RIGHT TO ASSOCIATION CASES

SSS Employee Asso. v CA 175 SCRA 686 (July 28, 1989)

Facts: The petitioners went on strike after the SSS failed to act upon the unions demands concerning the
implementation of their CBA. SSS filed before the court action for damages with prayer for writ of
preliminary injunction against petitioners for staging an illegal strike. The court issued a temporary
restraining order pending the resolution of the application for preliminary injunction while petitioners
filed a motion to dismiss alleging the courts lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Petitioners
contend that the court made reversible error in taking cognizance on the subject matter since the
jurisdiction lies on the DOLE or the National Labor Relations Commission as the case involves a labor
dispute. The SSS contends on one hand that the petitioners are covered by the Civil Service laws, rules
and regulation thus have no right to strike. They are not covered by the NLRC or DOLE therefore the
court may enjoin the petitioners from striking.
Issue: Whether or not SSS employers have the right to strike
Whether or not the CA erred in taking jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Held: The Constitutional provisions enshrined on Human Rights and Social Justice provides guarantee
among workers with the right to organize and conduct peaceful concerted activities such as strikes. On
one hand, Section 14 of E.O No. 180 provides that the Civil Service law and rules governing concerted
activities and strikes in the government service shall be observed,
subject to any legislation that may be enacted by Congress referring to Memorandum Circular No. 6, s.
1987 of the Civil Service Commission which states that prior to the enactment by Congress of applicable
laws concerning strike by government employees enjoins under pain of administrative sanctions, all
government officers and employees from staging strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs and
other forms of mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public service.
Therefore in the absence of any legislation allowing govt. employees to strike they are prohibited from
doing so.
In Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 the employees in the civil service are denominated as government employees
and that the SSS is one such government-controlled corporation with an original charter, having been
created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of the civil service and are covered by the Civil
Service Commissions memorandum prohibiting strikes.
Neither the DOLE nor the NLRC has jurisdiction over the subject matter but instead it is the Public
Sector Labor-Management Council which is not granted by law authority to issue writ of injunction in
labor disputes within its jurisdiction thus the resort of SSS before the general court for the issuance of a
writ of injunction to enjoin the strike is appropriate.

GSIS vs. KAPISANAN ng mga Manggagawa sa GSIS

510 S 623
FACTS: A four day concerted demonstration, rallies and en masse walkout was held in front of the GSIS
main building in Pasay City. The mass action participants were GSIS personnel, among them are
members of the herein KAPISANAN, a public sector union of GSIS rank and file employees. Said mass
action targets the herein petitioner GARCIA and his management style.
On October 10, 2004 the manager of the GSIS Investigating Unit issued a Memo directing 131 union and
non-union members to show cause why they should not be charged administratively for participating in
the rally. KAPISANANs counsel, Atty. Molina sought reconsideration of the said memo on the ground
that the subject employees resumed work in obedience of the return to work issued.
However, the plea of reconsideration was denied by the filing, on October 25 2004, of the administrative
charges against some 110 KAPISANAN members for grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service. KAPISANAN then filed a Petition for Prohibition before the CA, on the
grounds that:
Members should not be made to explain why they supported their unions cause
Petitioner Garcia blatantly disregarded Civil Service Reso No. 021316 otherwise known as the Guidelines
for Prohibited Mass Action
Pending resolution of the petition for prohibition of the CA, the GSIS Management proceeded with the
investigation of the admin cases which resolved 207 out of 278 cases, resulting to the exoneration of 20
respondent-employees, reprimand of 182 and suspension of 5.
On June 16 2005, the CA rendered the herein ASSAILED decision holding that Garcias filing of admin
charges against 361 of KAPISANANs members is TANTAMOUNT to GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION which may be the proper subject of the writ of prohibition. Unable to accept the above
ruling, petitioner GARCIA sought reconsideration, which was denied. Hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the right of public sector to form unions or associations include right to strike?
HELD: Negative. Employees in the public service may not engage in strikes or in concerted and
unauthorized stoppage of work. The right of government employees to organize is limited to the
formation of unions or associations, without including the right to strike. Fact remains that the erring
employees, instead of exploring non-crippling activities during their free time, had taken a disruptive
approach to attain whatever it was they were specifically after. As events evolved, they assembled in front
of the GSIS main office building during office hours and staged rallies and protests, and even tried to
convince others to join their cause, thus provoking work stoppage and service-delivery disruption, the
very evil sought to be forestalled by the prohibition against strikes by government personnel.

