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RIGHT TO INFORMATION CASE DIGESTS

Chavez v. Pea and Amari


Fact:
In 1973, the Comissioner on Public Highways entered into a contract to reclaim areas of Manila Bay with
the Construction and Development Corportion of the Philippines (CDCP).
PEA (Public Estates Authority) was created by President Marcos under P.D. 1084, tasked with developing
and leasing reclaimed lands. These lands were transferred to the care of PEA under P.D. 1085 as part of
the Manila Cavite Road and Reclamation Project (MCRRP). CDCP and PEA entered into an agreement
that all future projects under the MCRRP would be funded and owned by PEA.
By 1988, President Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517 transferring lands to PEA. It was followed by
the transfer of three Titles (7309, 7311 and 7312) by the Register of Deeds of Paranaque to PEA covering
the three reclaimed islands known as the FREEDOM ISLANDS.
Subsquently, PEA entered into a joint venture agreement (JVA) with AMARI, a Thai-Philippine
corporation to develop the Freedom Islands. Along with another 250 hectares, PEA and AMARI entered
the JVA which would later transfer said lands to AMARI. This caused a stir especially when Sen. Maceda
assailed the agreement, claiming that such lands were part of public domain (famously known as the
mother of all scams).
Peitioner Frank J. Chavez filed case as a taxpayer praying for mandamus, a writ of preliminary injunction
and a TRO against the sale of reclaimed lands by PEA to AMARI and from implementing the JVA.
Following these events, under President Estradas admin, PEA and AMARI entered into an Amended JVA
and Mr. Chaves claim that the contract is null and void.
Issue:
w/n: the transfer to AMARI lands reclaimed or to be reclaimed as part of the stipulations in the
(Amended) JVA between AMARI and PEA violate Sec. 3 Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution
w/n: the court is the proper forum for raising the issue of whether the amended joint venture agreement is
grossly disadvantageous to the government.
Held:
On the issue of Amended JVA as violating the constitution:
1. The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of
title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may lease these lands to private
corporations but may not sell or transfer ownership of these lands to private corporations. PEA may only
sell these lands to Philippine citizens, subject to the ownership limitations in the 1987 Constitution and
existing laws.
2. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural resources of the
public domain until classified as alienable or disposable lands open to disposition and declared no longer
needed for public service. The government can make such classification and declaration only after PEA
has reclaimed these submerged areas. Only then can these lands qualify as agricultural lands of the public

domain, which are the only natural resources the government can alienate. In their present state, the
592.15 hectares of submerged areas are inalienable and outside the commerce of man.
3. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of 77.34
hectares110 of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of
the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of
the public domain.
4. Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156 hectares111 of still
submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the
public domain.
PEA may reclaim these submerged areas. Thereafter, the government can classify the reclaimed lands as
alienable or disposable, and further declare them no longer needed for public service. Still, the transfer of
such reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain to AMARI will be void in view of Section 3, Article
XII of the 1987Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable
land of the public domain.

GARCIA VS BOARD OF INVESTMENTS


G.R. No. 92024 November 9 1990
FACTS:
The Bataan Petrochemical Corporation (BPC), a Taiwanese private corporation, applied for registration
with the Board of Investments (BOI) in February 1988 as a new domestic producer of petrochemicals in
the Philippines. It originally specified the province of Bataan as the site for the proposed investment but
later submitted an amended application to change the site to Batangas. Unhappy with the change of the
site, Congressman Enrique Garcia of the Second District of Bataan requested a copy of BPCs original
and amended application documents. The BoI denied the request on the basis that the investors in BPC
had declined to give their consent to the release of the documents requested, and that Article 81 of the
Omnibus Investments Code protects the confidentiality of these documents absent consent to disclose.
The BoI subsequently approved the amended application without holding a second hearing or publishing
notice of the amended application. Garcia filed a petition before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the BoI committed grave abuse of discretion in yielding to the wishes of the
investor, national interest notwithstanding.

RULING:

The Court ruled that the BoI violated Garcias Constitutional right to have access to information on
matters of public concern under Article III, Section 7 of the Constitution. The Court found that the
inhabitants of Bataan had an interest in the establishment of the petrochemical plant in their midst [that]
is actual, real, and vital because it will affect not only their economic life, but even the air they breathe
The Court also ruled that BPCs amended application was in fact a second application that required a
new public notice to be filed and a new hearing to be held.

Although Article 81 of the Omnibus Investments Code provides that all applications and their supporting
documents filed under this code shall be confidential and shall not be disclosed to any person, except with
the consent of the applicant, the Court emphasized that Article 81 provides for disclosure on the orders
of a court of competent jurisdiction. The Court ruled that it had jurisdiction to order disclosure of the
application, amended application, and supporting documents filed with the BOI under Article 81, with
certain exceptions.
The Court went on to note that despite the right to access information, the Constitution does not open
every door to any and all information because the law may exempt certain types of information from
public scrutiny. Thus it excluded the trade secrets and confidential, commercial, and financial
information of the applicant BPC, and matters affecting national security from its order. The Court did
not provide a test for what information is excluded from the Constitutional privilege to access public
information, nor did it specify the kinds of information that BPC could withhold under its ruling.

VALENTIN L. LEGASPI
vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
Facts:
The fundamental right of the people to information on matters of public concern is invoked in this special
civil action for mandamus instituted by petitioner Valentin L. Legaspi against the Civil Service
Commission. The respondent had earlier denied Legaspi's request for information on the civil service
eligibilities of certain persons employed as sanitarians in the Health Department of Cebu City. These
government employees, Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, had allegedly represented themselves as
civil service eligibles who passed the civil service examinations for sanitarians.

Claiming that his right to be informed of the eligibilities of Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, is
guaranteed by the Constitution, and that he has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy to acquire the
information, petitioner prays for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of mandamus to compel the
respondent Commission to disclose said information.

The Solicitor General interposes procedural objections to give due course to this Petition. He challenges
the petitioner's standing to sue upon the ground that the latter does not possess any clear legal right to be
informed of the civil service eligibilities of the government employees concerned. He calls attention to
the alleged failure of the petitioner to show his actual interest in securing this particular information. He
further argues that there is no ministerial duty on the part of the Commission to furnish the petitioner with
the information he seeks.
Issues:
a.
Whether or not the Civil Service Commission is obliged to produce the information regarding the
eligibilities of certain persons employed as sanitarians in the Health Department of Cebu City?
b.

Whether or not the petitioner has a standing to assert the right to information?

