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Election Law Cases

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Ladlad vs Comelec...................2
Atong Paglaum,Inc. cases .... 13
Bagong Bayani vs Comelec .......47
Aklat vs Comelec ......61
BANAT vs Comelec .....63
BAYAN Muna vs Comelec ...78
Penera vs Comelec...84
Gador vs Comelec....88
Conquilla vs Comelec..89
Loreto-Go vs Comelec....91
PNOC vs NLRC..94
Quinto vs Comelec...97
Villaber vs COmelec..111
Moreno vs Comelec..114
Valled vs Comelec.....116
Lopez vs Comelec...120
Marquez vs Comelec...122
Rodriguez vs Comelec.125
Caasi vs Comelec.130
Social Justice vs Dangerous Drugs..133
Borja Jr. vs Comelec..139
Mendoza vs Comelec...142
Aldovino Jr. vs Comelec..143
Limbona vs Comelec....149
Jalosjos vs Comelec...153
Asistio vs trinidad.154
Frivaldo vs Comelec...157
Ugdoracion vs Comelec168
Altarejos vs Comelec.....171
Sobejana-Condon vs Comelec....176
Jacot vs Dal...184
Dangka vs Comeleccannot be
searched
Jurilla vs Comelecnot available
G.R. No. 81192 ,January 12, 1998
Pamatong vs Comelec.189
Bautista vs Comelec....191
Martinez vs HRET...195
Dela Cruz vs Comelec...202
Fermin vs Comelec.208
Mitra vs Comelec....216
Domino vs Comelec...224
Salcedo II vs Comelec....230
Aratea vs Comelec...234
Ibrahim vs Comelec..242
Codilla vs De Venecia..246
Bagatsing vs Comelec..259
Grego vs Comelec.....263
Trinidad vs Comelec.269
Rulloda vs Comelec.....272
Villanueva vs Comelec...274
Miranda vs Abaya....275

Pearliegates

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Sinaca vs Mula....281
Talaga vs Comelec...285
Castiil vs Comelec....285
Tagolino vs HRET...294

Election Law Cases


Factual Background
G.R. No. 190582

April 8, 2010

ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY represented herein by its Chair, DANTON REMOTO, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS Respondent.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

... [F]reedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter much. That would be a mere shadow of
freedom. The test of its substance is the right to differ as to things that touch the heart of the existing order.

Justice Robert A. Jackson

This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with an application for a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction, filed by Ang Ladlad LGBT Party (Ang Ladlad) against the Resolutions of the Commission
on Elections (COMELEC) dated November 11, 20092 (the First Assailed Resolution) and December 16, 20093
(the Second Assailed Resolution) in SPP No. 09-228 (PL) (collectively, the Assailed Resolutions). The case has its
roots in the COMELECs refusal to accredit Ang Ladlad as a party-list organization under Republic Act (RA) No.
7941, otherwise known as the Party-List System Act.4

Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and women who identify themselves as lesbians, gays,
bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs). Incorporated in 2003, Ang Ladlad first applied for registration
with the COMELEC in 2006. The application for accreditation was denied on the ground that the organization
had no substantial membership base. On August 17, 2009, Ang Ladlad again filed a Petition5 for registration
with the COMELEC.

Before the COMELEC, petitioner argued that the LGBT community is a marginalized and under-represented
sector that is particularly disadvantaged because of their sexual orientation and gender identity; that LGBTs are
victims of exclusion, discrimination, and violence; that because of negative societal attitudes, LGBTs are
constrained to hide their sexual orientation; and that Ang Ladlad complied with the 8-point guidelines
enunciated by this Court in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections.6 Ang Ladlad laid
out its national membership base consisting of individual members and organizational supporters, and outlined
its platform of governance.7

West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette1


On November 11, 2009, after admitting the petitioners evidence, the COMELEC (Second Division) dismissed
the Petition on moral grounds, stating that:
One unavoidable consequence of everyone having the freedom to choose is that others may make different
choices choices we would not make for ourselves, choices we may disapprove of, even choices that may
shock or offend or anger us. However, choices are not to be legally prohibited merely because they are
different, and the right to disagree and debate about important questions of public policy is a core value
protected by our Bill of Rights. Indeed, our democracy is built on genuine recognition of, and respect for,
diversity and difference in opinion.

