibility
of genuinecommensurability
derivesfrom
Aristotle's
metaphysics,
whichdistinguishes
sharplybetweencategoriessuch
as quantityand quality.Therecan be no genuinequantitative
relationship
betweendifferent
qualities:whiteis neithergreaternorless thanloud. The
qualitiesthatmakea chairwhatit is are neithergreaternorless thanthose
thatmake a shoe whatit is. For thisreason,it is impossibleto calculate
the relativevalues of different
quantitatively
productson thebasis of the
naturesof theproductsthemselves.
Here Meikle offersa plausible"Aristotelian"38
explanationof Aristotle's
assertionthatdifferent
productscannotbe trulycommensurated.
Undeniably,Aristotledoes notfindanytheoretical
methodforcalculatingvalues,
andMeiklemaybe absolutelyrightaboutwhyhe does not.Butis thisreally
Aristotle'sconcernin the presentchapter?Aristotledoes not seem to be
makingthetheoretical
pointthatcommensurability
is impossible,sincehe
merelystatesthisas a factwithoutany argument.He does not offerthe
explanationthatMeikle offersor draw the connectionthatMeikle draws
betweenthe categoriesand exchange.In its presentcontext,Aristotle's
remarkis merelyan acknowledgement
and brushingoffof a difficulty
he
does not wish or need to deal with.He is obviouslynot concernedwith
exploringor explainingthe possibilityor impossibility
of establishinga
metaphysically
valid exchangeratiobetweendifferent
items,and instead
seemscontentto pursuehisgoals in spiteof thisproblembyrelyingon need
(Xpcia) as a basis forexchange.Need providesa good enoughbasis forAristotle'sanalysisto continue,and thismakesit pretty
clearthathe is notinvolvedin analyzingthemetaphysics
of exchange.
38. In thesensethatAristotlemightagreewithit.Howeverin Politics4 1296bh7-33Aristotlesaysthat
it is possibleto comparequalityand quantity-although
he does notsay how.

414
GABRIEL DANZIG
Takinga moreethicalapproach,Judsonarguesthatthisconceptof need

philosophicalconcepton thebasis of whichAristotleactuis an important
in objectiveterms.In his
a theoryof "fairprice,"39
allyintendsto construct
view,need providesan objectivebasis forthecalculationof the value of
althoughhe admitsthatAristotledoes not explainhow this
commodities,
offers
no indicationof howone woulddecidewhether
wouldwork:Aristotle
shoesaremoreneedfulthana house,and if so, byhow much.Accordingto
one of the
Judson'stheory,
water,arguablythebestof all things,certainly
mostnecessary,shouldseeminglybe themostexpensiveas well.
As we haveseen,Meiklerejectstheidea thatxpcia providestherealbasis
of people not of the items
because it is a property
of commensurability
and notesthatAristotle"neverlinkschreiawithcommensurathemselves,
In Meikle'sview,thesentencewe havequoted(1 133b13-15,p. 413
bility."40
itis impossiblethatthingsdiffering
that"in truth
above) is a clearstatement
In response,Judsonoffersa novel
so muchshouldbecomecommensurate."
whilethingscanof thesame sentence.In his interpretation,
interpretation
in relatheycan be made commensurate
nottrulybe made commensurate,
is implausible,sinceon thisreadingthe
tionto need.But thisinterpretation
thefirst.
secondhalf of thesentenceseemsto contradict
set forthby
In addition,Judson'spositionrestsheavilyon theargument,
than"demand";buton this
Meikle,thatthetermXpciameans"need"rather
conceptionof needby
pointhe has beenmisled.MeikleexplainsAristotle's
Somethingcan
reference
to his discussionof aVaLKfl in theMetaphysics.41
if it is a conditionfortheexistenceor
be called necessary,says Aristotle,
of some being(1015a20-27). A productwouldbe trulynecesflourishing
to humansursary(or needed),and valuable,then,insofaras it contributed
humanflourishing
(i56attovia). Use-value,
vival or to true(Aristotelian)
ethicalworld,determines
exchangeone mightsay,withinan Aristotelian
notby subjectivehumanwants,
value. Andtheseuse-valuesaredetermined
butby objectivecriteria.
of Xpciaas obthisdoes notwork.Meikle'sunderstanding
Unfortunately,
use of the
jectiveneed as opposedto subjectivewantdoes notfitAristotle's
termin the Ethicspassage we are considering.When Aristotlesays that
wherethereis no need,thereis no exchange(1 133a27-28, 1133b6-10),he
betweenxpcia andall actualinstancesof exis drawinga directrelationship
change.He cannotmeanthatall actualexchangeis motivatedby objective
needas opposedto desire,"want,"orfeltneed.The termxpEcais obviously
thatlead to acbroadto includeall thesubjectivemotivations
sufficiently
tualinstancesof exchange.Strictly
speaking,itis feltneedthatprovidesthe
motivationforexchange;and it is feltneed backed by purchasingpower
thatmakesexchangepossible.While it is probablywrongto see Xpcia as
it is certainlywrongto portrayit as an obidenticalto "market-demand,"
39. One shouldnote,however,thatAristotledoes notspeak of "fairprice"in thediscussion,or offer
anyhintsaboutwhatitemsare trulyworth.
EconomicThought,24-25.
40. Aristotle's
41. Ibid.,chaps. 2 and 6, esp. pp. 117-22.

