The Intractable Conflict: Why Colombia?

s War
Against the FARC Eludes Resolution
By Philip K. Abbott
Journal Article | Nov 16 2014 - 3:26pm

The Intractable Conflict: Why Colombias War Against the FARC Eludes Resolution
Philip K. Abbott
Introduction
Through qualitative analysis, it is the authors view that the country of Colombia has evolved into what
can be coined as an intractable conflict with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-Peoples Army
(FARC-EP). This conflict has remained unresolved for such a long period of time and at such a high level
of intensity and destructiveness, that each side views the seemingly rigid position of the other side as a
threat to its very existence. Intractable wars are often perceived as a controversial concept, particularly
among academicians. Even so, this particular dispute is not impossible to resolve nor should it be
misconstrued as a statement to undermine everything President Juan Manuel Santos and the FARC
leadership are attempting to do in bringing peace to this war-torn-nation. It is simply an opportunity to
acknowledge root and proximate causes of this conflict and to further analyze both positive and negative
intervening factors. As is true with any breakdown in social behavior, there are many contributing
elements that make analysis and resolution extremely challenging despite the heroic efforts by
government officials, military leaders, and the overwhelming application of military power.
The story line of this conflict straddles between expectations and political power, and there is an
underlying fear of never reaching a win-win resolution. This is perceived as compromising on endearing
values or as demonstrating a sign of weakness. Apparently, anyone showing the courage to change for the
good of Colombia (or anyone appearing to placate the status quo challenger) faced real risks.
Unfortunately, history shows that all efforts to suppress the FARCs illegal approach to dissent from the
state have been unsuccessful.
Not surprisingly, with few exceptions, insurgencies do not successfully end by military action but by
social, economic and political change.[i] It seems that governments defeat themselves more often than
they are defeated by a dominant insurgency like FARC. This is true because governments tend to address
the root causes half-heartedly, fail to extend credible control of rural areas, overly depend on military
means to solve social problems, and become too dependent on fickle sponsors burdened with sustaining
domestic support.[ii] This is further compounded by the seemingly belligerent and ambiguous U.S.
foreign policy. Therefore, unless there is a fundamental change in how Colombian society views and
manages this conflict, we can be assured these differences will stalemate or elude a resolution for decades
to come.
This essay will portray the necessity in moving beyond military solutions, unsubstantiated propaganda,

and negative imaging, which for so many years has dominated the Colombian narrative. Moreover, it is
the authors intention to summon the reader to the social-psychological dimension that permeates all
aspects of this intractable conflict. History, perceptions and identity are not only inherently present in the
escalation of Colombias conflict with the FARC; they are also intrinsic in managing this conflict and
contributing to a sustainable peace. In order to gain a more equitable perception of reality, it is important
to acknowledge history, learn empathy, and to recognize fear and its according legitimacy. These efforts
will help formulate policies and strategies that are coherent and accurately address these realities. [iii]
Acknowledging Colombias Violent History
So what are the underlying causes of this destructive and intractable conflict? Clearly they have been
ignored and grossly blurred over Colombias past fifty years. Conflict analysis requires not only learning
history, but actually acknowledging the progression of events, conflicts, and the related eruption of
violence. In viewing this narrative, understanding how history and critical junctures shaped Colombias
path of economic and political institutions enables us to have a more complete theory of the origins of
differences between poverty and prosperity.[iv] Besides gaining insight of the root causes of this
prolonged struggle, it also offers the necessary perspectives for effective conflict management.
The inheritance of the Iberian Crowns caste system, a way to exercise political and economic control over
colonial Latin American, has a profound place in Colombian history.[v] Arguably, benevolent autocracy
and legitimized cruelty also had enduring effects on Colombian society. During the 16th century, Spain
carried the stamp of absolutism where military prowess, religious purity and subordination to the Spanish
Crown were above commerce, identity, and material gain.[vi] After independence from Spain, land
became available, ostensibly for both the Colombian working class and elite.[vii] The sudden opening of
this valuable frontier led to further divergence, shaped by the existing institutional differences, especially
those concerning who had access to the land.[viii] This created an egalitarian and economically dynamic
country, where land was allocated to the politically powerful and those with wealth and contacts, making
such people even more powerful.[ix] Consequently, the revolutionary movement failed to open the
political system to a broader cross section of Colombian society, and prevented more inclusive economic
institutions. The growing fear of unmet expectations provoked social unrest, but neither armed hostilities
nor the resulting peace agreements laid the necessary foundation or basis to resolve these long-standing
grievances for political and agrarian reform.[x] Now a decade into the 21st Century, Colombia remains
replete with symptoms of the same deep-rooted tensions between the governing elite and the land-less
poor.
As played out before in history, when socially and ideologically different worlds collide, those who
adhere to a particular social order often demonstrate very little empathy for opposing views, and are
therefore unwilling to compromise on their opinions or world views. The Colombian ruling elites lack of
addressing political injustice, and the growing socio-economic disparity and humiliation further fomented
social unrest. The Colombian government tried to suppress the resistance by belligerent means. Despite
its futility, once the Colombian government legitimatized their monopoly of violence as a justifiable
measure to counter the opposition, it sent a clear signal to the FARC regarding their natural right to do
what it must to stay alive.[xi]
Colombian history also shows how internal conflicts are not always independent of their domestic context.
Although the social, economic, and political conditions may have been set internally since the
independence movement, its trajectory has been greatly affected by a multitude of external factors of
varying scope and impact. A major external factor influencing Colombias domestic context was a set of
other global conflicts that became superimposed or impinged upon the growing unrest over social
injustice. Indeed, the Cold War had immense effect on Colombias seemingly manageable internal

