Annotated Bibliography

Barkan,En,Hernandez,Kaplan,Yannix1
PrimarySources
"TheBattleForIran."N.d.TS,NationalSecurityArchiveElectronicBriefingBookNo.
435.GeorgeWashingtonUniversity.
TheNationalSecurityArchive.GeorgeWashingtonUniversity,19Aug.2013.Web.20
Dec.2014.ThisrecentlydeclassifiedinternalCIAreportsummarizesOperationAJAXs
process,andconfirmsinanappendixthatmostofthedocumentationcoveringthecoup
wasdestroyed.Interestingly,itstatesthatmuchofthepublicsknowledgeoftheevent
aroundthetimeperiodwaswildlyinaccurate.Additionally,itshowsthattheCIAwas
extremelynaiveintheaftermathofvictory,neglectingtofollowtheShahs
governmentcloselyortheoppressiveregimethathebeganwiththecreationofSAVAK.
Baraheni,Reza.""..AmnestyIntl.N.p.,28Oct.1976.Web.04Jan.2015.
Thissource,whichiswritteninArabic,wasusefulindetermininghowIranwasduring
thebrutalruleundertheshah.ThissourcewasadirectwritingfromRezaBaraheni,an
Iranianhistorianduring1976,whentheturmoilwasrisingandactionswerecomingtoa
head.ThissourcetalksabouthowlowthepublicopinionwasoftheIraniansecretpolice,
theSAVAK.Specifically,itdetailshowSAVAKwouldrandomlytakecitizensfrom
theirhouseandwouldtorturethemeveniftheysimplylivednexttoapossibleShah
protester,inagrotesquedescriptionofthebrutalityallowedundertheShahsregime.
BritishForeignandCommonwealthOffice,ed."BritishAmericanPlanningTalks,Washington,
October1011,1978."(n.d.):n.pag.
TheNationalSecurityArchive(GeorgeWashingtonUniversity).GeorgeWashington
University.Web.13Oct.2014.Thisdocumentisasetofnotesfromameetingofthe
BritishForeignandCommonwealthOfficefrom1978,astheydiscussthestateofforeign
affairswithAmericanofficials.InthesectionpertainingtoIran,thenotetakeroutlinesa
pointthatHenryPrecht,BritishCountryDirectorforIran,makes,wherehecallsthemess
inIran"theworstforeignpolicydisastertohittheWestformanyyears."Prechtgoeson
tocorrectlypredictthefalloftheShah'sgovernmentwithinayear,andtheuprisingof
Khomeini.AllinattendanceagreedthathoweverbadrelationswithIrangot,theycould
notbeterminatedbecauseofIraniandependenceontheWestbuyingoil.Thisshowsthat
whilebothAmericansandBritishofficialsunderstoodthesituationwasratherdireasa
resultoftheCoup,andtheyrealizedtheyhadmadeamistake,theydidnotfully
appreciatethelegacythattheycouldbeleaving,andthefullextentoftheirmistakes,as

theydidnotaccountfortheantiwesternsentimentfeltinIranatthetimeofKhomeini's
risetopower.
Broe,WilliamV.
MemorandumFortheRecord:GenesisofOperationFUBELT
.Rep.
National
SecurityArchive
.GeorgeWashingtonUniversity.Web.8Feb.2015
Thismemorandumwasoneofthefirstdocumentsfromtheplanningprocessofoperation
FUBELT,whichisbetterknownastheChileancoup.Thememorandumoutlineswith
urgencytheneedforaChileanleaderotherthanSalvadorAllende,whoposeda
Communistthreattothecountry,andthreatenedthepolicyofcontainment.The
memorandumwastakenfromtheNationalSecurityArchive,sponsoredbyGeorge
WashingtonUniversity,makingitaveryreliableprimarydocument.Itwasvery
beneficialtoourlegacyargumentinthatitoutlinedanaspectofAmericanforeignpolicy
duringthecoldwar,andwasaverygoodexampleoftheUnitedStatesoverthrowinga
democraticallyelectedleader,andreplacingtheleaderwithsomeoneelseinacoup.
Bruce,DavidK.,andRobertA.Lovett.BruceLovettReport.Rep.N.p.:n.p.,1956.Print.
ThisreportcommissionedbytheBoardofConsultantsonFederalIntelligenceActivities
highlightstheshortfallsoftheCIAorganizationalsystem,whichitdescribesas
freewheelinganduncheckedbyqualifiedauthorities,bothinternallyandexternally.
AuthorsDavidK.E.BruceandRobertA.Lovett(theSecretaryofDefense)werehighly
criticalofthefreenatureoftheCIA,statingthatitcontainednoneofthelongrange
guidanceandvisionsnecessarytoensureeffectivepolicyprocedure(PP)operations.
Theyprovidefewspecificdetailstosupporttheirclaims,usingmostlybroad
generalizationsaboutCIAworkersorleaders,althoughtheauthoritativenatureofthe
reportanditswritersleadsustobelievethattheyhavesomeweightbehindtheirclaims.
CampaigntoInstallaProWesternGovernmentinIran
.N.d.CIA,Summary.
Thisreportreleasedin2011withtheCIAFreedomofInformationAct,likelyprepared
byDonaldWilbur,anarchitectofthecoup,detailstheUnitedStates'spointofviewand
thoughtprocessregardingtheeventsandtheiractionsinIran.Althoughlikelybiased,it
providesanelucidatingperspectiveofthecoup,firstpresentingknowledgeoftheTudeh
party'sandSovietUnion'sinfluenceandrecognizingtheexistenceofFedayenIslam.It
claimsthattheUSsawitselfasan"honestbroker,"andthatitwas"admittedlyreluctant"
totakecovertactioninIran,butthatthecoupwasa"moredesirablerisk"thanlettingthe
Sovietsgainanadvantageintheregion.Itmaybeimportanttonotethatthedocument

washeavilyexcised,presentingthepossibilitythattheCIAiswithholdingyetmore
importantinformation.
Coyne,J.Patrick.CoyneReporttotheCIA.Rep.N.p.:n.p.,1956.Print.
ThisreportonthestatusofCIAoperationssystemsprovidedacomprehensivesummary
oftheissueswithintheCIAorganizationalsystem.Primarily,alackofproperchecksand
balancesonCIAoperationsallowedittopursuemultiplepotentiallydisastrous
undertakings,withoutanyofthelongrangeguidanceandplanningthatshouldbe
providedbytheStateandDefenseDepartments.Overall,thissourceunderscoredthe
downfallsoftheCIAatthetime,andgavesomesuggestionsonhowtoimprovethe
accountabilityoftheorganization.
Daniel,Clifton."U.S.andBritainConfrontedByDilemmaonHelptoIran."TheNewYork
Times11Aug.1952:n.pag.Print.
Thisprimarysourcenewsarticle,publishedintheNewYorkTimesaboutayearbefore
thecoup,discussesthedilemmaoftheAmericanandBritishgovernmentsindeciding
whetherornottoactinIran.TheprimaryBritishmotivationinIranwastocombat
Mossadeq'snationalizationoftheAIOC.TheBritishinsisteduponmeetingwiththe
UnitedStatesfirstinordertogetthemtoagreetoassist.Ofparticularinterestinthis
articleisthefacttheUnitedStates'StateDepartmentwasmentionedasthedrivingforce
behindtheAmericandecisiontoinstigatethecoupduetothebeliefofacommunist
threatbytheTudehParty.TheheadoftheStateDepartment,ofcourse,wasnoneother
thanJohnFosterDulles.ThisarticleprovidesaninterestinglookathowtheBritishwere
abletodragtheUnitedStatesalongwiththemtohelptheminthecoup,andhow
misinformedtheUnitedStateswere.Italsoreflectsthemisguidedandmisinformed
leadershipofJohnFosterDullesandtheresultinglegacyofthat.
Donovan,William.TheBasisforaPermanentUnitedStatesForeignIntelligenceService.Rep.
N.p.:n.p.,1944.Print.
ThisprimarysourcedocumentisaproposalfromGeneralWilliamDonovantoPresident
RooseveltaboutformingwhatwouldbecometheCentralIntelligenceAgency.This
sourceissignificantbecauseitstatestheoriginalpurposeoftheCIA.Donovanwantedto
formanorganization"whichwillprocureintelligencebothbyovertandcovertmethods
andwillatthesametimeprovideintelligenceguidance,determinenationalintelligence
objectives,andcorrelatetheintelligencematerialcollectedbyallgovernmentagencies."
Underthisplan,apowerful,centralizedintelligenceagencywouldcoordinateall

intelligenceservices.Thissourcewasveryimportantinprovidingcontextandlearning
abouttherootsoftheCIA.Understandingitsoriginsallowsustobetteranalyzeand
understanditsdevelopmentandinturntheDullesbrothers'influence.
Doolittle,JamesH.,WilliamB.Franke,MorrisHadley,andWilliamD.Pawley.
TheReporton
theCovertActivitiesoftheCentralIntelligenceAgency
.Rep.N.p.:n.p.,1954.Print.
Thisprimarysourcereport,onlyrecentlydeclassifiedduetotheFreedomofInformation
Act,wasabsolutelyvitalinourresearchandformingourargument.Thereport,
conductedbyLt.GeneralJamesH.Doolittlewiththeassistanceofothermilitaryofficers
andexpertsfromothergovernmentorganizations,wasmadeperrequestofPresident
Eisenhower.Thereportisa"comprehensivestudyofthecovertactivitiesoftheCentral
IntelligenceAgency."Thereasonwhythissourceissovaluableisnotonlythatitissuch
adetailedinvestigationintotheCIA'sinnerworkings,butthatitoccurredrightaftertwo
successfulCIAdrivencoupsinIranandGuatemala,makingitespeciallypertinenttoour
research.OfparticularinterestinthereportistheemphasisDoolittleputsontheneedfor
improvementintheCIAintermsofcommunicationandinterdepartmentalcoordination.
ItalsocalledforthereorganizationoftheCIA'sstructure,andnotedcertainsecurity
lapses.GiventheextremelysecretivenatureoftheCIAandtheextremelackofavailable
primarysourcesabouttheorganizationduringthetimeofthebrothers,thissourceisby
faroneofthemostvaluablethatwehaveuncovered.Itstronglysupportsourargument
regardingtheproblemsinleadershipontheAmericansideofthecoupstemmingfrom
governmentbureaucracy.
Dulles,Allen."AllenDullesInterview."Interview.
YouTube
.Google,20Feb.2010.Web.13
Oct.2014.
This1966interviewofAllenDullesprovidesagoodlookatDulles'spersonalcovering
upofthecoup.Whentheinterviewerdescribestheamountofdocumentsstillclassified
bytheCIAabouttheCoup,Dullesclaims"Ithinkeverythingthatisvitalasfaras
formingajudgementastowhatreallyhappenedhasbeenmadeavailable."Thisisa
blatantlie,andtheinterviewercontinuestovoicehisskepticism,onlytobemetby
Dullesunyieldingandcharismaticdefense.Thissourcewasafairdemonstrationofboth
thelackofleadershipofthecoupbecauseitshowedtheCIA'sadamantdenialthatthey
messedup,andpartiallythelegacytoobecausetheywereunwillingtocomeoutwiththe
truthandtrytofixtheirmistakes.
Dulles,Allen."Correspondence."LettertoDonaldWilbur.30Jan.1954.MossadeghProject.

N.p.,22June2014.Web.22Nov.2014.
InaninternalCIAletter/memorandum,AllenDullescongratulatesDonaldWilburforhis
workonthe1953Iraniancoup.Thisletterhelpedusunderstandtherelationshipbetween
theBritishandAmericansidesofthecoupthatWilburmediated,whichwasgenerally
tactfulandprofessionalwithoutcopiouscommunication.Also,heonceagainexpresses
hissomewhatignorantopinionofthecoup'ssuccess,withoutanythoughtforthelong
termconsequencesofanoppressiveandauthoritarianregimeinIran,evenifitsupported
theWest.
Dulles,Allen."AllenW.DullesOralHistoryInterview."InterviewbyThomasBraden.JohnF.
KennedyPresidentialLibrary.N.p.,n.d.Web.30Dec.2014.
ThisinterviewofAllenDullesin1964coverstheplanningfor,execution,andaftermath
oftheBayofPigsinvasionledbytheCIAduringDulles'stenureasDirector.Dulles
explainsthathemadeamistakeinallowingPresidentKennedytobecomesoinvolvedin
thecrisis.Hebelieves,despitethedisasterthatoccurred,thattheoperationhadhadsome
hopeforsuccess,andthatitwasmainlypoorluckandexecutionthatledtothepartial
failureoftheoperation.ThissourcehelpedusunderstandDulles'sopinionsonhowCIA
operationsshouldberunandled,withoutinterferencefromoutsidegovernmentagencies.
Dulles,Allen.Germany'sUnderground.NewYork:Macmillan,1947.Print.
Thisbook,whichwaswrittenbyAllenDulles,goesindepthintohowtheOSSwas
created,andhowthataffectedtheeventsinWorldWarII.Withinthisbook,Dulles'
judgmentalattitudeisapparenttoalltheleadershedisagreedwith.Hetalkedabouthow
theUnitedStatesshould'vegottenintothewarasearlyaspossible.Fromthisbook,we
canseehowhisthoughtsaboutradicalactionaffectedhisleadershipinthecoup.Itisa
veryhelpfulprimarysource,inthatitprovidesdeepinsightintoDullessperspectiveon
hisownleadership.Combiningitwithothersources,onecandrawconclusionsabouthis
overconfidence,andhowJohnFosterDulleswasoverconfidentaswell.Itwasvery
beneficialtotheleadershipargument.
Dulles,Allen.TheInvisibleWar.Rep.N.p.:n.p.,2007.HarveyMuddLibrary.Web.14Dec.
2014.
ThisundatedOSSreportissuedbyAllenDullesexplainsthestandoffbetweentheUnited
StatesandtherecentlyinpowerCommunistsinRussia.Hespendsasignificantamount
oftimedetailingtheAmericanpublicopinionoftheCommunistadvance,thoughhe

believesthatpeopleshouldbemorewaryofthethreat.Headmitsthatnobodyhasany
accurateinformationontheSoviets,showingthatmostofthehyperbolicclaimshe
continuestomakeareunfounded.Overall,itshowstheinaccuratepreconceptionsthat
DullesformedevenbeforehewasfullyinformedoftheCommunistsituationaroundthe
globe,andthereforeisveryhelpfulfortheleadershipargumentofimpulsiveforeign
policy.
Dulles,AllenW."THEPRESENTSITUATIONINGERMANY."CouncilonForeign
Relations.3Dec.1945.ForeignAffairs.Web.4Jan.2015.
ThisisanofftherecordspeechwhichAllenDullesmadethatwasrecentlyreleasedto
thepublic.AlthoughitisaboutGermanyin1945,itprovidesinsightintoDulles's
leadershipabilities.Heoftendescribesthesituationasimpossibleandmakesbroad
generalizationsaboutthepopulationsinvolved,supportingtheideathatDulleswas
generallypessimisticintheshortterm,andthathewaspronetoromanticizethesituation
inhismindtomatchwithhisselfimageasaChristianAmericancrusaderouttohelpthe
peopleoftheworldagainstallevils.
Dulles,Allen.SovietEconomicInfluences.Rep.N.p.:n.p.,1958.05Dec.2007.Web.6Jan.
2015.
ThisreportwrittenbyAllenDullesfortheCIAoutlinesSovieteconomicactivities
aroundtheglobe,focusingmainlyon"thirdworld"countries,includingIran(althoughby
thispointIranwasalreadyunderUScontrol).Dullesexpressesconcernsofthepowerof
Sovietpropagandathroughouttheglobe,specificallyinEgyptandIran,demonstrating
hisfearoftheSovietsintheMiddleEast.Mostimportantly,though,hehighlightsthe
extentofSoviettradeintheMiddleEast,whichhebelievedtobeanindicatorofSoviet
expansionarytendencies.ThishelpedrevealthatwhileDulleswasanidealisticleader,set
inhisways,hewasstillbrilliant,andhadsufficientknowledgeofthesentimentsinIran
afterthecoup.
Dulles,JohnF."InterviewwithJohnFosterDulles."InterviewbyHull.AmericanHistory.
AshlandUniversity,2006.Web.15Dec.2014.
InaninterviewwiththeForeignIntelligenceAdvisoryBoard,JohnFosterDulles
explainshisviewonthepolicyofcontainment.Hesaysthatamoredynamicand
proactive"positive"policyisnecessarytocountertheSoviets,andinordertofreethe
captivepeoplesunderSovietcontrol.Hestatesthatadefensivepolicywillinevitablyfail
andbepushedbackbyanaggressivepolicy,sotheAmericansshouldassumeamore

