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Confronting Bureaucratic Capture

Rethinking Participatory Planning Methodology in Kerala
K N Harilal

The peoples planning programme in Kerala is under

threat of a bureaucratic capture with government orders
and guidelines from above subduing the process of
participatory planning. This paper proposes overhauling
the methodology of planning from below to put the
experiment back on track. This will involve demystifying
and debureaucratising the planning process and
strengthening participatory spaces. However, the
enthusiasm for maximising participation should not be
at the expense of the right to be critical. Peoples
participation is not a substitute for expertise in
development planning. Participatory planning has to
make maximum use of the expertise within the
government and outside it without compromising on
accountability and responsiveness to the people.

The web version of this article corrects a few errors that

appeared in the print edition.

I thank M A Oommen and P S Vijayshankar for their valuable remarks on

an earlier draft. The errors in the paper remain my own.
K N Harilal (harilal@cds.ac.in) is at the Centre for Development Studies,
Thiruvananthapuram.

52

n a press conference held on 3 November 2011, the mayor

of Thiruvananthapuram City Corporation, K Chandrika,
expressed concern over the delay in receiving the district
planning committees (DPC) approval for the corporations
budget proposals for the financial year 2011-12. We submitted
proposals for the approval of around 765 projects in August.
There are just four months left in this financial year, which
means that we might not be able to complete many of these
projects in time, she said.1 Thiruvananthapuram Corporations story is not an exception; it is shared by most local governments (LGs) in Kerala. And not just in 2011-12, but in most
years in the recent past. Planning generally takes six to seven
months, leaving hardly five to six months for implementation.
LGs are rendered helpless by a highly complicated and heavily
bureaucratised methodology for plan formulation and approval. The magnitude of resistance posed by the web of regulations should be obvious to any observer they run into hundreds of printed pages and several volumes.2
What Partha Chatterjee (1997: 82-103) has famously said
about planning in India has become true of the peoples planning experiment in Kerala planning as politics has given
way to planning as (an) instrument of politics. According to
Chatterjee, the Indian state assiduously maintains the sphere
of planning as a preserve of experts, mostly economists and
technocrats, keeping it far removed from political contestations. Planning is projected as a sphere above politics, only to
be used as an instrument of the state in furthering its twin
objectives accumulation and legitimisation. In contrast, peoples planning was launched in 1996 with the express intent of
deepening democracy by demystifying and debureaucratising
planning at the local level, defining it as a sphere of the local
people and, hence, of politics (Isaac and Franke 2000: 33-52).
However, the bureaucracy appears to have overreacted to the
prospect of political competition and the entry of non-experts
and the uninitiated into planning by making the rule books for
local plans several times more stringent and cumbersome than
those at higher tiers of government.
Bureaucratic capture happens when the bureaucracy, and
the regulatory apparatus it administers, drifts from its original
mandate of facilitating participation to that of discouraging it.
Instead of facilitating it, rules and procedures discourages participation by making it cumbersome, difficult, and ineffective.
Instead of participatory spaces disciplining the bureaucracy,
under conditions of bureaucratic capture, the bureaucracy disciplines participatory spaces, and participation is reduced to
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an exercise in legitimisation. In other words, planning degenerates into an instrument of politics.

The positive impact of peoples planning, especially in deepening democracy, can hardly be exaggerated (John and Jos
2002; Heller et al 2007). But, as recent research testifies, the
Kerala experiment is deviating from its original goals (GOK
2009). Most importantly, participation has stagnated or even
declined in terms of numbers as well as quality (Sudhakaran
2006). Tightening of the rule book and multiplying government orders has not helped improve the quality of local plans
and projects either (GOI 2006: 101-28). If anything, the decentralisation has had a dampening effect on the mobilisation of
local taxes (GOK 2011); the system of keeping accounts has not
been made transparent (Oommen 2005; GOK 2009); it has not
been able to check corruption (Widmalm 2008: 132-73); it has
failed to integrate schemes across different tiers of government (Kannan 2000), and so on the list of woes could go on
and on. While local plans have fared well in the service sector
and triggered some notable success stories in agriculture, their
overall impact on the goods-producing sector has been rather
dismal (GOI 2008; Harilal 2008; Mohanakumar and Vipinkumar 2010). What is more disappointing is the inability to envision the future, which is an inalienable quality of any planning
exercise. In the absence of a five-year plan or an alternative
vision statement, local planning has been reduced to the preparation and implementation of annual plans.
It is this picture of general despair that provoked us to initiate
a rethinking on the methodology of peoples planning in the
state. Towards this end, the research unit on local self-governments at the Centre for Development Studies (CDS-RULSG) organised a dialogue using multiple forums, such as workshops,
online debates, focus group discussions, and interviews with
people from various walks of life, including elected representatives, government officers, experts, and activists. This paper
may be seen as an outcome of the brainstorming that followed.3
Before dissecting the methodology of planning, we need to
interrogate the idea of peoples planning at the local level, as
we attempt to do in Section 1, to generate a clear understanding on its potential as well as limits in making democracy more
efficient, deep, dense, and meaningful. In Section 2, we
attempt a critique of the methodology of peoples planning
currently in vogue, and try to unravel the bureaucratic capture
of peoples planning in Kerala. The primary purpose of this
paper, however, is the search for alternative methodologies,
which can restore the spirit of participation. Therefore, in the
critique of the existing methodology, we make an attempt to
outline the broad contours of an alternative approach.4 Even
though the threat of bureaucratic takeover is real, it is no reason to be pessimistic if the present stalemate is viewed as an
important phase in the struggle for deepening democracy.5
1 Democratising Democracy

