EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-7424. August 31, 1954.]

LOURDES CAMUS DE LOPEZ, on her behalf and as guardian ad litem of the minors,
SALVADOR C. LOPEZ, JR., and LUIS CARLOS LOPEZ, Petitioners, v. HON. CIRILO G.
MACEREN, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Davao, MARIA N. VDA. DE LOPEZ,
ENRIQUE LOPEZ, SALVADOR LOPEZ, JR., LEOPOLDO LOPEZ, RODOLFO LOPEZ and the
guardian ad litem for the minor FLORDELlZ LOPEZ, Respondents.
Soriano, Inton & Pea, for Petitioners.
Abella, Cavestany, Syyap & Estrellado, for Respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. DEPOSITIONS; JUDICIAL DISCRETION; LIMITATIONS ON; CASE AT BAR. While section 16 of

Rule 18 of the Rules of Court vests discretion in the court in allowing the taking of depositions, this
discretion is not unlimited. It must be exercised, not arbitrarily, capriciously or oppressively, but in
consonance with the spirit of the law, to the end that its purpose may be attained. If, as in the case
at bar, the order of the court forbidding the taking of a deposition tends, in effect, to deprive one,
not only of his right under section 1 of Rule 18, but also of the opportunity to prove his claim, and,
consequently, of the due process guaranteed by the Constitution, the said order should be set
aside.
2. ID.; OBJECTION AGAINST DEPOSITIONS NOT SUFFICIENT. The objection to the effect that if
the depositions were taken the court could not observe the behaviour of the deponents is untenable.
Otherwise, no deposition could ever be taken, said objection or handicap being common to all
deposition.

DECISION

CONCEPCION, J.:

Petitioner Lourdes Camus de Lopez, on her behalf and as guardian ad litem of her minor children,
Salvador C. Lopez, Jr., and Luis Carlos Lopez, is the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 1035 of the Court of
First Instance of Davao. Respondents Maria N. Vda. de Lopez, Enrique Lopez, Salvador Lopez, Jr.,
Leopoldo Lopez, Rodolfo Lopez and Flordeliz Lopez are the defendants in said case No. 1035, the
purpose of which is to secure delivery of some property of the deceased Salvador Lopez, Sr., as
alleged share of the petitioner, who claims to be his widow. She contends that, although his
previous marriage with respondent Maria N. de Lopez, which was unknown to petitioner, had not
been dissolved and was still subsisting, and acting in bad faith, and without advising petitioner of

such first marriage, Salvador Lopez, Sr., wedded the latter in 1938, and, thereafter, lived as
husband and wife with her; and that, as a consequence of said union, Salvador C. Lopez, Jr., and
Luis Carlos Lopez were born in Manila on December 6, 1939, and November 25, 1940, respectively,
and then christened as legitimate children of Salvador Lopez, Sr. and the petitioner, as set forth in
their respective birth and baptismal certificates. After the filing of the answer of said respondents,
as defendants in said Civil Case No. 1035, or on December 8, 1953, petitioner herein through her
counsel filed a "notice for the taking" of her deposition and that of one Pilar Cristobal, at Room 202
of the Vasquez Building, 1865 Azcarraga Street, Manila, on January 16, 1954, at 2:00 p.m. Acting,
however, upon an urgent motion of the defendants in said Civil Case No. 1035, respondent Hon.
Cirilo C. Maceren, as Judge of First Instance of Davao, issued an order, dated January 11, 1954,
prohibiting the taking of said deposition. Accordingly, petitioner instituted the present case for the
purpose of annulling said order of January 11, 1954, and of having no restraint to the taking of the
aforementioned deposition.
Petitioner maintains that respondent Judge committed a grave abuse of discretion in forbidding the
taking of said deposition, she being entitled thereto as a matter of right, without leave of court, after
the filing of the answer of the defendants in said Civil Case No. 1035, for section 1 of Rule 18 of the
Rules of Court provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Deposition pending action, when may be taken. By leave of court after jurisdiction has been
obtained over any defendant or over property which is the subject of the action, or without such
leave after an answer has been served, the testimony of any person, whether a party or not, may be
taken, at the instance of any party, by deposition upon oral examination or written interrogatories.
The attendance of witnesses may be compelled by the use of subpoena as provided in Rule 29.
Deposition shall be taken only in accordance with these rules. The deposition of a person confined
in prison may be taken only by leave of court on such terms as the court prescribes."cralaw
virtua1aw library
Under the other hand, respondents invoke, in their favor, section 16 of the same rule,
reading:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Orders for the protection of parties and deponents. After notice is served for taking a deposition
by oral examination, upon motion seasonably made by any party or by the person to be examined
and upon notice and for good cause shown, the court in which the action is pending may make an
order that the deposition shall not be taken, or that it may be taken at some designated place other
than that stated in the notice, or that it may be taken only on written interrogatories, or that
certain matters shall not be inquired into, or that the scope of the examination shall be limited to
certain matters, or that the examination shall be held with no one present except the parties to the
action and their officers or counsel, or that after being sealed the deposition shall be opened only by
order of the court, or that secret processes, developments or research need not be disclosed, or that
the parties shall simultaneously file specified documents or information enclosed in sealed
envelopes to be opened as directed by the court; or the court may make any other order which
justice requires to protect the party or witness from annoyance, embarrassment, or
oppression."cralaw virtua1aw library
This provision explicitly vests in the court the power to "order that the deposition shall not be taken"
and, this grant connotes the authority to exercise discretion in connection therewith (National
Bondholders Corp. v. McClintic, 1 Fed. Rules Service, 388, 99 F. [2d] 595). It is well-settled,

however, that the discretion conferred by law is not unlimited; that it must be exercised, not
arbitrarily, capriciously or oppressively, but in a reasonable manner and in consonance with the
spirit of the law, to the end that its purpose may be attained. Referring to the objective of section 16
of Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, former Chief Justice Moran has the following to
say:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The advisory committee of the United States Supreme Court said that this provision is intended to
be one of the safeguards for the protection of the parties and deponents on account of the
unrestricted right to discovery given by section 1 and 2 of this Rule. A party may take the deposition
of a witness who knows nothing about the case, with the only purpose of annoying him or wasting
the time of the other parties. In such case, the court may, on motion, order that the deposition shall
not be taken. Or, a party may designate a distinct place for the taking of a deposition, and the
adverse party may not have sufficient means to reach that place, because of poverty or otherwise, in
which case the court, on motion, may order that the deposition be taken at another place, or that it
be taken by written interrogatories. The party serving the notice may wish to inquire into matters
the disclosure of which may be oppressive or embarrassing to the deponent, especially if the
disclosure is to be made in the presence of third persons, or, the party serving the notice may
attempt to inquire into matters which are absolutely private of the deponent, the disclosure of which
may affect his interests and is not absolutely essential to the determination of the issues involved in
the case. Under such circumstances, the court, on motion, may order that certain matter shall not
be inquired into or that the scope of the examination shall be limited to certain matters, or that the
examination shall be held with no one present except the parties to the action and their officers or
counsel, or that after being sealed the deposition shall be opened only by order of the court, or that
secret processes, developments, or research need not be disclosed, or that the parties shall
simultaneously file specific documents or informations enclosed in sealed envelopes to be opened as
directed by the court. In other words, this provision affords the adverse party, as well as the
deponent, sufficient protection against abuses that may be committed by a party in the exercise of
his unlimited right to discovery. As a writer said: Any discovery involves a prying into another
persons affairs a prying that is quite justified if it is to be a legitimate aid to litigation, but not
justified if it is not to be such an aid. For this reason, courts are given ample powers to forbid
discovery which is intended not as an aid to litigation, but merely to annoy, embarrass or oppress
either the deponent or the adverse party, or both." (Comments on the Rules of Court by Moran, Vol.
I, pp. 435-6, 1952 ed.)
It is not claimed that the order complained of sought to avert any of the evils which said section 16
was meant to prevent or arrest. Moreover, petitioner was permitted to institute and maintain Civil
Case No. 1035 as a pauper. As such, she can ill afford to meet the expenses to make, with her
witnesses, the trip or trips from Manila to Davao, and to stay in said province for the time necessary
for the hearing of the case, which might not take place on the first date Set therefor. Hence, the
order in question tended, in effect, to deprive her, not only of her right, under section 1 of Rule 18,
to take the deposition in question, but also, of the opportunity to prove her claim and, consequently,
of the due process guaranteed by the Constitution. Upon the other hand, the records indicate that
the defendants in Civil case No. 1035 who are the widow of Salvador Lopez, Sr. and their
legitimate children - must be well off financially, for the estate of the deceased Salvador Lopez,
Sr., which has already been partitioned among them, appears to be worth approximately half a
million pesos. The main reason given in support of the contested order is that, if the deposition were
taken, the court could not observe the behaviour of the deponents. The insufficiency of this
circumstance to justify the interdiction of the taking of a deposition becomes apparent when we

consider that, otherwise, no deposition could ever be taken, said objection or handicap being
common to all depositions alike. In other words, the order of respondent Judge cannot be sustained
without nullifying the right to take depositions, and, therefore, without, in effect repealing section 1
of Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, which, clearly, was not intended by the framers of section 16 of the
same rule.
It is, consequently, clear that a grave abuse of discretion was committed by respondent Judge in
issuing the aforesaid order of January 11, 1954, for which reason the same should be, as it is
hereby annulled and set aside, with cost against the respondents, except the Hon. Cirilo C.
Maceren.
So ordered.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. L-41154 January 29, 1988
SILVERIO VERAN, LUIS VERAN, CRISTINA VERAN, LEON VERAN, GREGORIO SALAMERA, and
GENEROSA SALAMERA, petitioners,
vs.
The HON. COURT OF APPEALS and PRIMITIVA VILLAREAL, respondents.