dispute. During this period, the Soviet Union, the United States, and their proxies routinely sustained
regional alliances.
As marginalized segments of Colombian society unsuccessfully sought changes within the traditionally
unfair political, social and economic structures; the threatened, poor, working class fled to remote areas of
Colombia to seek refuge and create meaningful living arrangements. Many also began to organize under
the Colombian Communist Party (PCC), which was perceived as a feasible and democratic way to
leverage social and economic reform.[xii] Notwithstanding the growing consternation and seemingly
legitimate claims for unfulfilled human needs, this once tractable conflict quickly escalated. Tangible
issues became increasingly more embedded within a larger set of values, beliefs, identities, and cultures.
[xiii] Overtime, the actual genesis of this conflict became more diluted and progressively less relevant.
Three distinct phases of U.S. foreign policy began shaping Colombias internal security environment,
often at the expense of conflict resolution.
During the second half of the 20th century, U.S. foreign policy aimed at defeating communism. This
ideology had an important role in foreign policy formulation, for within ideologies lie many of the values
that inform the definitions of national interest.[xiv] However, ideologies can also contain highly
generalized and abstracted interpretation of history. They often narrowly focus on the world as it is
becoming and should become, rather than a realistic appreciation of the world as it actually is.[xv] To
invert the medical metaphor, ideology is like a powerful medicine of which a drop will cure but a
teaspoon will kill.[xvi]
Unlike President Eisenhower, Kennedys initial response to the perceived danger of communism
spreading in Latin America was drawn from the premise; those who make reform impossible will make
revolution inevitable.[xvii] Kennedy believed that in order to safeguard security interests, the United
States must address the poverty and oppression that seemed a fertile breeding ground for communism.
[xviii] Notwithstanding the well-intended Alliance for Progress initiative a sort of Marshall Plan for
Latin America aimed at reducing revolutionary pressure by stimulating economic development and
political reform, it quickly ran out of political steam. In fact, by November 1963, the Alliance for Progress
was essentially moribund.
A growing obsession with global communism further exacerbated domestic tensions. It made any
substantial political changes to Colombian society increasingly harder to achieve and much more
expensive than supplying military weapons and counterinsurgency training.[xix] Similarly, the idea of
creating self-sufficient communes or communist enclaves in the middle of the Andes Mountains was
viewed as a threat to both Bogota and Washington. Meanwhile, Kennedy was ever sensitive to charges of
appearing soft on communism and the bitter contention regarding his military leaderships role within a
cold war context. He decided to fulfill his campaign promises by regaining the upper hand in this political
debate.[xx]
As the United States began to export militaristic anti-Communist policies throughout Latin America, the
most important U.S. [anti-communist] ally became Latin American armed forces.[xxi] Under this strategic
security arrangement, U.S. naval and air power would handle any communist invaders from outside the
hemisphere, while Latin American armies would turn their U.S. supplied weapons inward against the
internal enemies of freedom: revolutionary organizers in factories, poor neighborhoods, and universities.
[xxii] To this extent, while U.S. counterinsurgency strategy began to build momentum under Plan Laso,
[xxiii] the conflict in Colombia took on a more destructive and violent narrative. The creation of these
communist enclaves provided the CIA and the Pentagon with their first foray into Colombia. In May
1964, after several years of planning by the CIA and U.S. Southern Command, Operation Maquetalia
launched an estimated 5,000 Colombian army elite force, backed by U.S. helicopters and fighter planes

