Legal Ethics Digests

A. LAWYER
1. Duty to the Court/Negligence of a Lawyer
In Re: Vicente Y. Bayani
A.C. No. 5307. August 9, 2000
Facts: Atty. Vicente Bayani was the lawyer for the appellant in a criminal case. He failed to
submit his proof of service in his appellant's brief which subsequently caused the inability of the
appellee to file his own brief. The IBP was order to investigate on the matter and despite
repeated notices, Bayani failed to submit the proof of service and his answer to the IBP's query.
Hence, this administrative complaint.

Held: GUILTY. Atty. Bayani's failure to submit proof of service of appellant's brief and his
failure to submit the required comment manifest willful disobedience to the lawful orders of the
Supreme Court, a clear violation of the canons of professional ethics. It appears that Atty. Bayani
has fallen short of the circumspection required of a member of the Bar. A counsel must always
remember that his actions or omissions are binding on his clients. A lawyer owes his client the
exercise of utmost prudence and capability in that representation. Further, lawyers are expected
to be acquainted with the rudiments of law and legal procedure and anyone who deals with them
has the right to expect not just a good amount of professional learning and competence but also a
whole-hearted fealty to his client's cause. Having been remiss in his duty to the Court and to the
Bar, Atty. Bayani was suspended from the practice of law for 3 months and until the time he
complies with the Order of the Supreme Court to submit the required proof of service.
2. Duty to Client/Accounting of Clients Money/Negligence
Teodulfo B. Basas vs. Atty. Miguel I. Icawat

A.C. No. 4282. August 24, 2000

Facts: Atty. Miguel Icawat was the lawyer for Teodulfo Basas and some other laborers in their
complaint against their employer. The NLRC rendered an adverse decision. Basas and his
fellow workers, however, insisted that they appeal the decision. Atty. Icawat, however, failed to
file the required memorandum of appeal. Basas filed an administrative complaint, also alleging
that Atty. Icawat issued a receipt for an amount less than that which they had paid him.
Held: GUILTY. Respondent's failure to file the memorandum of appeal required by the NLRC
Rules of Procedure reveals his poor grasp of labor law. Respondent practically admitted that he

did not file the memorandum. His failure to file the memorandum clearly prejudiced the interests
of his clients. Respondent manifestly fell short of the diligence required of his profession, in
violation of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which mandates that a lawyer
shall serve his client with competence and diligence. Rule 18.03 further provides that a lawyer
shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith
shall render him liable. For his failure to issue the proper receipt for the money he received from
his clients, respondent also violated Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
states that a lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the
client. The Court fined Atty. Icawat in the amount of PhP 500, with a warning that a repetition of
the same offense or a similar misconduct will be dealt with more severely.
3. Duty of Lawyer to Client/Proper Conduct
Teodoro R. Rivera vs. Atty. Sergio Angeles
A.C. No. 2519. August 29, 2000
Facts: Atty. Sergio Angeles was the legal counsel of Teodoro Rivera and 2 others in a civil case.
Rivera and his 2 co-plaintiffs received a favorable decision. Atty. Angeles received almost PhP
50,000 from one of the defendants in the case as partial fulfillment of the judgement against the
latter. Atty. Angeles, however, never told his clients of the amount he had received and never
remitted the same to him, leaving them to discover such fact on their own. Rivera and his coplaintiffs filed an administrative complaint for disbarment against Atty. Angeles.
Held: GUILTY. Atty. Angeles was not disbarred but the Court ruled that his act amounted to
serious misconduct. The Court has repeatedly stressed the importance of integrity and good
moral character as part of a lawyers equipment in the practice of his profession. For it cannot
be denied that the respect of litigants for the profession is inexorably diminished whenever a
member of the Bar betrays their trust and confidence. The Court is not oblivious of the right of a
lawyer to be paid for the legal services he has extended to his client but such right should not be
exercised whimsically by appropriating to himself the money intended for his clients. There
should never be an instance where the victor in litigation loses everything he won to the fees of
his own lawyer. For deceit in dealing with his client, Atty. Angeles was suspended from the
practice of law for 1 year.
Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. vs. Attys. Antonio M. Llorente and Ligaya P. Salayon
A.C. No. 4690. August 29, 2000
Facts: Attys. Antonio Llorente and Ligaya Salayon were election officers of the COMELEC and
held the position of Chairman and Vice-Chairman respectively for the Pasig City Board of
Candidates. The respondents helped conduct and oversee the 1995 elections. Then Senatorial
candidate Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. alleged that the respondents tampered with the votes received
by them by either adding more votes for particular candidates in their Statement of Votes (SoV)
or reducing the number of votes of particular candidates in their SoV. Pimentel filed an
administrative complaint for their disbarment. Respondents argued that the discrepancies were
due to honest mistake, oversight and fatigue. Respondents also argued that the IBP Board of
Governors had already exonerated them from any offense and that the motion for
reconsideration filed by Pimentel was not filed in time.

Held: GUILTY. Respondents do not dispute the fact that massive irregularities attended the
canvassing of the Pasig City election returns. The only explanation they could offer for such

irregularities is that the same could be due to honest mistake, human error, and/or fatigue on the
part of the members of the canvassing committees who prepared the SoVs. There is a limit, we
believe, to what can be construed as an honest mistake or oversight due to fatigue, in the
performance of official duty. The sheer magnitude of the error renders the defense of honest
mistake or oversight due to fatigue, as incredible and simply unacceptable. Indeed, what is
involved here is not just a case of mathematical error in the tabulation of votes per precinct as
reflected in the election returns and the subsequent entry of the erroneous figures in one or two
SoVs but a systematic scheme to pad the votes of certain senatorial candidates at the expense of
the petitioner in complete disregard of the tabulation in the election returns. A lawyer who holds
a government position may not be disciplined as a member of the bar for misconduct in the
discharge of his duties as a government official. However, if the misconduct also constitutes a
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility or the lawyers oath or is of such character
as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or shows moral delinquency on his part, such individual
may be disciplined as a member of the bar for such misconduct. Here, by certifying as true and
correct the SoVs in question, respondents committed a breach of Rule 1.01 of the Code which
stipulates that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
By express provision of Canon 6, this is made applicable to lawyers in the government service.
In addition, they likewise violated their oath of office as lawyers to do no falsehood. The Court
found the respondents guilty of misconduct and fined them PhP 10,000 each and issued a stern
warning that similar conduct in the future will be severely punished.

4. Misrepresentation and Non-payment of IBP

Dues
Soliman M. Santos, Jr. v. Atty. Francisco R.
Llamas
A.C. No. 4749. January 20, 2000
Facts: Complaint for misrepresentation and non-payment of bar membership dues. It appears
that Atty. Llamas, who for a number of years now, has not indicated the proper PTR and IBP OR
Nos. and data in his pleadings. If at all, he only indicated IBP Rizal 259060 but he has been
using this for at least 3 years already. On the other hand, respondent, who is now of age,
averred that he is only engaged in a limited practice of law and under RA 7432, as a senior
citizen, he is exempted from payment of income taxes and included in this exemption is the
payment of membership dues.
Held: GUILTY. Rule 139-A requires that every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay annual
dues and default thereof for six months shall warrant suspension of membership and if
nonpayment covers a period of 1-year, default shall be a ground for removal of the delinquents

name from the Roll of Attorneys. It does not matter whether or not respondent is only engaged
in limited practice of law. Moreover, the exemption invoked by respondent does not include
exemption from payment of membership or association dues.

In addition, by indicating IBP Rizal 259060 in his pleadings and thereby

misprepresenting to the public and the courts that he had paid his IBP dues to the Rizal Chpater,
respondent is guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides: Rule
1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. His act is
also a violation of Rule 10.01 which provides that: A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor
consent to the doing of any in court; nor mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.
Lawyer was suspended for 1 year or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later.
B. JUDGES
1. Gross Ignorance of the Law

Improper Imposition of the Punishment of Contempt

Flaviano B. Cortes v. Judge Felina Bangalan
A.M. No. MTJ-97-1129. January 19, 2000
Facts: Complainant was one of the co-accused in an adultery case filed before the sala of
respondent Judge Bangalan. In a letter-complaint, he moved for the voluntary inhibition of
respondent judge on the ground that the latter cannot be impartial over the criminal case
because complainant previously filed an opposition to the appointment of respondent as RTC
judge.
For this, respondent judge issued an order citing Complainant in direct contempt of
court, averring further that his pleading contained derogatory, offensive or malicious statements
"equivalent to misbehavior committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to
interrupt the proceedings before the same within the meaning of Rule 71. When complainant
appealed said order in the same court, after posting a notice of appeal, respondent judge
ordered him to submit a record on appeal. Upon failure to do so, respondent judge issued a
warrant of arrest against Complainant for which he was arrested and jailed for 1 day with a fine
of P10.00.
Thus, Complainant charges respondent judge with gross ignorance of the law,
oppressive conduct and abuse of authority when the latter held him in contempt of court on
account of the statements he made in his letter-complaint which statements, complainant
insists, are absolutely privileged in nature. Complainant further alleges that he filed a notice of
appeal from the order of contempt but respondent directed him to submit a record on appeal
despite the fact that the same is not required under the rules.
Held: GUILTY. Judge B was fined in the amount equivalent to 1-month salary with a stern
warning that a repetition of the same shall be dealt with more seriously. The Court said that
while it is true that the complainant attached the administrative letter-complaint in his letter for
respondent judge to inhibit in the criminal case, it was used merely to support his contention in
his motion for inhibition. A judge is bound never to consider lightly a motion for his inhibition that
questions or puts to doubt, however insignificant, his supposed predilection to a case pending
before him. Furthermore, the alleged offensive and contemptuous language contained in the
letter-complaint was not directed to the respondent court.
A judge may not hold a party in contempt of court for expressing concern on his
impartiality even if the judge may have been insulted therein. While the power to punish in

contempt is inherent in all courts so as to preserve order in judicial proceedings and to uphold
the due administration of justice, judges, however, should exercise their contempt powers
judiciously and sparingly, with utmost restraint, and with the end in view of utilizing their
contempt powers for correction and preservation not for retaliation or vindication.
Anent the charge of gross ignorance of the law in requiring complainant to submit a
record on appeal, we find the respondent judge's order to be not it accord with the established
rule on the matter. Contempt proceedings is not one of those instances where a record on
appeal is required to perfect an appeal. Thus, when the law is elementary, so elementary, not to
know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.

Payment of Docket Fees in Election Cases

Alfredo B. Enojas v. Judge Eustaquio Z. Gacott, Jr.
A.M. No. RTJ-99-1513. January 19, 2000
Facts: Judge Gacott is being administratively charged in this case with serious misconduct,
inefficiency and gross ignorance of the law. This complaint arose when respondent Judge
dismissed an election case on the ground of non-payment of docket fees, although the case
was had been previously admitted and was deemed properly filed by the original Judge
(inhibited himself due to relationship to ones of the parties) whom Judge Gacott replaced.
Jugde G issued the dismissal order relying on a case (Manchester vs. CA) which states that - a
case is deemed commenced only upon the payment of the proper docket fees. To his opinion,
the required fees in this case was not yet paid by the protestant. Hence, this complaint charging
him primarily with gross ignorance of the law.
Held: GUILTY. Based on the facts and circumstances attendant to the case, the election protest
was properly filed. In fact, the original Judge already made an order that from the deposit given
by the protestant for the expenses of reopening the questioned ballots, an amount shall be
allocated for the payment of the required fees. More importantly, the Court held that the
Manchester ruling relied upon by respondent Judge does not apply to election cases. In a latter
case ( Pahilan), the evil sought to be avoided in the Manchester case does not exist in election
cases. Truth is, the filing fee in an election case is fixed and the claim for damages, to which the
docket fees shall be made to apply, is merely ancillary to main cause of action and is not even
determinative of the courts jurisdiction.
While it is true that not every error or mistake of a judge renders him administratively
liable, in this case, it is clear that the respondent judge was in utter disregard of established
rules amounting to gross ignorance of the law. The Pahilan case was decided long before the
respondent made a ruling on the election case. Thus, the respondent judge was duty bound to
adhere to, and apply the recent ruling, and he cannot feign ignorance thereof, because the
Code of Judicial Ethics requires him to be an embodiment of, among other things, judicial
competence. On e of the principal duties of a judge is to be abreast with law and jurisprudence
since the administration of justice requires continuous study of the law and jurisprudence. A
perusal of the challenge order reveals that respondent judge failed to live up to what is expected
of him as a dispenser of justice.

 Granting of Bail
Romulo Tolentino v. Judge Policarpio S. Camano, Jr.
A.M. RTJ-00-1522 January 20, 2000

Facts: Respondent Judge is being charged with gross ignorance of the law, grave abuse of
discretion, grave abuse of authority, violation of Canons 1, 2, and 3 of the Canons of Judicial
Ethics and incompetence in connection with granting bail to the accused in a criminal case for
child abuse.
The complaint alleges that respondent Judge granted bail while pending the holding of a
preliminary investigation. The defense moved to quash the information against the accused on
the alleged absence of a preliminary investigation. Consequently, respondent Judge ordered
that a preliminary investigation be had by the state prosecutor. During the pendency of this, he
granted bail in favor of the defendant after several notices of hearing to the state prosecutor to
which the latter failed to appear. After such grant, complainant herein now accuses respondent
of denying the prosecution the chance to adduce evidence to show that the guilt of the accused
was strong and that bail should not have been granted in his favor.
Held: NOT GUILTY. There was no denial of due process. It was not necessary to hold hearing
so that the prosecution could show that evidence of guilt of the accused was strong since a
preliminary investigation had been ordered by the court. At that point, bail was still a matter of
right. Respondent judge, knowing that bail was indeed a matter of right at that stage,
nevertheless set the hearing for the petition for bail four times. However, complainant failed to
appear and present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused was strong. It thus appears
that complainant is actually the one who was remiss in the performance of his duties.
Considering that the case was referred to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor for preliminary
investigation, the accused could be considered as entitled to bail as a matter of right. Thus,
respondent judges decision granting bail to the accused was proper and in accordance with law
and jurisprudence.

Issuance of an Order of Release

Jesusa Santiago vs. Judge Eduardo Jovellanos
Margarita Sanchez vs. Judge Eduardo Jovellanos
A.M. No. MTJ-00-1289. August 1, 2000
Facts: Jesusa Santiago and Margarita Sanchez were complainants in two different criminal
cases before the MTC of San Ildefonso, Bulacan and the RTC of Rosales, Pampanga,
respectively. The suspects in each of the criminal cases were caught by authorities and
detained. However, both suspects were released by order of Judge Eduardo Jovellanos,
presiding judge of the MCTC of Alcala-Bautista, Pangasinan. The complainants questioned both
Orders for Release issued by Judge Jovellanos, alleging that the requirements for the bailbond
had not been fulfilled and that the said judge had no jurisdiction to order the release.
Held: GUILTY. There are two defects in the Orders for Release signed by Judge Jovellanos.
First, in both cases, the detainees had not registered the bailbond in accordance with the Rules

of Criminal Procedure. One may not be given provisional liberty if the bailbond is not registered
with the proper office. Secondly, Judge Jovellanos did not have jurisdiction to order the release
of the detainees. The Rules of Criminal Procedure provide that when a suspect is arrested
outside of the province, city or municipality where his case is pending, he may either apply for
bail with the court where his case is pending or with any RTC in the province, city or municipality
where he was arrested. If a RTC judge is not available, he may apply for bail with any MTC or
MCTC in the place where he was arrested. In this case, Judge Jovellanos entertained motions
for bail and ordered release for suspects whose cases were not pending in his court nor were
they arrested within his jurisdiction. As an advocate of justice and a visible representation of the
law, a judge is expected to keep abreast with and be proficient in the interpretation of our laws.
A judge should be acquainted with legal norms and precepts as well as with statutes and
procedural rules. Unfamiliarity with the Rules of Court is a sign of incompetence which goes
against Canon 3, specifically Rule 3.01, of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Having accepted the
exalted position of a judge, Judge Jovellanos owes the public and the court he sits in proficiency
in the law. He must have the basic rules at the palm of his hands as he is expected to maintain
professional competence at all times. Judge Jovellanos was suspended for 1 year without pay
issued the warning that similar conduct in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

Grant of a Motion for Reconsideration

Gloria Lucas v. Judge Amelia A. Fabros
A.M. No. MTJ-99-1226. January 31, 2000

Facts : Complainant Lucas was the defendant in an ejectment case pending before respondent
judge. She alleges that Judge Fabros granted the plaintiffs motion for reconsideration after the
case had been dismissed the case for failure of plaintiff and her counsel to appear at the
Preliminary Conference. She averred that it is elementary, under Section 19(c) of the Rules of
Summary Procedure, that a motion for reconsideration is prohibited, but respondent judge, in
violation of the rule, granted the motion for reconsideration. She added that, notwithstanding the
fact that the respondent herself had pointed out in open court that the case is governed by the
Rules on Summary Procedure, the judge ordered the revival of the case out of malice, partiality
and with intent to cause an injury to complainant. Thus, the instant complaint, charging
respondent judge with Gross Ignorance of the Law and Grave Abuse of Discretion
Held: NOT GUILTY. The SC held that respondent judge not guilty of gross ignorance of the
law and grave abuse of discretion.
As a rule, a motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading under Section 19 of the
Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. This rule, however, applies only where the judgment
sought to be reconsidered is one rendered on the merits. Here, the order of dismissal issued by
respondent judge due to failure of a party to appear during the preliminary conference is
obviously not a judgment on the merits after trial of the case. Hence, a motion for the
reconsideration of such order is not the prohibited pleading contemplated under Section 19 (c)
of the present Rule on Summary Procedure. Thus, respondent judge committed no grave abuse
of discretion, nor is she guilty of ignorance of the law, in giving due course to the motion for
reconsideration subject of the present