aggressivestandpoint.Overall,hebelievesthatthemoralsuperiorityoftheUnitedStates
canovercometheSoviet"evil"aslongastheydonottakeonanegativedefeatistattitude
astheyhadbeen,whichwouldrequireamoreactiveforeignpolicyconcerningtheCold
War.
Dulles,JohnF."JohnFosterDullesInterview:U.S.SecretaryofStateunderPresidentDwightD.
Eisenhower."InterviewbyWilliamB.HuieandHenryS.Hazlitt.Longines
Chronoscope.1952.Television.
ThistelevisedinterviewofJohnFosterDulleshimselfprovidedanuncensored
perspectiveofFosterDulles'sviewsontheColdWar.Asheexplainedhimself,he
believedthattheUnitedStatesneededtobecomemorevigorousandregainAmerican
"dynamism"inordertofightSovietRussiaindefenseofAmericanandhumanrights
aroundtheworld.HealsostatesthatmoreopentradeandeconomicpoliciesintheFirst
andThirdworldswerekeytoholdingbacktheRussiansoffensivesaroundtheglobe.
Dullesalsostatesthathedoesnotacceptthe"communizationoftheChinesemainland."
InadditiontoshowingthefearDulleshadofCommunismintheworld,theinterviewis
alsoindicativeofhowDullesaffectedUnitedStatesforeignpolicy.Theviewpointshe
sharesintheinterviewarethatofananticommunistideologyasopposedtoa
prodemocracypolicy.ThisisextremelyrelevanttoourargumentthatDulles'leadership
leftthelegacyofafundamentalchangeinthegoalsofUnitedStatesforeignpolicy.
Dulles,JohnF."JohnFosterDullesonMassiveRetaliation."JohnBurroughsHistory.Web.15
Dec.2014.
ThisstatementmadebyJohnFosterDullessummarizeshisperspectiveonAmerican
foreignpolicyconcerningtheSovietthreatonaglobalscale.Asheputsit,theAmericans
couldnotaffordtoallowtheSovietstocometothem,orelsetheywouldbeforcedtouse
"massiveretaliation"measuresalloutornuclearwarinordertosimplyholdbackthe
Soviets.TheSoviets,knowingthis,wouldthenbesecureintheirabilitytodominatethe
UnitedStates.Instead,hesays,theAmericancommunityhadtobeproactiveandbecome
theaggressoritself,sothattheSovietswouldnothavethechancetoattackonitsown
terms.Averyhelpfulleadershipsource,itprovidedtheinsightonFosterDullessideas,
whichwenthandinhandwithhisbrothers.
"EisenhowerDoctrine(1957)."WorldHistory:TheModernEra.ABCCLIO,2015.Web.29
Dec.2014.
Thisprimarysource,commonlyknownastheEisenhowerDoctrine,isafamousspeech

thatdefinestheAmericanforeignpolicyofthatera.Inthespeech,Eisenhowerdeclared
thatMiddleEasternstatescouldrequestAmericanaidiftheyfeltthreatenedbyanother
foreignpower.EisenhowerspecificallypointsoutthethreatoftheSovietUnionandthe
spreadofcommunism.ThissourceisextremelyrelevantbecausewhatEisenhoweris
sayingperfectlyreflectsthefundamentalinfluencethattheDullesbrothers'leadership
hadonAmericanforeignpolicy.EisenhowerevengoessofarastomentionJohnFoster
andhisviewsonforeignpolicy.Assuch,thissourceisclearlyindicativeofthelegacyin
foreignpolicyoftheDullesbrothers'leadership.
Eisenhower,DwightD.MandateforChange,19531956:TheWhiteHouseYears.GardenCity,
NY:Doubleday,1963.Print.
Thisprimarysourcespansexactlythetimeperiodweareinterestedin.Itgivescopiesof
Eisenhower'scorrespondencewithIranianleadersandalsogiveshisthoughtsontheir
nationsrelationships.Specifically,hebelievedthatIranandtheUnitedStateswere
highlydependentoneachother,mainlyduetothetraderelationshiptheyheldwith
IranianoilbeingusedinaAmericanandAmericanmilitarysupportinIran.However,he
doesnotmentionspecificallythecovertactionstheCIAhadplannedforIranand
Mossadeq,whichwereonlylaterunveiledin2012.IthelpswiththelegacyinIran
argument,showinghowthesituationwashandledinthecountryafterMossadeqwas
overthrown.
Eisenhower,DwightD."PresidentEisenhower'sFinalReplytoPremierMossadegh."Letterto
MohammedMossadeq.29June1953.TheMossadeghProject.MohammedMossadegh,
n.d.Web.4Jan.2015.
NearlyamonthafterreceivingMossadeq'spleafordomestichelpinIran,Eisenhower's
replyisfranklycurt.HeputstheblameonIran'sinabilitytoworkwiththeBritishinstead
ofproposingwaysinwhichtheUnitedStatescouldhelp.Thisisbecausehehadalready
giventheDullesbrothersthegoaheadtocarryouttheIraniancoup.Thiscorrespondence
showshowlittleEisenhowerknewaboutIranoutsideofwhattheDullesbrothershad
toldhim.Ithelpsshowthemisguidedleadership,andinformationandcommunication,
becauseEisenhowerwaswillingtoalienateMossadeqattheorderoftheDullesbrothers,
withoutbotheringtolearnanythingofthesituationhimself.
Eisenhower,DwightD."CorrespondencetoPremierMossadegh."LettertoMohammed
Mossadeq.26Feb.1953.TheMossadeghProject.MohammedMossadegh,n.d.Web.4
Jan.2015.

InEisenhower'scordialresponsehesayshewilltakeMossadeq'sviewsinto
consideration.Thisisinterestingbecauseatthistime,hewasawarethattheDulles
brotherswantedtooverthrowMossadeq.Thisbehaviorwas,frankly,blatantlydishonest
andareflectionoftheDullesbrotherspowerfulinfluencesoverEisenhower.Inaddition,
itshowstheAmericangovernmentswillingnesstosayonethinganddoanother,inthis
casemisleadingMossadeqwhileplanningtodeposehim.Thissource
Excised."AntiTudehActivitiesofZahediGovernment."CIAMemo.10Sept.1953.Web.2Jan.
2015.
Thisprimarysourcedocument,obtainedbytheNationalSecurityArchivethroughthe
FreedomofInformationAct,isaCIAmemoregardingtheantiCommunistactionsofthe
ZahedigovernmentinstalledbytheCIA.WrittenbytheActingChiefoftheCIA's
divisionofNearEastandAfrica,thememodiscussestheZahedigovernment'splanto
haveanationalcrackdownontheTudehpartyinIran.Thismemoisextremelyrelevant
toourargumentbecauseitshowstheintentionsoftheCIAthroughZahedi.TheCIA's
ultimategoalandconcerninthecoupwasthepresenceofthecommunistTudehparty
andtheirallegedgainingofpowerandinfluence.Assuch,theirfirstgoaluponinstalling
theirhandselectednewleaderofIranwastoremovethecommunistthreat.Thisis
indicativeoftheDullesbrothers'leadershipgoalsofdestroyingcommunism,andofthe
legacyofanticommunismthattheirleadershipcreated.
Gaddis,JohnLewis.TheUnitedStatesandtheOriginsoftheColdWar,19411947.NewYork:
ColumbiaUP,1972.Print.
ThissourcedirectlyfromtheColdWarerawaskeyinhelpingdevelopaconnection
betweenthecoldwarandtheIraniancoup.Thisbooktookaworldlyviewwhen
explainingeverythingthathadhappened,andhowtheworldsurroundingaffectedthe
coldwar.Thisbookwentindepthintoexplainingeverycountriespartandcontribution
totheeventsthatleduptothecoldwar.Thisbookalsogoesbeyondandbrieflyexplains
howthearmsracehasledtoaviolentsocietytodayobsessedwithstaying"safe"fromthe
enemy.
Golestan,Erahim."ErahimGolestanDescribes28MoradCoup."Interview.TheMossadegh
Project.BBCPersian.England,n.d.Radio.
Thisisaveryinterestingfirsthandaccountofwhatitwaslikeonthegroundduringthe
coup.Itwillhelpuswithfiguringoutwhatthedayofthecoupwaslikeandhowthe
Dulles'actionshadanaffectonaveragepeopleinIran.Inparticular,thissourcedescribes

theviolencebehindthecoup,andtheseeminglyobviousoutsideinfluencesthatwere
affectingtherevolution.GolestanbelievesinthegoodintentionsofMossadeqasa
representativeofthepeopleofIranandasastaunchsupporterofdemocracy,
demonstratingthepositivepublicopinionthatthepublicheldofMossadeqandthe
hypocrisywithwhichthepeopleofIranlaterviewedtheUnitedStates.
Haines,GeraldK.CIAandGuatemalaAssassinationProposals,19521954.Rep.N.p.:n.p.,n.d.
NationalSecurityArchive.GeorgeWashingtonUniversity.Web.6Jan.2015.
InareporttotheCIA,analystG.K.Hainesgivesafairlyobjectiveandfactbased
descriptionofthe1954Guatemalancoup,whichwasthesecondCIAsponsored
depositionofaforeigngovernment.Itprovidedaveryclearanalysisofthisevent,which
wasusefulinimprovingourunderstandingofthelegacyoftheIraniancoupinCIA
foreignaffairs.
"InterviewwithRezaShahPahlavi."InterviewbyGerardDeVilliers.TheImperialShah.N.p.,
1975.15Nov.2014.
Thisbrief,measuredinterviewofRezaShahPahlavishowssomeoftheShah'spublic
opinionsofhisregime,andhisignoranceofthegeneralstateofhisnation.Essentially,he
hadneglectedhisdutiesasleaderduringhistenureasShahandasaresultlosttouchwith
theneedsofhispeople,whoatthetimewerebeginningtobecomerestlesswith
SAVAK'stightcontroloverthepopulationandtheShah'sinabilitytoimprovethe
situation.TheShahseemedtobelievethattheoverallpopulationwasrelatively
submissivetohispsychologicalpressures.
Jefferson,Thomas."Correspondence."LettertoMarquisDeLafayette.2Apr.1790.MS.New
York,NewYork.
InapersonallettertotheMarquisdeLafayette,FoundingFatherThomasJefferson
explainshisgoalsforthenewAmericangovernment.Inparticular,hestatesthatthe
ultimategoalofagovernmentistofaithfullysupportthevaluesuponwhichitwas
founded.InthecaseoftheUnitedStates,hemeansthatdemocracyshouldbetheend
goalofallofthenewgovernment'sengagements,andthattheyshouldbehonorablein
theirpursuitsregardlessofcircumstances.
Kennan,GeorgeF.
TheSourcesofSovietConduct
.ForeignAffairs.4Jan.2015.Web.4Jan.
2015.

TheXArticlewaswrittenbyGeorgeF.Kennan,oneofthemostpowerfulvoicesin
AmericanforeignpolicyduringtheColdWar.Inthisarticle,Kennanoutlinesthetheory
ofcontainment,astrategytopatientlybutfirmlycontainSovietexpansionaroundthe
world.ThisisincontrasttoJohnFosterDullessstrategyofrollback,thestrategyto
pushbackSovietinfluences.Kennanessentiallyadvocatesforaslowbutsure
prodemocracypolicythatwilleventuallybeabletoweardownthecommunistswith
helpfromtheinternalissuestheUSSRfacesonitsown.
Killian,JamesR.,WilliamO.Baker,ClarkClifford,JamesH.Doolittle,GordonGray,EdwinH.
Land,WilliamL.Langer,RobertD.Murphy,andMaxwellTaylor.ForeignIntelligence
AdvisoryBoardReporttothePresident.Rep.Comp.J.PatrickCoyne.N.p.:n.p.,1956.
Print.
ThisreportbytheForeignIntelligenceAdvisoryBoardisacompletedescriptionofthe
CIA'slacklusterprocessesforapprovingpolicyprocedure(PP)actions,includingthe
Iraniancoup.Inthemostbasicterms,therewasnoapparentevidenceofanysortof
checksonthepoweroftheCIA,whichwasabletoundertakeimpulsiveoperationswith
poorplanningandevaluationofpotentialconsequences.Theauthorsexpress"concern"
fortheweakornonexistentsystemsinplaceforqualitycontrolintheCIA,whichwere
forthemostpartinformalandproforma.
Kirkpatrick,LymanB.KirkpatrickReport.Rep.NationalSecurityArchive,14Apr.2011.
Web.10Nov.2014.
TheKirkpatrickreportisacomprehensiveinternalCIAstudydetailingtheAgency'srole
inBayofPigsInvasion.Itconcludesthat,essentially,theCIAwasextremely
disorganizedandillpreparedtohandleanoperationofthescaleoftheinvasion.Ina
mirroroftheBruceLovettandCoynereportsfollowingtheIraniancoup,thisreportis
extremelycriticaloftheoverallCIAexecution,andstatesthatitisimperativetofixthese
fundamentalshortfallswithintheAgency.Inparticular,itstatesthattherewereno
measuresinplacetochecktheviabilityofsuchoperations,whichseemedtorunoutof
controlontheideasoftheleadership,leadingtotheblameonandeventualresignationof
AllenDullesasDirector.
Koch,ScottA."Zendebad,Shah!":TheCentralIntelligenceAgencyandtheFallofIranian
PrimeMinisterMohammedMossadeq,August1953"N.d.TS,NationalSecurityArchive
ElectronicBriefingBookNo.435.GeorgeWashingtonUniversity.TheNationalSecurity
Archive.GeorgeWashingtonUniversity,19Aug.2013.Web.18Dec.2014.

ThisdeclassifiedCIAdocumentisthemostrecentlyreleasedinternalhistoryofthe1953
IraniancoupbyaCIAhistorian.Althoughheavilyexcised,itprovidesavaluable
perspectiveofthecoupfromsomeonewhowitnessedtheeventbuthadnodirectstakein
it.Basically,Kochgivesaplainsummaryofthecoupanditsaftermath.Incomparisonto
otherCIAdocuments,itismuchlessextremeinitsopinions,suggestingthatthepeople
behindthecoupwereslightlybiasedanddidnotnecessarilyhaveaccurateinformationor
opinions.
"MarshallPlan(1947)."WorldHistory:TheModernEra.ABCCLIO,2015.Web.6Jan.2015.
Thisprimarysourcedocument,aspeechbySecretaryofStateGeorgeMarshall,isthe
speechthatannouncedtheMarshallPlan,whichwasacrucialpieceoftheUnitedStates'
postWorldWarIIforeignpolicy.MarshallspeaksofthedireneedfortheUnitedStates
tohelprebuildthedemocraciesofEurope.Thisshowshowatthetime,Americanforeign
policywasmorecenteredaroundprotectingandpromotingdemocracythanactively
fightingCommunism.WhilethisisduetothefactthattheColdWarwasnotinfull
swing,thisisalsoindicativeofhowtheDullesbrothers'influencemanagedtochangethe
verybasisofAmericanforeignpolicy.ThelegacyoftheirleadershipliesinhowAmerica
shiftedfrompoliciesliketheMarshallPlantomoreactiveantiCommunistones.
Mossadeq,Mohammed."Mossadegh'sMessagetoPresidentEisenhower."LettertoDwightD.
Eisenhower.7Jan.1953.N.p.:n.p.,n.d.N.pag.TheMossadeghProject.Mohammed
Mossadegh.Web.4Jan.2015.
InthisdirectcorrespondencetoPresidentEisenhower,Mossadeqrequestshelpthe
EisenhoweradministrationdemocraticgrowthinIran.ThisshowsthatMossadeq
genuinelybelievedindemocracy,askingforhelpfromtheUnitedStatesgovernment,
despitewishingtostayneutralintheColdWarcapitalismvs.communismconflict.It
supportsourargumentforthelegacyregardingtheUnitedState'sColdWarideology,in
thatitshowsthattheUnitedStateswaswillingtobendorbreaksomeofitsvalues
regardingdemocracyandfreedominordertostompoutwhatitperceivedascommunism
aroundtheworld.
Mossadeq,Mohammed."Mossadegh'sSecondMessagetoPresidentEisenhower."Letterto
DwightD.Eisenhower.28May1953.TheMossadeghProject.MohammedMossadegh,
n.d.Web.4Jan.2015.
Inthisletter,MossadeqisspecificallyoutliningthetroublesheishavinginIranto
Eisenhower.HetellsEisenhoweraboutthelowstandardoflivingoftheIranianpeople

andasksforassistancewiththeBritishgovernmentbecauseMossadeqiswishingto
nationalizeoil.WhatMossadeqdoesn'trealizeisthattheplanningforthecoupisalready
underway.Thiswashelpfulinourleadershipargument,becauseitshowshow
manipulativetheDullesandEisenhowercouldbe,posingasafriendwhentheyhad
alreadybeenplottingagainsthim.
"Mossadeq'sSpyService."N.d.TS,NationalSecurityArchiveElectronicBriefingBookNo.
435.GeorgeWashingtonUniversity.TheNationalSecurityArchive.GeorgeWashington
University,19Aug.2013.Web.20Dec.2014.
ThisinternalCIApropagandapieceillustratesclearlytheCIAperspectiveonMossadeq's
leadershipintheIraniangovernment.Accordingtotheauthor,Mossadeqisacorrupt
dictatorandrunsawidespreadspysysteminordertocrushallinternalopposition.The
authorcontinuestoclaimthatMossadeqheldstrongtieswiththeTudehandMoscow,
andexpressesadesiretobreakthosetiesandchangetheleadershipsituationinIran.
Naftali,Timothy,GeorgeEliades,FrancisGavin,ErinMahan,JonathanRosenberg,David
Shreve,PatriciaDunn,PhilipZelikow,andErnestMay,eds.TheGreatCrises,Volume
One.Rep.NationalSecurityArchive,2Apr.2014.Web.6Jan.2015.
ThiscompilationofPresidentJohnF.Kennedy'scorrespondencesincludesasection
regardingtheBraziliancoupof1964,anotherCIAbackedoperation.Basically,ithelped
usunderstandthebackgroundoftheBraziliancoup,whichwasadirect"descendant"of
theoperationTPAJAXin1953.Especiallyusefulwasapassagedescribingingeneralthe
effectsofthecoup,supportingourargumentforthelegacyofthe1953operation.
NationalSecurityActof1947.Rep.N.p.:n.p.,1947.Print.
TheNationalSecurityActof1947establishedtheCIA,theUnitedStates'firstpeacetime
intelligenceagency.Thisdocumentisimportantbecauseitdescribesthepurposeofthe
CIA'sformation.TheCIAwasformedessentiallytotakeoverthefunctionsoftheOSS.
UnderstandingtheoriginsoftheCIAanditsoriginalpurposeisvitaltounderstandingthe
poweroftheDullesbrothersandthechangestheirleadershipmadenotjustintheCIA,
butinAmericangovernmentasawhole.
NationalSecurityArchive.Rep.GeorgeWashingtonUniversity,11Dec.2011.Web.04Jan.
2015.
InareportmadeduringtheVietnamcoup,theStateDepartmentdescribestheatrocities

