119 Appellants' Joint Consolidated Reply Brief

Case: 14-56140, 02/04/2015, ID: 9409771, DktEntry: 119, Page 1 of 79
Case No. 14-56140

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CALIFORNIA COALITION FOR FAMILIES AND CHILDREN,
PBC, a Delaware public benefit corporation, COLBERN C. STUART, III
Plaintiffs-Appellants
v.
SAN DIEGO COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATION, et al.
Defendants-Appellees
Appeal From The United States District Court
For The Southern District of California
Case No. 03-cv-1944 CAB (JLB)
The Honorable Cathy Ann Bencivengo
APPELLANTS JOINT CONSOLIDATED REPLY BRIEF
Colbern C. Stuart III, J.D.

President, California Coalition for
Families and Children, PBC
4891 Pacific Highway Ste. 102
San Diego, CA 92110
Telephone: 858-504-0171
Cole.Stuart@Lexevia.com
Plaintiff-Appellant In Pro Se
Dean Browning Webb, Esq.

Law Offices of Dean Browning Webb
515 E 39th St.
Vancouver, WA 98663-2240
Telephone: 503-629-2176
RICOman1968@aol.com
Counsel for Plaintiff-Appellant
California Coalition for
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.
INTRODUCTION .............................................................................1
A. Organization of Reply ........................................................................2
B. Appellees Other Grounds and Type-Volume of Reply ................3
II.
COUNTER-STATEMENT OF FACTS ............................................5

A. The District Court Dismissed Under Rule 8(a)(2), Not 41(b) ...........5
B. Judicial Appellees Distort and Contradict the FAC (DktEntry 51-1
and Joinders) ......................................................................................................5

1. Appellees Contradict California Coalitions Prospective Relief
Claims
2. Stuart Has Never Attempted to Appear as Counsel for California

Coalition 7
C. Federal (Chubb) Contradicts FAC Allegation of Conspiracy to
Illegally Prosecute Stuart for Criminal Trespass and Harassing Judges
(DktEntry 65) .....................................................................................................8
D. Doyne Contradicts the FAC Alleging He Was a Private Mediator,
Active Participant in the Stuart Assault, and Is Not a Judge (DktEntry 64) .....8
E. Lawyer Defendants Contradict The FAC (DktEntry 64) ..................9
3. Lawyer Defendants Participated In the Planning and Execution of
the Stuart Assault, Were State Actors, and RICO Persons ............................9
F. Bierer Contradicts the FAC Alleging Her Participation in the Stuart
Assault, Kidnapping, Fraud, and Extortion (DktEntry 60)................................9
G. Fritz Contradicts the FAC (DktEntry 45) ........................................10
1. California Coalition, PBC ............................................................10
2. Stuart v. Stuart and People v. Stuart............................................11
3. Stuarts Bar Status .......................................................................11
1
III.
REPLY TO STANDARD OF REVIEW .........................................13

A. Review of Rule 8 is De Novo, Not Abuse of Discretion .................13
B. Fritz Standards of Review are Inaccurate (DktEntry45) .................13
C. Other Grounds are Reviewed De Novo .......................................14
IV.
REPLY TO ANSWERING ARGUMENTS ...................................15

A. The District Courts Dismissal with Prejudice Was Error ..............15
1. A District Court Cannot Dismiss Sua Sponte with Prejudice For
Curable Rule 8 Issues...................................................................................15

2. The District Court Bypassed Rule 41(b) Because Appellants
Successfully Objected to the Evidentiary Lucas Declaration ......................16
3. The District Court Referenced, But Did Not Analyze Under PreTwombly Authority ......................................................................................16
4. McHenry, Nevijel, and Schmitd Are Inapposite ..........................17
5. Rule 41(b) Sanction Would Be Error ..........................................20
B. The Superior Courts Initial Rule 12(b)(6) Motion Asserted
Clarification Issues Not Enabling Dismissal ...................................................28
C. Defendants Did Not Prove Factual Foundations for Judicial or
Eleventh Amendment Immunity ......................................................................28
1. The Commission Has Not Proven Statehood ..............................29
2. The District Court Extended Judicial Immunity under Ashelman
v. Pope Contrary to Controlling Supreme Court Authority.........................35
3. Family Court Judges Cannot Identify an Accused Function that is
Immune .43
D. Like Ashelman, Pierson Was an Illegal Incursion into
Congressional Authority ..................................................................................45
1. United States Courts Exercise Limited Jurisdiction ....................46
2. Pierson is Not On Point ...............................................................47
2
3. Congress Intended to Abrogate Judicial Immunity .....................47

4. Conclusion: If aura there be, it is hardly protected by
exonerating from liability such lawless conduct as took place here ..........57
E. The District Courts Hostility, Threats, Insults, and Expressed Bias
Was a Deprivation of Impartial Tribunal .........................................................57
F. California Coalition Was Entitled to File Motion for Witness
Harassment Restraining Order .........................................................................60
1. General Order 550 Does Not Legalize Threats to Imprison........61
2. Appellants Have Right to Allege Venue .....................................62
3. Californias Litigation Privilege is Inapplicable .........................62
4. California Government Code 6254.21 is Unconstitutional .........62
G. Superior Courts Two Failed Sanctions Motions Entitles California
Coalition to Counter-Sanctions ........................................................................65
H. Incorporation/Preservation of Motion for Preliminary Injunction ..67
V.
MOTION TO ANSWER OTHER GROUNDS BRIEFING AS
CROSS APPEAL .....................................................................................................68

VI.
CONCLUSION ................................................................................69
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Abagnin v. AMVAC Chemical Corp., 545 F.3d 733 (9th Cir. 2008) .......................14
Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970).................................................36
Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, , 432-37 (1993) ................. 40, 50
Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500 (2006) .......................................................52
Arnold v. Bostick, 339 F.2d 879 (9th Cir. 1964)......................................................48
Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union, 542 U. S. 656 (2004).........................70
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) ....................................................................27
Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072 (9th Cir. 1986) ................................. 39 et passim
Babcock v. Tyler, 884 F.2d 497 (9th Cir. 1989) ......................................................40
Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) ....................35
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) ....................................................17
Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449 (9th Cir. 1994).......................................................19
Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478 (1991) ........................................................................49
Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978) ..................................................................43
Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. 236 (1845) ..........................................................................51
Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350 (2011) ........................................................44
Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947).....................................................................43
Dahl v. City of Huntington Beach, 84 F.3d 363 (9th Cir. 1996) .............................29
Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24 (1980) ......................................................................41
Detabali v. St. Lukes Hosp., 482 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2007) ..................................52
Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 2001) ....................................48
Foti v. City of Menlo Park, 146 F.3d 629 (9th Cir. 1998) .......................................70
Gaiardo v. Ethyl Corp., 835 F2d 479 (3rd Cir. 1987) .............................................72
4
Galbraith v. Cnty. of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2002) .........................20
Galvez v. Kuhn, 933 F.2d 773 (9th Cir. 1991) .........................................................52
Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030 (1991) ............................................44
Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635 (1980) ....................................................................38
Gray v. Evercore Restructuring L.L.C., 544 F3d 320 (1st Cir. 2008) .....................38
Greater Los Angeles Council on Deafness, Inc. v. Zolin, 812 F.2d 1103 (9th Cir.
1987) ....................................................................................................................32
Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F. 2d 579 (2nd Cir. 1949) ................................................43
Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971) ...........................................................59
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) .............................................................42
Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 2001) ..................................................51
Hearns v. San Bernardino Police Dep't, 530 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 2008) ................13
Hoffman v. Harris, 511 U.S. 1060 (1994) ...............................................................50
Hurles v. Ryan, 706 F.3d 1021 (9th Cir.2013) ........................................................64
In re W. States Wholesale Natural Gas Antitrust Litig., 715 F.3d 716 (9th Cir.
2013) ....................................................................................................................14
Indus. Bldg. Materials, Inc. v. Interchemical Corp., 278 F. Supp. 938 (C.D. Cal.
1967) ....................................................................................................................30
ITSI T.V. Prods., Inc. v. Agric. Associations, 3 F.3d 1289 (9th Cir. 1993) .............32
Kadamovas v. Stevens, 706 F.3d 843 (7th Cir. 2013)..............................................19
Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118 (1997) .......................................................... 40, 49
Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep't, 839 F.2d 621 (9th Cir. 1988) .............21
Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978) ........................70
Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Unit, 507 U.S. 163 (1993) .....................20
Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 1377 (2014)......52
Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540 (1994) ...........................................................65
Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182 (1943) ...............................................................51
2
Lopez v. Vanderwater, 620 F.2d 1229 (7th Cir. 1980) ............................................41

Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (1986) ....................................................................53
McGowan v. State of Md., 366 U.S. 420 (1961) ......................................................48
McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172 (9th Cir. 1996) ...................................................18
Meyers v. Contra Costa County Dept. of Soc. Servs., 812 F.2d 1154 (9th Cir. 1986)
..............................................................................................................................48
Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889 (9th Cir. 2003) ................................................ 5, 39
Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978)...............60
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) .....................................................................53
Moore v. Brewster, 96 F.3d 1240 (9th Cir. 1996) ...................................................46
Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962 (9th Cir. 2009) .........................................27
Nevijel v. N. Coast Life Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 671 (9th Cir. 1981) ..............................20
Owen v. City of Independence, MO, 445 U.S. 622 (1980) ......................................53
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) ..............................................................42
Pennekamp v. State of Fla., 328 U.S. 331 (1946)....................................................43
Picking v. Pennsylvania R.R., 151 F.2d 240 (3rd Cir. 1945) ..................................53
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) ......................................................7
Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) .......................................................................54
Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522 (1984) .....................................................................47
Randall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. 523 (1868) .................................................................61
Rehberg v. Paulk,, 132 S.Ct. 1497 (2012) ...............................................................40
Rhoden v. United States, 55 F.3d 428 (9th Cir. 1995) .............................................13
Rich v. Taser Int'l, Inc., No. 2:09-CV-02450-ECR (D. Nev. Aug. 2, 2012) ...........72
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974) .................................................................38
Sparkman v. McFarlin, 601 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1979) .............................................43
Sparks v. Duval Cnty. Ranch Co., 588 F.2d 124 (5th Cir.) .....................................41
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002)................................................17
3
Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951) .............................................................55

Tourgeman v. Collins Fin. Servs., Inc., 755 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2014) ..................52
Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914 (1984).....................................................................38
Turner v. Bank of North America, 4 U.S. 8 (1799) .................................................51
United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012) ....................................................70
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) .....................................................56
United States v. National Medical Enters., Inc., 792 F.2d 906 (9th Cir.1986) .......29
United States v. Roach, 745 F.2d 1252 (9th Cir. 1984) ...........................................52
Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975) ...................................................................64
STATUTES
18 U.S.C. 1964 ........................................................................................................8
California Government Code 6254.21 ..................................................... 64, 66, 71
RULES
Fed.R. App.P. 28.1 .............................................................................................. 5, 70
Fed.R. Civ.P. 56(h) ..................................................................................................68
Fed.R. Civ.P. 8 .......................................................................................... 7 et passim
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
United States Constitution, Article I ................................................................ 45, 49
United States Constitution, Article III ........................................................ 24, 45, 47
United States Constitution, Amend. I ............................................... 7, 50, 62, 64, 65
United States Constitution, Amend. IV .....................................................................4
United States Constitution, Amend. V................................................................ 7, 62
United States Constitution, Amend. XI .......................................... 28, 32, 33, 50, 69
United States Constitution, Amend. XIV ......................................... 7, 32, 33, 50, 69
California Constitution, Article I 2(a)............................................................ 67, 71

California Constitution, Article I 26 .............................................................. 67, 71
LAW REVIEW ARTICLES

J. Feinman, R. Cohen, Suing Judges: History and Theory, 31 S.C.L. REV. 201
(1979) .................................................................................................. 41 et passim
Note, Liability of Judicial Officers Under Section 1983, 79 YALE L.J. 322 (1969)
............................................................................................................. 41 et passim
I.
INTRODUCTION
This Joint Consolidated Reply responds to the Answering Briefs of all

Appellees including:
DktEntry 45: Jeffrey Fritz and Basie & Fritz (Fritz. Brf.);
DktEntry 51: Superior Court of San Diego County, Robert J. Trentacosta,
Michael Roddy, Judicial Council, AOC, Tani CantiSakauye, Lorna Alksne,
Christine K. Goldsmith, Jeannie Lowe, William Mcadam, Edlene McKenzie,
Michael S. Groch, Kristine P. Nesthus, Steven Jahr, Lisa Schall and Joel R.
Wohlfeil (Jud. Brf.);
DktEntry 52: Ashworth, Blanchet, Kristensen & Kalemenkarian, Sharon
Blanchet, Law Offices of Lori Clark Viviano, National Family Justice Center
Alliance and Lori Clark Vivano (Alliance Joinder);
DktEntry 53-1: County of San Diego and William D. Gore (County Brf.);
DktEntry 55: American College of Forensic Examiners Institute and Robert
O'Block (ACFEI Brf.);
DktEntry 60: Bierer and Associates and Marilyn Bierer (Bierer Brf.);
DktEntry 62: Brad Batson, Commission on Judicial Performance and Lawrence
J. Simi (Comm. Brf.);
DktEntry 64: Stephen Doyne and Dr. Stephen Doyne, Inc. (Doyne Brf.);
DktEntry 65: Chubb Group of Insurance Companies (Federal Brf.);
DktEntry 67: San Diego County Bar Association Correspondence: San Diego
County Bar Association (Joinder) (SDCBA Brf.);
DktEntry 68: Allen Slattery, Inc., Baldwi n and Baldwin, Carole Baldwin, Laury
Baldwin, Hargraeves & Taylor, PC, William Hargraeves, Meridith Levin, Janis
Kay Stocks and Stocks & Colburn (Lawyer. Brf);
DktEntry 69: Terry Chucas and Susan Griffin (Chucas Brf.);
DktEntry 71: Larry Corrigan, Love and Alvarez Psychology, Inc. and Lori Love
(Love Brf.);
1
DktEntry 75: Off Duty Officers (ODO Brf.)