dropping napalm to destroy the Independent Republic of Marquetalia. Although initially praised as a
successful mission, the joint U.S.-Colombian military operation to destroy Marulandas communists failed
to achieve its strategic objective, which actually helped catalyze the founding of the FARC.
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the long-lived anti-communism policy was soon replaced by a waragainst-drugs policy as the most important domestic issue in U.S. politics, especially with regards to
Colombia. By 1999, Colombia had surpassed Peru and Bolivia as the worlds largest producer of coca
and source country for over three-fourths of the worlds cocaine supply.[xxiv] The General Accounting
Office (GAO) further reported that an estimated two-thirds of FARC units were engaged in drug activity.
[xxv] GAOs quantifying charges of FARC involvement in drugs were perhaps less significant for the
Colombian social elite than the FARCs involvement with extortion and especially kidnappings, which
directly impacted their lives. Nonetheless, this made the FARC an easy target for Colombian society and
a national scapegoat for all the ills that beset Colombia.
In preparing for the 1998 presidential elections, FARC leader, Manuel Marulanda, met with Conservative
Party candidate Andres Pastrana, making it known that if Pastrana were elected, the FARC would
negotiate for peace in good faith. On the basis of that understanding, the Colombian people, who were
desperate for an end to the conflict, voted Pastrana into office as the peace candidate. Pastrana was
eager to fulfill his campaign promises, so he presented Plan Colombia to the U.S. Congress and requested
assistance for judicial reform and socio-economic development. However, U.S. lawmakers were more
concerned that Pastranas emphasis on peace negotiations would distract Colombias attention from a U.S.
antidrug agenda. Characteristically, senior U.S. government officials exerted pressure on Pastrana to
emphasize counternarcotics as a national priority.[xxvi] From what was substantially envisaged a
Marshall Plan[xxvii] for peace and social development, Plan Colombia soon became the cornerstone to
a U.S. regional counterdrug policy. To that end, U.S. Congress passed a resolution that would decertify
Colombia, essentially cutting off all U.S. foreign assistance to Colombia, if Pastranas peace initiatives especially the proposed plan to grant the FARC a demilitarized zone interfered with coca aerial
eradication efforts in southeastern Colombia. The extreme variation in analyzing Colombias security
problem indicated a lack of clear strategic vision as to how U.S. policy should integrate with the
fundamental goals of Colombias internal security challenges and the ongoing peace process with the
FARC. Moreover, this ambiguity reflects on the content of a strategic plan that went from a vision to
complement the ongoing peace process with the FARC, to a U.S. inspired and controlled counternarcotics
policy.
For their part, FARC leaders argued that the state had acted in bad faith by pretending to negotiate while
continuing to work with paramilitary forces that massacred peasants in areas under FARC influence. The
FARC further justified their distrust by pointing to the results of a previous round of peace negotiations
with President Belisario Betancur in the mid-1980s. As a result of those talks, the Colombian government
agreed to allow the FARC and the Colombian Communist Party to form the Patriotica Union (UP), a legal
political party that was joined by other leftist leaders and movements. However, over the next decade
paramilitaries, hired assassins, and state security agents killed an estimated three to four thousand UP
members, including two presidential candidates. The near extermination of the UP not only strengthened
the FARCs hardline military position, but also further diluted the true nature of the conflict and its
complexity, from a popular insurgency seeking political and economic pluralism to a contemptuous narcoinsurgency.
The third U.S. foreign policy decision directly affecting conflict resolution in Colombia was a result of the
September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States. Overnight, the FARC was suddenly branded a "terrorist"
organization, as the Global War on Terrorism replaced a U.S.-backed counter-insurgency strategy. Under