The contagion of popular uprisings that the world is witnessing now, given their geographical spread and far-reaching
implications, could be seen as a major wave of democratisation. But, as the strong presence of popular movements even in
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established democracies of the west suggests, the present wave

of democratisation is unlikely to be satiated by the promise of
electoral competition. Can the role of people in a democracy
be stretched beyond producing governments? Or, to put the
classic question bluntly, is it possible for the people to govern?
The hegemonic theory of democratic elitism will answer the
question in the negative. The elite are unlikely to welcome
mass politics or the growing participation of the people for its
anarchic potential. According to elitist theory, if we define sovereignty in a broad sense as the formation and determination
of the general will, it is impossible for the people to govern.
The elitist theory reduces the concept of sovereignty from a
process of forming the general will to a process of choosing
one of the competing groups of the elite to govern.
It is important to see why the scope of peoples participation
is limited to that of choosing between the elites (Schumpeter
1980: 250-73; Pateman 1970: 1-45). The first argument is a
Weberian one, which considers administration to be too complex to be handled by the people. The second argument evokes
the penetration of particular interests, which makes the formation of rationality through public discourse difficult. The
third one, referred to as the mass society argument, cautions
against irrational pressure by the masses on the political system. It is assumed that the rule of the elites will solve the problem of administrative complexity, check the undue influence
of particular interests, and protect values not shared by the
masses. In this view, the lower the level of participation, the
more enduring and resilient democracy will be.
It was the introduction of the concept of the public sphere
that created a much-needed break in the democratic debate.
Habermas reconciles the contradiction between the increasing
complexity of public administration and participation by the
people by separating public administration from the public
sphere (1992: 27-79). The separation of the state and the public
sphere, and the conceptualisation of the latter as a space for
free discussion relieves participation from the curse of administrative complexity. According to Habermas, within the
boundaries of the public sphere, actors can acquire only influence, not political power.
The influence of a public opinion generated more or less discursively
in open controversies is certainly an empirical variable that can make
a difference. But, public influence is transformed into administrative
power only after it passes through the filters of institutionalised procedures of democratic-opinion and will formation and enters through
parliamentary debates into legitimate lawmaking (1996: 371).

However, representatives of the third wave of democracy,

especially scholars from Latin America, who stand for more
direct participation, criticise Habermas for not offering a
proper connection between reason and will. According to
Avritzer (2002: 50), a mechanism stronger than influence is
required to connect the public sphere to the political system.
Avritzers idea of participatory publics, built around the experience of Latin American countries since the 1980s, is an
attempt to innovate such a stronger connection. Participatory
publics add two elements to the public sphere a public forum
and accountability. A public forum provides the public sphere
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with the capacity to foster deliberation and thus increases the

chances of arriving at consensus/decisions. Participatory
budgeting in Brazil is a good example of participatory publics,
where deliberative bodies play a role in arriving at decisions as
well as in monitoring their implementation (Baiocchi 2003).
Participation and Autonomy