Occena vs. Commission on Elections

[GR 56350, 2 April 1981]
Facts: The challenge in these two prohibition proceedings against the validity of three Batasang Pambansa
Resolutions proposing constitutional amendments, goes further than merely assailing their alleged
constitutional infirmity. Samuel Occena and Ramon A. Gonzales, both members of the Philippine Bar and
former delegates to the 1971 Constitutional Convention that framed the present Constitution, are suing as
taxpayers. The rather unorthodox aspect of these petitions is the assertion that the 1973 Constitution is not
the fundamental law, the Javellana ruling to the contrary notwithstanding.
Issue: Whether the 1973 Constitution was valid, and in force and effect when the Batasang Pambansa
resolutions and the present petitions were promulgated and filed, respectively.
Ruling: It is much too late in the day to deny the force and applicability of the 1973 Constitution. In the
dispositive portion of Javellana v. The Executive Secretary, dismissing petitions for prohibition and
mandamus to declare invalid its ratification, this Court stated that it did so by a vote of six to four. It then
concluded: "This being the vote of the majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to the new
Constitution being considered in force and effect." Such a statement served a useful purpose. It could
even be said that there was a need for it. It served to clear the atmosphere. It made manifest that as of 17
January 1973, the present Constitution came into force and effect. With such a pronouncement by the
Supreme Court and with the recognition of the cardinal postulate that what the Supreme Court says is not
only entitled to respect but must also be obeyed, a factor for instability was removed. Thereafter, as a
matter of law, all doubts were resolved. The 1973 Constitution is the fundamental law. It is as simple as
that. What cannot be too strongly stressed is that the function of judicial review has both a positive and a
negative aspect. As was so convincingly demonstrated by Professors Black and Murphy, the Supreme
Court can check as well as legitimate. In declaring what the law is, it may not only nullify the acts of
coordinate branches but may also sustain their validity. In the latter case, there is an affirmation that what
was done cannot be stigmatized as constitutionally deficient. The mere dismissal of a suit of this character
suffices. That is the meaning of the concluding statement in Javellana. Since then, this Court has
invariably applied the present Constitution. The latest case in point is People v. Sola, promulgated barely
two weeks ago. During the first year alone of the effectivity of the present Constitution, at least ten cases
may be cited.

IN RE: EDILLON (AC 1928 12/19/1980)

FACTS: The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing Attorney in the Philippines. The
IBP Board of Governors recommended to the Court the removal of the name of the respondent from
its Roll of Attorneys for stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues assailing the provisions of the Rule
of Court 139-A and the provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article III, of the IBP By-Laws pertaining to the
organization of IBP, payment of membership fee and suspension for failure to pay the same.
Edillon contends that the stated provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense
that he is being compelled as a pre-condition to maintain his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a

member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled
financial support of the said organization to which he is admitted personally antagonistic, he is being
deprived of the rights to liberty and properly guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the
respondent concludes the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no
legal force and effect.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court may compel Atty. Edillion to pay his membership fee to the IBP.
HELD: The Integrated Bar is a State-organized Bar which every lawyer must be a member of as
distinguished from bar associations in which membership is merely optional and voluntary. All lawyers
are subject to comply with the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar including payment a
reasonable annual fees as one of the requirements. The Rules of Court only compels him to pay his annual
dues and it is not in violation of his constitutional freedom to associate. Bar integration does not compel
the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not the meeting of his Integrated Bar Chapter
or vote or refuse to vote in its election as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the
payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court in order to further the States legitimate interest in elevating
the quality of professional legal services, may require thet the cost of the regulatory program the
lawyers.
Such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. The right to practice law
before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And if the
power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize then a penalty designed to enforce its
payment is not void as unreasonable as arbitrary. Furthermore, the Court has jurisdiction over matters of
admission, suspension, disbarment, and reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation as part of its
inherent judicial functions and responsibilities thus the court may compel all members of the Integrated
Bar to pay their annual dues.
G.R. No. 122226 March 25, 1998
UNITED PEPSI-COLA SUPERVISORY UNION (UPSU), petitioner,
vs.
HON. BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA and PEPSI-COLA PRODUCTS, PHILIPPINES, INC.
respondents.
FACTS: Petitioner is a union of supervisory employees. It appears that on March 20, 1995 the union filed
a petition for certification election on behalf of the route managers at Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines,
Inc. However, its petition was denied by the med-arbiter and, on appeal, by the Secretary of Labor and
Employment, on the ground that the route managers are managerial employees and, therefore, ineligible
for union membership under the first sentence of Art. 245 of the Labor Code, which provides:
Ineligibility of managerial employees to join any labor organization; right of supervisory employees.
Managerial employees are not eligible to join, assist or form any labor organization. Supervisory
employees shall not be eligible for membership in a labor organization of the rank-and-file employees but
may join, assist or form separate labor organizations of their own.
Petitioner brought this suit challenging the validity of the order, dismissed.