President Uribes heighted security policy, Plan Patriotas counterterrorism strategy appeared to replicate
Plan Colombias counter narcotics strategy in that the majority of resources were still being used for
military operations against the FARC and very little dedicated for social and economic development.
[xxviii]
As seen during Plan Colombia, the War on Terrorism further dehumanized the FARC, making it easier to
enable the Uribe government to act more forcefully without constraint. Both the Colombian government
and FARC came to perceive one another as dire enemies. Although a very common practice, once the
enemy was considered to be less than human, it became psychologically acceptable to resort to
increasingly more destructive means, which resulted in gross violations of human rights from both sides of
the conflict.
The Impact of Empathy in Conflict Resolution
Im not a Chavista, but I understand where he is coming from with respect to the poor.[xxix] The
callous indifference of the Colombian ruling elite and FARC slowly depleted humanity and civility out of
those who participated in this seemingly endless struggle. In analyzing Colombias violent history, it is
increasingly more apparent that this intractable conflict will continue to be an indisputable fact of life well
into the 21st century, unless there is a paradigm shift where both sides of the argument exercise their
capacity for empathy.[xxx] Empathy has a reputation as a fuzzy, feel-good emotion that is often
associated in some vague way with everyday kindness or civility. Therefore, its value is easily dismissed
when defending national interests or seeking diplomatic and political solutions to ideological differences.
[xxxi] Interestingly, two wise South African leaders, Nelson Mandela and Desmond Tutu, are veritable
examples of how they challenged South African citizens to will a society in which justice and fairness
became common practice. In this particular case, empathy played an integral role in achieving a peaceful
resolution. Moreover, during the 2008 U.S. presidential primaries, voters were asked what they felt was
most important in a presidential candidate. The majority regarded empathy as legitimate and highly
relevant in determining the best president to lead the most powerful nation in the world.[xxxii]
However, such an empathic society is only possible when individuals are conditioned to imagine
themselves in other peoples situations. Just as perceptions are formed early in life and passed down
through generations, empathy also shapes individuals, and in many ways, has the power to transform
entire societies.[xxxiii] For a Colombian citizen to see through the eyes of a FARC member, or vice
versa, this presupposes the fundamental corrigibility of human nature, whereby individuals can learn,
grow and improve their behaviors. Unfortunately, the FARC and their affiliates live in a survivalist
society imperiled by economic hardship and insecurities. In this kind of environment, self-expression is
low and empathy rarely reaches beyond family bonds or kinship relations.[xxxiv] Indeed, the envy of
many societies, Switzerland for example has developed a cultural ability to expose human beings to
empathy at a very early age. Through generations this process sharpens its citizens receptivity, tolerance,
and their capacity to be nice to each other [sind lieb miteinand] in local Swiss dialect. Consequently,
empathy becomes an essential component of this direct democracy built on consensus.[xxxv]
Moreover, with empathy as part of a national identity, individuals develop the ability to humanize each
other and bring greater understanding to differing ideological views and perceptions. How Colombias
prolonged conflict is managed will depend on a clear understanding and acknowledgement of their
historical context. More importantly, their conflict may be a direct reflection on its willingness to reach
beyond ones own narrow interpretation of reality.[xxxvi] As commonly seen in Colombia, perceptions
are not always perfect images of reality. They tend to exploit deception and false information to gain a
strategic advantage over the enemy, which has led to a good-versus-evil dialectic.[xxxvii]
Unfortunately, over time this has created a very destructive atmosphere, which is increasingly more