Since ancient times, society has grappled with deep disagreements about the definitions and demands of
morality. In many cases, where moral convictions are concerned, harmony among those theoretically opposed
is an insurmountable goal. Yet herein lies the paradox philosophical justifications about what is moral are
indispensable and yet at the same time powerless to create agreement. This Court recognizes, however, that
practical solutions are preferable to ideological stalemates; accommodation is better than intransigence;
reason more worthy than rhetoric. This will allow persons of diverse viewpoints to live together, if not
harmoniously, then, at least, civilly.

Pearliegates

x x x This Petition is dismissible on moral grounds. Petitioner defines the Filipino Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and
Transgender (LGBT) Community, thus:

x x x a marginalized and under-represented sector that is particularly disadvantaged because of their sexual
orientation and gender identity.

and proceeded to define sexual orientation as that which:

x x x refers to a persons capacity for profound emotional, affectional and sexual attraction to, and intimate and
sexual relations with, individuals of a different gender, of the same gender, or more than one gender."

Election Law Cases

This definition of the LGBT sector makes it crystal clear that petitioner tolerates immorality which offends
religious beliefs. In Romans 1:26, 27, Paul wrote:

For this cause God gave them up into vile affections, for even their women did change the natural use into that
which is against nature: And likewise also the men, leaving the natural use of the woman, burned in their lust
one toward another; men with men working that which is unseemly, and receiving in themselves that
recompense of their error which was meet.

object or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy are inexistent and void
from the beginning.

Finally to safeguard the morality of the Filipino community, the Revised Penal Code, as amended, penalizes
Immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibitions and indecent shows as follows:

Art. 201. Immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibitions, and indecent shows. The penalty of
prision mayor or a fine ranging from six thousand to twelve thousand pesos, or both such imprisonment and
fine, shall be imposed upon:

In the Koran, the hereunder verses are pertinent:


1. Those who shall publicly expound or proclaim doctrines openly contrary to public morals;
For ye practice your lusts on men in preference to women "ye are indeed a people transgressing beyond
bounds." (7.81) "And we rained down on them a shower (of brimstone): Then see what was the end of those
who indulged in sin and crime!" (7:84) "He said: "O my Lord! Help Thou me against people who do mischief"
(29:30).

As correctly pointed out by the Law Department in its Comment dated October 2, 2008:

The ANG LADLAD apparently advocates sexual immorality as indicated in the Petitions par. 6F: Consensual
partnerships or relationships by gays and lesbians who are already of age. It is further indicated in par. 24 of
the Petition which waves for the record: In 2007, Men Having Sex with Men or MSMs in the Philippines were
estimated as 670,000 (Genesis 19 is the history of Sodom and Gomorrah).

Laws are deemed incorporated in every contract, permit, license, relationship, or accreditation. Hence,
pertinent provisions of the Civil Code and the Revised Penal Code are deemed part of the requirement to be
complied with for accreditation.

ANG LADLAD collides with Article 695 of the Civil Code which defines nuisance as Any act, omission,
establishment, business, condition of property, or anything else which x x x (3) shocks, defies; or disregards
decency or morality x x x

It also collides with Article 1306 of the Civil Code: The contracting parties may establish such stipulations,
clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public order or public policy. Art 1409 of the Civil Code provides that Contracts whose cause,

Pearliegates

2. (a) The authors of obscene literature, published with their knowledge in any form; the editors publishing
such literature; and the owners/operators of the establishment selling the same;

(b) Those who, in theaters, fairs, cinematographs or any other place, exhibit indecent or immoral plays, scenes,
acts or shows, it being understood that the obscene literature or indecent or immoral plays, scenes, acts or
shows, whether live or in film, which are prescribed by virtue hereof, shall include those which: (1) glorify
criminals or condone crimes; (2) serve no other purpose but to satisfy the market for violence, lust or
pornography; (3) offend any race or religion; (4) tend to abet traffic in and use of prohibited drugs; and (5) are
contrary to law, public order, morals, good customs, established policies, lawful orders, decrees and edicts.