Participatory publics, however, do not replace administrators

or experts; they represent a midway between participation
and complex administration. Participatory institutions venturing into running the administration are likely to be exposed to
the risk of getting co-opted into the administrative hierarchy
as its appendage. They will lose their autonomy and critical
edge, and cease to be a part of the public sphere.6 An important point to be emphasised in the context of our critique of the
Kerala experience is the need to preserve the relative autonomy of the participatory forum so that it retains the right to
dissent and criticise.
Kerala has a long and illustrious history of democratisation
movements, which goes far beyond establishing electoral competition. The history of public action in Kerala is well documented (Sen 1996; Ramachandran 1996). People have come
together on umpteen occasions to put pressure on the state to
not only break redundant rules and make new ones, but also to
implement them without fail. In the process, they created institutional arrangements that sit on the boundary of the state
and public sphere (participatory publics) for ensuring responsiveness and accountability. Democratic movements in Kerala
did not resist the temptation to participate in local and regional
governments for the fear of co-option. What they vowed to do
instead was to combine participation and struggle (bharanavum samaravum) so that there was immunity to co-option.7
The tension between participation in government and the
need to carry on the struggle against the state has been an important feature of Keralas experiments in democratic politics.
It may be noted that participation, in spite of its many virtues, entails some costs. It may not be the first best route in all
instances in terms of efficiency. Yet, it is considered desirable
for its intrinsic value it augments the quest for development
as freedom (Evans 2002). The process of preference formation
on public goods is as important, if not more important, as the
preferences themselves. As a matter of fact, an environment of
collective action and public discussion is required for people to
make informed preferences.
The virtues of participation, however, do not offer valid reasons to downgrade representative structures of democracy or
to valorise direct democracy. This note of caution is important
in the context of the tendency in the literature, especially in
policy circles of international development agencies, to eulogise local and participatory structures of democracy while
denigrating representative institutions and higher tiers of government. This will result in overburdening local participatory
institutions with unrealistic expectations, while allowing
higher tiers of government to shirk responsibilities. It is such
eventualities that transform participatory planning from its high
position as a process of politics to an instrument of politics.
54

We have to note the following points in this connection.

First, the contradiction between participation and representation is more imaginary than real; representation is unavoidable even at lower tiers of government, and participation, as
the history of public action in Kerala proves, is possible even at
higher levels of government. Second, LG activities might have
negative or positive externalities that might spill over into
neighbouring localities (Mookherjee 2004: 5-25). All costs and
benefits of such externalities need not always get into the decision-making process of an LG, especially when the people affected are outsiders. In such cases, intervention from higher
tiers of government may be required. Third, LGs are constrained by the absence of scale in many of their operations
(ibid: 22-23). They are also deficient in institutional capacities
to deal with issues involving scale economies. For instance,
higher tiers of governments are better suited to maintain and
coordinate professional groups related to public health, public
works, irrigation, drinking water, and so on.
Fourth, on account of increasing external integration, many
aspects of life that are apparently local are increasingly falling
beyond the reach and control of LGs. In most areas of economic
activity, the rules of the game are set at higher levels of government, and, in some cases, at the level of supra-national
agencies, so that LGs are rendered helpless or can only hope to
make the best out of externally set games. In short, in planning for local development, a global sense of place is
required, which is constituted by economic, social, cultural,
and political relations, and flows of commodities, information,
and people that extend far beyond a locality (Giles and Stokke
2000). Any attempt to underplay the contextuality of place,
ignoring national and transnational economic and political
forces, will only help foist unrealistic expectations on local
democracy, while at the same time exonerating the state and
transnational power holders. Last, but not the least the tendency to essentialise and romanticise LG also has the danger of
downplaying local social inequalities and power relations.
2 Participation: From Theory to Practice

The tension between the idea of democracy and its practice is

mainly played out in the sphere of participation. The peoples
planning experiment in Kerala is best seen as an episode in the
larger struggle for deepening democracy, with an obvious
focus on enhancing the space and scope for participation.
Here, the larger question of democracy whether people can
govern is confronted at the level of local development planning. When participatory planning was launched in 1996, it
did not have any model to emulate. The campaign tried to
learn by doing and successfully evolved a methodology of participatory planning, which had undergone many changes over
the last 15 years. Here, we attempt a critique of the methodology, focusing mainly on the version currently in vogue, an outline of which is presented in Table 1 (p 55).8
The unjustifiably long process of making and sanctioning
local plans is the most telling evidence of a bureaucratic
capture. As the data on DPC approval of LG plans in 2011-12
clearly show, even as late as in August 2011, only 34% of the
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Figure 1: Share of Month-wise Expenditure in Total Plan Expenditure
70
60

Share

50
40
30
20

March

b D

February

December

November

October

September

August

January

2009-10

2008-09

July

May

April

June

2007-08

10

Source: Sulekha, Information Kerala Mission, Government of Kerala.