DktEntry 95: Ashworth, Blanchet, Kristensen & Kalemenkarian, Sharon
Blanchet, National Family Justice Center Alliance (Alliance Brf.);
DktEntry 111: City of San Diego, Jan Goldsmith, and Emily Garson (City Brf.);
DktEntry 114: Robert A. Simon (Simon Brf.)
A. Organization of Reply
To enable a single consolidated joint reply, this brief replies to the Answering
Briefs in the following organization:
Section II replies to statement of facts in answering briefs, setting forth misstatements contrary to the presumed-true FAC allegations, or extraneous to the
record below;
Section III responds to standard of review controversy;
Section IV responds to Appellees arguments directed at the issues presented
in Appellants Joint Opening Brief (AOB; DktEntry 43) following the
organization of the Joint Opening Brief (see AOB CONTENTS, DktEntry 43, pp.
2-51). Where multiple appellees join or argue the same issue, this Reply combines
the multiple appellee arguments within the same sub-section and responds.
Section V responds to the many new issues raised by Appellees which were
not grounds for appeal analyzed in the AOB.
Appellants have filed an
accompanying motion to dismiss the other grounds arguments as untimely crossappeals or, in the alternative, to permit further proceeding according to cross-appeal
procedure provided in Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28. See Motion to
1
All p. page references follow ECF-stamped consecutive pagination (blue

typeset) if available. References to the district court docket (Doc. No.) similarly
follow the district courts ECF-stamped consecutive pagination, if available.
Excerpts of record are referenced by party-assigned pagination.
2
Dismiss Untimely Cross Appeals; Motion to Expand Reply Brief Type-Volume

Limits; Alternative Motion to Proceed As Cross-Appeal (Motion To Dismiss)
filed herewith.
B. Appellees Other Grounds and Type-Volume of Reply
The fourteen Answering Briefs combined total about 50,000 wordsless than
the 196,000 (combined) Appellees would be permitted in fourteen joint briefs under
FRAP 32(a)(7)(B)(i).
To comply with FRAP 32(a)(7)(B)(ii) (A reply brief is acceptable if it
contains no more than half of the type volume specified in 32(a)(7)(B)(i)) and to
permit a single joint reply California Coalition limits type volume of this
consolidated reply to one-half the 50,000 total words in answering briefs, for a total
of 20,000 words, consistent with the type-volume limit proportions of FRAP
32(a)(7)(B)(i)-(iii). See Motion To Dismiss filed herewith.
The length and complexity of answering briefs results from appellees
decision to assert other grounds which were not adjudicated or relied on by the
district court, but which appellees claim support the final judgment. California
Coalition contests this assertion and herby and by accompanying motion moves to
dismiss answering briefs asserting other grounds as untimely cross-appeals.
Alternatively California Coalition hereby and by accompanying motion
moves to treat Appellees answering briefs as cross-appeals under FRAP 28.1(c)(2),
and adopt type-volume and cross-appeal procedures consistent with that Rule,
permitting this reply to serve as part of a combined joint response and reply under
FRAP 28.1(c)(1) and (3). In the event the court permits Appellees cross-appeal,
California Coalition also requests to file a separate response addressing the new
other grounds issues raised in appellees answering briefs, and set a combined
type-volume limit for its principal, reply, and response briefs pursuant to FRAP 28.1.
See Motion to Dismiss filed herewith.
3
II.
COUNTER-STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellees devote substantial effort contesting the presumed-true fact

allegations of the FAC. See Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 893 (9th Cir. 2003)
(en banc). Statements of fact contrary to, or outside of, the FAC are inappropriate
and may be disregarded or stricken. Id. See accompanying Motion to Strike
Improper Excerpts. This counter statement section spotlights inappropriate fact
controversy.
A. The District Court Dismissed Under Rule 8(a)(2), Not 41(b)
Appellees assert inconsistent reasons for the district courts dismissalsome
asserting merely Rule 8(a)(2), others asserting Rule 41(b). See, e.g., Fritz Brf. p. 7;
Jud. Brf. p. 37-40. The July 9 Order dismissing with prejudice references only Rule
8(a)(2). See AOB p. 34.
Doyne and Federal accurately recognize that the district court did not rely on
Rule 41(b), but Rule 8(a)(2) only (This action is presented on appeal after the
district court dismissed Appellants' FAC with prejudice for failure to comply with
FRCP, Rule 8(a)(2).). Doyne Brf. p. 8, 13; Fed. Brf. 12-13. Fritz identifies a
standard of review for only Rules 8 and 12. Lawyer Appellees assert the district
court dismissed pursuant to Rule 8. Law. Brf. p. 14, 15. ABC&K, Blanchet, Viviano,
Family Justice Center assert the same. ABC&K Brf. (DktEntry 95-1) 7, 14.
B. Judicial Appellees Distort and Contradict the FAC (DktEntry 51-1
and Joinders)
Judicial Appellees and joiners attempt to rewrite the FAC to erase California
Coalition to convert the case into a convenient disgruntled litigant claim.2 Jud.
2
The tactic coincides with Appellees improper re-assertion of RookerFeldman and Heck v. Humphries defenses which re-attempt disgruntled litigant
theories which Appellees lost below, and were not cross-appealed. The issues, and
5
Brf. p. 13. Judicial Appellees conspicuously eliminate lead plaintiff California

Coalition and its claims from sections I, II, and III of its Answering Brief,
referencing only Stuart. The tactic omits California Coalition and its members
presence and injury at the April 2010 SDCBA Seminar supporting chilling and
Unfair Competition Claims of Count 1 and 2, ignores California Coalitions
allegation of its business development activity in supporting UCL and Lanham Act
claims, ignores the history of California Coalitions organized petitioning of United
States representatives and institutions in support of Section 1985(1), (2), and (3)
claims and related obstruction of justice RICO claims, and omits allegations of
Superior Courts in-house counsel Kristine Nesthus illegal threats and obstruction
of California Coalition members after this action was filed as alleged in the Nesthus
Obstruction civil right and RICO claims. The gross distortion is an unfaithful
litigation tactic.
Judicial Appellees and Bierer argue this action is a disgruntled litigant
lawsuit to leverage their Rooker-Feldman other grounds cross-appeals. Bierer Brf.
7-9; Jud. Brf. 13. This action does not seek modification of any issue that was or
could be resolved in a divorce court. The FAC alleges federal law claims asserting
RICO enterprise liability for injury to business or property (18 U.S.C. 1964(c))
of California Coalition and Stuart (Racketeering Counts 1-11), declaratory and
injunctive relief for California Coalitions association members (Prospective Relief
Counts 1 and 2), and remedy for injury and deprivation of civil rights to California
Coalition and Stuart based on events occurring primarily after Stuarts dissolution
action was terminated.
facts related to them, are not properly presented in this appeal. See Motion to
Dismiss.
6
1. Appellees Contradict California Coalitions Prospective Relief

Claims
Prospective Relief Counts 1 and 2 seek declarations and injunctions to
establish, vindicate, and enforce fundamental establish rightsdefined in the
complaint as Family Federal Rights. ER 350, 353, 123-24. Several Appellees
mock the concept of Family Federal Rights. E.g., Jud. Brf. p. 13.
Family Federal Rights are unique to persons having familial relationships.
They are clearly-established and well recognized in United States courts, which are
advanced from Family Courts within the State of California.
The rights are
articulated though generations of Supreme Court precedent going back at least as far
as Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), are derived from the first, fourth,
fifth, and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution, and guarantee a
unique genus of liberties of association, free speech, and privacy, and entitled to
heightened protections of due process and equal protection.
California Coalition has spotlighted this well-established bundle of
fundamental rights of association, privacy, expression and conscience to distinguish
the unique context in which traditional constitutional rights are treated by United
States courts, and by this action seeks prospective relief to protect their exercise.
2. Stuart Has Never Attempted to Appear as Counsel for
California Coalition
Appellees reference the district courts initial misunderstanding that Stuart
was attempting to represent California Coalition. Jud. Brf. p. 25. Stuart has only
appeared in pro se, and has never attempted to appear for California Coalition.
California Coalitions counsel Mr. Dean Webb was retained prior to filing the initial
Complaint and at all times represented California Coalition. See caption, Doc. No.
1; 94 (pro hac vice appointment); ER 18, 21, 23-24, 35. The Complaint and all
pleadings prior to Mr. Webbs admission accurately note Mr. Webb was arranging
to appear pro hac vice.
7
C. Federal (Chubb) Contradicts FAC Allegation of Conspiracy to

Illegally Prosecute Stuart for Criminal Trespass and Harassing
Judges (DktEntry 65)
Contradicting the presumed-true allegations of the FAC, Federal argues its
only involvement with this case was to investigate and, following that
investigation, to deny his claim against SDCBA based on events that occurred at
SDCBAs April 15, 2010, seminar. Fed. Brf. p. 8, 11, 17, 20. The FAC alleges
Stuarts telephone conversation with Federals adjuster, who revealed intent to
falsely prosecute Stuart for criminal trespass. ER 179-181. The FAC alleges
conspiracy between Federal, the county bar, and City Attorneys Office to thwart
and retaliate for Stuarts $10 million claim and demand. ER 184-187.
D. Doyne Contradicts the FAC Alleging He Was a Private Mediator,
Active Participant in the Stuart Assault, and Is Not a Judge (DktEntry
64)
Doyne alleges he was appointed, controverting the FAC alleging he was
hired as a private mediator on referral from Wohlfeil. Doyne Brf. 9-10; FAC Count
11 (ER 265). Doyne incorrectly asserts No facts are alleged that Doyne had
anything to do with the decision to arrest Stuart, and the subsequent criminal and
administrative proceedings against Stuart. Doyne Brf. 11. The FAC asserts Doyne
as an active co-conspirator in the Stuart Assault. FAC claims 1.6, 1.10 (ER 155,
163).
Doyne improperly joins Judicial Appellees assertion of judicial immunity in
their Answering Brief, claiming Each and every argument set forth in the
aforementioned Answer should apply equally to Doyne as if asserted separately and
on his behalf. Doyne Brf. (Dkt Entry 64-1) p. 14. Doyne is not a judgehis
function in this case was commercialnot judicialcontracted private mediation
services during which he committed fraud, extortion, abuse of process, and
8
subsequent efforts to thwart and retaliate for Appellants efforts to investigate his
participation in the criminal enterprises, report his activities to state and federal law
enforcement, and obtain his arrest and prosecution. FAC claims 1.6, 1.10 (ER 155,
163). Doyne at no time functioned as a Superior Court Judge, and his attempt to join
immunity argument (each and every argument) in the Judicial Appellees brief is
inappropriate.
E. Lawyer Defendants Contradict The FAC (DktEntry 64)
3. Lawyer Defendants Participated In the Planning and Execution
of the Stuart Assault, Were State Actors, and RICO Persons
Lawyer Appellees incorrectly assert FAC alleges only Lawyer Appellees . .
. were panelists at a San Diego County Bar Association . . . and nothing else. Law.
Brf. p. 11-12, 13.
The FAC alleges lawyer defendants were Stuart Assault
Coordinators participating in the Stuart Assault through pre-seminar planning

including plans to assault Stuart (Count 1, claim 1.12 (ER 168); Count 2), and
participated in planning of the San Diego Family Law Community (the San Diego
Domestic Dispute Industry Criminal Enterprise, or SD-DDICE) (ER 240-243, 297298) schemes to defraud and extort San Diego Domestic Dispute Industry Litigants.
F. Bierer Contradicts the FAC Alleging Her Participation in the Stuart
Assault, Kidnapping, Fraud, and Extortion (DktEntry 60)
Bierer incorrectly asserts the FAC makes only a conclusory allegation that
Bierer was somehow part of the coordination of Stuarts arrest. Bierer Brf. 9, 13.
To the contrary, the FAC alleges Bierer as a Stuart Assault Coordinator accused in
most Counts, and details Bierers coordination with the other Stuart Assault
Coordinators to identify Stuart at the seminar and alerting SDCBA and Sheriffs
deputies of his location. Claim 1.8 (ER 159). The FAC also details her involvement
in all five enterprises committing fraud, extortion, and kidnapping of Stuart. ER
296-302, 317-318).
9
G. Fritz Contradicts the FAC (DktEntry 45)

1. California Coalition, PBC
Fritz controverts FAC allegation of an extended series of conflicts between
California Coalition and the San Diego Family Law Community. Frtz. Brf. p. 9.
Fritz asserts this action has nothing to do with the history between the parties
because California Coalition did not come into existence until the very day before
the original complaint was filed in this case. Id. He supports this controversion
with purported evidence he submitted in support of a pleading-stage motion below
his Supp. ER 1. Frtz. Brf. p. 9. Bierer engages in similar controversy. Bierer Brf.
19-20.
The controversy ignores the allegations of the FAC:
(1) alleging California Coalition membership as mothers, fathers, and
children who have withstood abundant hardship resulting from the current practices
of what is generally described as the Family Law Community (ER 121);
(2) that since 2008 California Coalition has assisted mothers, fathers, and
children in defending and supporting family autonomy in relations with one another
and government interests with related jurisdiction (ER 131) (emphasis added);
(3) that California Coalition is active in protecting, empowering, and
promoting parents and children through education, community support, lobbying,
litigation, and public and private entity awareness (ER 131);
(4) detail describing California Coalitions long history of efforts to redress
those grievances through petition, expression, political action, and commercial
competition3 (ER ER 121-137);
3
In February, 2010, California Coalition members learned of a Seminar to

be hosted by SDCBA for various San Diego Family Law Community which
California Coalition attended to raise awareness . . . promote CALIFORNIA
COALITION alternatives to what it regarded as illegal, harmful business practices
10
(5) FAC exhibits consisting of photographs and documentation dating

California Coalitions operations for years prior to filing this action (FAC Ex. 28).
Fritzs focusses on the distinction between California Coalition for Families
and Children, PBC, a Delaware public benefit corporation, and successor to
California Coalition for Families and Children, Inc., a California corporation formed
in 2008, which was merged with California Coalition, PBC upon its formation in
August, 2013. These transactions are referenced at Doc. Nos. 114, 129 (sealed
declarations of Colbern Stuart in opposition to motions of Eric Ching to withdraw).
The PBC successor entity is the only existing corporate entity.
2. Stuart v. Stuart and People v. Stuart
Fritz controverts the FAC by offering pleadings from Stuarts family court
dissolution and City Attorney prosecution. See Fritz Supp.ER 1-50. The evidence
was not admitted below and is irrelevant to this appeal. See accompanying Motion
to Strike Improper Excerpts.
3. Stuarts Bar Status
Fritz controverts FAC allegations that Stuart was admitted to practice law in
California, Arizona, and Nevada before his disbarment by Defendant Garsons
illegal persecution. Frtz.Brf. p. 11. The district court considered Fritzs credibility
attack below and resolved the attack against Fritz. See ER 54-55 (You can
represent yourself, thats not a problem.).
The FAC concedes Stuarts disbarment as part of the retaliatory prosecution
of Garson and Goldsmith. ER 192-193; AOB p. 19. The FAC accurately alleges
of the Family Law Community, and continue CALIFORNIA COALITIONS

PUBLIC BENEFIT ACTIVITIES (ER 136) (emphasis added) at which
CALIFORNIA COALITION created promotional pamphlets and exhibits to
distribute, and large poster-sized signage to display, and organized volunteers to
participate in the SDCBA ENGAGEMENT. ER 137; Doc. No. 90-1, Exhibits 2628.
11
Stuart was previously a member of the bars of three states and five districts. ER 202206 (FAC Claims 3.2-3.5). All allegations relating to Stuarts bar memberships are
accurate and necessary to support numerous FAC claims. See, e.g, Stuarts Position
Under the United States ER 254-257 (Section 1985(1), (3) claims); ER 202-206)
(Malicious Prosecution Claims 3.2-3.5).
12
III.
REPLY TO STANDARD OF REVIEW
A. Review of Rule 8 is De Novo, Not Abuse of Discretion

Several Appellees inaccurately asserts the standard of review as abuse of
discretion. Fritz Brf. 19-20; Jud. Brf. p. 19. The cited cases analyzed under abuse
of discretion to dismiss as opposed to permit amendment after the district courts
determination of the underlying issue of lawcompliance with Rule 8. Dismissal
as a sanction under Rule 41(b) necessarily requires a preliminary determination of
an issue of lawa failure to comply with these rules. Fed.R. Civ.P. 41(b).
Compliance with Rule 8 is essentially a question of law.
Hearns v. San
Bernardino Police Dep't, 530 F.3d 1124, 1129 (9th Cir. 2008).
B. Fritz Standards of Review are Inaccurate (DktEntry45)
Fritz cites Rhoden v. United States, 55 F.3d 428, 432 (9th Cir. 1995) in support
of argument that a district court has discretion to dismiss a complaint for failure
to comply with Rule 8. Fritz Brf. p. 29. This is a misrepresentation of Rhoden. In
Rhoden this Court reversed a district courts grant of summary judgment against a
Section 1983 plaintiff, remanding the case to the district court. On appeal, the
plaintiff-appellant apparently also asked this Court for leave to amend the complaint
to add a Bivens action. Rhoden at 432. This Court determined that because the
case was being remanded, the request to amend was properly remanded to the district
court. Id. and n. 9. Rhoden advised on remand: We note, however, that [a] pro se
litigant must be given leave to amend his or her complaint unless it is absolutely
clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment Id.
at n.9.
Fritz Appellees cite In re W. States Wholesale Natural Gas Antitrust Litig.,
715 F.3d 716 (9th Cir. 2013) cert. granted sub nom. Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 134
S. Ct. 2899 (2014) for the claim that leave to amend is not automatic. Fritz Brf.
p. 29. W. States is inappositethere plaintiffs were seeking to amend under Rule
13
15 to add a treble damages antitrust claim based on the same facts as the non-treble
damages state law claims of their original complaint. This Court affirmed denial of
leave because the treble damages claim was based on the same facts as the original
claims, and could have been brought at the outset of the litigation. Id. at 738.
Plaintiffs delay in seeking the late-stage amendment adding new claims and theories
caused prejudice to defendants, making amendment inappropriate. Id. at 739.
C. Other Grounds are Reviewed De Novo
Appellees asserting other grounds
provide inaccurate statements of
standard of review. The district courts July dismissed with prejudice for Rule 8
aloneit made no decision regarding the other grounds defendants assert,
meaning there is no decision in the district court on other grounds to review. See
Motion to Dismiss filed herewith.
Appellees sought dismissal on the other
grounds below under Rule 12(b)(6), review of which is de novo. Abagnin v.