CORTES, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 46367R, entitledSilverio Veran, et. al. v. Primitiva Villareal, reversing the trial court's decision declaring
petitioners the owners pro-indiviso of the property subject of the litigation.
As found by the Court of Appeals in its Decision promulgated on May 27, 1975:
Plaintiffs brought this action to recover possession of a parcel of land located in
Atimonan, Quezon and registered in the name of a Aleja Glodoveza, mother and
grandmother of said plaintiffs, against the defendant Primitiva Villareal, who died
during the pendency of this action and was subsitituted accordingly.
It is alleged in the complaint that plaintiffs only allowed the afore-named defendant,
being a cousin, to erect her house on a portion of the and in dispute, which they
inherited from Aleja Glodoveza, who in turn received it as her share from her mother's
estate. Said defendant, however, refused to vacate the lot when demanded to do so
repeatedly, claiming co-ownership also by inheritance from their common ancestor, the

mother of Aleja Glodoveza. Thus, in the amended answer, defendant interposed the
following special defenses:
a. That the land particularly described in paragraph No. 5 of the
Complaint was originally owned pro-indiviso and in common by the late
Leocadia Glodoveza, defendant's mother, the deceased Aleja Glodoveza,
plaintiffs' predecessor, and the late Ladislawa Glodoveza, all children of
Cornelio Glodoveza and Filomena Padilla, after whose death their
children above-mentioned orally partitioned said land, by virtue of which
the portion occupied by the defendant was given and received by her
from her predecessor, and the other portion by the plaintiffs and other
co-heirs over said realty.
a.1. That in the said oral extrajudicial partition,the above-indicated Lot
No. 1744 was adjudicated to the three children of the late spouses
Cornelio Glodoveza and Filomena Padilla above-named, for a special
purpose, i.e., to enable each of them to own a land by the roadside suited
for residential purpose.
a.2. That of all the real properties, left by the aforenamed spouses, the
plaintiffs' mother Aleja Glodoveza received as her share in the
extrajudicial partition of Lot No. 1742 a portion of Lot No. 1744,
consisting of residential and rice land; and a part of Lot No. 1832, all of
the Atimonan Cadastre; whereas, the defendant's mother Leocadia
Glodoveza received only two parcels of land.
b. That even if the plaintiffs have registered the said land in whole as
described in paragraph No. 5 of the cited Complaint, yet it is also a fact
that said registration was secured thru fraud, deceit, representation and
by illegal means to great damage of herein defendant and the heirs of
Ladislawa Glodoveza, and she and the latter have filed their protest to the
Director of Lands after they learned that the plaintiffs through fraud,
deceit, misrepresentation, by illegal means and irregularly obtained their
free patent, as evidenced by the aforedsaid protest together with the two
affidavits supporting it to be presented at the trial of this case.
Because of the pendency of the administrative case as mentioned in the answer, the
trial of the case was suspended indefinitely on petition of both parties. However, when
the plaintiffs changed their counsel, the latter moved for the setting of the case for
trial after almost four years from Dec. 5, 1955 when the complaint was filed, the
motion was granted, but for failure of the defendants to appear on the date set for
hearing, plaintiffs were allowed to present their evidence ex-parte, after which decision
was rendered on Dec. 15, 1959 in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant.

Upon a motion for reconsideration, the decision was set aside in order to allow the
defendant to present her evidence, after filing an amended answer, on the advice of the
trial court itself, so as to include a prayer for the reconveyance of the disputed portion
of the lot, said lot, described as Lot 1744, having been already registered in the name
of Aleja Glodoveza, the predecessor of plaintiffs.
Defendant offered as part of her evidence the deposition of Apolonia Glodoveza, but it
was denied admission by the trial court on the ground that no proof was submitted to
show that the witness was so old and infirm as not to be able to come to court to
testify, as contended by plaintiffs in their opposition to the deposition-taking.
After trial, judgment was rendered the dispositive portion reading as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and
against the defendant, declaring the former owners pro indiviso of Lot No.
1744, covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P. 1589 of the Register of
Deeds of Quezon, and ordering the latter to vacate the portion of the land
occupied by her house, to pay the plaintiff the sum of P300.00 as
damages, P200.00 as attorney's fees and the costs of this suit. (pp. 1-4,
Decision.)
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court:
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from should be as it is hereby reversed, and the
complaint is accordingly dismissed. On the counterclaim, judgment is hereby rendered
ordering the appellees to reconvey the portion of Lot No. 1744, designated in the
subdivision survey plan as Lot No. 1744-B to the appellant, as substituted by her
heirs. Costs against appellees in both instances. (p. 11, Decision).
As respondent court also denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration, the case was elevated to
this Court. After petitioner filed her comment, this Court, on November 5, 1975, resolved to give the
petition due course.
After petitioner and respondent filed their respective briefs, the case was submitted for decision.
Petitioners assign as errors the following.
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THE REJECTION BY THE COURT A
QUO OF WITNESS APOLONIA GLODOVEZA'S DEPOSITION AS ERRONEOUS, DESPITE THE FACT
THAT THE COURTA QUO'S CONCLUSION UNDER THE PREMISES WAS IN ACCORDANCE WITH
THE APPLICABLE PROVISIONS OF THE RULES OF COURT,

II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN GIVING UNDUE APPRECIATION TO THE
MATTERS RELATED IN THE IRREGULARLY-ACCEPTED DEPOSITION OF WITNESS APOLONIA
GLODOVEZA WHEN THE SAME MATTERS STANDING ALONE ARE HARDLY ADEQUATE TO
BELIE THE CONTRARY EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY PETITIONERS.
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE LETTER DATED
FEBRUARY 25, 1921 OF FEDERICO VERAN, HUSBAND OF PETITIONER'S PREDECESSOR-ININTEREST, ADDRESSED TO PRIVATE RESPONDENT, SEEKING A P1.00 YEARLY CONTRIBUTION
FOR TAXES COULD GIVE RISE TO ANY PRESUMPTION THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT HAD BEEN
IN POSSESSION OF THE DISPUTED PORTION OF THE LAND IN QUESTION SINCE 1921.
IV
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ATTACHING MISPLACED SIGNIFICANCE ON
EXHIBIT "4" A SUBDIVISION SURVEY PLAN OF THE LOT IN QUESTION-WHEN WHATEVER
PROBATIVE VALUE EXHIBIT "4" MAY HAVE ON THE MATTER IN ISSUE IS RENDERED
PRACTICALLY USELESS SINCE IT WAS PREPARED ALMOST ONE (1) YEAR AFTER ALEJA
GLODOVEZA THE PETITIONERS' PREDECESSOR-IN-INTEREST HAD OBTAINED AN
ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE (NO. P-1589) WHICH ACTUALLY LAID TO REST ANY DOUBT AS
TO THE OWNERSHIP OF THE DISPUTED PORTION OF THE LOT IN QUESTION.
V
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT "NO EVIDENTIARY
WORTH CAN, THEREFORE, BE ATTACHED TO WHAT TRANSPIRED IN THE SAID
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS (BEFORE THE BUREAU OF LANDS)" WHEN SAID
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS HAD PRECISELY BEEN DESIGNED TO LAY AT REST
WHATEVER CONFLICTING CLAIMS THE CONTENDING PARTIES HAD OVER THE PROPERTY IN
QUESTION.
VI
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE COURT A
QUO. (pp. 1-3, Brief for Petitioners).
Save for the first and second, which are closely interrelated, the errors assigned by petitioners shall
be discussed separately.
1. The deposition of Apolonia Glodoveza was taken on January 21, 1961. At that time the applicable
rules of procedure were provided in the (old) Rules of Court, Section I of Rule 18 of which states:

Section 1. Deposition pending action, when may be taken.-By leave of court after
jurisdiction has been obtained over any defendant or over property which is the
subject of the action, or without such leave after an answer has been served, the
testimony of any person, whether a party or not, may be taken, at the instance of any
party, by deposition upon oral examination or written interrogatories. ...
Considering that the deposition was taken long after the answer had been filed and served, there
was therefore no need to seek the approval of the trial court for the taking of the deposition, notice
of such taking being sufficient. In the instant case, it is not disputed that notice of the depositiontaking was received by petitioners well before the intended date and that although petitioners filed
an opposition, this was not acted upon by the trial court before the taking of the deposition.
Leave of court for taking depositions should, however, be distinguished from the approval of the
court for the use of the deposition Under Section 4 of Rule 24 of the Revised Rules of Court, which
was already in force and effect when the deposition was offered in evidence:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) The deposition of a witness, whether or not a party, may be used by any party for
any purpose if the court finds:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) that the witness is unable to attend or testify because of age,
sickness, infirmity, or imprisonment;
xxx xxx xxx
Thus, with regard to the use of a deposition, there is occasion for the court to exercise its discretion,
the proper time being when the deposition is formally offered in evidence.
In the instant case, the trial court did not admit the deposition when it was formally offered, on the
ground that petitioners were denied their right to cross-examine the deponent. However, the Court
of Appeals, in deciding to admit the deposition, observed:
The rejection of said deposition is assigned as one of the errors of the trial court. From
the facts sufficiently disclosed by the records, We find no irregularity in its execution.
The reason for the taking was disclosed not only in the notice, but also in the
deposition itself. To reject such a deposition on the ground considered by the trial
court smacks of a technicality which does not serve the ends of substantial justice.
The counsel of the plaintiffs was notified sufficiently in advance of the depositiontaking, and his opposition was not acted upon favorably before the day set for the
taking of the deposition. If he failed to appear on that day, as he could have done if he
exerted diligent efforts, he did so at his own risk. (p. 7, Decision).

The findings of fact supporting this conclusion of the Court of Appeals not being disputed, We agree
that, under the circumstance, petitioners' contention that they were denied their right to crossexamine the deponent is unfounded.
Further, as pointed out by respondent, before the deposition was formally offered, respondent had
already testified as to the age of deponent.
ATTY. BALDEO:
Q Do you know Apolonia Glodoveza?
A Yes, sir.
Q Where is she now, do you know?
A She is in Atimonan.
Q Do you know how old she is now?
A She is very old, more or less, ninety years, (tsn, pp. 13-14, May 30,
1963).
Apparently, this was overlooked by the trial court when it denied admission of the deposition.
In view of the foregoing, it cannot be argued that the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error
when it decided to admit the deposition of Apolonia Glodoveza.
As correctly observed by respondent court:
With the admission of the deposition, a very significant fact gets into the records
which is that the assignment of the lot in question was to the three sisters, not to Aleja
alone, and the segregation or apportionment thereof among the said sisters was made
by their eldest sister, Ruperta Glodoveza in 1905. (p. 7, Decision).
As found by the Court of Appeals, this conclusion is buttressed by the testimony of Enrique
Glodoveza (p. 6, Decision) and documentary evidence (p. 8, Decision).
This disposes then of petitioners' first two assignments of error.
2. Petitioners argue that respondent court erred in concluding that the letter (Exhibit 2) dated
February 25, 1921 of Francisco Veran addressed to private respondent, seeking a P1.00 yearly
contribution for taxes gave rise to the presumption that private respondent had been in possession
of the disputed portion of the lot since 1921.
The pertinent portion of Exhibit 2 reads as follows:

At ang ikalawa, ay ang isang bagay na bakasakaling hindi na itagubilin ng inyong ina
bago siya yumaon. Ang bagay na ito ay natutukol sa kabuwisan ng kapirasong lupa na
kalakip sa declaracion sa aking pangalan, kaparis din ng sa ina mong Lawa
(Ladislawa). Ang lugar na ito ay alam ninyo sapagkat kayo ang naglinis at nag
halaman doon.
At dahil dito ay gosto kong inyong ipagpatuloy ang pagambag sa ka buwisan nito sa
halagang peso (P1.00) sa taon-taon paris din ng pagambag ng yumaon ninyong ina.
At once it will be noticed that the letter does not specify which parcel of land is referred to.
Respondent claims that it referred to the disputed lot and this view was sustained by the Court of
Appeals. Petitioners contend that the letter refers to a different lot owned by Francisco Veran. As the
facts relative to this matter are not quite clear, this Court is inclined to respect the findings of the
Court of Appeals:
Thus Exhibit 2 would seem to prove that as early as Feb. 25, 1921, appellants were
already in possession of the disputed portion of Lot No. 1744, as by said exhibit, it is
shown that on the date aforementioned, appellees' father, Francisco Veran, was asking
Mr. and Mrs. Celso Villacruel (nee Primitive Villareal) for a contribution of Pl.00 for
payment of yearly tax on the property in question. This document gives credence to
Enrique Glodoveza's testimony that it was since 1910 that appellant has occupied the
lot in dispute not only since 1950 as claimed by appellees. (p. 8, Decision).
3. Contrary to petitioners' contention, the expiration of the one-year period from the issuance of an
Original Certificate of Title covering the disputed lot in favor of the heirs of Aleja Glodoveza will not
bar private respondent's action for reconveyance. Private respondent's counterclaim for
reconveyance was made in her amended answer filed on March 4, 1961, some seven and a half
years after the issuance of the title in the name of the heirs of Aleja Glodoveza on December 3,
1953, but well within the ten-year prescriptive period for bringing an action for reconveyance based
on an implied or constructive trust resulting from fraud in securing title (Diaz v. Gorricho, 103 Phil.
261 [1958]; J.M. Tuazon & Co., Inc. v. Magdangal, G.R. No. L-15539, January 30, l962, 4 SCRA 84;
Alzona v. Capunitan, G.R. No. L-10228, February 28, 1962, 4 SCRA 450). Thus, in Gonzales v.
Jimenez, G.R. No. L-19073, January 30, l965, 13 SCRA 80, the Court said:
Since it appears that the land in question was obtained by defendants thru fraudulent
representations by means of which a patent and a title were issued in their name, they
are deemed to hold it in trust for the benefit of the person prejudiced by it. Here this
person is the plaintiff. There being an implied trust in this transaction, the action to
recover the property prescribes after the lapse of ten years. Here this period has not
yet elapsed.
Further, no error was committed by the Court of Appeals in appreciating the significance of the
subdivision survey plan of the disputed lot (Exhibit 4). The fact that it was prepared a year after the

title was issued in the name of the heirs of Aleja Glodoveza does not per se render misplaced
respondent court's reliance upon it. The division in the subdivision survey plan of the disputed lot
into three portions assigned to Leocadia, Aleja and Ladislawa respectively, merely served to
corroborate testimony as to the lot's apportionment among the three sisters.
4. Neither do We find error in respondent court's conclusion that no evidentiary worth can be
attached to what transpired in the administrative case pending before the Bureau of Lands,
considering that the decision rendered by said bureau was still pending appeal before the
Department of agriculture at the time the decision of the trial court was rendered. Further, it is not
disputed that the decision of the Bureau of Lands was never offered in evidence, but was merely
attached to petitioners' "Urgent Ex-parte Petition to Render the Much Awaited and Long Overdue
Judgment." Section 35 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court is quite clear that "the court shall
consider no evidence which has not been formally offered."
5. To conclude, no reversible error was committed by the Court of Appeals when it reversed the
decision of the lower court.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 90478 November 21, 1991
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD
GOVERNMENT), petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, BIENVENIDO R. TANTOCO, JR. and DOMINADOR R.
SANTIAGO, respondents.
Dominador R. Santiago for and in his own behalf and as counsel for respondent Tantoco, Jr.

NARVASA, J.:p
Private respondents Bienvenido R. Tantoco, Jr. and Dominador R. Santiago together with
Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Bienvenido R. Tantoco, Sr., Gliceria R. Tantoco, and Maria
Lourdes Tantoco-Pineda-are defendants in Civil Case No. 0008 of the Sandiganbayan. The case was
commenced on July 21, 1987 by the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) in
behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. The complaint which initiated the action was denominated
one "for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and damages," and was avowedly filed
pursuant to Executive Order No. 14 of President Corazon C. Aquino.
After having been served with summons, Tantoco, Jr. and Santiago, instead of filing their answer,
jointly filed a "MOTION TO STRIKE OUT SOME PORTIONS OF THE COMPLAINT AND FOR BILL OF
PARTICULARS OF OTHER PORTIONS" dated Nov. 3, 1987. 1 The PCGG filed an opposition
thereto, 2 and the movants, a reply to the opposition. 3 By order dated January 29, 1988, the
Sandiganbayan, in order to expedite proceedings and accommodate the defendants, gave the PCGG
forty-five (45) days to expand its complaint to make more specific certain allegations. 4
Tantoco and Santiago then presented a "motion for leave to file interrogatories under Rule 25 of the
Rules of Court" dated February 1, 1988, and "Interrogatories under Rule 25." 5 Basically, they
sought an answer to the question: "Who were the Commissioners of the PCGG (aside from its
Chairman, Hon. Ramon Diaz, who verified the complaint) who approved or authorized the inclusion of
Messrs. Bienvenido R. Tantoco, Jr. and Dominador R. Santiago as defendants in the . . case?" 6 The
PCGG responded by filing a motion dated February 9, 1988 to strike out said motion and
interrogatories as being impertinent, "queer," "weird," or "procedurally bizarre as the purpose
thereof lacks merit as it is improper, impertinent and irrelevant under any
guise." 7
On March 18, 1988, in compliance with the Order of January 29, 1988, the PCGG filed an
Expanded Complaint. 8As this expanded complaint, Tantoco and Santiago reiterated their motion
for bill of particulars, through a Manifestation dated April 11, 1988. 9
Afterwards, by Resolution dated July 4, 1988, 10 the Sandiganbayan denied the motion to strike
out, for bill of particulars, and for leave to file interrogatories, holding them to be without legal and
factual basis. Also denied was the PCGG's motion to strike out impertinent pleading dated February
9, 1988. The Sandiganbayan declared inter alia the complaint to be "sufficiently definite and clear
enough," there are adequate allegations . . which clearly portray the supposed involvement and/or
alleged participation of defendants-movants in the transactions described in detail in said
Complaint," and "the other matters sought for particularization are evidentiary in nature which
should be ventilated in the pre-trial or trial proper . ." It also opined that "(s)ervice of interrogatories
before joinder of issue and without leave of court is premature . . (absent) any special or
extraordinary circumstances . . which would justify . . (the same)."

Tantoco and Santiago then filed an Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim under date of July 18,
1988. 11 In response, the PCGG presented a "Reply to Answer with Motion to Dismiss Compulsory
Counterclaim " 12
The case was set for pre-trial on July 31, 1989. 13 On July 25, 1989, the PCGG submitted its PRETRIAL. 14 The pre-trial was however reset to September 11, 1989, and all other parties were
required to submit pre-trial briefs on or before that date. 15
On July 27, 1989 Tantoco and Santiago filed with the Sandiganbayan a pleading denominated
"Interrogatories to Plaintiff," 16 and on August 2, 1989, an "Amended Interrogatories to
Plaintiff"' 17 as well as a Motion for Production and Inspection of Documents. 18
The amended interrogatories chiefly sought factual details relative to specific averments of PCGG's
amended complaint, through such questions, for instance, as
1. In connection with the allegations . . in paragraph 1 . ., what specific property or
properties does the plaintiff claim it has the right to recover from defendants Tantoco, Jr.
and Santiago for being ill-gotten?
3. In connection with the allegations . . in paragraph 10 (a) . . what specific act or
acts . . were committed by defendants Tantoco, Jr. and Santiago in "concert with"
defendant Ferdinand Marcos and in furtherance or pursuit, of the alleged systematic
plan of said defendant Marcos to accumulate ill-gotten wealth?"
5. In connection with . . paragraph 13 . ., what specific act or acts of the defendants
Tantoco, Jr. and Santiago . . were committed by said defendants as part, or in
furtherance, of the alleged plan to conceal assets of defendants Ferdinand and Imelda
Marcos?
7. In connection with . . paragraph 15(c) . . is it plaintiff's position or theory of the case
that Tourist Duty Free Shops, Inc., including all the assets of said corporation, are
beneficially owned by either or both defendants Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos and that
the defendants Tantoco, Jr. and Santiago, as well as, the other stockholders of record of
the same corporation are mere "dummies" of said defendants Ferdinand and /or Imelda
R. Marcos?
On the other hand, the motion for production and inspection of documents prayed for examination
and copying of
1) the "official records and other evidence" on the basis of which the verification of the
Amended Complaint asserted that the allegations thereof are "true and correct;"

2) the documents listed in PCGG's Pre-Trial Brief as those "intended to be presented

and . . marked as exhibits for the plaintiff;" and
3) "the minutes of the meeting of the PCGG which chronicles the discussion (if any)
and the decision (of the Chairman and members) to file the complaint" in the case at
bar.
By Resolutions dated August 21, 1989 and August 25, 1989, the Sandiganbayan admitted the
Amended Interrogatories and granted the motion for production and inspection of documents
(production being scheduled on September 14 and 15, 1989), respectively.
On September 1, 1989, the PCGG filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of August 25,
1989 (allowing production and inspection of documents). It argued that
1) since the documents subject thereof would be marked as exhibits during the pre-trial on
September 11, 1989 anyway, the order for "their production and inspection on September 14 and
15, are purposeless and unnecessary;"
2) movants already know of the existence and contents of the document which "are clearly described
. . (in) plaintiff's Pre-Trial Brief;"
3) the documents are "privileged in character" since they are intended to be used against the PCGG
and/or its Commissioners in violation of Section 4, Executive Order No. 1, viz.:
(a) No civil action shall lie against the Commission or any member thereof for anything
done or omitted in the discharge of the task contemplated by this Order.
(b) No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or produce
evidence in any judicial, legislative, or administrative proceeding concerning matters
within its official cognizance.
It also filed on September 4, 1989 an opposition to the Amended Interrogatories, 19 which the
Sandiganbayan treated as a motion for reconsideration of the Resolution of August 21, 1989
(admitting the Amended Interrogatories). The opposition alleged that
1) the interrogatories "are not specific and do not name the person to whom they are
propounded . .," or "who in the PCGG, in particular, . . (should) answer the interrogatories;"
2) the interrogatories delve into "factual matters which had already been decreed . . as part of the
proof of the Complaint upon trial . .;"
3) the interrogatories "are frivolous" since they inquire about "matters of fact . . which defendants . .
sought to . . (extract) through their aborted Motion for Bill of Particulars;"