LGs had received the DPC proceedings permitting them to start

plan implementation.9 The city corporations, including Thiruvananthapuram, were still waiting for DPC clearance. Even at
this stage, there were LGs that had not yet submitted their
plans to technical advisory groups (TAGs). Obviously, the time
that goes into plan formulation is greater than the time available
Table1: Stages of Planning Prescribed during Eleventh (2007-12) Plan
Serial Number

I
II
III
IV
V
VI
VII
VIII
IX
X
XI
XII
XIII
XIV

Phase

Taking Stock : Detailed Review of Development

Re-constitution of working groups and sector-wise reviews by them
Preparation for convening grama sabhas (village assemblies)
Preparatory interaction with stakeholder groups
Grama sabha meetings
General and subject group meetings
Watershed planning
Introducing watershed dimension into local level planning
Preparation of approach paper and development report
Consolidation of the outcomes of earlier phases
Preparation of Draft Annual Plan for the LG
Allocation of Plan funds and preparation of plan document
Development seminar
Seminar at LG level with wide participation to discuss the draft plan
Incorporating suggested changes in the annual plan
Effecting changes in allocation and other parameters if suggested
Preparation of development projects
Conversion of project ideas into project documents
Finalisation of the Plan for DPC approval
LG council meeting for finalising the plan
Technical Appraisal by Technical Advisory Groups (TAGs)
Procedural and technical vetting
DPC approval
DPC meeting
Issue of DPC proceedings
Formal approval to use plan funds
Plan implementation and monitoring

Source: Government Order, GO (MS)/128/2007/LSGD, 14-05-2007 (KILA 2009 d: 41).

Table 2: Plan Expenditure of Local Governments in Kerala (percentage of outlay)

Type of LGs

General
SCP
TSP
Total
2001-02 2009-10 2001-02 2009-10 2001-02 2009-10 2001-02 2009-10

Grama panchayats 68.27 79.70 46.27

61.91 45.94 67.71 63.25 73.61

Block panchayats

71.90 81.70 44.74

81.08 54.50 84.48 62.21 81.65

District panchayats 54.04 71.24 38.60

69.41 51.84 74.46 48.91 70.79

Municipalities

64.46 79.50 35.54 64.98 25.00 52.85 59.80 75.29

Corporations

57.15 73.83 19.69

48.84 0.00

Total

65.84 78.40 42.59

65.56 49.57 72.72 59.93 73.85

0.00

50.18 66.15

Source: Government of Kerala, Economic Review, various years, Kerala State Planning Board.
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for implementation. Data for earlier years reveal an almost

similar pattern.
The lag in plan formulation is reflected in the data on plan
expenditure (Table 2). However, the shortfall in plan expenditure is particularly worrying in the case of the special component plan (SCP) and the tribal sub-plan (TSP). An equally important problem related to plan expenditure is its bunching in
the last quarter of the year. Table 3, which presents data on
plan outlay and expenditure till the end of November 2011, is
self-explanatory in this regard. While the expenditure in state
government plans reached 30%, LGs were lagging behind at
17%. As the experience of previous years shows, the expenditure levels improve and reach respectable levels at the end of
the year. In the central and state government plans, bunching
of expenditure reflects a payment problem than the actual
Table 3: State and Local Plans Outlay and Expenditure 2011-12 (Rs in crore)
Category

Outlay

State Plan
State plan schemes
9,435.95
Local governments (grant-in-aid)
Village panchayat
1,412.11
Block panchayat
333.74
District panchayat
342.64
Municipalities
306.17
Corporations
179.39
Total LGs
2,574.05
Total state plan
12,010.00

Expenditure
up to
30 November 2011

Expenditure till
November
2011 (%)

Expenditure till
November
2010 (%)

3,152.15

33.00

38.00

249.37
83.39
54.54
43.44
13.84
444.58
3,596.73

18.00
25.00
16.00
14.00
8.00
17.00
30.00

36.00
36.00
34.00
36.00
25.00
33.00
37.00

Figures are subject to changes and corrections.

Source: Central Plan Monitoring Unit, Government of Kerala.10

execution of work, whereas with LGs, the approval of plans as

well as their implementation is delayed beyond half the year.
Needless to say, the economic activities the planners wish to
influence are mostly year-round ones that cannot wait till the
last quarter.
In Figure 1, all the three graphs, representing month-wise
expenditure of development funds of LGs for 2007-08, 2008-09
and 2009-10, were close to floor level till the end of the year
before exploding to touch the roof in the last few months, especially in March. It is alarming that the expenditure achieved
in March alone was as high as 65% of the total annual expenditure in both 2008-09 and 2009-10. Most LGs are constrained
to rush through the implementation process, lest they be
blamed for forfeiting the plan grant-in-aid. This results in
questionable implementation practices, quality and efficiency
deficits, corruption, parking of funds with autonomous implementation agencies, complaints from the public, and audit
objections (GOK 2006).
The signs of bureaucratic capture are seen more vividly
when we dissect the process of plan formulation into its component phases (Table 1). The planning process up to the TAG/
DPC phase takes around four months. This is clear from the
data on submission of plan documents to the TAG in 2011-12
the cumulative proportion of LGs that submitted their plan
proposals was 20% up to the end of June, 76% till the end of
July and 84% in August. It took two to three more months for
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TAG vetting, DPC approval, and issue of DPC proceedings. That