 Imposition of Proper Penalty

Felicidad Dadizon vs. Judge Aniceto Lirios
A.M. No. MTJ-00-1295. August 1, 2000
Facts: Felicidad Dadizon was the complainant in a prosecution for Falsification of a Public
Document (Art. 172, RPC) which was tried and decided by Judge Aniceto Lirios of the MTC of
Naval, Biliran. Judge Lirios convicted the accused, Pablo Suzon, and sentenced him to a
straight penalty of 7 months imprisonment and imposed a PhP 1,000 fine. Dadizon questioned
the punishment meted by the said judge, alleging that the straight penalty of 7 months is way
below the penalty provided by law. Judge Lirios defended his decision, stating that he had to
appreciate the mitigating circumstance that Suzon was already 70 years of age.
Held: GUILTY. As judge of thirty-three (33) years, respondent should have known that the
Indeterminate Sentence Law provides for the imposition of a prison sentence in the minimum
and maximum term for offenses punishable by the Revised Penal Code or the special laws. The
offense committed was Falsification by a Private Individual and Use of Falsified Document
punishable under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code which provides for a penalty of
imprisonment of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods (ranging from 2 years,
4 months and 1 days to 6 years) and a fine of not more than Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00).
Respondent Judge appreciated one (1) mitigating circumstance (old age), which is merely an
ordinary mitigating circumstance. The imposition of a straight penalty of seven (7) months by
respondent Judge is clearly erroneous. While a judge may not always be subjected to
disciplinary action for every erroneous order or decision he renders, that relative immunity is not
a license to be negligent or abusive and arbitrary in performing his adjudicatory prerogatives. It
is true that a judge may err in fixing the minimum and maximum terms of an indeterminate
sentence. However, the unawareness of or unfamiliarity with the application of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law and duration and graduation of penalties merit disciplinary action from reprimand
to removal. Every judge should know that in applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law for
offenses penalized under the Revised Penal Code, the indeterminate sentence should have a
fixed minimum and maximum. And when the law is so elementary, not to know it or to act as if
one does not know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. Judge Aniceto Lirios was fined in
the amount of PhP 5,000 and issued stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act
will be dealt with more severely by the Court.

Application of Rules of Procedure

Alfonso C. Ortiz vs. Judge Alex L. Quiroz
A.M. No. MTJ-00-1259 August 4, 2000
Facts: Alfonso Ortiz initiated a criminal complaint against Inocencia Hernandez for malicious
mischeif and grave threats. The case was assigned to Judge Alex Quiroz, presiding judge of
Branch 69 of the MTC of Pasig City. Before trial, however, Judge Quiroz ruled that the case
would be governed by ordinary rules of procedure rather than the summary rules of criminal

procedure because the case fell within the exceptions in P.D. 1508. Ortiz filed an administrative
complaint against Judge Quiroz, arguing that the summary rules not the ordinary rules should
be followed for his case.
Held: GUILTY. Under the Revised Penal Code, grave threats is penalized with imprisonment of
1 month and 1 day to 6 months (arresto mayor) and a fine not exceeding PhP 500, if the threat
is not subject to a condition (Article 282). Malicious mischief, on the other hand, is penalized
with imprisonment of 2 months and 1 day to 6 months (arresto mayor in its medium and
maximum periods) if the value of the damage caused exceeds PhP 1,000 (Article 329). In this
case, the alleged damage to complainant was estimated to be PhP 50,000. Thus, the subject
criminal cases should have been tried under the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure,
considering that such rule is applicable to criminal cases where the penalty prescribed by law
for the offense charged is imprisonment not exceeding 6 months or a fine not exceeding PhP
1,000 or both, irrespective of other imposable penalties, accessory or otherwise or of the civil
liability arising therefrom [Section 1 B(4), Revised Rule on Summary Procedure]. Respondent
judge, therefore, erred in applying the ordinary rules of procedure instead of the rules of
summary procedure. A judge has a duty to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with
the statutes and procedural rules. In fact, the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that judges
must be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence. He must have the basic rules
at the palm of his hand and be proficient in the interpretation of laws and procedural rules.
Judge Quiroz was reprimanded, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act
would be dealt with more severely.

Issuance of a Writ of Execution

Teresita Jason vs. Judge Briccio Ygana
A.M. No. RTJ-00-1543. August 4, 2000
Facts: Teresita Jason was the defendant in an ejectment case before the MTC of Pasig City.
Having received an adverse judgement, Jason appealed the decision to Branch 153 of the RTC
of Pasig City, presided by Judge Briccio Ygana. Respondent judge affirmed the decision of the
MTC and subsequently issued a Writ of Execution for the judgement. The Sheriff of Branch 153
executed upon some personal properties of Jason and gave a Notice to Vacate. Jason filed an
administrative complaint against Judge Ygana, arguing that the Writ of Execution should have
been issued by the court of origin and not the appellate court.
Held: GUILTY. The case should have been remanded back to the MTC for execution. The rule is
that if the judgment of the metropolitan trial court is appealed the regional trial court and the
decision of the latter is itself elevated to the Court of Appeals, whose decision thereafter
become final, the case should be remanded through the regional trial court to the metropolitan
trial court for execution. The only exception is the execution pending appeal which is not evident
from the records of this case. A judge is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory
acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules; it is imperative that he be conversant with
basic legal principles. Canon 4 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics requires that the judge should
be studious of the principles of law. Canon 18 mandates that he should administer his office with
due regard to the integrity of the system of the law itself, remembering that he is not a
depository of arbitrary power, but a judge under the sanction of law. Judge Ygana was fined
PhP 10,000 for gross ignorance of the law.

 Conducting Hearings for Probation

Carlos B. Creer vs. Judge Concordio Fabillar
A.M. No. MTJ-99-1218. August 14, 2000
Facts: Respondent Judge Concordio Fabillar, acting presiding judge of the 9th MCTC of
Giporlos-Quinapundan, Eastern Samar, convicted Carlos Creer of grave coercion. Creer
appealed the conviction to the RTC where it was affirmed. Creer subsequently filed a Motion for
Reconsideration. Creer was then apprehended and jailed by order of Judge Fabillar. Creer
alleged that respondent judge made him sign an application for probation which the said judge
denied. The RTC subsequently reversed the conviction of Creer and ordered his release. Creer
filed an administrative complaint against Judge Fabillar, charging the latter with gross ignorance
of the law for conducting hearings for probation despite his pending appeal.
Held: GUILTY. The rule is that no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the
defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction. At the time complainant
applied for probation, an appeal had already been perfected. Although respondent Judge
eventually denied the application, the fact still remained that he had acted on it by asking the
probation officer to conduct a post-sentence investigation instead of outrightly denying the same
as so explicitly mandated by the law. Observance of the law, which he is bound to know and
sworn to uphold, is required of every judge. When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to
his office to know and to simply apply it; anything less than that would be constitutive of gross
ignorance of the law. Judge Fabillar was suspended from service for 6 months without pay and
ordered to pay a PhP 20,000 fine. He was further warned with the most severe penalty for
another infraction by him.

Order of Acquittal
Fredesminda Dayawon v. Judge Maximino A. Badilla
A.M. No. MTJ-00-1309. September 6, 2000
Facts: Ms. Fredesminda Dayawon charged Judge Maximino A. Badilla of the Municipal Trial
Court of Pili, Camarines Sur, with "Gross Ignorance of the Law and Incompetence" relative to
Criminal Case for estafa.
Complainant averred that respondent Judge acquitted the accused and declared her to
only be liable civilly, despite Alamos admittance in open court that she had received the subject
goods from complainant to be sold on commission basis with the obligation to remit the
proceeds of the sale or to return the items, if unsold, but had failed to comply seasonably
therewith despite demand. Complainant stressed that these admissions, together with the
finding that the accused had acted in bad faith, were clearly sufficient to convict the accused of
the crime of estafa.
Held: GUILTY. A judge is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with
statutes and procedural rules; so long as he remains on the bench, it is imperative that he
continues to be conversant with the basic law and maintain the desired professional
competence.

The Court finds it fit, however, to reduce the recommended fine of P5,000.00 to P2,000.00
considering that no nefarious motive on the part of respondents judge has been shown.

Issuance of Hold Departure Order

Re: Hold-Departure Order Dated August 9, 1999 Issued by Judge Salvador B. Mendoza,
MCTC, Poro-San Francisco-Tedela-Pilar, Poro, Cebu Office of the Court Administrator v.
Judge Salvador B. Mendoza
A.M. No. 00-1281-MTJ. September 14, 2000
Facts: MTC Judge Mendoza issued a Hold Departure Order in Criminal Case No. T-1806,
entitled "People of the Philippines v. Arnie Pena Osabel." pending before him in the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court, Poro-San Francisco-Tedela-Pilar, Poro, Cebu. The Secretary urged the Court
Administrator to look into the fact that the order in question was issued in violation of Supreme
Court Circular No. 39-97 dated June 19, 1997.
Held: GUILTY. Circular No. 39-97 limits the authority to issue hold-departure orders to the
Regional Trial Courts in criminal cases within their exclusive jurisdiction.

Canon 3, Rule 3.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct exhorts judges to be "faithful to the
law and maintain professional competence." The Court has not been remised in reminding
judges to exert diligent efforts in keeping abreast with developments in law and jurisprudence.
Needless to state, the process of learning the law and the legal system is a never-ending
endeavor, hence, judges should always be vigilant in their quest for knowledge so they could
discharge their duties and responsibilities with zeal and fervor.

2. Habitual Tardiness
Antonio Yu-Asensi vs. Judge Francisco D.
Villanueva
A.M. No. MTJ-00-1245. January 19, 2000
Facts: Complainant charges Judge Villanueva for serious misconduct and/or inefficiency
particularly violating the Canons of Judicial Ethics on promptness and punctuality. Judge V
had been consistently late for 45 minutes to 1 1/2 hours during scheduled hearings, thus
delaying the cause of complainant where he was the plaintiff in a reckless imprudence case.
Due to his tardiness, C's lawyer had also been compelled to extend trial even beyond the
prescribed period provided for by law.
Held: GUILTY. Habitual tardiness amounts to serious misconduct and inefficiency in violation of
the Canons of Judicial Ethics. Several SC Circulars have been issued which enjoin judges to be
punctual in the performance of their judicial duties, recognizing that the time of litigants,
witnesses, and attorneys are of value, and that if the judge is not punctual in his habits, he sets

a bad example to the bar and tends to create dissatisfaction in the administration of justice.
Furthermore, Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates: "A judge shall dispose of
the court's business promptly and decide cases within the required periods."

3. Gross Inefficiency and Duty/Liability over

Court Personnel
Atty. Martin Pantaleon v. Judge Teofilo Guadiz
A.M. No. RTJ-00-1525 January 25, 2000

Facts: In this case, respondent Judge is charged with Gross Inefficiency, Neglect and Delay in
Elevating the Records of Civil Case No. 88-2187, to which the complainant was the plaintiffs
counsel. After receiving an adverse decision, complainant filed a Notice of Appeal within the
reglementary period and consequently, respondent Judge issued an order for the transmittal of the
records of the case to the appellate court. However, despite constant follow-up by counsel, three
years have passed and the records of the case have not been transmitted.
In his Answer, respondent judge contends that the court stenographer misplaced the
transcript of the testimony of one of the witnesses, hence the record could not be transmitted to
the Court of Appeals. He further averred that complainant should have invited his attention by
filing the proper motion or by writing a personal letter informing him of the non-transmittal of the
records within three months from the date of his order of transmittal.
Held: GUILTY. A judge cannot hide behind the incompetence of his subordinates. He should be
the master of his own domain and take responsibility for the mistakes of his subjects.

The non-transmission of the records by reason of inefficiency of the staff cannot

exonerate respondent judge from administrative liability. As administrative officer of the court, a
judge is expected to keep a watchful eye on the level of performance and conduct of the court
personnel under his immediate supervision who are primarily employed to aid in the
administration of justice as required by Canon 3, Rule 3.09 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
In the case of Re: Judge Fernando Agdamag, the Court stated: he (judge) sits not only
to judge litigated cases with the least possible delay but that his responsibilities include being an
effective manager of the court and its personnel. He is presumed to be cognizant of his
responsibilities as a worthy minister of the law. At the very least, he is expected to keep abreast
with his docket.
Certainly, a delay of three years in the transmission of court records to the appellate
court, where only a period of 30 days is required, is inexcusable.

Acting Judge Reynaldo B. Bellosilo v. Dante dela Cruz Rivera, Sheriff III, Branch 34,
Metropolitan Trial Court, Quezon City

A.M. No. P-00-1424. September 25, 2000

Dante dela Cruz Rivera, Sheriff III, Branch 34, Metropolitan Trial Court, Quezon City vs.
Acting Judge Reynaldo B. Bellosilo, Branch 34, Metropolitan Trial Court, Quezon City.
A.M. No. MTJ-00-1316. September 25, 2000
Facts: Sheriff Dante Rivera allegedly falsified his Personal Data Sheet. For this, respondent
Judge accused him of dishonesty and subsequently prevented him from reporting for work.
Afterwhich, respodent Judge filed an administrative complaint against the sheriff.
Held: GUILTY. A judge has no authority or power to prevent an employee from reporting for
work. If indeed complainant Rivera committed falsification in the accomplishment of his personal
data sheet, the most that Judge Bellosillo could have done was to file an administrative charge
against complainant Rivera, which he later on did but after the complainant Rivera filed an
administrative charge against him (Judge Bellosillo) for conduct unbecoming.
While a judge may have supervision over his employees, he should not however exercise
his authority over them in an oppressive or despotic manner. Judge Bellosillo should have
realized that it is the Supreme Court which has the authority to discipline/dismiss his
subordinate. The most that he can do is merely to file an administrative complaint against the
erring employee.
4. Impartiality and Impropriety of a Judge

Issuance of Conflicting Orders

Daniel & Suprema Dumo v. Judge Romeo V. Perez
A.M. No. MTJ-00-1242 January 20, 2000

Facts: Spouses Dumo filed this administrative complaint against respondent Judge Perez for
gross ignorance of the law, grave abuse of discretion and patent partiality.
Respondent MTC Judge issued a Writ of Execution to enforce the decision of a case
involving quieting of title and recovery of ownership of real property. However, said writ was
returned unsatisfied because the herein complainants was the actual owners and occupants of
the questioned property without being impleaded in the original case. Subsequently, respondent
Judge issued an order stating that complainants shall not be affected by said writ because they
were not made parties to the case. Despite such order, he moved on to issue a Writ of
Possession in favor of the original plaintiff (Espinas). As a consequence, Espinas used such
Writ of Possession against the herein complainants in order to eject them from their property
and deprived them from the enjoyment of the same.
The crux of this controversy therefore is the issuance of respondent Judge of conflicting
orders, which according to complainants, showed patent partiality over Espinas, the original
plaintiff in the case for quieting of title.
Held: GUILTY. First of all, respondent Judge is guilty of ignorance of the law. As a municipal trial
court judge, he obviously had no jurisdiction over the action for quieting of title and recovery of
ownership filed by Espinas against the original defendants. It must be stressed that the case
was NOT for ejectment over which MTCs have original jurisdiction, but for quieting of title
and/or ownership falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of regional trial courts. The question of
jurisdiction if so basic and elementary a matter that a judges ignorance of it is simply
inexcusable.
Secondly, the judges act of issuing conflicting orders is likewise inexcusable. After
declaring that the Writ of Execution cannot be made enforceable against herein complainants as
they were not made parties to the case, he reversed himself nevertheless by issuing the Writ of

Possession. Under said writ of possession, it was patent that he was contradicting his previous
ruling by ordering therein to eject all adverse occupants, which of course, was so broad to
affect all persons including herein complainants. The issuance of said writ gave rise to the
suspicion of partiality or bias in favor of Espinas.
The presumptions of regularity and good faith in the performance of judicial functions on
respondents part are negated by the circumstances of record. While a judge cannot be made
liable for any criminal, civil, or administrative charge for an erroneous decision rendered in good
faith and in the absence of fraud, it is imperative that he should have basic knowledge of the
law. Judges must keep abreast of the laws and jurisprudence to be able to render justice and
maintain public confidence in our legal system.