committedbythevariouspartiesinvolvedduringtheevent.Thissourcewasmainly
usefulforoutliningtheSouthVietnamcoup,improvingourunderstandingofthe
insidiouslegacythattheprecedentoftheIraniancoupleftin1953.Additionally,it
providedveryspecificstatementsthatwouldbehelpfulinexplainingtheimpactofthe
eventinthelongrun.
Nixon,Richard."RichardNixononthe1953CoupinIran."Interview.CSPAN.CSPAN,2014.
Web.29Dec.2014.
Interestingly,thisvideointerviewisfrom1991andRichardNixon,theVicePresident
underEisenhower,admitsEisenhower'sroleintheoverthrowofMossadeqinarare
breachofconfidentiality.HealsodefendsEisenhower'scontroversialdecisionto
continuewiththecoup,despitetheobviousroleitplayedintheRevolutionjustadecade
earlierandtheturmoiliscreatedwithinIranandforUSIranianrelations.
Obama,Barack."REMARKSBYTHEPRESIDENTONANEWBEGINNING."Cairo
University,Cairo,Egypt.4June2009.TheWhiteHouse.Web.4Jan.2015.
ThisaddressbyPresidentBarackObamainEgyptspeaksofathawingofrelations
betweentheUnitedStatesandMiddlesEasternnations,followingtheirturbulenthistory.
PresidentObamastatesthattheAmericangovernmentwishestonormalizethe
relationshipsbetweentheirnations,afteradecadeslonghiatus.Thisshowsusthatonly
nowaretiesbetweentheUSandtheMiddleEast,specificallyIran,beinghealed,
followingthecoupandthesubsequentrevolution,duetothebrashdecisionsofthe
Dullesbrothers.
Pahlavi,Shah."INTERVIEWWITHTHESHAHOFIRAN1977."InterviewbyBarbara
Walters.YouTube.ABC,1977.Web.29Dec.2014.
InterestingtoseetheShah"inperson."ThemostelucidatingpartwaswhentheShahis
askedifIranisgettingmoneyfromtheCIAand,andhebrazenlylies,statingthatIranis
notbeingfundedbytheUnitedStates.Thishelpedusunderstandtherelationship
betweenIranandtheUnitedStatesundertheShah,whichwasstillclandestineatthe
time.Basically,welearnedthattheShahwasstillastaunchsupporteroftheWesteven
rightbeforehisdeposition,inreturnforbeingplacedintopower,withhisunwillingness
tosellouthisallies.
Roosevelt,FranklinD."ArsenalofDemocracy"RadioAddressDeliveredbyPresident

Roosevelt,1940.RadioAddress,WashingtonDC.Address.
ThissourceisaradioaddressgivenbyPresidentFranklinD.Rooseveltin1940about
howtheUnitedStatesmustbean"arsenalofdemocracy."Rooseveltstatesthatthe
UnitedStatesmustaiddemocracyinWorldWarIIby"bysendingeveryounceandevery
tonofmunitionsandsuppliesthatwecanpossiblysparetohelpthedefenderswhoarein
thefrontlines."Thissourceisextremelyusefulandrelevantbecauseitisindicativeof
thepredominantideaofprodemocracyinUnitedStatesforeignpolicypriortotheDulles
brothers,asopposedtothelaterzeitgeistofanticommunism.Bypresentingtheblatant
differencesinforeignpolicygoalsbeforetheadventoftheDullesbrothers'decisions,this
speechshowsthelegacyoftheDullesbrothers'leadershipchoices.
Roosevelt,Kermit."CIA,MemofromKermitRooseveltto[Excised],July16,1953."(1953):n.
pag.
TheNationalSecurityArchive(GeorgeWashingtonUniversity)
.CIA.Web.28Sept.
2014.
ThisisaletterwrittenbyKermitRoosevelttoananonymousgovernmentofficial.Itwas
declassifiedin2011,alongwithacollectionofotherlettersfromRoosevelt.Itisaprimary
source,andthereforegivesexactinsightintotheplanningprocessbehindthecoup.
Althoughthetypedletterisshort,itshowssomeleadershiponbehalfofKermitRoosevelt,
intheformofsimplyplanning,yetitalsoshowsalackofleadershipinthattheBritishand
AmericanintelligenceagenciesarehavingtroublepersuadingZaheditobethenextrulerof
Iran.
Roosevelt,Kermit.
Countercoup:TheStrugglefortheControlofIran
.NewYork:
McGrawHill,1979.
Mohsen.1.banan.byname.net
.Web.13Oct.2014.
Roosevelt'sbook,althoughpartiallycensored,providesanindepthlookathisperspective
oftheevent,theplanningoftheevent,andhowtheycarrieditout.Partsofitaresimplya
personalnarrativeandunhelpful,butthereareextremelyhelpfulsectionsthatdetailthe
planningprocess.Throughwhatwehavealreadydeducedpertainingtothelackof
leadership,thereisaslightundertoneofconfusion,somesmallthingsthatdidn'tgo
accordingtoplan,eveninthebookthathasbeenwrittensuchthatthesethingsaren'tonthe
surface.Thissourcehelpeddeterminewherethingswentwronginthecoup,asadirect
resultoflackofleadership.
StateDepartment.USIranianFriendship.MossadeghProject.N.p.,9May2014.Web.15Nov.
2014.

ThisstatementissuedbyJohnFosterDullesimmediatelyfollowingthecoupoutlineshis
hopesfortheUSIranianrelationship.Asheputsit,hehopesthattheywillbeabletodo
businesswithIranasamembersofthe"familyoffreenations."Thishelpsshowthateven
thoughDulleswasbeingdishonestaboutUSinvolvementinthecoup,hemaystillhave
beentrulyinterestedinsupportingIranagainstSovietinfluences,offeringsubstantial
amountsofemergencyaidinresponseto"recentCommunistabetteddisorders"inIran,
andhailingtheIranianambassadortotheUnitedStateswithgenuinerespect.
"SupremeCourtJusticeWilliamO.DouglasonMossadeghinIran."
SupremeCourtJustice
WilliamO.DouglasonMossadeghinIran
.TheMossadeghProject,n.d.Web.04Jan.
2015.
ThisisacompilationofmanyprimarysourcesfromWilliamO.Douglaswhowasagreat
admirerofMossadeq.Inaprevioussecondarysource,StephenKinzer'sbook,wefoundit
mentionedthatDouglaswasabigcriticoftheDullesbrothers.Becauseofthis,hisisan
interestingperspectivebecausehewasoneoftheDulles'onlycontemporarieswhowould
probablyagreewithourargumentthattheDulles'didmoreharmthangood.
Taylor,Maxwell.
TheTaylorCommissionReport
.Rep.N.p.:n.p.,1984.
NationalSecurity
Archive
.GeorgeWashingtonUniversity.Web.12Feb.2015.
ThissourcewasareportwrittenbytheTaylorcommitteeinthewakeoftheBayofPigs
invasion,butremainedclassifieduntilafreedomofinformationsuitwasfiledin1984.The
reportdiscussesthefailuresandsuccessesoftheattemptedinvasion,pinningasignificant
amountofblameontheDullesbrothers,aswellastheoperationheadsandpresident.The
reportwasveryhelpful,becauseitwasoneofthefewpapersthathasactuallybeen
declassified,andthereforewasoneofthefewauthoritativeprimarysourcesavailable.
Overall,itwasmosthelpfulindealingwiththelegacyoftheDullesbrothersleadership,
becauseitshowedhowtheirpolicieswerestillpresentinthegovernment,evenafterthe
Iraniancouphadalreadyended.
Townley,Michael.NationalSecurityArchive.Rep.GeorgeWashingtonUniversity,11Sept.
1973.Web.6Jan.2015.
ThisDINAreporttotheStateDepartmentcoverstheCIAruncoupinChilein1973,
whichwasrunbythesameleadershipastheoriginalcoupin1953AllenDulles.The
reportwasmostusefulinexplainingtheChileanoperation,andprovideduswith
elucidatingquotesaboutthelegacyoftheChileancoupandhowitwasaffectedbythe
CIAspoliciesformedduringthe1953operationinIran.

Truman,HarryS."RecommendationofAssistancetoGreeceandTurkey."Addressofthe
PresidentoftheUnitedStates.80thCongress1stSession,WashingtonDC.12Mar.1947.
TrumanLibrary.Web.2Jan.2015.
ThisaddressbyPresidentTrumanistheaddressinwhichheannouncedthepolicyofthe
TrumanDoctrine.WiththeTrumanDoctrine,TrumanestablishedthattheUnitedStates
would"supportfreepeoplewhoareresistingattemptedsubjugationbyarmedminorities
orbyoutsidepressures."ItisindicativeofAmerica'sforeignpolicyatthetime,onethat
ostensiblypledgedtohelpdemocracybutinactualitywasintendedtocombat
communism.Thisprimarysourceisrelevantbecauseitprovidesinformationaboutthe
goalsofAmerica'sforeignpolicypriortotheDullesbrothers.Basedonthatinformation,
itappearsthattheDullesbrotherswerenotthesoleforceintransitioningAmerica's
foreignpolicyfromoneofprodemocracytooneofanticommunism.Instead,thelegacy
oftheiractionsinAmericanforeignpolicywerelikelyanextensionofaprevailing
Americanzeitgeist.
Truman,HarryS."TheTrumanDoctrine."
AmericanRhetoric
.MichaelE.Eidenmuller,n.d.
Web.18Feb.2015.
TheTrumanDoctrinewasaspeechdeliveredbyHarryS.TrumaninMarchof1947
beforecongress,whereheclarifiedandoutlinedAmericasforeignpolicyoftheCold
War.Inadditiontocontainingcommunism,thedoctrineshowedthatAmericawas
willingtohelpprotectothercountriesfromCommunismbyusingbothfinancialand
militarymethods.Thissourcewasparticularlyusefulindefiningourcontextargument,
especiallyintheareaofAmericanforeignpolicy.
UnitedStatesofAmerica.CentralIntelligenceAgency.ClandestineServicesHistory.
Overthrow
ofPremierMossadeqofIran:November1952August1953
.ByDonaldN.Wilber.
N.p.:n.p.,n.d.Print.
Thisservicehistoryofthe1953Iraniancoup,knownastheWilberreports,providea
completehistoryoftheCIAsactionsinIran,andthusitisoneofthemostusefuland
relevantsourcesonthetopic.Whilesomenamesanddetailswerealteredandexcisedby
theCIA,allofthevitalinformationisaccurateandintact.Thesourcedelvesintodetails
abouttheimpetusforthecoup,thereasoningbehinddecisionsthatweremade,the
situationinIran,andotherimportantaspectsofthecoup.Mostimportantly,itrevealsthe
impulsiveandmisguidedactionsoftheCIAduringthecoup.Thereasoningbehindmany
oftheactionsdepictedinWilbersreportareflawed,andtheleadershipquestionable.

Thisisadirecteffectofaglaringlackofleadershipatthetopofthechainofcommand:
theDullesbrothers.Asawhole,theWilbertreportshowsthelegacyofthemisguided
leadershipoftheDullesbrothers,whichwasextremelyvitalinsupportingourargument
andaidingourresearch.
Wilson,Woodrow.JointAddresstoCongressLeadingtoaDeclarationofWarAgainstGermany
(1917).
UnitedStatesCongress,WashingtonDC.ThissourceisanaddressfromWoodrow
WilsontoCongressdiscussingtheUnitedStates'declarationofwaragainstGermany
duringWorldWarI.WoodrowWilsonemphasizestheimportanceofprotecting
democracyintheglobalscale.HisjustificationfordeclaringwaragainstGermanyisthat
itsactionsinthewararethreateningtheveryexistenceofdemocracy,soitisthedutyof
theUnitedStatestonotonlyprotectdemocracyfortheirownbenefit,butfortheentire
world's.ThissourcespecificallyshowstheprimaryideainUnitedStatesforeignpolicy
atthetime:protectingandspreadingdemocracy.Thisstandsinstrongcontrastwithits
goalsaftertheriseoftheDullesbrothers,wheretheyshiftedfrombeingprodemocracy
toanticommunism.Assuch,thissourceemphasizesthelegacyoftheDullesbrothers'
leadershipdecisionsthatchangedthegoalsofUnitedStatesforeignpolicy.
Wisner,Frank."Memorandum."N.d.TS,NationalSecurityArchiveElectronicBriefingBook
No.435.GeorgeWashingtonUniversity.NationalSecurityArchive.GeorgeWashington
University,19Aug.2013.Web.15Dec.2014.
ThismemofromFrankWisner,oneoftheplannersofOperationAJAX,is
recommendingacommendationforoneoftheotherparticipantsintheoperation,even
afterevidenceappearsthattheShahhasbeguntoimplementhisbrutalregimeof
oppression.ThisprimarysourceshowsthattheCIAlackedanyforesightorevenadesire
tomonitorthesituationinIranafterthecoup,despitetheShah'sactionsinthecountry.
SecondarySources
Abrahamian,Ervand,MichaelBarkan,ChristopherEn,JakeHernandez,AveryKaplan,and
JustinYannix."ErvandAbrahamianInterview."Telephoneinterview.7Jan.2015.
WewerefortunateenoughtoarrangeaninterviewwithnotedIranexpertandMiddle
EastprofessorErvandAbrahamian.Hewasextremelyhelpfulingivingusinfoabout
AmericanmotivesbehindthecoupandtheleadershipbehindtheAmericansideofthe

coup,amongothertopics.Inparticular,heexplainedhowtheDullesbrothers'
preconceivedideasledthemignoreother'sideas,evenfiringsomewhoexpressed
contradictoryopinions.TheinformationhegaveuspaintedaclearerpictureoftheDulles
brothers'leadershipandgaveusabetterideaofthelegacyoftheiractions.
Abrahamian,Ervand."The1953CoupinIran."ScienceandSociety65.2(2001):182215.
JSTOR.Web.11Sept.2014.
ThisbookbyErvandAbrahamian,anIranianhistorian,helpeddescribetheIraniancoup
detailbydetail.Withinhisbookhegoesdeepintodetailabouthowthecoupwas
fabricated,andhowthemindsetsoftheleadersgreatlychangedthesuccessofthecoup.
Thisbooktalkedaboutthebrothersinvolvedinthecoup,andhowtheiraggressive
dominationofthepeacetalksledtoanunsuccessfulcoupandadestructiveandlonglasting
legacy.
Abrahamian,Ervand.
TheCoup:1953,theCIA,andtheRootsofModernU.S.Iranian
Relations
.NewYork:TheNewPress,2013.Print.
ErvandAbrahamianisahistorianoftheMiddleEastspecializinginmodernIran,anda
professoratBaruchCollegeoftheCityUniversityofNewYorksystem.Thisbook
providesextensiveandspecificdetailsabouteverythinginvolvingthecoup,includingCIA
involvementandthelegacy.AbrahamiandiscussesextensivelytheroleoftheCIA.
AbrahamianarguesthattheUnitedStateswasmotivatedtosendtheCIAintoIrannotdue
tothethreatofcommunism,butduetotheiroilinterests.Thisdiffersfromtheargumentof
themajorityofotherhistorianswhoarguethatcommunismwastheprimarymotive.This
drawsintoquestionwhatexactlytheCIAhopedtoachieveinIran.Whilethatremains
relativelyunclear,thelegacyofitsactionsdonot.Similartowhathasbeenstatedbyother
preeminentexpertsonIran,likeStephenKinzer,Abrahamianstatesthatthecoupledto
eventsliketheIslamicRevolutionandtheriseofextremistIslam.Whilethelegacyofthe
CIA'sactionsareclear,theactionsthemselvesareextremelyquestionableandmysterious,
whichislikelyindicativeofalackofleadership.
Abrahamian,Ervand.FeathermanDistinguishedLectureonHumanities:The1953IranianCoup
Revisitedin2012.UniversityofNewEngland.24Oct.2012.Lecture.
InalectureatUNE,ErvandAbrahamiandetailsthecoupandarguesthatitwasmotivated
byUSandBritishoilinterests.Abrahamian,ahistorianatCUNY,claimsthatthe
AmericanswantedcontinuedeasyaccesstoIranianoil,insteadoftheoriginalbeliefthat
theywereafraidofaCommunistcoupinthenation.HecontinuestoshowthattheTudeh

werenotcapableofacoup,despiteearlieropinions.Also,Abrahamianstatesthatbyfirst
attemptingtoinstallQavamintheplaceofMossadeq,andfailing,theygaveMossadeq
morelegitimacyandpopularsupportasatruenationalist.Heconcludeswiththelegacyof
thecoupinthemoderndaynuclearissue,sayingthattheWesternimperialisttendencies
originatingfromthecoupcontinuetoaffectUSIranianrelations,withtheUStryingto
constrainIran.
Ali,Tariq."OperationIranianFreedom:Iran'sBriefExperimentwithDemocracyCametoa
TragicEnd,CourtesyofWashington."
Nation
18Aug.2003:37.
StudentEdition
.Web.21
Sept.2014.
AcommonmisconceptionabouttheMiddleEastisthatithashasoneoppressiverulerafter
anotherforthousandsofyears.Thisisnotthecase,thisarticlediscussesthetimeswhen
Irantriedfordemocracy,mostnotablyunderMohammedMossadeq.Thisarticle,written
byanestablishedjournalists,isaboutStephenKinzer'sproMossadeqbook.Itprovides
morecontexttosupporttheclaimthatAmericaandBritainroyallymessedupIranforthe
next50yearsbyoverthrowingMossadeq.
Amini,Fariba."FaribaAmini."Telephoneinterview.14Dec.2014.
FaribaAminiisanIranianjournalistandalsothedaughterofMossadeq'spersonallawyer
whowasveryclosewithMossadeqinthefinalyearsofhislife.AminiprovidedanIranian
perspectivetowardsthecoupandexplainedheropiniontousthat,ratherthanthe
leadershipoftheDullesbrothersbeingardentlyanticommunist,itwasantinationalist.She
saidthatmanyoftheleadersweredrivenbymonetarygain.Also,shehadavery
ideologicalviewofMossadeqasamanwhotrulyloveddemocracy.Thisistrue,Mossadeq
wasanidealistwhichmakesthelegacyofthecoupthatmuchmorecrushing.
Bahrampour,Tara."PatriotofPersia:AReview."
WashingtonPost
21July2012:n.pag.Print.
TaraBahrampour'sreviewofChristopherdeBellaigue'sbookprovidesbothaninsightful
summaryofhisviews,aswellasanexcellentoverviewofthelegacyofthe1953coup.
BahrampourgivesanexcellentsummaryofMossadeqslifeprecedingthecoup,including
hisbackground,andthereforethisservesasanexcellentbroadcontextsource,aswellasa
helpfulreview.BothBahrampourandBellaigueoffersympatheticviewstowards
Mossadeq,andseemhimasavisionarywhohadsomuchtoofferhiscountrybeforehe
wastragicallyremovedfrompower,andreplacedbyAmericaspuppet.Thissourcehelps
withthelegacyargument,bydescribinganIranthathadmaintainedMossadeqinpower,as
anillustrious,modernizedcountry.