20% of the LGs submitted their plans to the DPC before July
suggests that there is scope for saving time during the initial
stages. But the initial stages involving grama sabhas, development seminars, and working groups are indispensible because
they have a bearing on participation. Avoidable delays occur
mainly after the submission of plan proposals to TAGs. This
phase has more to do with overseeing and disciplining of LGs
from above than plan formulation as such. We shall come back
to the TAG phase later when we discuss alternatives to the
present methodology of planning.
More direct evidence of bureaucratic capture is to be seen in
the government orders related to LG plans. The Kerala Institute of Local Administration (KILA) has done a commendable
job in putting together all the orders and circulars in five volumes running into more than 1,200 pages. A critical reading of
the text of a sample of LG orders will help us understand the
phenomenon of bureaucratic capture. We take the widely
discussed EMS housing programme for illustration. We found
as many as 14 government orders/circulars pertaining to the
programme, each one promising that further clarifications
will follow. The language of the orders is linear, unidirectional,
and clearly undemocratic. The power structure they signify is
so unequal that it leaves no trace of agency to LGs, except
committing their resources, including borrowed funds, for the
programme. An important point of decision of the programme
was the selection of beneficiaries, which left no space
whatsoever for LGs. Norms for identifying the eligible as well
as the steps to pursue the norms were given from above. LGs
were required to appoint verification teams, and super check
teams, but the constitution of the teams was specified
from above.
The idea that everything is best decided from above stretches
far beyond what is suggested here. Formats for receiving applications and preparing the list of beneficiaries, five-digit
codes to be used to identify beneficiaries, and so many other
seemingly trivial things were decided and given as commands
from above. What happens when such a comprehensive regime
of power varies its commands too often? It is not surprising
that representatives as well as officials at the local level found
it humiliating.11 LGs were even denied the freedom that line
departments usually give their field offices.
Many Complicated Orders

It would be interesting to see why the government orders related to LGs show a tendency to multiply in number and get so
complicated in content. Some important factors can be easily
traced. First, some of the orders were meant to demarcate
areas of jurisdiction among different tiers of government, necessitated by the decentralisation that was newly introduced.
Second, there is an element of pedagogy in the language used
and the descriptive style adopted in the orders that tend to
make them uncharacteristically long and voluminous. This is
obviously meant to help newly elected representatives and volunteers. However, it turned out to be counterproductive in
many contexts. For instance, illustrations regarding procedures
56

were interpreted as mandatory steps to be followed in plan formulation. There were also instances where the audit team interpreted the government orders in a literal sense, overlooking
the spirit of capacity building. Third, the LG orders were mechanisms meant to communicate central and state government
priorities, especially guidelines meant to prevent local elite
capture, pertinent to the devolved funds. Fourth, for want of
other viable mechanisms, government orders were used as instruments for coordinating different agencies. Fifth, unlike
the field officers of departments, LGs and local people provided
prompt feedback, frequently necessitating revisions and
amendments. A more important reason that we wish to highlight from the point of view of a possible rethink on the methodology of participatory planning is the overlap between participation and administration.
As a perusal of government orders and guidelines indicate,
they tend to become too rigid and complex when participatory institutions are entrusted with the responsibilities of
public administration, especially execution of government
programmes. In peoples planning, unlike in the participatory publics of Brazil, participation is not restricted to deliberation and ensuring of accountability. On the contrary, participatory institutions are stretched beyond policymaking,
prioritisation and monitoring, and entrusted with the responsibilities of public administration such as preparing project
documents and estimates (working groups), technical vetting
and issuing technical sanction (TAG/committee system),
selecting beneficiaries (grama sabhas), and executing work
(beneficiary committees).
Once participatory institutions are incorporated into the
state machinery, and entrusted with government work, it is
only natural that they will be subject to the discipline of government rules. It is also obvious that such participatory institutions will be made accountable and answerable to higherups in the bureaucracy. In the process, participatory institutions may lose their right to demand accountability and be
critical. Instead, they will find themselves at the receiving end.
The case of beneficiary committees, which were entrusted
with the job of implementing projects, such as construction of
buildings, roads, and canals, help prove the point. It was difficult for genuine beneficiary committees to survive in the environment of elaborate administrative controls and commands
related to execution of work and payment, let alone red tape
and corruption. The system ultimately failed because fake
committees far outnumbered genuine ones. Such beneficiary
committees tended to pre-empt local vigilance groups that
kept a watch on the quality of work executed. The distinction
between citizens, who are entitled to raise questions, and the
state machinery, which is responsible for providing answers,
was blurred and perhaps reversed.
The mix up of participation and administration has important consequences. First, participatory spaces lose their defining features such as autonomy and the right to be critical.
Second, experts/officials are alienated and freed from responsibility. These two points, which are interrelated, can be
illustrated with the example of participatory management
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in a local public health centre (PHC). The local people who