Ruling:
a. This question is first addressed to the government agency having custody of the desired
information. However, as already discussed, this does not give the agency concerned any discretion to
grant or deny access. In case of denial of access, the government agency has the burden of showing that
the information requested is not of public concern, or, if it is of public concern, that the same has been
exempted by law from the operation of the guarantee. To hold otherwise will serve to dilute the
constitutional right. As aptly observed, ". . . the government is in an advantageous position to marshall
and interpret arguments against release . . ." (87 Harvard Law Review 1511 [1974]). To safeguard the
constitutional right, every denial of access by the government agency concerned is subject to review by
the courts, and in the proper case, access may be compelled by a writ of Mandamus.
In determining whether or not a particular information is of public concern there is no rigid test which can
be applied. "Public concern" like "public interest" is a term that eludes exact definition. Both terms
embrace a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either because these directly
affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen. In the
final analysis, it is for the courts to determine in a case by case basis whether the matter at issue is of
interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the public.
b. In the instant, case while refusing to confirm or deny the claims of eligibility, the respondent
has failed to cite any provision in the Civil Service Law which would limit the petitioner's right to know
who are, and who are not, civil service eligibles. We take judicial notice of the fact that the names of those
who pass the civil service examinations, as in bar examinations and licensure examinations for various
professions, are released to the public. Hence, there is nothing secret about one's civil service eligibility, if
actually possessed. Petitioner's request is, therefore, neither unusual nor unreasonable. And when, as in
this case, the government employees concerned claim to be civil service eligibles, the public, through any
citizen, has a right to verify their professed eligibilities from the Civil Service Commission.
The civil service eligibility of a sanitarian being of public concern, and in the absence of express
limitations under the law upon access to the register of civil service eligibles for said position, the duty of
the respondent Commission to confirm or deny the civil service eligibility of any person occupying the
position becomes imperative. Mandamus, therefore lies.

WHEREFORE, the Civil Service Commission is ordered to open its register of eligibles for the position
of sanitarian, and to confirm or deny, the civil service eligibility of Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano
Agas, for said position in the Health Department of Cebu City, as requested by the petitioner Valentin L.
Legaspi.

Chavez v. PCGG, 299 SCRA 744


FACTS: Petitioner asks this Court to define the nature and the extent of the peoples constitutional right to
information on matters of public concern. Petitioner, invoking his constitutional right to information and
the correlative duty of the state to disclose publicly all its transactions involving the national interest,
demands that respondents make public any and all negotiations and agreements pertaining to PCGGs
task of recovering the Marcoses ill-gotten wealth.
ISSUE: Are the negotiations leading to a settlement on ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses within the scope
of the constitutional guarantee of access to information?
HELD: Yes. Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution, it is incumbent upon the PCGG and
its officers, as well as other government representatives, to disclose sufficient public information on any
proposed settlement they have decided to take up with the ostensible owners and holders of ill-gotten
wealth. Such information, though, must pertain to definite propositions of the government, not necessarily
to intra-agency or inter-agency recommendations or communications during the stage when common
assertions are still in the process of being formulated or are in the exploratory stage. There is a need, of
course, to observe the same restrictions on disclosure of information in general -- such as on matters
involving national security, diplomatic or foreign relations, intelligence and other classified information.
GONZALES VS. NARVASA
G.R. No. 140835, August 14 2000
FACTS:
Petitioner Ramon A. Gonzales, in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer, filed a petition for prohibition
and mandamus filed on December 9, 1999, assailing the constitutionality of the creation of the
Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform (PCCR) and of the positions of presidential
consultants, advisers and assistants. The Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform (PCCR) was
created by President Estrada on November 26, 1998 by virtue of Executive OrderNo. 43 (E.O. No. 43) in
order to study and recommend proposed amendmentsand/or revisions to the 1987 Constitution, and
the manner of implementing the same. Petitioner disputes the constitutionality of the PCCR based on the
grounds that it is a public office which only the legislature can create by way of a law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner has a legal standing to assail the constitutionality ofExecutive Order No. 43

HELD:
The Court dismissed the petition. A citizen acquires standing only if he can establish that he has suffered
some actual or threatened injury as a result of theallegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is
fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.
Petitioner has not shown that he has sustained or is in danger of sustaining any personal
injury attributable to the creation of the PCCR. If at all, it is only Congress, not petitioner, which
can claim any injury in this case since, according to petitioner, the President has encroached upon the
legislatures powers to create a public office and to propose amendments to the Charter by forming the
PCCR. Petitioner has sustained no direct, or even any indirect, injury. Neither does he claim that his
rights or privileges have been or are in danger of being violated, nor that he shall be subjected to any
penalties or burdens as a result of the PCCRs activities. Clearly, petitioner has failed to establish his
locus standi so as to enable him to seek judicial redress as a citizen.
Furthermore, a taxpayer is deemed to have the standing to raise a constitutional issue when it is
established that public funds have been disbursed in alleged contravention of the law or the Constitution.
It is readily apparent that there is no exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power. The PCCR
was created by the President by virtue of E.O. No. 43, as amended by E.O. No. 70. Under section 7 of
E.O. No. 43, the amount of P3 million is appropriated for its operational expenses to be sourced from
the funds of the Office of the President. Being that case, petitioner must show that he is a real party in
interest - that he will stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment or that he will be entitled to the
avails of the suit. Nowhere in his pleadings does petitioner presume to make such a representation.

Valmonte vs. Belmonte [GR 74930, 13 February 1989]


Facts: Ricardo Valmonte wrote Feliciano Belmonte Jr. on 4 June 1986, requesting to be "furnished with
the list of names of the opposition members of (the) Batasang Pambansa who were able to secure a clean
loan of P2 million each on guaranty (sic) of Mrs. Imelda Marcos" and also to "be furnished with the
certified true copies of the documents evidencing their loan. Expenses in connection herewith shall be
borne by" Valmonte, et. al. Due to serious legal implications, President & General Manager Feliciano
Belmonte, Jr. referred the letter to the Deputy General Counsel of the GSIS, Meynardo A. Tiro. Tiro
replied that it is his opinion "that a confidential relationship exists between the GSIS and all those who
borrow from it, whoever they may be; that the GSIS has a duty to its customers to preserve this
confidentiality; and that it would not be proper for the GSIS to breach this confidentiality unless so
ordered by the courts." On 20 June 1986, apparently not having yet received the reply of the Government
Service and Insurance System (GSIS) Deputy General Counsel, Valmonte wrote Belmonte another letter,
saying that for failure to receive a reply "(W)e are now considering ourselves free to do whatever action
necessary within the premises to pursue our desired objective in pursuance of public interest." On 26 June
1986, Ricardo Valmonte, Oswaldo Carbonell, Doy Del Castillo, Rolando Bartolome, Leo Obligar, Jun
Gutierrez, Reynaldo Bagatsing, Jun "Ninoy" Alba, Percy Lapid, Rommel Corro, and Rolando Fadul filed
a special civil action for mandamus with preliminary injunction invoke their right to information and pray
that Belmonte be directed: (a) to furnish Valmonte, et. al. the list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa
members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were able to secure clean loans immediately
before the February 7 election thru the intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos;