AMVAC Chemical Corp., 545 F.3d 733, 737 (9th Cir. 2008).
See, e.g., Doyne Brf. (DktEntry 64-1 at 8), Statement of Issues 2 Whether
other grounds for dismissal raised by Defendant/Appellee Doyne, including the
statute of limitations, abstention, the Rooker-Feldman, quasi-judicial immunity,
immunity for reporting child abuse under Penal Code 11172(a) and failure to state
facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action support dismissal of the First Amended
Complaint.
14
IV.
REPLY TO ANSWERING ARGUMENTS5
A. The District Courts Dismissal with Prejudice Was Error

1. A District Court Cannot Dismiss Sua Sponte with Prejudice For
Curable Rule 8 Issues
Judicial Appellees6 claim the district courts dismissal with prejudice under
Rule 8(a)(2) alone was not sua sponte because the Omnibus referenced Rule 8 as
part of its Notice and analysis under Rule 41(b). Jud. Brf. p. 34. Judicial Appellees
concede the Omnibus notice (Jud. SER (DktEntry: 51-2, p. 160) and briefing sought
dismissal with prejudice under Rule 41(b) and not under Rule 8 alone.
See
Appellees Notice and Introduction to the Memorandum (The FAC should be

dismissed with prejudice on the following grounds: 1) Pursuant to Rule 41(b) for
failure to comply with Rules 9(b), 8(a), 8(e), and for violations of the courts orders
and other rules;). Supp. ER 107 (DktEntry 45-2); DSER 4, 12 (DktEntry 64-2, 6).
Because the district court analyzed under rule 8 alone, Judicial Appellees must
concede either (a) their notice was deficient, or (b) the district court acted sua sponte.
Either concession is sufficient to reverse. See AOB at 34-35.
California Coalition does not contend a lack of opportunity to argue Rule 8
issues as one element of the five-factor Rule 41(b) analysis, but that that the district
court bypassed the noticed grounds for dismissalRule 41(b) for failure to comply
with Rules 9(b), 8(a), 8(e)to analyze under the subsidiary issue of Rule 8
alone. If the Omnibus would have noticed a request to dismiss at the courts
discretion on Rule 8 alone, California Coalition would have vigorously argued
against the irregularity of a discretionary dismissal under Rule 8. Rule 8 is a
This Section IV follows the AOB ARGUMENT section. See

CONTENTS, AOB p. 2.
6
All Appellees joined Judicial Appellees briefing; references to Judicial
Appellees and Jud. Brf. includes all joinders.
15
standard of pleading that must be enabled by other rules such as Rule 12(b)(6), (e),
or 41. AOB p. 35. The courts dismissal on grounds not noticed was improper.
Judicial Appellees attempt to defend the district courts sua sponte dismissal
with a bald assertion that a motion to dismiss for failure to comply with Rule 8 was
also appropriate. Jud. Brf. 40. This is an inaccurate statement of lawthe Rules
contain no motion to dismiss for failure to comply with Rule 8. The remedy for
an allegation lacking sufficient specificity to provide adequate notice is, of course, a
Rule 12(e) motion for a more definite statement. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 597 (2007). If a pleading fails to specify the allegations in a manner that
provides sufficient notice, a defendant can move for a more definite statement under
Rule 12(e) before responding. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 514
(2002).
The discretion Appellees reference arises after a district court has first
accurately determined first the issue of law that is Rule 8; then second properly
weighed the five Thompson factors. Hearns at 1129. Appellees cite no authority
supporting the ridiculous contention that a court has discretion to dismiss for
failure to comply with Rule 8 alone.
2. The District Court Bypassed Rule 41(b) Because Appellants
Successfully Objected to the Evidentiary Lucas Declaration
Neither the San Diego County Bar Association (represented by Mr. Lucas)
nor any Appellee dispute that the district court disregarded the evidentiary Lucas
declaration and Omnibus 41(b) analysis based thereon.
3. The District Court Referenced, But Did Not Analyze Under PreTwombly Authority
Judicial Appellees misconstrue the district courts treatment of McHenry,
Nevijel, and Schmitd. Jud. Brf. (DktEntry 51-1) 34-35. The district court lifted
16
quotes7 from those cases describing complaints there at issueThe Ninth Circuit
has affirmed . . . ER 5:8-14. The district court did not find the FAC committed
those sins. The court instead accused length, acronyms and defined terms, and a
general reference to unmanageable, argumentative, confusing, and frequently
incomprehensible ER 8, 10.
4. McHenry, Nevijel, and Schmitd Are Inapposite
a. McHenry Applied Abrogated Forms Of Action Standard and Abrogated
Circuit Law
Appellees rely heavily on McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172 (9th Cir. 1996).
McHenry applied abrogated pre-1937 Federal Rules form of action standards.
Judge Kleinfeld wrote: The forms of action we have buried, but they still rule us
from their graves. . . . [T]here are good reasons why the forms of action still shape
pleadings, though the rules no longer require pleadings to conform to the ancient
forms. Id. at 1180 (quoting F.W. Maitland, The Forms of Action At Common Law
2 (1909)). Judge Kleinfeld dismissed despite finding the magistrate identified
several cognizable claims. Id. at 1176-77.
This astonishing reach into the graves of the obsolete forms of action to
uphold dismissal with prejudice of a viable complaint has been error since the 1938
Rules Enabling Act, which expressly buried the ancient forms of pleading in favor
of a single formthe civil action. The court may at any time unite the general
rules prescribed by it or cases in equity with those in actions at law so as to secure
one form of civil action and procedure for both. Ch. 651, Pub.L. 73415, 48 Stat.
1064, enacted June 19, 1934. In burying the forms the Act provides: All laws in
conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or effect after such rules have
taken effect. 28 U.S.C.A. 2072 (West). Notwithstanding Judge Kleinfelds
A tome approaching the magnitude of War and Peace, try to fish a gold
coin from a bucket of mud. Jud. Brf. p. 36-37.
17
fondness for Professor Maitland and the ancient forms of action, his foundation for
the holding of McHenry remainsgratefullylong-interred.
McHenry also invoked a comparison with the skeletal Form 9 to the Rules, a
standard which has been sadly abandoned since Twombly. The Forms Appendix to
the civil rules, with its beautifully brief model complaints, is a fossil remnant of the
era of reform that produced the civil rules in 1938 . . . Kadamovas v. Stevens, 706
F.3d 843, 844-45 (7th Cir. 2013). Dissenting in Twombly, Justices Stevens and
Ginsberg berated their majority for abandoning Form 9 by rewrite[ing] the Nation's
civil procedure textbooks and call into doubt the pleading rules of most of its States
. . . . Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 579 (2007) (Stevens, J., Ginsburg,
J., dissenting). [T]he Court has announced a significant new rule that does not even
purport to respond to any congressional command . . . . Id. at 596. McHenrys
invocation of Form 9 even further diminishes its authority in the present case
asserting complex conspiracies against many defendants subject to Twomblys
plausibility standards that compel detail and abandonment of Form 9s simplicity.
McHenry also cited to Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449 (9th Cir. 1994) which
was overruled in Galbraith v. Cnty. of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119, 1121 (9th Cir.
2002) as defying then-controlling Supreme Court authority of Leatherman v.
Tarrant County Narcotics Unit, 507 U.S. 163 (1993). See also CrawfordEl v.
Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 599 (1998) and Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506,
508 (2002). Branch, too, is long dead.
It would be difficult to identify a more morbid assembly of dead law in a live
case than McHenry. Yet McHenry is beloved by some desiring error. California
Coalition respectfully suggests this Court could serve beneficial ends by ending
McHenrys death struggle with the final stake of abrogation.
18
b. Nevijel Has Been Repeatedly Diminished

In Nevijel v. N. Coast Life Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 671 (9th Cir. 1981) plaintiffs
conceded (perhaps unwisely) that their third complaint did not comply with Rule 8,
and sought leave to amend again. On plaintiffs admission, the district court denied
leave and dismissed. Plaintiffs on appeal did not assert compliance with Rule 8, but
only that that the district court abused its discretion in dismissing the case under
Rule 41(b) because less drastic alternatives were available. Id. at 674. This Court
affirmed on the admission and also aggravated circumstances of three other cases
brought by the same plaintiff in different state and federal venues against the same
insurance defendants on the same legal theories that had been dismissed for the same
reasons. Id.
Nevijals facts are not present. California Coalition insists the FACan
initial complaint to most Appelleessatisfies Rule 8, but could be amended to cure
technicalities. AOB 44-45. Appellees do not allege aggravated circumstances
because California Coalition has brought no prior suit.
Nevijel has been repeatedly diminished since 1981.
In Hearns v. San
Bernardino Police Dep't, 530 F.3d 1124, 1129 (9th Cir. 2008) this Court revisited
Nevijels application of the abuse of discretion standard, holding We review a
Rule 41(b) dismissal for abuse of discretion. To do so, we must necessarily consider
the legal question of whether the district court correctly dismissed without prejudice
the original complaint on Rule 8 grounds. A district court by definition abuses its
discretion when it makes an error of law. Id. at 1129 (internal citations omitted).
This Court in Hearns declined to follow Nevijel, reversing the district courts
dismissal under Rule 41(b) as an abuse of discretion because, by misapplying Rule
8, the district court committed an error of law. Id.
Other courts have declined to follow Nevijal. See Fid. Nat. Title Ins. Co. v.
Castle, 2011 WL 6141310 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (RICO complaint against 52 defendants,
12 counts, 44 pages, 565 pages of exhibits, 13 plaintiffs, with claims broken into
19
parts and in which plaintiffs regularly refer to defendants' without specifying

exactly which defendant or defendants is liable for the alleged acts.) [T]he Court
finds no fault with the length and complexity of the complaint, as that is a necessary
consequence of the number and complexity of the schemes alleged.
Id.;
Sathianathan v. Smith Barney, Inc., C 04-2130 SBA, 2004 WL 3607403 (N.D. Cal.
June 6, 2005), n. 15 (declining to follow Nevijel where plaintiff proceeding in pro
se); Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep't, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988)
(declining to follow Nevijel where plaintiff proceeds in pro se).
5. Rule 41(b) Sanction Would Be Error
Judicial Appellees concede the district court did not specifically reference
Rule 41(b), but assert nevertheless the courts analysis under Rule 8 would have
been sufficient under Rule 41(b). Jud. Brf. 37. Judicial Appellees are incorrect.
First, in ruling on California Coalitions Objections and Motion to Strike the
district court agreed to disregard the entire Omnibus Rule 41(b). AOB p. 34, ER 14.
Judicial Appellees are attempting to overcome judicial sanction by an unearned
second bite.
Second, Judicial Appellees themselves do not present an issue under Rule
41(b) in this appeal: The issues presented in this appeal are: (1) whether the district
court abused its discretion in dismissing the action for failure to comply with Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 8. California Coalition does not present an issue under rule
41(b): Can a district court dismiss a complaint with prejudice sua sponte for failure
to comply with Rule 8(a)(2), without analyzing grounds for dismissal under Rule 12
or 41(b)? Apparently all parties agreedismissal under Rule 41(b) is not presented
on appeal.
Yet, even if this Court elects to analyze under Rule 41(b), Judicial Appellees
attempt to salvage grounds for a Rule 41(b) dismissal fails.
20
a. The District Court Construed Rule 8(a)(2) Contrary to the Unambiguous Rule
and Rules 8(d) and (e)
No appellee contests California Coalitions assertion that the district court
construed Rule 8(a)(2) contrary to the face of the rule, and that the extra-textual
construction deprived California Coalition of fundamental rights constituting a
violation of the Rules Enabling Act. AOB at 38-40. This Court may reverse on
these concessions alone.
b. Defendants and The District Court Demonstrate They Understood Most
Claims, Satisfying Rule 8
Other than lifting pithy blurbs other cases, Appellees do not contest California
Coalitions assertion that they and the district court8 understood most claims. AOB
at 40. Appellees demonstrate this dispositive fact again in this Court through their
improper other grounds arguments re-asserting the same vigorous, pointed attacks
from the Omnibus. Their behavior demonstrates the FAC gives notice sufficient to
satisfy Rule 8.
c. Post-Twombly Pleading Under Rule 8(a)(2) Requires Detail
No appellee contradicts that post-Twombly pleading of conspiracy requires
greater factual detail. In their other grounds answers, Appellees re-assert attacks
in the district court accusing insufficient detail to establish plausibility. These
attacks were unpersuasive in the district courtlikely because they were asserted
contrary to the multi-stage process set forth in Iqbal and Moss I. AOB p. 43.
8
The district court also recognized causes of action, stating: It is a complaint

that is in the nature of the sort of thing I might expect to see from an uneducated
person who is in custody who knows nothing about the law and has simply pulled
out books and statutes and recited the causes of action without any recitation to facts
or relationship to the defendants in the case. ER 53 (emphasis added). Stuartan
intellectual property lawyerwas in custody when he drafted the Complaint (FAC
453; Doc. Nos. 114, 129, 155-1 (sealed)), did pull out books from jail libraries
there being nothing else to pulland vigorously asserts the claims do not lack
recitation to facts or relationship to the defendants.
21
d. Acronyms and Defined Terms Do Not Foul Rule 8

Several appellees repeat the district courts unfair criticism of acronyms and
defined terms citing U.S. ex rel. Garst v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 328 F.3d 374 (7th
Cir. 2003), a False Claims Act qui tam action similar to Cafasso.9 In Garst Judge
Easterbrook affirmed dismissal of a complaint which, in 155 pages, failed to plead
even a single False Claims Act fraud claim. Garst at 377. Like Ms. Cafasso, Ms.
Garst alleged facts implying fraud, but did not achieve the high Rule 9(b) hurdle of
False Claims Act fraud.
To overcome the shortfall, both Garst and Cafasso
unsuccessfully re-pled volume of circumstance that could not vault the fraud hurdle,
simultaneously corrupting her short, plain pleading. Id. Here, Appellants plead
to lower thresholds, and successfully allege many cognizable claims.
Judge Easterbrooks displeasure with acronyms arose because they referenced
concepts and documents that were external to the complaint: The acronyms alone
force readers to look elsewhere Id. Here, the FAC acronyms and defined terms
refer only to internal concepts each defined in the complaints. See DktEntry 12
(Motion to Take Judicial Notice) p. 5-6.
Most importantly, Judge Easterbrook conceded that if plaintiff would had pled
even a single false claim (Section 3729) claim (Rule 8), all pleading sins are
forgiven: A concise statement of the claim illustrated by 400 concrete examples of
fraud would be one thing, but 400 variations on the kind of paragraph we have
quoted are quite another. Id. at 378. Here, Appellees cannot deny the FAC pleads
many cognizable claims.
e. Acronyms and Defined Terms Enable Short, Plain Claims
Tagging enables efficient pleading of short, plain claims while eliminating
repetition. For example, the FAC alleges facts describing California Coalitions
interaction with state and federal authorities seeking the investigation, arrest, and
9
See also AOB p. 42, Motion To Take Judicial Notice (DktEntry12) p. 4-6.
22
prosecution of several defendants at FAC 76-97 (ER 124-131), tags the section as
DUE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE and incorporates the allegations into
multiple short, plain claims:
Common Allegations (FAC 107-116; ER 135-137);
Stuart Assault: Claims 1.1-1.13 (FAC 149-309; ER 143-171);
City Attorney Malicious Prosecution/Obstruction of Justice (and anticipatory
pleading of statute of limitations tolling and estoppel, accrual issues): Claims
3.1-3.6 (FAC 349-508; ER 177-207)
Commission Conspiracy/Obstruction of Justice: Claims 5.2, 5.5 (FAC 581625; ER 222-230);
Conspiracy to Interfere With Rights (Section 1985): Claim 9.2 (Section
1985(2) (FAC 774-789; ER 257-261), Claim 9.3 (Section 1985(3)(a)) (FAC
790-793; ER 261-262);
The definition of the domestic dispute industry marketplace (FAC 956; ER
197);
Racketeering Count 3: Kidnapping (FAC 1039-1073; ER 324-329);
Racketeering Claim for Relief 4.2: Extortion (FAC 1079-1082; ER 330331);
Racketeering Claim for Relief 5.1: Obstruction of Justice (FAC 1083-1130;
ER 331-340);
Racketeering Count 6: Violent Crime in Aid of Racketeering (FAC 11311134, ER 341);
All conspiracy and aiding and abetting Racketeering Counts (Racketeering
Counts 7-10) (FAC 1135-1176; ER 341-348);
Prospective Relief Count 1: Section 1514(b) Witness Harassment Restraining
Order (FAC 1192-1197; ER 351-352); and
23
Prospective Relief Count 2: Declaratory Judgment and Restraining Orders