3. Those who shall sell, give away or exhibit films, prints, engravings, sculpture or literature which are offensive
to morals.

Petitioner should likewise be denied accreditation not only for advocating immoral doctrines but likewise for not
being truthful when it said that it "or any of its nominees/party-list representatives have not violated or failed to
comply with laws, rules, or regulations relating to the elections."

Furthermore, should this Commission grant the petition, we will be exposing our youth to an environment that
does not conform to the teachings of our faith. Lehman Strauss, a famous bible teacher and writer in the U.S.A.
said in one article that "older practicing homosexuals are a threat to the youth." As an agency of the
government, ours too is the States avowed duty under Section 13, Article II of the Constitution to protect our
youth from moral and spiritual degradation.8

Election Law Cases


When Ang Ladlad sought reconsideration,9 three commissioners voted to overturn the First Assailed Resolution
(Commissioners Gregorio Y. Larrazabal, Rene V. Sarmiento, and Armando Velasco), while three commissioners
voted to deny Ang Ladlads Motion for Reconsideration (Commissioners Nicodemo T. Ferrer, Lucenito N. Tagle,
and Elias R. Yusoph). The COMELEC Chairman, breaking the tie and speaking for the majority in his Separate
Opinion, upheld the First Assailed Resolution, stating that:

Thus, even if societys understanding, tolerance, and acceptance of LGBTs is elevated, there can be no
denying that Ladlad constituencies are still males and females, and they will remain either male or female
protected by the same Bill of Rights that applies to all citizens alike.

xxxx
I. The Spirit of Republic Act No. 7941
IV. Public Morals
Ladlad is applying for accreditation as a sectoral party in the party-list system. Even assuming that it has
properly proven its under-representation and marginalization, it cannot be said that Ladlads expressed sexual
orientations per se would benefit the nation as a whole.

Section 2 of the party-list law unequivocally states that the purpose of the party-list system of electing
congressional representatives is to enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and under-represented
sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute
to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become
members of the House of Representatives.

If entry into the party-list system would depend only on the ability of an organization to represent its
constituencies, then all representative organizations would have found themselves into the party-list race. But
that is not the intention of the framers of the law. The party-list system is not a tool to advocate tolerance and
acceptance of misunderstood persons or groups of persons. Rather, the party-list system is a tool for the
realization of aspirations of marginalized individuals whose interests are also the nations only that their
interests have not been brought to the attention of the nation because of their under representation. Until the
time comes when Ladlad is able to justify that having mixed sexual orientations and transgender identities is
beneficial to the nation, its application for accreditation under the party-list system will remain just that.

x x x There is no question about not imposing on Ladlad Christian or Muslim religious practices. Neither is there
any attempt to any particular religious groups moral rules on Ladlad. Rather, what are being adopted as moral
parameters and precepts are generally accepted public morals. They are possibly religious-based, but as a
society, the Philippines cannot ignore its more than 500 years of Muslim and Christian upbringing, such that
some moral precepts espoused by said religions have sipped [sic] into society and these are not publicly
accepted moral norms.

