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Foundations of Professional Ethics

Submitted by Stefan Sencerz on Mon, 01/17/2011 - 19:02
Course Home [1]

Monday, 09-09-13: What Is Morality?

Assignments:
Read Rachels, chapter 1.
Readings:

Texts:
Rachels, "The Elements of Moral Philosophy"
http://philosophy.tamucc.edu/prof_ethics_lecture1
Synopsis:
WHAT IS MORALITY? (Rachels, chapter 1, lecture notes)
1.1 The Problem of Definition:
Moral philosophy is the attempt to achieve a systematic understanding of the nature of morality
and what it requires of us -- in Socrates words, how we ought to live and why (Rachels, p. 1).
If we know enough about the nature of morality, we might know something about how we ought
to live. Rachels attempts to describe a minimum conception of morality, viz., some basic
features that all foirms of ethical reasoning have in common. He does this through three
examples that (1) display some moral principles that shape our everyday ethical thinking and (2)
show something of the nature of ethical reasoning.

1.2 First Example: Baby Theresa

Baby Theresa was born anencephalic with both cerebrum and cerebellum as well as the top of
her skull missing; she had the brain stem. In the United States, most cases of anencephaly are
detected during pregnancy and aborted. Of those not aborted, half are still born. About 350 each
year are born alive, and they usually die within a few weeks. Because Theresa had no brain, she
was not able to feel any pain or have any other mental states. Her parents made a request to
terminate her life and use her orhans to help other children (p. 2).
An image of an anencephalic baby: http://i.imgur.com/hitXN.jpg [2]
Anencephaly (no brain formation): http://iheartautopsy.com/wpcontent/uploads/2012/02/anencephaly1.gif [3]
The Benefits Argument (a form of consequentialism):
1. If we can benefit someone, without harming anyone else, we ought to do so.
2. Transplanting the organs would benefit the other children without harming Baby Theresa.
3. Therefore, we ought to transplant the organs.
How good is this argument?
The argument is valid. That is, the conclusion follows from the premises. So, if the premises are
true so is the conclusion.
The premise #2 seems true. If we were to transplant Theresa's organs, it would surely benefit
many children. Furthermore, because Theresa has no conscious life and cannot feel anything,
nothing that happens to her can harm her.
There are some problems with premise #1:
Consequentialism and its internal problems: The premise #1 assumes the truth of
consequentialism, i.e., the idea that morality is a function of bringing about good results (benefits)
and avoiding bad results (harms). Some of the problems are internal to the consequentialist
accounts acoounts of morality. The premise #1 seems to work all right in our case where we only
have two options (i.e., to transplant the organs or not) and one of the options does not harm
anyone. But it does not seem to handle equally well other cases where, perhaps, we have more
than one feasible option. For example, it does not tell us what to do if we can perform several
different actions such that each of them brings about various benefits while nor harming anyone.
Furthermore, it does not tell us what to do if each of our actions bring about some minimal harm
while also causing enormous benefits. In some real life situations some tradeoffs seem
inevitable. This premise does not tell us what to do in such cases.
Thus, Premise #1 does not seem to be the best statement of the core consequentialist idea that
the moral wrightness depends both on bringing about some benefits but also on avoidoing or at
least minimizing harms. Ultimately, we may have to develop a better version of consequentialism.

Rachels attempts to do it in chapters 7-8. What he proposes there follows the following line:
(A better statement of Consequentialism) We ought do do a certain action if this action
brings about the best balance of benefits and harms.
Non-consequentialism: Other criticisms of premise #1 are external to consequentialism.
Namely, some philosophers reject consequentialism; they disagree that benefits and harms is all
that matters when we make moral decisions. In particular, a popular view maintains that morality
is not a matter of consequences but rather a matter of respecting every person. A view of this
sort has been developed, e.g., by a German philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) who linked
the idea of respect with the idea of not using anyone merely as a means. Kant thought that we
have a duty to treat every person with respect or not use any person merely as a means. This
idea is addressed in the next argument.
The Argument That We Should Not Use People (Merely) As Means (a form of deontology
based on the idea of respect for persons):
1. It is wrong to use people (merely) as means to other peoples ends.
2. Taking Theresas organs would be using her (merely) as a means to benefit other
children.
3. Therefore, it should not be done.
But how good is this argument?
Rachels observes that the concept of using someone (merely) as a means is vague and needs
some elucidation. Once we explain this concept, it turns out that we do not use Theresa merely
as a means (in any relevant sense). Hence, the premise #2 of this argument is false (see
Rachels, pp. 3-4):
Principle of Respect #1 (due to Immanuel Kant):
(R1) We use someone (merely) as a means when a) this person has autonomy (i.e., is able to
make fully rational decisions about what is to happen to him/her); and b) we violate their
autonomy through manipulation, trickery, deceit, or coercion.
A problem: Theresas autonomy was not violated in any such way because she is not an
autonomous (i.e., free) being. So, on this interpretation of respect, using her organs does
not involve treating her merely as a means. That is, premise #2 is false.
Principle of Respect #2 (due to contemporary Kantian philosophers, e.g., Tom Regan):
(R2) We use someone (merely) as a means when we violate someones interests or preferences
(respect requires, at the very least, that someone is not harmed or harmed as little as possible).
A problem: Theresas interests will not be violated because she has none. She is going to
die soon Killing her would not cause her any suffering or impose any hardship on her.