(for Article III standing purposes) (FAC 1198-1203; ER 353-355).
The district court accused tagged passages as pages of generalized
grievances about the family courts. ER 47. The accusation is incorrecteach
tagged section provides necessary factual foundation for several claims.
For
example, the district court may have regarded allegations describing California
Coalitions petitioning and free speech interaction with the Family Law
Community at the Stuart Assault as generalized grievances. The passage is not
merely generalized grievances, but instead an operative concept in several claims.
The section is tagged as ENGAGEMENT (FAC 64-70; ER 121-123)) and
incorporated into Counts 1, 2, 3, and most others.
Similarly, federal supremacy-related reform and petition activity is described
as Family Federal Rights Reform, Exercise, Support and Advocacy and tagged as
FFRRESA (FAC 71-75; ER 123-124) and incorporated into to civil rights,
obstruction of justice and prospective relief counts, enterprise (RICO) allegations,
tolling, estoppel, and accrual (statute of limitations anticipatory pleading), and
anticompetitive practices (RICO and Lanham Act). California Coalitions presence
and purposes in the domestic dispute industrys commercial marketplace and
competition with defendants is tagged as PUBLIC BENEFIT ACTIVITY (FAC
98-106; ER 131-135) and incorporated into Lanham Act and racketeering counts;
and many others.
Its difficult to conceive a more effective method of pleading short, plain
claims. The practice is common. See DktEntry 12 (MTJN) Exs. 1-4.10
10
Appellees understand the usefulness of acronymstheir answering briefs

define over a dozen. See AOC or Administrative Office of the Courts (DktEntry
51-1); (AOB or Appellants Opening Brief (DktEntry 45-1); AJOB is
nowhere defined but presumably means Appellants Joint Opening Brief
24
Several Appellees repeat the district courts error asserting the FAC contains
terms with no discernable meaning (ER 8). The accusation is error because the
FAC defines black hat at 955 (ER 304), and poser advocacy paperwad and
kite bomb at 985 (ER 312).
f. Peonage Predicates Are Properly Pled
Appellees do not contest authority such as Sedima, Turkette, and Philip
Morris holding that indirectly-accusing predicates are properly pled to establish
RICO elements of enterprise, continuity, and defendants participation in the
enterprise. Appellees do not contest that RICO enables a broad dragnet to capture
anyone associated with organized crime, including conductors such as Mr. Jahr and
operators such as Ms. Levin. Appellees do not contest Appellants observations that
the district court alone attacked peonage predicates sua sponte, and that the district
courts plausibility attack must proceed under the multi-stage process established in
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 664 (2009) and Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d
962, 970 (9th Cir. 2009) (Moss I). See AOB p. 42-43.
(DktEntry 62); CCFC OB is nowhere defined but presumably references

California Coalition for Families and Children Openning Brief (DktEntry 64-1);
OB defined as Opening Brief of Appellant (DktEntry 64-1); CJP or
Commission on Judicial Performance (DktEntry 51-1); AOC or
Administrative Office of the Courts (DktEntry51-1); SDCBA or San Diego
County Bar Association (DktEntry 65-1); SER-F or Supplemental Excerpts of
Record-Federal (DktEntry 65-1). ACFEI or American College of Forensic
Examiners International (DktEntry 55); CCFC or California Coalition for
Families and Children (DktEntry 60, 64-1); SER or Supplemental Excerpts of
Record (DktEntry 51-1); DSER or Doyne Supplemental Excerpts of Record
(DktEntry 64-1); MTD or Motion to Dismiss (DktEntry 51-1); RJN is
nowhere defined but presumably references Request for Judicial Notice (DktEntry
64-1)
25
g. Defendants Proved No Prejudice

No appellee salvages the district courts error of defining prejudice to
include the district court, its docket, or parties in other cases. Only prejudice to
the defendants is relevant. Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of City of Los Angeles, 782
F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir. 1986).
Rule 41(b) is a sanctionprimarily geared toward unreasonable failure to
prosecute, causing delay, and thereby prejudice. The Thompson factors expeditious
resolution manage its docket and prejudice to the defendants contemplate
timing issues.
No appellee can complain of delay. California Coalition has expeditiously
prosecuted at every step. Appellants filed this action 100 days after Stuarts release
from county jail and an oppressive 4 year suspended sentence, rapidly served all
defendants within about 60 days of filing (Doc. Nos. 11, 13-15, 24-38, 41-46),
sought no extensions of time to plead (defendants sought extensions), amended and
filed the FAC in twenty short days over the 2013 holiday season after the December
19 oral dismissal (ER 49), complied with the courts aggressive Omnibus briefing
schedule giving California Coalition 30 days to oppose twenty motions (ER 33) , and
filed notice of this appeal (ER 4) five days after entry of final judgment (ER 1). The
FAC is a first pleading to most Appellees. AOB 23, 42. Appellants have never
sought extension or missed a deadline, and no defendant has ever complained of
delay.
Appellees complaints under Rule 41(b) relate to technical pleading issues
which Appellees have concocted as some desire more (others less) detail at this
pleading stage. If anyone, Appellees have delayed this case by their inefficient
insistence to adjudicate merits at the pleading stage.
Nor is the fact that defendants must comb through the complaint
prejudiceotherwise every complex case would be disposable as a sanction.
Prejudice is the serious impairment of a rightsuch as fleeting evidence. The
26
FAC alleges Appellees are already in possession of relevant public records and
evidence. See ER 179, 194, 196, 198, etc. Defendants have not and cannot allege
impairment.
h. Public Policy Favors Adjudication on Merits.
In cases that implicate important public policy concerns, the court should
weigh the public interest in the case and the preference for disposing of cases on
their merits prior to granting dismissal. United States v. National Medical Enters.,
Inc., 792 F.2d 906, 913 (9th Cir.1986); Dahl v. City of Huntington Beach, 84 F.3d
363, 366 (9th Cir. 1996). This case is aimed to remedy conditions critical to millions
of families and children within this Circuitdishonest legal and social services,
criminal enterprises involving statewide Family Court psychologists, prosecutors,
and county judges, and the integrity of the statewide Family Court system itself.
The Thompson balancing test weighs overwhelmingly against a sanction of
dismissal of an initial complaint on curable pleading technicalities.
i. Legitimate Manageability Concerns Are Not Grounds for Dismissal
Appellees cite no authority supporting the district courts assertion of
manageability concerns as warranting dismissal with prejudice.
Because
manageability is not relevant to Rule 8(a)(2), and never sufficient grounds for
dismissal with prejudice, this Court may disregard the heavy reliance on
manageability. Philip Morris, 449 F.Supp. 2d 1, 29 (2006).
j. California Coalition Requested to Amend
Appellees do not deny that the Omnibus was a first attack for all but Superior
Court and Commission Appellee, or that California Coalition made numerous
representations of ability and willingness to amend. They offer no defense of the
district courts refusal to permit amendment, particularization, or deployment of the
Civil RICO Case Statement made available by the Southern District for precisely
this circumstance. Indus. Bldg. Materials, Inc. v. Interchemical Corp., 278 F. Supp.
27
938, 949 (C.D. Cal. 1967) (drastic remedy of sanction only appropriate where no
less drastic measures available).
B. The Superior Courts Initial Rule 12(b)(6) Motion Asserted
Clarification Issues Not Enabling Dismissal
Judicial Appellees defend their initial decision to seek only dismissal with
prejudice under Rule 12(b)(6) (rather than 12(e)) by stating that a motion to dismiss
for failure to comply with Rule 8 was also appropriate. Jud. Brf. p. 40. This misstates Appellants point: Appellants do not claim that a motion to dismiss under rule
12(b)(6) based on an alleged failure of Rule 8 was unavailable, but instead assert
that Judicial Appellees made a tactical error of grossly overreaching for a Rule
12(b)(6) insisting on only dismissal with prejudice against an initial complaint for
curable pleading technicalities more properly addressed under Rule 12(e)or by the
voluntary process proposed in California Coalitions Meet and Confer. See Doc.
No. 21-1 Ex. A.
The district court salvaged Judicial Appellees overreach by granting leave to
amend, yet the proper disposition of the overreach was to deny the motion to dismiss.
This disposition was error, which all defendants compounded in the Omnibuss
assertion of failure to comply with the improvident order.
Absent the initial
improvident dismissal with leave, there is insufficient basis for the Omnibus request
for sanction, and this case proceeds toward adjudication in the district court.
The initial dismissal was an interlocutory order in error, precipitating the July
dismissal with prejudice. This Court may reverse on either error alone.
C. Defendants Did Not Prove Factual Foundations for Judicial or
Eleventh Amendment Immunity
Commission and Judicial Appellees concede that judicial and Eleventh
Amendment immunities are (1) affirmative defenses (2) turning on facts, (3) for
28
which they bear the burden of proof, (4) on the face of the complaint at this stage,
(5) with certitude.11
1. The Commission Has Not Proven Statehood
Commission Appellees concede the critical issues necessary to reversethe
issue of state-funding was unsolved by the district court. Comm. Brf. (DktEntry:
62) p. 18. They thus concede that Eleventh Amendment Immunity requires receipt
of facts the Commission did not (and could not at the pleading stage) introduce in
the district court. See Greater Los Angeles Council on Deafness, Inc. v. Zolin, 812
F.2d 1103, 1110 (9th Cir. 1987) (We must look behind the pleadings . . .); Fed.R.
Civ.P 8(c)(1); ITSI T.V. Prods., Inc. v. Agric. Associations, 3 F.3d 1289, 1291 (9th
Cir. 1993). The Commission concedes this Court has no precedent precluding the
factual issue of the Commissions relationship with the State of California. Comm.
Brf. p. 19.
Commission incorrectly claims Appellants assert Eleventh Amendment
immunity may not be raised in a motion to dismiss. Jud. Brf. 14. The AOB argues
the oppositethat immunity may be adjudicated on a motion to dismiss in unusual
circumstanceswhere the face of the Complaint admits the defense . . . with
certitude. AOB 47. Commission Appellees did not assert that the original
11
Commission Appellees must prove these facts: (1) A money judgment

against the commission would expend itself on the public treasury. Dugan v.
Rank, 372 U.S. 609 (1963); Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465
U.S. 89 (1984); Shaw v. State of California Department of Alcoholic Beverage
Control, 788 F.2d 600, 603 (9th Cir.1986); (2) The specific acts accused in the
Complaint were the exercise of state-level authority. Greater Los Angeles Council
on Deafness, Inc. v. Zolin, 812 F.2d 1103, 1110 (9th Cir. 1987); and (3) The State
of California would be bound by any injunctions issued by the district court below.
Pennhurst, supra.; Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency,
440 U. S. 391, 400-401 (1979); Hess v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corporation,
513 U.S. 30 (1994). It is insufficient that the Commission may exercise a slice of
state power. Id.
29
Complaint admitted the Commission as a State with certitude, and must concede
it asserted the opposite factthe Commission is an entity beneath state level.
AOB at 48; Compl. 18, 172. These factual allegations are presumed true. Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 664 (2009).
a. Commission Concedes Ricotta is Insufficient
Commission Appellees also concede the single case relied on by the district
courtRicotta v. California, 4 F. Supp. 2d 961, 976 (S.D. Cal. 1998)did not
engage in an extensive Eleventh Amendment assessment. Comm. Brf. p. 20. That
is a vast understatementRicotta did not engage in any Eleventh Amendment
assessment because Mr. Ricotta, appearing in pro se, unwisely conceded he
erroneously sued the state when naming the Commission. Ricotta at 976.12
These concessions alone are sufficient to reverse the district courts dismissal
based solely on Ricotta. See AOB at 47-48.
b. Commission Appellees Improperly Assert New Facts Contrary to the FAC
At this pleading stage, the only source of facts under the Eleventh Amendment
analysis are those pled in the initial Complaint (Doc. No. 1). The Commission
cannot contest that the presumed-true allegations describe Commission Defendants
12
Commission Appellees cite this Courts 1998 unpublished decision in

Ricotta in violation of Circuit Rule 36-3(c). Commission Brf. p. 20, n.3. The illegal
citation is aggravated by the fact that the Commission implies the Supreme Courts
denial of certiorari on Mr. Ricottas unsuccessful petition (528 U.S. 864 (1999))
supported the district court decision. Appellants respectfully request leave of Circuit
Rule 36-3(c) to submit rebuttal (not authority) refuting the Commissions citation to
the unpublished decision. The Supreme Courts denial of Mr. Ricottas petition on
the unusual outcome of this Courts (unpublished) opinion cannot be construed to
affirm a finding that the Commission was entitled to Eleventh Amendment
immunity. The district courts (published) adjudication of Eleventh Amendment
immunity issues (4 F. Supp. 2d 961 (S.D. Cal. 1998)) was not adjudicated in the
unpublished decision. In an extremely unusual outcome, only a Rooker-Feldman
issue that was not presented in the district court or on appeal was dispositive in this
Courts (unpublished) opinion, and thus on petition.
30
as beneath State level entities. Compl. 18 (an entity), caption (municipal

entity). Both SIMI and BATTSON are sued in both individual and official
capacities under only the Commissionneither are identified as employees or
agents of the State of California. Compl. 19, 20. On the only relevant record, the
Commissions motion should have failed.
c. Commission Offers California Law as FactYet Undermines Commissions
Sovereignty Claim
Commission Appellees cite California law as a substitute for necessary facts
evidencing their relationship with the State of California. Statutes establish legal
authoritythey are not evidence necessary under Pennhurst (State treasury in
jeopardy, State has complete control, and entire State will be boundsee n. 11,
supra.). The recitations contained in the Constitution and Government Code statues
are in this context inadmissible hearsay offered for the truth of the matters asserted.
They were not submitted by other means such as judicial notice, and are thus
strikable as matter outside of the record. See accompanying Motion to Strike
Improper Excerpts. In the district court Commission Appellees did not, and could
not at the pleading stage, introduce this controversial evidence.
The statutes are further inadmissible as they controvert the Commissions own
assertion of unity with the State of California. The Commissions citations indicate
it exercises subordinate, specific jurisdiction over county officials subordinate to the
Supreme Court (Comm. Brf. p. 16); its finances are separate from the budget of any
other state agency or court (Id. p. 18); it has independent rule-making authority
(Id.); is operated by citizen volunteer and county judge members; maintains
independent structure, and powers over active and retired (non-State-employee)
county officials to investigate; and has oversight and discipline of subordinate
(county) judges (Id.).
The Government Code sections describe independent
Commission powers to investigate retired (non-State-employee) county officials;

management of county judge disability retirement applications; its governance by
31
masters (rather than state legislators); its independent ability to hire, manage,
reimburse, and pay medical and other experts and reporters and independent
special counsel from funds available to it (Id. at 19) (emphasis added).
These sections also do not evidence the state Constitutions establishment
of the Commission. They are rules like any other state law governing behavior
how the Commissions members are appointed, length of terms served, and how
judges are disciplined. The California Constitution references many entities
which are well-recognized as beneath State-level, including counties (Art. 11 1),
cities (Art. 11, 6), county courts (Art. 6, 1), schools and school districts (Art. 9
5, 6, 14), the Regents of the State of California (Art. 9, 9), and the public
corporation that is the State Bar of California (Art. 6 9).
If California law becomes admissible as evidence at some stage, it will
undermine Commissions claim to unity with the State.
d. The State of California Has Waived or Consented to Federal Jurisdiction in
Due Process and Equal Protection Claims
The Fourteenth Amendment provides: No State shall make or enforce any
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws. U.S. Const., Amend. XIV, sec. 1. The Amendment, passed by
representatives of the States in the Senate in 1868, nearly 84 years after the 1795
ratification of the Eleventh Amendment, constitutes unequivocal consent by the
States, through their representatives in the Senate, to be bound by this federal law.
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment grants Congress the power to enforce
the Section 1 guarantees against States by enacting appropriate legislation. Bd. of
Trustees of Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 365 (2001). The 1871 Civil
Rights Act, also enacted by representatives of States in the Senate, was a specific
deployment of Congress power under section 5, empowering citizens to bring suit
32
under the Fourteenth Amendment, and further articulating the States consent to be
sued in federal court for its violations of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Therefore something is uniquely amiss in a society where the government,
the authoritative oracle of community values, involves itself in racial
discrimination. Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 190-91 (1970)
(Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Justice Brennans
observation was formally enacted into legislation in 1986. 42 U.S.C. 2000d-7

provides:
(1) A State shall not be immune under the Eleventh Amendment of the
Constitution of the United States from suit in Federal court for a violation of
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 [29 U.S.C. 794], title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972 [20 U.S.C. 1681 et seq.], the Age
Discrimination Act of 1975 [42 U.S.C. 6101 et seq.], title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 [42 U.S.C. 2000d et seq.], or the provisions of any other
Federal statute prohibiting discrimination by recipients of Federal financial
assistance.
(emphasis added).
The Fourteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights Act are both a Federal
statute prohibiting discrimination.
The State of California receives generous
Federal financial assistance through numerous sources including interstate

highway, education, agriculture, housing and urban development, energy, justice,
labor, social insurance and welfare, and medical insurance assistance, incentive
matching payments to States for child support enforcement and family programs
under Titles I, IV-A and D, X, XI, XIV and XVI of the Social Security Act and the
Act of July 5, 1960 (24 U.S.C. Chapter 9).
The FAC alleges discrimination through numerous equal protection and due
process claims. See EQUAL PROTECTION at ER 145 (FAC 163); EQUAL
33
PROTECTION CLASSES at ER 230-32 (FAC 629-635); Section 1983, 1985, and