4) the interrogatories "are really in the nature of a deposition, which is prematurely filed and
irregularly utilized . . (since) the order of trial calls for plaintiff to first present its evidence."
Tantoco and Santiago filed a reply and opposition on September 18, 1989.
After hearing, the Sandiganbayan promulgated two (2) Resolutions on September 29, 1989, the first,
denying reconsideration (of the Resolution allowing production of documents), and the second,
reiterating by implication the permission to serve the amended interrogatories on the plaintiff
(PCGG). 20
Hence, this petition for certiorari.
The PCGG contends that said orders, both dated September 29, 1989, should be nullified because
rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. More particularly, it
claims
a) as regards the order allowing the amended interrogatories to the plaintiff PCGG:
1) that said interrogatories are not specific and do not name the particular individuals
to whom they are propounded, being addressed only to the PCGG;
2) that the interrogatories deal with factual matters which the Sandiganbayan (in
denying the movants' motion for bill of particulars) had already declared to be part of
the PCGG's proof upon trial; and
3) that the interrogatories would make PCGG Commissioners and officers witnesses,
in contravention of Executive Order No. 14 and related issuances; and
b) as regards the order granting the motion for production of documents:
1) that movants had not shown any good cause therefor;
2) that some documents sought to be produced and inspected had already been
presented in Court and marked preliminarily as PCGG's exhibits, and the movants
had viewed, scrutinized and even offered objections thereto and made comments
thereon; and
3) that the other documents sought to be produced are either
(a) privileged in character or confidential in nature and their
use is proscribed by the immunity provisions of Executive
Order No. 1, or
(b) non-existent, or mere products of the movants' suspicion
and fear.

This Court issued a temporary restraining order on October 27, 1989, directing the Sandiganbayan
to desist from enforcing its questioned resolutions of September 29, 1989 in Civil Case No. 0008. 21
After the issues were delineated and argued at no little length by the parties, the Solicitor General
withdrew "as counsel for plaintiff . . with the reservation, however, conformably with Presidential
Decree No. 478, the provisions of Executive Order No. 292, as well as the decisional law of 'Orbos v.
Civil Service Commission, et al.,' (G.R. No. 92561, September 12, 1990) 22 to submit his
comment/observation on incidents/matters pending with this . . Court if called for by
circumstances in the interest of the Government or if he is so required by the Court." 23 This, the
Court allowed by Resolution dated January 21, 1991. 24
Subsequently, PCGG Commissioner Maximo A. Maceren advised the Court that the cases from
which the Solicitor General had withdrawn would henceforth be under his (Maceren's) charge
"and/or any of the following private attorneys: Eliseo B. Alampay, Jr., Mario E. Ongkiko, Mario
Jalandoni and such other attorneys as it may later authorize." 25
The facts not being in dispute, and it appearing that the parties have fully ventilated their respective
positions, the Court now proceeds to decide the case.
Involved in the present proceedings are two of the modes of discovery provided in the Rules of
Court: interrogatories to parties , 26 and production and inspection of documents and
things. 27 Now, it appears to the Court that among far too many lawyers (and not a few judges),
there is, if not a regrettable unfamiliarity and even outright ignorance about the nature, purposes
and operation of the modes of discovery, at least a strong yet unreasoned and unreasonable
disinclination to resort to them which is a great pity for the intelligent and adequate use of the
deposition-discovery mechanism, coupled with pre-trial procedure, could, as the experience of other
jurisdictions convincingly demonstrates, effectively shorten the period of litigation and speed up
adjudication. 28 Hence, a few words about these remedies is not at all inappropriate.
The resolution of controversies is, as everyone knows, the raison d'etre of courts. This essential
function is accomplished by first, the ascertainment of all the material and relevant facts from the
pleadings and from the evidence adduced by the parties, and second, after that determination of the
facts has been completed, by the application of the law thereto to the end that the controversy may
be settled authoritatively, definitely and finally.
It is for this reason that a substantial part of the adjective law in this jurisdiction is occupied with
assuring that all the facts are indeed presented to the Court; for obviously, to the extent that
adjudication is made on the basis of incomplete facts, to that extent there is faultiness in the
approximation of objective justice. It is thus the obligation of lawyers no less than of judges to see
that this objective is attained; that is to say, that there no suppression, obscuration,
misrepresentation or distortion of the facts; and that no party be unaware of any fact material a

relevant to the action, or surprised by any factual detail suddenly brought to his attention during
the trial. 29
Seventy-one years ago, in Alonso v. Villamor, 30 this Court described the nature and object of
litigation and in the process laid down the standards by which judicial contests are to be conducted
in this jurisdiction. It said:
A litigation is not a game of technicalities in which one, more deeply schooled and
skilled in the subtle art of movement and position, entraps and destroys the other. It
is, rather a contest in which each contending party fully and fairly lays before the court
the facts in issue and then brushing aside as wholly trivial and indecisive all
imperfections of form and technicalities of procedure, asks that justice be done on the
merits. Lawsuits, unlike duels, are not to be won by a rapier's thrust. Technicality,
when it deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance
and chief enemy, deserves scant consideration from courts. There should be no vested
right in technicalities. . . .
The message is plain. It is the duty of each contending party to lay before the court the facts in
issue-fully and fairly; i.e., to present to the court all the material and relevant facts known to him,
suppressing or concealing nothing, nor preventing another party, by clever and adroit manipulation
of the technical rules of pleading and evidence, from also presenting all the facts within his
knowledge.
Initially, that undertaking of laying the facts before the court is accomplished by the pleadings filed
by the parties; but that, only in a very general way. Only "ultimate facts" are set forth in the
pleadings; hence, only the barest outline of the facfual basis of a party's claims or defenses is
limned in his pleadings. The law says that every pleading "shall contain in a methodical and logical
form, a plain, concise and direct statement of the ultimate factson which the party pleading relies for
his claim or defense, as the case may be, omitting the statement of mere evidentiary facts." 31
Parenthetically, if this requirement is not observed, i.e., the ultimate facts are alleged too generally
or "not averred with sufficient definiteness or particularity to enable . . (an adverse party) properly
to prepare his responsive pleading or to prepare for trial," a bill of particulars seeking a "more
definite statement" may be ordered by the court on motion of a party. The office of a bill of
particulars is, however, limited to making more particular or definite the ultimate facts in a pleading
It is not its office to supply evidentiary matters. And the common perception is that said evidentiary
details are made known to the parties and the court only during the trial, when proof is adduced on
the issues of fact arising from the pleadings.
The truth is that "evidentiary matters" may be inquired into and learned by the parties before the
trial. Indeed, it is the purpose and policy of the law that the parties before the trial if not indeed
even before the pre-trial should discover or inform themselves of all the facts relevant to the
action, not only those known to them individually, but also those known to adversaries; in other

words, the desideratum is that civil trials should not be carried on in the dark; and the Rules of
Court make this ideal possible through the deposition-discovery mechanism set forth in Rules 24 to
29. The experience in other jurisdictions has been that ample discovery before trial, under proper
regulation, accomplished one of the most necessary of modern procedure: it not only eliminates
unessential issue from trials thereby shortening them considerably, but also requires parties to play
the game with the cards on the table so that the possibility of fair settlement before trial is
measurably increased. . ."32
As just intimated, the deposition-discovery procedure was designed to remedy the conceded
inadequacy and cumbersomeness of the pre-trial functions of notice-giving, issue-formulation and
fact revelation theretofore performed primarily by the pleadings.
The various modes or instruments of discovery are meant to serve (1) as a device, along with the
pre-trial hearing under Rule 20, to narrow and clarify the basic issues between the parties, and (2)
as a device for ascertaining the facts relative to those issues. The evident purpose is, to repeat, to
enable parties, consistent with recognized privileges, to obtain the fullest possible knowledge of the
issues and facts before trials and thus prevent that said trials are carried on in the dark. 33
To this end, the field of inquiry that may be covered by depositions or interrogatories is as broad as
when the interrogated party is called as a witness to testify orally at trial. The inquiry extends to all
facts which are relevant, whether they be ultimate or evidentiary, excepting only those matters
which are privileged. The objective is as much to give every party the fullest possible information of
all the relevant facts before the trial as to obtain evidence for use upon said trial. The principle is
reflected in Section 2, Rule 24 (governing depositions) 34 which generally allows the examination of
a deponent
1) "regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject of the pending
action, whether relating to the claim or defense of any other party;"
2) as well as:
(a) "the existence, description, nature, custody, condition and location of any books,
documents, or other tangible things" and
(b) "the identity and location of persons having knowledge of relevant facts."
What is chiefly contemplated is the discovery of every bit of information which may be useful in the
preparation for trial, such as the identity and location of persons having knowledge of relevant facts;
those relevant facts themselves; and the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and
location of any books, documents, or other tangible things. Hence, "the deposition-discovery rules
are to be accorded a broad and liberal treatment. No longer can the time-honored cry of "fishing
expedition" serve to preclude a party from inquiring into the facts underlying his opponent's case.
Mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper litigation.

To that end, either party may compel the other to disgorge whatever facts he has in his possession.
The deposition-discovery procedure simply advances the stage at which the disclosure can be
compelled from the time of trial to the period preceding it, thus reducing the possibility, of surprise,
. . . 35
In line with this principle of according liberal treatment to the deposition-discovery mechanism,
such modes of discovery as (a) depositions (whether by oral examination or written interrogatories)
under Rule 24, (b) interrogatories to parties under Rule 25, and (c) requests for admissions under
Rule 26, may be availed of without leave of court, and generally, without court intervention. The
Rules of Court explicitly provide that leave of court is not necessary to avail of said modes of
discovery after an answer to the complaint has been served. 36 It is only when an answer has not
yet been filed (but after jurisdiction has been obtained over the defendant or property subject of the
action) that prior leave of court is needed to avail of these modes of discovery, the reason being that
at that time the issues are not yet joined and the disputed facts are not clear. 37
On the other hand, leave of court is required as regards discovery by (a) production or inspection of
documents or things in accordance with Rule 27, or (b) physical and mental examination of persons
under Rule 28, which may be granted upon due application and a showing of due cause.
To ensure that availment of the modes of discovery is otherwise untrammeled and efficacious, the
law imposes serious sanctions on the party who refuses to make discovery, such as dismissing the
action or proceeding or part thereof, or rendering judgment by default against the disobedient party;
contempt of court, or arrest of the party or agent of the party; payment of the amount of reasonable
expenses incurred in obtaining a court order to compel discovery; taking the matters inquired into
as established in accordance with the claim of the party seeking discovery; refusal to allow the
disobedient party support or oppose designated claims or defenses; striking out pleadings or parts
thereof; staying further proceedings. 38
Of course, there are limitations to discovery, even when permitted to be undertaken without leave
and without judicial intervention. "As indicated by (the) Rules . . ., limitations inevitably arise when
it can be shown that the examination is being conducted in bad faith or in such a manner as to
annoy, embarass, or oppress the person subject to the inquiry. 39 And . . . further limitations come
into existence when the inquiry touches upon the irrelevant or encroaches upon the recognized
domains of privilege." 40
In fine, the liberty of a party to make discovery is well nigh unrestricted if the matters inquired into
are otherwise relevant and not privileged, and the inquiry is made in good faith and within the
bounds of the law.
It is in light of these broad principles underlying the deposition-discovery mechanism, in relation of
course to the particular rules directly involved, that the issues in this case will now be resolved.