and/or (b) to furnish petitioners with certified true copies of the documents evidencing their respective
loans; and/or (c) to allow petitioners access to the public records for the subject information.
Issue: Whether Valmonte, et. al. may access GSIS records pertaining to behest loans secured by Imelda
Marcos in favor of certain members of the opposition in the Batasang Pambansa.
Held: The pertinent provision under the 1987 Constitution is Art. 111, Sec. 7 states that "The right of the
people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to
documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government
research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law." An informed citizenry with access to the diverse currents in
political, moral and artistic thought and data relative to them, and the free exchange of ideas and
discussion of issues thereon, is vital to the democratic government envisioned under our Constitution. The
cornerstone of this republican system of government is delegation of power by the people to the State. In
this system, governmental agencies and institutions operate within the limits of the authority conferred by
the people. Denied access to information on the inner workings of government, the citizenry can become
prey to the whims and caprices of those to whom the power had been delegated. The postulate of public
office as a public trust, institutionalized in the Constitution (in Art. XI, Sec. 1) to protect the people from
abuse of governmental power, would certainly be mere empty words if access to such information of
public concern is denied, except under limitations prescribed by implementing legislation adopted
pursuant to the Constitution. The right to information is an essential premise of a meaningful right to
speech and expression. But this is not to say that the right to information is merely an adjunct of and
therefore restricted in application by the exercise of the freedoms of speech and of the press. Far from it.
The right to information goes hand-in-hand with the constitutional policies of full public disclosure and
honesty in the public service. It is meant to enhance the widening role of the citizenry in governmental
decision-making as well in checking abuse in government. Yet, like all the constitutional guarantees, the
right to information is not absolute. As stated in Legaspi, The people's right to information is limited to
"matters of public concern", and is further "subject to such limitations as may be provided by law."
Similarly, the State's policy of full disclosure is limited to "transactions involving public interest", and is
"subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law." Hence, before mandamus may issue, it must be clear
that the information sought is of "public interest" or "public concern", and is not exempted by law from
the operation of the constitutional guarantee. Herein, the information sought by Valmonte, et. al. is the
truth of reports that certain Members of the Batasang Pambansa belonging to the opposition were able to
secure "clean" loans from the GSIS immediately before the 7 February 1986 election through the
intercession of the former First Lady, Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos. In sum, the public nature of the loanable
funds of the GSIS and the public office held by the alleged borrowers make the information sought
clearly a matter of public interest and concern. However, a second requisite must be met before the right
to information may be enforced through mandamus proceedings, viz., that the information sought must
not be among those excluded by law. On this matter, Belmonte has failed to cite any law granting the
GSIS the privilege of confidentiality as regards the documents subject of the petition. His position is
apparently based merely on considerations of policy. The judiciary does not settle policy issues. The
Court can only declare what the law is, and not what the law should be. Under our system of government,
policy issues are within the domain of the political branches of the government, and of the people
themselves as the repository of all State power. Although it may be true that when the information
requested from the government intrudes into the privacy of a citizen, a potential conflict between the

rights to information and to privacy may arise. Such competing interests of these rights need not be
resolved in the present case. The right to privacy belongs to the individual in his private capacity, and not
to public and governmental agencies like the GSIS. Moreover, the right cannot be invoked by juridical
entities like the GSIS. Thus, neither can the GSIS through its General Manager, Belmonte, invoke the
right to privacy of its borrowers. The right is purely personal in nature, and hence may be invoked only by
the person whose privacy is claimed to be violated. It may be observed, however, the concerned
borrowers themselves may not succeed if they choose to invoke their right to privacy, considering the
public offices they were holding at the time the loans were alleged to have been granted. It cannot be
denied that because of the interest they generate and their newsworthiness, public figures, most especially
those holding responsible positions in government, enjoy a more limited right to privacy as compared to
ordinary individuals, their actions being subject to closer public scrutiny. In fine, Valmonte, et. al. are
entitled to access to the documents evidencing loans granted by the GSIS, subject to reasonable
regulations that the latter may promulgate relating to the manner and hours of examination, to the end that
damage to or loss of the records may be avoided, that undue interference with the duties of the custodian
of the records may be prevented and that the right of other persons entitled to inspect the records may be
insured.

Aquino Vs Morato
FACTS : In February 1989, petitioner, herself a member of respondent Movie and Television Review and
Classification Board (MTRCB), wrote its records officer requesting that she be allowed to examine the
board's records pertaining to the voting slips accomplished by the individual board members after a
review of the movies and television productions. It is on the basis of said slips that films are either
banned, cut or classified accordingly. Petitioner's request was eventually denied by respondent Morato on
the ground that whenever the members of the board sit in judgment over a film, their decisions as
reflected in the individual voting slips partake the nature of conscience votes and as such, are purely and
completely private and personal On February 27, 1989, respondent Morato called an executive meeting of
the MTRCB to discuss, among others, the issue raised by petitioner. In said meeting, seventeen (17)
members of the board voted to declare their individual voting records as classified documents which
rendered the same inaccessible to the public without clearance from the chairman. Thereafter, respondent
Morato denied petitioner's request to examine the voting slips. However, it was only much later, i.e., on
July 27, 1989, that respondent Board issued Resolution No. 10-89 which declared as confidential, private
and personal, the decision of the reviewing committee and the voting slips of the members.
ISSUE : WON Resolution No. 10-89 is valid
HELD : The term private has been defined as "belonging to or concerning, an individual person,
company, or interest"; whereas, public means "pertaining to, or belonging to, or affecting a nation, state,
or community at large. As may be gleaned from the decree (PD 1986) creating the respondent
classification board, there is no doubt that its very existence is public is character. it is an office created to
serve public interest. It being the case, respondents can lay no valid claim to privacy. The right to privacy
belongs to the individual acting in his private capacity and not to a governmental agency or officers
tasked with, and acting in, the discharge of public duties. the decisions of the Board and the individual