V. Legal Provisions

But above morality and social norms, they have become part of the law of the land. Article 201 of the Revised
Penal Code imposes the penalty of prision mayor upon "Those who shall publicly expound or proclaim doctrines
openly contrary to public morals." It penalizes "immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibition and
indecent shows." "Ang Ladlad" apparently falls under these legal provisions. This is clear from its Petitions
paragraph 6F: "Consensual partnerships or relationships by gays and lesbians who are already of age It is
further indicated in par. 24 of the Petition which waves for the record: In 2007, Men Having Sex with Men or
MSMs in the Philippines were estimated as 670,000. Moreoever, Article 694 of the Civil Code defines "nuisance"
as any act, omission x x x or anything else x x x which shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality x x x."
These are all unlawful.10

II. No substantial differentiation

In the United States, whose equal protection doctrine pervades Philippine jurisprudence, courts do not
recognize lesbians, gays, homosexuals, and bisexuals (LGBT) as a "special class" of individuals. x x x
Significantly, it has also been held that homosexuality is not a constitutionally protected fundamental right, and
that "nothing in the U.S. Constitution discloses a comparable intent to protect or promote the social or legal
equality of homosexual relations," as in the case of race or religion or belief.

xxxx

Pearliegates

On January 4, 2010, Ang Ladlad filed this Petition, praying that the Court annul the Assailed Resolutions and
direct the COMELEC to grant Ang Ladlads application for accreditation. Ang Ladlad also sought the issuance ex
parte of a preliminary mandatory injunction against the COMELEC, which had previously announced that it
would begin printing the final ballots for the May 2010 elections by January 25, 2010.

On January 6, 2010, we ordered the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to file its Comment on behalf of
COMELEC not later than 12:00 noon of January 11, 2010.11 Instead of filing a Comment, however, the OSG filed
a Motion for Extension, requesting that it be given until January 16, 2010 to Comment.12 Somewhat
surprisingly, the OSG later filed a Comment in support of petitioners application.13 Thus, in order to give
COMELEC the opportunity to fully ventilate its position, we required it to file its own comment.14 The COMELEC,
through its Law Department, filed its Comment on February 2, 2010.15

Election Law Cases

In the meantime, due to the urgency of the petition, we issued a temporary restraining order on January 12,
2010, effective immediately and continuing until further orders from this Court, directing the COMELEC to
cease and desist from implementing the Assailed Resolutions.16

We grant the petition.

Compliance with the Requirements of the Constitution and Republic Act No. 7941
Also, on January 13, 2010, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) filed a Motion to Intervene or to Appear as
Amicus Curiae, attaching thereto its Comment-in-Intervention.17 The CHR opined that the denial of Ang
Ladlads petition on moral grounds violated the standards and principles of the Constitution, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). On
January 19, 2010, we granted the CHRs motion to intervene.

On January 26, 2010, Epifanio D. Salonga, Jr. filed his Motion to Intervene18 which motion was granted on
February 2, 2010.19

The Parties Arguments

Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the exclusion by using religious dogma,
violated the constitutional guarantees against the establishment of religion. Petitioner also claimed that the
Assailed Resolutions contravened its constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of speech and assembly, and
equal protection of laws, as well as constituted violations of the Philippines international obligations against
discrimination based on sexual orientation.

The OSG concurred with Ang Ladlads petition and argued that the COMELEC erred in denying petitioners
application for registration since there was no basis for COMELECs allegations of immorality. It also opined that
LGBTs have their own special interests and concerns which should have been recognized by the COMELEC as a
separate classification. However, insofar as the purported violations of petitioners freedom of speech,
expression, and assembly were concerned, the OSG maintained that there had been no restrictions on these
rights.

In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a concrete and genuine national political
agenda to benefit the nation and that the petition was validly dismissed on moral grounds. It also argued for
the first time that the LGBT sector is not among the sectors enumerated by the Constitution and RA 7941, and
that petitioner made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged its national existence contrary to
actual verification reports by COMELECs field personnel.

Our Ruling

Pearliegates

The COMELEC denied Ang Ladlads application for registration on the ground that the LGBT sector is neither
enumerated in the Constitution and RA 7941, nor is it associated with or related to any of the sectors in the
enumeration.

Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for the proposition that only those
sectors specifically enumerated in the law or related to said sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and
professionals) may be registered under the party-list system. As we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW
Labor Party v. Commission on Elections,20 "the enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors is
not exclusive". The crucial element is not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular
organization complies with the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941.