Hence, this petition. Pressing for resolution its contention that the first sentence of Art. 245 of the Labor
Code, so far as it declares managerial employees to be ineligible to form, assist or join unions,
contravenes Art. III, 8 of the Constitution which provides:
The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions,
associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.
ISSUES:
(1) whether the route managers at Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc. are managerial employees and
(2) whether Art. 245, insofar as it prohibits managerial employees from forming, joining or assisting labor
unions, violates Art. III, 8 of the Constitution.
HELD: YES and NO
As a class, managers constitute three levels of a pyramid: (1) Top management; (2) Middle Management;
and (3) First-line Management [also called supervisors].
FIRST-LINE MANAGERS The lowest level in an organization at which individuals are responsible
for the work of others is called first-line or first-level management. First-line managers direct operating
employees only; they do not supervise other managers. Examples of first-line managers are the foreman
or production supervisor in a manufacturing plant, the technical supervisor in a research department, and
the clerical supervisor in a large office. First-level managers are often called supervisors.
MIDDLE MANAGERS The term middle management can refer to more than one level in an
organization. Middle managers direct the activities of other managers and sometimes also those of
operating employees. Middle managers principal responsibilities are to direct the activities that
implement their organizations policies and to balance the demands of their superiors with the capacities
of their subordinates. A plant manager in an electronics firm is an example of a middle manager.
TOP MANAGERS Composed of a comparatively small group of executives, top management is
responsible for the overall management of the organization. It establishes operating policies and guides
the organizations interactions with its environment. Typical titles of top managers are chief executive
officer, president, and senior vice-president. Actual titles vary from one organization to another and
are not always a reliable guide to membership in the highest management classification.
A distinction exists between those who have the authority to devise, implement and control strategic and
operational policies (top and middle managers) and those whose task is simply to ensure that such
policies are carried out by the rank-and-file employees of an organization (first-level
managers/supervisors). What distinguishes them from the rank-and-file employees is that they act in the
interest of the employer in supervising such rank-and-file employees.
Managerial employees may therefore be said to fall into two distinct categories: the managers per se,
who compose the former group described above, and the supervisors who form the latter group.
#1: It appears that this question was the subject of two previous determinations by the Secretary of Labor
and Employment, in accordance with which this case was decided by the med-arbiter.

To qualify as managerial employee, there must be a clear showing of the exercise of managerial attributes
under paragraph (m), Article 212 of the Labor Code as amended. Designations or titles of positions are
not controlling. As to the route managers and accounting manager, we are convinced that they are
managerial employees. Their job descriptions clearly reveal so (Workers Alliance Trade Union (WATU)
v. Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc., Nov. 13, 1991)
This finding was reiterated in Case No. OS-A-3-71-92. entitled In Re: Petition for Direct Certification
and/or Certification Election-Route Managers/Supervisory Employees of Pepsi-Cola Products Phils.Inc.
* doctrine of res judicata certainly applies to adversary administrative proceedings
Thus, we have in this case an experts view that the employees concerned are managerial employees
within the purview of Art. 212.
At the very least, the principle of finality of administrative determination compels respect for the finding
of the Secretary of Labor that route managers are managerial employees as defined by law in the absence
of anything to show that such determination is without substantial evidence to support it.
The Court now finds that the job evaluation made by the Secretary of Labor is indeed supported by
substantial evidence. The nature of the job of route managers is given in a four-page pamphlet, prepared
by the company, called Route Manager Position Description, the pertinent parts of which read:
A. BASIC PURPOSE
A Manager achieves objectives through others.
As a Route Manager, your purpose is to meet the sales plan; and you achieve this objective through the
skillful MANAGEMENT OF YOUR JOB AND THE MANAGEMENT OF YOUR PEOPLE.
These then are your functions as Pepsi-Cola Route Manager. Within these functions managing your
job and managing your people you are accountable to your District Manager for the execution and
completion of various tasks and activities which will make it possible for you to achieve your sales
objectives.
Xxxx
Distinction is evident in the work of the route managers which sets them apart from supervisors in
general. Unlike supervisors who basically merely direct operating employees in line with set tasks
assigned to them, route managers are responsible for the success of the companys main line of business
through management of their respective sales teams. Such management necessarily involves the planning,
direction, operation and evaluation of their individual teams and areas which the work of supervisors does
not entail.
The route managers cannot thus possibly be classified as mere supervisors because their work does not
only involve, but goes far beyond, the simple direction or supervision of operating employees to
accomplish objectives set by those above them.
While route managers do not appear to have the power to hire and fire people (the evidence shows that
they only recommended or endorsed the taking of disciplinary action against certain employees), this
is because thisis a function of the Human Resources or Personnel Department of the company.
# 2: Constitutionality of Art. 245
Art.245 is the result of the amendment of the Labor Code in 1989 by R.A. No. 6715, otherwise known as
the Herrera-Veloso Law. Unlike the Industrial Peace Act or the provisions of the Labor Code which it