ARISTOTELIAN
RECIPROCITY
415
jective factordistinctfromsubjectivewants.And if Xpcia does notrepresentobjectiveneed, thenit cannotprovidethe basis forcalculating"fair

feltneed,thentheonly
price"as opposedto actualprice.If Xpciarepresents
is themarketprice.42
priceit can help determine
thatAristotle
The mistakecommonto theseapproachesis theassumption
is providinga methodforcalculatingpriceor value apartfromthemechanismof theGreekmarketplace.In fact,he is explainingwhyit is just to
on thebasis of theactualpricesof things.Actualprices
makerepayments
thediffering
values of theproducerswithinthe
arefairbecause theyreflect
city.For this reason,theyhelp the city,and forthis reason as well, the
values of different
producersare a crucialelementin Aristotle'sratio.
VI
Aristotle'sexchangeratioconcernsthe relationship
betweenproductsand
At 1133a22-24 Aristotle
producers.
writes:6c t oivuv 67c6poiKo6oJIoq TcpO6
is to shoeYKUTOTOJIOV, Toar& i,co6iJ*iaTa
rTpoq owKLav("As housebuilder
to explain
maker,so mustso manyshoesbe to a house").Those whoattempt
thisbaffling
statement
have in generaltakentwolines.On theone side are
thosewho taketheratioat face value,takingtheproducersand productsto
be distinct
andindependently
determined
valuesthatmustbe brought
intorelationwitheach other.On thisview,different
producershavedifferent
"values." The problemis thatit is difficult
to see whatthiscould mean.We are
notaccustomedto thinkof producersas havingquantifiable
values,and we
do notsee howsuchvaluescouldinfluence
a tradeof products.
Whynotjust
tradetheproductsand leave theproducersoutof thepicture?
For thisreasonsomecommentators,
mostrecently
Meikle,43have argued
thattheratiois a ratioof equality:1:1::1:1. This allows us to ignorethe
values of theproducersand concentrate
on establishing
therelativevalues
of theproducts.The producersare mentionedonlyto tell us thatwe must
exchangeequal values.
One cannotobject,as does Finley,thatthisis impossiblesince in effect
it cancelsoutone of thepairsof factors.44
These factorsarenotnecessarily
introduced
because of theirinfluenceon theratio.In everyformof justice
thereare always fourterms,two people and two portionsto be allotted
(113 a1 5-20). In distributive
justice,thepersonsmaybe treatedas unequal
(1131a22-24); in corrective
justicepropertheyaretreatedas equal (1132a47). Thereis, then,nothinginherently
problematic
abouttheapparently
gratuitousintroduction
of fourterms,twopersonsandtwoquantitiesof goods,
42. Perhapsone shouldeven take XpEiahereto mean somethinglike "use", and renderthe sentence
thus:"Now in truthit is impossiblethatthingsdiffering
so muchshouldbecomecommensurate,
butthey
can be sufficiently
commensurated
forordinaryuse"; compareAn.pr. 24b15 and Cael. 269b21.
43. He cites onlyThomas Heath and Gauthierand Jolifas sharingthisopinion(Aristotle's
Economic
Thought,134-35). In factit was held by manycommentators:
Jackson(FifthBook, 92) and V. Johnson
("Aristotle'sTheoryof Value,"AJP 69 [1939]: 451) are examples.In supportof thisinterpretation,
Heath
rightlypointsout (Mathematicsin Aristotle[Oxford,1949], 274-75) thatthe values of the objects exchangedwill onlybe equal if theratiobetweentheproducersis equal. He failsto note,however,thatan
equal exchangewouldbe unfairif theproducersare unequal.
44. "EconomicAnalysis,"9.

416
GABRIEL DANZIG
or abouttheequalityof theratio.45But thereare otherreasonsto objectto

thisinterpretation.
First,the orderin whichAristotlepresentsthe ratiois on thisreading
reverses
complex.RatherthansayingthatA:B::C:D, Aristotle
unnecessarily
is to theshoemaker
theorderof theproductssayingthatthehousebuilder
whattheshoesareto thehouse(A:B::D:C). The reversalof theorderof the
productshas no point at all if we are speakingonly of an equal ratio
in thisreversalof orderin each of the
is consistent
(1:1:: 1:1),46 andAristotle
Butthisreversalis precisely
theratio.47
twoinstancesin whichhe mentions
whatis called forif theratiois unequal.If thehousebuilder(A) is worth
ratiowillbe 2:1. Since he is
twicewhattheshoemaker(B) is worth,thefirst
worthtwiceas much,he shouldreceivetwiceas muchfromthetrade,and
hence thevalue of thetradedshoes (D) shouldbe twicethe value of the
we geta ratioof 2:1,
theorderof theproducts
tradedhouse(C). By reversing
whichis equal to theratioof theproducers.
if
On theotherhand,thisreversalof orderwillnotcreateanydisturbance
theratioof theproducershappensto be equal, forin sucha case theorder
ornottheparties
formulais accuratewhether
Thus,Aristotle's
is immaterial.
of thegroundsor degreesof theirinequality.48
are equal, and irrespective
the relativevalues of different
in determining
Aristotleis not interested
or evenin decidingwhether
theyareequal or unequal,butonly
professions,
a ratiothatis validregardlessof theirrelativevalues in the
in constructing
tobe expressed,
professions
city.Thisratioallowsforthevaluesof different
whatthosevaluesmaybe. The disin determining
and allowsforflexibility
withhumanrelationswithin
cussionis a "political"one,concernedprimarily
thecity,and designedto be applicableto a varietyof citieswitha varietyof
social relations.
A secondreasonforsupposingthatAristotleassumesthepossibilityof
to thediscussionof
inequalityin theratiomaybe foundin theintroduction
is notidenticalto
ThereAristotle
explainsthatsimplereciprocity
reciprocity.
justice,sinceit does nottakeaccountof theinequalitybetweenpeople.He
andclaimsthatitwouldnot
an officer,
givesan exampleof a citizenstriking
merelyto strikehimback in orderto achievejustice,
be just fortheofficer
as well,whereasan
buthe wouldhaveto givehiman additionalpunishment
who strikesa citizenneed notbe punishedat all. Aristotletherefore
officer
is a matterof proportion
(dvaXoyia)he commits
has said thatreciprocity
45. In anycase, once Aristotle
and products:"analogia is an isotetesof logoi,
of someratiobetweenproducers
himselfto theintroduction
and [concerns]at leastfourterms"( 1131a3 1).
46. Meikle argues (Aristotle's Economic Thought, 131) that the reversal of order in the products
(A:B::D:C ratherthanA:B::C:D) "is simplyto markthefactthatin exchange,A, thebuilder,does notget