difficult to reverse.
As shown in South Africa under Nelson Mandela, only when the Colombian society imagines the
experience of people living outside of their ascribed social status, will they freely enter into a dialogue that
would enable reconciliation of differences. Mendala;s South Africa was an example of how empathy is
important in solving socio-political problems. But empathy is not a panacea for solving Colombias
intractable conflict. Human beings generally withhold empathy from others because cultural and
ideological narratives present them as irrevocably different, making it easier to portray the enemy as
contemptible and therefore deserving of their misfortune.[xxxviii] What is meaningful, however, is that
empathy serves as a powerful psychological guide for compassion and social responsiveness. Without it,
the FARC and Colombian government are likely to remain cold toward each other and therefore unable to
even know how to understand or make sense of the destructive predicament they face. Not only is
Mandelas unique ability for forgiveness a valuable leadership lesson, his real genius lies in making the
citizens of South Africa amenable to recognizing fear and seeing others as worthy or legitimate to be
listened to and to negotiate with.[xxxix]
Recognizing Fear and According Legitimacy
It all began so innocentlyall I wanted in life was to get married, get a job as a seamstress, and take
care of my children.[xl] The Colombian conflict has taken on increased symbolic significance over the
past fifty years. The original argument to create more pluralistic political and economic institutions for a
broader cross section of society has become less relevant as new causes and fears were generated. Both
the Colombian government and FARC developed a mutual fear of each other as well as a profound desire
to inflict as much physical and psychological harm on each other as possible.[xli] This sense of threat and
hostility has pervaded the lives of those directly and indirectly involved in this conflict, and seems to
override their ability to recognize and legitimize any common concerns they may actually share.[xlii]
Arguably, fear can be viewed as both a cause and a consequence of Colombias violent history, making
conflict analysis and resolution more difficult. This intractable conflict involves interests and general
values that both Colombias ruling elite and FARC regard as worthy to fight over. The FARC faced a
legitimate fear based on unfulfilled social, economic, and political needs and the consequences of losing
ones identity and security. On the other hand, the Colombian government faced perceived security
concerns regarding the spread of communism, the social scourge of drug trafficking, and most recently
terrorism.
It is understandable for Colombias ruling elite to view the FARC as nothing more than bandits,
communists, and drug trafficking terrorists who are willing to destroy the country and restructure political
and economic institutions in their favor. Brutal tactics and reliance on the cocaine business, as one source
of illicit financing, further alienated the majority of the population outside of certain rural regions. The
FARC members were also responsible for countless atrocities against civilians including massacres, car
bombings, mass kidnappings, and coerced recruitment of children. Their improvised explosive devices
(IEDs)[xliii] killed and mutilated thousands of Colombian citizens and forced millions of innocent people
to be internally displaced from their homes.
The FARCs involvement with drugs, extortion and especially kidnapping, only complicated the issue
making them an even easier target for negative imaging and dehumanization. Once the FARC and their
affiliates were considered less than human, it became psychologically acceptable to employ less than
human practices a perfect recipe for human rights violations. This is an extremely dangerous practice.
It is equally convenient for the FARC and their affiliates to question the legitimacy of the Colombian
government and ruling elite as untrusting hegemons, full of selfish and corrupt practices to control

political and economic power in their favor. It is the FARCs view that Colombian democracy has flaws,
particularly when two-thirds of Colombians living in rural areas still suffer from absolute poverty, as
defined as the inability to properly feed and clothe themselves. Living in constant danger, one can ask,
How can violence be the solution when violence was the primary reason for poverty and inequality?
[xliv]
Like hundreds of thousands of deprived Colombians, Pedro Antonio Marin, alias Manuel Marulanda
Velez, was also swept up by the maelstrom that followed Jorge Gaitans death,[xlv] which catapulted the
country into a decade-long civil war, known as La Violencia, or The Violence.[xlvi] Full of fear, poor
peasants desperately fled to the remote mountains and organized into liberal and communist self-defense
groups to protect themselves and their families against the rampages of the conservative governments
paramilitary and police forces. Although most communists, guerrillas or bandits, as they were labeled, put
down their weapons during the 1958 national-front governments amnesty, several demobilized leaders
and hundreds of their followers were savagely murdered.[xlvii] The communists were cautious because
the Colombian government demonstrated an unwillingness to grapple with serious solutions concerning
agrarian reform and the associated challenges of rural living.
Colombias ruling elite harbored a profound distaste for centralized power, a tradition that dated back to
the days of the Spanish Crown.[xlviii] There was simply no appetite for political and economic inclusivity
or a desire to create a consensus around solutions to ideological differences and social tension. The
political agreement that finally ended La Violencia guaranteed a sixteen-year period in which liberals and
conservatives would share power, leaving no electoral outlet for social reform. There seemed to be no
effort to understand, legitimize or demonstrate empathy for any of the political concerns or social
challenges facing the poor. It also appeared that Colombia defied solutions to social problems, a defining
characteristic since independence, where each spasm of bloodshed always seemed to be a continuation of
the previous one.[xlix]
Conclusion
The sign outside the entrance to the cemetery reads; Aqui somos todos iguales. In English, Here we
are all equals. But equality in the cemetery cannot ignore the violent experiences and deep-rooted
perceptions that have polarized Colombia into two unequal worlds. Decades of revenge and attacks on
areas of personal sensitivity have created an atmosphere of distrust, anger, and vulnerability. The
adversarial relationship between the ruling elite and FARC is marked by such a long history of fear and
mistrust that only when a paradigm shift in thinking happens, can the true causes of this dispute be openly
acknowledged and the rigidity of thinking pacified. Regrettably, violence in Colombia is rooted in
complex social-political factors: poverty, ideological differences, social inequality, the governments
shortcomings, the scourge of narcotics and numerous other problems. These have led to the fact that in
nearly two centuries since independence, Colombia has experienced only forty-seven years of peace.[l]
Revenge solves nothing according to former Colombian President Alvaro Uribe Velez who said, We
cannot lash out angrily at this violence and expect it to go away.[li] Nor should violence in Colombia be
interpreted in moral terms as a confrontation between good and evil. The biggest obstacle to conflict
resolution as pointed out by former FARC leader Marulanda is the isolation of this fightbetween you
in the city, and us, here in the mountains. Your voices and our voices dont listen to each other; we rarely
speak to each other. Its not the mountain across our paths that form the obstacle. Among yourselves, its
the very little you know about us, among us, its the very little we know of your history.[lii]
Colombian society is as much divided today as it was fifty years ago because of these social-psychological
barriers. There is still pro-FARC Colombians from rural areas who remain distrustful of a government