More importantly, judges should not only be impartial but should also appear impartial.
Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides that: a judge should also avoid impropriety
and the appearance of impropriety in all activities. A judge should so behave at all times as to
promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. (Rule 2.01, Canon 2).
Leopoldo G. Dacera, Jr. vs. Judge Teodoro A. Dizon
A.M. No. RTJ-00-1573. August 2, 2000
Facts: Leopoldo Dacera, Jr. was the complainant in a prosecution for Qualified Theft filed with
Branch 37 of the RTC of General Santos City with Judge Teodoro Dizon presiding. The
prosecutor later filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that Dacera had executed and signed
an Affidavit of Desistance from pursuing the prosecution. Dacera, however, opposed the Motion
to Dismiss, alleging that Judge Dizon had unduly influenced him to sign the Affidavit of
Desistance and that he had not been fully appraised of the consequences of his actions in doing
so. The Supreme Court assigned an Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals to investigate into
the matter.
Held: NOT GUILTY. The investigation did not find any conclusive evidence that Judge Dizon
was personally biased in favor of either party in the disposition of the case in question. It must
be noted that respondent judge did not actually dismiss the case upon motion of the prosecutor
and even voluntarily inhibited himself upon motion of Dacera to disqualify him. However, the
investigation did reveal that Judge Dizon had made telephone calls to Dacera and even had
discussions with him inside his chambers in order to verify the truth about the Affidavit of
Desistance. While there is no clear proof of malice, corrupt motives or improper considerations,
the acts of respondent in calling and meeting with the complainant still leave much to be desired
and are deserving of reprimand. A judge is not only required to be impartial; he must also
appear to be impartial. Fraternizing with litigants tarnishes this appearance. Canon II of the
Code of Judicial Conduct basically provides that judges should avoid impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety in all activities and should so behave at all times as to promote public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. It is clear that the acts of the
respondent judge have been less than circumspect. He should have kept himself free from any
appearance of impropriety and should have endeavored to distance himself from any act liable
to create an impression of indecorum. The complaint filed by Dacera against Judge Dizon, Jr.,
was dismissed for lack of merit. However, respondent Judge was admonished to refrain from
making calls to any parties-litigant and/or counsel with cases pending in his sala and sternly
warned that a repetition of the same will be dealt with more severely.
William R. Adan vs. Judge Anita Abucejo-Luzano
A.M. No. MTJ-00-1298. August 3, 2000

Facts: William Adan was the complainant in 2 criminal cases for Grave Oral Defamation tried
and decided by Judge Anita Abucejo-Luzano of the MCTC of Lopez Jaena, Misamis Occidental.
Respondent judge convicted the accused and sentenced them accordingly. Upon Motion for
Reconsideration, however, respondent judge reversed her decision and rendered a judgement
for acquittal. Adan questioned the reversal of the conviction, alleging that Judge AbucejoLuzano had modified her judgement because having received new information from the
accused, she conducted a personal ocular inspection of the place where the crime was
committed without the presence of the parties involved.

Held: GUILTY. Respondent Judge should have known that an ex-parte ocular inspection without
notice to nor presence of the parties and after the case had already been decided was highly
improper. If respondent Judge had entertained doubts that she wished to clarify after the trial had
already terminated, she should have ordered motu proprio the reopening of the trial for the
purpose, with due notice to the parties, whose participation therein is essential to due process.
Thus, it is error for the judge to go alone to the place where the crime was committed and make
an inspection without previous knowledge or consent of the parties. The conduct of the ex-parte
inspection, the result of which apparently influenced her to reconsider her earlier decision, was
highly improper as she, in effect, admitted additional evidence without giving the prosecution a
chance to object to its introduction or to controvert the same. Her actions show an ignorance of
the law and proper procedure to be followed for a situation such as this. Furthermore, respondent
judge has opened herself to charges of partiality and bias by meeting with the accused privately.
No matter how noble her intentions may have been, it was improper for respondent judge to meet
the accused without the presence of complainant. Respondent Judge has failed to live up to the
norm that judges should not only be impartial but should also appear impartial. She thus violated
Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which provides that a judge should avoid impropriety
and the appearance of impropriety in all activities. Judge Abucejo-Luzano was fined PhP 10,000
and issued a stern warning that any similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely.

5. Gross Misconduct amounting to Violation of

a Constitutional Right/ Serious/Grave
Misconduct
Atty. NapoleonS. Valenzuela v. Judge Reynaldo Bellosillo
A.M. No. MTJ-00-1241 January 20, 2000
Facts: Respondent Judge is being charged with gross violation of the constitutional right of
subject accused to assistance by counsel of her own choice, gross misconduct, oppression,
partiality and violation of the Code of Judicial Ethics.
In a BP 22 case, Judge allegedly granted bail to the accused despite not being
accompanied and represented by her counsel at that time. It appears that Judge granted bail
without the assistance of the counsel of record, Atty. Valenzuela and he even suggested that the
latter should be replaced by another counsel. Aghast by such decision, Atty. V filed his Notice of
Withdrawal, in conformity with his clients decision, Meriam Colapo. Subsequently, he filed the

instant administrative complaint against respondent Judge. To support his position, he attached
an Affidavit allegedly executed by his client Colapo. However, during the hearing of the case, he
failed to present Colapo as Witness as she was allegedly out of the country although she was
willing to testify at that time.
Held: NOT GUILTY. On the issue of granting bail without the assistance of counsel, the Court
held that it was valid and sufficiently based on the Manifestation filed by Atty. Valenzuela. With
regard to the alleged act of respondent Judge suggesting to the accused that she should
change her counsel (complainant Atty. V) and recommending a different lawyer, the Court found
that the evidence adduced by the complainant was insufficient to substantiate the charges
against him. The only evidence offered by complainant was the Affidavit of his client Meriam
Colapo, and it cannot be the basis of a finding of guilt even in an administrative case. The
complainants failure to present his principal witness, in the absence of other evidence to prove
his charges was fatal and said Affidavit cannot be given credence and is inadmissible without
the said affiant being placed on the witness stand.
The employment or profession of a person is a property right within the constitutional
guaranty of due process of law. This applies also to Judges. Respondent judge cannot therefore
be adjudged guilty of the charges against him without affording him a chance to confront the
said witness, Meriam Colapo. Otherwise, his right to due process would be infringed.
Erlinda Sy vs. Danilo Norberte

A.M. No. 00-1398-P. August 1, 2000

Facts: In her civil case versus Antoinetta Galvez, complainant Erlinda Sy obtained a writ of
preliminary attachment against all properties of the former. She alleged, however, that
respondent Danilo Norberte, Sheriff of Branch 125 of the RTC of Kalookan City, tipped off
Galvez about the said writ. She further alleged that Norberte actively assisted Galvez in the
removal of her personal property from the latter's residence. Sy filed a complaint with Branch
125 of the RTC of Kalookan City which was submitted for investigation.
Held: GUILTY. The investigation revealed that Norberte was positively identified and seen by the
complainant Sy and 2 other witnesses in the act of helping Galvez remove her personal
property from her residence. Norberte's alibi did not prove to be credible. The offense of serious
or grave misconduct refers to such misconduct that shows the element of corruption, clear intent
to violate the law or flagrant disregard of established rules. In tipping off and assisting Galvez,
Norberte's actions are an attempt to circumvent a valid court order. Even if Norberte did not tip
off Galvez, his mere presence at the scene is punishable. Being an officer of the Court,
respondent sheriff should have refrained from actuations though innocent and in good faith
which may result in suspicion of impropriety and may consequently taint the good image of the
judiciary. The nature and responsibilities of officers of the judiciary are not mere idealistic
sentiments but true working standards and attainable goals that should be matched with actual
deeds. They are expected to serve with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and
efficiency and to conduct themselves with propriety and decorum at all times. Norberte was
suspended for 1 month without pay and issued the warning that similar conduct in the future will
be punished more severely.
In Re: Procedure adopted by Judge Daniel Liangco

(A.M. No. 99-11-158-MTC. August 1, 2000)

Facts: RTC Judge Pedro Sunga of San Fernando, Pampanga received information about
irregularities in the disposition of jueteng cases before the MTC's of the said region. Upon
investigation, Judge Sunga discovered that of the 55 jueteng cases filed in July 1999, 53 were
assigned to Branch 1 of the MTC of San Fernando presided by Judge Daniel Liangco. Noting
that statistical improbability that 53 out of 55 jueteng cases should be assigned to only 1
Branch, Judge Sunga demanded a written explanation as to how such a situation had come
about. In his letter, Judge Liangco explained that it has been his practice to automatically take
over all jueteng cases without the need for raffling. The reason he cited is that the accused in
such cases are deprived of their liberty and that by automatically assigning these cases to his
branch, the accused can file motions for bail and the same can be entertained immediately
without waiting for the raffle. In short, because of the need for provisional liberty, all jueteng
cases are considered to be automatically raffled to his branch so that he may entertain motions
for bail and the accused can be immediately released upon filing of the bond. The Supreme
Court ordered further investigation of the case and placed Judge Liangco on preventive
suspension.
Held: GUILTY. Judge Liangco clearly violated Supreme Court Circular No. 7 which provides: "All
cases filed with the Court in stations or groupings where there are two or more branches shall
be assigned or distributed to the different branches by raffle. No case may be assigned to any
branch without being raffled." There is no connection at all between respondents alleged desire
to facilitate the release of such accused on bail and his questionable act of retaining the records
of the cases for direct assignment to his own sala. For after granting bail to the accused, his
alleged purpose of immediately extending provisional liberty to the accused shall already have
been served. There is thus no need or justification to retain the records of the cases and
consider them raffled off to his own sala. The questioned acts of respondent Judge Liangco
constitute a clear breach of his duty as a judge. The Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that:
A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary. Respondent judges manner of automatically assigning jueteng
cases to its own branch without the benefit of raffle, casts doubt on his integrity as a judge and
erodes the confidence of the people in the judicial system. A judges official conduct and his
behavior in the performance of judicial duties should be free from the appearance of impropriety
and must be beyond reproach. Judge Liangco was suspended from service for 6 months
without pay and issued the warning that similar conduct in the future shall be dealt with more
severely.
6. Neglect of Duty/Abuse of Authority

Zenaida S. Beso v. Judge Juan Daguman

A.M. No. MTJ-99-1211. January 28, 2000
Facts: In a Complaint-Affidavit dated December 12, 1997, Zenaida S. Beso charged Judge Juan
J. Daguman, Jr. with solemnizing marriage outside of his jurisdiction and of negligence in not
retaining a copy and not registering the marriage contract with the office of the Local Civil
Registrar.

In his comment, the respondent judge alleged that the marriage of the complainant had to be
solemnized in Calbayog City though outside his territory as municipal Judge of Sta. Margarita,
Samar because : 1) physically indisposed and unable to report to his station in Sta. Margarita;
2) complainant said she had to fly abroad that same day; 3) that for the parties to go to another
town for the marriage would be expensive and would entail serious problems of finding a
solemnizing officer and another pair of witnesses or sponsors; 4) if they failed to get married on
August 28, 1997, complainant would be out of the country for a long period and their marriage
license would lapse and necessitate another publication of notice; 5) if the parties go beyond
their plans for the scheduled marriage, complainant feared it would complicate her employment
abroad.
Held: GUILTY. The authority of a judge to solemnize marriage is only limited to those
municipalities under his jurisdiction. Clearly, Calbayog City is no longer within his area of
jurisdiction. Additionally, there are only three instances, as provided by Article 8 of the Family
Code, wherein a marriage may be solemnized by a judge outside his chamber[s] or at a place
other than his sala, and the circumstances of this case do not fall in any of these exceptions.
Moreover, as solemnizing officer, respondent Judge neglected his duty when he failed to
register the marriage of complainant to Bernardito Yman. Such duty is entrusted upon him
pursuant to Article 23 of the Family Code which provides:

"It shall be the duty of the person solemnizing the marriage to furnish either of the
contracting parties the original of the marriage certificate referred to in Article 6
and to send the duplicate and triplicate copies of the certificates not later than
fifteen days after the marriage, to the local civil registrar of the place where the
marriage was solemnized. xxx"
Lastly, a judge is charged with exercising extra care in ensuring that the records of the
cases and official documents in his custody are intact. There is no justification for missing
records save fortuitous events. The records show that the loss was occasioned by carelessness on
respondent Judges part. This Court reiterates that judges must adopt a system of record
management and organize their dockets in order to bolster the prompt and efficient dispatch of
business. It is, in fact, incumbent upon him to devise an efficient recording and filing system in
his court because he is after all the one directly responsible for the proper discharge of his
official functions.
7. Prompt Disposition of Cases/ Inefficiency/Abuse of Authority
State Prosecutor Romulo Tolentino vs. Judge Nilo Malanyaon
A.M. No. RTJ-99-1444. August 3, 2000
Facts: Judge Nilo Malanyaon, presiding judge of Branch 30 of the RTC of Camarines Sur,
dismissed 5 separate criminal cases for lack of evidence and also refused to issue warrants of
arrest on the ground of lack of probable cause. Acting State Prosecutor for Camarines Sur
Romulo Tolentino assailed the orders for dismissal and the refusal to issue the warrants for
arrest alleging that Judge Malanyaon had abused his authority and knowingly rendered unjust
orders. Tolentino also complained that several motions had been filed before respondent judge
and have yet to be resolved and decided upon.

Issues: (1) Did Judge Malanyaon exercise grave abuse of discretion and act in excess of
jurisdiction in dismissing the criminal cases?
(2) Was Judge Malanyaon guilty of unreasonable delay for failing to act on the motions
filed by State Prosecutor Tolentino?
Held: (1) NO. The allegations that respondent judge had violated Canons 1, 2 and 3 of the
Canons of Judicial Conduct are without merit. Good faith and absence of malice, corrupt or
improper consideration are sufficient defenses protecting a judicial officer charged with
ignorance of the law and promulgation of an unjust decision from being held accountable for
errors of judgment on the premise that no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in
the administration of justice can be infallible. There is no proof of grave abuse of discretion.
These charges were dismissed by the Court.
(2) YES. The motions/incidents were left unacted upon from 3 to 5 months and were
still pending when the administrative complaint was filed against respondent. Respondent
should be aware of his duties as an arbiter of justice. Under Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct, a judge shall dispose of the court's business promptly and decide cases within the
required periods. While the prosecutor in this case is not without fault, the respondent cannot
escape responsibility for his inaction of the pending motions before him. Even assuming
arguendo that the various motions filed by the prosecutor were considered to be mere scraps of
paper or without merit, the judge must nevertheless resolve on those matters promptly by
granting or denying them. It is the duty of the judge to rule upon the motions filed before him
even if his actions are merely to deny them. Respondent judge was found guilty for his failure to
resolve pending motions and/or incidents and, accordingly, a penalty of reprimand was imposed
upon him with the warning that a repetition of the same or similar violation will be dealt with a
more severe penalty by the Court.
Juan Luzarraga vs. Hon. Amaro M. Meteoro
A.M. No. 00-1572. August 3, 2000
Facts: Juan Luzarraga was the plaintiff in a civil case assigned to Branch 41 of the RTC of
Camarines Norte. After the said plaintiff had rested his case and presented his evidence, the
case was transferred to the newly-created Branch 64 of the RTC of Camarines Norte, presided
by Judge Amaro Meteoro. It was only 2 years later that Judge Meteoro proceeded with the
presentation of the defendant's evidence. The case was finally submitted for decision a year
later. After an elapse of more than 7 months without a decision on the case, Luzarraga filed an
administrative complaint against Judge Meteoro. Respondent judge pleaded for the
understanding and compassion of the Court, citing that his branch had more than 300 cases
pending before it, that he had trouble recruiting and training competent personnel and that he
had suffered a stroke.
Held: GUILTY. More than one year had already elapsed since the submission of the case and
respondent Judge has not decided the same despite the Motion for Early decision filed the
complainant. The Court has consistently held that the failure of a judge to decide a case within
the required period is not excusable and constitutes gross inefficiency and non-observance of
said rule is a ground for administrative sanction against the defaulting judge. Rule 3.05 of
Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct admonishes all judges to dispose of the court's
business promptly and to decide cases within the periods fixed by law. The failure to render a
decision within the 90-day period constitutes serious misconduct in derogation of the speedy
administration of justice. When circumstances arise that would prevent the judge from disposing
a case within the reglementary period, all that he has to do is to file an application with the Court

asking for a reasonable extension of time within which to resolve the case. However, the record
of this administrative matter does not show that respondent made an attempt to make such a
request. Instead, he preferred to keep the case pending, thereby inviting suspicion that
something sinister or corrupt is afoot. That he was burdened with a heavy case load and is a
stroke victim, serve only to mitigate the penalty, not to exonerate him. Judge Meteoro was fined
P20,000 with the warning that a repetition of the same shall be dealt with more severely. He was
further directed to decide the subject case within a non-extendible period of 30 days from
receipt of resolution, and to submit to the Office of the Court Administrator a copy of his decision
within 10 days from promulgation thereof.
Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in the RTC, Branches 87 and 98, Quezon City
A.M. No. 99-11-423-RTC. August 16, 2000
Facts: On September 15 to 17, 1999, the Office of the Court Administrator conducted an audit
and physical inventory of pending cases in Branches 87 and 98 of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, presided over by Judge Elsie Ligot-Telan and Judge Justo M. Sultan, respectively.
The audit team reported that Judge Ligot-Telan had a well-managed docket. Judge Sultan,
however, was a different story. Of the 57 cases submitted for decision, 34 were already beyond
the reglementary period, some of which involve detention prisoners. It was observed that the
said branch gave the least preference to cases submitted for decision, and it has no effective
docket system and recording of cases. In fact, the Branch Clerk of Court had not submitted the
required docket and inventory of cases for a number of years. Records did not show that Judge
Sultan ever requested for an extension of time within which to decide the cases submitted
before him.
Held: GUILTY. The Court reiterates that failure to decide cases within the required period is
inexcusable and constitutes gross inefficiency which is a ground for administrative sanction
against the defaulting judge, either by a fine or suspension from the service, depending on
factors that tend to aggravate or mitigate his liability. This is in accordance with the mandate that
the judge shall dispose of the business of the court promptly and decide cases within the
prescribed periods. Conformably, the rules require the courts to decide cases ready for decision
within 3 months from date of submission. The Court is not unmindful of the Herculean task trial
judges are faced with the perennial clogged dockets of the lower courts. However, this should
not be an excuse for them to abdicate their duty to dispense justice. Judges must adopt a
system of record management and organize their dockets in order to bolster the prompt and
efficient dispatch of business. Furthermore, if the caseload of the judge prevents the disposition
of cases within the reglementary periods, he should ask this Court for a reasonable extension of
time to dispose of the cases involved. This is to avoid or dispel any suspicion that something
sinister is going on. The Court fined Judge Sultan PhP 20,000 to be taken from his retirement
benefits.
Dominga D. Quillal-Lan vs. Judge Alicia L. Delos Santos
A.M. No. MTJ-00-1269. August 24, 2000
Facts: The daughter of complainant Dominga Quillal-Lan was the defendant in a Forcible Entry
case before Judge Alicia Delos Santos of the MTC of Digos, Davao del Sur. The complainant
alleges that respondent judge failed to decide the case within the mandatory 30-day period as
provided by the Rules on Summary Procedure. Judge Delos Santos avers that she was on sick
leave and therefore could not be expected to decide upon the case within the said period.