his own product(houses) back again,butshoes."So too Jackson(FifthBook,92): "theformulaA:B::xD:C
therelationsof A and B afterthe
represents
proportion
to A:B::C:xD onlybecausetheformer
[is] preferred
exchange,thelattertheirrelationsbeforeit."But thereis no suggestionin thetextthatthisis thereasonfor
justice,althoughthereis an "exchange"
thereversalof order:thereis no reversalin theratioof corrective
thereas well.
does notreverse
47. 1133a22-24, 1133a32-33. At otherplaces he speaksof a diagram,and therefore
theorderof theproducts:I 133a7-8, 1133b3-4.
and
correction,
48. See Jackson'smeasuredcomments:"Particularjustice is attainedin distribution,
in thesamepositionrelativeto one another,as theywere
barter,whenthepartiesare,afterthetransaction,
beforeit. Whatconstitutesidentityof relativepositions,the authordoes not ask" (FifthBook, 88); and
of thelaws of value . . . " (p. 91).
anyinvestigation
later,"[H]e has notattempted

417
sets aside simple reciprocity(TO6&VUtIETovIO6'KaW' ikao'rta) and turnsto

analogous reciprocity (TO6&Vy-tn0oV0O& KaT' avaXoyiav) to explain the
basis of voluntary
exchange.Fromthisdiscussionit is clearthattheadvantage of analogousreciprocity
over simplereciprocity,
and the reasonthat
Aristotle
setsasidetheone andmakesuse of theother,is thatanalogousreciprocitytakesintoaccounttheinequalitybetweenpersons.This discussion
if therewereno possibilityof inequalitybetweenthe
wouldbe superfluous
to whom(alone) Aristotleappliestheconceptof analoexchangepartners
gous reciprocity.49
But the strongestreasonforconcludingthattheratioof theproducers
is notan equal ratiois, not surprisingly,
thatAristotleexplicitlysays that
different
and unequal values:50oi' yap ?K 6 0
producershave different
L KOlVtVit, a
iaTpQV 7iVVT7
?$ icTpOUKcL 7cwp70D, Kat oXQ) ?C?pQV KQl
OUK 'taov. aXXLa TouToui 6?t ikaaanOvat (1133al6-18).51 Here Aristotle
claims thatdoctorsand farmersare bothdifferent

(qualitatively)and unequal (quantitatively).
The word Tr?poCv
expressesdifference,
while the
wordsOuK
expressinequality.These are the only wordsAristotle
',Tov
could have chosento expressquantitative
inequality,and thatis whatthe
phraseregularly
meansin Aristotle's
writings.
As Aristotlesays elsewhere:
TO tuov `T6tovTCp7tou (Cat. 6.6a26).52 And by saying that the producers
must be equalized (-uouTouq6&l iGcrnOivat), Aristotle makes it clear that
theyare not merelydifferent

but also unequal. He cannotbe sayingthat
different
producersmustbe made qualitativelyequal, forif thatcould mean
itcouldonlymeanthattheywouldno longerbe different

anything,
kindsof
producers!
This view of thepassage is confirmed
by a consideration
of its context.
The passage followsimmediately
on theheelsof a discussionof theequalizationof products.At 1133al2-14, Aristotle
pointsoutthattheproductof
one of the producersmay well be morevaluable thanthatof one of the
others:Oi0'v yap KOXUCl KpovTTOV civat -c6OoT?pOU ipyv - Ooat-CpOU.

661
oi5v Tai5a icyarnOvat. Since a house is more valuable thana pair of shoes, we
cannotexpectanyoneto tradetheone fortheother:thetwoitemsmustbe

"equalized."Thereis no reasonto see hereanyreference
to theproblemof
thecommensurability
of qualitatively
different
products.Aristotledoes not
49. The term&VrtMFnovO6gis used consistently
to referto unequalrelationsin theAristotelian
writings.
See Pol. 1261a30andMag. Mor. 1.33.13.5,1.33.14.3.
50. Meikle argues(Aristotle's
EconomicThought,137) thattheemphasisin Aristotle'sdiscussionis on
theproportionate
equalityof thegoods,nottheproducers(1 133a10-12): "[E]verystepanddetailof Aristotle'sargument
in NE 5.5 bearsexclusivelyon theproductsand theproportions
in whichtheyare exchanged"
(p. 138). Since,accordingly,
Aristotledoes notin practicetakeanyaccountof thepeopleinvolved,theirrelativevaluesdo notinfluence
theratioof theexchange,andhencemustbe equal. Buttheargument
is notpersuasive.Even if Aristotleconsidersthevalues of theproducersan important
elementin his equation,as I
believehe does,theequalizingwillbe effected
bytheratioof theproductstraded.His pointis preciselythis:
therelativevaluesof theproducersmustbe takenintoaccountwhenmakingan exchangeof goods.
51. "For itis nottwodoctorsthatassociateforexchange,buta doctorand a farmer,
or in generalpeople
who are different
and unequal;butthesemustbe equated"(trans.Ross). Meikle is awareof thisstatement
and pointsout (Aristotle's
EconomicThought,138) thatoffsetting
it is another(1 133b3-4), whichpurportedlysays thatbeforetheexchangetheyare equal. But thepassage does notclearlysay this.
52. The wordtaos has a well-attested
mathematical
use, and mathematical
equalityis alwaysa quantitativematter.Aristotlealso uses thetermin politicaland ethicalcontexts,whereit retainsthismeaning;see
forexamplePol. 1301a34,whereTaotand aivtaothave a purelyquantitative
sense.