superseded, R.A. No. 6715 provides separate definitions of the terms managerial and supervisory
employees, as follows:
Art. 212. Definitions. . . .
(m) managerial employee is one who is vested with powers or prerogatives to lay down and execute
management policies and/or to hire transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline
employees. Supervisory employees are those who, in the interest of the employer, effectively recommend
such managerial actions if the exercise of such authority is not merely routinary or clerical in nature but
requires the use of independent judgment. All employees not falling within any of the above definitions
are considered rank-and-file employees for purposes of this Book.
The distinction between top and middle managers, who set management policy, and front-line
supervisors, who are merely responsible for ensuring that such policies are carried out by the rank and
file, is articulated in the present definition. 30 When read in relation to this definition in Art. 212(m), it
will be seen that Art. 245 faithfully carries out the intent of the Constitutional Commission in framing Art.
III, 8 of the fundamental law.
*Framers Intent: MR. LERUM. My amendment is on Section 7, page 2, line 19, which is to insert
between the words people and to the following: WHETHER EMPLOYED BY THE STATE OR
PRIVATE ESTABLISHMENTS. In other words, the section will now read as follows: The right of the
people WHETHER EMPLOYED BY THE STATE OR PRIVATE ESTABLISHMENTS to form
associations, unions, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.
Nor is the guarantee of organizational right in Art. III, 8 infringed by a ban against managerial
employees forming a union. The right guaranteed in Art. III, 8 is subject to the condition that its exercise
should be for purposes not contrary to law. In the case of Art. 245, there is a rational basis for
prohibiting managerial employees from forming or joining labor organizations.
PETITION is DISMISSED.

FACTS:
The petitioner is a union of supervisory employees. It appears that on March 20, 1995 the union filed a
petition for certification on behalf of the route managers at Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc.
However, its petition was denied by the med-arbiter and, on appeal, by the Secretary of Labor and
Employment, on the ground that the route managers are managerial employees and, therefore, ineligible
for union membership under the first sentence of Art 245 of the Labor Code, which provides:
Ineligibility of managerial employees to join any labor organization; right of supervisory employeesManagerial employees are not eligible to join, assist or form any labor organization. Supervisory
employees shall not be eligible for membership in a labor organization of the rank-and-file employees but
may join, assist or form separate labor organizations of their own.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, pressing for resolution its contention that the first
sentence of Art. 245 of the Labor Code, so far declares managerial employees to be ineligible to form,
assit or join unions, contravenes Article III, Section 8 of the 1987 Constitution which provides:

The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors to form unions,
associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Art. 245, insofar as it prohibits managerial employees from forming, joining or assisting
labor unions, violates Article III, Section 8 of the Constitution.
RULING:
Art. 245 do not violate Article III, Section 8 of the Constitution. The real intent of Article III,
section 8 is evident in Lerums proposal. The Commission intended the absolute right to organize of
government workers, supervisory employees and security guards to be constitutionally guaranteed. By
implication, no similar absolute constitutional rights to organize for labor purposes should be deemed to
have been granted to top-level and middle managers. Nor is the guarantee of organizational right in Art.
III, Section 8 of the Constitution infringed by a ban against managerial employees forming a union. The
guaranteed right in Art. III, Section 8 is subject to the condition that its exercise should be for the
purposes not contrary to law. In the case of Art 245, there is rational basis for prohibiting managerial
employees from forming or joining labor organization. For the reason that these managerial employees
would belong to or be affiliated with a Union, the latter might not be assured of their loyalty to the Union
in view of evident conflict of interest. The union also becomes company-dominated with the presence of
managerial employees in Union membership.