Held: GUILTY. There is no doubt that a case of Forcible Entry falls within the Rules of
Summary Procedure and as stated therein, must be decided within 30-days. Respondent should
have rendered judgment in the forcible entry case before she went on leave. Delay in the
disposition of cases covered by the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure defeats the very
purpose of said rule, which is the expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases. Failure to
decide such cases on time renders the rationale for the rule meaningless and inutile. Respondent
appears to be remiss in her duties as judge when she failed to render judgment in the case as
mandated by the rules. Under Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, she is required to
dispose of the courts business promptly and to decide cases within the required time frame. We
have time and again reminded judges to comply with the rules regarding the period to decide
cases, in pursuance of the Courts oft-repeated policy of speedy disposition of quality justice for
all. Judge Delos Santos was fined PhP 1,000 and issued a warning that similar conduct in the
future will be dealt with more severely.
Cob C. Dela Cruz v. Judge Rodolfo M. Serrano
A.M. No. RTJ-00-1582. September 4, 2000

Facts: Complainant contends, among others, that it took one (1) year and five (5) months instead
of three months to render a decision in civil case. The civil case was submitted for decision on
April 1996, but the decision thereon was only promulgated on October 8, 1997.
Held: GUILTY. It is not disputed that it took respondent Judge one (1) year and five (5) months,
after Civil Case No. 908 was submitted for decision, to decide it which is way beyond the threemonth period mandated by the Constitution.
Section 15 (1) of Article VIII of the Constitution provides that all cases filed before the lower
courts must be decided or resolved within three (3) months from date of submission. The Code
of Judicial Conduct likewise provides that a judge should administer justice impartially and
without delay [Rule 1.02.] and directs a judge to dispose of the courts business promptly and
decide cases within the required periods. [Rule 3.05.]

It is an oft-repeated maxim that justice delayed is often justice denied. Thus, any delay in the
administration of justice may result in depriving the litigant of his right to a speedy disposition of
his case and will ultimately affect the image of the judiciary. A delay in the disposition of cases
amounts to a denial of justice, brings the court into disrepute and ultimately erodes public faith
and confidence in the judiciary.
Rolando Sulla v. Hon. Rodolfo C. Ramos
A.M No. MTJ-00-1319. September 27, 2000

Facts: Dr. Rolando A. Sulla charging respondent Judge Rodolfo C. Ramos, presiding judge of
the Municipal Trial Court of Jaro, Leyte, with unreasonable delay or refusal to render a decision
in criminal Case No. 8121. The case was submitted for decision in April 1997. But as of May
21, 1999, date of complainants letter, and despite constant requests for its early resolution,
respondent Judge Ramos has not rendered any decision in the said case.

Held: GUILTY. This Court has consistently impressed upon judges the need to decide cases
promptly and expeditiously pursuant to Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and

Section 15(1) and (2), Article VIII of the Constitution. Judges are presumed to be aware of Rule
3.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which calls for a judge to be faithful to the law and
maintain professional competence. Rule 3.05 admonishes all judges to dispose of the courts
business promptly and decide cases within the period fixed by law.
8. Negligence/Incompetence of a Judge
Norma Esguerra vs. Judge Guillermo Loja

A.M. No. RTJ-00-1523. August 15, 2000

Facts: Norma Esguerra was the complainant in a criminal case for Falsification of a Public
Document tried before Judge Guillermo Loja of Branch 26 of the RTC of Manila. Complainant
alleged that Judge Loja failed to decide the case within the 90-day reglementary period and
further accused him of falsifying his certificate of service in order to make it appear that he had
decided the case. Judge Loja countered by stating that he had indeed decided upon the case
but rather, the decision was just not dated.
Held: GUILTY. A careful study of the facts shows that Judge Loja is guilty only of SIMPLE
NEGLIGENCE and not of the administrative complaint filed against him. There is no clear proof
that the respondent judge falsified his certificate of service simply because his decision was
dated. Even assuming that there was a slight delay in deciding the case, it must be taken into
consideration that Judge Loja has a heavy case load (almost 800 cases pending) and that this
is the first offense by a judge who provided long and consistent service to the Judiciary. The
Court fined Judge Loja PhP 2,000 and issued a warning that similar conduct in the future will be
more severely punished.
9. Duty of Court Employees
Marta Bucatcat v. Edgar Bucatcat and Gene Jaro
A.M. No. P-93-985. January 28, 2000
Facts:Marta T.Bucatcat (complainant) charged her husband, Edgar Y. Bucatcat, and Gene S.
Jaro (respondents), Court Interpreter respectively, of the Third Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Gandara, Samar, with immorality. Complainant avers that she is the legal wife of respondent
Bucatcat. She claims that respondents are having an illicit relationship with each other.
Moreover, respondents allegedly have two (2) children together and that respondent Jaro, at the
time of the filing of the letter-complaint, was pregnant with their third child.
Held: GUILTY. There is sufficient evidence to hold respondents liable for immorality for
maintaining an illicit relationship with each other. Every employee of the judiciary should

be an example of integrity, uprightness and honesty. Like any public servant, he must exhibit the
highest sense of honesty and integrity not only in the performance of his official duties but in his
personal and private dealings with other people, to preserve the courts good name and standing.
It cannot be overstressed that the image of a court of justice is mirrored in the conduct, official
and otherwise, of the personnel who work thereat, from the judge to the lowest of its personnel.
Court employees have been enjoined to adhere to the exacting standards of morality and

decency in their professional and private conduct in order to preserve the good name and
integrity of courts of justice.
Respondents DISMISSED from service.

JUNE 1998-1999
A. JUDGES
1. Good Faith in Rendering Decisions

Atty. Antonio T. Guerrero v. Hon. Adriano Villamor (296 SCRA 88)

Facts: Carlos and his counsel, Guerrero, charged respondent with gross ignorance of the law and
knowingly rendering an unjust judgment after they lost a civil and a criminal case tried by
respondent. They were also thwarted on appeal. However, in the pleadings before the CA, they
used abusive language in describing the respondents acts, hence, respondent judge cited them
for direct contempt, which was later set aside by the SC.
Held: Case dismissed. The order of direct contempt may only be considered as an error of
judgment. A judge may not be administratively charged for mere errors of judgment, in the
absence of showing of any bad faith, malice or corrupt purpose. Moreover, judges cannot be
held to account criminally, civilly, or administratively for an erroneous decision rendered by them
in good faith.

Impartiality

Re: Inhibition of Judge Eddie R. Rojas (292 SCRA 306)

Facts: Atty. Rojas was appointed a judge. One of the criminal cases he inherited was one in
which he acted as prosecutor. He explained that his delay in inhibiting himself from presiding on
that case was because it was only after the belated transcription of the stenographic notes that he
remembered that he handled that case. He also says that the counsels did not object and he never
held full-blown hearings anyway.
Held: Judge is filed & reprimanded. The Rules of Court prevent judges from trying cases where
they acted as counsel without the consent of the parties. This prevents not only a conflict of
interest but also the appearance of impropriety on the part of the judge. A judge should take no
part in a proceeding where his impartiality might reasonably be questioned. He should
administer justice impartially & without delay. The prohibition does not only cover hearings but
all judicial acts (e.g. orders, resolutions) some of which Judge Rojas did make.

Carlito D. Lazo v. Judge Antonio V. Tiong (300 SCRA 214)

Facts: Judge Tiong was accused of failing to inhibit himself in a criminal case because he was
related within the fourth degree of affinity to the accused. The judge claims he did so in the
hopes that his presence would allow the parties to settle amicably.
Held: Judge reprimanded. A judge should take no part in a proceeding where his impartiality
might reasonably be questioned. Also, Rule 137, Rules of Court, provides that no judge or
judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, inter alia, is related to either party within the sixth
degree pf consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree computed according to
the rules of the civil law. Under this provision, the Presiding Judge is mandated to disqualify
himself from sitting in a case. He cannot exercise his discretion whether to inhibit himself or not.
2. Speedy Administration of Justice

Baltazar D. Amion v. Judge Roberto S. Chiongson (301 SCRA 614)

Facts: A is a policeman charged with murder. During the trial, J ordered that he be represented
by counsel de officio because As attorney was ill. A then charged J with ignorance of the law &
oppression because the fact that the counsel de officio did not know the particulars of the case
meant that A would be denied due process.
Held: Complaint dismissed. The Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a judge should
administer justice impartially and without delay. A judge should always be imbued with a high
sense of duty & responsibility in the discharge of his obligation to promptly administer justice.
In this case, the reason J appointed a FLAG lawyer was because As lawyer had postponed
several hearings because he was ill or out of town. Also, A had various lawyers during the said
case who always postponed the hearings for various reasons such as illness, lack of knowledge of
the case or unavailability for trial. These are all legal but clearly dilatory means used by the
complainant to delay the case for 4 years. J should be commended for his efforts to expedite the
case.
Fe T. Bernardo v. Judge Amelia A. Fabros (307 SCRA 28)
Facts: B accused F of inaction in an unlawful detainer case for 7 months when the rules on
summary procedure call for a decision in 30 days. F does not deny the inaction but says B has no
standing as she is only the attorney-in-fact of the plaintiffs to the civil case.
Held: FINED. Judges must decide cases expeditiously, especially in summary proceedings. She
should either ask for additional time to decide or devise an efficient filing system to expedite
decision. Finally, standing or personal interest of the complainant is immaterial in administrative
cases which involves the public good.

Dolores Gomez v. Judge Rodolfo A. Gatdula (293 SCRA 433)

Facts: Gomez is the complainant in 2 different criminal cases before Judge Gatdula. When she
petitioned the SC to change the venue of 1 of the cases, Respondent suspended the scheduled
hearings in both cases. When required by the SC to show cause why disciplinary action should

not be taken against him, he delayed his comment thereto. He eventually explained that the
suspension of hearing was made because the request for change of venue was pending in the SC.
Held: Judge Gatdula acted vindictively & oppressively, apparently irked by the request of
petitioner. He need not have suspended both hearings as the change of venue only involved
one case. His delay in commenting on the change of venue also effectively delayed both cases
by 5 months. His acts are not free from the appearance of impropriety, let alone beyond
reproach, as required by Canon 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics.

Re: Cases Left Undecided by Judge Narciso M. Bumanlag, Jr. (306 SCRA 50)
Facts: Upon retirement, B left 7 criminal and 3 civil cases undecided within the 90-day period
required by section 15, Article VIII of the Constitution. He said his failure was due to a serious
illness.
Held: FINED. Members of the bench have a duty to administer justice without undue delay.
Failure to do so within the reglementary period constitutes a neglect of duty warranting
administrative penalties. If hindered by illness, a judge should inform the Office of Court
Administrator and ask for additional time to decide in order to avoid the sanctions. However, if
there is no malice or bad faith, and the judge is prevented by factors beyond his control, the
penalty will be mitigated.

Re: Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in the Regional Trial Court Branch 24, Ipil,
Zamboanga del Sur; Branch 2, Isabela, Basilan; and Municipal Circuit Trial Court,
Labason, Zamboanga del Norte (303 SCRA 208)
Facts: Judge Apostol had a backlog of 280 cases. Also, there had been no actions on 268 other
cases assigned to him. Judge says he has constant medical problems and no legal researchers to
help him. These and the peace and order problems in his locality prevent him from expediting.
Held: Fined for gross neglect of duty. The Code of Judicial Conduct provides that a judge should
administer justice without delay and dispose of the courts business promptly and decide cases
within the reglementary periods. If his health problems were preventing him from doing his duty,
he should have retired early so a healthier successor could act on the case load.

Re: Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in the RTC, Branch 68 of Camilang, Tarlac
(305 SCRA 61)
Facts: Judge R was due for compulsory retirement. The OCA found that he had many pending
cases, some of which were undecided beyond the 90-day period.
Held: FINED but penalty mitigated. Rule 3.05 of Canon 3 enjoins all judges to attend promptly to
the business of the court and decide cases within the time fixed by law. A judge is mandated to
render judgment not more than ninety (90) days from the time the case is submitted for
decision. Failure to render the decision within the prescribed period of ninety (90) days from
submission of a case for decision constitutes serious misconduct and gross inefficiency.
However, since after being reminded of this, Judge R cleared most of his docket (even those not
overdue for decision) before retiring, the fine is mitigated.

Atty. Raula A. Sanchez v. Judge Augustine A. Vestil (298 SCRA 1)

Facts: Complainant charged RTC Judge Vestil with falsifying his monthly certificate of service
submitted to the SC by stating that he has no pending case submitted for decision or resolution
that has gone beyond the NINETY (90) day period allowed by law when in fact there were
numerous civil & criminal cases which the respondent failed to resolve within the said period.
Respondents say most of the cases were either inherited & substantially heard by other judges, or
that they require further study or whose stenographic notes were yet to be transcribed and these
are excepted from being included the certificate by a proviso contained therein.
Held: Respondent Judge suspended and fined. Judges are mandated to decide cases
seasonably. Judges who cannot comply with such mandate should ask for additional time,
explaining in their request the reasons for the delay. Neither the proviso nor the fact that notes
are to be transcribed is a valid defense for not deciding within the required time. The SC has
consistently held that the failure of a judge to decide a case within the required period is not
excusable and constitutes gross inefficiency & the non-observance of said rule is ground for
administrative sanction against the defaulting judge.

B. LAWYERS
1. Assisting in the Speedy Administration of Justice

Eternal Gardens Memorial Park Corporation vs. Court of Appeals (293 SCRA 622)
Facts: Judgment was rendered against the petitioner ordering it to reconvey the cemetery to the
rightful owners. Despite the final decision of the SC, petitioner was able to prevent the
execution for 17 years, and thus render the judgment ineffectual. They filed several petitions and
motions for reconsideration with the trial court and the CA despite the fact that it would never
prosper as the trial courts decision had long become final before the said petitions were filed.
Held: Petition denied. While lawyers owe their entire devotion to the interest of the client and
zeal in the defense of their clients right, they are also officers of the court, bound to exert every
effort to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. They should not misuse the
rules of procedure to defeat the ends of justice or unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a
judgment or misuse court processes. The facts and the law should advise them that a case such
as this should not be permitted to be filed to merely clutter the already congested judicial
dockets. They do not advance the cause of law or their clients by commencing litigations that for
sheer lack of merit do not deserve the attention of the courts.