418
GABRIEL DANZIG
say thatthetwoproductsdiffer
qualitatively
(theycertainly
do), butmerely
thatone maybe KpcLTTOV(better,
greater)thantheother.It is simplya questionof the obviousquantitative
inequalitybetweenthe values of the two
products:youcannotexpectto paythesamepricefora houseas youpayfor
a pairof shoes.53
As we have said, Aristotleis notinvestigating
theproblemof thecomof qualitatively
mensurability
different
productsor tryingto determine
in
"absolute"termstherelativevaluesof different
products.54
He simplytakes
it forgrantedthatsomeitemsare worthmorethanothers.Attheend of the
discussion,hisestablishment
of theratiobetweena bed anda housedepends
on his alreadyknowingthepriceof a house,and presumably
thepriceof a
bed as well (1 133b23).5 Farfromcalculatingprices,he alreadyknowsthem.
This lack of interestin explaininghow to determinethe truerelative
values of productsis no deficiencyif thereare no such grounds,and this
is Aristotle'sopinion.As he says, it is notreallypossibleto quantifythe
values of qualitativelydifferent
products.Earlierin the Ethics,Aristotle
cautionedagainstexpectinggreaterprecisionthanis possible given the
natureof thesubjectmatter(1094b11-27). Givenhis view thatthereis no
genuineway to quantifythese values, it would be a sign of our lack of
education(1094b24) if we expectedhim to tell us how to determinethe
relativeworthsof different
products.
But if it is impossibleto quantifythe values of the products,thenit
shouldbe equallyimpossibleto quantifythevalues of thosewho produce
them:thesamequalitativedifference
thatmakesproductsincommensurable
to thesame degree.56Once
shouldmaketheirproducersincommensurable
we recognizethatAristotlehas notaimedto providea methodfortheoretically calculatingtherelativevalues of products-althoughhe recognizes
in value-we shouldnotbe surprisedthathe does notprothattheydiffer
vide a methodfortheoretically
calculatingtherelativevalues of producers,
in value.
althoughheretoo he does recognizethattheydiffer
VII
to explainthegroundsof inequalitybedoes notattempt
AlthoughAristotle
he is concernedwiththeinequalityitself.58
tweenproducersor products,57
53. The authorof theMag. Mor. (1.33) also assumesthatwe are speakingof theobviousquantitative
products.
inequalitybetweendifferent
54. See Jackson,FifthBook, 91; B. J. Gordon,"Aristotleand the Developmentof Value Theory,"
QuarterlyJournalofEconomics77 (1964): 120.
saw,he has to knowthepriceof
correctly
55. He listsonlythepriceof thehouse,butas theParaphrast
6(
oiKiMa71EVTE VWOV,r6
his ratio.See theParaphrast176: E(Yro
thebed as well in orderto construct
KhV1l Vtd& (ed. G. Heylblut[Berlin,1889], 98).
56. Meikleobjectsthattheratiocannotbe unequalforanotherreason:"The ratioas builderto shoemaker
because
of fairnessin thewaythestandardview supposes[i.e.,a ratioof inequality],
cannotsetthestandard
how manyof one sortof thingto give forhowmanyof
on itsown itdoes notgive anywayof determining
EconomicThought,137). It is truethatknowingthat
whichis thepointof theexercise"(Aristotle's
another,
thenumberof shoes thatequals a house.
theratioof builderto shoemakeris 2:1 will nothelpus determine
Butby thesametoken,neitherwill it helpus to knowthattheratiois 1:1. But sinceneitherratiosolvesthat
exercise.
problem,perhapssolvingthatproblemis notthepointof thisparticular
neverevenhintswhatthenature
132) thatAristotle
EconomicThought,
57. Meiklepointsout(Aristotle's
of the inequalitymightbe, arguingthatif Aristotlereallyhad inequalityon his mind,he would have
explainedwhatsortof inequalityitis. Butthisdoes notfollow.
58. See Roll's sensibleconclusions(History,34-35).

ARISTOTELIANRECIPROCITY
419
factaboutthecity,and it mustbe respected

This inequalityis an important
vvoXaoyov
uowiv Yap
-CujdyT
if the KotvQvia of thecityis to be maintained:
theinequalitybetween
vt' noXlktq
(1 132b33-34). Onlybyrespecting
CTupt~t
equalitybe established,and
thedifferent
forcesin thecitycan proportional
In theLaws, Platomakesthe
thecityremainunitedand itscitizensfriendly.
same point,arguingthatonlyproportional
equalitycan maintainfriendship
he refersto thisformof equalityas "politin thecity(757b-d). Signficantly,
ical justice."
But althoughwe do notneedto searchforan explanationof thegrounds
we shouldlike to know,at least,whattheinequalitybetween
of inequality,
productsare unequalin thesense
producerscould possiblymean.Different
producers
thattheyhave different
prices.But in whatsense could different
be quantitatively
unequal?
is thinking
of thesocial standing
Ithas oftenbeensuggestedthatAristotle
of variousproducers.59
However,as Meiklehas pointedout,itwouldbe absurdto expectthatthesocial standingof an individualproducercouldaffect
makesno hintthathe
thepricehe commandsin themarket.In fact,Aristotle
is thinkingof the social standing of individual craftsmen.If anything,his
concernis withthe statusof different