voting slips accomplished by the members concerned are acts made pursuant to their official functions,
and as such, are neither personal nor private in nature but rather public in character. They are, therefore,
public records access to which is guaranteed to the citizenry by no less than the fundamental law of the
land.
Petitioner: LEO ECHEGARAY
Respondents: SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, ET AL
FACTS:
On January 4, 1999, the SC issued a TRO staying the execution of petitioner Leo Echegaray scheduled on
that same day. The public respondent Justice Secretary assailed the issuance of the TRO arguing that the
action of the SC not only violated the rule on finality of judgment but also encroached on the power of the
executive to grant reprieve.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court abused its discretion in granting a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)
on the execution of Echegaray despite the fact that the finality of judgment has already been rendered
that by granting the TRO, the Honorable Court has in effect granted reprieve which is an executive
function.
HELD:
No. Respondents cited sec 19, art VII. The provision is simply the source of power of the President to
grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons and remit fines and forfeitures after conviction by final
judgment. The provision, however, cannot be interpreted as denying the power of courts to control the
enforcement of their decisions after their finality.
The powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life of a death convict do not
exclude each other for the simple reason that there is no higher right than the right to life.
For the public respondents therefore to contend that only the Executive can protect the right to life of an
accused after his final conviction is to violate the principle of co-equal and coordinate powers of the three
branches of our government.
Petitioner: LEO ECHEGARAY
Respondents: SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, ET AL
Facts:
The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of petitioner Leo Echegaray y Pilo for the crime of rape of
the 10 year-old daughter of his common-law spouse. The supreme penalty of death was to be imposed
upon him. He then filed motion for recon and a supplemental motion for recon raising constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 7659 and the death penalty for rape. Both were denied. Consequently, Congress
changed the mode of execution of the death penalty from electrocution to lethal injection, and passed
Republic Act No. 8177, designating death by lethal injection. Echegaray filed a Petition for prohibition
from carrying out the lethal injection against him under the grounds that it constituted 1. cruel, degrading,
or unusual punishment, 2. Being violative of due process, 3. a violation of the Philippines obligations
under international covenants, 4. an undue delegation of legislative power by Congress, an unlawful
exercise by respondent Secretary of the power to legislate, and an unlawful delegation of delegated

powers by the Secretary of Justice. In his motion to amend, the petitioner added equal protection as a
ground.
The Solicitor General stated that the Supreme Court has already upheld the constitutionality of the Death
Penalty Law, and has declared that the death penalty is not cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual
punishment; execution by lethal injection, as authorized under R.A. No. 8177 and the questioned rules, is
constitutional, lethal injection being the most modern, more humane, more economical, safer and easier to
apply (than electrocution or the gas chamber); in addition to that, the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights does not expressly or impliedly prohibit the imposition of the death penalty.
Issues: 1. Is the lethal injection a cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment? 2. Is it a violation of our
international treaty obligations? 3. Is it discriminatory (pertaining to sec 17)?
Held: 1. No 2. Yes 3rd. Petition denied.
1. Petitioner contends that death by lethal injection constitutes cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment
because (1) R.A. No. 8177 fails to provide for the drugs to be used in carrying out lethal injection, the
dosage for each drug to be administered, and the procedure in administering said drug/s into the accused;
(2) its implementing rules are uncertain as to the date of the execution, time of notification, the court
which will fix the date of execution, which uncertainties cause the greatest pain and suffering for the
convict; and (3) the possibility of mistakes in administering the drugs renders lethal injection inherently
cruel. It is well-settled in jurisprudence that the death penalty per se is not a cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment. In Harden v. Director of Prisons- punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a
lingering death; but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in the
constitution. It implies there something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere
extinguishment of life. Would the lack in particularity then as to the details involved in the execution by
lethal injection render said law cruel, degrading or inhuman? The Court believes not. Petitioner
contends that Sec. 16 of R.A. No. 8177 is uncertain as to which court will fix the time and date of
execution, and the date of execution and time of notification of the death convict. As petitioner already
knows, the court which designates the date of execution is the trial court which convicted the accused.
The procedure is that the judgment is entered fifteen (15) days after its promulgation, and 10 days
thereafter, the records are remanded to the court below including a certified copy of the judgment for
execution. Neither is there any uncertainty as to the date of execution nor the time of notification. As to
the date of execution, Section 15 of the implementing rules must be read in conjunction with the last
sentence of Section 1 of R.A. No. 8177 which provides that the death sentence shall be carried out not
earlier than one (1) year nor later then eighteen (18) months from the time the judgment imposing the
death penalty became final and executory, without prejudice to the exercise by the President of his
executive clemency powers at all times. Hence, the death convict is in effect assured of eighteen (18)
months from the time the judgment imposing the death penalty became final and executor wherein he can
seek executive clemency and attend to all his temporal and spiritual affairs. Petitioner also contends that
the infliction of wanton pain in case of possible complications in the intravenous injection that
respondent Director is an untrained and untested person insofar as the choice and administration of lethal
injection is concerned, renders lethal injection a cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment. This is
unsubstantiated. First. Petitioner has neither alleged nor presented evidence that lethal injection required
the expertise only of phlebotomists and not trained personnel and that the drugs to be administered are
unsafe or ineffective. Petitioner simply cites situations in the United States wherein execution by lethal

injection allegedly resulted in prolonged and agonizing death for the convict, without any other evidence
whatsoever. Second. Petitioner overlooked Section 1, third paragraph of R.A. No. 8177 which requires
that all personnel involved in the execution proceedings should be trained prior to the performance of
such task. We must presume that the public officials entrusted with the implementation of the death
penalty will carefully avoid inflicting cruel punishment. Third. Any infliction of pain in lethal injection is
merely incidental in carrying out the execution of death penalty and does not fall within the constitutional
proscription against cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment. In a limited sense, anything is cruel
which is calculated to give pain or distress, and since punishment imports pain or suffering to the convict,
it may be said that all punishments are cruel. But of course the Constitution does not mean that crime, for
this reason, is to go unpunished. The cruelty against which the Constitution protects a convicted man is
cruelty inherent in the method of punishment, not the necessary suffering involved in any method
employed to extinguish life humanely.
2. Violation of international treaties? In countries which have not abolished the death penalty, sentence of
death may be imposed only for the most serious crimes in accordance with the law in force at the time of
the commission of the crime and not contrary to the provisions of the present Covenant and to the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. This penalty can only be carried
out pursuant to a final judgment rendered by a competent court. The punishment was subject to the
limitation that it be imposed for the most serious crimes. Included with the declaration was the Second
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Aiming at the Abolition of
the Death Penalty was adopted by the General Assembly on December 15, 1989. The Philippines neither
signed nor ratified said document.
3. Petitioner contends that Section 17 of the Implementing Rules is unconstitutional for being
discriminatory. SEC. 17. SUSPENSION OF THE EXECUTION OF THE DEATH SENTENCE.
Execution by lethal injection shall not be inflicted upon a woman within the three years next following
the date of the sentence or while she is pregnant, nor upon any person over seventy (70) years of age. In
this latter case, the death penalty shall be commuted to the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the
accessory penalties provided in Article 40 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner contends that Section 17
amends the instances when lethal injection may be suspended, without an express amendment of Article
83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by section 25 of R.A. No. 7659, stating that the death sentence
shall not be inflicted upon a woman while she is pregnant or within one (1) year after delivery, nor upon
any person over seventy years of age. While Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section
25 of Republic Act No. 7659, suspends the implementation of the death penalty while a woman is
pregnant or within one (1) year after delivery, Section 17 of the implementing rules omits the one (1) year
period following delivery as an instance when the death sentence is suspended, and adds a ground for
suspension of sentence no longer found under Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code as amended, which is
the three-year reprieve after a woman is sentenced. This addition is, in petitioners view, tantamount to a
gender-based discrimination. Being an implementing rule, Section 17 must not override, but instead
remain consistent and in harmony with the law it seeks to implement.

