DIGEST: Nazareth v.s. Villar G.R.

188635 (2013)
October 29, 2013Author:
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Facts:
1. On December 22, 1997, Congress enacted R.A. No. 8439 to
address the policy of the State to provide a program forhuman
resources development in science and technology in order to
achieve and maintain the necessary reservoir of talent and
manpower that would sustain the drive for total science
and technology mastery.3 Section 7 of R.A. No. 8439 grants the
following additional allowances and benefits (Magna Carta
benefits) to the covered officials and employees of the
Department of Science and Technology (DOST). Under R.A. No.
8439, the funds for the payment of the Magna Carta benefits are
to be appropriated by the General Appropriations Act (GAA) of the
year following the enactment of R.A. No. 8439.
2. The DOST Regional Office No. IX in Zamboanga City released the
Magna Carta benefits to the covered officials and employees
commencing in CY 1998 despite the absence of specific
appropriation for the purpose in the GAA. Subsequently, following
the post-audit conducted by COA State Auditor Ramon E. Vargas
on April 23, 1999, October 28, 1999, June 20, 2000, February 27,
2001, June 27, 2001, October 10, 2001 and October 17, 2001,
several NDs (Notice of Disallowance) were issued disapproving
the payment of the Magna Carta benefits. The provision for the
use of savings in the General Appropriations Act (GAA) was
vetoed by the President; hence, there was no basis for the
payment of the aforesaid allowances or benefits according to the
State Auditor.
3. DOST Secretary Dr. Filemon Uriarte, Jr. to request the Office of the
President (OP) through his Memorandum dated April 3, 2000
(Request for Authority to Use Savings for the Payment of Magna

Carta Benefits as provided for in R.A. 8439) for the authority to

utilize the DOSTs savings to pay the Magna Carta benefits.6 The
salient portions of the Memorandum of Secretary Uriarte, Jr.
explained the request in the following manner: x x x. However,
the amount necessary for its full implementation had not been
provided in the General Appropriations Act (GAA). Since the Acts
effectivity, the Department had paid the 1998 MC benefits out of
its current years savings as provided for in the Budget Issuances
of the Department of Budget and Management while the 1999
MC benefits were likewise sourced from the years savings as
authorized in the 1999 GAA. The 2000 GAA has no provision for
the use of savings. The Department, therefore, cannot continue
the payment of the Magna Carta benefits from its 2000 savings. x
x x. The DOST personnel are looking forward to His Excellencys
favorable consideration for the payment of said MC benefits,
being part of the administrations 10-point action program to
quote I will order immediate implementation of RA 8439 (the
Magna Carta for Science and Technology Personnel in
Government) as published in the Manila Bulletin dated May 20,
1998.
4. Through the Memorandum dated April 12, 2000, then Executive
Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, acting by authority of the President,
approved the request of Secretary Uriarte, Jr., With reference to
your Memorandum dated April 03, 2000 requesting authority to
use savings from the appropriations of that Department and its
agencies for the payment of Magna Carta Benefits as provided for
in R.A. 8439, please be informed that the said request is hereby
approved.
5. On July 28, 2003, the petitioner, in her capacity as the DOST
Regional Director in Region IX, lodged an appeal with COA
Regional Cluster Director Ellen Sescon, urging the lifting of the
disallowance of the Magna Carta benefits for the period covering
CY 1998 to CY 2001 amounting to P4,363,997.47. She anchored
her appeal on the April 12, 2000 Memorandum of Executive
Secretary Zamora, and cited the provision in the GAA of 1998.

Issue: Is the act of the Executive Secretary falls under Article VI,
Section 25 (5) which provides (5) No law shall be passed authorizing
any transfer of appropriations, however, the PRESIDENT, x x x may by
law, be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations
law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their
respective appropriations.
Held:
NO. Simply put, it means that only the President has the power to
augment savings from one item to another in the budget of
administrative agencies under his control and supervision. This is the
very reason why the President vetoed the Special Provisions in the
1998 GAA that would authorize the department heads to use savings
to augment other items of appropriations within the Executive Branch.
Such power could well be extended to his Cabinet Secretaries as alter
egos under the doctrine of qualified political agency enunciated by
the Supreme Court in the case of Binamira v. Garrucho, 188 SCRA 154,
where it was pronounced that the official acts of a Department
Secretary are deemed acts of the President unless disapproved or
reprobated by the latter. Thus, in the instant case, the authority
granted to the DOST by the Executive Secretary, being one of the alter
egos of the President, was legal and valid but in so far as the use of
agencys savings for the year 2000 only. Although 2000 budget was
reenacted in 2001, the authority granted on the use of savings did not
necessarily extend to the succeeding year.
Demetria v Alba
Facts:
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of first paragraph of Sec 44 of PD
1177 (Budget Reform Decree of 1977)as concerned citizens,
members of the National Assembly, parties with general interest
common to all people of the Philippines, and as taxpayerson the
primary grounds that Section 44 infringes upon the fundamental law by
authorizing illegal transfer of public moneys, amounting to undue