Bamberg,JamesH."Mossadeq'sOverthrow,August1953."
TheHistoryofTheBritish
PetroleumCompany
.Vol.II.Cambridge:CambridgeUP,1994.48890.Print.
InthisbookaboutwhatisnowBP,BambergexplainshowBPwasn'ttherootofallthe
problemsinthemiddleeasttoday,itwasmerelyacatalystfortheBritishandU.S.
governmentstooustcommunisminthemiddleeast.Thischapterfocusedonexplaining
howMossadeq'sdecisiontobeuncompromisingwastherootofexistingproblemstoday,
thattheU.S.andbritswereunwillingtomakeanotheroilcompromise.Bambergalsostates
becauseMussadiqwasn'twillingtoshareontheoilfront,thepoliticalreasoningbehindthe
coupwasnaughtbutasimpleexcuseforwantingtheoil.
Behrooz,Maziar."TudehFactionalismandthe1953CoupinIran."
InternationalJournalof
MiddleEastStudies
33.3(2001):36382.
JSTOR
.Web.05Oct.2014.
Inthisjournal,MaziarBehroozprovidesanoverviewofthelongtermlegacyofthe1953
coup,mainlyconcerningtheCommunistTudehparty.Behrooz,aprofessorofhistoryat
SFSU,connectsthecouptothedownfalloftheTudehparty,andexplainsthattheywere
neverabletorecoverduetothetimingofthecoupinalongsideaperiodofintraparty
factionalism.Additionally,hestatesthatthecoupisatleastpartiallyresponsibleforthe
1979revolutioninIran,thetensionsincurrentUSIranrelations,andthearrested
developmentofIran'snationalindependence,withtheinstitutionoftheShahhalting
constitutionalprocessesandthemovetowardnationalistleadership.
Bezhan,Frud."AftershocksofIran's1953CoupStillFeltaroundtheWorld,60YearsLater."
RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty
.BroadcastingBoardofGovernors,15Aug.2013.Web.
3Oct.2014.
Bezhan,anestablishedinvestigativejournalistwhospecializesinIran,detailsthelegacyof
thecoupinthepresentday.Citingvarioussources,hesaysthatthecoupwasdetrimentalto
Washington'sstandinginIran,andinthelongrunpavedthewayforapowerful
antiAmericanregimetocometopower.Itallowedtwooppositiongroups,radical
Islamistsandradicalleftists,torisetoprominenceinthewakeoftheShah.Also,the
"success"ofthecoupencouragedtheCIAtousesimilartacticsinothernationssuchas
Guatemala,leadingtostronglegaciesaroundtheglobe.
Bezhan,Frud."AftershocksOfIran's1953CoupStillFeltAroundTheWorld,60YearsLater."
.N.p.,n.d.Web.28Sept.2014.

AlthoughthisarticlewaspublishedbyRadioFreeEurope,amediaoutletinitiallystarted
bytheCIAasasourceofpropaganda,itgaveinsightintothelegacyofthecoup.For
example,inIranundertheShahallpoliticalpartieswereoppressedwhich"pavedtheway
fortwopoliticaltrendsradicalIslamistsledbyAyatollahRuhollahKhomeiniandradical
leftistsintheformofthemilitantMujahedineKhalq."Therepercussionsofthecoupare
stillfeltinIraniananimosityanddistrustoftheUnitedStates.
Bill,JamesA.
TheEagleandtheLion:TheTragedyofAmericanIranianRelations
.New
Haven:YaleUP,1988.Print.
Thissourcewasfoundafteritwasmentionedas"requiredreading"onUSIranianrelations
byanotherjournalist.ItisanindepthhistoryofIranfromtheendofWWIItothe1980's
anditexploreshowtheUSandIranwentfrombeingbestfriendstobitterenemies.Italso
isverycriticalofAmericaninvolvementinthe1953coup.JamesA.Billisacelebrated
authorityofIranianhistoryandapossibleinterviewcandidateforlateroninourproject.
Blake,Kristen.
TheUSSovietConfrontationinIran,19451962
.Lanham:UofAmerica,2009.
Print.
AuthorKristenBlakeisaprofessoratMolloyCollegeandanexpertontheColdWarin
theNearEast.Inhervolume,Blakecoversthepoliticalandeconomicdevelopmentsin
IraninthecontextoftheColdWarinahighlycomprehensivemanner,includingtheoil
nationalizationcrisisof1952.Takingapostrevisioniststance,shearguesthatthecoup
wascausedprimarilybyUSSovietrivalries,althoughherfocusremainsontheoriginsand
impactsoftheUSUKSovietrivalriesintheregion.Ultimately,thissourcedhelpedputthe
coupinthecontextoftheColdWar,andgaveinsightintothelongtermeffectsofthe
conflicts.
Blum,William.
KillingHope:USMilitaryandCIAInterventionssinceWorldWarII
.London:
Zed,2003.Print.
Inthisbook,authorWilliamBlum,whoisahistorian,notedforeignpolicycritic,and
formeremployeeoftheStateDepartment,discussestheCIA'shistoryofforeign
interventions,withonesectiondevotedtothe1953IranianCoup.Ofparticularinterestis
howmuchofamesstheentireUnitedStatesoperationinIranwas.InresponsetoaState
DepartmentreportthatessentiallystatedthattheTudehPartywasnotathreat,Kermit
Roosevelt,theleaderofMiddleEastoperationsoftheCIA,said"Idon'tknowwhatto
makeofthat...[aUSambassadortoIranin1953]thoughtthattherewasaseriousdanger
thatMossadeghwasgoingto,ineffect,placeIranunderSovietdomination."Thisshows

thelackofcommunicationandleadershipontheAmericansidetheleaderofoperations
didn'tevenknowthepurposeofwhathewasdoing.Ofcourse,lackofleadershipleadstoa
negativelegacy,whichisexactlywhathappenedinIran.TheIranianpeoplewereforcedto
endureanoppressivereignundertheShahandhisbrutalSAVAKpoliceforce.This
createdtheantiU.S.sentimentthatlikelycontributedtotheriseofradicalIslaminIran.
Blum,William."Iran1953:MakingItSafefortheKingofKings."
KillingHope:U.S.Military
andCIAInterventionssinceWorldWarII
.Monroe,Me.:CommonCourage,1995.6472.
Print.
ThisbookisverycriticaloftheCIAandgaveafactualaccountofwhathappenedduring
andafterthecoup,juxtaposedagainstwhatKermitRooseveltandotherCIAinsiderssaid
happened.ItshowshowunpreparedanduninformedtheCIAleadershipwasinexamples
suchasquotesabouttheTudehthreatthatneveractuallygivespecificexamples.Italso
showshowunpreparedKermitRoosevelt,thedefactoleaderintheMiddleEast,was.For
example,hehiredthetwokeyIranianagentsthedaybeforethecoup.
Byrne,Malcolm."MalcolmByrneInterview."Telephoneinterview.7Jan.2015.
MalcolmByrne,deputydirectoroftheNationalSecurityArchive,wasfortunatelywilling
totalktousoverthephoneandanswerafewofourquestions.Alargenumberofour
primarysourcescamefromhiswebsiteatGeorgeWashingtonUniversitythatheandthe
NationalSecurityArchiveobtainedfromtheCIAthroughtheFreedomofInformationAct.
HewashelpfulingivingusmoreinformationabouttheCIA,specificallythebureaucracy
thatpreventedlowerlevelspecialistsfromvoicingtheirconcernsregardingtheoperation.
Unfortunately,weweren'tabletospeakwithhimaslongaswehadhopedto,andwedid
notgetmuchinformationabouttheDullesbrothersfromhim,butoverallhisinterviewwas
stillveryhelpfulinassistingourresearch.
Byrne,Malcolm."IraniansDebatethe1953Coup."
JSTOR
.MERP,2000.Web.28Sept.2014.
IntherecordingofatelevisionprogrambetweenIranianmen,thecoupisdiscussedina
differentlight,explaininghowitaffectedtheirlivesindividually,givinganinsightintoa
regularman'slife.ThemenmainlyfocusonhowthefailureoftheUStoputabetterleader
inplace,thenewgovernmentbegantofail,andtheUS'sincessantneedtoeradicate
communismmayhaveinfluencedIranfortheworse.
Byrne,Malcolm."Iran1953:TheRoleofMI6,BritishPetroleumandKermitRoosevelt's
Countercoup."
TheNationalSecurityArchive(GeorgeWashingtonUniversity)
.George

WashingtonUniversity,13May2014.Web.05Oct.2014.
Byrne,DirectorofresearchattheNationalSecurityArchivesponsoredbyGeorgetown
University,andauthorofseveralbookschroniclingtheMiddleEast,providesalookatthe
censorshipoftheIraniancoup.Hediscussesitbylookingatseveralkeychangesmadeto
KermitRoosevelt'sbook"Countercoup,"withaspecificfocusontheirkeepingthe
AngloIranianOilCompanyfrombeingmentioned.Thesourceprovidesalookintothe
Britishleadershipofthecoup,becauseallmentionsoftheAIOCwerechangedto"british
intelligence."ThereforethisshowsthattheBritishintelligenceagencywasessentially
overpoweredbyanoilcompany.Thesourcewaspublishedfairlyrecently,withthehelpof
severalrecentlydeclassifieddocuments.
Caistor,Nick.Forward.
NuncaMs
.ComisinNacinalsobrelaDesaparicindePersonas.
London,ButlerandTannerLtd.Frome,1986.
Thissecondarysourcewasaforwardtoabook,writtenbyNickCaistor,apublished
historicalauthorveryknowledgeableabouttheDirtyWarthattookplaceinArgentina.In
theforwardhegoesintodepthabouttherepercussionsoftheDirtyWarandlos
desaparecidosandwhatitmeansforthemodernworld.Thisishelpfulforthelegacy
argumentbecauseithelpsputtheIranianCoupintocontextwithotherCIAcovertly
backedcoups.Additionally,theauthorprovideseasilyquotablestatements,compatible
withatimelineinthelegacyargument.
Cohen,Roger."TheNewYorkTimesUpfront|TheNewsMagazineforHighSchool."
TheNew
YorkTimesUpfront
.Scholastic&TheNewYorkTimes,n.d.Web.27Sept.2014.
RogerCohen'swellwrittenandauthoritativearticlemorethanadequatelydescribesthe
legacyofthe1953Iraniancoup,indescribingtheleadup,theeventsof,andwhat
happenedimmediatelyaftertheIranianRevolutionandHostageCrisisattheendofthe
1970's.Cohenisawellestablishedjournalistwhohasworkedasaforeigncorrespondentin
fifteencountriesincludingplacesinthemiddleeast,whichensureshehasthenecessary
backgroundtomakethisarticlecredible.Ittiesinwelltoourtopic,becauseweneed
evidenceonhowthelackofstrongleadershipinthe1953coupleadtoabadlegacy.
Conlin,JosephRobert.TheAmericanPast:ASurveyofAmericanHistoryEnhancedEdition.
Vol.II.Belmont,CA:Wadsworth,2011.75658.Print.Since1865.
Thisbook,writtenbyHistorianJosephConlin,wasparticularlyhelpfulbecauseit
devotedasignificantportionofitsColdWarsectiontodiscussingtheimpactofthe

Dullesbrothers.ThebookgaveusagreatsummaryofwhattheDullesbrothersdidin
Iranaswellasinothercountries,likeGuatemala,whichisusefulforourlegacy
argument.Whatwasparticularlyhelpfulaboutthissourcewasthatittalkedabouthow
EisenhoweroftendeferredpowertoDullesintermsofforeignaffairs.Thiswas
extremelyhelpfulinbackingupourargumentthatalackofchecksandbalancesaround
theDullesbrothersledtotheirincreaseofleadershippower.
Connor,JohnT.,RonaldReagan,andNelsonA.Rockefeller.
ReporttothePresidentbythe
CommissiononCIAActivitieswithintheUnitedStates
.WashingtonDC:USGovernment
PrintingOffice,1975.Print.
ThisprimarydocumentisareporttoGeraldFordontheactionsoftheCIA,andtimes
whenitdidthingsoutsideofit'sauthority.ItshowsthatCIAandFBIleadershipattimes
workedagainsteachotherattheexpenseofnationalsecurity,howevertheCIAhashad
goodtieswithstateandlocalpolicedespitethattheCIAisonlysupposedtodealwith
foreignaffairs.ThisdocumentalsoshowshowthelegacyoftheCIAwasshapedbythe
lawssayingwhatitcouldandcouldnotdo.
Cottam,RichardW."AmericanPolicyandtheIranianCrisis."
IranianStudies
13.14(1980):
279305.Web.4Oct.2014.
ThisjournalarticlebyRichardCottamplacesaheavyhandonhowtheinternalconflictsin
IranmadeitweakandthereforesusceptibletoothercountriessuchastheUStryingto
extortitsresources.Theseinternalconflictshestatedwerehowtheseparationbetweenthe
religiousgovernmentandtheseculargovernmentwasn'tclear.Thisuncertaintyinthe
governmentmadeitcleartotheUSthatsomethinghadtobedoneaboutthelackof
leadership,thereforetheUSdecidedtoreplacethecurrentleaderwithaprechosenone.
ThishelpedIran'sgovernmentforawhile,anditalsoplayedtowardstheUS'sinterests.
Cottam,RichardW."TheUnitedStates,IranandtheColdWar."
IranianStudies
3.1(1970):
222.
JSTOR
.Web.20Sept.2014.
ProfessorandIranistRichardCottamoftheUniversityofPittsburghoverviewsAmerican
foreignpolicyinIranduringtheColdWar.Inparticular,hestatesthatwhilesome
historiansbelieveoilinterestsprovidedtheprimarymotiveforUSactions,thereislittle
evidenceofsuchinstead,AmericanperceptionsofacommunistthreatcoloredAmerican
foreignpolicy.Essentially,Cottamcreatesanoverviewoftheeventsandmotivesof
AmericanactionsinIranduringtheColdWar,andcontextualizesthecoupinabroader
periodofIranianhistory.