1986 Counts at ER 257-264 (FAC 774-807); SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
at ER 146 (FAC 165); and Prospective Relief Count 2 at ER 353-55.
As the State of California has received abundant Federal financial
assistance, it has subjected itself to the jurisdiction of United States courts for
claims the State has discriminated in the administration of that assistance. Even if
mere arms of the state, Commission Appellees must defend this lawsuit in a United
States courthouse. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 671 (1974)
e. California Constitutional Immunity Does Not Protect the Commission;
Employees are Not Immune For Ultra Vires Acts
California Coalition concedes that Mssrs. Simi and Battson enjoy an
immunity against state law claims for acts taken in the course of their official duties.
California Coalition accuses only unconstitutional conduct, which can never be
pursuant to official duty. FAC Count 5, Racketeering Counts 1-11 (ER 217-231,
316-349); Cal. Const. art. I 26; Katzberg v. Regents of Univ. of California, 29 Cal.
4th 300 (2002); Pennhurst at 909 (1984). Duly-enacted legislation bestowing
immunity on select officials performing the critical public duty of disciplining
judicial officials does and should enjoy a presumption of the strongest immunity.
Un-enacted policy proclamation by judicial officials who uniquely benefit from
their self-legislation does and should suffer the opposite presumptionof reckless
illegitimacy.
f. The Commissions Other Grounds Are No Help
The December 23 dismissal (ER 48) cited only Ricotta and California
Constitution Art. IV, 18(h) without reference to other law the Commission asserts
here. Appellants distinguished Commissions other cases below demonstrating they
too failed to adjudicate the critical issue, and the district court apparently agreed.
Doc. No. 57, pp. 15-17. Commissions new law should be disregarded, and its
34
dismissal be reversed and remanded instructing that Commission Appellees must

introduce evidence in the district court.
2. The District Court Extended Judicial Immunity under
Ashelman v. Pope Contrary to Controlling Supreme Court
Authority
a. Judicial Appellees Concede They Failed to Proffer, and the District Court
Failed to Conduct, an Historical Analysis of Function at Common Law
Judicial Appellees concede they and the district court failed to identify a
firmly-rooted tradition of an immunity at 1871 common law for any of the
functions accused in the FAC. Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 920 (1984); Jensen
v. Lane Cnty., 222 F.3d 570, 577 (9th Cir. 2000). This concession is sufficient to
reverse. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 249-50 (1974).
b. Appellees Attempt to Shift Their Burden
Appellees defend instead by arguing as if plaintiffs have a burden of pleading
non-immunity: [T]he FAC fails to identify any acts outside the scope of judicial
immunity. Jud. Brf. p. 47. The burden works in the opposite direction: The
presumption is that qualified rather than absolute immunity is sufficient to protect
government officials in the exercise of their duties. . . . The burden is on the official
claiming absolute immunity to identify the common-law counterpart to the function
that the official asserts is shielded by absolute immunity. Miller v. Gammie, 335
F.3d 889, 897 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486487). As
with any affirmative defense raised at the pleading stage, Judicial Appellees have
the burden of establishing the defense on the face of the complaint with certitude.
See Fed.R. Civ.P 8(c)(1); Gray v. Evercore Restructuring L.L.C., 544 F3d 320, 324
(1st Cir. 2008). A plaintiff need not plead to anticipate immunity defenses. Gomez
v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980). A plaintiff need not plead with specificity.
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002).
35
The FAC alleges many acts of each defendant judge in many claims,13 yet
Judicial Appellees fail to identify any claim accusing a judicial act within the
jurisdiction of any court. Appellees fail to carry their formidable burden.
c. Ashelman Stands In Error Under Controlling Supreme Court Authority
Judicial Appellees do not dispute AOB analysis demonstrating that Ashelman
v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072 (9th Cir. 1986) illegally expanded Sparkman, but defend
Ashelman as binding precedent in this Circuit. Jud. Brf. p. 43. The defense fails.
In Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) this Court
addressed a strikingly similar question:
A goal of our circuit's decisions, including panel and en banc decisions, must
be to preserve the consistency of circuit law. . . . That objective, however,
must not be pursued at the expense of creating an inconsistency between our
circuit decisions and the reasoning of state or federal authority embodied in a
decision of a court of last resort.
Id. at 900. Miller considered whether the district court or circuit panel was bound
by circuit precedentBabcock v. Tyler, 884 F.2d 497 (9th Cir. 1989)that was, like
Ashelman, fundamentally inconsistent with the reasoning of Supreme Court
authority of Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 127-29 (1997), and Antoine v. Byers
& Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429 (1993). Miller at 893. Because Babcock was
fundamentally inconsistent with superior and subsequent authority, Miller held
that neither the district court nor circuit panel was bound by circuit precedent. Id.
13
See, e.g., FAC Count 1 (Stuart Assault), Count 2 (inducement claims),

Count 3 (non-immune allegations at ER 177, Claim 3.4, 3.5, 3.6), Count 4
(Nesthus Obstruction of Justice), Count 6 (supervisory claims), Count 9 (nonimmune allegations at ER 206, 254, 257, 261-264), Count 10, Count 11
(Wohlfeil/Schall in Doyne Terrorism), and all racketeering counts.
36
An even stronger case for release from Ashelmans several errors is present.
Ashelmans broad grant of immunity is starkly inconsistent with Rehberg v. Paulk,,
132 S.Ct. 1497 (2012) and decades of prior controlling Supreme Court authority
repeatedly admonishing that the freewheeling policy analysis contained in
Ashelman is error. See analysis at AOB p. 51-55.
Appellees also persist in resurrecting Ashelmans adoption of McAlesters
encounter with a judge, precise act and act itself debris.14 Jud. Brf. p. 42, 45,
48. The concepts did not survive Sparkman. [A]s the language in Stump indicates,
the relevant inquiry is the nature and function of the act, not the act itself.
Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 13 (1991). See also al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949,
960 (9th Cir. 2009) rev'd on other grounds, 131 S. Ct. 2074 (2011). Immunity turns
on function, not act or actor. AOB p. 52.
Ashelmans ultimate act is also fundamentally inconsistent with superior
and subsequent authority.
The term originated in Ashelman at 1075 despite
fundamental inconsistency with Pierson, Sparkman, and Rehberg. It is also

inconsistent with this Courts decisions in Rankin, Beard, Star v. Baca, and other
authorities including Wallace v. Powell and cases cited on therein (Doc. No. 163).
See AOB 56-61.
Ultimate act is also inconsistent with Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24 (1980)
which held that private parties conspiring with a judge do not enjoy a derivative
immunity from the judge even if the judge is immune. Id. at 29. Sparks does not
support immunity for inchoate conspiracy setting in motion deprivation because
the Supreme Court was not presented with the question. Plaintiffs appear not to have
targeted Judge Carillo, who was by then in prison, likely judgment-proof, and thus
useless in responding to a money judgment. See Sparks v. Duval Cnty. Ranch Co.,
14
Harper v. Merckle, 638 F.2d 848, 857 (5th Cir. 1981).

37
588 F.2d 124, 125 (5th Cir.) on reh'g, 604 F.2d 976 (5th Cir. 1979) aff'd sub nom.
Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24 (1980). If Judge Carillo were still sittingbacked by
an indemnity agreementplaintiffs surely would have pled their case differently. If
so, under Pierson and Sparkman Carillos immunity for the inchoate conspiracy
must be analyzed separately. See AOB 56-61. See also Sparkman v. McFarlin, 601
F.2d at 264-68 (Sprecher, J., concurring); Lopez v. Vanderwater, 620 F.2d 1229,
1237 (7th Cir. 1980).
The Fifth Circuit en banc decision in Sparks v. Duval Cnty. Ranch Co., 604
F.2d 976 (5th Cir. 1979) recognized that the expansion of Justice Whites test
would be error: The rule is a harsh one, laden with potential for unredressed wrong.
As such, its scope should not be extended beyond that necessary to preserve the
judge's independence of mind and judgment . . . Id. at 980.
Neither the district court nor a panel of this Court is bound by Ashelmans
several fundamentally inconsistent errors.
d. Bradley Does Not Support Ultimate Act
In Bradley, Justice Field described his fear that a vindictive plaintiff could
easily defeat immunity merely by ascribing an allegation of malicious intent to a
judicial act, thereby forcing a judge to stand trial. Few persons sufficiently irritated
to institute an action against a judge for his judicial acts would hesitate to ascribe
any character to the acts which would be essential to the maintenance of the action.
Bradley at 348.15
15
Ironically Justice Fields rationale reveals profound distrust of the

institution he comprises. Conceiving a more disturbing no confidence vote is
impossible. Fields contemporaries were not so jaded. I cannot bring myself to
believe that officers in command would hesitate to give orders which a sense of duty
required . . . from any idle apprehension of being harassed by vexatious actions."
Dawkins v. Lord Paulet, L.R. 5 Q.B. 94, 108 (1869) (Cockburn, C.J., dissenting);
Pulliam at 529-544; See also Pierson at 565 (Douglas, J, dissenting); Sparkman at
38
Modernly a judges distrust of her institutional colleagues is mitigated by

procedural barriers provided in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) and
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) which protect against a mere ascription
of culpable intent. These are bolstered by Twomblys plausibility test, and Rule 56
thereafter.
16
Sparkman v. McFarlin, 601 F.2d 261, 267 (7th Cir. 1979). Judges are
certainly not so fragile today. See Pennekamp v. State of Fla., 328 U.S. 331, 349
(1946) (For this to follow, there must be a judge of less than ordinary fortitude
without friends or support or a powerful and vindictive newspaper bent upon a rule
or ruin policy, and a public unconcerned with or uninterested in the truth or the
protection of their judicial institutions.); Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 376
(1947).
No court has ever denied that absolute immunity inflicts a monstrous
injustice on wronged litigants, and taxes the credibility and integrity of judicial
institutions. Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F. 2d 579, 581 (2nd Cir. 1949); Butz v.
Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 521 (1978). It has been justified as a necessary evil to
protect the ardor of judges and prosecutors. Id. While one might reasonably have
concluded that our efforts to assure justice is done17 would have been betterdirected toward inculcating ardor through discipline and integrity than by
expanding immunity, the issue is moot. Today the monstrosity of immunity is no
longer the least restrictive means of promoting the substantial state interest of
judicial efficiency. Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030, 1074 (1991).
368 (Stewart, J., Powell, J., dissenting).
16
See Note, Liability of Judicial Officers Under Section 1983, 79 YALE L.J.
322, 329-334 (1969) (hereinafter Yale Note) (When courts first formulated the
doctrine of judicial immunity, a plaintiff who pleaded properly could force a judicial
officer to go to trial. This, of course, is no longer true in the federal courts.); J.
Feinman, R. Cohen, Suing Judges: History and Theory, 31 S. C. L. Rev. 201, 268269 (1979) (hereinafter Suing Judges)
17
Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1365 (2011)
39
Resolving Justice Fields ascribe concerns is accomplished at the pleading stage,

the heavy tax of absolute immunity no longer necessary, and thus the blunt-force
monstrosity of absolute immunity should be rejected.
e. The District Court Illegally Expanded Ashelman Even Further
Appellees do not contest that the district court expanded Ashelman in
utterances at hearings, but seek to blind this Court to the district judges commands
and threats. Jud. Brf. p. 46, n. 12. Ignoring the district judges utterances at hearing
omits events necessary to adjudicate this appeal.
First, the district judge plainly intended her commands at hearing to have the
force of orders. At hearing on December 19, 2013, the court commanded Stuart to
file an amended complaint within 20 days from the hearingnot the written order.
See Doc. No. 86 (Minute Order after hearing). Stuart had to request the written
order. ER 66 (All right. Ill give you a written order, but your amended complaint
is still due 20 days from today.). At hearing on February 26 Stuart requested a
written order setting forth the courts decision denying his motion for sanctions. ER
37. The court refused, referencing its disposition of the motion at hearing on
December 19 as dispositive, and entering a minute order on February 26 making the
order effective nunc pro tunc to the oral disposition. ER 38, 16.18 Analyzing the
district courts findings, commands, and threats at hearings is critical context to
understand the evolution of the FAC at issue.
It is true that the district judges written orders were more defensible, yet
comparison of the hearing transcripts with the written orders demonstrates the
district judge herself expected California Coalition to obey her commands at hearing
despite the more reserved written order. For example, the December 19 transcript
18
Pro se plaintiff requested the court to address 39 Motion for Sanctions

against defendants filed by plaintiff Colbern Stuart. The motion is denied NUNC
PRO TUNC to 12/19/2013.
40
reflects a command that that the FAC better damn well not be more than 30 pages
long, sir. AOB at 22; ER 61. The December 23 written order withdrew limitation
on length (ER 46:27-28), yet the July 9 order dismissed citing a failure to comply
with the oral command regarding length: plaintiffs amended complaint . . . is even
longer than the original . . . . ER 10. At hearing on December 19, 2013, the district
judge commanded to include plausible facts and non-frivolous argument in
anticipation of affirmative defenses (AOB 25-27; ER 46, 57, 62).
California
Coalition complied (AOB 23-27), yet the July dismissal with prejudice (ER 6-12)
criticized argument and plausible facts detail pled under command: plaintiffs
amended complaint remains unmanageable, argumentative, confusing, and
frequently incomprehensible. ER 10.
Most importantly, even though the courts several threats to impose sanctions
at both hearings did not find their way into the written orders (compare ER 38, 5960 with ER 12, 42, 49), the district judge took her commands at hearing very
seriouslythe July dismissal reveals she was contemplating not only sanctions, but
a sua sponte citation for contempt against Appellants filing the FAC.
Few
practitioners are so hearty as to ignore a district judges vitriolic threats of sanctions