delegation of legislative powers and allowing the President to override

the safeguards prescribed for approving appropriations.
The Solicitor General, for the public respondents, questioned the legal
standing of the petitioners and held that one branch of the government
cannot be enjoined by another, coordinate branch in its performance of
duties within its sphere of responsibility. It also alleged that the petition
has become moot and academic after the abrogation of Sec 16(5),
Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution by the Freedom Constitution (which
was where the provision under consideration was enacted in pursuant
thereof), which states that No law shall be passed authorizing any
transfer of appropriations, however, the Presidentmay by law be
authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for
their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective
appropriations.
Issue:
1. W/N PD 1177 is constitutional
2. W/N the Supreme Court can act upon the assailed executive act
Held:
1. No. Sec 44 of PD 1177 unduly overextends the privilege granted
under Sec16(5) by empowering the President to indiscriminately
transfer funds from one department of the Executive Department to
any program of any department included in the General Appropriations
Act, without any regard as to whether or not the funds to be
transferred are actually savings in the item. It not only disregards the
standards set in the fundamental law, thereby amounting to an undue
delegation of legislative powers, but likewise goes beyond the tenor
thereof.
Par. 1 of Sec. 44 puts all safeguards to forestall abuses in the
expenditure of public funds to naught. Such constitutional infirmities
render the provision in question null and void.

2. Yes. Where the legislature or executive acts beyond the scope of its
constitutional powers, it becomes the duty of the judiciary to declare
what the other branches of the government has assumed to do as void,
as part of its constitutionally conferred judicial power. This is not to say
that the judicial power is superior in degree or dignity. In exercising this
high authority, the judges claim no judicial supremacy; they are only
the administrators of the public will.
Petition granted. Par. 1, Sec. 44 OF PD 1177 null and void.

In re laureta and maravilla

Facts:
Maravilla Illustre wrote to the justices of the SC, complaining about the
dismissal of her case (a land dispute involving large estate) by
a minute-resolution. Illustre claims that it was an unjust resolution
deliberately and knowingly promulgated by the 1 st Division, that it was
railroaded with such hurry beyond the limits of legal and judicial ethics.
Illustre also threatened in her letter that, there is nothing final in this
world. This case is far from finished by a long shot. She threatened
that she would call for a press conference. Illustres letter basically
attacks the participation of Justice Pedro Yap in the first division.
It was established that Justice Yap was previously a law partner
of Atty. Ordonez, now the Solgen and counsel for the opponents. The
letters were referred to the SC en banc. The SC clarified that when the
minute-resolution was issued, the presiding justice then was not Justice
Yap but Justice Abad Santos (who was about to retire), and that Justice
Yap was not aware that Atty Ordonez was the opponents counsel.
It was also made clear that Justice Yap eventually inhibited himself
from the case. Still, Illustre wrote letters to the other justices (Narvasa,
Herrera, Cruz), again with more threats to expose the kind of judicial
performance readily constituting travesty of justice.
True to her threats, Illustre later filed a criminal complaint before
the Tanodbayan, charging the Justices with knowingly rendering an
unjust Minute Resolution. Justice Yap and Solgen Ordonez were
also charged of using their influence in the First Division in rendering

