Philosophy 270: Leibniz Handout #2

Dr. Brandon C. Look

I. Leibnizs account of substance (Discourse on Metaphysics and Correspondence with

Arnauld)
True Unity Argument
(1) Every substance has true (substantial) unity.
(2) Anything whose essence is extension is divisible.
(3) Anything that is divisible is a being by aggregation.
(4) Nothing that is a being by aggregation has true (substantial) unity.
(5) Hence, anything whose essence is extension lacks true unity.
(6) Therefore, nothing whose essence is extension is a substance.
Consider Leibnizs letter to Arnauld of 28 November 1686:
(1) Our body, absent our soul, can only be called a body in an improper sense.
(2) Substantial form is indivisible.
(3) A block of marble is like a pile of stones, and thus cannot pass as a single
substance, but as an assemblage of many.
(4) A substantial unity requires a thoroughly indivisible and naturally indestructible
being
(5) If a thing is not truly animated, then it is only a true phenomenon, like the
rainbow.
Consider also Leibnizs letter of 30 April 1687:
I hold that philosophy cannot be better reestablished and reduced to something
precise, than by recognizing only substances or complete beings endowed with a true
unity, together with the different states that succeed one another; everything else is
only phenomena, abstractions, or relations. (p.223)
II. Pre-established Harmony (in three easy steps):
(1) speaking with metaphysical rigor, there is no real influence of one created
substance on another. (p. 223)
(2) God originally created the soul in such a way that everything must arise for it
from its own depths, through a perfect spontaneity relative to itself, and yet with a
perfect conformity relative to external things. (p. 223)
(3) It is this mutual relation, regulated in advance in each substance of the universe,
which produces what we call their communication, and which alone brings about
the union of soul and body. (p. 223)

III. Leibnizs philosophical terminology:

(a) Contingent: A proposition is contingent iff it is not necessary, that is, iff its
contrary does not imply a contradiction. A being is contingent iff its existence
is not necessary, i.e. if its non-existence in a possible world is possible.
(b) Necessary: A proposition is necessary iff its contrary implies a contradiction. A
being is necessary iff its non-existence in a possible world is impossible.
(c) Necessary ex hypothesi (Certain): A proposition is necessary ex hypothesi (i.e.
certain) iff, given certain initial conditions, it could not not be true. A being is
necessary ex hypothesi iff, given certain initial conditions, it could not not have
existed. But the propositions or beings are in themselves contingent because
their contraries do not imply contradiction.
(d) Possible World: A world that God could have created were it not for the
goodness that is part of divine nature. A set of compossible complete individual
concepts.
(e) Actual World: The world in which we live, created by God as the best of all
possible worlds.

IV. How can this be the best of all possible worlds?

A reconstruction of Leibnizs implicit argument:
(1) God is omnipotent and omniscient and benevolent and the free creator of the
world. (Def.)
(2) Things could have been otherwise i.e., there are other possible worlds.
(Premise)
(3) Suppose this world is not the best of all possible worlds. (I.e., The world could
be better.)
(4) If this world is not the best of all possible worlds, then at least one of the
following must be the case:
(a) God was not powerful enough to bring about a better world; and/or
(b) God did not know how this world would develop after his creation of it
(i.e. God lacked foreknowledge); and/or
(c) God did not wish this world to be the best; and/or
(d) God did not create the world; and/or
(e) there were no other possible worlds from which God could choose.
(5) But, any one or more of (4)(a)-(e) contradicts (1) and/or (2).
(6) Therefore, this world is the best of all possible worlds.