deBellaigue,Christopher."Coupdunnit:whatreallyhappenedinIran?"ForeignAffairs
Sept.Oct.2014.GlobalIssuesinContext.Web.11Sept.2014.
ThissourcewasveryusefulindetermininghowmoderndayIranhasbeenaffectedbypast
events.Thissourcedoesagreatjobofexplainingthepasteventsthathelpedgeneratethe
turmoilthatexiststoday.Thisarticlegoesontoexplainhowthecoupwasacrucialpartof
thecurrentevents,andhowtheremovalofthefirstdemocraticallyelectedprimeminister
leaderwassoonoustedandreplacedbyalongstringofleaderswhoweren'tnecessarily
bad,butleaderswhodidnotimproveuponthepegsofIran,butsimplystayedwithinthe
traditionalideasofthinking,anddidnotbringnew.Thisarticlealsoexplainedhowthe
coupandthehostagecrisisledtoantiussentimentsthatcarrythroughtoday.
DeLuce,Dan."TheSpectreofOperationAjax."
TheGuardian
.N.p.,20Aug.2003.Web.3Oct.
2014.
Inthiscontextsource,authorDanDeLuceprovidesasummaryoftheeventsofthe1953
IranianCoup.Whilethearticledidhelpbyprovidingageneralunderstandingofwhatit
waslikeinIranin1953,andtheAmericanandBritishinvolvement,itisprimarily
interestingbecauseitsuggeststhatAmericanactionsinIranledtoIslamichostilitytoward
theUnitedStates.DeLucesaysthatAmericaninvolvementinMossadegh'soverthrow
helped"unleashawaveofIslamicextremismandassistedtopowertheantiAmerican
clericalleadershipthatstillrulesIran."ThisprovidesadefinitivelegacyofAmerica's
involvementinthecoupaftertwodecadesunderthedictatorialShah,theIranianpeople's
resentmentturnedtowardAmerica.Basedonwhatotherarticleswehavereadhavesaid
abouttheorganizationandleadershipoftheCIA,itisclearthatpoorleadershiponthe
AmericansideledtothislegacyinIran.TheGuardianisareputablepublication,sothis
sourceismostlikelytrustworthy.
Divine,RobertA."EisenhowerandtheMiddleEast."
EisenhowerandtheColdWar
.NewYork:
OxfordUP,1981.N.pag.Print.
ThischaptergavesomehistoricalcontextforwhatwasgoingonwiththerestoftheCold
WarconflictaroundthetimeoftheCoup.Foronething,Washingtondidnotknowwhatto
makeofthenewsthatStalinhaddied,theyhadlittletonoinsideinformationandtheydid
notknowhowhisdeathwouldaffecttheSovietUnion.AfewmonthsbeforetheCoup
Eisenhowergavehis"AtomsforPeace"speechwhichshowedthathewantedtoleadthe
UnitedStatesintoaneweraofpeacewiththeRussians.Hiswordsarecontradictorytothe

realityofwhatwouldhappeninafewmonthstime.Thisbookshowedthatdespitegood
willedleaders,resolvingtheColdWarconflictwouldtakealotmore.
Doenecke,JustusD."Revisionists,OilandColdWarDiplomacy."
IranianStudies
3.1(1970):
2333.
JSTOR
.Web.21Sept.2014.
JustusD.Doenecke,ProfessorofHistoryatNewCollegeofFlorida,explainsthe
revisionistviewpointofAmericanpolicyinIranduringtheColdWar.Adesirefornatural
resources,namelyoil,drovetheAmericanforcesintheregion,eventuallyleadingtothe
coupin1953.Ingeneral,thejournalplacesthecoupinalargercontextofAmericanpolicy
inIranduringthetime,helpingtoillustratetherolethecoupplayedduringtheColdWarin
Iran.
Dujmovic,Nicholas."IntelligenceinPublicLiterature."
CentralIntelligenceAgency
.Central
IntelligenceAgency,05Feb.2013.Web.05Oct.2014.
InreviewingSarahJaneCorke'sbook,NicholasDujmovic(amemberofCIAsHistory
StaffattheCenterfortheStudyofIntelligence),highlightedpartsofCorke'sargument
suchasthelackofCIAleadershiporefficiencyinthebeginningwaspartlyduetothe
Trumanadministrationnothavingacomprehensiveplanforfightingcommunism.When
lefttoitsowndevices,theCIAtendedtofollowtheDonovanmodelofcowboydiplomacy,
however,Dujmovicmakesthepointthefactisthattherewassignificantpolicyinputfrom
bothStateandthePentagonforCIAoperationsintheFarEastintheearly1950s,mostof
which...wereunsuccessful.AllthissuggeststhatCIAsharestheblameforthesefailures
withotherpartsofthegovernmentandthatbettercoordinationdoesntnecessarilyleadto
betterormoresuccessfulcovertaction.
Frazer,Simin."SiminFrazer."Telephoneinterview.6Jan.2015.
SiminFrazergrewupinawealthyfamilyinIraninthe1960s,butsheisnowanAmerican
citizen.Sheansweredourquestionsregardingwhatitwaslikeforanaveragecitizen
followingthecoup.HerfamilydidwellundertheShah,butshehassincecometo
realizationsabouthisregime.Oneinterestingthingshesaidwasthatsheneverlearned
aboutthe1953coupinschool,theShahasaleaderwasafactoflife.Overall,shewasable
toenlightenusinregardtothechaoticbutdiscordantcivilianexperiencefollowingthe
coup.
Engdahl,William.
ACenturyofWar:AngloAmericanOilPoliticsandtheNewWorldOrder
.
London:Pluto,2004.Print.

Thissourceisabookthatgoesindepthexplainingabouthowpoliticsandoilhavebeen
interconnectedforthepastcentury.Thissourcealsoexplainedhowsomepoliticalleaders
tookthisopportunityofthecouptotakeadvantageofthepubliceye,sopeoplesuchas
ZbigniewBrzezinskitookcreditforhelpingoutthesituationinIran.Althoughhetook
credit,itwasmostlytheUSandbritishgovernments,notonesinglepersonthathelpedlift
outthecorruptshah.
Gasiorowski,Mark."JustLikeThat:HowtheMossadeqGovernmentWasOverthrown."
The
Iranian
.TheIranian,7July2000.Web.12Feb.2015.
ThissourcewasyetanotherhelpfulsourcefromProfessorGasiorowski.Init,he
essentiallyincludesthehighlightsoftheDonaldWilberreport,adocumentthathasbeen
ahugepartofourresearch.Healsocombinessomeofhisownfindingswiththe
informationincludedinthereport.Oneofthemostimportantthingsinthissourcewas
hisdiscussionofthedismissalofRogerGoiran.Althoughitisonlymentionedinthe
DonaldWilberreportthatGoiranwasdismissedfromdutyinTehran,Gasiorowski
explainsthatthiswasbecausehedidnotagreewithTPAJAX,andwastherefore
dismissed,presumablybyAllenDulles.Thisisanotherreflectionofthewillfulblindness
displayedbytheDullesbrothers.Theywereunwillingtoacceptviewsthatcontradicted
theirown,atestamenttotheirstubbornleadershipstyle.
Gasiorowski,Mark."MarkGasiorowskiInterview."Telephoneinterview.6Jan.2015.
MarkGasiorowskiisoneoftheleadingexpertsregardingthe1953coup.Inthe1980she
interviewedmanypeople,whohavesincedied,whoweredirectlyinvolvedinthecoup.He
alsotaughtinTehran.Hecomplicatedourthinkinginmanyaspectsofourprojectand
addednuancessuchasthedifferencesbetweenEisenhowerasarepublicanleaderand
Trumanasademocratleader.Healsoaddedtopreviousknowledgewhichwehadgained
fromStephenKinzeraboutthetruelegacyofthe1953coup.Inhiswords,itwassimplya
factorthatwasseparatedby25years,notadirectcauseandeffectrelationship.Thiswasa
veryhelpfulinterview.
Gasiorowski,MarkJ."The1953CoupD'EtatinIran."
InternationalJournalofMiddleEast
Studies
19.03(1987):26186.
JSTOR
.Web.1Oct.2014.
Gasiorowski,politicalscientistatTulaneUniversity,givesanoverviewofthepoliticaland
operationaldecisionsbehindthecoup.Asheexplainsit,conflictingpointsofviewbetween
theTrumanandEisenhoweradministrations,aswellaswithineachentity,ledtoserious

bureaucraticfailureintheAmericandecisionmakingprocess.Theleaders,including
Eisenhower,A.Dulles,andothers,supportedthecoup,butlowerlevelspecialists
recognizedthepotentialconsequencesofsuchanundertaking.Notonlyweretheleaders
unabletowinthesupportoftheirsubordinates,theythemselveswerenoncommittalfora
longtime,andwhentheydidmakethefinaldecisionstheyeitherlackedaccurate
informationonIran'spoliticalsituationorchosetoignorethefacts.
Gasiorowski,MarkJ.,andMalcolmByrne.MohammadMosaddeqandthe1953CoupinIran.
Syracuse:SyracuseUP,2004.Print.
Thisbookisoneofthedefinitiveresourcesonthecoup.Itcoversalmosteverydetail.The
twoauthors,GasiorowskiandByrne,aretwoofthepreeminentexpertsonthecoupinIran.
Oneoftheaspectsofthisbookthatmadeitsospecialwasthatithadmuchmoredetail
abouttheDullesbrothersthanotheraccountsofthecoup.Whileinotherbooksand
articles,onlyvaguementionsoftheCIAandtheStateDepartmentareincluded,inthis
booktheDullesbrothersareexplicitlytiedtotheiractionsandthelegacyofthoseactions.
Thisbookwasinstrumentalforusinformulatingourviewsontheleadershipofthe
brothers.
Gasiorowski,MarkJ."TheCIALooksBackonthe1953CoupinIran."
MiddleEastReport
216
(2000):45.
JSTOR
.Web.11Sept.2014.
Thisarticlewaswrittenwithnearly50yearsofhindsightontheeventsoftheIranianCoup,
butitwasalsowrittenayearbefore9/11.Fromthisperspective,itexploreshowtheCIA
haschanged,orfailedtochangesinceitsfirstcovertoverthrowofaforeignregime.The
legacyoftheCIAsinitialactionin1953canstillbefeltinCIAsoperationstodayandits
continuedinvolvementintheMiddleEast.However,afterthe1970s,theCIAbecame
markedlysmallersothelegacyofthecoupwassomewhatdiminishedatthattime.
Gates,RobertM."Intelligence,Democracy,andFreedom."
PresidentialStudiesQuarterly
22.2
(1992):23137.
JSTOR
.Web.21Sept.2014.
ThisessayisbasedonRobertM.Gates'addressinMarch1992atthe23rdAnnualStudent
Symposium,CenterfortheStudyofPresidency.Gates,formerdirectoroftheCIAand
SecretaryofDefense,referstoWilliamDonovanas"thefounderofmodernAmerican
intelligence."HedescribesDonovan'sleadershipandsignificanceincreatingtheCIA,and
thelegacyoftheorganization.Giventhattheessayispublishedinareputablejournal,and
thatthespeakeroftheaddressofwhichtheessayisderivedisextremelyauthoritative,this
isaverytrustworthysource.

Gavin,FrancisJ."Politics,Power,andU.S.PolicyinIran,19501953."(n.d.):n.pag.Harvard.
Web.21Sept.2014.
FrancisJ.GavinmanagestomakeIranianpoliticsofthe1950'ssoundinteresting,even
whiletalkingaboutyawninducingtopicssuchasreligioustiestowardseconomicpolicy.
Thisacademicwritingwasbeneficialtoresearchingthecoupbecauseitwasimportantto
haveastrongbackgroundknowledgeofIranianpolitics.Additionally,Gavinisan
extremelywellestablishedexpertonAmericanforeignpolicy.
Ghosh,Palash."Iran:TheLongLastingLegacyofthe1953U.S./CIACoup."
International
BusinessTimes
.InternationalBusinessTimes,20Mar.2012.Web.21Sept.2014.
Inaninterviewwithacollegeprofessor,thissourcestressestofindthelegacyofthecoup,
andallthesentimentstowardstheevent.Thisarticlealsodoesagoodjobofgoinginto
detailaboutcountryrelationsandhowpreviousleadersanddifferentcountriesimpacted
Iran'shistory.FromthissourceIlearnedmuchmoreaboutrelations,suchastheU.S
sufferedmuchblowbackfromthecoup,becausethenewleaderdidhelpconsolidate
power,butpublicopinionofhimwasn'thigh,makingitseemasifhewasapuppet.This
sparkedthebeginningofIraniandisdaintowardstheU.S.
Grim,Ryan."BP'sLongHistoryOfDestroyingTheWorld."
TheHuffingtonPost
.
TheHuffingtonPost.com,08June2010.Web.21Sept.2014.
Inthisshortarticle,theauthorobviouslyhasabiastowardstheOilCompanyforcausing
manyoftheproblemsintheMiddleEast.Thissourcewasn'tonehundredpercentreliable,
butitdidprovideanothersideoftheargumentstatingthatbadleadershipwasn'tthereason
forthecoup,butratheritwasforthecontrolofoil.Thisarticlesaysthemainandonly
reasonforthecoupwasforoil,focusingontheeconomicviewofthecoupratherthan
political.Althoughthisarticleisratheronesided,theauthordoesprovideveryindepth
reasoningintowhyhefeelsthewayhedoes.Overallthisarticleiswellwrittenanddoes
providedecentinformation.
Hader,Leon."OurManinIran:HowtheCIAandMI6InstalledtheShah."
OurManinIran:
HowtheCIAandMI6InstalledtheShah
.N.p.,16Feb.2013.Web.05Oct.2014.
Hader,globalaffairsjournalistintheMiddleEastandcriticofAmericanpolicyinthe
MiddleEast,paintsaverynegativepictureoftheAmericanIntelligenceinchargeofthe
IranianCoup.HeputsMuhammadMossadeqinanewlight,describinghowhisgoalwas

nottoalignwiththeSoviets,butrathertoavoidtheColdWarconflictalltogether,andthat
thenationalizationoftheAIOCwastoprotecteconomicinterests,nottospitetheBritish.
Thissourcerevealsleadershipinanewway,showinghowthefirstworldcountriesacted
outoffear,ratherthanlogicallyseeingthesituation.Itwaswrittenbeforethe
declassificationofallIranianCoupdocuments,butthatchangeslittleasthetruthwas
alreadypublished.
Hardy,ThomasS."IntelligenceReformintheMid1970s."
CentralIntelligenceAgency
.Central
IntelligenceAgency,04Aug.2011.Web.21Oct.2014.
ThisarticletoldusalotabouttheleadershipwithintheCIAbycomparingthethe
leadershipofAllenDullesinafledglingbranchofgovernment,tothesomewhat
humiliatedleadersoftheCIAinthe1970swhowerelookingtoopenanewchapteron
UnitedStatesintelligencegathering.Onethingtheychangedinthesereformmeetingsof
the1970swastheypassedlawsmakingtheCIAmoreaccountabletotheSenate.This
showedbycomparisonhowunaccountabletheCIAhadpreviouslybeen.
Heaps,JenniferD.
TrackingIntelligenceInformation:TheOfficeofStrategicServices
61.2
(1998):287308.
JSTOR
.Web.21Sept.2014.
ThissourceprovidesinformationabouttheOSS,theprecursortotheCIA.Itdelvesinto
detailabouthowtheOSSgatheredinformationandhowitfunctioned.AstheCIA
eventuallywouldtakeoverthefunctionsoftheOSS,thearticleshedsvaluablelightonthe
originsoftheCIAanditsinformationgatheringtactics.Weusedthissourceprimarilyasa
wayforprovidingcontextforourargumentinourwebsite.AstheCIAwasderivedfrom
theOSS,knowingthedetailsofthefunctionsandrolesoftheOSSisimportantto
understandingthedevelopmentoftheCIAanditsownroles.
Heiss,MaryAnn."TheUnitedStates,GreatBritain,andtheCreationoftheIranianOil
Consortium,19531954."
Taylor&Francis
.
TheInternationalHistoryReview,1994.Web.28Sept.2014.Thissourcewaswrittenbya
historicaljournalthatmadeamemoofameetinginIranin1954.Thisdocumentfocused
onhowtheeventssurroundingthecoupchangedtheworldmorethanthecoupitself,
explaininghowoilisoneofthebiggestfactorsthatdecidedtheUS'sdecisiontointervene,
butalsointheprocessofobtainingoil,alsostoppedthespreadofcommunism.This
documentalsopaystributetotheoilnegotiationsin1954thatHerbertHooverJr.had
called'perhapsthelargestcommercialdealeverputtogether.'

Hilsman,Roger."DoestheCIAStillHaveaRole?"
ForeignAffairs
74.5(1995):10416.
JSTOR
.Web.21Sept.2014.
ThissourcediscussesthechangingroleoftheCIA,andisthereforeparticularlyrelevantto
theorganization'slegacy.ThearticlediscussestherelevanceoftheCIA'sprimary
functions,likecovertpoliticalactions,codebreaking,espionage,oresotericfunctions.The
authorarguesthat,whileonceusefulduringperiodssuchastheColdWar,theCIAs
primaryfunctionsarenolongercosteffectiveornecessary.Theauthorquestionsthe
purposeoftheCIAsexistenceasawhole,andthereforeitslegacyasanorganization.The
articlewasfoundinareputablejournal,andwhiletheauthorspersonalviewsmustbe
takenintoaccount,theinformationisauthoritativeandtrustworthy.
Historian,ClaytonLaurieCia."ANewPresident,aBetterCIA,andanOldWar:Eisenhower
andIntelligenceReportingonKorea,1953."
TheEvolutionofCIAunderEisenhower
54.4
(2010):n.pag.Web.
ThisarticlewasveryhelpfulinexplainingEisenhowersroleinthegrowthoftheCIAinto
atruecowboyorganization.AnimportantdistinctionwasmadebetweentheRepublican
leadersunderEisenhowerandthemoreliberalleadersunderTruman.Thissource
illuminatedourknowledgeoftheleadershipbehindthegovernmentatthetimeofthecoup.
"HistoryofIran:AShortAccountof1953Coup."
HistoryofIran:AShortAccountof1953
Coup
.N.p.,n.d.Web.11Sept.2014.
Thisbroadcontextsourceprovidedussomebasistoourargument.Itprovidednamesof
leadersandablowbyblowoftheeventitself.Theactualonthegroundoperationwasled
byKermitRoosevelt,anditwastoputitlightly,afiasco.Initialattemptsatthecoupfailed
anditseemedlikeallwaslost,untilariotincitedbytheCIAanditspropagandaandits
thugsbroughtdownMossadeq.Ifthispoorleadershipandconfusionisanyindicationof
thelargerorganization,theCIAshouldprovetobequiteamess.
"HistoryoftheCentralIntelligenceAgency."
Fas.org
.FederationofAmericanScientists,n.d.
Web.04Oct.2014.
ThisarticlefromtheFederationofAmericanScientiststalksabouttheoriginsoftheCIA.
WhilethevalueofcentralizedintelligencewasmadeclearafterWorldWarII,the
inceptionoftheCIAwasatroubledandcontroversialprocess.WilliamDonovan,whois
creditedasthecreatoroftheCIA,wantedanorganizationthatwould"correlatethe
intelligencematerialcollectedbyallgovernmentagencies."Hisplanwasopposedbymany