professionsas a whole withinthe
city.60
then
If we assumethata housebuilder
is "worthmore"thana shoemaker,
accordingto Aristotle'sratiohe shouldreceivemorewhentheyexchange.
of prodObviously,however,we arenotspeakingof thenumericalquantity
uctstraded,fortheratiobetweentheproductsis said to be equal to theratio
betweentheproducers(A:B::D:C). If a housebuilder
is worthtwicewhata
shoemakeris worth,wouldthismeanthathe shouldgettwo shoes forone
if a housebuilder
getsa thousandpairsof shoes for
house?Or, conversely,
one housethenis he wortha thousandtimesthevalue of a shoemaker?
It is
hardto imaginewhatthiscould mean.
We mightwantto argue,however,thatan act of housebuilding
is worth
a thousandtimestheact of shoemaking.
Meikle arguesthatwhenAristotle
speaksof theinequalityof producershe has in mind"an inequalitybetween
persons,butpersonsconsideredsimplyas creatorsof productsof different
and unequalvalues,so thattheinequalityof personscollapses intoone of
Thismakestheratiocompletely
butcompletely
comprehensible
products."61
as well. If a house is wortha thousandshoes,thentheact of
superfluous
buildinga housewouldbe wortha thousandtimestheact of makinga shoe,
and in consequencethethousandshoesone paysfora housewouldstandin
relationto thesinglehouse as theact of buildinga house standsto theact
of makinga shoe. The numberof shoes (1000) is to thenumberof houses
(1) as thevalue of thehouse(1000) is to one shoe (1). In thiscase, theratio
is trueby tautology,and henceit teachesus absolutelynothing.And anyway,Aristotlespeaks of producers,nottheiracts.
59. A list of scholarswho held thatthiswas the case can be foundin Meikle,Aristotle'sEconomic
Thought,
p. 133,n. 7.
60. My view on thispointis not farfromthatset forthby J. A. Schumpeter,
Historyof Economic
Analysis,ed. E. B. Schumpeter
(New York,1954), p. 60, n. 1.
Aristotle's
61. Meikle,
EconomicThought,139.

420
GABRIEL DANZIG
The ratiobetweenproductsand producersobviouslyconcernstheirrelativevalues,nottheirrelativenumbers.But whatcould thismean?Let us

say thata housebuilderis worthtwicewhata shoemakeris worth.This can
notmeanthathe willget$1000 worthof shoesfor$500 of housing.Money
values of theproductsshouldbe
is used to equalize trades,so themonetary
equal. In theonlytradethatAristotledescribes,a house forfivebeds, the
tradedat theirmarketvalue. If thetradebetweenthe
itemsare apparently
ratioimpliesthatitcan be, thentheinequality
twois unequal,as Aristotle's
mustbe builtintothetradeof itemsof equal price.The $500 of shoes the
buildergetsis already"worthmore"thanthe$500 of housinghe provides.
For thisto make sense Aristotlemust,implicitlyif notexplicitly,have
some conceptof the inherentvalue of productsapartfromtheirmarket
price(althoughitis whatI have been callingthemarketpricethatinterests
value,62butit is clear
him).He does notexplainthenatureof thisinherent
thatsome suchvalue is implied.The unequalvalues of producerscan only
value of theprodinfluencetheratioif thereis anotherfactor,theinherent
uct,on whichit can have thateffect.This is whatJudsoncalls the"goods
withthe"exchangervariable"(better:"provariable";63 and this,together
theactualpriceof theitem.
ducervariable"),determines
worthtwopairsof shoes,butthata
Let us say thata chairis "inherently"
is worthtwicethe value of a shoemaker.This means thathe
chairmaker
shouldbe able to sell a singlechairforthepriceof nottwobutfourpairsof
shoes.He will sell hischairfor,say,$200, andwiththatmoneybuyfour,not
two,pairsof shoes.On thesurfacetheexchangeseemsequal: each received
has gotten
a $200 value fora $200 value. In fact,however,thechairmaker
more,whichis onlyfairsincehe deservesmore.
get$400 worth
It wouldbe a mistake,then,to insistthatthechairmaker
of shoes forhis $200 worthof chair:he would thenbe gettinga double
meansin
advantageovertheshoemaker.This is whatAristotleapparently
6' dvakoy7wqoi' 6Ei 6y7iv, 6av
his obscureremarkat 1133b1-3: ?ic iYX4wtu
(Ci 6? pn',&p-TEp0Cx?i?C4? Tk U'nEpOX kTO ?T?pOV 'aKpOV) adXX
d&kkX4ov-Tat
Here Aristotleis sayingthattheexchangeratiois
o-Tcv &x?
tat avTCOv.64
applicablewhentheproducersstillhave theirown productsand notafter

theyhave exchanged:otherwiseone side wouldgain twice.The exchange
value of theitems,
ratioshouldbe appliedto whatI havecalled theinherent
thesuperiorworth
notto theiractualprice.The actualpricealreadyreflects
alteredthe
of the superiorproducer,and hence if the price were further
morevaluableproducerwouldgain "bothsurpluses."
But althoughhis ratioimpliesthatthepriceis composedof some"inherwiththevalue of theproducer,Aristotledoes notoffer
entvalue" together
Economic
value; butas Meikle(Aristotle's
62. Use-valuecouldprovidea possiblebasis forthisinherent
use-value.Judson("Fair ExThought,13-17) has argued,Aristotlerejectsthepossibilityof quantifying
change,"168-75) arguesratherthatXpsia,objectiveneed,fillsthisrole.But he has no suggestionas to how
of labor-value(housesjust takemore
objectiveneedcould be defined.Othershave arguedthatit is a matter
does notsay.
laborto buildthanshoes).Aristotle
63. "Fair Exchange,"162.
whentheyhave alreadyexchanged(other64. "But we mustnotbringthemintoa figureof proportion
wise one extremewill have bothexcesses) butwhentheystillhavetheirown goods" (trans.Ross); contrast
Ross' explanationof thepassagein hisnoteon thispassage.