Duty to Protect Clients Interest

Development Bank of the Philippines and Asset Privitization Trust v. Court of Appeals and
Continental Cement Corporation (302 SCRA 362)

Facts: CCC filed an injunction suit to prevent the DBP and APT from foreclosing on its
mortgages. During trial, DBP & APT were unable to appear for cross-examining CCCs
witnesses because the respective counsels were unprepared, unavailable or ill. The lower court
decided this as a waiver, hence judgment was rendered for CCC. DBP & APT filed this petition
alleging denial of due process.
Held: Petition denied. There can be no denial of due process where a party had the opportunity to
participate in the proceedings but did not do so. Counsel for APT was absent on several
occasions because of withdrawal of previous counsel, unreadiness to conduct the crossexaminations and serious illness. The withdrawal of APTs previous counsel in the thick of the
proceedings would be a reasonable ground to seek postponement of the hearing. However, such
necessitates a duty on the part of the new counsel to prepare himself for the next scheduled
hearing. The excuse that it was due to the former counsels failure to turn over the records of the
case to APT, shows the negligence of the new counsel to actively recover the records of the case.
Counsel should have taken adequate steps to fully protect the interest of his client, rather than
pass the blame on the previous counsel. A motion to postpone trial on the ground that counsel is
unprepared for trial demonstrates indifference and disregard of his clients interest. A new
counsel who appears in a case in midstream is presumed and obliged to acquaint himself with all
the antecedent processes and proceedings that have transpired prior to his takeover. Also, even if
counsel had been ill with dengue, he chose not to notify his co-counsels who could have
conducted the cross-examination.
2. Falsehood/Forum-shopping/Dilatory Tactics

Ban Hua U. Flores v. Atty. Enrique S. Chua (306 SCRA 465)

Facts: Chua was charged with many offenses. The evidence was found to support the charges
that he notarized a forged deed of sale, that he caused to be published an advertisement of a SEC
decision in order to bring ridicule and shame upon a corporation, that he filed a civil case
knowing that the reliefs he prayed for were probably granted in the SEC case thus belying his
certification against forum shopping. He has also been previously reprimanded for bribing a
judge and for consistently using dilatory tactics to prolong a litigation.
Held: DISBARRED. He has thus violated Rules 10.01, 12.02, 12.04 (foisting or commission of
falsehood, forum-shopping and causing in court proceedings), Canon 19 (failing to resort to
lawful means in representing his client), 27, 3.01 and 13.02 (causing undue publication of a
pending action). He had an active role in committing fraud since he falsely stated that the person
making the deed of sale appeared before him and stated that the same was his free act and deedwhen evidence shows the signature was forged; also, he prolonged a family dispute by using
dilatory tactics and placing an advertisement in order to ridicule his opponents in violation of
Rule 1.04 that lawyers should encourage their clients to end a controversy by a fair settlement. A
lawyer must uphold the integrity of the profession. He brings honor to it by honesty and fair
dealing and by performing his duties to society, the bar, the courts and his clients.
3. Good Moral Character

Tomas Cabulisan v. Judge Adrian N. Pagalilauan (297 SCRA 593)

Facts: Cabulisan filed an administrative complaint against respondent for grave misconduct
committed as follows : (1) peeping into the bathroom where Marilyn C. Dumayas, a public
health nurse, and daughter of the owner of the house where he was boarding, was then taking a
bath; (2) having a mistress in the neighboring town; and (3) allowing local practitioners to write
decisions for him.
Held: Respondent filed for voyeurism, other charges dismissed for lack of evidence. People
who run the judiciary, particularly justices and judges, must not only be proficient in both the
substantive and procedural aspects of the law, but more importantly, they must possess the
highest degree on integrity and probity and an unquestionable moral uprightness both in their
public and private lives. By committing the acts in question, respondent violated the trust
reposed in him and utterly failed to live up to the noble ideals and rigid standards of morality
required in the judicial profession.

Victoriano P. Resurreccion v. Atty. Ciriaco C. Sayson (300 SCRA 129)

Facts: respondent was accused of having appropriated for his own benefit the amount of P 2,
5000.00 representing the amount which was delivered by the Resurreccion to the respondent as
compensation or settlement money of a case for homicide thru reckless imprudence. Sayson did
not turn over the amount to his client, the Complainant in the criminal case, forcing
Resurreccion to pay the same amount again. Sayson was later convicted for estafa.
Held: Sayson DISBARRED. Good moral character is not only a condition precedent to admission
to the legal profession, but it must also remain extant in order to maintain ones good standing in
that exclusive and honored fraternity. Acts of moral turpitude (i.e. done contrary to justices,
honesty & good morals) such as estafa or falsification render one unfit to be a member of the legal
proession. Also, Saysons acts of delaying the hearings before the OSG and the IBP reinforce this
view.

4. Abuse of Authority

Rosalia Villaruel, et al v. Grapilon, et al: In the Matter of the Petition to Remove Atty. Jose
A. Grapilon as President, IBP (302 SCRA 138)
Facts: G was accused of 16 IBP employees who sought his removal as IBP President for:
Immorality, questionable disbursements of funds, dishonesty, failure to turn over IBP donations
from private individuals, refusal to turn over records and money pertaining to the Employees
Loan Savings Association, Appropriation of Office Property, Extending loans to IBP employees,
oppression/harassment, appointment of unworthy employees and relatives and organization of a
secret society. The issue regarding legal ethics is whether the SC can assume jurisdiction or
should it be considered a labor dispute under the jurisdiction of the NLRC.

Held: Charges dropped. All the accusations of the petitioners were either unsubstantiated or
refuted by controverting evidence. As to the issue of jurisdiction, the SC has previously assumed
administrative jurisdiction over the IBP president. If the petitioners allege that the IBP terminated
them as an act of reprisal and with malice or bias, this would constitute gross abuse of authority
and serious misconduct warranting the use of the SCs supervisory powers over the IBP. Lastly,
even if there was no wrongful act, G is ordered to transfer the funds of the savings and loan
association to an account in their name to prevent the appearance and suspicion of impropriety.
5. Gross Ignorance of the Law

Jesus Conducto vs. Judge Iluminado C. Monzon (291 SCRA 619)

Facts: Respondent judge was charged with gross ignorance of the law. He refused to suspend
the mayor due to criminal charges against the latter for the crime of unlawful appointment. The
judge opined that an official cannot be suspended for something that has happened in a previous
term. Settled jurisprudence says this only applies to administrative, not criminal cases.
Held: Fined for P5000. While judges should not be disciplined for inefficiency on account
merely of occasional mistakes or errors of judgment, it is imperative that they be conversant
with basic legal principles. A judge is called upon to exhibit more than just cursory acquaintance
with the statutes and procedural rules; it is imperative that he be conversant with the basic legal
principles and aware of well-settled and authoritative doctrines. Also, if he did the act
deliberately, he violated Canon 18 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics directs a judge to administer
his office with due regard to the integrity of the system of the law itself, remembering that he is
not a depository of arbitrary power, but a judge under the sanction of law. An RTC judge cannot
overturn a settled doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court, otherwise, litigation would be
endless.

6. Gross Immoral Conduct

Julieta B. Narag vs. Atty. Dominador M. Narag (291 SCRA 451)

Facts: Atty. Narags spouse filed a petition for disbarment in the IBP alleging that her husband
courted one of his students, later maintaining her as a mistress and having children by her. Atty.
Narag claims that his wife was a possessive, jealous woman who abused him and filed the
complaint out of spite. IBP disbarred him, hence, this petition.
Held: Narag failed to prove his innocence because he failed to refute the testimony given
against him and it was proved that his actions were of public knowledge and brought disrepute
and suffering to his wife and children. Good moral character is a continuing qualification
required of every member of the bar. Thus, when a lawyer fails to meet the exacting standard of
moral integrity, the Supreme Court may withdraw his or her privilege to practice law. (Canons
1&7, Rule 7.03, Code of Ethics for Lawyers) It is not only a condition precedent to the practice
of law, but a continuing qualification for all members. Hence when a lawyer is found guilty of

gross immoral conduct, he may be suspended or disbarred. Grossly immoral means it must be
so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high
degree or committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the
common sense of decency. As a lawyer, one must not only refrain from adulterous relationships
but must not behave in a way that scandalizes the public by creating a belief that he is flouting
those moral standards.

Remedios Tapucar vs. Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar (293 SCRA 331)

Facts: Respondent was previously dismissed as CFI judge for maintaining and cohabiting with
his mistress. Despite this, he later married the same woman and had children with her. He even
made statements displaying contempt for the SC and mocking the law and said court. Petitioner,
his lawful wife, filed a letter-complaint for disbarment against her husband. IBP disbarred him.
Held: Disbarred (ratio is the same as the Narag case). A judge is a visible representation of the
law and, more importantly of justice. Ordinary citizens consider him as a source of strength that
fortifies their will to obey the law. A judge should avoid the slightest infraction of the law in all
actuations, lest it be a demoralizing example to others. Likewise, an attorney is also invested
with public trust. As officers of the court, lawyers must ensure the faith and confidence of the
public that justice is administered with dignity and civility. A high degree of moral integrity is
expected of a lawyer in the community where he resides. The Court may disbar or suspend a
lawyer for misconduct whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be
wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity, and good demeanor, thus proving unworthy to
continue as an officer of the court. The power to disbar, however, is one to be exercised with
great caution and only in a clear case of misconduct which seriously affects the standing and
character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and a member of the bar. Keeping a mistress,
entering into another marriage while a prior one subsists, as well as abandoning and/or
mistreating complainant and their children, show his disregard of family obligations, morality
and decency, the law and the lawyers oath. Such gross misbehavior over a long period of time
clearly shows a serious flaw in respondents character, his moral indifference to scandal in the
community, and his outright defiance of established norms.

Gross Misconduct

Erlinda Alonto-Frayna v. Judge Abdulmajid Astih (300 SCRA 199)

Facts: Judge Asith did not act on the case of the herein complainant for over 2 years despite the
orders and directives of the Office of the Court Administrator to resolve it without delay. In
addition, when asked to explain his actions before the SC, respondent failed to reply.
Held: A Judge who deliberately and continuously refuses to comply with the resolution of the SC
is guilty of gross misconduct & insubordination. It is gross misconduct & even without outright
disrespect for the SC for the respondent judge to exhibit indifference to the resolutions requiring
him to comment on the accusations contained in the complaint against him. Furthermore,
failure to render a decision beyond the 90 day period from its submission constitutes serious

misconduct to the detriment of the honor & integrity of his office & in derogation of a speedy
administration of justice.

Romulo F. Manuel v. Judge Demetrio d. Calimag (307 SCRA 657)

Facts: M charged C with selling him a stolen car, for which he was arrested.
Held: CASE DISMISSED. No evidence to substantiate the charges. The SC also said that to
warrant dismissal for misconduct, it must be shown that the misconduct is serious and has a
direct relation to his official duties amounting to misadministration, or intentional neglect and
failure to discharge said duties. The judicial acts complained of must be so corrupt or inspired
by an intention to violate the law.

Felicidad L. Oronce, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et. al. (298 SCRA 133)
Facts: During a dispute over land, Flaminiano illegally took possession of the property in
litigation using abusive methods. She was aided by her husband, a lawyer. The illegal entry
took place while the case was pending in the CA & while a writ of preliminary injunction was in
force.
Held: Atty. Flaminianos acts of entering the property without the consent of its occupants & in
contravention of the existing writ or preliminary injunction & making utterances showing
disrespect for the law & this Court, are unbecoming of a member of the Bar. Although he says
that they peacefully took over the property, such peaceful take-over cannot justify defiance
of the writ of preliminary injunction that he knew was still in force. Through his acts, he has
flouted his duties as a member of the legal profession. Under the Code of Professional
Responsibility, he is prohibited from counseling or abetting activities aimed at defiance of the
law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.
Re: Leaves of Absence Without Approval of Judge Eric T Calderon, Municipal Trial Court
Judge of Calumpit, Bulacan (302 SCRA 92)
Facts: Administrative case against Judge C for incurring leaves of absence for an almost straight
period of 3 years. His excuse is that he was suffering from a lingering illness of malignant
hypertension. However, despite the fact that medical certificates were presented in his favor,
most were made by his personal doctor (an orthopedic doctor). Also, the tests given by the Court
physician contradict the diagnosis given by his doctor.
Held: Guilty of gross misconduct and abandonment of office, judge dismissed. Judge C should
have been more conscious of his court duties, as well as more cautious of his actuations, than
he has shown in the performance of his functions and the discharge of his responsibilities to the
Court and the citizenry. Further, he should have been aware that, in frequently leaving his
station, he has caused great disservice to many litigants and has denied them speedy justice.
From the record it could be fairly concluded that he had habitually abandoned his sala for no
justifiable excuse at all. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitor , that the Court may impose its authority
upon erring judges whose actuations, on their face, would show gross incompetence, ignorance
of the law, or misconduct, is patently applicable to the instant case.

Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals (296 SCRA 171)

Facts: Petitioner filed a case for recission against the Quetulios and Abadillas alleging that the
former sold the land that had already been expropriated. The Quetulios did not file an answer, but
at the hearing on the motion for default, co-defendant Hernando was permitted by the judge to
appear as counsel for the defendants and file an answer.
Held: Case reinstated. Evidently, when respondent Hernando appeared before the trial court
and filed the Answer/Motion to dismiss, he was still under suspension from the practice of law.
A suspended lawyer, during his suspension, is certainly prohibited from engaging in the practice
of law, and if he does so, he may be disbarred. The reason is that, his continuing to practice the
profession during his suspension constitutes a gross misconduct and a willful disregard of the
suspension order, which should be obeyed though how erroneous it may be until set aside.

Impropriety

Flaviano B. Cortes v. Judge Emerito M. Agcaoili (249 SCRA 423)

Facts: Respondent was charged with impropriety and gross ignorance of the law. In a case for
illegal logging, he dismissed the case and returned illegally cut timber to the defendants because
the search warrant was invalid. He was also seen in eating and drinking in the company of said
defendants, and this supposedly influenced his decision.
Held: Judge Agcaoili is fined and suspended. Respondent erred in returning the seized articles
even though the warrant was invalid, illegal articles (illegally cut lumber) are not returned to
the possessor. He also violated Canon 2, Rule 2.01 of the Code of Judicial Ethics i.e. to avoid
impropriety or even or even the appearance of impropriety. Even though it was not proven that
he was influenced by the defendants (the dismissal was proper), he should not have fraternized
with litigants who had a pending case before him. To do so erodes public confidence in the
integrity and independence of the judiciary. A judge must avoid even the semblance of
impropriety.

Carlos Dionisio v. Hon. Zosimo V. Escano (302 SCRA 411)

Facts: E posted an advertisement for waitresses and singers to work at his restaurant at the RTC
bulletin board. He also conducted interviews for this in his sala. He was later caught when a
reporter from Hoy Gising! taped an interview which revealed that he intended to operate a
drinking pub with scantily clad waitresses.
Held: SUSPENDED. Rules 2.00, 5.02 and 5.03 provide that a judge should avoid impropriety
and even the appearance of impropriety. He should also refrain from financial and business
dealings that tend to reflect adversely on the courts impartiality, interfere with the proper
performance of judicial activities, or increase involvement with lawyers and litigants. He should
also manage financial interests so as to minimize the number of cases giving grounds for
disqualification. Finally, the halls of justice should not be used for unrelated purposes.

Benalfre J. Galang v. Judge Abelardo H. Santos (307 SCRA 582)

Facts: S was a judge and the publisher/columnist for a tabloid; he was also a writer for another
paper. G charges him with using his columns to ventilate his views. He has repeatedly used
insulting and inflammatory language against the governor and the provincial prosecutor and legal
adviser.
Held: JUDGE DISMISSED. While S has the right to free speech, his writing of vicious editorials
compromise his duties as judge in the impartial administration of justice. They reflect both on his
office and on the officers he ridicules. The personal behavior of a judge in his professional and
everyday life should be free from the appearance of impropriety. Improper conduct erodes the
public confidence in the judiciary.

Benjamin Sia Lao vs. Hon. Felimon C. Abelila III (295 SCRA 267)
Facts: in a family dispute over a parcel of land, respondent judge committed acts of forcible
entry, attempted to deny complainant of possession despite a lease in the latters favor. He also
gave firearms to his men in order to assault complainants workers. Respondent also fled from
police when called in for questioning.
Held: Respondent DISMISSED. A judge is the visible representation of the law and the
embodiment of the peoples sense of justice and that, accordingly, he should constantly keep
himself away from any act of impropriety, not only in the performance of his official duties but
also in his everyday actuations. No other position exacts a greater demand on moral
righteousness and uprightness of an individual than perhaps a seat in the judiciary. A judge
must be the first to abide by the law and to weave an example for the others to follow.

Spouses Benedicto & Rose Godinez v. Hon. Antonio Alano and Sheriff Alberto Ricardo
Alano (303 SCRA 259)
Facts: G charged A with committing irregularities in a civil case for sum of money. In said case,
a writ of preliminary attachment was issued and the effects seized were kept in Judge As house.
The court investigator found that the writ was improperly issued because the allegations of fraud
and attempts to abscond in the affidavit were bare assertions and not substantiated by the facts.
Held: FINED. The writ was issued in error. But in order to merit a disciplinary sanction, the error
or mistake committed by a judge should be patent, gross, malicious, deliberate, or done in bad
faith. Absent a clear showing that the judge has acted arrantly, the issue becomes judicial in
character and would not properly warrant the imposition of administrative punishment. Judge A
is fined for storing the effects in his house and their intent to charge storage fees. Judges should
avoid impropriety of the appearance of impropriety.