differentgovernmentdepartments.Itisclearthatatthattime,manyAmericansdidnot
supportthecreationoftheCIA,butinthewakeofWorldWarII,itwasdeemeda
necessaryevil.Aninterestingthingmentionedinthearticleishow,astimepassed,the
CIAgrewlargerinsizeandinfluence,yetitsactionsbecameincreasinglysecretive.Thisis
relevanttothecoupinIran,aboutwhichtheCIAwasextremelysecretive.Basedonthe
article'sdescriptionoftheorganization'sstructureanditssecrecy,thenegativelegacyleft
inIranbytheCIAcouldverywellbeaproductofpoorleadership.Thesecrecyofthe
organizationlikelyprovidedasortofveilthatgaveitsleadersasafetynettomakepoor
decisionsintheeventthattheyfailed,nobodywouldknowwhotoblame.
"HistoryoftheCIA."CentralIntelligenceAgency.CentralIntelligenceAgency,18Feb.2014.
Web.11Sept.2014.
ThissourcewasveryhelpfulindetermininghowtheCIAwasbroughtup,andwhythat
affectedtheeventssurroundingit.Thissourcewentintothehistoryofhoworiginallythe
CIAwastheOSS,whichwasbornoutoftheaftermathofWorldWarII.Thissourcealso
talkedabouttheleadersoftheCIA,andhoweachleaderandtheirdifferentideology
affectedtheoverallleadershipoftheCIA.ThehistoryofeverythingtheCIAwasinvolved
withwasnotdiscussedhowever,manyofthecovertoperationsandfailuresthatwelearned
aboutwerenotdiscussedastomaketheCIAlookgood.
Holsti,Ole."The"OperationalCode"ApproachtotheStudyofPoliticalLeaders:JohnFoster
Dulles'PhilosophicalandInstrumentalBeliefs."
CanadianJournalofPoliticalScience/
RevueCanadienneDeSciencePolitique
3.1(1970):12357.
JSTOR
.Web.04Oct.2014.
OleHolsti,professorofpoliticalscienceatDukeUniversity,providesanintensive,
extensive,andhighlysystematicanalysisofJ.Dulles'sbeliefsasapoliticalleader.Inshort,
hehadverystrongbeliefsinthepowerofmorality,waspessimisticintheshorttermbut
optimisticlongrun,andbelievedthatinflexibilityinpoliticalgoalswasextremely
importanttodefendcredibilityandpreserveperceivedstrength.Additionally,Holstistates
J.Dulles'sbeliefthataleader'sspiritualqualitiesdirectlyaffectforeignpolicy,implying
thatJ.Dullessoughttohaveastronginfluenceoninternationalaffairs,includingthecoup.
Holsti,OleR."WilltheRealDullesPleaseStandUp."
InternationalJournal
30.1,Diplomatic
Method(1974):3444.
JSTOR
.Web.28Sept.2014.
OleHolsti,ProfessorEmeritusofPoliticalScienceatDukeUniversity,createsanimageof
J.Dullesasanidealisticandrigidleaderwhoseambitionblindedhimtotheconsequences
ofmanyofhisactions.Bychoosingtoignoreorsuppressmanyoftheopinionsofhis

subordinates,J.Dullesranaverydictatorialsystem,wherehemademanydecisions
withoutoutsideinput.ThisperhapscausedJ.Dullestomakemanyimprudentchoices,
resultinginmanynegativelongtermconsequencessuchasthelegacyofthecoup.
Hoopes,Townsend."GodandJohnFosterDulles."ForeignPolicyNo.13(1973):15477.
JSTOR.Web.16Feb.2015.
TownsendHoopes,formerUndersecretaryoftheAirForce,createsacollageofanalysesof
severalworksonJohnFosterDullesasSecretaryofStateinthisjournalarticle,inaddition
tohisownconclusions.HoopesacknowledgesseveralpointsofviewofFosterDulles's
characterandideals,includingthathewasextremelyreligiousandthathewasdrivenby
ambition.Hoopeshimself,though,arguesthatDulleswassimplytoorigidinhisbeliefs,
unwillingtogiveanyquarterinhisforeignpolicyandotherdecisionmaking
responsibilities.Thisseemstoagreewithotherauthoritativeperspectives,especially
becauseSmithdoesnotmakeastrongjudgementonDulles'sactualbeliefs,justthatDulles
wasapoorleader,unabletosynthesizemultipleperspectivesandsourcesofinformationto
makeabalancedjudgement.
Immerman,RichardH."EisenhowerandDulles:WhoMadetheDecisions?"
Political
Psychology
1.2(1979):2138.
JSTOR
.Web.28Sept.2014.
IndescribingtherelationshipbetweenJ.DullesandEisenhower,Immerman,aprofessorat
TempleUniversity,bringsuptwodifferentviewsoftheirleadershipdynamic,especially
regardingtheColdWar.ThefirstandmorecommonlyacceptedisthatJ.Dulles'sforceful
styledominatedEisenhower'smorepassiveleadership,butthesecondclaimsthat
Eisenhowerhadmorecontrolthanpreviouslythought.Bothperspectiveshelpunderstand
thehowthebureaucraticmachinethatistheAmericangovernmentfunctionedduringthe
Iraniancoup.
Immerman,RichardH.
JohnFosterDullesandtheDiplomacyoftheColdWar
.Princeton,NJ:
PrincetonUP,1990.Print.
ProfessorImmermanofTempleUniversitydescribesJ.Dullesasamuchmorecalculating
leaderthanotheranalystshavedescribed,althoughheconcedesthathewasnotnecessarily
anymorefarsightedthanpreviouslythought.Immermancreatesanargumentfortheability
ofJ.Dullesasadiplomatwhowasabletousehisleadershipskillstoeffectivelyguideand
forcewhathewantedoutofothers.

Johnson,LochK."CovertActionandAccountability:DecisionMakingforAmerica'sSecret
ForeignPolicy."
InternationalStudiesQuarterly
33.1(1989):81109.
JSTOR
.Web.12
Oct.2014.
Johnson,aprofessorofpoliticalscienceattheUniversityofGeorgia,providesahistoryof
thedecisionmakingprocessforcovertactionintheUSgovernment.Byhisdescription,
thevastmajorityofthemoderndayprocess,includingalmostalloftheofficialcontrols
andexaminations,wereonlyimplementedaftertheNixonadministration.Before,the
leadersoftheCIAhadfreereign,andwentlargelyuncheckedintheactionsabroad,
creatingthepotentialfordangerousorevendisastrouscovertoperationstotranspire,such
asthe1953Iraniancoup.
Kangas,Steve."TimelineofCIAAtrocities."
Serendipity
(2002):n.pag.
MicrosoftAcademic
Search
.Web.28Sept.2014.
Inthisarticle,writtenbyaformermilitaryintelligenceworker,thehistoryoftheCIAis
chronicledtosupporttheauthorsargumentthattheCIAshouldbedismantledbecauseof
itspatternoforchestratingmilitarycoupswithlegaciesofhumanrightsabusesandthen
censoringmediaabouttheCIA'sinvolvementinfailedcoups.Itmakesthepointthatfrom
itsinception,theCIAlackedmoralleadershipbecausetheCIAleadershiponlyanswered
tothePresidentaccordingtotheNationalSecurityActof1947.
Karasipahi,Sena."ComparingIslamicResurgenceMovementsinTurkeyandIran."
TheMiddle
EastJournal
63.1(2009):87107.
JSTOR
.Web.5Oct.2014.
WheninitiallychoosingourtopicweknewthattheoppressiveregimeoftheShahhadled
toreligiousinstitutionsbeingtheonlyplacewherecitizenscouldexpressdissentandthisis
whytheAyatollahKhomeiniwasabletooverthrowtheShah.Thisarticle,however,
explainshowmuchmorecomplexthereasonsfortheIslamicRevivalinIranwere.The
author,aprofessoratTexasA&MUniversity,sites"denunciationofsubserviencetothe
US,"asonlyonereason.Othersincludetheinfluenceofreformistintellectualsduringthe
1970s,thetraditionsofShi'aIslam,andIslamasanideologytotakerefugeintoconfront
Westernizationanditschallenges.
Kinzer,Stephen.
AlltheShah'sMen:AnAmericanCoupandtheRootsofMiddleEastTerror
.
Hoboken,NJ:J.Wiley&Sons,2003.Print.
AlltheShah'sMenisafantasticbookandsource.Itheldsomuchinformationdirectly
relatedtoourtopic.ItclearlyoutlinestheleadershipofAllenDullesandotherssuchas

resistancefighterswhomadethiscouppossible.Possiblythebestpartofthisbookisthat
theauthorisnotonlyanauthorbutalsosomewhatofaninvestigativejournalist.A
majorityofhisinformationarethingssuchasinterviews,publicsources,anddeclassified
information.Thisbookcoverssomuchinformationrangingtothelivesofthoseinvolved
inthecoup,tothingssuchasthefactMohammadMossadeqoftenworepajamasduring
affairsofstatewithofficials.Kinzeralsoprovidesspeculationfortherelevancetoday,with
anargumentbackingitup.
Kinzer,Stephen."BPandIran:TheForgottenHistory."
CBSNews
.CBSInteractive,2010.Web.
05Oct.2014.
InthisnewsarticlewrittenbytheStephenKinzer,theblameforissueswithinIran's
governmentarerestedontheshouldersofBP(BritishPetroleum).KinzerstatedBPwas
overzealousandwishedtoprofitheavilyfromIran,andtakeit'sresources.Thislead
Mossadeqtotakeonanationalisticvalue,andtakebackIran'soiltomaximizetheir
countriesprofit.Britaindidnotwanttheoiltofallintothehandsofthecommunists,so
OperationAjaxwasputintoplace.Kinzerexplainshowthelackofauthorityand
cooperationinoperationajaxledtotheendofdemocracyiniran,eventuallyleadingto
newleaderswithanantiwesternattitude.
Kinzer,Stephen.
TheBrothers:JohnFosterDulles,AllenDulles,andTheirSecretWorldWar
.
N.p.:n.p.,n.d.Print.
Thisbookiswhereweinitiallycameupwithourideaforhistoryfair.Asthetitlewould
suggest,itdealsmainlywiththeleadershipoftheDullesbrothers.Itbeginswitha
thorough,albatedramatized,depictionoftheiryouthandschoolingandthusdescribeshow
theygrewuptobethementheybecame.Therestofthebookissplitupintothesixmain
countrieswheretheycarriedouttheirsecretwartogetridofleadersthatwentagainst
theirAmericanvalues.ThemostvaluableknowledgeabouttheirleadershipwhichItook
awayfromthisbookisthat,asthemosthighconcentrationofpowerbetweenrelativesin
theUSinhistory,theiropinionsandpolicieswereessentiallyanechochamberofeach
other.Theirleadershipwascloseminded,andthisledtodisastrousresults.
Kinzer,Stephen."TheBrothers."PoliticsandProse,Washington,D.C.03Oct.2013.Lecture.
InalectureforPoliticsandProse,acclaimedjournalistandacademicStephenKinzer
explainssomeoftheDullesbrothers'reasonsforinitiatingthecoupinIran.First,being
raisedextremelyreligiously,theybelievedinthestarkcontrastbetween"good"and"evil,"
andthatasChristianstheyhadtoactivelycombatimmoralityaroundtheglobe.

Additionally,aslawyersatSullivan&Cromwell,theDulles'soriginaljobsweretoprotect
Americanbusinessinterestsfromgovernmentsaroundtheworld,andtheirfirstshocking
defeatcamewhenIrannationalizeditsoilindustry,causingtheDulles'stohaveahuge
grudgeoncetheyarrivedinofficein1953.Asbrotherswithalmostidenticalworldviews,
theydidnotconsultorseekapprovalfromothers,andinsteadwereconvincedfromthe
startoftheirdecisions.Finally,Eisenhower'sopinionsregardingdefensethatcovert
operationsweresuperblyeffectiveonlyencouragedthemtocontinuewiththeirplansto
overthrowMossadeq,despitetheiradmittedlackofinformation.
Kinzer,Stephen."FTMWeeklyInterview:StephenKinzeronOperationAjaxandtheBlowback
fromIranSince1953."InterviewbyJerryRobinson.
FTMDaily
.FTMDaily,11Feb.
2012.Web.12Oct.2014.
WehaveusedmanysourcesfromStephenKinzer,asheappearstobethepreeminent
expertonthe1953CoupinIranandOperationAJAX.Thisisanextremelyuseful
interviewbecauseKinzer'sargumentisthattheCIAandtheUnitedStates'involvementin
thecoupdirectlyledtoitscurrentconditions.KinzerstatesthatinIran,thecommon
sentimentpeoplegivehimis,"Weusedtohaveademocracyhere.ButyouAmericans
cameoverhereanddestroyedit.Andeversincethen,wevebeenspiralingdown."Kinzer
alsostatesthatCIAinterventioninIranledtoa"cliqueoffanaticallyantiAmerican
mullahswhoareinpowernow."KinzerformsadirectconnectionbetweenCIAactionsin
IranandthelegacyoftheriseofextremistIslam.NotonlydoesKinzerdiscussthelegacy,
howeverhetiesitbacktoCIAactionsanditsleadership,orlackthereof.Kinzersaysthat
sendingtheCIAtoIransentIraninto"totalchaos,"andthatwhenyoulookbackatthe
event,itisclearthat"theAmericanroleincrushingIraniandemocracyin1953...setIran
andtheMiddleEastintoturmoilfromwhichithasneverrecovered."Duetoitsactions
duringthecoupthatresultedfromlackofleadership,Americaanditsorganizationslikethe
CIAareresponsibleforthenegativelegacy.
Kinzer,Stephen."HowTwoBrothersWagedA'SecretWorldWar'InThe1950s."Interviewby
ArunRath.
NPR
.NPR,2013.Web.13Oct.2014.
StephenKinzersuccinctlyandeloquentlydescribestheargumentinhisbookduringthis
interview.HetalksabouthowtheDullesbrotherswereinfluencedbytheirprotestant
upbringingtonotsitbackandletbadthingshappen,buttointervene,andalsothatthe
worldisveryblackandwhiteandsplitupintogoodandevil.TheDullesbrothers
leadershipinwagingasecretwarbeginningin1953showedtheinfluenceoftheir
leadershipandalsorepresentedthecovertandovertpartsofAmericanForeignPolicy.

Finally,KinzerdiscussedthelegacyofAmericansecretinterventionaroundtheworldand
howAmerican'sthesedaysaremoreawareofit.(Avery)
Kinzer,Stephen."InsideIran'sFury."
Smithsonian
.SmithsonianMagazine,Oct.2008.Web.05
Oct.2014.
StephenKinzerhaswrittenmanybooksandarticlesabouttheUnitedStates'involvement
inthecoupinIran,andgivenhishistoryasacorrespondentfortheNewYorkTimesand
asanacademic,heisclearlyanexpertinthisfield.Inthisarticle,KinzertellsIran'ssideof
thestory.Iranhashadalonghistoryofbeingdominatedbyforeignpowers,andtheCIA's
roleinthecoupaswellastheAmericanfundingoftheShahonlyexacerbatedtheintense
resentmenttheIranianpeoplebuiltup.Thecoupitselfwasapoorleadershipdecisionby
theCIA,onlyinitiatedduetoa"wilddistortion"aboutaCommunistthreatthattheBritish
fedtotheCIA.Additionally,thedecision"wasallveryemotionalandveryquick.There
wasnorealattempttofindoutwhoMossadeghwasorwhatmotivatedhim."Asaresultof
poorAmericanleadership,antiUnitedStatessentimentcontinuedtobuildupinIran,
resultinginthe1979hostagecrisisandthelegacyofanantiAmericansentimentthat
permeatestothisday.
Kinzer,Stephen."KinzerInterview."Telephoneinterview.6Dec.2014.
OurfirstinterviewwasilluminatingintheareaofleadershipbecauseKinzerwrotethe
bookwhichinitiallygaveustheideatostudytheDullesbrothersinthisproject.Healso
furtherexplainedthecoup'slegacyinIran.Specifically,hesaidthatadirectcauseand
effectlinecouldbedrawnbetweentheeventsof1953andtheeventualrevolutionin1979.
Finally,hedirectedustowardsomeverygoodprimarysourcestospeakwith,including
MalcolmByrneandMarkGasiorowski'sworksonthecoup.
Kornbluh,Peter."TopSecretCIA'OfficialHistory'oftheBayofPigs:Revelations."
TopSecret
CIA'OfficialHistory'oftheBayofPigs:Revelations
.NationalSecurityArchive,15Aug.
2011.Web.8Feb.2015.
ThisarticlewaswrittenbyPeterKornbluh,andexpertwhodoesresearchfortheNational
SecurityArchive,aprogramsponsoredbyGeorgeWashingtonUniversity.Kornbluhisan
expertonmanyoftheCIA'scovertoperationsaswellasmuchofAmerica'sforeignpolicy
duringtheColdWar.Thissourceprovidesaccesstomanyprimarydocumentspublished
fromwithintheCIAontheBayofPigs.Kornbluhprovidesshortsummariesofallofthe
documents,aswellasawrittenreportonhisownviewontheoperation.Thereforeitwas
veryhelpfulinprovidingcommentaryforthelegacyargument,andinshowinghowthe

DullesbrothersleadershiptendencieswerenotisolatedtotheIraniancoup,butratherwere
suggestiveoftheirentiretimespentinpower.
Landay,JonathanS."ObamasDroneWarKillsothers,NotJustAlQaidaLeaders."
McClatchyDC.TheMcClatchyCompany,9Apr.2013.Web.16Feb.2015.
ThisonlinearticleinthewellknownnewspaperMcClatchyDCcoversanexclusivereview
ofclassifiedCIAreportsonrecentdronestrikesinPakistan.Accordingtothejournalist,
theclassifiedreportsdocumenttheshortfallsoftheCIA'sdronestrikeprogram,andhowit
hadmisledCongressandtheAmericanpublicabouttheextentandnatureofitsactivities.
ThearticlehelpedusunderstandhowthelegacyofwillfulblindnessbegunbytheDulles
brothersinthe1953coupstillaffectsmodernUSforeignpolicy,evenoutsideofits
"traditional"kingmakingrolesasinthe1953coup.Additionally,thelackofcheckson
CIAandexecutivepowerismadeapparentinthereports,whichallowedtheorganizations
tocontinuewiththeirunsavoryactivitieswithoutreleasinginformationaboutthem.
Little,Douglas."Chapter2."
AmericanOrientalism:TheUnitedStatesandtheMiddleEast
since1945
.ChapelHill:UofNorthCarolina,2002.4346.Print.
InthisbookaboutIranianAmericanrelations,theauthoroutlinesthelegacyofthe
bureaucraticfailuresleadinguptothecoupin1953.Theauthorstatesthatthelackof
supportersofMossadeq'sregimewaspartialininfluencinghisdecisions.Overallthe
authorsaidthatthefailuretocometoasolidcompromiseovertheoilcausedmanyofthe
longlastingproblemstoday.Theauthoralsonotedhowthesituationscouldhavebeen
avoidediftheUnitedStatesgreedhadnotcloudeditspoliticalagenda.
Little,Douglas."19491958,Syria:EarlyExperimentsinCovertAction."
PressforConversion!
51(2003):1213.Web.
WrittenbyDouglasBrown,aprofessoratBrownUniversity,thissecondarysource
providesinsightintotheSyriancoupwhichwasaidedbytheCIAfrom1949to1958.It
elaboratesontheDullesroleinthecoup,primarilyJohnFosterDulles's,butthesourcewas
primarilyusedforthelegacyargument,specificallyforreferencetothelegacyinAmerican
foreignpolicy.IthelpsshowtherelationoftheIranianCouptoothercovertoperations
carriedoutbytheCIAduringtheColdWar,andprovidesquotablestatementswhichare
extremelyusefulforthewebsite.
Marsh,Steve."TheUnitedStates,IranandOperation'Ajax':InvertingInterpretative
Orthodoxy."
MiddleEasternStudies
39.3(2003):138.
JSTOR
.Web.11Sept.2014.