The petitioner's objections to the interrogatories served on it in accordance with Rule 25 of the
Rules of Court cannot be sustained.
It should initially be pointed out as regards the private respondents "Motion for Leave to File
Interrogatories" dated February 1, 1988 41 that it was correct for them to seek leave to serve
interrogatories, because discovery was being availed of before an answer had been served. In such a
situation, i.e., "after jurisdiction has been obtained over any defendant or over property subject of
the action" but before answer, Section 1 of Rule 24 (treating of depositions), in relation to Section 1
of Rule 25 (dealing with interrogatories to parties) explicitly requires "leave of court." 42 But there
was no need for the private respondents to seek such leave to serve their "Amended Interrogatories
to Plaintiff" (dated August 2, 1989 43) after they had filed their answer to the PCGG's complaint,
just as there was no need for the Sandiganbayan to act thereon.
1. The petitioner's first contention that the interrogatories in question are defective because they
(a) do not name the particular individuals to whom they are propounded, being addressed only to
the PCGG, and (b) are "fundamentally the same matters . . (private respondents) sought to be
clarified through their aborted Motion . . for Bill of Particulars" are untenable and quickly
disposed of.
The first part of petitioner's submission is adequately confuted by Section 1, Rule 25 which states
that if the party served with interrogatories is a juridical entity such as "a public or private
corporation or a partnership or association," the same shall be "answered . . by any officer thereof
competent to testify in its behalf." There is absolutely no reason why this proposition should not be
applied by analogy to the interrogatories served on the PCGG. That the interrogatories are
addressed only to the PCGG, without naming any specific commissioner o officer thereof, is utterly
of no consequence, and may not be invoked as a reason to refuse to answer. As the rule states, the
interrogatories shall be answered "by any officer thereof competent to testify in its behalf."
That the matters on which discovery is desired are the same matters subject of a prior motion for
bill of particulars addressed to the PCGG's amended complaint and denied for lack of merit is
beside the point. Indeed, as already pointed out above, a bill of particulars may elicit
only ultimate facts, not so-called evidentiary facts. The latter are without doubt proper subject of
discovery. 44
Neither may it be validly argued that the amended interrogatories lack specificity. The merest glance
at them disproves the argument. The interrogatories are made to relate to individual paragraphs of
the PCGG's expanded complaint and inquire about details of the ultimate facts therein alleged.
What the PCGG may properly do is to object to specific items of the interrogatories, on the ground of
lack of relevancy, or privilege, or that the inquiries are being made in bad faith, or simply to
embarass or oppress it. 45 But until such an objection is presented and sustained, the obligation to
answer subsists.

2. That the interrogatories deal with factual matters which will be part of the PCGG's proof upon
trial, is not ground for suppressing them either. As already pointed out, it is the precise purpose of
discovery to ensure mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts on the part of all parties even before
trial, this being deemed essential to proper litigation. This is why either party may compel the other
to disgorge whatever facts he has in his possession; and the stage at which disclosure of evidence is
made is advanced from the time of trial to the period preceding it.
3. Also unmeritorious is the objection that the interrogatories would make PCGG Commissioners
and officers witnesses, in contravention of Executive Order No. 14 and related issuances. In the first
place, there is nothing at all wrong in a party's making his adversary his witness .46 This is
expressly allowed by Section 6, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, viz.:
Sec. 6. Direct examination of unwilling or hostile witnesses. A party may . . . call an
adverse party or an officer, director, or managing agent of a public or private
corporation or of a partnership or association which is an adverse party, and
interrogate him by leading questions and contradict and impeach him in all respects
as if he had been called by the adverse party, and the witness thus called may be
contradicted and impeached by or on behalf of the adverse party also, and may be
cross-examined by the adverse party only upon the subject-matter of his examination
in chief.
The PCGG insinuates that the private respondents are engaged on a "fishing expedition," apart from
the fact that the information sought is immaterial since they are evidently meant to establish a
claim against PCGG officers who are not parties to the action. It suffices to point out that "fishing
expeditions" are precisely permitted through the modes of discovery. 47 Moreover, a defendant who
files a counterclaim against the plaintiff is allowed by the Rules to implead persons (therefore
strangers to the action) as additional defendants on said counterclaim. This may be done pursuant
to Section 14, Rule 6 of the Rules, to wit:
Sec. 14. Bringing new parties. When the presence of parties other than those to the
original action is required for the granting of complete relief in the determination of
a counterclaim or cross-claim, the court shall order them to be brought in as
defendants, if jurisdiction over them can be obtained."
The PCGG's assertion that it or its members are not amenable to any civil action "for anything done
or omitted in the discharge of the task contemplated by . . (Executive) Order (No. 1)," is not a ground
to refuse to answer the interrogatories. The disclosure of facto relevant to the action and which are
not self-incriminatory or otherwise privileged is one thing; the matter of whether or not liability may
arise from the facts disclosed in light of Executive Order
No. 1, is another. No doubt, the latter proposition may properly be set up by way of defense in the
action.

The apprehension has been expressed that the answers to the interrogatories may be utilized as
foundation for a counterclaim against the PCGG or its members and officers. They will be. The
private respondents have made no secret that this is in fact their intention. Withal, the Court is
unable to uphold the proposition that while the PCGG obviously feels itself at liberty to bring
actions on the basis of its study and appreciation of the evidence in its possession, the parties sued
should not be free to file counterclaims in the same actions against the PCGG or its officers for
gross neglect or ignorance, if not downright bad faith or malice in the commencement or initiation
of such judicial proceedings, or that in the actions that it may bring, the PCGG may opt not to be
bound by rule applicable to the parties it has sued, e.g., the rules of discovery.
So, too, the PCGG's postulation that none of its members may be "required to testify or produce
evidence in any judicial . . proceeding concerning matters within its official cognizance," has no
application to a judicial proceeding it has itself initiated. As just suggested, the act of bringing suit
must entail a waiver of the exemption from giving evidence; by bringing suit it brings itself within
the operation and scope of all the rules governing civil actions, including the rights and duties
under the rules of discovery. Otherwise, the absurd would have to be conceded, that while the
parties it has impleaded as defendants may be required to "disgorge all the facts" within their
knowledge and in their possession, it may not itself be subject to a like compulsion.
The State is, of course, immune from suit in the sense that it cannot, as a rule, be sued without its
consent. But it is axiomatic that in filing an action, it divests itself of its sovereign character and
sheds its immunity from suit, descending to the level of an ordinary litigant. The PCGG cannot
claim a superior or preferred status to the State, even while assuming to represent or act for the
State. 48
The suggestion 49 that the State makes no implied waiver of immunity by filing suit except when in
so doing it acts in, or in matters concerning, its proprietary or non-governmental capacity, is
unacceptable; it attempts a distinction without support in principle or precedent. On the contrary

The consent of the State to be sued may be given expressly or impliedly. Express
consent may be manifested either through a general law or a special law. Implied
consent is given when the State itself commences litigation or when it enters into a
contract. 50
The immunity of the State from suits does not deprive it of the right to sue private
parties in its own courts. The state as plaintiff may avail itself of the different forms of
actions open to private litigants. In short, by taking the initiative in an action against
the private parties, the state surrenders its privileged position and comes down to the
level of the defendant. The latter automatically acquires, within certain limits, the
right to set up whatever claims and other defenses he might have against the state. . . .
(Sinco, Philippine Political Law, Tenth E., pp. 36-37, citing U.S. vs. Ringgold, 8 Pet.
150, 8 L. ed. 899)" 51

It can hardly be doubted that in exercising the right of eminent domain, the State exercises its jus
imperii, as distinguished from its proprietary rights or jus gestionis. Yet, even in that area, it has
been held that where private property has been taken in expropriation without just compensation
being paid, the defense of immunity from suit cannot be set up by the State against an action for
payment by the owner. 52
The Court also finds itself unable to sustain the PCGG's other principal contention, of the nullity of
the Sandiganbayan's Order for the production and inspection of specified documents and things
allegedly in its possession.
The Court gives short shrift to the argument that some documents sought to be produced and
inspected had already been presented in Court and marked preliminarily as PCGG's exhibits, the
movants having in fact viewed, scrutinized and even offered objections thereto and made comments
thereon. Obviously, there is nothing secret or confidential about these documents. No serious
objection can therefore be presented to the desire of the private respondents to have copies of those
documents in order to study them some more or otherwise use them during the trial for any
purpose allowed by law.
The PCGG says that some of the documents are non-existent. This it can allege in response to the
corresponding question in the interrogatories, and it will incur no sanction for doing so unless it is
subsequently established that the denial is false.
The claim that use of the documents is proscribed by Executive Order No. 1 has already been dealt
with. The PCGG is however at liberty to allege and prove that said documents fall within some other
privilege, constitutional or statutory.
The Court finally finds that, contrary to the petitioner's theory, there is good cause for the
production and inspection of the documents subject of the motion dated August 3, 1989. 53 Some
of the documents are, according to the verification of the amended complaint, the basis of several of
the material allegations of said complaint. Others, admittedly, are to be used in evidence by the
plaintiff. It is matters such as these into which inquiry is precisely allowed by the rules of discovery,
to the end that the parties may adequately prepare for pre-trial and trial. The only other documents
sought to be produced are needed in relation to the allegations of the counterclaim. Their relevance
is indisputable; their disclosure may not be opposed.
One last word. Due no doubt to the deplorable unfamiliarity respecting the nature, purposes and
operation of the modes of discovery earlier
mentioned, 54 there also appears to be a widely entertained idea that application of said modes is a
complicated matter, unduly expensive and dilatory. Nothing could be farther from the truth. For
example, as will already have been noted from the preceding discussion, all that is entailed to
activate or put in motion the process of discovery by interrogatories to parties under Rule 25 of the
Rules of Court, is simply the delivery directly to a party of a letter setting forth a list of least
questions with the request that they be answered individually. 55 That is all. The service of such a

communication on the party has the effect of imposing on him the obligation of answering the
questions "separately and fully in writing underoath," and serving "a copy of the answers on the
party submitting the interrogatories within fifteen (15) days after service of the
interrogatories . . ." 56 The sanctions for refusing to make discovery have already been
mentioned. 57 So, too, discovery under Rule 26 is begun by nothing more complex than the service
on a party of a letter or other written communication containing a request that specific facts therein
set forth and/or particular documents copies of which are thereto appended, be admitted in
writing. 58 That is all. Again, the receipt of such a communication by the party has the effect of
imposing on him the obligation of serving the party requesting admission with "a sworn statement
either denying specifically the matters of which an admission is requested or setting forth in detail
the reasons why he cannot truthfully either admit or deny those matters," failing in which "(e)ach of
the matters of which admission is requested shall be deemed admitted." 59 The taking of
depositions in accordance with Rule 24 (either on oral examination or by written interrogatories)
while somewhat less simple, is nonetheless by no means as complicated as seems to be the
lamentably extensive notion.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, without pronouncement as to costs. The temporary
restraining order issued on October 27, 1989 is hereby LIFTED AND SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 101682 December 14, 1992
SALVADOR D. BRIBONERIA, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, GERTRUDES B. MAG-ISA, married to and assisted by
PEDRO MAG-ISA, respondents.