RE: REQUEST FOR LIVE RADIO-TV COVERAGE OF THE TRIAL IN THE


SANDIGANBAYAN OF THE PLUNDER CASES AGAINST FORMER PRESIDENT JOSEPH E.
ESTRADAR E S O L U T I O N

MENDOZA, J.:
This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision denying petitioners request for permission to televise
and broadcast live the trial of former President Estrada before the Sandiganbayan. The motion was filed
by the Secretary of Justice, as one of the petitioners, who argues that there is really no conflict between
the right of the people to public information and the freedom of the press, on the one hand, and, on the
other, the right of the accused to a fair trial; that if there is a clash between these rights, it must be
resolved in favor of the right of the people and the press because the people, as the repository of
sovereignty, are entitled to information; and that live media coverage is a safeguard against attempts by
any party to use the courts as instruments for the pursuit of selfish interests.
On the other hand, former President Joseph E. Estrada reiterates his objection to the live TV and radio
coverage of his trial on the ground that its allowance will violate the sub judice rule and that, based on his
experience with the impeachment trial, live media coverage will only pave the way for so-called "expert
commentary" which can trigger massive demonstrations aimed at pressuring the Sandiganbayan to render
a decision one way or the other. Mr. Estrada contends that the right of the people to information may be
served through other means less distracting, degrading, and prejudicial than live TV and radio coverage.
The Court has considered the arguments of the parties on this important issue and, after due deliberation,
finds no reason to alter or in any way modify its decision prohibiting live or real time broadcast by radio
or television of the trial of the former president. By a vote of nine (9) to six (6) of its members,[1] the
Court denies the motion for reconsideration of the Secretary of Justice.
In lieu of live TV and radio coverage of the trial, the Court, by the vote of eight (8) Justices,[2] has
resolved to order the audio-visual recording of the trial for documentary purposes. Seven (7)
Justices[3]vote against the audio-visual recording of the trial.
What follows is the opinion of the majority.
Considering the significance of the trial before the Sandiganbayan of former President Estrada and the
importance of preserving the records thereof, the Court believes that there should be an audio-visual
recording of the proceedings. The recordings will not be for live or real time broadcast but for
documentary purposes. Only later will they be available for public showing, after the Sandiganbayan
shall have promulgated its decision in every case to which the recording pertains. The master film shall
be deposited in the National Museum and the Records Management and Archives Office for historical
preservation and exhibition pursuant to law.[4]
For the purpose of recording the proceedings, cameras will be inconspicuously installed in the courtroom
and the movement of TV crews will be regulated, consistent with the dignity and solemnity of the
proceedings. The trial shall be recorded in its entirety, except such portions thereof as the Sandiganbayan
may decide should not be held public pursuant to Rule 119, 21 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure. No comment shall be included in the documentary except annotations which may be
necessary to explain certain scenes which are depicted. The audio-visual recordings shall be made under
the supervision and control of the Sandiganbayan or its Division as the case may be.
There are several reasons for such televised recording. First, the hearings are of historic
significance. They are an affirmation of our commitment to the rule that "the King is under no man, but

he is under God and the law." (Quod Rex non debet esse sub homine, sed sub Deo et Lege.) Second, the
Estrada cases involve matters of vital concern to our people who have a fundamental right to know how
their government is conducted. This right can be enhanced by audio-visual presentation. Third, audiovisual presentation is essential for the education and civic training of the people.
Above all, there is the need to keep audio-visual records of the hearings for documentary purposes. The
recordings will be useful in preserving the essence of the proceedings in a way that the cold print cannot
quite do because it cannot capture the sights and sounds of events. They will be primarily for the use of
appellate courts in the event a review of the proceedings, rulings, or decisions of the Sandiganbayan is
sought or becomes necessary. The accuracy of the transcripts of stenographic notes taken during the trial
can be checked by reference to the tapes.
On the other hand, by delaying the release of the tapes for broadcast, concerns that those taking part in the
proceedings will be playing to the cameras and will thus be distracted from the proper performance of
their roles whether as counsel, witnesses, court personnel, or judges will be allayed. The possibility
that parallel trials before the bar of justice and the bar of public opinion may jeopardize, or even prevent,
the just determination of the cases can be minimized. The possibility that judgment will be rendered by
the popular tribunal before the court of justice can render its own will be avoided.
At the same time, concerns about the regularity and fairness of the trial - which, it may be assumed, is the
concern of those opposed to, as much as of those in favor of, televised trials - will be addressed since the
tapes will not be released for public showing until after the decision of the cases by the
Sandiganbayan. By delaying the release of the tapes, much of the problem posed by real time TV and
radio broadcast will be avoided.
Thus, many important purposes for preserving the record of the trials can be served by audio-visual
recordings without impairing the right of the accused to a fair trial.
Nor is the right of privacy of the accused a bar to the production of such documentary. In Ayer
Productions Pty. Ltd. v. Capulong,[5] this Court set aside a lower court's injunction restraining the filming
of "Four Day Revolution," a documentary film depicting, among other things, the role of then Minister of
National Defense Juan Ponce Enrile in the 1986 EDSA people power. This Court held: "A limited
intrusion into a person's privacy has long been regarded as permissible where that person is a public
figure and the information sought to be elicited from him or to be published about him constitute matters
of a public character."[6]
No one can prevent the making of a movie based on the trial. But, at least, if a documentary record is
made of the proceedings, any movie that may later be produced can be checked for its accuracy against
such documentary and any attempt to distort the truth can thus be averted.
Indeed, a somewhat similar proposal for documentary recording of celebrated cases or causes
clbres was made way back in 1971 by Paul Freund of the Harvard Law School. As he explained:
In fairness let me refer to an American experience many of my lay friends found similarly moving. An
educational television network filmed a trial in Denver of a Black Panther leader on charges of resisting
arrest, and broadcast the document in full, in four installments, several months after the case was
concluded - concluded incidentally, with a verdict of acquittal.