and contempt posture at hearing simply because the threats did not find their way
into a written order.
Appellants respectfully request this Court consider all utterances of the district
judge as both context and substance of rulings subject to review.
f. Absolute Immunity Does Not Protect All Rulings and Decisions
Judicial Appellees offer this Court a demonstrably inaccurate scope of
immunity extending to all rulings and decisions of a judge in official capacity.
Jud. Brf. p. 47. Appellees suggested scope was not adopted in the district courts
41
December 23 order (ER 48), is inconsistent with Sparkman (AOB 52),19 and refuted
by multiple authorities denying immunity for rulings or decisions of a judge in
official capacity which are not judicial acts or are in excess of jurisdiction. AOB
p. 52-53.
g. County Judges Are Subject to Prospective Relief
Judicial Appellees assert this Courts decision in Moore v. Brewster, 96 F.3d
1240 (9th Cir. 1996), extends immunity in their favor against actions for
declaratory, injunctive and other equitable relief. Jud. Brf. p. 41. Correctly stated,
Moore stands for the exact opposite proposition:
The judicial or quasi-judicial immunity available to federal officers is not
limited to immunity from damages, but extends to actions for declaratory,
injunctive and other equitable relief. Cf. Pulliam v. Allen (state officials enjoy
judicial or quasi-judicial immunity from damages only).
Moore at 1243-44 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). The longstanding
rule for state and local officials under Pulliam is that judicial immunity is not a bar
to prospective injunctive relief. Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522 at 541-42 (1984).
h. Conclusion: Ashelman and the District Court Should be Reversed
I answer it is better to invade the judicial power of the States than permit it to
invade, strike down, and destroy the civil rights of citizens. A judicial power
perverted to such uses should be speedily invaded.
Remarks of Representative Lawrence (House sponsor of the Civil Rights Act of
1866), Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1837 (1866).
Ashelman has stood in error for 28 years. In error it has deprived scores of
westerners remedy for intentional criminal wrongdoing. In the backwaters of county
Family Courts Ashelmans expansion over Congress has expanded the $50
19
Justice Whites two factor test in Sparkman wisely eliminated the

ambiguous term official capacity from immunity discourse.
42
billion divorce industry over of a vulnerable core of our communitiesfamilies in

crisiswhose dishonest representatives have through schemes described in the FAC
defrauded, extorted, and blockaded access to federal remedies and institutions the
primary purpose of which is to prevent exactly such expansion. Ashelman and the
despotic exploitation it fosters must end today.
Appellants respectfully request this Court reverse the district courts
interlocutory orders, utterances, and final orders, and shrink Ashelman to its welldeserved grave.
3. Family Court Judges Cannot Identify an Accused Function that
is Immune
No appellee refutes the fundamental truth that the 42nd Congressand every
one before or since20is forbidden to immunize most Family Court function. U.S.
Const. Amend. 1; McGowan v. State of Md., 366 U.S. 420, 443 (1961); AOB
VI.D.4. Judicial Appellees cite three twentieth century cases, asserting It is wellestablished that judicial immunity applies to judges in divorce proceedings: Duvall
v. County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 2001), Arnold v. Bostick, 339 F.2d 879,
880-81 (9th Cir. 1964), and Meyers v. Contra Costa County Dept. of Soc. Servs., 812
F.2d 1154, 1158-59 (9th Cir. 1986). Jud. Brf. p. 49. These support nothing close to
a well-established tradition at 1871 common law extending immunity to Family

Court functions accused in the FAC.
In Duvall this Court applied the four-factor test from McAlester
(inconsistent with Sparkman (See AOB 51-53)) to immunize a judge for failing to
accommodate plaintiffs hearing disability at trial. Plaintiff argued denial of ADA
accommodation in the courtroom was an administrative act. This Court disagreed,
20
Including the California Legislature: The Legislature shall make no law

respecting an establishment of religion. Cal. Const. art. I, 4; Cory v. Cory, 70 Cal.
App. 2d 563, 569, (1945) (holding free exercise forbade divorce from considering
unpatriotic religious beliefs in custody determination.).
43
and found absolute immunity. Id. Duvall did not analyze 1871 common law or any
function specific to a divorce tribunal.
In Arnold this Court found immunity for a claim that the judge issued an
illegal contempt citation against plaintiff for violating an order excluding the
plaintiff from his family home. Citing only to Bradley, this Court found the judge
immune for the contempt functionthe court did not analyze immunity for the
underlying exclusion order. Arnold at 880. Arnold cited Bradleys freewheeling
policy languagenot 1871 common lawand is thus error. Malley at 352.
Meyers did not consider judicial immunity of a divorce judge, but
prosecutorial immunity of social workers in initiating a dependency proceeding, and
quasi-judicial immunity of court employees performing a statutorily-mandated
conciliation session with custody litigants. Meyers at 1158-59. This Court found
the Family Conciliation Court counselors were entitled to a qualified quasijudicial immunitylimited in scope to acts specifically authorized by statute. Id.
at 1159.
Meyers did not address the immunity of a judge, and did not analyze 1871
common to identify an analogue for the conciliation session function. If this Court
were to conduct that historical inquiry for Appellees asserting quasi-judicial
immunityincluding Doyne, Roddy, and othersit will find only a qualified
immunity. See Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 132 (1997) (Scalia, J., Thomas, J.,
concurring) (When public officials made discretionary policy decisions that did not
involve actual adjudication, they were protected by quasi-judicial immunity,
which could be defeated by a showing of malice, and hence was more akin to what
we now call qualified, rather than absolute, immunity.); Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S.
478, 500 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part).
Even qualified immunity has been doubted. See Hoffman v. Harris, 511 U.S. 1060
(1994) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (This all assumes, of course, that social workers
44
(at least as we now understand the term) even existed in 1871); Antoine v. Byers
& Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429 (1993) (denying court reporter absolute immunity
because court reporters did not appear until the late 19th century).
Meyers supports California Coalitions assertion that family court judges
exercise specific jurisdiction, and therefore if they have any immunity, it is narrow
i.e., qualifiedlimited to acts within the narrow jurisdiction of their courts, not
done maliciously or corruptly. See Kalina, Burns, supra.21
Further, like Arnold, Meyers relied on Ashelmans erroneous freewheeling
policy holding and the four-factor test from McAlester which was error after
Sparkman. AOB p. 51-54.
Finally, all three cases draw on authority no older than Bradley, in which
Justice Field originated policy in 1872 that could not have been in the 42nd
Congress mind with the April, 1871 passage of the Act, and are thus irrelevant. See
IV.D, infra.
D. Like Ashelman, Pierson Was an Illegal Incursion into Congressional
Authority
Judicial Appellees incorrectly claim that Pierson is binding precedent on the
issue presented by California Coalitionwhether the Constitutions vesting of only
judicial power in the judiciary under Article III, and reservation of legislative power
to Congress under Article I, prohibits federal courts from narrowing the
unambiguous face and clearly-recorded intent of duly-enacted legislation. Appellees
21
The Meyers plaintiffs did not allege the social workers acted maliciously
or corruptly, but only that they disobeyed a judges instructions. Id. If the Meyers
plaintiffs had made an allegation of corruption or malice, California Coalition
submits this Court could notunder any relevant authorityhave justified
extending immunity to the social workers or court employees. See Burns v. Reed,
500 U.S. 478, 486487 (The presumption is that qualified rather than absolute
immunity is sufficient . . . .).
45
do not dispute that this issue was not presented or decided in Bradley, Pierson or
any of its progeny. This Court is thus presented with an issue of first impression.
As a case of first impression this Court is not bound by Pierson or its progeny, but
may consider those decisions as well as out-of-circuit decisions, treatises, or
academic journals as persuasive. Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1169-73 (9th
Cir. 2001).
1. United States Courts Exercise Limited Jurisdiction
Federal courts have no more power than that derived from the Constitution or
Congress: If congress has given the power to this court, we possess it, not otherwise
. . . . Turner v. Bank of North America, 4 U.S. 8, 10 n.1(a) (1799). The
Congressional power to ordain and establish inferior courts includes the power of
investing them with jurisdiction either limited, concurrent, or exclusive, and of
withholding jurisdiction from them in the exact degrees and character which to
Congress may seem proper for the public good. Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182,
187 (1943) (citing Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. 236, 245 (1845); For I agree there is no
liberty, if the power of judging be not separated from the legislative and executive
powers. The Federalist No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (1788). As recently as 2014
the Supreme Court rejected circuit decisions narrowing a statutes unambiguous
language and discernable congressional intent. Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control
Components, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 1377, 1388 (2014) (reversing a Sixth Circuit decision
relying on a Second Circuit decision narrowing Lanham Act standing, and also
rejecting narrowing constructions from the Third, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth,
Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits). This Court has followed. See Tourgeman v. Collins
Fin. Servs., Inc., 755 F.3d 1109, 1117 (9th Cir. 2014), as amended on denial of reh'g
and reh'g en banc (Oct. 31, 2014). See also United States v. Roach, 745 F.2d 1252,
1253 (9th Cir. 1984) (We will not go beyond the face of the statute to search for
Congressional intent when that intent is obvious from the language of the act.).
46
Jurisdiction defects may be raised by a court or parties at any timeeven

initially on appeal. Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 506 (2006); Galvez v.
Kuhn, 933 F.2d 773, 775 n. 4 (9th Cir. 1991); Detabali v. St. Lukes Hosp., 482 F.3d
1199, 1202 (9th Cir. 2007).
2. Pierson is Not On Point
Pierson appears to have overlooked the fundamental question of its
jurisdiction. Other decisions addressing the question have consistently determined
that United States courts lack authority to construe Section 1983. See Picking v.
Pennsylvania R.R., 151 F.2d 240 (3rd Cir. 1945) (But the policy involved is for
Congress and not for the courts.); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961); Pulliam,
supra; Owen, supra. See AOB at 54-55. Pickings jurisdiction truism has never
beenand could never becontroverted in any United States court. 22
There being no binding precedent on the non-waivable issue of jurisdiction,
this Court isif at allbound to the unambiguous language of the statute, clearlyexpressed intent of Congress, holdings and reasoning in superior authority including
Monell, Pulliam, Owen, Kalina,23 and incontrovertible out-of-circuit authority
directly on point in Picking to decide the jurisdiction issue in the first instance in this
Circuit.
3. Congress Intended to Abrogate Judicial Immunity
The Supreme Courts twentieth century condemnation of freewheeling
immunity policy originating in Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (1986) is the honest
half of its absolute immunity jurisprudence. We reemphasize that our role is to
22
Cf. Bauers v. Heisel, 361 F.2d 581, 587 (3d Cir. 1966). Bauers rejected
Pickings immunity holding because it preceded Tenney v. Brandhove. Tenney
examined legislative speech privilege and is inapposite to Pickings separate analysis
of jurisdiction. See IV.D.3 infra. Pickings observation of Article III jurisdiction is
incontrovertible absent constitutional amendment.
23
And even more forceful dissents. See AOB 50-51.
47
interpret the intent of Congress in enacting 1983, not to make a freewheeling policy
choice, and that we are guided in interpreting Congress' intent by the common-law
tradition. Id. at 342. Under Malleys command we examine only congressional
intent.
The other half has found an absolute immunity in the unambiguous statute
becauseit is saidThe legislative record gives no clear indication that Congress
meant to abolish wholesale all common-law immunities . . . . The immunity of
judges for acts within the judicial role is equally well established [as the speech and
debate privilege], and we presume that Congress would have specifically so
provided had it wished to abolish the doctrine. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554555 (1967). The presumption is as worthy as any speculation. It overlooks the
most obvious evidence of congressional intentthe unambiguous language of the
statute itself. Moreover, actual analysis of the congressional record, and history of
judicial immunity reveals Chief Justice Warrens presumption is simply wrong.
a. Pierson Incorrectly Analyzed Legislative Privilege Rather Than Judicial
Immunity
In Pierson Chief Justice Warren presumed that the immunity of judges
was equally well established as the legislative privilege.
Remarkably, in
presuming, he failed to conduct any analysis of the common law of judicial

immunityciting only to Bradleys (post-Civil Rights Act) holding and Scott v.
Stansfield, 3 Law Reports, Exchequer, 220.24
Pierson at 554.
Chief Justice
Warrens analysis went no deeper. Dissenting, Justice Douglas did go deeper,

supporting his forceful conclusion: The Court's ruling is not justified by the
admitted need for a vigorous and independent judiciary, is not commanded by the
24
Analyzed in Bradley at n. 16. [A] judge of a county court was sued for
slander, and he put in a plea that the words complained of were spoken by him in his
capacity as such judge, while sitting in his court, and trying a cause in which the
plaintiff was defendant.
48
common-law doctrine of judicial immunity, and does not follow inexorably from
our prior decisions. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 559 (1967) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
Instead of analyzing judicial immunity, Justice Warren adopted analysis of
legislative privilege from Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951). In Tenney
Justice Frankfurter considered whether a California legislative committee
conducting a contempt proceeding against a man circulating a flyer protesting the
committee was immune from an action under Section 1983. Id. at 377.25 The
question was whether a speech or debate privilege could be extended to a
lawmakers behavior at a contempt hearing. Id.
Justice Frankfurter traced the history of English common law preserving
legislative privilege as derivative of libertyan extension of the voters freedom of
speech and conscience. Id. at 372-73. He aligned the privilege with the federal
speech or debate analog in the United States Constitution at Article I, Sec. 6, cl.
1.26 He presumedanalyzing no legislative historythat the 42nd Congress would
25
This Court foundcorrectlyno privilege. Brandhove v. Tenney, 183 F.2d

121, 124 (9th Cir. 1950).
26
That privilege is narrow: The Senators and Representatives . . . shall in all
Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest
during their Attendance at the Session of their respective Houses, and in going to
and returning from the same; and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they
shall not be questioned in any other Place. The privilege is against arrestnot civil
liabilitydoes not extend to felonies or treason, or breach of the peace a
misdemeanor. Arrest outside of Session is permitted, and members maybe
questioned for activity other than speech or debate. Tenney at 377 (citing
Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880) (false imprisonment not privileged);
Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U.S. 521 (1917). Even so limited Jefferson was fearful of
the power it gave legislators. Tenney at 375. Hamilton was not so fearful of the
least dangerous branchbecause it exercised no similar liberty. The Federalist No.
78 (Alexander Hamilton) (1788).
49
not have intended to limit legislative privilege in enacting the 1871 Civil Rights Act
because Congress was itself a staunch advocate of legislative freedom. Id. at 376
(emphasis added).
Tenney extended the speech immunity to the contempt function because
legislators are directly-elected and immediately accountable to voters. Id. at 378.
Tenney also held the narrow immunity was lost if there was a usurpation of
functions exclusively vested in the Judiciary or the Executive. Id.27
b. Judicial Immunity is the Opposite of Legislative PrivilegeJudges Are
Sovereigns Possessing Not Rights but Delegated Authority
Judicial authority and legislative freedom are night and day. Judges exercise
jurisdiction as sovereignsnot liberties from sovereigns. While judges have all the
rights of any citizen qua a citizen, a judge qua judge possesses no rights. First and
Fourteenth Amendments restrain only such action as may fairly be said to be that
of the States. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 621 (2000). [T]he
censorial power is in the people over the Government, and not in the Government
over the people. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 282-83 (1964).
There is no need for a judge to express opinions, experiences, or desires of her own
or those she represents to create lawshe is given law. Other than necessary for
faithful execution of the law, a judges freedom of conscience is irrelevant to
judicial functionrelevant conscience is given in the form of law that has matured
through free debate elsewhere. Judges do not function as a body, and (should) have
no one to debate. The Constitution does not extend a speech and debate privilege
to the judiciary because courts are not empowered to speak or debate. The function
27
Dissenting in Tenney, Justice Douglas observed that No other public

official has complete immunity for his actionsincluding of course judges. Tenney
at 382 (Douglas, J., dissenting). I see no reason why any officer of government
should be higher than the Constitution from which all rights and privileges of an
office obtain. Id.
50
of a judge is to adjudicateapply the given law to properly-admitted facts. There

is no need to protect a judges speech other than to preserve the judges ability to
pronounce adjudicationmerely a substantial state interest. Gentile v. State Bar
of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030, 1074 (1991). Judges are not representatives of voters,
but independent of electoral will, passion, and accountability.
The long history of preservation of legislative debatea fundamental
libertyis absent from the history of judicial immunity. There being no similar
firmly-rooted tradition of judicial speech liberty in 1871, there is no reason to
presume that the 1871 Congress would have seen need to exclude a tradition that
has never existed. Piersons adoption of Tenney was error.
c. Congress Expressly Intended to Abrogate Judicial Immunity
Nor can Chief Justice Warrens presumption withstand the incontrovertible
recordThe 1871 Congress repeatedly expressed intent that the Civil Rights Act
would abrogate judicial immunity. Congress adopted the language of Section 1983
from its criminal analogthe 1866 Civil Rights Act, today codified at 18 U.S.C.
242. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).28 Section 1983 was introduced by Ohio
Representative Shellabarger, who explained his bill on the House floor by
referencing Section 2 of the 1866 Act: that section provides a criminal proceeding
in identically the same case as this one provides a civil remedy for . . . 29 The Acts
thus must be construed as in pari materiaany construction of the 1871 Act must
admit congressional intent in enacting the 1866 Act. Picking v. Pennsylvania R.R.,
151 F.2d 240 (3rd Cir. 1945).
On that record it is incontrovertible that the 42nd Congress affirmatively
rejected common law judicial immunity.
28
29
See also Yale Note at 327-328.