421
The followingcommentstherefore
anyexplanationof whattheserepresent.
mustbe speculative,althoughtheexplanationI will offerdemands,I think,
theleast possibleextrapolation
fromthetext.I will tryto show thatAristotle'sratiomakessense,butI do notwishto claimthatmycommentshere
representAristotle'sthought-out
opinion. I will argue thatthe inherent
value, as opposed to theactualprice,is thelabor involvedin creatingthe
products,and thatthevalue of a produceris simplythedegreeto whichone
professionis morelucrativethananother.Let me explainhow I reachthese
conclusionson thebasis of Aristotle'sdiscussion.
As we have noted,thequantitative
difference
betweenproductsis simply
thefactthatsome cost morethanothers.If thequantitative
difference
betweenkindsof producersis strictly
parallel,thenthe inequalitybetween
producersmustbe the fact(here is the extrapolation)
thatsome kindsof
producers"cost more"thanothers.In whatsense could a producerhave a
"'cost"'?Aristotle
is notthinking
of higherandlowersalaries-salaries were
a rarityin the ancientworld-but ratherof unequal earningsthroughthe
tradeof products:afterall, theratioonlyconcernstrades.
Aristotle's
ratiois nothingmorethantheobservationthatat
Underlying
theend of theday,week,or month,membersof someprofessions
turnout
richerthanmembersof otherprofessions.
Thisis a commonplaceof modern
societyand was, I think,the case in ancientAthensas well.65As we all
know,doctors,lawyers,and even plumbers,arebetterpaid as professionals
than,say,teachersor (most) artistsare. They workthe same hours,trade
theirproductsfairlyin thesame marketplace,
and still,as a class, windup
richerthantheothers.In Aristotle's
view,thiscouldbe entirely
fair.The fact
thatdoctors"cost more"is an expressionof thefactthattheyare in some
sense "worthmore."
The factthatthedoctorgetsrichermeansthatit is easier,and takesless
time,forhimto create$200 worthof product.The $200 of productshe receives,therefore,
containmorelabor,moretime,moreinherent
value,than
theproductshe offersin exchangeforthem.This is nota labor-theory
of
value, in whichequal labor has equal value. It is a status-theory
of the
value of labor: thelaborof some professionsis worthmorethanthelabor
of others.For thisreason,Aristotle'sdiscussionis notan attempt
to rectify
themarketplace, buttojustifyits apparentinequalities.Far fromignoring
the relativevalues of the producers,Aristotle'sratiocomes primarilyto
emphasize the importanceof takingthis inequalityinto account when
judgingthefairnessof an exchange.
In sum,Aristotleis not concernedwithestablishingan "objective"fair
price,and does noteventhinksucha thingpossible.Ratherhe is explaining
thegroundson whichexistingpricescan be justifiedwithinanygivencity.
Everyprice,he tellsus, is madeup of twocomponents:theinherent
value
65. Thereis no clearevidenceon thisone wayortheother,buttherearesomeindications.
In Xenophon's
Oeconomicus(2.17) Socratesstatesthathe has noticedthatsome people in thesame professionearnmore
thanothers,and thishe attributes
to greaterefforts.
The statement
presumesthattherewouldbe otherreasons
formembersof different
professions
earningmorethanothers.In theLaws (743d) Plato indicatesthatthe
banausicprofessions
wereparticularly
wellpaid.

422
GABRIELDANZIG
(I have suggestedlaborforthiscompoof theobject,howeverunderstood

however
price),together
withtheworthof theproducer,
nentof finalmarket
by social or political
determined
(I have suggestedthatthisis determined
Whatis important
in exchangeis notthattheexchangebe fairin
forces).66
any "absolute"terms,butthatit reflecttherelationsbetweenproducersin
thecityin whichit takesplace. His ratiotellsus thattherelativeworthsof
in thepricesset on theseprofessionsand
are reflected
variousprofessions
are therefore
exchangesin themarketplace
and thatordinary
theirproducts,
fair.Justpeople are thosewho pay theprice.
VIII
discussionofjusticecouldbe so open-ended
Itmayseemodd thatAristotle's
to calculaterelativevaluesin anyabsolutesense,but
as notevento attempt
contextual
of Aristotle
willnotreallybe surprised.
Thisopen-ended,
students
generalmethodof buildingconsensus
analysisof exchangefitsAristotle's
statements
thatare agreeableto everyone
throughmakingunobjectionable
His ruleof ethics-do the
veryfar.67
butthatdo notadvancetheargument
open-endedto
rightthingin therightway at therighttime-is sufficiently
be applicableto anysituationin anycity.
Moreover,it fitsAristotle'sempiricalmethodin political science. In
between
Books 4-6 of thePoliticshe repeatedlyinsistson thedifference
of a particular
absolutejusticeandjusticein accordancewiththeU1t0cmr1t
city.68The studentof politicsmustbe concernednot only withthe best
regime,butwiththosethatactuallyexist: Kai Tulo u'TcpXou6iial to)wtctciw
6ci 66uvcrnOatOiOE1V TOV 7OXITtKOV (1289a6-7). Amongthequalifications
Aristotlelistsas essentialforthosewho hold thesupremerulein a cityis
knowingtKatOGU v1?V Kc(Tfl to)wcch, TiV ip6S TiV lEo2T?cv. ?i yaIp pil
TcUTOV TO &tKatOV KXTXIEUGUL Tag EOXUTEWa,LV(7K1] KMUT1S &KcaOGUVl]S
ctvat6ta(pop6k
(1309a36-37). If justiceis as variableas this,howcouldthe
between
exchangeratioaim to expressthe one and onlyjust relationship
different
productsand producers?
It is not always noticedthatthisdiscussionin thePoliticsis foreshadowedbythediscussionof conventional
politicaljusticein Book 5, chapters
afterthediscus6 and 7, of theEthics,a passage thatfollowsimmediately
Aristotlenotesthatthereare twokindsof justice,absosionof reciprocity.
lutejustice and politicaljustice (1 134a25-26). He dividespoliticaljustice
intonaturaland conventional(1 134b18-24). Conventionalpoliticaljustice
butthat
differently,
is anyruleor measurethatcould have been formulated
66. At 1133b0 Aristotle raises the issue of equalization for a thirdtime: 6si apa ToUTo ioaaaOvat. Althegeneralcontextof thestatement
is problematic,
precedingthisstatement
thoughthetextimmediately
makesit quiteclearthatAristotleis speakingof theequalizingof unequalneedbymeansof money.If one
to
now,he can takemoney,which"equalizes" theneedbyoffering
part,theseller,does notneedsomething
EconomicThought,30)
Meikle (Aristotle's
delay thereturnuntilsuch timeas thesellerneeds something.
is better:
arguesthatthewordToUTo refersback to theequalizationof products.But Rackham'stranslation
ToUTo is in the singular,and wheneverAristotlerefersto the equalizationof products,he uses a plural.
Moreover,thesubsequentdiscussionmakesitclearthatmoneyequalizes unequal"need."
at Eth.Nic. 1097b22-24 is in a way an apologyforthismethod.
67. His statement
68. 1288b21-1289a7,1301a25-39, 1301b35-1302a8, 1309a33-39, 1328b33-1329a2.