Furthermore, baby Theresa's preferences will not be thwarted either, for she has none and
will never have any preferences. Again, on this interpretation of the idea of respect, we do
not do anything disrespectful to Baby Theresa; she is not used merely as a means.
An iteresting question is about the relationships between R1 and R2. R1 is a standard
interpretation of the idea of respect, associated with the German Philosopher Immanuel Kant
(1724-1804). His ethical ideas are discussed in Chapters 9-10.
It is not completely clear what Kant would say about R2. Kant stresses the idea of respect for
autonomy and will, rather than the idea of acting in a beneficial way. But there is a possible way
to connect R1 (stressing the respect for autonomy) with R2.
In cases when we do not know what someone's will is (perhaps they did not tell us), sometimes
we can assume what this will would be. Namely, we can assume that he or she would like to be
treated in ways that do not impose any hardship on her and do not twart her interests and
preferences. Contemporary philosophers working within kantian tradition (neo-kantians) propose
this interpretation as a way to elucidate kantian ideas. It is called the idea of hypothetical consent.
Rachels himself suggests the idea of hypothetical consent towards the end of section in which he
discusses the idea on not using a person merely as a means. As he observes what follows:
"We might ask, If she could tell us what she wants, what would she say? This sort of
thought is useful when we are dealing with people have preferences (or once had them) but
cannot express them -- for example, a comatose patient who signed a living will before
slipping into the coma. But, sadly, Baby Theresa has no preferences about anything, nor
has she ever had any. So we can get no guidance from her, even in our imaginations. The
upshot is that we are left to do what we think is best" (p. 4).
Note: this example shows how ethics is done; i.e., by constructing arguments and thinking hard
to find objections to those arguments.
The Argument From The Wrongfulness of Killing
1. It is wrong to kill one person to save another.
2. Taking Theresas organs would be killing her to save another.
3. Therefore, it would be wrong to kill Theresa in order to harvest her organs.
Rachels Assessment
* The prohibition against killing is strong, but not absolute.
* It may be justified to kills someone when:
a) she has no future because she is going to die soon anyway,

b) she is not conscious,

and c) her killing would save others.
* On the whole, the arguments in favor of transplanting Baby Theresas organs seem to be
stronger than the arguments against it. (p. 5)
1.3 Second Example: Jodie and Mary: The infants, known as Mary and Jodie, were joined at
the lower abdomen. Their spines were fused, and they had only one heart and one set of lungs
between them. The doctors said that without intervention both girls would die within six months.
An operation to separate them would save Jodie, but Mary would die immediately. The parents,
devout Catholics, refused the permission to operate. They were overruled by the courts. Jodie
lived and Mary died.
This case received lots of attention from moral philosophers. You can read more on this topic,
e.g., in the essay by Christopher Kaczor, The Tragic Case of Jodie and Mary [4]

The following represents an argument in support of the operation:

The Argument That We Should Save as Many as We Can (p. 6)
1. It is permissible to do what is best (or, we should save as many people as we can).
2. It is best to save one girl than to let both die .
3. Therefore, its permissible to save one girl.
On the flip side, someone could propose the following argument against the operation:
The Argument from the Sanctity of Human Life (1) (p. 7)
1. It is absolutely wrong to kill an innocent human being (no matter what consequences, no
exceptions). (Prohibition against killing is absolute.)
2. Saving one girl would involve killing another.
3. Therefore, its wrong to save one girl.
Rachels observes that the judges rejected this argument for "a surprising reason". In words of
Lord Justice Robert Walker: "[Mary] would die, not because she was intentionally killed, but
because her body cannot sustain her life" (p. 7, emphasis added).
The Problem of Interpretation: Notice, in the above quote, Lord Justice Walker maintains only
what follows:

Justice Walkers Thesis: Mary would not be killed intentionally (that is, she would not be
killed on purpose).
Rachels (on p. 7) takes him to maintain a bit different thesis; namely:
Rachels' Interpretation of Justice Walkers Thesis: The surgery does not kill Mary but
rather, she is killed by her own weakness.
This interpretation is questionable. Walker is not committed to accepting any such claim. There is
a difference between killing someone and killing someone intentionally. The former speaks to the
issue of the results of someone's action and how these results are brought about; the latter
addresses also the mental states (intentions) of the actor.
The Justice Walker seems to be making two points. First, he seems to assume that it is always
wrong to aim at (to intend) killing an innocent human being. Second, he also seems to believe
that, under some circumstances, killing someone unintentionally can be permissible. So,
perhaps, we can develop a better way to understand the judge's point. His reasoning seems to
follow the following line:
An Improved Argument from the Sanctity of Human Life (2)
1. Unintentional (non-purposeful) killing of an innocent human being can be (and
sometimes is) permissible (it is not absolutely wrong).
2. Saving one girl would not involve killing anyone intentionally.
3. Therefore, saving one girl can be permissible.
An argument of this sort needs to be supplemented by further considerations specifying when
unintentional killing is permissible. Judges seem to believe that in this case saving one girl was
permissible because, all things considered, it was the best thing to do. To amplify, the principle
underlying this reasoning can be formulated along the following lines:
A Possible Ethical Principle:
Part 1: It is always wrong to intentionally kill an innocent person (or to aim at the distruction
of other basic human goods);
Part 2: When our action does not intentionally kill anyone (and does not destroy any other
basic human goods), this action is permissible provided that it brings about good balance of
benefits and harms.
This principle is one of the main components of so called the Natural Law Theory that is part of
Christian theology and ethics. Rachels discusses this theory further in chapter 4. I do nopt think
that, in that cghapter, he provides a correct interpretation of this theory. Here are my notes about
how the Ethics of Natural Law [5] can be understood.
Rachels returns to the Natural Law Theory one more time, in section 7.2 ("First

Example: Euthanasia") where he notices what follows:

"To summarize the church's doctrine: the intentional killing of innocent people is always
wrong" (p. 100, the 3rd paragraph, in the 7th edition, emphasis added).
This is the correct statement of the Roman Catholic doctrine (notice, the twins parents are
Catholics). Mamny other Christian theologians agree with this interpretation (se the link [5] and
this paper by C.E. Harris, Jr [6]). This doctrine puts a very strong emphasis on the structure of our
intentions.
1.4 Third Example: Tracy Latimer: Tracy Latimer, 12?year?old victim of cerebral palsy from
Saskatchewan, was killed by her father in 1993. She had the mental life of a 3?month old baby
and was in constant, severe pain. Mrs. Latimer supported her husband. The Supreme Court of
Canada required the mandatory sentence be imposed. He got 25 years.
The Wrongness of Discriminating Against the Handicapped
1. Handicapped people should be treated in the same way as everyone else.
2. When Tracy was killed, she was not treated in the same way as everyone else.
3. Therefore, killing her was wrong.
Rachels Objection: A premise (1) assumes that moral equality requires that everyone is treated
in the same way. But this is false. Moral equality implies only that:
(Moral Equality) It is wrong to treat someone differently than others if there are no good
reasons, or no relevant differences justifying different treatment. (pp. 9, 12-13).
He maintains that, in this case, there were such reasons.In particular, Tracy Lattomer suffered
terribly and had no chances for a good life.
The Slippery Slope Argument
1. If we accept any sort of mercy killing, we will have stepped onto a slippery slope down
which we will inevitably slide, and in the end all life will be held cheap.
2. It is wrong to allow for this kind of cheapening of human life.
3. Hence, Tracy should not have been killed.
Possible Worries about (Replies to) the Slippery Slope Argument
Are the causal claims that we slide on the slippery slope supported by any good evidence? Are
those dire predictions concerning the future justified? Are there any analogous situations from
which we can learn?
Some alleged examples of "slippery slopes":
* Marriage will collapse when we allow gay people to marry/ On this topic, see Section 3:7,

"The Question of Homosexuality". See also this (2013) overview of divorce rates in states
that allow and do not allow gay marriages [7].
* Allowing gay to serve openly in military will undermine defense sources. For all practical
purposes, Israel a country under siege. In 1993, Israel allowed gays and lesbians to serve
openly. See this study concerning Homosexuality and the Israel Defense Forces: Did Lifting
the Gay Ban Undermine Military Performance [8].
* Decreminalization of marijuana and other drugs will lead to higer use. About 14 years ago,
Portugal decreminalized all drugs and develped social programs designed to help users. It
turned out that the rates of users dropped down dramatically. More on this toipic in the
essay: "The Likely Cause of Addiction Has Been Discovered, and It Is Not What You Think
[9]".