Respondent also argues that Ang Ladlad made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged that it had
nationwide existence through its members and affiliate organizations. The COMELEC claims that upon
verification by its field personnel, it was shown that "save for a few isolated places in the country, petitioner
does not exist in almost all provinces in the country."21

This argument that "petitioner made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged its national existence"
is a new one; previously, the COMELEC claimed that petitioner was "not being truthful when it said that it or
any of its nominees/party-list representatives have not violated or failed to comply with laws, rules, or
regulations relating to the elections." Nowhere was this ground for denial of petitioners accreditation
mentioned or even alluded to in the Assailed Resolutions. This, in itself, is quite curious, considering that the
reports of petitioners alleged non-existence were already available to the COMELEC prior to the issuance of the
First Assailed Resolution. At best, this is irregular procedure; at worst, a belated afterthought, a change in
respondents theory, and a serious violation of petitioners right to procedural due process.

Nonetheless, we find that there has been no misrepresentation. A cursory perusal of Ang Ladlads initial
petition shows that it never claimed to exist in each province of the Philippines. Rather, petitioner alleged that
the LGBT community in the Philippines was estimated to constitute at least 670,000 persons; that it had 16,100
affiliates and members around the country, and 4,044 members in its electronic discussion group.22 Ang
Ladlad also represented itself to be "a national LGBT umbrella organization with affiliates around the Philippines
composed of the following LGBT networks:"

Election Law Cases


Abra Gay Association
Iloilo City Gay Association Iloilo City
Aklan Butterfly Brigade (ABB) Aklan
Kabulig Writers Group Camarines Sur
Albay Gay Association
Lesbian Advocates Philippines, Inc. (LEAP)
Arts Center of Cabanatuan City Nueva Ecija
LUMINA Baguio City
Boys Legion Metro Manila
Marikina Gay Association Metro Manila
Cagayan de Oro People Like Us (CDO PLUS)
Metropolitan Community Church (MCC) Metro Manila
Cant Live in the Closet, Inc. (CLIC) Metro Manila
Naga City Gay Association Naga City
Cebu Pride Cebu City
ONE BACARDI
Circle of Friends
Order of St. Aelred (OSAe) Metro Manila
Dipolog Gay Association Zamboanga del Norte
PUP LAKAN
Gay, Bisexual, & Transgender Youth Association (GABAY)
RADAR PRIDEWEAR
Gay and Lesbian Activists Network for Gender Equality (GALANG) Metro Manila
Rainbow Rights Project (R-Rights), Inc. Metro Manila
Gay Mens Support Group (GMSG) Metro Manila
San Jose del Monte Gay Association Bulacan
Gay United for Peace and Solidarity (GUPS) Lanao del Norte

Pearliegates

Election Law Cases


Sining Kayumanggi Royal Family Rizal

Society of Transexual Women of the Philippines (STRAP) Metro Manila

Rather than relying on religious belief, the legitimacy of the Assailed Resolutions should depend, instead, on
whether the COMELEC is able to advance some justification for its rulings beyond mere conformity to religious
doctrine. Otherwise stated, government must act for secular purposes and in ways that have primarily secular
effects. As we held in Estrada v. Escritor:26

Soul Jive Antipolo, Rizal

The Link Davao City

Tayabas Gay Association Quezon

Womens Bisexual Network Metro Manila

Zamboanga Gay Association Zamboanga City23

Since the COMELEC only searched for the names ANG LADLAD LGBT or LADLAD LGBT, it is no surprise that
they found that petitioner had no presence in any of these regions. In fact, if COMELECs findings are to be
believed, petitioner does not even exist in Quezon City, which is registered as Ang Ladlads principal place of
business.