they view as failing to deliver on past promises. Historically, the government has never helped us, and
with coca we helped ourselves economically. Now the government wants to help, but we are afraid it will
ruin the economy we now depend on to survive.[liii] There are also a majority of right-wing urban
dwellers avidly defending the government who they associate with security, sound democratic practices,
and economic prosperity. Over the past two decades, Colombia has emerged as a much safer and
economically prosperous country. Unfortunately, absent some form of compromise and a clear
understanding of the enemys narrative, the wishes of all Colombians cannot be simultaneously met or
legitimized.[liv]
How can Colombia bring better clarity to the seemingly blurred perspective regarding this conflict?
Perhaps a Truth and Reconciliation Commission, as realized in South Africa could add value to the
process of acknowledging history, learning empathy, and recognizing fear and its according legitimacy.
In theory, a Truth and Reconciliation Commission would help facilitate open communications between the
FARC and Colombian society as once suggested by Marulanda. This would also help disabuse prejudices
and misconceptions. It would help dissolve the rigidity of thinking. It would help acknowledge history.
It would help create an environment to share with each other the enemys world. It would help
promote individual healing. It would help humanize the enemy. It would help legitimize the once
negative portrait of the enemy. It would help unblock empathy. It would help encourage reconciliation
of differences. In summary, it would help provide the necessary foundation for a peaceful resolution to
this fifty-year conflict.
Changing Colombias calcified understanding of life and people will not be an easy task. Anything
worthwhile rarely is easy. The danger with perceptions is that while they are drawn from reality, over
time they actually create reality, as highlighted in Colombias historical context.[lv] Many of Colombias
ruling elite, as well as the FARC, operate far more from assumptions than from a genuine understanding
of reality. Both groups have their own history and narrative about the conflict, as passed down from
previous generations; however, few know very little about the narrative and history of the other. They are
unable to reach beyond their own perspectives primarily due to the scarcity of interaction between them.
Maybe this is where the South African philosophy of humanism, as expressed under Mandelas
leadership, could serve as a basic blueprint for conflict resolution. This could be the paradigm shift where
civility replaces violence as the solution to Colombias social problems. Surprisingly, this philosophy may
have played out during the August 22, 2014 dialogue on humanistic conditions between General Javier
Flrez, the former second-in-command of Colombias armed forces, and FARC negotiators in Havana. It
was one of the most dramatic moments in almost two years of ongoing peace talks between the
Colombian government and the FARC because it enabled, as stated by senior FARC negotiator, Ivan
Mrquez, the opportunity to talk warrior-to-warrior.[lvi] Regrettably, President Santos was emphatic
during his recent meeting with United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, when he proclaimed that
the Colombian government will have nothing to do with Castrochavismo,[lvii] essentially telling the
world that the Colombian government will not negotiate with the FARC any alternative options to current
political and economic institutions.[lviii] All hope rests on signing a peace agreement in Havana, Cuba,
but does this simply mean that Colombias violence and ongoing social struggle will be bequeathed to the
next generation?
End Notes

[i] Robert Taber, War of the Flea: The Classic Study of Guerrilla Warfare, (Washington, DC: Potomac
Books, Inc., 2002) p. 170.