423
has forceonce it has been formulated

in a particularway. He offersas
examplestheamountof ransomcustomarily
paidfora prisoner(2 mnai) and
thefactthata sacrifice
consistsof a goatrather
thantwosheep(1 134b21-22).
Aristotle'srecognition
of conventionalpoliticaljusticereflects
his concern
withexplainingarrangements
thatexist in real statesratherthansimply
an ideal. The efforts
constructing
to discoverthe"absolute"relativevalues
of productssimplyassumethatAristotleis concernedherewiththeideal,
withnaturalpoliticaljustice,ratherthanthealternative.
If theseefforts
have
notsucceeded,it is because thisassumptionis mistaken.
The exchangeratioexplainsthatpricesare an expressionof social or politicalvalues,butAristotle
does notinvestigate
howthesevaluesareformulated.Thereis a close parallelin thediscussionof distributive
justice.In that
discussionAristotleis explicitlyconcernedwiththequestionof inequality
betweenpeople,and how it affectsthedistribution
of goods. Here if anywherewe shouldexpectto learnwhatmakespeopleunequal.Butwe do not.
Aristotle
takestheexistenceof inequalityas a given,does notinquireintoits
grounds,but explainsthatsharesare to be allottedin proportion
to it. But
thisdiscussiondoes providesome indicationof theways in whichrelative
value mightbe determined
Tci
(1131a25-29): TO y7ap &KcLtOv
vopiLS
OjIOXO7OUG0 7VTC5 KXT a1rXVTlva 6c1V clvcal, Tiiv pi?VcoI aditcv ou' TiV LaUTi V
oi JICV61]JOKpacTtKOi ?XMOFcpfav,oi 6' 62tyE70UG1 naVT5c U7EapXc1v, a'
ILp tv.69 We note:
apXl%KOi 7E2XOUTOV,oi 6 CuyCVClfLV,
oi 6 aploToKTIo
1) Aristotle
is notconcernedwiththequestionof whether
politicalinequalityoughtto be based on wealthor on virtue,butmerelywishesto pointout
thatpoliticalsharesare distributed
in accordancewithwhateverprinciples
guidetheregimein question,principleshe is notinterested
in investigating
here;702) In additionto theexamplesof principlesof inequalityhe offers,
wealthand virtue,he also offersan exampleof a principleof equality,freedom. Thus, Aristotleis not only uninterested
in explainingwhat really
makespeople unequal,buthe is also unwillingto affirm
theirinequalityas
againsttheirequality.This is preciselytheway his ratiobetweenunequal
producersand theirproductsoughtto be understood.
Bothdiscussionsare
applicableto existingconditionswhether
foundedon a principleof equality
or one of inequality,
and withoutregardto theprincipleitself.
In short,in thischapter,Aristotlehas no interest
in determining
whether,
why,orbyhowmuchhousebuilders
aremorevaluablethanshoemakers.
He
is interested
in rotvwvt'a,
community,
and in conventional
politicaljustice.
He pointsout thatexchangescontainimplicitevaluationsof producersas
well as products,
andhencereflect
thevaluesof thecommunity
inwhichthe
exchangetakesplace.
His pointis well taken.The apparentinjusticemanifestin unequalearnings betweenprofessionsis (only) justifiableon the assumptionthatone
69. "For all menagreethatwhatis just in distribution
mustbe accordingto merit[daia] in some sense,
thoughtheydo notall specifythesame sortof merit,butdemocratsidentify
it withthestatusof freeman,
supporters
of oligarchywithwealth(or withnoble birth),and supporters
of aristocracywithexcellence"
(trans.Ross).
70. See Ritchie,"ParticularJustice,"189.