participate in management cannot take over the professional
responsibilities of the doctor. If they do, the doctor cannot be
held responsible for their actions. At the same time, the
professional expertise of the doctor need not be a barrier to
making her/him responsive and accountable to the people.
The example of the PHC and the doctor can be extended to a lot
of other cases.
It needs to be emphasised that peoples participation is not a
substitute for expertise or experience in development planning. The Weber/Schumpeter argument of administrative
complexity we discussed cannot be ignored. We are living in a
world of increasing specialisation, and accumulation of specialised knowledge and expertise in every area. A people who
value democracy should evolve the art and appropriate mechanisms to hire experts and harness knowledge without compromising the canons of popular sovereignty. Coming to the
third point, the overlap between participation and administration makes fixing responsibility and making the system
accountable nearly impossible. Fourth, such an environment
perpetrates corruption. The way out is to free participatory
spaces from those of public administration.
Participation without Execution

Such a shift in the methodology of planning will strengthen

participatory spaces as well as the system of administration.
The way out for citizens is not taking over the burden of administration on their shoulders. Local people cannot take on
the responsibility of constructing all buildings, bridges, and
canals. Neither can they directly run the local school and the
PHC. They can take part in participatory spaces to ensure that
their priorities are properly articulated, respected, and implemented in the most appropriate manner. Citizens and participatory spaces will continue to partake in imagining future
development, identifying development needs and problems,
reviewing past interventions, deliberating alternative solutions, making public opinion on prioritisation, and above all
demanding responsiveness and accountability. If the state
machinery does not respond, the people will have no option
but to further strengthen participation. They can also resort to
other forms of collective action.
Such activities of the local people and participatory institutions need not be constrained by annual plan cycles. Development planning is a continuous process. People and participatory bodies have the right to imagine the future of the region, consult experts, revisit and revise their vision, make development perspectives, and make model development programmes and projects. In grama sabhas and working groups
convened as part of the annual plan cycle, they can insist on
and help in translating public opinion into detailed project
documents and development plans. Such activism of the people need not result in any dilution of the responsibility of the
administrative agency/official concerned; it will need to be responsive as well as accountable to the preferences expressed
by the participatory institutions. Its prime responsibility
will be to develop viable and technologically sound project
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proposals, and own and implement them, besides being transparent and answerable to the people. The administrative hierarchy should also ensure that project proposals are vetted and
issued technical sanction, alongside owning up responsibility
of the technical sanction.
Even though there will be teething troubles, once such
administrative practices are in place, it will free the participatory spaces from the tyranny of government rules and regulations, besides saving time.12 This can be illustrated by going
back to the DPC/TAG phase of the planning cycle, which we referred to as the disciplining phase that accounts for more than
two months of the long planning process. A cursory comparison of LG plans with the state plan will help clarify the point.
The line departments are supposed to submit their plan proposals for the coming year to the state planning board around
September to November every year. After consultations at various levels, the state plan is finalised by the cabinet and presented to the legislative assembly, along with the annual
budget, in March. The departments can start implementing
programmes right from the start of the financial year, as and
when they are given administrative and technical sanction. In
the state plan, detailed administrative and technical vetting of
individual projects and the issue of technical sanction are separated from the process of plan formulation and approval.
These are seen as tasks related to implementation. The plan is
not withheld for want of technical clearance for any particular
project, however important it is. In the case of LG plans, it is
the opposite administrative and technical vetting of projects
precedes implementation.
The TAG/DPC phase is expected to ensure that local plans
fulfil two important requirements. First, that the LGs follow
the prescribed norms and procedures in making the local
plans, and second, that the projects are technically sound and
viable. The first task at the DPC level is unavoidable for ensuring horizontal and vertical integration of development plans,
which might assume more importance once district plans are a
reality. But the responsibility of ensuring technical soundness
of projects is best left to experts and the administrative machinery.13 Moreover, following the model of the state plan, detailed technical vetting can be shifted to the implementation
stage. Finalisation of the plan does not have to wait till the last
project is given technical clearance. It would save two to three
months in the plan cycle because implementation can commence as soon as the plan is approved. Technically complex
projects may take more time to begin but they will not hold
back implementation of other projects, for which technical
sanction may be given quickly.
This change might make it possible to complete the entire
process of plan formulation before the beginning of the plan
year. Bunching of implementation activities in the last quarter
means LGs are in no position to go through the processes of
plan formulation, such as convening grama sabhas, before the
beginning of the new plan year. Once plan implementation is
more evenly spread out, LGs can go by the pattern followed by
the state and central governments and prepare the plan in
advance. If done in this manner, LG plans can be integrated
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SPECIAL ARTICLE

with LG budgets and presented in March, which incidentally

has been a long-pending suggestion for improving local
governance in the state.
Plan Formulation and Limits of Decentralisation