ThisarticlediscussestheUnitedStatesinvolvementinthe1953IranianCoup.Itgoesinto
detailabouttheobjectivesandmotivesoftheTrumanandEisenhoweradministrations.The
articlearguesthatultimately,theUnitedStates'motivationtogetinvolvedinthecoupwas
tostopthespreadofcommunism.TheEisenhoweradministrationhadreachedapoint
whereitsonlytwooptionsinIranwere"writingIranofftocommunismasanexpendable
asset,"orOperationAJAX.Thearticleisrelevantbecauseitdiscussestheleadershipofthe
peoplebehindtheAmericansideofthecoup.Thearticlewaspublishedinarespected
journal,andislikelyreliable.
MatinDaftari,Hedayat."HedayatMatinDaftari:Mossadeq'sLegacyToday."
MERIPReports
No.113.IranSincetheRevolution(1983):2425.
JSTOR
.Web.05Oct.2014.
InaninterviewwiththegrandsonofMohammadMossadeq,thereasonforthecoupof
1953inIranwereputintocontextexplainingtheworldhadbeenunderimmensepressure
atthetime,andthattheweaknessoftheleadershipinRussiaafterthedeathofStalinhad
contributedtotheWestthenbeingallowedtotinkerinthebusinessofthemiddleeast.
HeydeyatMatinDaftariarguesthatMossadeqonlyhandledthesituationspoorlyduetothe
lackofhisresources.
McCurdy,Dave."GlasnostfortheCIA."
ForeignAffairs
73.1(1994):12540.
JSTOR
.Web.5
Oct.2014.
OnetheoryforwhytheCIAdidsomanymorallyquestionablethingsduringtheColdWar
isthatitwasasecretiveagencythatonlyhadtoanswertoonebranchofgovernment.In
the1970's,theUSgovernmenttriedtoaddressthisissuebycreatingtheHouseIntelligence
CommitteesotheCIAwouldhavetoanswertoCongressalso.Rep.DaveMcCurdyserved
onthiscommitteefortenyearsandinhiswritingaboutwaystheCIAmustchangeafter
theColdWar,itpaintsapictureofhowtheCIAwasduringtheColdWar.Itwasan
institutionwiththesinglegoalofbeatingtheSovietsanditwasaveryclosedinstitution.
McCurdysaysthattheCIAneedstobringinmoreoutsideexpertsbecauseduringtheCold
War,theleaderswereveryclosedandinneedofacademicandbusinessexpertsasleaders.
McMahon,RobertJ."EisenhowerandThirdWorldNationalists:ACritiqueoftheRevisionists."
PoliticalScienceQuarterly,1989.Web.28Sept.2014.
Inthisjournalarticle,theleadershipofEisenhowerwasgreatlycriticized,sayinghewasa
"lazyloof".Thisarticleobviouslyhasabiasbysayinghedidn'tcontributetohelp
relations,butitalsogoesasfartosayEisenhower,eventhoughhighlyregarded,was

actuallyworseningrelationsbetweentheUSandtheMiddleEast.Thisarticlewasa
differentpointofviewontheleadershiporlackofitthatwentintothecoupbeing
successful,butinthelongrun,worseningrelations.
MERIP."ACelebrationofPower."
MiddleEastResearchandInformationProject
(n.d.):
36+14.Web.28Sept.2014.
ThissourceisamemoirwrittenbyaPeaceCorpsvolunteerinIranin1971,18yearsafter
thecoupthatdroveMossadeqoutofpower.Theauthordescribesthedilapidatedand
oppressivestateofthecountryinthemidstoftheShah'srule.Thearticledescribesthe
violentoppressionoffreespeechbySAVAKagents,theconsolidationofpowertothe
Shah,andthepoorlivingconditions.Thisisparticularlyrelevantbecausethelandreform
thatconsolidatedpowerintothehandsoftheShahwasduetopressurefromtheUnited
States,andtheUnitedStatescontinuedtogivetheShahweaponsandaidafterthecoup.As
theCIAwastheprimaryUnitedStatesorganizationinvolvedwiththecoupinIran,this
articleisparticularlyrelevanttotheCIAbecauseitshowsthelegacyofitsactions.The
legacyinIranofwhatwasmostlikelyweakleadershipintheCIAisanoppressive,
dilapidatedcountry.Whilenoindividualauthoriscredited,thearticlewaspublishedbythe
MiddleEasternResearchandInformationProject,arespectedindependentresearchgroup,
soitisareliablesource.
Mintz,HelenC."IranMOSSADEQANDOILNATIONALIZATION."IranMOSSADEQ
ANDOILNATIONALIZATION.LibraryofCongress,1987.Web.11Sept.2014.
TheNationalizationofIranianoilwasahugepartofwhytheUSandBritishintervened,
andwithinthisarticle,theimportanceoftheoilwasheavilydisplayed,andthecoupand
manyothereventswereblamedonthenationalizationofIransoil.Theoilwas
nationalized,andsoonafter,thebritishandtheamericansbecameveryangry.Theyviewed
mossadeqasacommunistandwantedtogettheirhandsonIransoil,theybelievedthe
onlywaytheycouldachievethiswasbykickingoutMossadeqandbyputtinginsomeone
withideassimilartotheirs.
Moaddel,Mansoor."TheoriesofRevolution."Introduction.
Class,Politics,andIdeologyinthe
IranianRevolution
.NewYork:ColumbiaUP,1993.123.
GoogleBooks
.Web.13Oct.
2014.
Moaddel,MiddleEasternstudiesprofessorattheUniversityofMichigan,providesan
excellentsourcethatlooksatthecausesofthe1979IranianRevolution,whichwasthe
ultimateresultofthe1953Coup.Publishedin1993,itwasbeforetheCIAreleasedmostof

itsresourcessurroundingtheCoup,butsufficientlylateenoughsothatenoughinformation
wasavailabletoformanopinionontheCoup,andenoughtimehadelapsedafterthe
Revolutiontoseemostofitseffects.Ithelpsassemblemorepiecestothelegacyofthelack
ofleadershipinthe1953Coup,byexploringitseffects.
Mokhtari,Fariborz."Iran's1953CoupRevisited:InternalDynamicsversusExternalIntrigue."
MiddleEastJournal
62.3(2008):45788.
JSTOR
.Web.11Sept.2014.
ThisarticlediscussesthesituationinIranbefore,during,andafterthecoupin1953,as
wellastheBritishandAmericanrole.AfterMossadeqcametopower,theUnitedStates
begantofearthatIranwasfallingbehindthecommunistIronCurtain.SecretaryofStates
JohnFosterDullesaskedtheCIA,ledbyhisbrotherAllenDulles,toformulateacoupfor
Mossadeq'sremovalfrompower.Thisarticleisparticularlyrelevantbecauseitdiscusses
theAmericanandCIAleadershipbehindthecoup,aswellastheimmediateeffectsofthe
leadership'sdecisionsinIran.Thiswaspublishedinarespectedandauthoritativejournal,
andisthereforeatrustworthysource.
Nalapat,M.D."WahhabismKhomeinismIsTheEnemyOfIslam."
.RadioFreeEurope,13Mar.2009.Web.23Oct.2014.
Nalapat,directorofaninternationalrelationsdepartmentatanIndianUniversityprovides
anindepthlookattheidealsofWahhabismandKhomeinism,thenamegiventothe
IslamicideologythatemergedfromKhomeini'sriseto,andtimespentinpower.Although
thetwogroupsdonotlikeeachotherasoneisaformofSunniIslamwhiletheotheris
Shi'a,inrealitytheybothpracticeverysimilarthings.Thissecondarysourcewashelpfulin
thatithelpedconnectsomeofthedistantlegacyeventsfromtheIranianCoup.Thisis
becauseitdiscussesidealsthatemergedfromoneofthecoupsbiggesteffects.
Norouzi,Arash."Eisenhower'sDiaryConfessionofCIACoupinIran:Oct.8,1953."
Eisenhower'sDiaryConfessionofCIACoupinIran:Oct.8,1953
.TheMossadeghProject,
n.d.Web.13Oct.2014.
ThisisanarticlefromthepresidentoftheMossadeghProject,whichbyitselfwasnota
veryhelpfularticle,butitincludedaonepageexcerptfromEisenhower'sdiarythreeweeks
aftertheIranianCoup.InitheexpresseshisprideinandadmirationofKermitRoosevelt's
leadership.HementionsthatRooseveltdidanincrediblejobdespitebetrayalsatthe
beginningofthecoup,whichcontradictsotherinformationwehavefoundthatshowsthat
theissuesatthebeginningofthecoupweremostlyduetoCIAoversight.Thisshowsthat

Eisenhowerfullysupportedtheleadershipbehindthecoupandbelievedittobeasuccess
thatwouldhaveapositivelegacywhichtheUnitedStateswouldbenefitfrom.
Norouzi,Arash."Eisenhower'sDiaryConfessionofCIACoupinIran:Oct.8,1953."
Eisenhower'sDiaryConfessionofCIACoupinIran:Oct.8,1953
.TheMossadeghProject,
8Oct.2013.Web.13Oct.2014.
InthiswebsitededicatedtoexplainingthetruthaboutwhoMossadeghreallywas,the
authorputsaheavyblameonEisenhower,whoinadiaryentryboastsaboutthegreat
operationandanimpliedagent,(KermitRoosevelt)whowassuccessfulandquickwitted.
TheauthorstatesEisenhowerandmanyotherU.S.officialsweregenerallycocky,andfelt
asiftheyhaddonewithbestjobwithease.Wheninrealitytheoperationwasvery
lackluster,andleftIranwithalotofproblemsforthefuture.Theauthorarguesthelackof
trueleadershipleadtoalegacyofconfusionandconflictinternalandexternal.
OperationAjax
.Perf.KermitRoosevelt.IRTV,1973.
Youtube
.Web.13Oct.2014.
Inthisshortclipfromadocumentaryabouttheeventsofthecoup,KermitRooseveltis
interviewedabouthisrole.HeexplicitlystatesthenumberoneruleforOperationAjaxwas
toensurethattheU.S.wasnotshowninabadlight,thattheU.S.didnotwanttobe
reflectedbadlyuponiftheoperationfailed.Rooseveltsaysthisoperationwasverycheap
anddidn'trequirepersonnel,andwasquiteproudofthatfact.Onthecontrarythough,the
narratorexplainsthesmallnumberofpersonnelwasactuallydetrimental,thattherewasno
strongleadership,thatthecoupledtomoreconflictinthefuture.
Risen,James."SecretsofHistorytheCIAinIran."
NewYorkTimes
(2000):n.pag.
NewYork
TimesontheWeb
.Web.
Thisthorougharticlewascompiledfrommanyprimarysourcesanddigestedwithoutmuch
opinionadded,simplythefacts.Itwasinterestingbecause,althoughitwasnotwrittenat
thetimeofthecoup,ithasthestyleofanewspaperarticle.Itdescribedthelegacyofthe
coupinitsrelationtotheoverallriseofradicalIslaminIran.Ithelpedmeunderstandthe
importantdistinctionbetweenSunniandShiamuslims,andalsothepulloftheAyatollah
in1979.ItmadeclearalsothatthecoupwasjustanothereventinalonghistoryinIranand
theinstabilityanduncertaintyoftheColdWarwhichculminatedinthe1979revolution.
Risen,James."TryingtoPersuadeaReluctantShah."
NewYorkTimesonthe
.TheSecretsof
History,theCIAinIran,2000.Web.13Oct.2014.

ThisarticlereinforcesothersourceswehavefoundwhichshowKermitRoosevelttobean
impulsiveleader,andtheCIAtohaveoverlookedmajorissueswhenplanningthecoup.
ThecoupwasalreadyinmotionbeforeEisenhowersignedoffonit,andtwoweeksintothe
expensivepropagandacampaignandprotestswhichmayhaveincludedCIAagentsposing
ascommunistsandblowingupabuilding,theshahstillhadcoldfeet.Herefusedtosign
theproperpaperswhichwouldinditeMossadeghandittooktwoweeksforRooseveltand
theCIAtoconvincehim.ThisshowstheShah'sweakleadership,andtheCIAslackof
planningintheirleadership.
Roberts,G."Moscow'sColdWaronthePeriphery:SovietPolicyinGreece,Iran,andTurkey,
19438."
JournalofContemporaryHistory
46.1(2011):5881.Web.21Sept.2014.
ThissourceprovidedanewviewpointofIran'sroleintheColdWar,bysummarizingthe
SovietthoughtprocessonIran,amongotherstates.ProfessorRobertsemphasizesthatIran
wasasecondaryobjectivefortheUSSR,incontrasttomoreimportantgoalsinEastern
Europe.Overall,RobertscreatesanimportantperspectiveofIran'srolerelativetothe
largerColdWar.
Ruehsen,MoyaraD."MoyaraRuehsenInterview."Telephoneinterview.12Feb.2015.
AfterreadinganextremelyhelpfularticleabouttheplanningandconductofOperation
AJAXwrittenbyDr.Ruehsen,wefeltcompelledtosetupaninterviewwithher.Weasked
herawidevarietyofquestions,rangingfromtheBritishmotivestoJohnFosterDulles's
leadership.Despitehavingwrittenthearticleovertwentyyearsago,Dr.Ruehsenstill
deliveredinherresponses,andprovidedlotsofhelpfulinformationandanalysisthat
validatedourthesis.Overall,whileitdidn'tintroducetousanynewargumentsor
perspectivesonthecoup,thiswasaveryinsightfulandhelpfulinterview.
Ruehsen,MoyaraD."Operation'Ajax'Revisited:Iran,1953."
MiddleEasternStudies
29.3
(1993):46786.
JSTOR
.Web.11Sept.2014.
ThisarticlepublishedinthejournalMiddleEasternStudieswasveryhelpfulinproviding
contextaboutthecoupandsheddingsomelightaboutwhoexactlywasinvolved,andthe
extenttowhichtheywere.WhileEisenhower,JohnFosterDulles,andAllenDulleswere
allinterestedintheregionduetothethreatofcommunism,thearticledescribeshowthe
UnitedStateshadtobeswayedbytheBritishtobeinvolvedinthecoup.Thearticle
describesthepoorleadershipoftheCIAindecidingtoinitiateOperationAJAX.Kermit
Roosevelt,whowashighlyinvolvedinthecoup,saidthat,atthemeetingwhereJohn
FosterDullesdetailedhisplansforthecoup,many"iftheyhadfeltfreeorhadthecourage

tospeak,wouldhaveopposedtheundertaking."MuchoftheCIA'sactionsduringthecoup
aredetailed.AlmostallCIAactionswerecovertandindirect.ThissuggeststhattheCIA's
primaryinterestwasmakingthebestdecisionforIran,itwassimplytoeliminatethe
existingproblemasefficientlyandquietlyaspossible.Manypeopleintheorganizationdid
notliketheideaofthecoup,butwentalongwithitbecausetheysawnobetteroption.This
isanexampleofweakleadershipbytheCIA,andbyinstallingtheShahintopower,a
negativeandoppressivelegacyinIranwouldblossomfromthelackofleadership.
Sanchez,Raf."BritishDiplomatsTriedtoSuppressDetailsofMI6RoleinIranCoup."
The
Telegraph
.TelegraphMediaGroup,19Aug.2013.Web.05Oct.2014.
Sanchez,anationalnewsreporterforTheTelegraph,aBritishnewspaper,discussesBritish
involvementintheIraniancoup.Althoughthismaynotsoundintegral,heisoneofthefew
sourcesthatspecificallydiscussesMI6'sinvolvementintheIranianCoup.Sanchez
discussestheirpursuitofkeepinginformationabouttheCoupconfidential,andactive
denialoftheirinvolvement,howeveritisworthnotingthatthisarticlewaspublished
severalweeksbeforetheCIAdeclassifiedalldocumentsrelatedtothecoup.Thissource
pertainsmuchmoretoleadership,asitbrieflydiscussesMI6'sroleinassistingtheCIAin
thecoup.
Schlesinger,Arthur,Jr."EffectiveNationalSecurityAdvising:AMostDubiousPrecedent."
PoliticalScienceQuarterly
115.3(2000):34751.
JSTOR
.Web.28Sept.2014.
ThisarticlediscussesPresidentEisenhower'sleadershipstructureduringhistimeinthe
WhiteHouse,andhisuseoftheCIA,incontrastwithhissuccessor,JohnF.Kennedy.
Eisenhower,reluctanttouseconventionalforce,oftenturnedtotheCIAasatoolfor
internationalinterventionthecoupinIranwasanexampleofthis.DuringEisenhower's
presidency,theCIA'scovertoperationsdrewcriticismfrommembersofEisenhower's
BoardofConsultantsonForeignIntelligenceActivities,someofwhicharguedthatthe
CIA'saffairswerecostlyandnotjustifiable.Thearticleisparticularlyrelevanttothecoup
inIranbecauseitcriticizestheAmericanleadershipandtheCIA,sayingthatthe
"freewheeling"CIAhada"destructiveimpactontheoverallconductofforeignaffairs."
ThisdestructiveimpactwasdueinlargeparttoalackofstrongleadershipintheCIA.This
articlewasfoundinarespectedjournal,andthefactualinformationisreliabledespitethe
author'sbias.
Shoamanesh,SamS."Iran'sGeorgeWashington:RememberingandPreservingtheLegacyof
1953."
MITInternationalReview
(2009):n.pag.Web.5Oct.2014.