Against this backdrop, we find that Ang Ladlad has sufficiently demonstrated its compliance with the legal
requirements for accreditation. Indeed, aside from COMELECs moral objection and the belated allegation of
non-existence, nowhere in the records has the respondent ever found/ruled that Ang Ladlad is not qualified to
register as a party-list organization under any of the requisites under RA 7941 or the guidelines in Ang Bagong
Bayani. The difference, COMELEC claims, lies in Ang Ladlads morality, or lack thereof.

x x x The morality referred to in the law is public and necessarily secular, not religious as the dissent of Mr.
Justice Carpio holds. "Religious teachings as expressed in public debate may influence the civil public order but
public moral disputes may be resolved only on grounds articulable in secular terms." Otherwise, if government
relies upon religious beliefs in formulating public policies and morals, the resulting policies and morals would
require conformity to what some might regard as religious programs or agenda. The non-believers would
therefore be compelled to conform to a standard of conduct buttressed by a religious belief, i.e., to a
"compelled religion," anathema to religious freedom. Likewise, if government based its actions upon religious
beliefs, it would tacitly approve or endorse that belief and thereby also tacitly disapprove contrary religious or
non-religious views that would not support the policy. As a result, government will not provide full religious
freedom for all its citizens, or even make it appear that those whose beliefs are disapproved are second-class
citizens.1avvphi1

In other words, government action, including its proscription of immorality as expressed in criminal law like
concubinage, must have a secular purpose. That is, the government proscribes this conduct because it is
"detrimental (or dangerous) to those conditions upon which depend the existence and progress of human
society" and not because the conduct is proscribed by the beliefs of one religion or the other. Although
admittedly, moral judgments based on religion might have a compelling influence on those engaged in public
deliberations over what actions would be considered a moral disapprobation punishable by law. After all, they
might also be adherents of a religion and thus have religious opinions and moral codes with a compelling
influence on them; the human mind endeavors to regulate the temporal and spiritual institutions of society in a
uniform manner, harmonizing earth with heaven. Succinctly put, a law could be religious or Kantian or Aquinian
or utilitarian in its deepest roots, but it must have an articulable and discernible secular purpose and
justification to pass scrutiny of the religion clauses. x x x Recognizing the religious nature of the Filipinos and
the elevating influence of religion in society, however, the Philippine constitution's religion clauses prescribe
not a strict but a benevolent neutrality. Benevolent neutrality recognizes that government must pursue its
secular goals and interests but at the same time strive to uphold religious liberty to the greatest extent
possible within flexible constitutional limits. Thus, although the morality contemplated by laws is secular,
benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend
compelling state interests.27

Religion as the Basis for Refusal to Accept Ang Ladlads Petition for Registration
Public Morals as a Ground to Deny Ang Ladlads Petition for Registration
Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that "[n]o law shall be made respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." At bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is
"government neutrality in religious matters."24 Clearly, "governmental reliance on religious justification is
inconsistent with this policy of neutrality."25 We thus find that it was grave violation of the non-establishment
clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad.

Pearliegates

Respondent suggests that although the moral condemnation of homosexuality and homosexual conduct may
be religion-based, it has long been transplanted into generally accepted public morals. The COMELEC argues:

Election Law Cases


Petitioners accreditation was denied not necessarily because their group consists of LGBTs but because of the
danger it poses to the people especially the youth. Once it is recognized by the government, a sector which
believes that there is nothing wrong in having sexual relations with individuals of the same gender is a bad
example. It will bring down the standard of morals we cherish in our civilized society. Any society without a set
of moral precepts is in danger of losing its own existence.28

We are not blind to the fact that, through the years, homosexual conduct, and perhaps homosexuals
themselves, have borne the brunt of societal disapproval. It is not difficult to imagine the reasons behind this
censure religious beliefs, convictions about the preservation of marriage, family, and procreation, even dislike
or distrust of homosexuals themselves and their perceived lifestyle. Nonetheless, we recall that the Philippines
has not seen fit to criminalize homosexual conduct. Evidently, therefore, these "generally accepted public
morals" have not been convincingly transplanted into the realm of law.29

