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2014: Russias New Military Doctrine Tells It All - Carnegie Moscow Center - Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

20 Years of Leading Analysis

Eurasia Outlook
2014: Russias New Military Doctrine
Tells It All
Posted by: DMITRI TRENIN
MONDAY, DECEMBER 29, 2014 14 PRINT PAGE

As one of his final acts of 2014, on December 26 President Vladimir Putin signed Russias new military
doctrine. In principle, the doctrine, an official statement on national defense, is regularly updated and made
public. Its previous iteration had been in place since February 2010. In the run-up to the publication of the
text, there were gloomy predictions. One suggested that the United States and its NATO allies would be
formally designated Russias likely adversaries. Another one, based on the remarks of a senior serving
general, expected Russia to adopt the notion of preventive nuclear strike. Neither of these provisions found
its way into the published document. The doctrine does, however, faithfully reflect the sea change which
occurred in Russias foreign policy and security and defense postures in 2014.
Essentially, for Commander-in-Chief Putin and for his generals, admirals, and security officials, war in 2014
ceased to be a risk and turned into grim reality. Russia has had to use its military forces in Ukraine,
arguably the most important neighbor it has in Europe. The conflict over Ukraine, in Moscows view,
reflects the fundamental reality of an intensification of global competition and the rivalry of value
orientations and models of development. Against the background of economic and political instability
crises and popular movementsthe global balance is changing in favor of emerging power centers. In this
new environment, the doctrine highlights information warfare and outside interference in Russias domestic
politics as risks of increased importance.
The list of main external risks has not changed much, but the nuances are important. As in the past, top of
the table is NATO-related issues: its enhanced capabilities, global reach and enlargement, which brings
alliance infrastructure closer to Russias borders. After the risk of NATO comes the risk of destabilization of
countries and regions, which can be taken to mean Libya, Syria and Ukraine, and foreign force
deployments close to Russia, which presumably refers to additional NATO aircraft in the Baltic States,
BMD assets in Romania, and naval ships in the Black Sea. The top portion of the list of risks contains
references to U.S. strategic ballistic missile defense, its Global Strike concept, and strategic non-nuclear
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systems.

The latter two risks have attracted a lot of attention in Moscow recently, which put them on a par, along with
strategic BMD, as key risks to Russias deterrence capability, the apple of the eye of Russias entire
defense posture. The danger is, of course, that Russian officials may exaggerate the risks and overreact
as they did once under Mikhail Gorbachev, when they fell under the spell of Ronald Reagans Strategic
Defense Initiative (SDI) with its brilliant pebbles and such. As a result, much of Gorbachevs disarmament
agenda was based on the need to avert something which was not coming.
Some standard notions in the doctrine have acquired new urgency. Threats to territorial integrity and foreign
claims to parts of Russia have always been there, but, with the acquisition of Crimea, Moscow must
seriously consider the need to protect the peninsula against Kievs irredentism. Consequently, Russia has,
since last summer, been turning Crimea into an area of major military deployments.
Notably, other risks, which do not directly impact on Russia, have moved down on the list. Among these
risks are: the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, missiles and missile technologies; global
terrorism, potentially with the use of radioactive and toxic materials; arms and drug trafficking; armed
domestic conflicts along ethnic and confessional lines; and the activities of armed radicals and private
military companiesa provision covering both the Islamic State and the successors to Blackwater.
The concept of what constitutes a military risk has been broadened to include the use of information and
communication technologieswhich may mean anything from Twitter/Facebook flash mobs, as during the
Arab Spring, to cyber attacksto achieve military-political goals. Another risk added to the doctrine is the
toppling of legitimate governments and subsequent imposition of regimes inimical to Russian interestsa
clear reference to Kievs Maidan and the overthrow of President Yanukovych.
This reference is also linked to the list of domestic military risks. First on that list are violent attempts at
changing the constitutional system. During the winter of 2011-2012, the Russian authorities watched the
growth of the protest movement in Moscow and across the country with increasing concern. Vladimir Putin
then accused the protesters of colluding with the U.S. government. In May 2012, on the eve of Putins
presidential inauguration, the Russian authorities reacted strongly against the protesters scuffling with
police in central Moscow, and then worked effectively to degrade and stifle the radical opposition. However,
the Kiev Maidan, which began in late November 2013, soon gave them an example of the successful
overthrow of an entrenched regime.
The doctrine elaborates on Russias relationships with its allies, partners and other countries. It singles out
Belarus as Moscows closest ally, whose armed forces are practically integrated with Russias. This
situation explains the Kremlins tolerance for Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenkos undisguised
blackmail of Russia. The next category is the members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization
(CSTO) of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan, which have agreed to
coordinate their policies and have formed rapid reaction forces for various contingenciesmainly in Central
Asia, with a view toward countering risks coming out of Afghanistan (a cause of rising common concern). In
December, Putin welcomed CSTO leaders to the new National Defense Control Center in Moscow and
invited their countries to join the center. In the Caucasus, the Russian republic of Chechnya has emerged
as Moscows security stronghold and a paramilitary resource. Also, under a treaty concluded in November,
Abkhazia has merged its forces with Russias. South Ossetia is de facto a Russian military protectorate.
This completes Russias defense perimeter as of late 2014.
Even though President Putin continues to make tongue in cheek reference to the United States and its
NATO allies as partners, the military doctrine is blunter on the issue. Only countries deemed to be friendly
to Moscow are labeled partners: members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (China and Central
Asia) and the BRICS group. Placing China in the SCO context, the doctrine proposes to coordinate efforts
to deal with military risks in the common space. This, of course, falls far short of any form of military
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alliance with Beijing.

To the United States, NATO and the EU, the doctrine offers a dialogue of equals on European and AsiaPacific security, arms control, countering WMD proliferation, and confidence building measures.
Interestingly, it also contains language about joint missile defense, Russias 2010 proposal to NATO which
did not fly then. Realizing that that proposal is now absolutely dead, the doctrine vows not to allow the
United States to achieve military superiority through development of BMD or strategic non-nuclear systems.
For the foreseeable future, Russia should feel absolutely confident about the deterrence capabilities of its
strategic nuclear forces.
Despite the public debate, the Russian doctrine makes no change to the principles of using nuclear
weapons. As before, Russia will retaliate against a nuclear/WMD attack against itself and/or its allies; and it
will also go nuclear if an existential threat is posed by a conventional attack.
The new iteration of Russias military doctrine makes it clear that even if the West is not officially an
adversary, it is a powerful competitor, a bitter rival, and the source of most military risks and threats. Even
faced with a coming recession, upgrading defense capabilities and force readiness remain Russias clear
priority. Russia is also strengthening integration and cooperation with its several allies and partners in
Eurasia, even as military contacts with the West are downgraded to Cold War levels. A watershed has
been passed.

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