424
GABRIEL
DANZIG
is in someway"worthmore"thantheother.Societiesthatreward
profession
stating
withhighsalaries,forexample,are implicitly
banausicprofessions
insightis thatwhatappears
Aristotle's
theirevaluationof thoseprofessions.
to be merelybuyingand sellingis reallyan expressionof social relations.
betweenthe
This is preciselywhathis exchangeratiosays:therelationship
housebuilderand the shoemakeris expressedin therelativevalues of the
of thevaluesthathold
itemstheyexchange.But sincepricesarea reflection
in accordancewith
payingtheprice,makinga repayment
a citytogether,
theKoltVWVtc of thecity.Andsincethesevalthemarketvalue,is supporting
a kindof justice,payingthepricemeansdoingjusticein the
ues represent
city.To be just,one shouldalwayspay theprice,forthepricereflectsthe
justiceof thecityand helpsmaintainits KOltWV1Xa. For thisreason,everythingshouldbe givena price(1 133bl4-15). And forthisreasonas well,
is essentiallya politicalone.
discussionof reciprocity
Aristotle's
Bar Ilan University


Danzig - The Political Character of Aristotelian Reciprocity PDF

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Danzig - The Political Character of Aristotelian Reciprocity PDF

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

The Political Character of Aristotelian Reciprocity

Author(s): Gabriel Danzig

This content downloaded from 132.208.246.237 on Sat, 31 Jan 2015 09:38:43 AM

THE POLITICAL CHARACTER OF

Classical Philology95 (2000): 399-424

This content downloaded from 132.208.246.237 on Sat, 31 Jan 2015 09:38:43 AM

This content downloaded from 132.208.246.237 on Sat, 31 Jan 2015 09:38:43 AM

This content downloaded from 132.208.246.237 on Sat, 31 Jan 2015 09:38:43 AM

oiKovo0ltKl referredto estate management,and not to a theoreticalscience

concerninghumaneconomicbehavior.Althoughtheywere aware of the

Ethics and Politics). And where the termsotiKovO%tKTior oiKovoptKoq do

appearas thetitleof a work,thesubjectis noteconomicsperse, butrather

This content downloaded from 132.208.246.237 on Sat, 31 Jan 2015 09:38:43 AM

But thisview is notcompelling.Aristotlesays explicitlythatreciprocity

This content downloaded from 132.208.246.237 on Sat, 31 Jan 2015 09:38:43 AM

pOp 66o. TOV yap cuvakkayJV lat Tlcx6c otov

PJTOV Tl PJV CKOU61td ?C1t Tl 6' cKOUfltc, CKOU6G

6aVwicp67, y77yu, Xpi[ct,

6ECT,O6, OdvaUTo, dpJtQy7, intP1Wpo, KaKMryopia,JTpon1aKucTpo6.

This content downloaded from 132.208.246.237 on Sat, 31 Jan 2015 09:38:43 AM

justice is thetermforthefirstpartof corrective

Kat Totg aKoDYtolo (1131b25-36).

iwtov0O6, because, as we will see, dvTutcaovO6;does work according to

examples of transactionsin this discussion: oCO'v 7y&p6taippci ?i ?Jt?CKTs

or crime(and is listedas suchin thepreviousquotation),since

23. Aristotleoftenuses a singletermfora class and a prominent

This content downloaded from 132.208.246.237 on Sat, 31 Jan 2015 09:38:43 AM

This content downloaded from 132.208.246.237 on Sat, 31 Jan 2015 09:38:43 AM

This content downloaded from 132.208.246.237 on Sat, 31 Jan 2015 09:38:43 AM

(1 132b32-33). His discussionconcernsvoluntary

This content downloaded from 132.208.246.237 on Sat, 31 Jan 2015 09:38:43 AM

refernot only to voluntarytransactionsor contracts,which is its usual

This content downloaded from 132.208.246.237 on Sat, 31 Jan 2015 09:38:43 AM

In thissense,and onlyin thissense,is

This content downloaded from 132.208.246.237 on Sat, 31 Jan 2015 09:38:43 AM

in returnfor a blow he has received(1 132b28-30). He explainsthatro

avwtotoIv helpsmaintainthecity,because people desireto avengewrongs

and repaybenefits(1132b33-1133a2). He explainsthe importanceof the

underlyingprinciple of the discussion. Aristotleuses the termsix times in

This content downloaded from 132.208.246.237 on Sat, 31 Jan 2015 09:38:43 AM

of) in orderthatthereshouldbe moreof it

Buthow does one calculatetheamountto repay?

This content downloaded from 132.208.246.237 on Sat, 31 Jan 2015 09:38:43 AM

This content downloaded from 132.208.246.237 on Sat, 31 Jan 2015 09:38:43 AM

Takinga moreethicalapproach,Judsonarguesthatthisconceptof need

This content downloaded from 132.208.246.237 on Sat, 31 Jan 2015 09:38:43 AM

jective factordistinctfromsubjectivewants.And if Xpcia does notrepresentobjectiveneed, thenit cannotprovidethe basis forcalculating"fair

This content downloaded from 132.208.246.237 on Sat, 31 Jan 2015 09:38:43 AM

or abouttheequalityof theratio.45But thereare otherreasonsto objectto

(A:B::D:C ratherthanA:B::C:D) "is simplyto markthefactthatin exchange,A, thebuilder,does notget

This content downloaded from 132.208.246.237 on Sat, 31 Jan 2015 09:38:43 AM

sets aside simple reciprocity(TO6&VUtIETovIO6'KaW' ikao'rta) and turnsto

claims thatdoctorsand farmersare bothdifferent

theyare not merelydifferent

itcouldonlymeanthattheywouldno longerbe different

others:Oi0'v yap KOXUCl KpovTTOV civat -c6OoT?pOU ipyv - Ooat-CpOU.

cannotexpectanyoneto tradetheone fortheother:thetwoitemsmustbe

This content downloaded from 132.208.246.237 on Sat, 31 Jan 2015 09:38:43 AM

This content downloaded from 132.208.246.237 on Sat, 31 Jan 2015 09:38:43 AM

factaboutthecity,and it mustbe respected

concernis withthe statusof different

This content downloaded from 132.208.246.237 on Sat, 31 Jan 2015 09:38:43 AM