No one could witness the trial without a feeling of profound respect for the painstaking way in which the
truth was searched for, for the ways whereby law copes with uncertainties and ambiguities through
presumptions and burden of proof, and the sense of gravity with which judge and jury carried out their
responsibilities.
I agree in general with the exclusion of television from the courtroom, for the familiar good reasons. And
yet the use of television at a trial for documentary purposes, not for the broadcast of live news, and with
the safeguards of completeness and consent, is an educational experiment that I would be prepared to
welcome. Properly safeguarded and with suitable commentary, the depiction of an actual trial is an
agency of enlightenment that could have few equals in its impact on the public understanding.
Understanding of our legal process, so rarely provided by our educational system, is now a desperate
need.[7]
Professor Freund's observation is as valid today as when it was made thirty years ago. It is perceptive for
its recognition of the serious risks posed to the fair administration of justice by live TV and radio
broadcasts, especially when emotions are running high on the issues stirred by a case, while at the same
time acknowledging the necessity of keeping audio-visual recordings of the proceedings of celebrated
cases, for public information and exhibition, after passions have subsided.
WHEREFORE, an audio-visual recording of the trial of former President Estrada before the
Sandiganbayan is hereby ordered to be made, for the account of the Sandiganbayan, under the following
conditions: (a) the trial shall be recorded in its entirety, excepting such portions thereof as the
Sandiganbayan may determine should not be held public under Rule 119, 21 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure; (b) cameras shall be installed inconspicuously inside the courtroom and the movement of TV
crews shall be regulated consistent with the dignity and solemnity of the proceedings; (c) the audio-visual
recordings shall be made for documentary purposes only and shall be made without comment except such
annotations of scenes depicted therein as may be necessary to explain them; (d) the live broadcast of the
recordings before the Sandiganbayan shall have rendered its decision in all the cases against the former
President shall be prohibited under pain of contempt of court and other sanctions in case of violations of
the prohibition; (e) to ensure that the conditions are observed, the audio-visual recording of the
proceedings shall be made under the supervision and control of the Sandiganbayan or its Division
concerned and shall be made pursuant to rules promulgated by it; and (f) simultaneously with the release
of the audio-visual recordings for public broadcast, the original thereof shall be deposited in the National
Museum and the Records Management and Archives Office for preservation and exhibition in accordance
with law.
SO ORDERED.

Bantay vs. COMELEC


G.R. No. 177271
May 4, 2007
FACTS: Before the Court are two consolidated petitions for certiorari and mandamus to nullify and set

aside certain issuances of the Commission on Elections (Comelec) respecting party-list groups which
have manifested their intention to participate in the party-list elections on May 14, 2007.
A number of organized groups filed the necessary manifestations and subsequently were accredited by the
Comelec to participate in the 2007 elections. Bantay Republic Act (BA-RA 7941) and the Urban Poor for
Legal Reforms (UP-LR) filed with the Comelec an Urgent Petition to Disqualify, seeking to disqualify the
nominees of certain party-list organizations. Docketed in the Comelec as SPA Case No 07-026, this urgent
petition has yet to be resolved.
Meanwhile petitioner Rosales, in G.R. No. 177314, addressed 2 letters to the Director of the Comelecs
Law Department requesting a list of that groups nominees. Evidently unbeknownst then to Ms. Rosales,
et al., was the issuance of Comelec en banc Resolution 07-0724 under date April 3, 2007 virtually
declaring the nominees names confidential and in net effect denying petitioner Rosales basic disclosure
request. Comelecs reason for keeping the names of the party list nominees away from the public is
deducible from the excerpts of the news report appearing in the April 13, 2007 issue of the Manila
Bulletin, is that there is nothing in R.A. 7941 that requires the Comelec to disclose the names of
nominees, and that party list elections must not be personality oriented according to Chairman Abalos.
In the first petition (G.R. No. 177271), BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR assail the Comelec resolutions
accrediting private respondents Biyaheng Pinoy et al., to participate in the forthcoming party-list elections
without simultaneously determining whether or not their respective nominees possess the requisite
qualifications defined in R.A. No. 7941, or the "Party-List System Act" and belong to the marginalized
and underrepresented sector each seeks to.
In the second petition (G.R. No. 177314), petitioners Loreta Ann P. Rosales, Kilosbayan Foundation and
Bantay Katarungan Foundation impugn Comelec Resolution dated April 3, 2007.
While both petitions commonly seek to compel the Comelec to disclose or publish the names of the
nominees of the various party-list groups named in the petitions, BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR have the
additional prayers that the 33 private respondents named therein be "declare[d] as unqualified to
participate in the party-list elections and that the Comelec be enjoined from allowing respondent groups
from participating in the elections.
ISSUE:
1. Can the Court cancel the accreditation accorded by the Comelec to the respondent party-list groups
named in their petition on the ground that these groups and their respective nominees do not appear to be
qualified.
2. Whether respondent Comelec, by refusing to reveal the names of the nominees of the various party-list
groups, has violated the right to information and free access to documents as guaranteed by the
Constitution; and
3. Whether respondent Comelec is mandated by the Constitution to disclose to the public the names of
said nominees.
HELD: The 1st petition is partly DENIED insofar as it seeks to nullify the accreditation of the
respondents named therein. However, insofar as it seeks to compel the Comelec to disclose or publish the