While LGs perform relatively well in the infrastructure and

service sectors, their track record in the goods-producing sector, especially industrial activities, is rather weak. They have
not been particularly successful in creating sustainable livelihood opportunities (GOI 2006, 2008). It is not that LGs have
not made an effort they are bound to pay special attention to
the productive sector because of stringent state government
guidelines on minimum allocation of plan funds to the productive sector. But, as the fact that the government had to impose
such a condition shows, and as LG leaders harp on in most
meetings, they are at a disadvantage in the productive sector.
The microenterprises supported by LGs are characterised by
poor survival rates. In this area, it is difficult to locate model
LGs or enduring individual units. The collapse of the Mancheri
model that came up during the Ninth Plan period, which was
widely hailed for its positive features, and the poor track
record of LGs in general convey important lessons on the limits
of decentralisation. In the case of industrial activities, the
influence of structural factors such as scale economies is much
more pervasive and all the more challenging when it comes to
organising support for producers. Many complementary activities such as organising marketing networks, infrastructure
development, credit, research and development support, or

brand-name development are beyond the reach of lower tiers

of government. Higher tiers of government are better positioned to take up such roles to help LGs successfully intervene
in the productive sector. In the absence of such support, it is
not realistic to expect many success stories from the petty
commodity producers that LGs endeavour to support.
Local planners can, however, imbibe valuable lessons from
their experience, which is marked by success as well as high
failure rates. Green patches are seen in areas least affected by
structural factors such as scale economies, advertisement
intensity, or brand-name loyalty. Farming and dairy, for
instance, have a high number of success stories. Admittedly,
even such sectors suffer from structural issues such as scale,
although on a less intensive level. Development interventions
in such areas succeed when producers are extended organised
support to overcome structural barriers. The support extended
by the Kudumbashree Mission to womens neighbourhood
groups, the Vegetable and Fruit Promotion Council of Kerala
(VFPCK) to vegetable farmers, and the state-level paddy procurement programme to paddy growers is worth mentioning.
The way out is to improve the methodology of planning, perhaps with the help of district plans, to have sustained inter-tier
cooperation and coordination.
Further, LG intervention, especially the package of assistance extended to producers, is typically confined to the below
the poverty line (BPL) category. This is widely reported as a
factor constraining LG intervention in the productive sector
because the beneficiary units more often than not lack

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SPECIAL ARTICLE

minimum viability scale. LG plans should perhaps have a

broader scope than typical anti-poverty programmes. In
priority areas such as food security, the definition of beneficiaries could be broad based to include producers who can attain minimum viability conditions. This, in general, should be
the approach to economic activities with benign externalities,
such as conservation of paddy land, protection of sacred
groves, or a private project proposing to use solid waste to
produce energy.
It is quite unusual for governments, at any level for that matter, to complain about excess supply of resources. But such
complaints are common among LGs, especially in the area of
the SCP and TSP. There are instances of LGs such as the
Kozhikode Corporation surrendering TSP funds back to the
state government. The problems discussed in the context of LG
intervention in agriculture and industrial activities are more
severe in the case of the SCP and TSP. Landlessness or inadequate possession of land makes agriculture and allied activities unviable for many SCP and TSP beneficiaries. In industrial
activities, the general limitations are also applicable to the SCP
and TSP. This issue assumes added importance because LGs are
penalised for expenditure shortfalls in the SCP and TSP by cutting down their general purpose funds. Such shortfalls and
compensation from general purpose funds leave many LGs
with very limited space to plan projects in the general segment. In our opinion, the root cause of the problem is the structural constraints that limit the capacity of lower tiers of government to formulate viable SCP and TSP projects. Such structural barriers are best addressed at higher levels of government. Therefore, the state government should either scale
down the proportion of SCP and TSP funds earmarked for LGs,
or come up with an effective support mechanism to make their
projects sustainable.
Conclusions

An assessment of the methodology of participatory planning

cannot ignore the system that existed before its introduction.
Almost everything related to development administration that
comes up for decision in participatory planning now was earlier decided by line department bureaucracies, that too through
non-transparent processes. Local governance was eventless
and noise free. That it has suddenly become a contested
terrain, embedded in debates and collective action, is a sign of
successful democratisation. The experiment no doubt has
resulted in commendable expansion of the democratic space,
in terms of electoral competition as well as more direct avenues of participation. Nonetheless, signs of participation fatigue and bureaucratic capture are too obvious to be ignored.
There are objective limits to decentralisation that constrain
LGs in their efforts to live up to the expectation of the people.
This comes out quite sharply in the case of their inability to
create livelihood opportunities for the people, especially in the
goods-producing sector because of structural reasons. The distribution of powers and responsibilities across different tiers
of government, and the methodology of planning, ought to be
made more sensitive to the limits faced by the lower tiers. In
Economic & Political Weekly