PADILLA, J.:
On 17 October 1991, the petitioner filed with this Court a petition
for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals, Eleventh Division, * in CA-G.R. SP
No. 20114 dated 13 August 1990 as well as its resolution dated 9 September 1991 denying the
petitioner's for reconsideration.
Acting upon the petition, the Court required the private respondents to comment thereon. After the
private respondents had filed their comment, the Court resolved to consider the comment as answer
and to give due course to the petition and the case was deemed submitted for decision.

The antecedents are as follows:

On 23 May 1988, petitioner Salvador D. Briboneria, as plaintiff, filed a complaint

for Annulment of

Document and Damages, with prayer for preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order
against private respondent Gertrudes B. Mag-isa, with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, docketed
therein as Civil Case No. 55961, alleging inter alia that:
xxx xxx xxx
2. Plaintiff, together with his wife Nonita A. Briboneria, are the registered owners (of) a
parcel of land located at 59 Amsterdam Street Provident Village, J. de la Pea,
Marikina, Metro-Manila, covered under Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-29859 (Copy
attached herewith as Annex A) more particularly described as follows:
A parcel of land . . . situated in the Municipality of Marikina, Province of
Rizal, Island of Luzon . . . containing an area of THREE HUNDRED (300)
SQUARE METERS, more or less, . . .
Among the improvements on this parcel of land is plaintiff's residential house where
his wife and children used to stay until they migrated to the United States.
3. The abovementioned parcel of land was acquired and the residential house was
constructed through plaintiff's hard-earned salaries and benefits from his employment
abroad.
4. Plaintiff, as the duly registered owner, has declared the above-described parcel of
land and residential house for tax purposes under P.D. No. 464, copies of Declaration
of Real Property attached herewith as Annexes B and B-1.
5. Of late, plaintiff was surprised to learn that his wife Nonita A. Briboneria sold to
defendant Gertrudis B. Mag-isa by means of a Deed of Absolute Sale, copy attached
herewith as Annex C, the abovementioned house and lot.

6. Plaintiff, as the duly registered owner, never authorized or empowered Nonita A.

Briboneria or anybody for or on his behalf, stead or representation to enter into any
transaction regarding the sale, transfer or conveyance of the abovedescribed house
and lot.
7. Plaintiff had all along been expecting that the house and lot shall be for his family,
particularly his children.
8. As a result of the unauthorized sale, plaintiff was denied the use and enjoyment of
his properties since defendant Gertrudis B. Mag-isa had even leased the premises to
another who in turn had prohibited plaintiff from entering the premises.
9. By reason of the unlawful deprivation from him of his properties, plaintiff suffered
serious anxiety, fright, mental anguish and wounded feelings and further subjected
him to social humiliation and embarassment, particularly considering that the
abovementioned properties came from his hard-earned salaries and emoluments from
his employment abroad, for which defendants Mag-isa must be adjudged liable for
moral damages in an amount not less than ONE MILLION PESOS (P1,000,000.00) or
as may be equitably determined by this Honorable Court.
10. In order to serve as an example or correction for the public good, defendants Magisa should likewise be adjudged liable for examplary damages in an amount not less
than ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00) or as may be equitably
determined by this Honorable Court.
11. Plaintiff, in protection of his legitimate right and interests prejudiced by
defendants Mag-isa, was constrained to engage the services of undersigned counsel
for P50,000.00, exclusive of appearance fees and expenses.
Plaintiff adopts the foregoing.
12. The next move of defendants Mag-isa is to consolidate ownership over the
properties by means of the Deed of Absolute Sale (Annex C herein) which is inceptually
void.
13. Defendant Register of Deeds of Marikina would have no other alternative but to
give due course to the consolidation of ownership over the properties in the name of
defendants Mag-isa which eventually causes grave and irreparable injury, untold
injustice and undue prejudice to plaintiff unless a Writ of Preliminary Injunction, or
at least a Temporary Restraining Order is immediately issued by this Honorable Court
enjoining or restraining defendant Register of Deeds of Marikina, Metro-Manila or any
person acting on his behalf from consolidating ownership of the house and lot covered
under TCT No. N-29895 of the Registry of Deeds for the province of Rizal in the name
of defendants Mag-isa or their heirs or successor-in-interest.

14. Plaintiff is ready and willing to post a bond in such amount as this Honorable
Court may equitable determine subject to such conditions and terms as may be
appropriately imposed thereon.
In due time, private respondent Gertrudes B. Mag-isa, as defendant, filed her answer

alleging as

follows:
1. Defendants admit their circumstances as alleged in paragraph 1, the age of plaintiff
but denies the rest of the allegations therein for lack of knowledge and/or information
sufficient to form a judgment as to the truths thereof.
2. Defendants admit the allegations in paragraph 2 that pursuant to Transfer
Certificate of Title No. N-29859 (Annex "A"), plaintiff together with his wife appears to
be the registered owners of the subject parcel of land but that is more apparent and
(sic) real considering that defendants have admittedly bought the land and the
improvements thereon and defendants were purchasers in good faith and for value.
3. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 3 for lack of knowledge and
information to form a judgment as to the truths, and granting arguendo that the
acquisition of the land and the construction of the house came from the salaries and
benefits of the plaintiff, said salaries and benefits are considered conjugal.
4. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 4 for lack of knowledge and
information sufficient to form a judgment as to the truth thereof although it may be of
judicial notice that the Office of the Provincial/Municipal Assessor motu
proprio accomplishes (sic) Annexes "B" and "B-1" and all tax declarations for that
matter based on existing records in said office.
5. Defendants admit the allegations in paragraph 5 in so far as the transaction of
absolute sale between them and defendant's (plaintiff's) wife who acted not only in her
behalf but also as attorney-in-fact of her husband, plaintiff in the instant case, which
transaction was actually known by and with the consent of or should at least have
been known to and with the consent of plaintiff as evidenced by a letter of plaintiff to
his wife, a xerox copy of which is attached hereto as Annex "1" and made an integral
part hereof.
6. Defendants deny the allegation in paragraph 6, the truth and fact being that
plaintiff's wife was duly authorized by a Special Power of Attorney to transact on and
sell the subject house and lot, a xerox copy of which marked Annex "2" is hereto
attached and made an integral part hereof.
7. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 7 for lack of knowledge and
information sufficiento (sic) form a judgment as to the truths thereof.

8. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 8 to the effect that he was denied the
use and enjoyment of his properties for the reason that as the owners of the property,
defendants have the absolute rights of use and enjoyment over said properties with
the prerogative to lease the same to any party of their choice, the lessee with the right
to exclude others from the use and enjoyment of the premises.
9. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraphs 9, 10 and 11 not only for lack of
knowledge and information to form a judgment as to the truths thereof but also
because said allegations have no factual and legal basis.
10. Defendants admit the allegations in paragraph 12 in so far as the prospective
registration of Annex "C" is concerned but deny the rest of the allegations for reasons
stated earlier to the effect that Annex "C" is a valid and binding sale, with defendants
as the purchasers in good faith and for value.
11. Defendants admit the allegations in paragraph 13 in so far as the ministerial
functions of defendant Register of Deeds but deny the rest of the allegations the same
being without any factual and legal basis for reasons essayed earlier.
12. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 14 for lack of knowledge and
information sufficient to form a judgment as to the truths thereof aside from the fact
that plaintiff's alleged readiness and willingness to post a bond will simply be exercises
in futility.
On 13 September 1988, after issues in the case had been joined, petitioner served on the private
respondent Mag-isa a request for admission

reading as follows:

ATTY. ALFREDO A. ALTO

Counsel for Defendant Mag-isa
Balaga-Luna Building
Malolos, Bulacan
Greeting:
Plaintiff, through counsel, respectfully requests your admission within ten (10) days
from service hereof pursuant to Rule 26, Rules of Court of the following:
The Material facts
1. That plaintiff, together with his wife Nonita A. Briboneria, are the registered owners
of a parcel of land together with the improvements thereon covered under Transfer
Certificate of Title No. N-29895 (Annex A-Complaint) located at 59 Amsterdam Street,
Provident Village, Marikina, Metro-Manila.

2. That plaintiff, as the duly registered owner had declared for the year 1988 the
parcel of land and residential house for tax purposes under P.D. 464.
3. That plaintiff's family used to live at the said residential house.
4. That defendant Mag-isa actually lives near the location address of plaintiff's
properties.
5. That defendant Mag-isa knows that plaintiff works abroad but he (plaintiff)
regularly comes home and stays with his family at their residential house
abovementioned.
6. That the abovementioned house and lot were acquired through plaintiff's hardearned salaries and benefits from his employment abroad.
7. That plaintiff has reserved the house and lot as a place to stay to (sic) with his
family upon his retirement from his employment.
8. That plaintiff had never authorized his wife or anybody for that matter to sell or to
dispose of the property covered under TCT No. N-29895.
9. That plaintiff never executed the alleged Special Power of Attorney dated November
14, 1984 appended as Annex 2 Answer.
10. That the alleged Special Power of Attorney mentions "Transfer Certificate of Title
No. N-29995 issued by the Register of Deeds of Rizal."
11. That plaintiff never personally appeared before Notary Public Jose Constantino
upon whom the acknowledgment of said Special Power of Attorney was made.
12. That plaintiff never sold or disposed of, and never consented to the sale or
disposition of properties covered under TCT No. N-29995.
13. That plaintiff never received the consideration of the alleged sale, and he never
benefited therefrom in any manner.
14. That defendant Mag-isa never confirmed with plaintiff notwithstanding their being
neighbors, the authenticity of the alleged Special Power of Attorney and the validity of
the alleged Deed of Absolute Sale particularly considering that the subject matter
thereof involves plaintiff's properties.
15. That plaintiff was denied the use and enjoyment of his properties since defendant
Mag-isa had even leased the premises to another who in turn had prohibited plaintiff
from entering the premises.