names of the nominees of party-list groups, sectors or organizations accredited to participate in the May
14, 2007 elections, the 2 petitions are GRANTED. Accordingly, the Comelec is hereby ORDERED to
immediately disclose and release the names of the nominees of the party-list groups,
1. The Court is unable to grant the desired plea of petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR for cancellation of
accreditation on the grounds thus advanced in their petition. The exercise would require the Court to
make a factual determination, a matter which is outside the office of judicial review by way of special
civil action for certiorari. In certiorari proceedings, the Court is not called upon to decide factual issues
and the case must be decided on the undisputed facts on record. The sole function of a writ of certiorari is
to address issues of want of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion and does not include a review of the
tribunals evaluation of the evidence. (note that nowhere in R.A. No. 7941 is there a requirement that the
qualification of a party-list nominee be determined simultaneously with the accreditation of an
organization. )
2. Section 7, Article III of the Constitution, viz:
Sec.7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to
official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as
well to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen,
subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
Section 28, Article II of the Constitution reading:
Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of
full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.
COMELECs basis of its refusal to disclose the names of the nominees of subject party-list groups,
Section 7 of R.A. 7941,which last sentence reads: "[T]he names of the party-list nominees shall not be
shown on the certified list" is certainly not a justifying card for the Comelec to deny the requested
disclosure. There is absolutely nothing in R.A. No. 7941 that prohibits the Comelec from disclosing or
even publishing through mediums other than the "Certified List" of the names.
It has been repeatedly said in various contexts that the people have the right to elect their representatives
on the basis of an informed judgment. While the vote cast in a party-list elections is a vote for a party,
such vote, in the end, would be a vote for its nominees, who, in appropriate cases, would eventually sit in
the House of Representatives. The Court frowns upon any interpretation of the law or rules that would
hinder in any way the free and intelligent casting of the votes in an election
3. COMELEC has a constitutional duty to disclose and release the names of the nominees of the party-list
groups named in the herein petitions. The right to information is a public right where the real parties in
interest are the public, or the citizens to be precise, but like all constitutional guarantees, however, the
right to information and its companion right of access to official records are not absolute. The peoples
right to know is limited to "matters of public concern" and is further subject to such limitation as may be
provided by law. But no national security or like concerns is involved in the disclosure of the names of
the nominees of the party-list groups in question. Doubtless, the Comelec committed grave abuse of
discretion in refusing the legitimate demands of the petitioners for a list of the nominees of the party-list
groups subject of their respective petitions. Mandamus, therefore, lies.

Province of North Cotabato vs Government of the Republic of the Philippines


FACTS:
On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation
Front (MILF) were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement of the Ancestral Domain Aspect of
the GRP - MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, the petitioners seek to compel respondents
to disclose and furnish them the complete and official copies of the MA-AD and to prohibit the slated
signing of the MOA-AD and the holding of public consultation thereon. They also pray that the MOAAD be declared unconstitutional. The Court issued a TRO enjoining the GRP from signing the same.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the constitutionality and the legality of the MOA is ripe for adjudication;
2. Whether or not there is a violation of the people's right to information on matters of public concern (Art
3 Sec. 7) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest (Art 2, Sec
28) including public consultation under RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991)
3. Whether or not the signing of the MOA, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines would be
binding itself
a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a juridical,
territorial or political subdivision not recognized by law;
b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA;
c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral domain in
violation of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997),
particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION,
RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)
RULINGS:
1. Yes, the petitions are ripe for adjudication. The failure of the respondents to consult the local
government units or communities affected constitutes a departure by respondents from their mandate
under EO No. 3. Moreover, the respondents exceeded their authority by the mere act of guaranteeing
amendments to the Constitution. Any alleged violation of the Constitution by any branch of government
is a proper matter for judicial review.
As the petitions involve constitutional issues which are of paramount public interest or of transcendental
importance, the Court grants the petitioners, petitioners-in-intervention and intervening respondents the
requisite locus standi in keeping with the liberal stance adopted in David v. Macapagal- Arroyo.

In Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre, this Court held:


x x x [B]y the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the challenged action, the dispute
is said to have ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other overt act . Indeed, even a
singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial duty.x x x x
By the same token, when an act of the President, who in our constitutional scheme is a coequal of
Congress, is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution and the laws x x x settling the dispute
becomes the duty and the responsibility of the courts.
That the law or act in question is not yet effective does not negate ripeness.

2. Yes. The Court finds that there is a grave violation of the Constitution involved in the matters of public
concern (Sec 7 Art III) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public
interest (Art 2, Sec 28) including public consultation under RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991).
(Sec 7 ArtIII) The right to information guarantees the right of the people to demand information, while
Sec 28 recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information even if nobody demands. The complete and
effective exercise of the right to information necessitates that its complementary provision on public
disclosure derive the same self-executory nature, subject only to reasonable safeguards or limitations as
may be provided by law.
The contents of the MOA-AD is a matter of paramount public concern involving public interest in the
highest order. In declaring that the right to information contemplates steps and negotiations leading to the
consummation of the contract, jurisprudence finds no distinction as to the executory nature or commercial
character of the agreement.
E.O. No. 3 itself is replete with mechanics for continuing consultations on both national and local levels
and for a principal forum for consensus-building. In fact, it is the duty of the Presidential Adviser on the
Peace Process to conduct regular dialogues to seek relevant information, comments, advice, and
recommendations from peace partners and concerned sectors of society.
3. a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a juridical,
territorial or political subdivision not recognized by law;
Yes. The provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that the Parties aimed to vest in the BJE
the status of an associated state or, at any rate, a status closely approximating it.
The concept of association is not recognized under the present Constitution.
No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized under our laws as having an
associative relationship with the national government. Indeed, the concept implies powers that go
beyond anything ever granted by the Constitution to any local or regional government. It also implies the
recognition of the associated entity as a state. The Constitution, however, does not contemplate any state
in this jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much less does it provide for a transitory status that
aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory for independence.

The BJE is a far more powerful entity than the autonomous region recognized in the Constitution. It is not
merely an expanded version of the ARMM, the status of its relationship with the national government
being fundamentally different from that of the ARMM. Indeed, BJE is a state in all but name as it meets
the criteria of a state laid down in the Montevideo Convention, namely, a permanent population, a defined
territory, a government, and a capacity to enter into relations with other states.
Even assuming arguendo that the MOA-AD would not necessarily sever any portion of Philippine
territory, the spirit animating it which has betrayed itself by its use of the concept of association runs
counter to the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic.
The defining concept underlying the relationship between the national government and the BJE being
itself contrary to the present Constitution, it is not surprising that many of the specific provisions of the
MOA-AD on the formation and powers of the BJE are in conflict with the Constitution and the laws. The
BJE is more of a state than an autonomous region. But even assuming that it is covered by the term
autonomous region in the constitutional provision just quoted, the MOA-AD would still be in conflict
with it.
b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA:
The MOA-AD provides that any provisions of the MOA-AD requiring amendments to the existing legal
framework shall come into force upon the signing of a Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the
necessary changes to the legal framework, implying an amendment of the Constitution to accommodate
the MOA-AD. This stipulation, in effect, guaranteed to the MILF the amendment of the Constitution .
It will be observed that the President has authority, as stated in her oath of office, only to preserve and
defend the Constitution. Such presidential power does not, however, extend to allowing her to change the
Constitution, but simply to recommend proposed amendments or revision. As long as she limits herself to
recommending these changes and submits to the proper procedure for constitutional amendments and
revision, her mere recommendation need not be construed as an unconstitutional act.
The suspensive clause in the MOA-AD viewed in light of the above-discussed standards.
Given the limited nature of the Presidents authority to propose constitutional amendments, she cannot
guarantee to any third party that the required amendments will eventually be put in place, nor even be
submitted to a plebiscite. The most she could do is submit these proposals as recommendations either to
Congress or the people, in whom constituent powers are vested.
c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral domain in
violation of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997),
particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION,
RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)
This strand begins with the statement that it is the birthright of all Moros and all Indigenous peoples of
Mindanao to identify themselves and be accepted as Bangsamoros. It defines Bangsamoro people as
the natives or original inhabitants of Mindanao and its adjacent islands including Palawan and the Sulu