[ii] Ben Connable and Martin C. Libicki, How Insurgencies End, (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation
2010), p. 152.
[iii] Maire A. Dugan, Power Inequalities, The Beyond Intractability Project, Edited by Guy Burgess and
Heidi Burgess (Colorado: The Conflict Information Consortium, University of Colorado, February 2004),
http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/power-inequalities.
[iv] Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity and
Poverty, (Great Britain: Profile Books, 2012) p. 101
[v] John Charles Chasten, Born in Blood & Fire: A Concise History of Latin America, (New York: W.W.
Norton & Company 2006 ) p. 83.
[vi] Robert Harvey, Bolivar The Liberator of Latin America: The War Against the Spanish Empire,
(United Kingdom: Skyhorse Publishing 2011), p. 37.
[vii] Albert Berry, Has Colombia Finally Found an Agrarian Reform That Works?,
http://www.peri.umass.edu/fileadmin/assets/pdfs/Berry-AGREF_1_.10.pdf.
[viii] Acemoglu and Robinson, p. 37.
[ix] Ibid, p. 37.
[x] Karen Ballentine and Jack Sherman, editors, The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed
and Grievance, (A project of the International Peace Academy, 2003).
[xi] Thomas Hobbs, Leviathan, (Australia: The University of Adelaide, February 27, 2014 by eBooks @
Adelaide), Chapter 21.
[xii] Garry Leech, The FARC: The Longest Insurgence, (Halifax: Fernwood Publishing 2011), p. 7.
[xiii] Michelle Maiese, Causes of Disputes and Conflicts, The Beyond Intractability Project, (Colorado:
The Conflict Information Consortium, University of Colorado, October 2003),
http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/underlying-causes.
[xiv] Henry Kissenger, Years of Upheaval , (Boston, MA: Little, Brown & C0. 1982), pp. 465-467.
[xv] Terry L. Deibel, Foreign Affairs Strategy: Logic for American Statecraft, (Great Britain: Cambridge
University Press 2007), p.118.
[xvi] Ibid, p. 118.
[xvii] John Charles Chasteen, p. 280.
[xviii] Steven R. Robe, p. 7

[xix] Ibid, p.281.

[xx] Steven R. Robe, P. 703.
[xxi] John Charles Chasteen, p.281.
[xxii] Ibid, p.281.
[xxiii] In 1962, Plan Laso was the first U.S. initiative designed to pre-empt the spread of communism in
Colombia. One of its primary objectives was to "eliminate the so-called "independent republics" created
by leftist insurgents and some bandit elements in the upper Magdalena Valley.
[xxiv] Cynthia J. Arnson, Introduction, The Peace Process in Colombia and U.S. Policy, (Latin American
Program: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars Number 246, May 2000), p. 11.
[xxv] Ibid, pp. 6-18.
[xxvi] Ibid, p. 11.
[xxvii] The Marshall Plan, named after Secretary of State George C. Marshall, was launched by President
Harry Truman (1945-1952) to reconstruct sixteen Western European countries after World War II. The
total amount of support was estimated at thirteen billion dollars.
[xxviii] Garry Leech, Beyond Bogota, p. 173.
[xxix] Interview with demobilized FARC members, Bucaramanga, Colombia, 2013.
[xxx] Claudia Seymour, Social Psychological Dimensions of Conflict, The Beyond Intractability
Project, Edited by Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess, (Colorado: The Conflict Information Consortium,
University of Colorado, September 2003), http://www.beyondintractibility.org/essay/social-psychological.
[xxxi] Roman Krznaric, Can Empathy Help Resolve Violent Conflict?, Outrospection: November 5,
2013.
[xxxii] Jeremy Rifkin, The Empathic Civilization: The Race to Global Consciousness in a World in Crisis,
(New York: Penguin Group, 2009), p. 446
[xxxiii] Anna Titulear, The Power of Empathy in Conflict Resolution, Peace and Conflict Monitor, May
16, 2012.
[xxxiv] Jeremy Rifkin, p. 449.
[xxxv] Philip K. Abbott, Achieving a Peace Settlement between Abkhazia and Georgia: Lessons from
Swiss Federalism, Small Wars Journal, May 6, 2011.