said Minute Resolution. Atty LAURETA was the counsel of Illustre. He

circulate copies of the complain to the press, without any copy
furnished the Court, nor the Justices charged. It was made to appear
that the Justices were charged with graft and corruption. The
Tanodbayan dismissed the complaint.
Now, the SC is charging them with contempt. They claim that the
letters were private communication, and that they did not intend
to dishonor the court.
Issue
: WON privacy of communication was violated
Held
: The letters formed part of the judicial record and are a matter of
concern for the entire court.
There is no vindictive reprisal involved here. The Courts authority and
duty under the premises is unmistakable. It must act to preserve its
honor and dignity from the scurrilous attacks of an irate lawyer,
mouthed by his client, and to safeguard the morals and ethics of
the legal profession.
We are not convinced that Atty Laureta had nothing to do with Ilustres
letters, nor with the complaint filed with the tanodbayan. Atty Laureta
repeated disparaging remarks such as undue influence, powerful
influence in his pleadings. This was bolstered by the report that
Laureta distributed copies of the complaint to the newspaper
companies in envelopes bearing his name. He was also heard over the
radio. Lastly, as Illustres lawyer, he had control of the proceedings.SC
resolutions are beyond investigation from other departments of
the government because of separation of powers. The correctness of
the SC decisions are conclusive upon other branches of government.
Tanada v cuenco
After the 1955 national elections, the membership in the Senate was
overwhelmingly occupied by the Nacionalista Party. The lone opposition
senator was Lorenzo Taada who belonged to the Citizens Party.
Diosdado Macapagal on the other hand was a senatorial candidate
who lost the bid but was contesting it before the Senate Electoral
Tribunal (SET). But prior to a decision the SET would have to choose its

members. It is provided that the SET should be composed of 9

members comprised of the following: 3 justices of the Supreme Court,
3 senators from the majority party and 3 senators from the minority
party. But since there is only one minority senator the other two SET
members supposed to come from the minority were filled in by the NP.
Taada assailed this process before the Supreme Court. So did
Macapagal because he deemed that if the SET would be dominated by
NP senators then he, as a member of the Liberalista Party will not have
any chance in his election contest. Senator Mariano Cuenco et al
(members of the NP) averred that the Supreme Court cannot take
cognizance of the issue because it is a political question. Cuenco
argued that the power to choose the members of the SET is vested in
the Senate alone and the remedy for Taada and Macapagal was not to
raise the issue before judicial courts but rather to leave it before the
bar of public opinion.
ISSUE: Whether or not the issue is a political question.
HELD: No. The SC took cognizance of the case and ruled that the issue
is a justiciable question. The term Political Question connotes what it
means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It refers to
those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by
the people in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or
executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.
In this case, the issue at bar is not a political question. The Supreme
Court is not being asked by Taada to decide upon the official acts of
Senate. The issue being raised by Taada was whether or not the
elections of the 5 NP members to the SET are valid which is a judicial
question. Note that the SET is a separate and independent body from
the Senate which does not perform legislative acts.
But how should the gridlock be resolved?
The nomination of the last two members (who would fill in the
supposed seat of the minority members) must not come from the

majority party. In this case, the Chairman of the SET, apparently

already appointed members that would fill in the minority seats (even
though those will come from the majority party). This is still valid
provided the majority members of the SET (referring to those legally
sitting) concurred with the Chairman. Besides, the SET may set its own
rules in situations like this provided such rules comply with the
Constitution.
MIRANDA VS AGUIRRE
Posted by kaye lee on 12:46 PM
G.R. No. 133064 September 16 1999
FACTS:
1994, RA No. 7720 effected the conversion of the municipality of
Santiago, Isabela, into an independent component city. July 4th, RA No.
7720 was approved by the people of Santiago in a plebiscite. 1998, RA
No. 8528 was enacted and it amended RA No. 7720 that practically
downgraded the City of Santiago from an independent component city
to a component city. Petitioners assail the constitutionality of RA No.
8528 for the lack of provision to submit the law for the approval of the
people of Santiago in a proper plebiscite.
Respondents defended the constitutionality of RA No. 8528 saying that
the said act merely reclassified the City of Santiago from an
independent component city into a component city. It allegedly did not
involve any creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial
alteration of boundaries of local government units, therefore, a
plebiscite of the people of Santiago is unnecessary. They also
questioned the standing of petitioners to file the petition and argued
that the petition raises a political question over which the Court lacks
jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the petition at
bar.
RULING:

Yes. RA No. 8528 is declared unconstitutional. That Supreme Court has

the jurisdiction over said petition because it involves not a political
question but a justiciable issue, and of which only the court could
decide whether or not a law passed by the Congress is
unconstitutional.
That when an amendment of the law involves creation, merger,
division, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of local
government units, a plebiscite in the political units directly affected is
mandatory.
Petitioners are directly affected in the imple-mentation of RA No. 8528.
Miranda was the mayor of Santiago City, Afiado was the President of
the Sangguniang Liga, together with 3 other petitioners were all
residents and voters in the City of Santiago. It is their right to be heard
in the conversion of their city through a plebiscite to be conducted by
the COMELEC. Thus, denial of their right in RA No. 8528 gives them
proper standing to strike down the law as unconstitutional.
Sec. 1 of Art. VIII of the Constitution states that: the judicial power shall
be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instru-mentality of the
Government.