Gregorio & Teresita Lorena v. Judge Adolfo Encomienda (302 SCRA 632)
Facts: Spouses Lorena were evicted from the property of Judge Es brother. They refused to
vacate. The mayor invited the parties to a conciliation meeting but they still refused. The owners
allowed them to stay on the condition that they sign a written promise to leave after the grace
period. When L refused, E phoned him and tried to convince him to sign. L still refused, E then

said: mga tarantado, mabulok kayo sa kalabos! and slammed the phone down. L accuses E and
his conspirators of abuse of authority for later throwing them in jail.
Held: REPRIMANDED. Although the charges against E were refuted by evidence, the serious
nature of the tasks of judges requires them to be circumspect in both their public and their
private dealings. As they are expected to rise above human frailties they must, in all their
activities, avoid not only impropriety but even the appearance of impropriety. Hence, E should
not have called L by [hone which gave the impression of undue pressure and influence. He
should not have cursed L over the phone as a judges behavior must be beyond reproach.

Office of the Court Administrator vs. (Judge) Florentino S. Barron (297 SCRA 376)
Facts: Judge Barron was arrested during an entrapment operation when he tried to solicit bribes
from an American national in exchange for ruling in the latters favor in a pending case.
Held: Judge dismissed. A judge should always be a symbol of rectitude and propriety,
comporting himself in a manner that will raise no doubt whatsoever about his honesty. The
conduct of respondent shows that he can be influenced by monetary considerations. His act of
demanding and receiving money from a party-litigant constitutes serious misconduct in office. It
is this kind of gross and flaunting misconduct, no matter how nominal the amount involved,
which erodes the respect for the law and the courts.

Sarah B. Vedana vs. Judge Eudarlo B. Valencia (295 SCRA 1)

Facts: Complainant is the court interpreter and a relative of respondent judge. She claims that
he kissed and fondled her when she went to his sala to inform him that the cases for the day were
ready for trial.
Held: Respondent guilty of violating Canons 2, 3 and 22 of the Code of Judicial Ethics. The
Code mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of impropriety not only with
respect to his performance of his judicial duties, but also to his behavior outside his sala and as a
private individual. A public official is also judged by his private morals. A judge, in order to
promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with
propriety at all times. A judges official life can not simply be detached or separated from his
personal existence.

Negligence

Corazon T. Reontoy v. Atty. Liberato R. Ibadlit (302 SCRA 604)

Facts: On January 28, 1998 the SC found Ibadlit administratively liable and suspended him from
the practice of law for 1 year for failing to appeal within the reglementary period the decision
rendered against his client. His reason was, an appeal would only be futile. SC declared that it
was highly improper for him to have adopted such opinion. SC said that a lawyer was without
authority to waive his clients right to appeal and that his failure to appeal within the
reglementary period constituted negligence and malpractice, proscribed by Rule 18.03, Canon

18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides (a) lawyer shall not neglect a
legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
This is a motion for reconsideration.

Held: Suspension lowered to 2 months his arguments are partly persuasive, he believed in good
faith that his clients case was weak and that she accepted his explanation that the adverse
decision was not worth appealing anymore. Besides, it was only several years later that she
complained when no more relief was available to her. Also, complainant had reasonable
opportunity to hire another counsel for a second opinion whether to appeal from the judgment or
file a petition for relief, that he did not commit to handle his clients case on appeal and that the
testimonies of complainant and her brother were unpersuasive. This is also his first offense.
People of the Philippines v. Sevilleno ( 304 SCRA 519)
Facts: In a criminal case for rape with homicide, the accused pleaded guilty. However, the 3 PAO
lawyers assigned as counsel de officio did not perform their duty. The first did not advise his
client of the consequences of pleading guilty, the second left the courtroom during trial and thus
did not cross-examine the prosecution witnesses. The third postponed the presentation of
evidence for the defense, and when he did appear, he said he would rely solely on the plea in the
mistaken belief that it would lower the penalty to reclusion perpetua.
Held: Case remanded. Canon 18 required every lawyer to serve his client with utmost
dedication, competence and diligence. He must not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and
his negligence in this regard renders him administratively liable. In this case, the defense
lawyers did not protect, much less uphold, the fundamental rights of the accused.

N.B. Case remanded because of error by the judge in not using searching questions to find if the
plea was made knowingly.
Rodolfo P. Velasquez v. CA & PCIB (GR No. 124049, June 30, 1999)
Facts: As an incident in the main case, V appointed his counsel as attorney-in-fact to represent
him at the pre-trial. Counsel failed to appear, hence V was declared in default. The order of
default was received by counsel but no steps were taken to have it lifted or set aside.
Held: Binding on V. V was also guilty of negli8gence because after making the special power of
attorney, he went abroad and paid no further attention to the case until he received the decision.
Thus, no FAME which will warrant a lifting of the order.

Property Under Litigation

Regalado Daroy vs. Esteban Abecia

Facts: Daroy was plaintiff in a forcible entry case. He hired Abecia as his lawyer and won. To
satisfy the award for damages, a parcel of land of the defendant was sold to Daroy at an

execution sale. The land was then sold to Daroys relative, who then sold it to Abecias wife. He
now claims that these sales are void because Abecia forged his signature on the deeds of sale.
IBP disbarred Abecia.
Held: Reversed. The evidence shows that Daroy was a party to the sale at the time ot was
made and did not discover it 9 years later as he claimed. He was not defrauded <real issue
the parties thought that because the land had been acquired at a public sale to satisfy a
judgment in a case in which respondent was complainants counsel, the latter could not acquire
the land. The parties made this arrangement to circumvent Art. 1491 of the Civil Code which
prevents lawyers from acquiring property and rights that may be the object of any litigation in
which they may take by virtue of their profession. The prohibition in Art. 1491 does not apply to
the sale of a parcel of land acquired by a client to satisfy a judgment in his favor, to his attorney
was not the subject of the litigation. While judges, prosecuting attorneys, and others connected
with the administration of justice are prohibited from acquiring property or rights in litigation or
levied upon in execution the prohibition with respect to attorneys in the case extends only to
property and rights that may be the object of any litigation in which they may take part by virtue
of their profession.

Qualifications

Ruferto Gutierrez and Maritess Passion vs. Judge Estanislao S. Belan

(294 SCRA 1)
Facts: Concerned citizens of Binan Laguna charged respondent MTC judge with conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service. They claim he committed perjury for failure to
disclose a previous charge for two criminal offenses in his written application to the JBC.
Held: Judge is dismissed. Every prospective appointee to the judiciary must apprise the
appointing authority of every matter bearing on his fitness for judicial office, including such
circumstances as may reflect on his integrity and probity. These are qualifications specifically
required of appointees to the judiciary by Article VIII, Sec. 7(3) of the Constitution. The act of
concealing the two criminal cases against him is a clear proof of his lack of the said qualification
and renders him unworthy to sit as a judge- even if he was ultimately acquitted. He is not being
chastened for having had a pending criminal case at the time of his application for a judicial
position but for his dishonesty and misrepresentation in the process of seeking that office.

Unlawful Conduct

Cleto Docena vs. Atty. Dominador Q. Limon (295 SCRA 262)

Facts: Respondent was petitioners lawyer in a civil case. During that case, he asked the
petitioners to post a supersedeas bond to stay execution of the appealed decision. Petitioners
forwarded the money to Limon. Later, the case was decided in their favor. They were unable to
recover the money because the clerk of court said no such bond had ever been filed. IBP
suspended him for one year. Hence this petition.

Held: Disbarred (see Canon 1.01 and 16.01). Respondents allegation that the money was
payment of his fees was overcome by other evidence. The law is not a trade nor craft but a
profession. Its basic ideal is to render public service and to secure justice for those who seek its
aid. If it has to remain an honorable profession and attain its basic ideal, lawyers should not only
master its tenets and principles but should also, by their lives, accord continuing fidelity to them.
By extorting money from his client through deceit, Limon has sullied the integrity of his brethren
in the law and has indirectly eroded the peoples confidence in the judicial system. He is
disbarred for immoral, deceitful and unlawful conduct.
Victor Nunga v. Atty. Verancio Viray (306 SCRA 487)
Facts: N accused V of notarizing documents without a commission. It appears that in 1987 and
1991 he notarized deeds of sale of property between the bank he works for and his minor son. At
those times, he was not commissioned as a notary public.
Held: SUSPENDED. Notarization is invested with public interest because3 it converts a private
document into a public one. Notarizing without commission is a violation of the lawyers oath to
obey the laws (the Notarial Law) and by making it appear that he is so authorized is a deliberate
falsehood which violates the lawyers oath and Rule 1.01 (CPR) that a lawyer shall not engage
in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Atty. Prudencio Penticostes v. Prosecutor Diosdado Ibaez (304 SCRA 281)

Facts: Pascual was sued for non-remittance of SSS benefits. She gave the contested amount to
respondent, who was supposed to forward the same to the SSS and drop the charges. Respondent
did not forward the amount. He only remitted the amount after his complaint for misconduct was
filed with the IBP.
Held: REPRIMANDED. A high sense of morality, honesty and fair dealing is expected and
required of a member of the bar. Rule 1.01 provides that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. While Pascual may not strictly be considered a client of
respondent, the rules relating to a lawyers handling of funds of a client is still applicable, thus,
lawyers are bound to promptly account for money or property received by them on behalf of
their clients and failure to do so constitutes professional misconduct. Also, even if he was acting
as a prosecutor, Canon 6 provides that these canons shall apply to lawyers in government
service in the discharge of their official tasks.

Attorneys Fees

Renato S. Ong & Francia N. Ong v. Court of Appeals, Inland Trailways, Inc. & Philtranco
Service Enterprise, Inc. (301 SCRA 387)
Facts: Renato Ong was injured during a vehicular collision. He was awarded damages by the
trial court. On appeal, the CA, the awards for actual damages, moral damages & attorneys fees
were reduced because (1) the cost & feasibility of corrective surgery had not been adduced in
evidence, (2) the document relied upon to prove actual damages was not formally offered in

evidence and (3) no evidence but the bare assertion of counsel was put forward to prove damages
for unearned income.
Held: Attorneys fees is an indemnity for damages ordered by a court to be paid by the losing
party to the prevailing party, based on any of the cases authorized by law. It is payable not to
the lawyer but to the client, unless the 2 have agreed that the award shall pertain to the lawyer
as additional compensation or as part thereof. The Court has established a set of standards in
fixing the amount of attorneys fees. Counsels performance, however, does not justify the award
of 25 percent attorneys fees. The nature of the case was not exceptionally difficult, and his
handling of the case was sorely inadequate, as shown by his failure to follow elementary norms
of civil procedure & evidence. It is well-settled that such award is addressed to sound judicial
discretion and subject to judicial control.

Legal Ethics
Conflicts of interests, a crucial aspect of the subject of legal and judicial ethics which is
proscribed by all legal systems in the world, is a recurring problem that insults the legal
profession, for which reason, I wish to share a few Philippine decisions thereon, infra.
1. In the case of ERLINDA ABRAGAN, et. al. vs. vs. Atty. MAXIMO G.
RODRIGUEZ, A.C. No. 4346. , April 3, 2002, it was held that lawyers
violate their oath of office when they represent conflicting interests and that
they taint not only their own professional practice, but the entire legal
profession itself. Thus:
X x x.
Having said that, we find, however, that respondent falls short of the
integrity and good moral character required from all lawyers. They are
expected to uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times. The trust
and confidence clients repose in them require a high standard and
appreciation of the latters duty to the former, the legal profession, the
courts and the public. Indeed, the bar must maintain a high standard of
legal proficiency as well as of honesty and fair dealings. To this end,
lawyers should refrain from doing anything that might tend to lessen the
confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of their
profession.
In the present case, respondent clearly violated Rule 15.03 of Canon 15
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that a
lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written
consent of all concerned given after full disclosure of the facts.
The Court explained in Buted v. Hernando:

[A] lawyer represents conflicting interests when, in behalf of one client, it

is his duty to contend for that which duty to another client requires him to
oppose.
The obligation to represent the client with undivided fidelity and not to
divulge his secrets or confidence forbids also the subsequent acceptance
of retainers or employment from others in matters adversely affecting any
interest of the client with respect to which confidence has been reposed.
(Italics in the original)
In the case at bar, petitioners were the same complainants in the indirect
contempt case and in the Complaint for forcible entry in Civil Case No.
11204. Respondent should have evaluated the situation first before
agreeing to be counsel for the defendants in the indirect contempt
proceedings. Attorneys owe undivided allegiance to their clients, and
should at all times weigh their actions, especially in their dealings with the
latter and the public at large. They must conduct themselves beyond
reproach at all times.
The Court will not tolerate any departure from the straight and narrow
path demanded by the ethics of the legal profession.
In Hilado v. David, which we quote below, the Court advised lawyers to be
like Caesars wife to be pure and to appear to be so.
This stern rule is designed not alone to prevent the dishonest practitioner
from fraudulent conduct, but as well as to protect the honest lawyer from
unfounded suspicion of unprofessional practice. It is founded on principles
of public policy, on good taste. As has been said in another case, the
question is not necessarily one of the rights of the parties, but as to
whether the attorney has adhered to proper professional standard. With
these thoughts in mind, it behooves attorneys, like Caesars wife, not only
to keep inviolate the clients confidence, but also to avoid the appearance
of treachery and double-dealing. Only thus can litigants be encouraged to
entrust their secrets to their attorneys which is of paramount importance in
the administration of justice.
Because of his divided allegiance, respondent has eroded, rather than
enhanced, the public perception of the legal profession. His divided
loyalty constitutes malpractice for which he may be suspended,
following Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of Attorneys by
Supreme Court, grounds therefor. Any member of the bar
may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney
by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other

gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or

by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required
to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful
disobedience appearing as an attorney for a party to a case
without authority so to do. x x x.
x x x.
A survey of cases involving conflicting interests on the part of counsel
reveals that the Court has imposed on erring attorneys either a reprimand,
or a suspension from the practice of law from five (5) months to as high as
two (2) years.
X x x.
See:
Marcelo v. Javier Sr., 214 SCRA 1, 12-13, September 18, 1992; Fernandez v. Grecia, 223 SCRA 425, 434,
June 17, 1993. 203 SCRA 1, October 17, 1991. 84 Phil. 571, 578-579, September 21, 1949, per Tuason, J.
See Nombrado v. Hernandez, 26 SCRA 13, November 25, 1968; San Jose v. Cruz, 57 Phil. 792, February 4,
1933. Vda. De Alisbo v. Jalandoon Sr., 199 SCRA 321, July 31, 1991; Bautista v. Barrios, 9 SCRA 695,
December 21, 1963; Natan v. Capule, 91 Phil. 640, July 23, 1952; Cantorne v. Ducosin, 57 Phil. 24, August 9,
1932.

2. In the case of BENEDICTO HORNILLA and ATTY. FEDERICO D.

RICAFORT, complainants, vs. ATTY. ERNESTO S. SALUNAT,
respondent. A. C. No. 5804, July 1, 2003, it was emphasized that a lawyer
shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. (Rule 15.03, Code of
Professional Responsibility). THUS:
X x x.
The pertinent rule of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
RULE 15.03. A lawyer shall not represent conflicting
interests except by written consent of all concerned given
after a full disclosure of the facts.
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests
of two or more opposing parties. The test is whether or not in behalf of
one client, it is the lawyers duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his
duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one client,
this argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other client.
This rule covers not only cases in which confidential
communications have been confided, but also those in which no

confidence has been bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict

of interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will require the
attorney to perform an act which will injuriously affect his first client
in any matter in which he represents him and also whether he will be
called upon in his new relation to use against his first client any
knowledge acquired through their connection. Another test of the
inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new
relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of
undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of
unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance thereof.
X x x.
See:
Rule 15.06 A lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able to influence any public official, tribunal or
legislative body.
Pineda, Legal and Judicial Ethics, p. 199 [1999 ed.].
Hilado v. David, 84 Phil. 569 [1949]; Nombrado v. Hernandez, 26 SCRA 13 [1968]; Bautista v. Barrios, 9
SCRA 695 [1963].
Pineda, Legal and Judicial Ethics, supra, p. 199, citing Pierce v. Palmer, 31 R.I. 432.
Agpalo, Legal Ethics, supra, p. 220, citing In re De la Rosa, 27 Phil. 258 [1914]; Grievance Committee v.
Rottner, 152 Conn. 59, 203 A 2d 82 [1954] and Titania v. Ocampo, 200 SCRA 472 [1991].
CORPORATION CODE, sec. 23.
3 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS (Permanent Ed.) 8044 (Importance of determining
whether officer a trustee or agent).
Pascual v. Del Saz Orozco, 19 Phil. 82 (1911), cited in Gochan v. Young, G.R. No. 131889, 12 March 2001.
Asset Privatization Trust v. CA, 360 Phil. 768 (1998).
Harvard Law Review, Developments in the Law: Conflict of Interest, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1244, 1339-1342
(1981), cited in SOLOMON, SCHWARTZ, BAUMAN & WEISS, CORPORATIONS: LAW AND POLICY
(3rd ed.) 1129 (1994).
Cannon v. United States Acoustics Corporation, 398 F. Supp. 209 (N.D. Ill. 1975), affirmed in relevant part
per curiam 532 F. 2d 1118 (7th Circ. 1978), citing Murphy v. Washington American League Baseball Club,
Inc., 116 U.S. App. D.C. 362, 324 F. 2d 394 (1963).
Ong Ching v. Ramolete, 151-A Phil. 509, 514 [1973].