Cong. Globe, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. 60 (App.) (1871); Yale Note at 327.
51
I answer it is better to invade the judicial power of the States than permit it to
invade, strike down, and destroy the civil rights of citizens. A judicial power
perverted to such uses should be speedily invaded.
Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1837 (1866) (remarks of Representative
Lawrence). The 1866 Act was vetoed by President Johnson because it abrogated
common law judicial immunity.30 In the fight to defeat the veto, Senate Judiciary
Committee Chairman Trumbull expressed revulsion at the entire concept of judicial
immunity: It is the very doctrine out of which the rebellion was hatched.31
Section 1 of the 1871 Act (now Section 1983) passed rapidly through
Congress because debate wasnt necessaryCongress recognized Section 1 as
merely adding a civil remedy to the 1866 Act. Debate instead focused on section
2 of the bill (modernly Section 1985) because of concerns over federalism and
regulation of private behavior. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 99 (1971).
The recorded debate demonstrates unequivocally that Congress intended to
abrogate common law judicial immunity:
[T]he decisions of the county judges, who are made little kings, with almost
despotic powers to carry out the demands of the legislature which elected
them-powers which, almost without exception, have been exercised against
Republicans without regard to law or justice, make up a catalogue of wrongs,
outrageous violations, and evasions of the spirit of the new constitution,
unscrupulous malignity and partisan hate never paralleled in the history of
parties in this country or any other.
30
Yale Note at 327.

Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1758 (1866) (remarks of Senator
Trumbull); Yale Note at 328.
31
52
Cong. Globe, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. 186 (1871) (remarks of Representative Platt).
What is to be the case of a judge? . . . Is that State judge to be taken from his
bench? Is he to be liable in an action? ... It is the language of the bill: for there
is no limitation whatsoever on the terms that are employed, and they are as
comprehensive as can be used.
Id. (remarks of Senator Thurman).
[T]he judge of a State court, though acting under oath of office, is made liable
to a suit in the Federal Court and subject to damages for his decision against
a suitor, however honest and conscientious that decision may be . . .
Id. (remarks of Representative Lewis). Representative Arthur recognized the law
would be a drastic reversal of common law immunity:
Hitherto, in all the history of this country and of England, no judge or court
has been held liable, civilly or criminally, for judicial acts .... Willfulness and
corruption in error alone created a liability . . . .Under the provisions of this
section every judge in the State court. . . will enter upon and pursue the call
of official duty with the sword of Damocles suspended over him . . .
Cong. Globe, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1871) 365-366.32
32
See also Yale Note at 328 and references to additional consistent comments
in n. 38. On three occasions during the debates, legislators explicitly stated that
53
Courts considering parallel questions have deferred to this vivid record. See,
e.g., Picking v. Pennsylvania R.R., 151 F.2d 240 (3rd Cir. 1945) (But the privilege
as we have stated was a rule of the common law. Congress possessed the power to
wipe it out. We think that the conclusion is irresistible that Congress by enacting the
Civil Rights Act sub judice intended to abrogate the privilege to the extent indicated
by that act and in fact did so . . . . The statute must be deemed to include members
of the state judiciary acting in official capacity.); Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of
City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 665 (1978); Owen v. City of Independence, Mo.,
445 U.S. 622, 643 (1980); Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 543 (1984).
Far from an intent to incorporate common law judicial immunity, Congress in
passing both Acts specifically intended to eliminate it as the source of the
monumental evil of state-sponsored oppression jeopardizing our nations existence
by precipitating civil warfare.33
judges would be liable under the [1871] Act. No one denied the statements. In
sum, the question of congressional intent seems relatively clear: there was no
universal acceptance of the broad English immunity rule in 1871, and the only
legislative history available supports the proposition that Congress intended Section
1983 to cover judges. Yale Note at 328. Yale Notes 1969 author left open the door
that the legislative history does not preclude entirely the Court's construction of the
statute if the policy reasons for judicial immunity are sufficiently persuasive. That
policy reasons door was closed eleven years later in Malley.
33
Congress intent to hold judges accountable is recorded as recently as 1979
by the 96th Congress:
[Section 1983] is an essential element of an extraordinary series of
congressional enactments that transformed the relationship between the
Federal Government and its constituent parts. [T]he very purpose of the 1983
was to interpose the Federal courts between the States and the people, as
guardians of the people's Federal rightsto protect the people from
unconstitutional action under color of State law, whether that action be
executive, legislative, or judicial.
54
d. Congress Could Not Have Intended Bradleys Immunity Policy

Bradley was decided in 1872a year after Congress passed Section 1983.
Congress could not have had it in mind while debating Section 1983. It is thus
irrelevant in analysis under Rehberg and Malleys command. Neither are twentieth
century expansions of Bradley relevant. E.g., Pierson, Sparkman, Mireles.
Justice Fields articulation of policy in Bradley was innovativenot
descriptive.34 Bradley expanded Randall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. 523 (1868)35the
first federal case to consider absolute judicial immunity. Every authority cited in
Randall is from an English autocracy our nation fought wars to become independent
of.36 See Randall n. 14.37
Justice Fields 1868 statement of monarchical of immunity for superior judges
was:
Statement of David A. Clarke, Chairperson, Committee on Judiciary, Government

of the District of Columbia on the Act of Dec. 29, 1979, 93 Stat. 1284, PL 170 LH,
1st Sess. (Dec. 29, 1979) (emphasis added).
34
Certainly, no broad rule of immunity existed prior to Bradley. For most
of the history of the common law, judges had only a very limited immunity. Suing
Judges at 256; Yale Note at 323-327 ([J]udicial immunity was not a universal
doctrine.).
35
Justice Fields doctrinal epiphany From Randall to Bradley is welldocumented. See C. Swisher, S. Field, Craftsman of the Law (1930); G. White, The
American Judicial Tradition at 84-108 (1976); Graham, Justice Field and the
Fourteenth Amendment, 52 YALE L.J. 851 (1943); McCurdy, Justice Field and the
Jurisprudence of Government-Business Relations 61 J. AM. HIST. 970 (1975);
Westin, Stephen Field and the Headnote to O'Neill v. Vermont, 67 YALE L.J. 363
(1958); Suing Judges at 243-249, 254-256.
36
When all government, domestic and foreign, in little as in great things,
shall be drawn to Washington as the center of all power, it will render powerless the
checks provided of one government on another and will become as venal and
oppressive as the government from which we separated. Thomas Jefferson to
Charles Hammond, 1821
37
See Suing Judges at 224-43 (analysis of pre-Bradley primary sources).
55
[Was] the act done a judicial act, done within his jurisdiction? If it was not,
he can claim no immunity or exemption by virtue of his office from liability
as a trespasser; for if he has acted without jurisdiction, he has ceased to be a
judge.
Randall at 531. Inferior judges enjoyed only a qualified immunity. See Kalina v.
Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 132 (1997) (Scalia, J., Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Field
acknowledged decisions which denied an absolute immunity where the acts, in
excess of jurisdiction, are done maliciously or corruptly.38
Fields qualification was warranted. Analyses of 1871 common law reveal
predominating inconsistencynothing close to a firmly-rooted tradition. Few
American States had considered an immunity rule, and those that did disagreed. Yale
Note at 326-27. [A]s in England, the lower judges were most subject to suit, and
for many of them the rule was one of liability for extra-jurisdictional acts, malicious
acts, or both. Id. Justice Field's opinion in Bradley hastened the expansion of
immunity: [Bradley] was enormously influential in recasting the doctrinal analysis
of state courts, as well as their general approach to problems in this area. By the
early twentieth century, the law had begun to shift from a basic position of liability
to a preference for immunity, although the culmination of the change was very
recent. Suing Judges at 221 (emphasis added).
Bradleys innovative policy exhortationthough perhaps persuasive in case
it one day finds its way onto the floor of Congresscannot inform us of
congressional intent in 1871. Far from controlling, Bradley is the germ of the
38
These cases distinguish between superior judgeswhich enjoyed a

statutory cap on money damages, and judges of limited jurisdiction, justices of the
peace, and magistrateswho remained fully liable. Yale Note 325. Justice Fields
characterization of those sporadic decisions was hardly recognition of a firmlyrooted tradition of uniform broad immunity. Jensen v. Lane Cnty., 222 F.3d 570,
577 (9th Cir. 2000).
56
damnable freewheeling policy analysis condemned by the Supreme Court from

Malley through Rehberg.
The only honest conclusion is astoundingyet incontrovertible. Nineteenth
and twentieth century American judges have overstepped constitutional restriction
to usurp powers reserved to the legislature and written for themselves an immunity
far greater even than that of an English judge at common law. California Coalition
submits 1871 common law cannot support any tradition of absolute immunity
satisfying Rehberg and Malleys command.
4. Conclusion: If aura there be, it is hardly protected by
exonerating
from liability such lawless conduct as took place
here39
Ashelmans and Piersons disregard of the unambiguous language and
statutory history of the Civil Rights Acts have enabled deprivation of fundamental
rights of vulnerable, unsophisticated United States citizens the statutes were
intended to protectfamilies and children of moderate means ensnared in
government systems that survive on exploitation and oppression of the unfortunate.
On the foundation of such roguish jurisprudence, Appellees have expanded
obscenely profitable business enterprises inside of county courthouses, coopted local
police powers and prosecutors to persecute lawful behavior, and jointly monetized
the evil at their core, heaping deprivation, insult, and state-sponsored exploitation
onto families in crisis.
What shame a profession of reason today endures. FAC 594; ER 224.
E. The District Courts Hostility, Threats, Insults, and Expressed Bias
Was a Deprivation of Impartial Tribunal
Judicial Appellees dispute California Coalitions assertion that the district
courts hostility, sua sponte advocacy, insults, and express bias deprived appellants
39
Sparkman at 368 (Stewart, J. dissenting).

57
of due process and impartial tribunal. They cite law analyzing denials of recusal
motions under 28 U.S.C. 1361. Jud. Brf. p. 69. California Coalition did not seek
recusal, but asserts deprivation in support of reversal and prays for remand
instructing relief from Southern District Local Rule 83.3(c)(5) requirement to appear
by local counsel. AOB at 66, 69. [A] biased decisionmaker [is] constitutionally
unacceptable. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975); Hurles v. Ryan, 706 F.3d
1021, 1036 (9th Cir.2013) (fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due
process).
Judicial Appellees Authority Supports California Coalition
In Litkey plaintiff-appellants claimed the judge demonstrated impatience,
disregard for the defense and animosity by admonishing plaintiffs counsel to
refrain from grandstanding through an irrelevant political defense. Liteky v.
United States, 510 U.S. 540, 542 (1994). Plaintiffs did not dispute their crimes, but
argued that they were justified as furtherance of their political agenda to protest the
U.S. governments involvement in El Salvador. Id. at 543. The district judge
cautioned against using the trial as a political forum and instructed to focus on the
material issues at trial. Plaintiffs later moved to recuse, the district judge denied, and
the Eleventh Circuit and Supreme Court affirmed. Id.
The Supreme Court found plaintiff did not identify an extrajudicial source
of bias that could improperly influence the judges in-court behavior. Id. at 545.
The Court also found that the district judge did not err in refusing to recuse because
the in-trial comments were not wrongful or inappropriate because it was
undeserved, or because it rests upon knowledge that the subject ought not to possess
. . . or because it is excessive in degree . . . . Id. at 550.
California Coalition asserts that the district judges behavior was wrongful
or inappropriatevitriol and intimidating, yet specious, threat of sanction directed
at California Coalition and its retained co-counsel as he attempted to appear causing
58
his withdrawalconstituting a California tort causing deprivations of due process

and impartial tribunal in the district court. In Litkey the district judge acted to protect
a legitimate interestprotecting process and court resources. The district judge
below possessed no interest in interfering with California Coalitions professional
relationships.
Further, unlike Litkey and Pesnell, Appellants allege impartiality arising from
extrajudicial factorsthe district judges common professional community and
personal interests with judicial defendants accused of judicial wrongdoing. See
AOB at 65-66.40
Appellees suggest the district judge was merely expressing frustration (Jud.
Brf. p. 70; Bierer Brf. (DktEntry 60) p. 7, 23). The December 19, 2013 transcript of
the initial hearing reflects the district judge was highly engaged the moment she
entered the courtroom. See ER 52-60 (forceful ruling before argument); ER 61-66
(forceful vitriol in instructing to amend; forceful rejection of Stuarts request for
immediate certification). At hearing on February 26 the district judge characterized
the atmosphere of the December 19 hearing as a vortex. ER 26-27.
The record reflects no behavior by any party or counsel to contribute to a
vortex, or even frustration. To Appellants knowledge, parties and counsel have
remained unfailingly polite toward one another and the district court on and off the
recordeven joining stipulation when availabledespite that some maintain
strongly opposed interests. The district courts denial of Superior Courts two
40
See also DktEntry 11-2, pp. 78 (Appellants Joint Overlength Opening Brief
(submitted for review with Appellants Joint Motion to File Overlength Opening
Brief, DktEntry 11-1) in which Appellants asserted: The district courts pattern of
unusual hostility, was excessive, impartial favoring defendants with whom she
shares a professional community, and harmful error. To comply with this Courts
order (DktEntry 42) denying/granting in part Appellants motion (DktEntry 11-1) to
exceed type-volume limits, the phrase was eliminated from the shortened
Appellants Joint Opening Brief (DktEntry 43).
59
sanctions motions confirms Appellants have not behaved unprofessionally or in bad

faith.
Appellants pleadings and papers are meritoriousthough no doubt
uncomfortable for many.
These circumstances seem incapable of inspiring a
vortex, indicating the district judge was motivated by extrajudicial concerns.