The Material Documents

1. Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-29895 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal, copy
attached to the Complaint as Annex A.
2. The Declarations of Real Property filed by Salvador D. Briboneria pursuant to P.D.
464 for the year 1988, copies attached to the Complaint as Annexes B and B-1.
On 10 November 1988, the private respondents filed with the court a quo their Answer to Request
for Admission,5 alleging that most if not all the matters subject of petitioner's request for admission
had been admitted, denied and/or clarified in their verified answer dated 20 June 1988, and that
the other matters not admitted, denied and/or clarified were either irrelevant or improper.
On 18 November 1988, petitioner filed a Motion for summary
Judgment,

claiming that the Answer to Request for Admission was filed by private respondents

beyond the ten (10) day period fixed in the request and that the answer was not under oath; that,
consequently the private respondents are deemed to have admitted the material facts and
documents subject of the request for admission, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 26 of the Rules of
Court. The private respondents filed an opposition

to the motion for summary judgment, while the

petitioner filed a reply 8 to said opposition.

On 28 December 1988, the trial court issued an order

denying

the petitioner's motion for summary judgment. Petitioner moved for reconsideration

10

which the

court granted in its order dated 20 July 1989, setting aside the order of 28 December 1988.

11

The

private respondents, in turn, filed a Motion for Clarification and Reconsideration, to which the
petitioner filed an opposition.

12

On 1 February 1989, the trial court issued another order

13

this

time setting aside its order of 20 July 1989 and set the pre-trial conference on 22 February 1989.
The petitioner thereupon filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus to annul and set aside the order dated 1 February 1989 of the court a quo, alleging
that the said order was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. On
13 August 1990, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision,
motion for reconsideration having been likewise denied,

15

14

dismissing the petition. Petitioner's

he is now before us in the present

petition.
Petitioner assails the respondent appellate court in holding that the matters of fact and the
documents requested to be admitted are mere reiterations and/or reproductions of those alleged in
the complaint. He claims that the material facts and documents described in the request for
admission are relevant evidentiary matters supportive of his cause of action. He further argues that
the private respondents have impliedly admitted the material facts and documents subject of the
request for admission on account of their failure to answer the request for admission within the
period fixed therein, and for said answer not being under oath.

The petition can not be upheld; the petitioner's contentions are devoid of merit.
To begin with, a cursory reading of the petitioner's complaint and his request for admission clearly
shows, as found by respondent appellate court, that "the material matters and documents set forth
in the request for admission are the same as those set forth in the complaint which private
respondents either admitted or denied in their answer."

16

The respondent court therefore correctly

held that this case falls under the rule laid down in Po vs. Court of Appeals.

17

wherein this Court

held:
A party should not be compelled to admit matters of fact already admitted by his
pleading and concerning which there is no issue (Sherr vs. East, 71 A2d, 752, terry
260, cited in 27 C.J.S. 91), nor should he be required to make a second denial of those
already denied in his answer to the complaint. A request for admission is not intended
to merely reproduce or reiterate the allegations of the requesting party's pleading but
should set forth relevant evidentiary matters of fact, or documents described in and
exhibited with the request, whose purpose is to establish said party's cause of action
or defense. . . .
Moreover, under Section 1, Rule 26 of the Rules of Court,

18

the request for admission must be

served directly upon the party; otherwise, the party to whom the request is directed cannot be
deemed to have admitted the genuineness of any relevant document in and exhibited with the
request or relevant matters of fact set forth therein, on account of failure to answer the request for
admission.

19

In one case, namely, CA-G.R. No. 20561-R, entitled "Jose Ledesma, Jr., PlaintiffAppellee, versus Guillermo Locsin, Defendant-Appellant",

20

the Court of Appeals in favorably

resolving the defendant-appellant's motion for reconsideration of its earlier decision (wherein it
affirmed the summary judgment of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental in favor of
plaintiff Jose Ledesma, Jr. upon failure of defendant Guillermo Locsin to answer a request for
admission served upon his counsel by the plaintiff) held in its Resolution dated 1 June 1963, as
follows:
The issue raised by the first two assigned errors is whether or not a request for
admission must be served directly on a party, and not his counsel, in order that said
request can be considered as validly served. In our decision which is sought to be
reconsidered, we held that a request for admission may be validly served upon party's
counsel. After a further review of the facts of the case and the circumstances
surrounding the same, we are now fully convinced that it should not be so.
The general rule as provided for under Section 2 of Rule 27 (now Section 2, Rule 13) of
the Rules of Court is that all notices must be served upon counsel and not upon party.
This is so because the attorney of a party is the agent of the party and is the one
responsible for the conduct of the case in all its procedural aspects; hence, notice to

counsel is notice to party. The purpose of the rule is obviously to maintain a uniform
procedure calculated to place in competent hands the orderly prosecution of a party's
case (Chainani v. Judge Tancinco, G.R. No. L-4782, Feb. 29, 1952; Capili v. Badelles,
G.R. No. L-17786, Sept. 29, 1962). However, the general rule cannot apply where the
law expressly provides that notice must be served upon a definite person. In such
cases, service must be made directly upon the person mentioned in the law and upon
no other in order that the notice be valid.
Whenever notice is necessary, it must appear that it was served on the
proper person, and there must be strict compliance with a statute
requiring service on a particular person, so that service on another
person is not sufficient.
In general, service of notice of a modal or formal step in a proceeding on
the attorney of record is sufficient, if not otherwise specifically provided
by statute or rule of court. (66 C.J.S. 658)
Thus, we see that section 7 of Rule 40, with regard to notice of pendency of an appeal
from an inferior court to a Court of First Instance, provides that "it shall be the duty of
the clerk of the court to notify the parties of that fact by registered mail", and the
Supreme Court construing said section held, in Ortiz v. Mania, G.R. No. L-5147, June
2, 1953, that the notice of the pendency of the appeal must be served upon the parties
for said section being express and specific cannot be interpreted to mean that the
notice can be given to the lawyer alone.
Similarly, section 1 of Rule 20 (now Section 1, Rule 25) provides that "any party may
serve upon any adverse party written interrogatories", and Chief Justice Moran
commenting on this rule states that "the written interrogatories referred to in the
instant provision should be delivered directly to the adverse party." We see no valid
reason why a different rule should govern request for admission inasmuch as written
interrogatories and request for admissions are both modes of discovery.
Section 1 of Rule 23 (now Section 1, Rule 26) of the Rules of Court which expressly
states that "a party may serve upon any other party a written request" should receive
no other construction than that the request for admission must be served directly on
the party and not on his counsel. Section 2 of Rule 27 (now Section 2, Rule 13) of the
Rules of Court does not control the mode of service of request for admission. It should
be observed that the orders, motions and other papers mentioned in said section have
this property in common: they have to be filed with the court. A request for admission,
on the other hand, need not be filed with the court; it was intended to operate extrajudicially and courts are not burdened with the duty to determine the propriety or
impropriety of the request for admission (I Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court,
1957 ed., 372-73; I Francisco's Rules of Court, Part 2, p. 282).

. . . Permission of the court is not required to make such a request or

demand, or to file it, or serve it on the adverse party; but service must be
made in the manner specified by the statute or rule. (27 C.J.C. 277)
And the answer to the request for admission is likewise not a matter of record and
would require another step in procedure to bring it on record (Seranton Lackawanna
Trust Co. vs. McDermont, 1 Pa. Dist. & Co. 2nd 539, 55 Lack. Jur. 265, cited in 27
C.J.S. 277, fn 19). Section 2 of Rule 27 governs only those papers that have to be filed
in court and does not govern papers which, by the rules of procedure, do not have to
be filed in court.
In view of the foregoing, it is our considered opinion that the request for admission
made by plaintiff was not validly served and that, therefore, defendant cannot be
deemed to have admitted the truth of the matters upon which admissions were
requested and, consequently, the summary judgment rendered by the court a quo has
no legal basis to support it. This conclusion renders it unnecessary to discuss the
other assigned errors.
The plaintiff-appellee Jose Ledesma, Jr. filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari of the
aforesaid resolution, docketed as G.R. No.
L-21715. On 2 October 1963, this Court denied the petition, thus
After a consideration of the allegations of the petition filed in case L-21715 (Jose
Ledesma, Jr. vs. Guillermo Locsin), for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals
referred to therein, THE COURT RESOLVED to dismiss the petition for lack of merit.
In the present case, it will be noted that the request for admission was not served upon the private
respondent Mag-isa but upon her counsel, Atty. Alfredo A. Alto. Private respondent Mag-isa,
therefore, cannot be deemed to have admitted the facts and documents subject of the request for
admission for having failed to file her answer thereto within the period fixed in the request.
WHEREFORE, the petition should be, as it is hereby, DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals
dated 13 August 1990 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 71388. September 23, 1986.]

MARIA MONSERRAT R. KOH, Petitioner, v. HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT,
HON. JOB. B. MADAYAG in his capacity as the Presiding Judge, of Branch CXLV, Regional
Trial Court of Makati, Et Al., Respondents.
Bito, Misa & Lozada Law Office for Petitioner.
Fernandez, Oliva, Umali & Associates and Vicente C. Ramirez, Jr. for Respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; DEPOSITION AND DISCOVERY; PURPOSE. The rules
on discovery (Rules 24, 25, 26, 27, 28 and 29 of the Revised Rules of Court) are intended to enable
a party to obtain knowledge of material facts within the knowledge of the adverse party or of third
parties through depositions; to obtain knowledge of material facts or admissions from the adverse
party through written interrogatories; to obtain admissions from the adverse party regarding the
genuineness of relevant documents or relevant matters of fact through requests for admission; to
inspect relevant documents or objects and lands or other property in the possession or control of
the adverse party; and to determine the physical or mental condition of a party when such is in
controversy. Thus mutual discovery enables a party and thus facilitates an amicable settlement or
expedites the trial of the case. All the parties are required to lay their cards on the table so that
justice can be rendered on the merits of the case.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT MANDATORY. Trial judges should, therefore, encourage the proper
utilization of the rules on discovery. However, recourse to discovery procedures is not mandatory. If
the parties do not choose to resort to such procedures, the pre-trial conference should be set
pursuant to the mandatory provisions of Section 1 of Rule 20.