3. In the case of FELICITAS S. QUIAMBAO vs. ATTY. NESTOR A.

BAMBA, Adm. Case No. 6708, August 25, 2005, discussed the tests of
conflicts of interest. THUS:

X x x.
The issue in this case is whether the respondent is guilty of
misconduct for representing conflicting interests in contravention of
the basic tenets of the legal profession.
Rule 15.03, Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides: A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests
except by written consent of all concerned given after a full
disclosure of the facts. This prohibition is founded on principles
of public policy and good taste. [8] In the course of a law yer-client
relationship, the law yer learns all the facts connected with the
clients case, including the weak and strong points of the case. The
nature of that relationship is, therefore, one of trust and confidence
of the highest degree. [9] It behooves lawyers not only to keep
inviolate the clients confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of
treachery and double-dealing for only then can litigants be
encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of
paramount importance in the administration of justice. [10]
In broad terms, lawyers are deemed to represent conflicting
interests when, in behalf of one client, it is their duty to contend for
that which duty to another client requires them to oppose. [11]
Developments in jurisprudence have particularized various tests to
determine whether a law yer s conduct lies within this proscription.
One test is whether a law yer is duty-bound to fight for an issue or
claim in behalf of one client and, at the same time, to oppose that
claim for the other client. [12] Thus, if a lawyers argument for one
client has to be opposed by that same lawyer in arguing for the
other client, there is a violation of the rule.
Another test of inconsistency of interests is whether the
acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full discharge of
the lawyers duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client
or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the
performance of
that duty. [13] Still another test is whether the lawyer would be
called upon in the new relation to use against a former client any
confidential information acquired through their connection or
previous employment. [14]
The proscription against representation of conflicting
interests applies to a situation where the opposing parties are
present clients in the same action or in an unrelated action . It is of
no moment that the law yer would not be called upon to contend for

one client that which the lawyer has to oppose for the other client,
or that there would be no occasion to use the confidential
information acquired from one to the disadvantage of the other as
the two actions are wholly unrelated. It is enough that the opposing
parties in one case, one of whom would lose the suit, are present
clients and the nature or conditions of the lawyers respective
retainers with each of them would affect the performance of the
duty of undivided fidelity to both clients. [15]
In this case, it is undisputed that at the time the respondent filed the replevin case
on behalf of AIB he was still the counsel of record of the complainant in the
pending ejectment case. We do not sustain respondents theory that since the
ejectment case and the replevin case are unrelated cases fraught with different
issues, parties, and subject matters, the prohibition is inapplicable. His
representation of opposing clients in both cases, though unrelated, obviously
constitutes conflict of interest or, at the least, invites suspicion of double-dealing.
While the respondent may assert that the complainant expressly consented to his
continued representation in the ejectment case, the respondent failed to show that
he fully disclosed the facts to both his clients and he failed to present any written
consent of the complainant and AIB as required under Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.
X x x.
In view of all of the foregoing, we find the respondent guilty of
serious misconduct for representing conflicting interests.
X x x.
In similar cases where the respondent was found guilty of
representing conflicting interests a penalty ranging from one to
three years suspension was imposed. [28] In this case, we find that a
suspension from the practice of law for one year is warranted.
X x x.

Selected Notes:
[8] Hilado v. David, 84 Phil. 569, 579 (1949).
[9] Maturan v. Gonzales, A.C. No. 2597, 12 March 1998, 287 SCRA 443.
[10] Hilado v. David, supra note 8.
[11] Canon 6, par. 2, Canons of Professional Ethics.

[12]

Hornilla v. Salunat, A.C. No. 5804, 1 July 2003, 405 SCRA 220; Northwestern University v. Arquillo,
G.R. No. 6632, 2 August 2005.
[13] Tiania v. Ocampo, A.C. No. 2302, 12 August 1991, 200 SCRA 472, 479.
[14] Abaqueta v. Florido, A.C. No. 5948, 22 January 2003, 395 SCRA 569; Pormento v. Pontevedra, A.C. No.
5128, 31 March 2005.
[15] RUBEN E. AGPALO, LEGAL ETHICS 223 (6th ed. 1997), citing Memphis & Shelby County Bar Assn
v. Sanderson, 52 Tenn. App. 684; 378 SW2d 173 (1963); B.A. Op. 132 (15 March 1935).
[16] Maturan v. Gonzales, supra note 9; Artezuela v. Maderazo, 431 Phil. 135 (2002).
[17] Abaqueta v. Florido, A.C. No. 5948, 22 January 2003, 395 SCRA 569, 576.
[18] Rules 14.01 and 14.02, Canon 14, Code of Professional Responsibility.
[19] Rule 14.03 of Canon 14 and Rule 15.03 of Canon 15, Code of Professional Responsibility.
[23] Nakpil v. Valdes, 350 Phil. 412.
[27] Teodosio v. Nava, A.C. No. 4673, 27 April 2001, 357 SCRA 406.
[28] Vda. de Alisbo v. Jalandoni, A.C. No. 1311, 18 July 1991, 199 SCRA 321; PNB v. Cedo, A.C. No. 3701,
28 March 1995, 243 SCRA 1; Maturan v. Gonzales, supra note 9; Northwestern University, Inc. v. Arguillo,
A.C. No. 6632, 2 August 2005.

4. In the case of LETICIA GONZALES vs. ATTY. MARCELINO CABUCANA, A.C.

No. 6836, January 23, 2006, Rule 15. 03 was intended to avoid the
appearance of treachery and double-dealing for only then can litigants be
encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount
importance in the administration of justice.
X x x,
Before going to the merits, let it be clarified that contrary to the report of
Commissioner Reyes, respondent did not only represent the Gatcheco spouses in
the administrative case filed by Gonzales against them. As respondent himself
narrated in his Position Paper, he likewise acted as their counsel in the criminal
cases filed by Gonzales against them.[23]
With that settled, we find respondent guilty of violating Rule 15.03 of Canon 15
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit:
Rule 15.03 A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interest except by written
consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.

It is well-settled that a lawyer is barred from representing conflicting interests

except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the
facts.[24] Such prohibition is founded on principles of public policy and good
taste as the nature of the lawyer-client relations is one of trust and confidence of
the highest degree.[25] Lawyers are expected not only to keep inviolate the
clients confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and doubledealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to
their lawyers, which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice.
[26]
One of the tests of inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new
relation would prevent the full discharge of the lawyers duty of undivided fidelity
and loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in
the performance of that duty.[27] As we expounded in the recent case of
Quiambao vs. Bamba,[28]
The proscription against representation of conflicting interests
applies to a situation where the opposing parties are present clients
in the same action or in an unrelated action. It is of no moment that
the lawyer would not be called upon to contend for one client that
which the lawyer has to oppose for the other client, or that there
would be no occasion to use the confidential information acquired
from one to the disadvantage of the other as the two actions are
wholly unrelated. It is enough that the opposing parties in one case,
one of whom would lose the suit, are present clients and the nature
or conditions of the lawyers respective retainers with each of them
would affect the performance of the duty of undivided fidelity to
both clients.[29]
The claim of respondent that there is no conflict of interests in this case, as the
civil case handled by their law firm where Gonzales is the complainant and the
criminal cases filed by Gonzales against the Gatcheco spouses are not related, has
no merit. The representation of opposing clients in said cases, though
unrelated, constitutes conflict of interests or, at the very least, invites
suspicion of double-dealing which this Court cannot allow.[30]
Respondent further argued that it was his brother who represented Gonzales in the
civil case and not him, thus, there could be no conflict of interests. We do not
agree. As respondent admitted, it was their law firm which represented Gonzales
in the civil case. Such being the case, the rule against representing conflicting
interests applies.
As we explained in the case of Hilado vs. David:[31]
[W]e cannot sanction his taking up the cause of the adversary
of the party who had sought and obtained legal advice from his

firm; this, not necessarily to prevent any injustice to the plaintiff

but to keep above reproach the honor and integrity of the courts
and of the bar. Without condemning the respondents conduct as
dishonest,
corrupt, or fraudulent, we do believe that upon the admitted facts it
is highly inexpedient. It had the tendency to bring the profession,
of which he is a distinguished member, into public disrepute and
suspicion and undermine the integrity of justice.[32]
The claim of respondent that he acted in good faith and with honest intention
will also not exculpate him as such claim does not render the prohibition
inoperative.[33]
In the same manner, his claim that he could not turn down the spouses as no other
lawyer is willing to take their case cannot prosper as it is settled that while there
may be instances where lawyers cannot decline representation they cannot be
made to labor under conflict of interest between a present client and a prospective
one.[34] Granting also that there really was no other lawyer who could handle the
spouses case other than him, still he should have observed the requirements laid
down by the rules by conferring with the prospective client to ascertain as soon as
practicable whether the matter would involve a conflict with another client then
seek the written consent of all concerned after a full disclosure of the facts.
[35] These respondent failed to do thus exposing himself to the charge of doubledealing.
X x x.
In similar cases where the respondent was found guilty of representing conflicting
interests a penalty ranging from one to three years suspension was imposed.[38]
X x x.
See:
[1] Rule 10.01 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he
mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.
[2] Rule 13.01 A lawyer shall not extend extraordinary attention or hospitality to, nor seek opportunity for,
cultivating familiarity with judges.
[3] Rule 15.02 A lawyer shall be bound by the rule on privilege communication in respect of matters
disclosed to him by a prospective client.
[4] Rule 15.03 A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned
given after a full disclosure of the facts.
[5] Rule 21.01 A lawyer shall not reveal the confidences or secrets of his client except:

a) When authorized by the client after acquainting him of the consequences of the disclosure;
b) When required by law;
c) When necessary to collect his fees or to defend himself, his employees or associates or by judicial action.
[6] Rule 21.02 A lawyer shall not, to the disadvantage of his client, use information acquired in the course
of employment, nor shall he use the same to his own advantage or that of a third person, unless the client with
full knowledge of the circumstances consents thereto.
[24] See Rule 15.03, Code of Professional Responsibility.
[25] Quiambao vs. Bamba, A.C. No. 6708 (CBD Case No. 01-874), August 25, 2005.
[27] Santos, Sr. vs. Beltran, A.C. No. 5858, December 11, 2003, 418 SCRA 17, 25-26.
[28] A.C. No. 6708 (CBD Case No. 01-874), August 25, 2005.
[31] 84 Phil. 569 (1949).
[33] Quiambao vs. Bamba, supra.
[35] See Rules 15.01 & 15.03, CPR.
[36] Mercado vs. Vitriolo, 459 SCRA 1, 8; Rangwani vs. Dio, 443 SCRA 408, 417.
[37] Rangwani vs. Dio, supra.

[38] Quiambao vs. Bamba, Adm. Case No. 6708, August 25, 2005; Vda de Alisbo vs. Jalandoni, A.C. No.
1311, July 18, 1991, 199 SCRA 321; PNB vs. Cedo, 312 Phil. 904 (1995); Maturan vs. Gonzales, 350 Phil.
882 (1998); Northwestern University, Inc. vs. Arguillo, A.C. No. 6632, August 2, 2005.

2006 Legal Ethics Case Digest

MARIA ELENA MORENO VS. ATTY. ERNESTO ARANETA
A.C. No. 1109. April 27, 2005
Facts: Ernesto Araneta issued two checks to Elena Moreno for his indebtedness which amounts
to P11, 000.00, the checks were dishonored. It was dishonored because the account against
which is drawn is closed. Thereafter the case was forwarded to the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court. The Commission recommended the
suspension from the practice of law for three (3) months. On 15 October 2002, IBP Director for
Bar Discipline Victor C. Fernandez, transmitted the records of this case back to this Court
pursuant to Rule 139-B, Sec. 12(b) of the Rules of Court. Thereafter, the Office of the Bar
Confidant filed a Report regarding various aspects of the case. The Report further made mention
of a Resolution from this Court indefinitely suspending the respondent for having been convicted
by final judgment of estafa through falsification of a commercial document.

Issue: Whether or not Araneta should be disbarred due to the issuance of checks drawn against a
closed account.
Held: The Court held that the act of a person in issuing a check knowing at the time of the
issuance that he or she does not have sufficient funds in, or credit with, the drawee bank for the
payment of the check in full upon its presentment, is a manifestation of moral turpitude. In Co v.
Bernardino and Lao v. Medel, we held that for issuing worthless checks, a lawyer may be
sanctioned with one years suspension from the practice of law, or a suspension of six months
upon partial payment of the obligation. In the instant case, however, herein respondent has,
apparently been found guilty by final judgment of estafa thru falsification of a commercial
document, a crime involving moral turpitude, for which he has been indefinitely suspended.
Considering that he had previously committed a similarly fraudulent act, and that this case
likewise involves moral turpitude, we are constrained to impose a more severe penalty. In fact,
we have long held that disbarment is the appropriate penalty for conviction by final judgment of
a crime involving moral turpitude. As we said in In The Matter of Disbarment Proceedings v.
Narciso N. Jaramillo, the review of respondent's conviction no longer rests upon us. The
judgment not only has become final but has been executed. No elaborate argument is necessary
to hold the respondent unworthy of the privilege bestowed on him as a member of the bar.
Suffice it to say that, by his conviction, the respondent has proved himself unfit to protect the
administration of justice.
Spouses OLBES VS. Atty. VICTOR V. DECIEMBRE
AC-5365. April 27, 2005
Facts: Atty. Victor V. Deciembre was given five blank checks by Spouses Olbes for security of a
loan. After the loan was paid and a receipt issued, Atty. Deciembre filled up four of the five
checks for P50, 000 with different maturity date. All checks were dishonored. Thus, Atty.
Deciembre fled a case for estafa against the spouses Olbes. This prompted the spouses Olbes to
file a disbarment case against Atty. Deciembre with the Office of the Bar Confidant of this Court.
In the report, Commissioner Dulay recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice
of law for two years for violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Issue: Whether or not the suspension of Atty. Deciembre was in accord with his fault.
Held: Membership in the legal profession is a special privilege burdened with conditions. It is
bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in the law, but also known to possess good
moral character. A lawyer is an oath-bound servant of society whose conduct is clearly
circumscribed by inflexible norms of law and ethics, and whose primary duty is the advancement
of the quest for truth and justice, for which he has sworn to be a fearless crusader. By taking the
lawyers oath, an attorney becomes a guardian of truth and the rule of law, and an indispensable
instrument in the fair and impartial administration of justice. Lawyers should act and comport
themselves with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach, in order to promote the
publics faith in the legal profession. It is also glaringly clear that the Code of Professional
Responsibility was seriously transgressed by his malevolent act of filling up the blank checks by
indicating amounts that had not been agreed upon at all and despite respondents full knowledge
that the loan supposed to be secured by the checks had already been paid. His was a brazen act of

falsification of a commercial document, resorted to for his material gain.