1.5 Reason and Impartiality

Rachels holds that two basic points about ethics emerge from a consideration of these examples.
1. Our feelings are important, but they must be guided by reason.
2. Ethics includes the idea of impartiality.
But why not to guide our moral views by feelings alone?
A) Feelings may be irrational.
B) People often have different feelings about the same issue.
So, we need to be in touch we our feelings and we need to get the facts straight, but thats
not enough.

IMPARTIALITY ACCORDING TO RACHELS

Rachels' basic idea: Each individuals interests and point of view are equally important.
This is one of the most important ideas in ethics, one we will return to many times.

SOME GENERAL COMMENTS ABOUT THE FIRST CHAPTER

First, Rachels teaches us how to swim by forcing or encouraging us to swim. That is, he
introduces ethics by means of three very dramatic examples. By discussing what philosophers
think about these cases and how we analyze them, we learn how ethics is supposed to be done.
There are other way in which the issue could be introduced. For example, we could start with the

following graph:

Then we could make the following observations:

i) NORMATIVITY OF ETHICS: Judgments belonging to various circles are all normative; they
belong to various normative domains or systems (e.g., morality, law, religion, and so on). They
are not purely descriptive.
In other words, they do not just state or describe facts (or tell us how things are). They also tell us
how things ought to be, what kind of people we should become, what kinds of actions are right
and wrong, and so on.
ii) RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN NORMATIVE SYSTEMS: Morality/ethics does not seem to be
the same things as law or religion. But why not? Philosophers proposed various answers to this
question. For example:
A) morality seems to be less formal than law (and religion); there is no formal authority (a
court of some sort) that decides ethical issues.
B) We can reason about morality; that is, we can offer good reasons to support our views
and to refute conflicting views. By contrast, many religious considerations are grounded in
faith. Thus, it's very hard to reason and argue about them.
C) Furthermore, morality comes with different sanctions; e.g., when you break a moral rule,
you do not go to jail or pay a ticket. By contrast, you will feel guilty or regretful. Also, society
can put informal pressure on you, even ostracize you. Furthermore, in case of religions, you
may get some super-natural reward or punishment (e.g., you may end up in heaven or in
hell).
D) Morality, law, and religion may regulate differen areas. In particular, moral norms concer
evaluation of actions, people, and situations/outcomes. By contrast, law only regulate
actions.
It would be interesting to explore further those differences. I tried to develop some of these ideas
in this outline [10] (especially in part on "Ethics as a Normative System").
iii) MATTERS OF INTERPRETATION: Rachels is a bit sloppy when he introduces ethical
considerations proposed in some religious contexts. For example, he does not seem to explain

well what is really at stake in the example of conjoined twins. He makes similar mistakes when
he goes further into analyzing ethical theories originally introduced in religious context (e.g., in
chapter 4.3 "The Theory of Natural Law").
iv) IMPARTIALITY OF ETHICS: Rachels stresses the fact that impartiality is a crucial component
of ethical reasoning. He thinks that impartiality requires of us to take each individuals interests
and point of view as equally important. But there are other ways in which ethical impartiality can
be understood. Namely, we could propose the following:
Another Idea About Ethical Impartiality: The rules and principles are impartial if and only if
they are applicable across the board, to all similarly situated individuals. That is, they are
impartial when no one is above or below morality.
This way of introducing impartiality leaves it open whether interests of parties matter or not
and also in what ways and how much they matter. In particular, kantian ethics of respect
seems to be grounded in the idea of respecting someone's will and autonomy, rather than
in the idea of treating equally someone's interests. So, this way of introducing impartiality
does not beg any questions against kantian ethics.

LOGIC ETHICS HISTORY METAPHYSICS EPISTEMOLOGY MIND VALUE

LANGUAGE
Source URL: https://philosophy.tamucc.edu/prof_ethics_lecture1
Links:
[1] https://philosophy.tamucc.edu/../courses/fall-2011/professional-ethics
[2] http://i.imgur.com/hitXN.jpg
[3] http://iheartautopsy.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/anencephaly1.gif
[4] http://www.lifeissues.net/writers/kac/kac_13conjoinedtwins.html
[5] https://philosophy.tamucc.edu/content/foundations-professional-ethics
[6] http://falcon.tamucc.edu/~sencerz/Harris_Nat_Law.htm
[7] http://www.nbcchicago.com/blogs/ward-room/States-That-Allow-Same-Sex-Marriage-Have-Lower-DivorceRates-213335351.html
[8] http://www.palmcenter.org/files/Homsexuality%20and%20Israel%20Defense%20Forces_0.pdf
[9] http://www.huffingtonpost.com/johann-hari/the-real-cause-of-addicti_b_6506936.html
[10] http://falcon.tamucc.edu/~sencerz/metaeth.htm