Thisonlinejournalprovidesasummaryoftheeventsandeffectsofthe1953Iraniancoup.
Shoamanesh,anadviserattheInternationalCriminalCourt,statesthatthelegacyofthe
coupcreatedablowbackforUSIranrelationsanddirectlyimpededthedevelopmentof
Iranianpoliticalandnationalistdevelopment.Additionally,heclaimsthatthecoupcreated
anexcuseusedbymoderndayIranianleaderstoavoidaccountabilityforthemyriad
nationalissues,andinfluencedIranianculturetodevelopa"mistrustfulmind"mindset,
preventingthemfromtrustingoutsideforcesandinhibitingIraniandevelopmentin
internationalaffairs.
Simkin,John."SpartacusEducational."SpartacusEducational.N.p.,Sept.1997.Web.11Sept.
2014.
ThisarticlepointsouthowtheCIA,aftertryingoutmanycoups,nowheldasenseof
secrecyamongthepublic.Theamountofconspiracytheoriesbegantorise,andasthis
articlestates,theassassinationofJFKcouldhavebeenacoverupbythegovernment,and
theybeganthisstyleoflyingoncetheybegancovertoperationsinothercountries.
Smith,andRedfield."IranCoupD'etat1953."
Utexas.edu
.UniversityofTexas,n.d.Web.11
Sept.2014.
Thisbroadarticleheldsomeinterestinginsightsintothe1953coup.Itaddressedpartofthe
legacyofthecoup,thatitplantedantiAmericansentiment.Thiswouldprovetobeavery
importantissueleadingtothe1979IslamicRevolution.Anotherthingthisarticleaddresses
isthefactthatmanyoftheleadersinvolvedontheIraniansidewiththecoupwere,infact,
exnazis.ThisshowsjusthowdeepthefearofcommunismranwithAmericanleaders,that
theywerewillingtoconsortwithexnazisinordertoachievethegreatergood.
Smith,Gaddis."TheShadowofJohnFosterDulles."
ForeignAffairs
52.2(1974):40308.
JSTOR
.Web.27Sept.2014.
G.G.Smith,professorEmeritusofHistoryatYale,providesadescriptionofJohnDullesin
theAmericanpoliticalmachine.SmithcharacterizesJ.Dullesasapoliticallydriven,
hardline,passionateleaderintheAmericangovernmentwhoseviewswereextremely
influentialinAmericanforeignrelations.Thisjournal,however,createsaconnection
betweenJ.Dulles'sleadershipandmanyofthenegativelegaciesoftheEisenhower
administration,includingtheIraniancoup,citingthesomewhatcontradictorystancesof
EisenhowerandJ.Dulles.

Smith."IranCoupD'etat1953."UniversityofTexas,n.d.Web.11Sept.2014.
Thisbroadarticleheldsomeinterestinginsightsintothe1953coup.Itaddressedpartofthe
legacyofthecoup,thatitplantedantiAmericansentiment.Thiswouldprovetobeavery
importantissueleadingtothe1979IslamicRevolution.Anotherthingthisarticleaddresses
isthereasonsfortheUnitedStatestogetinvolvedinIraninthefirstplace.Oneshiftinthe
UnitedStatespolicyoccurredwhenEisenhowercameintoofficeafterTruman.
Eisenhowersleadershipwasalsoreflectedintheleadersheelected,suchastheDulles.
Sonnenberg,Ben."OSSintoCIA."
GrandStreet
2.2(1983):17786.
JSTOR
.JSTOR.Web.21
Sept.2014.
BenSonnenberg'sarticleprovidesaninsightfullookattheearlyrootsoftheCIA.Of
particularinterestisthearticle'sdescriptionofDonovan'sleadershipandsentimentsinthe
inceptionoftheCIA.ThearticleprovidesrichdetailsaboutDonovan'smotivations,
struggles,conflicts,andvalues,andhowhisinfluencereflecteditselfintheCIAsmodus
operandi,andthereforeitslegacyasanorganization.Thisisanauthoritativesecondary
source,publishedinawellknownandrespectedjournal.
Takeyh,Ray."WhatreallyhappenedinIran:theCIA,theousterofMosaddeq,andthe
restorationoftheShahRayTakeyh."ForeignAffairs.JulyAug.2014.GlobalIssuesin
Context.Web.11Sept.2014.
Thissourcegoesintodetailaboutthethoughtprocessesandwhathappenedinthecoup
fromapoorIranianperspective.Thistalksabouthowthemajorityofcommoniranians
wereveryawareofthiscoup,anddidnotwantMossadeqousted.Ittalksabouthow
Mossadeqwasevenusedasasignofpeaceandprosperityinmanycases.Theleadership
ofZahediwasalsoaddressedandhowhisrulewaslacklusterinsubstancetomoveIran
forwardeconomically,politically,andsocially.Theiraniansknewhewasafigurehead,
buthewasstillexpectedtohelpserveIrananditsinterests.
Tehranian,Majid.Rev.ofEmpireandNationhood:TheUnitedStates,GreatBritain,andIranian
Oil,19501954,byMaryA.Heiss.IranianStudies3.3/4(2000):51012.JSTOR.Web.7
Jan.2015.
TehranianbasicallygivesasummaryofHeiss'sbook,comprehensivelydescribingher
argumentsavespecificdetails.Thisreviewwashelpfulinthatitpointsouttherelationship

betweenradicalIslamintheMiddleEastandglobalism,andstatesthatthecrisisinthe
MiddleEastanticipatedthelargerglobalclashbetweenthetwosystems.
"TextofGorbachev'sFarewellAddress."TheNewYorkTimes.TheNewYorkTimes,25Dec.
1991.Web.07Jan.2015.
FollowingtheendoftheColdWar,fromanewlensewecanseehowtheIraniancoup
trulychangedthecourseofourhistorystartingwiththecoldwar.Becauseofourimpulsive
leadershipandourimpulsiveactions,theeventsintheColdwarcouldhavebeen
determinedbytheleadershipofthecoupandtheactions.Becauseofthecoup,which
leadersbelievedtobeasuccessatfirstwasthenseenasafailure,sinceitobviouslycreated
manynewproblemsinthearea.Howeveritwastoolate,thesedestructiveideologieshad
alreadyspilledintotheplanningoftheColdWar.
"WahhabismKhomeinismIsTheEnemyOfIslam."
.N.p.,n.d.
Web.23Oct.2014.
ThisarticlegavemeamorecomplexunderstandingoftheviewsofsomeIranians.
Obviously,allIraniansarenotradicalmuslims,butthisarticleshowedmeanevenmore
nuancedperspectiveonthecultureofIslaminthepostrevolutionworld.Ittalkedabout
howthemilitarizedradicalpanArabWahhabibrandpropagatedbyKhomeiniisvery
differentfromthemoremoderatespiritualbrandofIslam,whichiswhattrueislamis.It
saysthatpartofthe1953coupslegacywas,notonlyaddingtotheeventualresultofthe
revolution,butalsoitembitteredtiesbetweentheUnitedStatesandIransomuchsothat
manyAmericanshaveatwistedviewofIranians.Thissourceshowedthatthelegacyofthe
coupismuchmoreculturallycomplexthanweinitiallythought.
Ward,StevenR.
Immortal:AMilitaryHistoryofIranandItsArmedForces
.WashingtonD.C.:
GeorgetownUP,2009.Print.
Reviewingthisbookwasverybeneficialtomyresearchforthisproject.Thiswasavery
highqualitysource,withmanyotherindepthsourcesbackingitup.Thisbookwas
publishedbyauniversity,soalltheinformationinthisbookwasveryspecificand
authoritative.Whileonlyafewchaptersweredirectlylinkedtoourtopic,eachchapterheld
relevantspecificinformation.Fromthissource,Iwouldsayitsstrongestpointisthe
quantityofinformationleadinguptoeachevent.Thisbookwasveryheavyonexplaining
theleadershipthatwasrequiredforthecoupandeventsleadinguptoit,butalsoexplaining
thelegacyandaftermath.

Weiner,Tim."C.I.A.DestroyedFileson1953IranCoup."
TheNewYorkTimes
.TheNewYork
Times,28May1997.Web.11Sept.2014.
ThiswasaveryinterestingarticlethatexposeshowcorrupttheCIAcanbe.Ithabitually
needsmorespaceinitssafesandburnsallofitsdocuments.Thisisadirectlegacyofthe
OSSandWildBillDonovansidealsaboutacowboyorganizationthatcollects
intelligence,actsfirstandthinkssecond.ThisarticlewasalsointerestingbecauseUS
leadersdidnotofficiallyacknowledgethatAmericawasbehindthecoupuntil2012.It
discussestheinternalworkingsoftheCIAandhowitspreadthecoupasasuccesswhenit
firsthappened,whichcreatedalegacyoftheUnitedStatesoverthrowinggovernmentsall
aroundtheworldoncethisprecedentwasset.
Weiner,Tim."PartTwo"AStrangeKindofGenius""
LegacyofAshes:TheHistoryoftheCIA
.
NewYork:Doubleday,2007.N.pag.Print.
It'snowonderthatthisbook,basedon50,000originaldocumentsandprimaryreporting,
wonthePulitzerPrize.ThisbookisorganizedbyUSpresidentandhowtheCIAinteracted
witheachadministration.ThechaptersaboutEisenhowerwerehelpfulinunderstanding
howtheCIAmanipulatedandwhitewashedinformationinordertopreserveacertain
publicimageandtocarryoutdubiousoperations.Thisbookalsohasaninformative
chapterontheIraniancoupandwhyitwastheCIA'sonlysuccessfulcoup.
Wilber,DonaldNewton."VII.ApparentFailure."
ClandestineServiceHistory:Overthrowof
PremierMossadeqofIran,November1952August1953
.Washington,D.C.?:Central
IntelligenceAgency,ClandestineService,1969.4464.Print.
Inthenewlydeclassifieddocumentsexplainingtheentiresituation,inthechapter:
APPARENTFAILURE,DonaldWilberexplainshowatfirst,duringthenightwhenthe
militarywassupposedtobesetup,bureaucraticfailuresledtolittletononeofthe
necessarypersonnelshowingupoutsidethecompound.Heexplainsthatiswas
pandemoniumandeveryoneinvolvedwasrunningaroundblindlywithoutanyclear
direction.Overall,Donaldshowstheentiresituationwasdraggedoutlongerthanithadto
be,allbecauseofbureaucraticinconsistenciesandthelackofastrongleadertoguidethe
mission.
Wilbert,Caroline."HowStuffWorks"HowtheCIAWorks""HowStuffWorks.N.p.,n.d.Web.
11Sept.2014.
Thiswasapodcastwelistenedto,anditgavegreatinsightonhowtheCIAoperates,and

whytherewereweaknessesintheCIAsleadershipwhenitwasfirstcreated.Itisstated
thattheamountofthingsthathadbeengoingonaroundthecreationoftheCIAdeveloped
astressfulenvironmentfortheworkers,andtheleadersbecamelessefficient,ruleswere
passedlazily,andtheCIAwasamessforawhile.Thiswouldhelpexplainthelackof
functionalityatthetimeoftheIraniancoup,whentheleadershipwasamess,andthe
followingyearswereinthewakeofadestructivebeginning.
Weldin,Zelda."Turkey:LandmarkTrialof1980MilitaryCoupLeadersBegins."
GlobalLegal
Monitor:
.N.p.,n.d.Web.07Jan.2015.
ThisarticleexploresthelegacyoftheIraniancoupinAmericanForeignpolicyandhowit
indirectlyledtothe1980coupinTurkey.Itwasnotastraightcauseandeffect,rathera
precedentsentbytheIraniancoupwhichcreatedacultureinwhichtheTurkishcoupcould
happen.Thisalsogaveusgoodhistoricalcontextinunderstandingwheneventsinthecold
wartookplaceandhowtheactionmovedaroundtheworld.
Wilford,Hugh."IKnewThatTheyLovedMe."
AmericanHistory
48.6(2014):50.
Academic
OneFile
.Web.21Sept.2014.
Oneofthefewsourcesthatactuallydoesso,IKnewThatTheyLovedMeprovidesanin
depthlookatwhyKermitRoosevelt,anactiveArabistandantiimperialist,wouldhelp
causeacoupthatprettymuchdestroyedeverythinghewasworkingfor.WrittenbyHugh
Wilford,aprofessionalhistorian,thesecondarysourceisbothauthoritative,andstillquite
broad.Itsimultaneouslynarratestheeventsofthe1953coupandinterspersesitwitha
discussionofRooseveltsmotivations.
Woods,Jennifer."TheUnitedStatesandtheOverthrowofPrimeMinisterMossadeghin1953."
(2008):n.pag.UMBC,17May2008.Web.21Sept.2014.
Whilenotwrittenbyanacclaimedhistorian,thissourcealsoprovidesauthoritativeinsight
intothelegacyshortlyafterthecoup.Alsopotentiallyhelpfularethesourcesprovidedby
theauthor.Mostarecitationstobooksandscholarlyjournals,allofwhichlooktobevery
usefulsources.
Young,Michael."CentralIntelligenceArabists:HowtheCIATiltedtowardtheArabsinthe
1950sand'60s."
Reason
Apr.2014:56.
StudentEdition
.Web.21Sept.2014.Theviewof
theauthoressentiallyisthat"spiescannotsubstitutefordiplomats."
Thissourceisareviewofabookbyhistorian,HughWilford.Itdoesagoodjobof

condensingoneargumentinthebook,theroleof"Arabists"intheCIA.Itprovides
historicalcontexttotheIraniancoupregardingotherwaystheCIAwasdismissiveofother
MiddleEasternleaderswhodidnotsharetheirhateoftheSovietstheresultssuchas
NasseracceptingtheCzecharmsdeal.
Zahrani,MostafaT."TheCoupThatChangedtheMiddleEast:Mossadeqv.TheCIAin
Retrospect."
WorldPolicyJournal
19.2(2002):9399.
JSTOR
.Web.11Sept.2014.
Inthisarticle,Dr.MostafaT.Zahrani,formerIraniandiplomatattheIranmissiontothe
UnitedNationsandthedirectorgeneraloftheIranianInstituteofPoliticalandInternational
Studies,arguesthatthe1953CoupinIrandirectlyleadtotheriseofradicalIslamandthe
tensecurrentIranianU.S.relations.Whilethearticledidgointosomedetailaboutthelack
ofCIAleadershipbehindthecoup,itwasprimarilyusefulbecauseoftheexplicit
connectionsitmadeaboutthelegacyofthecoup.ZahranistatesthattheUnitedStatesand
theCIA'sinvolvementin1953madeIraniansextremelydistrustfulofAmericans,which
directlyledtothe1979hostagecrisis.Also,Zahranimentionsthat"Washingtonresisted
joiningwithBritaintounseatMossadeq"untilthefinalmonthsbeforethecoup,andthat
UnitedStatesmotivesarestillgenerallyunclear.Thisisextremelyindicativeofaglaring
lackofleadershipbytheCIAandtheotherassociatedAmericanorganizations.
Additionally,theradicalAyatollahRuhollahKhomeiniemergedasa"powerfuldissenting
voice"inthemidstofthechaosofthecoup,whichledtotheriseofradicalIslaminIran
andantiAmericansentiments.Zahraniexplicitlytiesthelegacyoftheemergenceof
radicalIslamtotheconditionscausedbythelackofleadershipinthecoupof1953.Thisis
adirectconnectionbetweenthelackofCIAleadershipinthecoupandalegacyof
extremistIslam,whichisexactlytheevidencewewerelookingfortodefendourthesis.
Zirinsky,Michael.Rev.ofMohammedMossadeqandthe1953CoupinIran,byMark
GasiorowskiandMalcolmByrne.IranianStudies39.39(2006):15054.JSTOR.Web.7
Jan.2015.
ZirinskyhighlightsinhisreviewofByrneandGasiorowski'sbookthemoralhypocrisy
thatwasapparentwithintheUnitedStatesgovernmentwhentheyoverthrewMohammed
Mossadeq,ademocraticallyelectedleaderandsupporterofliberalvalues.Perhapsmost
importantwasthedescriptionofByrneandGasiorowski'sapparentperspectivesofthe
differentpartiesinvolvedinthecoup,whicharedecidedlycritical.

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