archipelago at the time of conquest or colonization, and their descendants whether mixed or of full blood,
including their spouses.
Thus, the concept of Bangsamoro, as defined in this strand of the MOA-AD, includes not only Moros
as traditionally understood even by Muslims, but all indigenous peoples of Mindanao and its adjacent
islands. The MOA-AD adds that the freedom of choice of indigenous peoples shall be respected. What
this freedom of choice consists in has not been specifically defined. The MOA-AD proceeds to refer to
the Bangsamoro homeland, the ownership of which is vested exclusively in the Bangsamoro people by
virtue of their prior rights of occupation. Both parties to the MOA-AD acknowledge that ancestral domain
does not form part of the public domain.
Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 provides for clear-cut procedure for
the recognition and delineation of ancestral domain, which entails, among other things, the observance of
the free and prior informed consent of the Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples.
Notably, the statute does not grant the Executive Department or any government agency the power to
delineate and recognize an ancestral domain claim by mere agreement or compromise.
Two, Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 requires all national offices to
conduct consultations beforeany project or program critical to the environment and human ecology
including those that may call for the eviction of a particular group of people residing in such locality, is
implemented therein. The MOA-AD is one peculiar program that unequivocally and unilaterally vests
ownership of a vast territory to the Bangsamoro people, which could pervasively and drastically result to
the diaspora or displacement of a great number of inhabitants from their total environment.
CONCLUSION:
In sum, the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process committed grave abuse of discretion when he failed
to carry out the pertinent consultation process, as mandated by E.O. No. 3, Republic Act No. 7160, and
Republic Act No. 8371. The furtive process by which the MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs
contrary to and in excess of the legal authority, and amounts to a whimsical, capricious, oppressive,
arbitrary and despotic exercise thereof. It illustrates a gross evasion of positive duty and a virtual refusal
to perform the duty enjoined.
The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its specific
provisions but the very concept underlying them, namely, the associative relationship envisioned between
the GRP and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that the associated entity is a state
and implies that the same is on its way to independence.

CASE DIGEST - AKBAYAN VS. AQUINO


Facts: The signing of the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA) at the sidelines of
the Asia-Europe Summit in Helsinki in September 2006 was hailed by both Japanese Prime Minister
Junichiro Koizumi and Philippine President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as a milestone in the continuing
cooperation and collaboration, setting a new chapter of strategic partnership for mutual opportunity and
growth (for both countries).

JPEPA which has been referred to as a mega treaty is a comprehensive plan for opening up of markets in
goods and services as well as removing barriers and restrictions on investments. It is a deal that
encompasses even our commitments to the WTO.
The complexity of JPEPA became all the more evident at the Senate hearing conducted by the Committee
on Trade and Commerce last November 2006. The committee, chaired by Senator Mar Roxas, heard
differing views and perspectives on JPEPA. On one hand the committee heard Governments rosy
projections on the economic benefits of JPEPA and on the other hand the views of environmental and
trade activists who raised their very serious concerns about the country being turned into Japans toxic
waste basket. The discussion in the Senate showed that JPEPA is not just an issue concerning trade and
economic relations with Japan but one that touches on broader national development concerns.
Issues:
1. Do the therein petitioners have standing to bring this action for mandamus in their capacity as citizens
of the Republic, as taxpayers, and as members of the Congress
2. Can this Honorable Court exercise primary jurisdiction of this case and take cognizance of the instant
petition.
3. Are the documents and information being requested in relation to the JPEPA exempted from the general
rules on transparency and full public disclosure such that the Philippine government is justified in
denying access thereto.
Rulings:
The Supreme Court en banc promulgated last July 16, 2008 its ruling on the case of Akbayan Citizens
Action Party et al vs. Thomas G. Aquino et al (G.R. No. 170516). The Highest Tribunal dismissed the
Petition for mandamus and prohibition, which sought to compel respondents Department of Trade
Industry (DTI) Undersecretary Thomas Aquino et al to furnish petitioners the full text of the JapanPhilippines Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA) and the lists of the Philippine and Japanese offers
submitted during the negotiation process and all pertinent attachments and annexes thereto.
In its Decision, the Court noted that the full text of the JPEPA has been made accessible to the public
since 11 September 2006, and thus the demand to be furnished with copy of the said document has
become moot and academic. Notwithstanding this, however, the Court lengthily discussed the substatives
issues, insofar as they impinge on petitioners' demand for access to the Philippine and Japanese offers in
the course of the negotiations.
The Court held: Applying the principles adopted in PMPF v. Manglapus, it is clear that while the final
text of the JPEPA may not be kept perpetually confidential since there should be 'ample opportunity for
discussion before [a treaty] is approved' the offers exchanged by the parties during the negotiations
continue to be privileged even after the JPEPA is published. It is reasonable to conclude that the Japenese
representatives submitted their offers with the understanding that 'historic confidentiality' would govern
the same. Disclosing these offers could impair the ability of the Philippines to deal not only with Japan
but with other foreign governments in future negotiations.

It also reasoned out that opening for public scrutiny the Philippine offers in treaty negotiations would
discourage future Philippine representatives from frankly expressing their views during negotiations. The
Highest Tribunal recognized that treaty negotiations normally involve a process of quid pro quo, where
negotiators would willingly grant concessions in an area of lesser importance in order to obtain more
favorable terms in an area of greater national interest.
In the same Decision, the Court took time to address the dissent of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno. It said:
We are aware that behind the dissent of the Chief Justice lies a genuine zeal to protect our people's right
to information against any abuse of executive privilege. It is a zeal that We fully share. The Court,
however, in its endeavour to guard against the abuse of executive privilege, should be careful not to veer
towards the opposite extreme, to the point that it would strike down as invalid even a legitimate exercise
thereof.

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