Unlike Pesnell, California Coalition does not allege mere impatience or
anger, but vitriol and threats of sanctionincluding citation for contemptexpress
bias (unfortunately . . . ), repeated sua sponte advocacy, and for committing a tort
depriving California Coalition of necessary representation.
California Coalition respectfully submits that the pattern of behavior,
combined with the extremely uncomfortable consequence of placing California
Coalition in possession of a tort adverse to the district judge, together rises to such
a high degree of favoritism or antagonism as to make fair judgment impossible
(Litkey at 555) constituting a deprivation of due process and impartial tribunal
sufficient to justify the modest relief requested.
F. California Coalition Was Entitled to File Motion for Witness
Harassment Restraining Order
Judicial Appellees defend the district courts refusal to grant leave to seek a
witness harassment restraining order by asserting Superior Court counsel Kristine
Nesthuss threats and coordination of California Highway Patrol detectives and San
Diego County Sheriffs deputies41 was legal under State law and a Southern District
general order. Jud. Brf. (DktEntry 51-1) p. 56. Appellees concede that accurately
41
Including California Coalition members or affiliates who posted unredacted

copies of the original complaint on the Internet, their internet website hosting service
providers, and threatening of California Coalitions process servers (ER 208-214;
Doc. No. 115 (letter to district judge from fearful California Coalition witness), and
counsel (Doc. No. Doc. Nos. 114, 129 (sealed oppositions to local counsel Mr. Eric
Chings motions to withdraw)),
60
identifying a personal address is an appropriate means of pleading venue within a

particular district yet assert their deployment of teams of state and local law
enforcement was justified because all that need be alleged is a vague allegation of
residency within the district. Jud. Brf. p. 56. They do not (and cannot) cite a rule
prohibiting identification of residential address as appropriate means of pleading
civil venue.
Appellees naked desire that plaintiffs plead more vaguely obviously cannot
legalize their behavior.
1. General Order 550 Does Not Legalize Threats to Imprison
Nor does local rule. Judicial Appellees misconstrue General Order
550(1)(h)(5), which provides:
Unless otherwise ordered by the court, parties must refrain from including
5. Home Addresses. In criminal cases, if a home address must be included
only the city42 and state should be listed.
(emphasis added). Judicial Appellees construe this language to prohibit including
home addresses in all pleadings and documents filed with the district court . . . as a
matter of law. Jud. Brf. p. 55 (emphasis added).
Appellees construction is incorrect. Subsection 5 is limited to criminal
cases. While Appellees rightly perceive their behavior as criminal, California
Coalition are civil litigants and may not conduct criminal proceedings. General
Order 550 does not apply, and Judicial Appellees action under color of law to
censor, obstruct, and retaliate for Appellants filing is illegal.
42
The district court sealed even Appellants redacted complaint (Doc. No. 8)
because it continues to identify the city in which the judges reside. Doc. No. 9.
61
2. Appellants Have Right to Allege Venue

Judicial Appellees incorrectly construe FAC Count 4the Nesthus
Obstruction of Justiceto assert deprivation of only a due process right of access
to courts: Given that the right to access the courts does not encompass the right to
include judicial officers home addresses, Count 4 fails as a matter of law. Jud.
Brf. p. 55. Count 4 does assert a deprivation of a due process right to access courts,
but also deprivation of speech and substantive due process.43 ER 214-216. These
rights certainly encompass the right to plead as required and permitted under Title
28s venue provisions and the First, Fifth, and Seventh Amendments to the United
States Constitution.
See ER 358-372.
Judicial Appellees fall far short of
establishing that Count 4 fails as a matter of law. Jud. Brf. p. 55.

3. Californias Litigation Privilege is Inapplicable
From footnote 17 Judicial Appellees assert state law claims . . . are barred
by Californias litigation privilege citing California Civil Code Section 47. Jud.
Brf. p. 55, n. 17. Apparently Judicial Appellees assert that Superior Courts general
counsel Kristine Nesthus threats and deployment of law enforcement to threaten
imprisonment of Coalition witnesses, members, process servers, and counsel is a
privileged publication or broadcast within California Civil Code Section 47. The
suggestion is preposterous.
4. California Government Code 6254.21 is Unconstitutional
Also from a footnote Judicial Appellees assert a defense that California
Government Code 6254.21 prohibits any person from displaying on the Internet a
judicial officers home address. Jud. Brf. p. 55, n.16.
California Coalition argued in its Ex Parte Application of Leave to File a
Temporary Restraining Order below (Doc. No. 4, ER 364-371) and re-assets now
that this statute is an unconstitutional deprivation of expression because it is (1)
43
These terms are defined in the FAC at ER 144-146.

62
content based and (2) does not fall within the several traditional categories of
permitted restriction on the content of speech. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct.
2537 (2012). Statutes prohibiting speech based on content are presumed invalid.
Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union, 542 U. S. 656, 660 (2004). Section
6254.21 is content-based because one must look at the content of the speech to
determine if it falls within the statutes prohibition. Foti v. City of Menlo Park, 146
F.3d 629, 636 (9th Cir. 1998). The statute proscribes reference to the telephone
number and address of an elected or appointed official.
Communication containing public official residence and contact is expressive
as relevant to important political rights. An officials residence identifies voting and
electoral district for eligibility for office, neighborhood relationships, standard of
living, indicates political inclinations relevant to the officials identity, fitness, and
character. Contact information enables communication to the official of information
and opinions relevant to his or her office. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254 (1964) (describing laws prohibiting expression regarding public officials
as a nullity, as absolute and as palpable as if Congress had ordered us to fall down
and worship a golden image.); Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435
U.S. 829, 839 (1978) (invalidating law restricting publication of confidential records
of judicial discipline proceedings).
Judges have been described as men of
fortitude and may be expected to receive and withstand intense public scrutiny and
criticism, including scrutiny of their lifestyles, neighborhoods, and places of abode.
Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 376 (1947). Section 6254.21 burdens such activity,
is content-based, and therefore invalid.
The burden of resurrecting section 6254.21 from the presumption of invalidity
rests on the parties asserting it. Alvarez at 2549. Such an achievement seems
dubious.
63
Section 6254.21 does not to fall within any of the historic and traditional
categories of expression long familiar to the bar. Id. at 2544. The CPRA was
enacted in 1968long after the ratification of the First Amendment, and of course
could not have been contemplated as an exception by the Constitutions framers.
Further, the state interests protected by the CPRA are not privacy, but public
access to public records. Section 6250 of the CPRA describes the relevant state
interest:
In enacting this chapter, the Legislature, mindful of the right of individuals to
privacy, finds and declares that access to information concerning the conduct
of the people's business is a fundamental and necessary right of every person
in this state.
In addition, the CPRA proscription against disclosure on the internet
appears not to be the least restrictive means for protecting the privacy interest
asserted. See Aschcroft at 666. Address and telephone information is available from
numerous sources, including the county registrar of voters, online election campaign
financing forms, ordinary phone books, credit records, campaign financing records,
and many other public sources.
Less restrictive means for protecting such
information include the officials own ability to refuse to disclose such information.
The district court relied in part on Appellees assertion of the CPRA in
denying Appellants motion for a witness harassment restraining order which is
appealed here (Issue 4, AOB 17, 66), and Appellees appear intent on asserting this
issue as a matter of law in defense of Count 4 of the FAC. The CPRAs validity is
thus at issue in this appeal.
Appellants submit California Government Code 6254.21 is an invalid
content-based restriction on speech protected under the First and Fourteenth
64
Amendments to the United States Constitution, and Article I 2(a) and 26 of the
California Constitution, and as an additional prayer for relief hereby respectfully
request this court adjudge the statute to be invalid.
G. Superior Courts Two Failed Sanctions Motions Entitles California
Coalition to Counter-Sanctions
Judicial Appellees claim the Superior Courts two failed motions44 for
sanctions based on the Superior Courts two failed motions to dismiss was faithful
litigation behavior. Jud. Brf. p. 70-72. Seeking Rule 11 sanctions concurrent with
a motion in order to leverage the motion is itself independently sanctionable.
Gaiardo v. Ethyl Corp., 835 F2d 479 (3rd Cir. 1987); Rich v. Taser Int'l, Inc., No.
2:09-CV-02450-ECR, 2012 WL 3155137, at *3 (D. Nev. Aug. 2, 2012) (A Rule 11
motion is not a proper vehicle for arguing the merits of a case . . . Plaintiffs will
therefore be awarded the reasonable expenses of defending such a motion. . . .).
Requesting sanctions is per se inappropriate where there exists legitimate
controversy. Committee Notes on Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
146 FRD 401, 590 (1993). Superior Court fails to overcome Gaiardos presumption
that its leverage Rule 11 motion is a hardball tactic. See Gaiardo at 485.
Superior Court argues it did not withdraw grounds on which the sanctions
motion was brought. Jud. Brf. p. 72. This is false. Superior Court withdrew
grounds: a (Mr. Webbs cured pro hac vice status); b (Lexevias cured capacity
issue); d (filing a frivolous 1,300 page complaint (a length issue refused by the
district court; Appellees later conceded the complaint was only 175 pages); f
(Superior Court non-judicial administrator Roddy seeking a quasi-judicial
44
Superior Court sought sanctions asserting California Coalition had

absolutely no chance of success under the existing precedents, and []no reasonable
argument can be advanced to extend, modify or reverse the law as it stands[,]
Judicial Appellees SER 97-99.
65
immunity); g (allegation of Stuart assault lacked evidentiary and legal support).

Compare Judicial Appellees SER 97-99 (notice of original Rule 11); with Doc. No.
139 at 2-3 (Notice of Superior Courts Omnibus Supplemental Memorandum); with
Doc. No. 160-1 (Memorandum in Support of Superior Court and Administrative
Office of the Courts (second) Motion for Sanctions). Superior Court also falsely
claims it prevailed on the initial motion to seeking only dismissal with prejudice
and without leave to amend. Doc. No. 21 p. 9:19. At hearing the district court
identified claims having merit but possibly defensiblea far cry from frivolous.
See AOB p. 40-41. Stuart requested, and the district court granted leave to amend
to cure. Doc. No. 21 p. 42:1. Stuart had offered to stipulate to this result. AOB
67.
Superior Courts second sanctions motion retreated from its initial assertion
of complete meritlessness filed solely to harass, to an assertion that the pleading
need not be frivolous as a whole to violate Rule 11(b) Doc. No. 160-1 p. 7:1-2. The
second sanctions motion was based in part on the improper evidentiary declaration
of Stephen Lucas, which the district court ignored but should have stricken. See
Doc. No. 160-1 at 8-10; AOB 34-35. Though the district court did not convert the
evidentiary Omnibus to a Rule 56 motion, evidentiary declarations submitted in bad
faith are sancitonable. Fed.R. Civ.P. 56(h).
The district courthaving five opportunities to analyze Superior Courts
dozens of briefing pagesdeclined to grant Superior Court relief it requested on
grounds it asserted, and found the FAC was not made solely for the purpose of
harassing the defendants or in contempt of the courts order to file a Rule 8 compliant
pleading. ER 12.
66
Superior courts Rule 11 motions were based largely on the other grounds
arguments Judicial Appellees assert here.45 Should this Court award Appellants any
relief requested, Appellants claims should be adjudged as not totally void of
merit and Superior Courts two sanctions motions based on such grounds should
be adjudged improper hardball tactics.
For all of the above reasons Appellants respectfully request an award of
counter-sanctions against the Superior Court.
H. Incorporation/Preservation of Motion for Preliminary Injunction
No Appellee objects to California Coalitions request to reverse the district
courts summary denial of California Coalitions Motion for Preliminary Injunction
Regarding Domestic Violence Restraining Orders (Doc. No. 109) for adjudication
here. See Judgment In a Civil Case (ER 4) and Order Dismissing Case with
Prejudice, Denying Motion for Preliminary Injunction (ER 6-12).
California
Coalition therefore respectfully requests this Court grant the relief as requested in
the Motion for Preliminary Injunction or, in the alternative, permit additional
briefing in this appeal to adjudicate the district courts summary denial of the motion.
45
See accompanying Motion to Dismiss Untimely Cross-Appeals for other

grounds issues; Doc. No. 160-1 at 10-15.
67
V.
MOTION TO ANSWER OTHER GROUNDS BRIEFING AS

CROSS APPEAL
Much of Appellees briefing is directed to issues not briefed by Appellants

Joint Opening Brief (DktEntry: 43) because Appellees assert what they characterize
as other grounds to achieve dismissal with prejudice, greatly expanding the scope
of issues on appeal. Appellants contend that the other grounds are so unrelated
and varied that they are not truly other grounds, but untimely cross appeals.
Appellants hereby and by accompanying motion move for permission to file
a separate Response Brief consistent with FRAP 28.1(c)(3). See Motion to Dismiss.
68
VI.
CONCLUSION
Appellees concede or do not contest most of California Coalitions Opening

Argument, warranting reversal. They instead argue other grounds which were not
adjudicated by the district court in an irregular cross-appeal. Those grounds also
fail, but this court need not reach that determination as Appellees concessions and
meritless arguments are alone sufficient to reverse and remand as requested in
Appellants Joint Opening Brief.
As an additional prayer, Appellants respectfully request this Court
determine that California Government Code 6254.21 is unconstitutional in
violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution,
and Article I 2(a) and 26 of the California Constitution.
Respectfully Submitted,
Dated: February 4, 2015
By: s/ Colbern C. Stuart III

Colbern C. Stuart, III
Families and Children, PBC,
in Pro Se
By: s/ Dean Browning Webb

Law Offices of Dean Browning Webb
California Coalition for
69
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
The undersigned certifies under Rule 32(a)(7)(C) of the Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure and Ninth Circuit Rule 32-1 and 28-4, that the attached reply
brief is proportionally spaced, has a type face of 14 points or more and, pursuant to
the word-count feature of the word processing program used to prepare this brief,
contains 19,055 words, exclusive of the matters that may be omitted under FRAP
32(a)(7)(B)(iii). To comply with FRAP 32(a)(7)(B)(ii) (A reply brief is
acceptable if it contains no more than half of the type volume specified in
32(a)(7)(B)(i)) and to permit a single joint reply California Coalition limits type
volume of this consolidated reply to one-half the 50,000 total words in answering
briefs, consistent with the type-volume limit proportions of FRAP 32(a)(7)(B)(i)(iii). By separate motion, California Coalition has moved this court for permission
to file this brief in excess of type-volume limits. See accompanying Motion To
Dismiss.

Families and Children, PBC,
in Pro Se
By: s/ Dean Browning Webb
California Coalition for Families and
Children, PBC
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the
Court for the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit by using the
appellate CM/ECF system on February 4, 2015 per Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure Ninth Circuit Rule 25-5(g).
I certify that all participants in the case are registered CM/ECF users and
that service will be accomplished by the appellate CM/ECF system. Any other
counsel of record will be served by facsimile transmission and/or first class mail
this 4th day of February, 2015.

President, California Coalition
For Families and Children, PBC,
in Pro Se

119 Appellants&#39; Joint Consolidated Reply Brief

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Case: 14-56140, 02/04/2015, ID: 9409771, DktEntry: 119, Page 1 of 79

Case No. 14-56140

APPELLANTS JOINT CONSOLIDATED REPLY BRIEF

Colbern C. Stuart III, J.D.

Dean Browning Webb, Esq.

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COUNTER-STATEMENT OF FACTS ............................................5

and Joinders) ......................................................................................................5

2. Stuart Has Never Attempted to Appear as Counsel for California

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REPLY TO STANDARD OF REVIEW .........................................13

REPLY TO ANSWERING ARGUMENTS ...................................15

Curable Rule 8 Issues...................................................................................15

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3. Congress Intended to Abrogate Judicial Immunity .....................47

MOTION TO ANSWER OTHER GROUNDS BRIEFING AS

CROSS APPEAL .....................................................................................................68

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Lopez v. Vanderwater, 620 F.2d 1229 (7th Cir. 1980) ............................................41

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Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951) .............................................................55

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California Constitution, Article I 2(a)............................................................ 67, 71

LAW REVIEW ARTICLES

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This Joint Consolidated Reply responds to the Answering Briefs of all

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DktEntry 75: Off Duty Officers (ODO Brf.)

Appellants have filed an

All p. page references follow ECF-stamped consecutive pagination (blue

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Dismiss Untimely Cross Appeals; Motion to Expand Reply Brief Type-Volume

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Appellees devote substantial effort contesting the presumed-true fact

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Brf. p. 13. Judicial Appellees conspicuously eliminate lead plaintiff California

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1. Appellees Contradict California Coalitions Prospective Relief

The rights are

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C. Federal (Chubb) Contradicts FAC Allegation of Conspiracy to

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The FAC alleges lawyer defendants were Stuart Assault

Coordinators participating in the Stuart Assault through pre-seminar planning

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G. Fritz Contradicts the FAC (DktEntry 45)

In February, 2010, California Coalition members learned of a Seminar to

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(5) FAC exhibits consisting of photographs and documentation dating

of the Family Law Community, and continue CALIFORNIA COALITIONS

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REPLY TO STANDARD OF REVIEW

A. Review of Rule 8 is De Novo, Not Abuse of Discretion

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provide inaccurate statements of

Appellees sought dismissal on the other

grounds below under Rule 12(b)(6), review of which is de novo. Abagnin v.

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REPLY TO ANSWERING ARGUMENTS5

A. The District Courts Dismissal with Prejudice Was Error

Appellees Notice and Introduction to the Memorandum (The FAC should be

119 Appellants' Joint Consolidated Reply Brief

119 Appellants' Joint Consolidated Reply Brief