Deception and other fraudulent acts are not merely unacceptable practices that are disgraceful
and dishonorable; they reveal a basic moral flaw. The standards of the legal profession are not
satisfied by conduct that merely enables one to escape the penalties of criminal laws.
Considering the depravity of the offense committed by respondent, we find the penalty
recommended by the IBP of suspension for two years from the practice of law to be too mild. His
propensity for employing deceit and misrepresentation is reprehensible. His misuse of the filledup checks that led to the detention of one petitioner is loathsome. Thus, he is sentenced
suspended indefinitely from the practice of law effective immediately.
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY, INC., and BEN A. NICOLAS vs. Atty. MACARIO D.
ARQUILLO
A.C. No. 6632. August 2, 2005
Facts: Atty. Macatrio D. Arquillo represented opposing parties in one a case before the before the
National Labor Relations Commission, Regional Arbitration Branch in San Fernando, La Union.
Herein, complainants accuse Atty. Arquillo of deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct and/or
violation of his oath as attorney by representing conflicting interests. The case was filed with the
IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline which found Atty. Arquillo guilty of the charge and
recommended a penalty of suspension for 6 months. The governors of the IBP increased the
penalty for 2 years.
Issue: Whether or not the acts of Arquillo merits his suspension from the practice of law.
Held: The Code of Professional Responsibility requires lawyers to observe candor, fairness and
loyalty in all their dealings and transactions with their clients. Corollary to this duty, lawyers
shall not represent conflicting interests, except with all the concerned clients written consent,
given after a full disclosure of the facts. When a lawyer represents two or more opposing parties,
there is a conflict of interests, the existence of which is determined by three separate tests: (1)
when, in representation of one client, a lawyer is required to fight for an issue or claim, but is
also duty-bound to oppose it for another client; (2) when the acceptance of the new retainer will
require an attorney to perform an act that may injuriously affect the first client or, when called
upon in a new relation, to use against the first one any knowledge acquired through their
professional connection; or (3) when the acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full
discharge of an attorneys duty to give undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or would invite
suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance of that duty. An attorney cannot
represent adverse interests. It is a hornbook doctrine grounded on public policy that a lawyers
representation of both sides of an issue is highly improper. The proscription applies when the
conflicting interests arise with respect to the same general matter, however slight such conflict
may be. It applies even when the attorney acts from honest intentions or in good faith.
In accordance with previous rulings from this court Atty. Arquillo is suspended for 1 year from
the practice of law.
RE: LETTER DATED 21 FEBRUARY 2005 OF ATTY. NOEL S. SORREDA.
A.M. No. 05-3-04-SC July 22, 2005

Facts: Atty. Noel S. Sorreda wrote a letter addressed to the Chief Justice over his frustrations of
the outcome of his cases decided by the Supreme Court. The letter contained derogatory and
malignant remarks which are highly insulting. The Court accorded Atty. Sorreda to explain,
however, instead of appearing before the court, he wrote another letter with insulting remarks as
the first one. The court was thus offended with his remarks.
Issue: Whether or not Atty. Sorreda can be held guilty of contempt due to the remarks he has
made in his letters addressed to the court.
Held: Unfounded accusations or allegations or words tending to embarrass the court or to bring it
into disrepute have no place in a pleading. Their employment serves no useful purpose. On the
contrary, they constitute direct contempt of court or contempt in facie curiae and a violation of
the lawyers oath and a transgression of the Code of Professional Responsibility. As officer of the
court, Atty. Sorreda has the duty to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts and to promote
confidence in the fair administration of justice.[24] No less must this be and with greater reasons
in the case of the countrys highest court, the Supreme Court, as the last bulwark of justice and
democracy
Atty. Sorreda must be reminded that his first duty is not to his client but to the administration of
justice, to which his clients success is wholly subordinate. His conduct ought to and must
always be scrupulously observant of law and ethics. The use of intemperate language and unkind
ascription can hardly be justified nor can it have a place in the dignity of judicial forum. Civility
among members of the legal profession is a treasured tradition that must at no time be lost to it.
Hence, Atty. Sorreda has transcended the permissible bounds of fair comment and constructive
criticism to the detriment of the orderly administration of justice. Free expression, after all, must
not be used as a vehicle to satisfy ones irrational obsession to demean, ridicule, degrade and
even destroy this Court and its magistrates. Thus, ATTY. NOEL S. SORREDA is found guilty
both of contempt of court and violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility amounting to
gross misconduct as an officer of the court and member of the Bar.
Heirs of Herman Rey, represented by ARACELI Vda. DE ROMERO vs. Atty. Venancio Reyes,
Jr.
A.C. No. 6192 June 23, 2005
Facts: Atty. Venancio Reyes is counsel for Heirs of Herman Rey for which they are intervenors in
a civil case involving multiple sale of a piece of land. There were three buyers however, and to
settle the case, they had agreed to a Compromise Agreement. The Compromise Agreement, dated
June 16, 1995, was signed in three stages, first by Elizabeth Reyes and her husband, then by
complainants and their counsel, Atty. Renato Samonte Jr., and last, by Antonio Gonzales,
Veronica Gonzales for and on behalf of V.R. Credit Enterprises, Inc. and by herein respondent.
Later, the RTC which houses the records of the case was destroyed by fire, thus The
complainants filed a motion for reconstitution of the records of the case, which was granted by
the RTC of Bulacan. The documents attached to the motion were the basis for the reconstituted
records. Because of the circumstances of signing of the Compromise Agreement, the copy
submitted to the RTC bore only the signatures of Elizabeth Reyes, her husband, complainants,
and that of their counsel, Atty. Renato Samonte. After a lapse of two (2) years from the date of
the Compromise Agreement, V.R. Credit Enterprises, Inc. still has not complied with its

obligation toward complainants. Hence, complainants filed a motion for issuance of writ of
execution against V.R. Credit Enterprises, Inc. for such failure. Atty. Reyes filed a motion for the
case was premature. Later he raised the issue that the Compromise Agreement was not valid
since it was not signed by Veronica Gonzales. Hence, the RTC rued that the Compromise as
unenforceable. Thus, herein, complainants filed this administrative case against Atty. Venancio
Reyes Jr. charging him with willful and intentional falsehood, in violation of his oath as a
member of the Philippine bar. IBP investigating commissioner found him guilty of violation of
his oath.
Issue: Whether or not Atty. Venancio Reyes is administratively liable.
Held: Lawyers are indispensable instruments of justice and peace. Upon taking their professional
oath, they become guardians of truth and the rule of law. Verily, when they appear before a
tribunal, they act not merely as the parties representatives but, first and foremost, as officers of
the court. Thus, their duty to protect their clients interests is secondary to their obligation to
assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. In assailing the legality of the
Compromise Agreement, he claims good faith. He maintains that he should not be faulted for
raising an allegedly valid defense to protect his clients interests. The records show, however, that
his actions bear hallmarks of dishonesty and doublespeak. Atty. Reyes is one of negotiating panel
in the compromise agreement. He impressed upon the parties and the trial judge that his clients
were bound to the Compromise Agreement. Then, suddenly and conveniently, he repudiated it by
falsely alleging that one of his clients had never signed it. True, lawyers are obliged to present
every available remedy or defense to support the cause of their clients. However, their fidelity to
their causes must always be made within the parameters of law and ethics, never at the expense
of truth and justice. In Choa v. Chiongson this principle was explained thus: While a lawyer
owes absolute fidelity to the cause of his client, full devotion to his genuine interest, and warm
zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights, as well as the exertion of his utmost learning
and ability, he must do so only within the bounds of the law Thus, herein, Atty. Venancio Reyes,
was ordered suspended for 1 year.
JESUS M. FERRER vs. ATTY. JOSE ALLAN M. TEBELIN
A.C. No. 6590. June 27, 2005
Facts: Ferrer obtained the services of Atty. Tebelin in a case against Global Link as a result of a
vehicular accident through the falut of Global Links driver. Ferrer paid Atty. Tebelin P5, 000.00
as acceptance fee and gave him all pertinent documents. However, Ferrer filed an administrative
case against Atty. Tebelin alleging that the said lawyer abandoned his case. However, Atty.
Tebelin expressed his willingness to return the money and denied having abandoned the case.
However, during the proceedings, herein Ferrer died. Atty. Tebelin was nowhere to be found in
his given address.
Issue: Whether or not Atty. Tebellin may still be held liable despite the death of the complainant.
Held: The court held that Atty. Tebelin may still be held liable despite the death of the
complainant. The death of a complainant in an administrative case notwithstanding, the case may
still proceed and be resolved. As in the case of Tudtud v. Colifores, the court ruled that The

death of the complainant herein does not warrant the non-pursuance of the charges against
respondent Judge. In administrative cases against public officers and employees, the
complainants are, in a real sense, only witnesses. Hence, the unilateral decision of a complainant
to withdraw from an administrative complaint, or even his death, as in the case at bar, does not
prevent the Court from imposing sanctions upon the parties subject to its administrative
supervision. This Court also finds respondent, for ignoring the notices of hearing sent to him at
his address which he himself furnished, or to notify the IBP-CBD his new address if indeed he
had moved out of his given address. His actuation betrays his lack of courtesy, his
irresponsibility as a lawyer. This Court faults respondent too for welting on his manifestationundertaking to return the P5,000.00, not to mention the documents bearing on the case, to
complainant or his heirs. Such is reflective of his reckless disregard of the duty imposed on him
by Rule 22.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility: Rule 22.02 A lawyer who withdraws
or is discharged shall, subject to a retaining lien, immediately turn over all papers and property to
which the client is entitled, and shall cooperate with his successor in the orderly transfer of the
matter, including all information necessary for the proper handling of the matter.
Thus, the court suspended Atty. Jose Allan M. Tebelin from the practice of law for Two (2)
Months and is ordered to return to complainants heirs the amount of P5, 000.00, with legal
interest.
JUDGES; UNDUE DELAY IN RENDERING JUDGMENT , A VIOLATION OF RULE 70
SECTION 11 OF THE RULES OF COURT
DORCAS PETALLAR VS. JUDGE JAUNILLO PULLOS
A.M. No. MTJ-03-1484. January 15, 2004
Facts: Complainant Dorcas Petallar averred that after the preliminary conference in a case for
forcible entry, he, as plaintiff and the defendants were ordered to submit their respective position
papers and evidence. Two months from the submission of their position papers, complainant
personally went to the Court to verify the judgment had been rendered. He caused his lawyer to
file a motion for rendition of judgment which was duly received by the court on August 6, 2001
but still no judgment was rendered on December 27, 2001 when the complaint was filed. Hence,
complainant Petallar charged Judge Juanillo Pullos, former presiding judge of the MCTC of
Surigao del Norte of violating Canon 1, Rule 1.02 & Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct as well as Rule 140, Section 4 & Rule 70, Section 10 & 11 of the Rules of the Court for
undue delay in rendering a decision in a case for forcibly entry.
Issue: Whether or not respondent be held liable for undue delay in rendering judgment.
Held: Respondent is guilty of undue delay in rendering judgment. The records show that the
parties had filed their respective position papers as early as February 2, 2000. thus, respondent
had until March 4, 2000. Had there been circumstances which presented him from handling
down his decision within the prescribed period, respondent should have at least requested from
the Court for an extension within which to render judgment. Failure to resolve cases submitted
for decisions within the period fixed by law constitutes serious violation of Article III, section 16
of the Constitution. Judges must perform their official duties with utmost diligence if public
confidence in the judiciary is to be preserved. A judge cannot by himself prolong the period for
deciding cases beyond that authorized by law. Without any order of extension granted by the

court, failure to decide a case within the prescribed period constitutes gross inefficiency that
merits administrative sanction.
COMPLAINTS FOR DISBARMENT; FORMAL INVESTIGATION
MERCEDES NAVA VS. ATTY. BENJAMIN SORONGON
AC No. 5442. January 26, 2004
Facts: Respondent Atty. Sorongon had been the counsel of complainant Mercedes Nava for
years. The former informed her of his intention to withdraw as her counsel in two of her cases
due to a stroke that paralyzed his right body but proposed to be retained in two other criminal
cases with lesser paper works. He filed his withdrawal on December 4, 1996 and was granted by
the court. Complainant alleged that while she continuously paid for the respondents services, the
latter represented other clients with hostile interests and cases filed against her. Complainant
cried that respondent assisted one Francisco Atas in filing a formal complaint for 11 counts of
violation of B.P. 22 against her. She sent a letter to respondents expressing her disbelief and
reminding him of his ethical and moral responsibility as a lawyer. Complainant prayed that an
investigation be conducted regarding this unfortunate actuation and deplorable behavior as well
as respondents double standard attitude.
Thereafter, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline issued a resolution suspending respondent
from the practice of law for one year considering his clear violation of the prohibition against
representing conflicting interest.
Issue: Whether or not a formal investigation is mandatory in complaints for disbarment.
Held: In complaints for disbarment, a formal investigation is a mandatory requirement. The court
may dispense with the normal referral to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines if the records are
complete and the question raised is simple. Similarly, if no further, factual determination is
necessary, the court may decide the case on the basis of the extensive pleading on record.
Complaints against lawyers for misconduct are normally addressed to the Court. If, at the outset,
the Court finds a complaint to be clearly wanting in merit, it out rightly dismisses the case. If,
however, the Court deems it necessary that further inquiry should be made, such as when the
matter could not be resolved by merely evaluating the pleadings submitted, a referral is made to
the IBP for a formal investigation of the case during which the parties are accorded an
opportunity to be heard. An ex parte investigation may only be conducted when respondent fails
to appear despite reasonable notice.
ABANDONMENT OF LAWFUL WIFE AND MAINTAINING ILLICIT RELATIONSHIP AS
GROUND FOR DISBARMENT
JOVITA BUSTAMANTE-ALEJANDRO VS. ATTY. WARFREDO TOMAS ALEJANDRO and
MARICRIS VILLARIN
AC No. 4256. February 13, 2004
Facts: Complainant submitted a photocopy of the marriage contract between her and respondent
Atty. Alejandro in support of her charge of bigamy and concubinage against the latter and
Villarin. She also submitted a photocopy of the birth certificate of a child of the respondent and
also stated that they were married in May 1, 1990 in Isabela, Province.

The Supreme Court directed respondents to file their comment on the complaint within 10 days
but they failed to comply. Copies of the resolution, complaint and its annexes were returned to
both respondents unserved with notation moved, same as when served personally.
Complainant was required anew to submit the correct, present address of respondents under pain
of dismissal of her administrative complaint. She disclosed respondents address at 12403
Develop Drive Houston, Texas in a handwritten letter.
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) recommended that both respondents be disbarred.
The Supreme Court ordered Atty. Alejandro to be disbarred while the complaint against his corespondent Atty. Villarin was returned to the IBP for further proceedings or it appears that a copy
of the resolution requiring comment was never deemed served upon her as it was upon Atty.
Alejandro.
Issue: Whether or not abandonment of lawful wife and maintaining an illicit relationship with
another woman are grounds for disbarment.
Held: Sufficient evidence showed that respondent Atty. Alejandro, lawfully married to
complainant, carried on an illicit relationship with co-respondent Atty. Villarin. Although the
evidence was not sufficient to prove that he co0ntracted a subsequent bigamous marriage, that
fact remains of his deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as member of the
bar. A disbarment proceeding is warranted against a lawyer who abandons his lawful wife and
maintains an illicit relationship with another woman who had borne him a child. We can do no
less in this case where Atty. Alejandro even fled to another country to escape the consequences
of his misconduct.
Therefore, Atty. Alejandro disbarred from the practice of law while the complaint against Atty.
Villarin was referred back to the IBP.
VIOLATION OF THE CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY; FAILURE OF
COUNSEL TO FILE BRIEF
BIOMIE SARENAS-OCHAGABIA VS. ATTY. BALMES OCAMPOS
AM No. 4401. January 29, 2004
Facts: Complainant Biomie Sarenas-Ochagabia and her aunts engaged the services of respondent
Atty. Balmes Ocampos in a civil case for recovery of possession and ownership of a parcel of
land. An adverse decision was rendered against complainants. Atty. Ocampos filed a Notice of
Appeal at their behest. The Court of Appeals gave them 45 days from notice to file their brief but
Atty. Ocampos was granted a 90-day extension. The extended period lapsed without an
appellants brief being filed, hence their appeal was dismissed. The dismissal was not challenged,
but complainants filed a complaint contending that respondent violated his duty to inform them
of his failure to file appellants brief and of the dismissal of the appeal.
Issue: Whether or not respondent has exercised due diligence for the protection of the clients
interests.
Held: A lawyer engaged to represent a client in a case bears the responsibility of protecting the
latters interest with utmost diligence. By failing to file appellants brief, respondent was remiss
in the discharge of such responsibility. He thus violated the Code of Professional which states:

Rule 12.03 A lawyer shall not, after attaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or
briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an explanation for his failure
to do so.
Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.
That respondent accepted to represent complainants gratis et amore does not justify his failure to
exercise due diligence in the performance of his duty. Every case deserves full attention,
diligence, and competence regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or
free.
Until his final release from the professional relation with a client, a counsel of record is under
obligation to protect the clients interest. If a party has a counsel of record, a court does not
recognize any other representation in behalf thereof unless in collaboration with such counsel of
record or until a formal substitution of counsel is effected. Since respondent had not then
withdrawn as counsel as he in fact filed a motion for extension of time to file brief, he was under
obligation to discharge his professional responsibility.

Lee vs Tambago, 544 SCRA 393, February 12, 2008

Facts: Complainant, Manuel L. Lee, charged respondent, Atty. Regino B. Tambago, with
violation of Notarial Law and the Ethics of the legal profession for notarizing a will that is
alleged to be spurious in nature in containing forged signatures of his father, the decedent,
Vicente Lee Sr. and two other witnesses, which were also questioned for the unnotated Residence
Certificates that are known to be a copy of their respective voter's affidavit. In addition to such,
the contested will was executed and acknowledged before respondent on June 30, 1965 but bears
a Residence Certificate by the Testator dated January 5, 1962, which was never submitted for
filing to the Archives Division of the Records Management and Archives Office of the National
Commission for Culture and Arts (NCAA). Respondent, on the other hand, claimed that all
allegations are falsely given because he allegedly exercised his duties as Notary Public with due
care and with due regards to the provision of existing law and had complied with elementary
formalities in the performance of his duties and that the complaint was filed simply to harass him
based on the result of a criminal case against him in the Ombudsman that did not prosper.
However, he did not deny the contention of non-filing a copy to the Archives Division of NCAA.
In resolution, the court referred the case to the IBP and the decision of which was affirmed with
modification
against
the
respondent
and
in
favor
of
the
complainant.

Issue: Did Atty. Regino B. Tambago committed a violation in Notarial Law and the Ethics
of

Legal

Profession

for

notarizing

spurious

last

will

and

testament?

Held: Yes. As per Supreme Court, Atty. Regino B. Tambago is guilty of professional
misconduct as he violated the Lawyer's Oath, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, Canon 1 and Rule
1.01nof the Code of Professional Responsibility, Article 806 of the Civil Code and provision of

the Notarial Law. Thus, Atty. Tambago is suspended from the practice of law for one year and his
Notarial commission revoked. In addition, because he has not lived up to the trustworthiness
expected of him as a notary public and as an officer of the court, he is perpetually disqualified
from reappointments as a Notary Public.