DECISION

FERIA, J.:

The Court affirms the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court (now renamed Court of Appeals)
which dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner against respondent Judge Job B.
Madayag of the Regional Trial Court of Makati and respondent First Interstate Bank of California.
Petitioner sought to annul and set aside the order of respondent Judge denying her motion to
dismiss the complaint based on res adjudicata.
On June 15, 1983, respondent Bank filed a Complaint against petitioner to recover the sum of US$7,434.90 or its equivalent in Philippine Currency which, due to a computer error, it had overpaid
to her on October 8, 1981. The Complaint alleged that on September 30, 1981, petitioners father

sent her US-$500.00 through the Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company which was the remitting
bank of respondent Bank. But due to computer mistake, respondent Banks Los Angeles Office
erroneously overstated the amount to US-$8,500.00 instead of US-$500.00, and as a consequence
respondent Bank issued and delivered to petitioner Cashier Check No. 1217681 amounting to US$8,500.00 dated October 8, 1981 which petitioner deposited to her account and subsequently
withdrew.
In her Answer dated August 17, 1983, petitioner admitted the above-stated allegations in the
Complaint and alleged that immediately after receipt of a formal demand letter to return the
overpayment, she offered to pay respondent Bank through its lawyer in installments of $100.00 a
month but the offer was unreasonably rejected.
It is significant to note that no copy of said Answer was attached to the petition for certiorari filed by
petitioner with the Intermediate Appellate Court, nor was any copy thereof attached to the petition
for review on certiorari filed with this Court. It was only in the Comment of respondents counsel
filed with this Court that a copy of said Answer was attached thereto.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
On August 19, 1983, Mr. E.R. Belen, Officer-in-Charge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch
141, sent the following "NOTICE OF CASE STATUS" to the parties through their respective lawyers.
GREETINGS:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Please take notice that cases where issues have been joined will be scheduled for pre-trial
conference only after Rules 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, and 29 where applicable, necessary and or
feasible have been resorted to by the parties.
If a party believes that those modes of discovery are not applicable, necessary or feasible with
respect to him, he shall file a manifestation to that effect.
The pre-trial conference, shall be scheduled as soon as the respective manifestations of having
resorted to, or of dispensing with, those modes of discovery have been filed by the parties.
The party, who has dispensed with those modes of discovery shall be deemed to have waived resort
thereto, and, unless for good cause shown, motion to resort thereto, after termination of the pretrial, shall not be granted. The costs entailed by the waiving party in presenting evidence during
trial that could have been obtained through any of those modes of discovery which were waived,
shall not be assessed against the adverse party nor awarded as part of the litigation expenses.
If, after 30 days from receipt of this notice, no such manifestation has been filed, the case shall be
archived or dismissed as the case may be.
Upon Order of the Court, this 19th day of August 1983.
Makati, Metro Manila.
(SGD.) E.R. BELEN
Officer-in-Charge

No manifestation was filed by the parties lawyers. On November 29, 1983, the presiding Judge (not
respondent Judge), issued the following order:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"For non-compliance with the Order (Notice of Case Status) dated August 19, 1983, more
particularly the last paragraph thereof, this case is hereby dismissed."cralaw virtua1aw library
This order was received by respondent Banks counsel on December 28, 1983.
On July 4, 1984, respondent Bank, through a new counsel, refiled its complaint which was
assigned to Branch 143 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati presided over by respondent Judge.
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of res adjudicata, as well as a
supplement thereto, which was opposed by respondent Bank.
On August 27, 1984, respondent Judge denied the motion to dismiss and on November 27, 1984, he
denied petitioners motion for reconsideration, on the following grounds:chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
(1) The dismissal was too drastic and was tantamount to depriving the plaintiff of its day in court.
(2) Notwithstanding the failure of the parties in said case to comply with said notice of case status
(above quoted), the court (Branch 141) should have set the case for pre-trial conference since the
last pleading had been filed and there are no other conditions to be complied with before any case is
calendared for pre-trial under Section 1 of Rule 20.
(3) It would be better for the defendant to have a definite and clear-cut decision as to her liability or
non-liability, instead of winning a case on a technicality.
On May 8, 1985, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Intermediate Appellate Court
praying that the orders denying the motion to dismiss and the motion for reconsideration be set
aside as null and void and that the complaint be ordered dismissed. On May 21, 1985, the appellate
court, finding no merit to the petition, resolved not to give it due course. In its decision, the
appellate court ruled as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"We concur with the above reasoning of respondent Judge. We should add to that our observation
that the order of dismissal of Judge Elbias in Civil Case No. 4272 (Annex F) was null and void for
lack of legal basis. The `notice of case status (Annex D) was not an order of the court. It was, as its
title indicated, only a `notice, not an order, The warring in the last paragraph of the notice advising
the parties that
If, after 30 days from receipt of this notice, no such manifestation has been filed, the case shall be
archived or dismissed as the case may be.
was not an order of the court. It was a warning emanating from E.R. Belen, the officer-in-charge (of
civil cases). The failure of the parties to heed the warning was not tantamount to disobedience of a
lawful order of the court, for the officer-in-charge was not the court or judge.
"Since the order of dismissal was null and void, it did not have the force of a judgment. It did not
constitute a bar to the refiling of the banks complaint. Respondent Judge did not err, or abuse his

discretion, in denying petitioners motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 7765." (pp. 35-36, Record)
Petitioner has appealed by certiorari to this Court. We are constrained to affirm. Indeed, with the
admission in petitioners Answer of the allegations in the Complaint that due to computer error
there was an overpayment to her of the amount of US-$8,000.00, coupled with her offer to pay
respondent Bank the amount of the overpayment in installments of $100.00 a month, we cannot
find any justification for ruling that the order dismissing the first complaint operated as an
adjudication on the merits or constituted a bar to the second complaint. In fact, the trial court
could have, on motion, rendered a judgment on the pleadings in the first case in favor of respondent
Bank.
True it is that respondent Banks counsel should have taken the precaution of complying with the
instructions contained in the "NOTICE OF CASE STATUS" if only to avoid the consequent delay
resulting from non-compliance; that respondent Banks counsel was negligent in not seeking a
reconsideration or clarification of the order of dismissal, or appealing therefrom. But, fortunately for
respondent Bank, the omissions of its counsel are not fatal to its cause in view of the defective
procedure which culminated in the dismissal of the first complaint.
The rules on discovery (Rules 24, 25, 26, 27, 28 and 29 of the Revised Rules of Court) are intended
to enable a party to obtain knowledge of material facts within the knowledge of the adverse party or
of third parties through depositions; to obtain knowledge of material facts or admissions from the
adverse party through written interrogatories; to obtain admissions from the adverse party
regarding the genuineness of relevant documents or relevant matters of fact through requests for
admission; to inspect relevant documents or objects and lands or other property in the possession
or control of the adverse party; and to determine the physical or mental condition of a party when
such is in controversy. This mutual discovery enables a party to discover the evidence of the adverse
party and thus facilitates an amicable settlement or expedites the trial of the case. All the parties
are required to lay their cards on the table so that justice can be rendered on the merits of the
case.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
Trial judges should, therefore, encourage the proper utilization of the rules on discovery. However,
recourse to discovery procedures is not mandatory. If the parties do not choose to resort to such
procedures, the pre-trial conference should be set pursuant to the mandatory provisions of Section
1 of Rule 20.
Petitioner argues that respondent Judge was wrong in stating that a pre-trial order should have
been issued since the last pleading had been filed, because the "notice of case status" was issued on
August 19, 1983, while the last pleading or the answer to petitioners counterclaim was filed much
later. Although, ordinarily, the last pleading which has to be filed before the court shall set the case
for pre-trial under Section 1 of Rule 20 is the answer to the counterclaim (Itchon v. Baligod, 17
SCRA 268; Pioneer Insurance & Surety Corp. v. Hontanosas, 78 SCRA 447), in the case at bar,
petitioners counterclaim for damages resulting from the filing of the complaint did not require an
answer (Navarro v. Bello, 102 Phil, 1019; Gojo v. Goyola, 35 SCRA 557). Since the counterclaim was
the last pleading, the court should have issued a pre-trial order after its submission and it was the
duty of the clerk of court to place the case in the pre-trial calendar under Section 5 of Rule 20.
Petitioner invokes the provisions of Section 3 of Rule 17 which reads as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Failure to prosecute. If plaintiff fails to appear at the time of the trial, or to prosecute his action
for an unreasonable length of time, or to comply with these rules or any order of the court, the
action may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the courts own motion. Tins
dismissal shall have the effect of an adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise provided by
court."cralaw virtua1aw library
This provision is not applicable to the case at bar. As the appellate court correctly held, the "notice
of case status" was not an order of the court. It was signed by Mr. E.R. Belen, officer-in-charge.
Even the warning in the notice (that if no such manifestation has been filed after 30 days from
receipt the case shall be archived or dismissed as the case may be) was ambiguous. The failure of
the parties to heed the warning did not constitute disobedience of a lawful order of the court.
Consequently, the order of dismissal could not have the effect of an adjudication upon the merits.
Neither could respondent Bank be considered to have failed to prosecute its action for an
unreasonable length of time, inasmuch as petitioners Answer was dated August 17, 1983 and the
order of dismissal was dated November 29, 1983.
Petitioner cites the case of Arellano v. Court of First Instance of Sorsogon (65 SCRA 45) in support
of her stand. However, in said case, the Court upheld the order of dismissal for failure of respondent
Barreta to serve any answer to petitioner Arellanos interrogatories. The dismissal was based on
Section 5 of Rule 29 which provides that if a party fails to serve answers to interrogatories
submitted under Rule 25, after proper service of such interrogatories, the Court on motion and
notice may dismiss the action or render judgment by default.
Petitioner further contends that if the ruling of the appellate court regarding the legality of the
notice signed by the officer-in-charge were sustained, then court processes such as summons,
notices of pre-trial, writs of execution and the like can be merely disregarded by lawyers. This
contention is without merit. Section 1 of Rule 14 expressly provides that upon the filing of the
complaint, the clerk of court shall forthwith issue the corresponding summons to the defendant.
Sections 1 and 5 of Rule 20 authorize the clerk of court to issue the notice of the date of the pretrial and Section 2 of Rule 22 authorizes the clerk of court to issue the notice of the date of the
trial. A writ of execution may be issued by the clerk of court pursuant to an order of execution
signed by the judge. There is no rule authorizing the issuance of the "notice of case status" in
question signed by an officer-in-charge.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the appellate court is affirmed, with costs against petitioner. This
decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.