[xxxvi] Anna Titulaer, The Power of Empathy in Conflict Resolution

[xxxvii] Claudia Seymour, Social Psychological Dimensions of Conflict.
[xxxviii] Martha Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions, (Great Britain:
Cambridge University Press 2001), p. 327.
[xxxix] John Kane, The Politics of Moral Capital, (England: Cambridge University Press 2001), pp.329300.
[xl] Interview with demobilized FARC members in Cali, Colombia, 2012.
[xli] Peter Coleman, Intractable Conflict, The Handbook of Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice,
edited by Morton Deutsch and Peter Coleman, (San Francisco: Josey-Bass, 2000), p. 428.
[xlii] Maiese, Michelle, Causes of Disputes and Conflicts, The Beyond Intractability Project, Edited by
Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess, (Colorado: The Conflict Research Consortium, University of Colorado,
October 2003), http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/underlying-causes.
[xliii] On an annual average from 2009 to 2013, there have been over 2,000 Colombian army soldiers
wounded and over 500 killed in action. The majority of these casualties are inflicted by FARC emplaced
improvised explosive devices.
[xliv] Alvaro Uribe Velez, No Lost Cause, (London: Penguin Books, 2012), p. 57
[xlv] Jorge Eliecer Gaitan , the populist Liberal leader whose radical politics resonated with Colombias
excluded poor. His assassination on April 9, 1948 ignited an uprising in Bogota that changed the course of
Colombian history. The uprising spread throughout the country, further igniting a decade-long civil war
between Liberals and Conservatives known simply as La Violencia, in which more than 200,000
Colombians were killed.
[xlvi] Dennis M. Rempe, Guerrillas, Bandits, and Independent Republics: US Counter-insurgency Efforts
in Colombia 1959-1965, in Small Wars (Winter 1995).
http://www.icdc.com/paulwolf/colombia/smallwars.htm.
[xlvii] In 1958, the National-Front government assumed power under the power-sharing agreement that
called for the Liberal Party and Conservative Party to alternate the presidency every four years and split
all government posts. This political arrangement lasted until 1974.
[xlviii] Alvaro Uribe Velez, p. 52.
[xlix] Ibid, p. 51.
[l] Alvaro Uribe Velez, p. 33.
[li] Ibid, p. 33.

[lii] Arturo Alape, Manuel Marulanda, Tirofijo Colombia: 40 aos de lucha guerrillera, (San Isidro,
Mexico: Txalaparta 1998), p. 54.
[liii] Interview with demobilized FARC member in Bucaramanga, Colombia in 2013.
[liv] Beyond Bogota: Diary of a Drug War Journalist in Colombia, (Boston, MA 2009), p. 217
[lv] Claudia Seymour, Social Psychological Dimensions of Conflict.
[lvi] The Americas, The moment of truth: Colombias peace process, The Economist, (August 30,
2014).
[lvii] Castrochavismo is in reference to the economic option taken by Fidel Castro and Hugo Chavez
whereby a centralized government plays a much stronger role in guiding the choice of each individual
decision.
[lviii] Politico, No tenemos nada que ver con el castrochavismo, El Tiempo,
http://www.eltiempo.com/politico/acciones , (22 de septiembre de 2014).

About the Author

Philip K. Abbott
Colonel Philip K. Abbott, U.S. Army, is currently the Combating Terrorism
Portfolio Manager at the United States Southern Command in Miami, Florida. He
received a B.A. from Norwich University, an M.A. from Kansas University, and an
M.S. from the National Defense University. He served in various Command & Staff
positions in Europe, the Pacific, and worked extensively throughout the Western
Hemisphere as a Latin American Foreign Area Officer.

Available online at : http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-intractable-conflict-whycolombia%E2%80%99s-war-against-the-farc-eludes-resolution

Links:
{1} http://smallwarsjournal.com/author/philip-k-abbott
{2} http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/power-inequalities
{3} http://www.peri.umass.edu/fileadmin/assets/pdfs/Berry-AGREF_1_.10.pdf
{4} http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/underlying-causes
{5} http://www.beyondintractibility.org/essay/social-psychological
{6} http://www.icdc.com/paulwolf/colombia/smallwars.htm
{7} http://www.eltiempo.com/politico/acciones
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