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vol xlviii no 36

many areas of their activity, especially in the case of livelihood

support programmes, LGs cannot do well without appropriate
support from higher tiers of government. This is particularly
true in the case of the SCP and TSP. The methodology of planning, therefore, should ensure better inter-tier cooperation
and coordination.
The more important challenge is bureaucratic capture that
bogs down participatory institutions and LGs with innumerable
rules, regulations, and procedures. The present bureaucracyinfested methodology of planning that delays implementation
till the last quarter of the year cannot be sustained. Though
there are many reasons for the proliferation of restrictive rules
and excessive disciplining from above, the overlap between
participatory spaces and public administration stands out. The
regulations tend to multiply and become more restrictive
when participatory institutions stray into the realm of public
administration. The way out is to have a clear dividing line
between participation and public administration. Such a division will only help the cause of democratisation. It will help
participatory institutions retain their autonomy and right to be
critical, which are important in making LGs responsive and
accountable to the people.
Citizens and participatory spaces will continue to partake in
imagining future development, identifying development
needs and problems, deliberating on alternative solutions,
helping formulate projects, forming public opinion on prioritisation, reviewing development intervention by different tiers
of government, and above all demanding responsiveness and
accountability. In other words, participation can be extended
well beyond the production of governments. But participatory
institutions will not take over public administration or replace
experts/administrative agencies.
The dividing line between participation and administration
will also help address the problem of alienation of experts and
make the system more accountable. The criticism of administrative complexity cannot be set aside easily. Instead of replacing experts and absolving them of responsibilities, participatory planning should strive to make the maximum use of expertise within the government as well as outside without compromising on the principles of accountability and responsiveness to the people. A people who value democracy should
evolve the art and appropriate mechanisms to hire experts and
harness knowledge without compromising on the canons of
popular sovereignty.
Notes
1 The press conference was covered by most newspapers the next day. The
City Corporation and many other LGs later requested the government to
extend the period of implementation by three months. The crisis on account of delays has worsened in 2012-13.
2 The Kerala Institute of Local Administration (KILA 2009a, b, c, d, and e)
has compiled all relevant government orders and circulars pertaining to
decentralisation in the state till then.
3 We organised two state-level workshops and several village-level meetings, apart from interviews with several key informants. We have also benefited from an online discussion (decwatch@googlegroups.com). We are
thankful to the participants for their valuable suggestions.
4 For a detailed presentation of the alternative methodology, see Harilal
(2012).
5 It would be nave to assume that the state, especially since its neo-liberal

59

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10

11

12

13

turn, will tolerate significant progress towards

democratisation. As Chatterjee (1997) has
shown, it will evolve strategies to overcome
such challenges to accumulation. But, it is
equally nave to imagine that the war for democracy will be so easily lost, particularly in a
region such as Kerala, known for the its rich
history of democratisation movements. For a
relevant critique of Chatterjees arguments, see
Mannathukkaran (2010).
Avritzer (2002: 51-53) speaks about the dangers of conflating deliberative decision-making
with public administration. He also emphasises the need to protect the autonomy and internal complexity of the administrative realm.
Bharanavum samaravum can be translated as
ruling and struggling. This was the strategy
employed by the left in Kerala. The communist
party used to mobilise people against the
government even when it led the state
government.
Important features of the methodology practised during the Eleventh Plan period, which
we analyse in the paper, are available in a government order, GO (MS)/128/2007/LSGD, dated 14 May 2007. Notably, the state government
has recently introduced some changes for the
Twelfth Plan period. An account of the methodology used during the initial years (Ninth
Plan) is in Isaac and Harilal (1997).
The data on submission and approval of LG
plans used in this study were collected from
the local self-government department, Government of Kerala.
Data on plan expenditure are not published.
The CPMU prepares reports (unpublished) to
facilitate reviews within the government. Our
source is CPMU review reports.
What embarrassed them the most was frequent
changes in the list of beneficiaries because of
changes in the norms. They found it very difficult to explain such changes to people and convince them.
This is the practice in the state government.
But such a shift at the LG level presupposes preparatory changes such as a reduction in the
number of projects, strengthening of the local
administrative set-up, better coordination with
line departments, and so on.
Absence of role clarity has affected the quality
of LG projects. But, as the experience so far
proves, TAG vetting is unlikely to improve the
quality of projects. It is difficult for TAGs to
verify thousands of projects that reach the DPC
in time. Over time, therefore, TAG vetting has
become a ritual.

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