The Assailed Resolutions have not identified any specific overt immoral act performed by Ang Ladlad. Even the
OSG agrees that "there should have been a finding by the COMELEC that the groups members have committed
or are committing immoral acts."30 The OSG argues:

x x x A person may be sexually attracted to a person of the same gender, of a different gender, or more than
one gender, but mere attraction does not translate to immoral acts. There is a great divide between thought
and action. Reduction ad absurdum. If immoral thoughts could be penalized, COMELEC would have its hands
full of disqualification cases against both the "straights" and the gays." Certainly this is not the intendment of
the law.31

Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or why special protection is
required for the youth. Neither has the COMELEC condescended to justify its position that petitioners
admission into the party-list system would be so harmful as to irreparably damage the moral fabric of society.
We, of course, do not suggest that the state is wholly without authority to regulate matters concerning
morality, sexuality, and sexual relations, and we recognize that the government will and should continue to
restrict behavior considered detrimental to society. Nonetheless, we cannot countenance advocates who,
undoubtedly with the loftiest of intentions, situate morality on one end of an argument or another, without
bothering to go through the rigors of legal reasoning and explanation. In this, the notion of morality is robbed of
all value. Clearly then, the bare invocation of morality will not remove an issue from our scrutiny.

We also find the COMELECs reference to purported violations of our penal and civil laws flimsy, at best;
disingenuous, at worst. Article 694 of the Civil Code defines a nuisance as "any act, omission, establishment,
condition of property, or anything else which shocks, defies, or disregards decency or morality," the remedies
for which are a prosecution under the Revised Penal Code or any local ordinance, a civil action, or abatement
without judicial proceedings.32 A violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code, on the other hand, requires
proof beyond reasonable doubt to support a criminal conviction. It hardly needs to be emphasized that mere
allegation of violation of laws is not proof, and a mere blanket invocation of public morals cannot replace the
institution of civil or criminal proceedings and a judicial determination of liability or culpability.

Pearliegates

As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmental interest to justify
exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the party-list system. The denial of Ang Ladlads registration on
purely moral grounds amounts more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a
tool to further any substantial public interest. Respondents blanket justifications give rise to the inevitable
conclusion that the COMELEC targets homosexuals themselves as a class, not because of any particular morally
reprehensible act. It is this selective targeting that implicates our equal protection clause.

Equal Protection

Despite the absolutism of Article III, Section 1 of our Constitution, which provides "nor shall any person be
denied equal protection of the laws," courts have never interpreted the provision as an absolute prohibition on
classification. "Equality," said Aristotle, "consists in the same treatment of similar persons."33 The equal
protection clause guarantees that no person or class of persons shall be deprived of the same protection of
laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place and in like circumstances.34

Recent jurisprudence has affirmed that if a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class,
we will uphold the classification as long as it bears a rational relationship to some legitimate government
end.35 In Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. v. Banko Sentral ng Pilipinas,36 we declared that "[i]n our
jurisdiction, the standard of analysis of equal protection challenges x x x have followed the rational basis test,
coupled with a deferential attitude to legislative classifications and a reluctance to invalidate a law unless there
is a showing of a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution."37

The COMELEC posits that the majority of the Philippine population considers homosexual conduct as immoral
and unacceptable, and this constitutes sufficient reason to disqualify the petitioner. Unfortunately for the
respondent, the Philippine electorate has expressed no such belief. No law exists to criminalize homosexual
behavior or expressions or parties about homosexual behavior. Indeed, even if we were to assume that public
opinion is as the COMELEC describes it, the asserted state interest here that is, moral disapproval of an
unpopular minority is not a legitimate state interest that is sufficient to satisfy rational basis review under the
equal protection clause. The COMELECs differentiation, and its unsubstantiated claim that Ang Ladlad cannot
contribute to the formulation of legislation that would benefit the nation, furthers no legitimate state interest
other than disapproval of or dislike for a disfavored group.

From the standpoint of the political process, the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender have the same interest
in participating in the party-list system on the same basis as other political parties similarly situated. State
intrusion in this case is equally burdensome. Hence, laws of general application should apply with equal force
to LGBTs, and they deserve to participate in the party-list system on the same basis as other marginalized and
under-represented sectors.

Election Law Cases


It bears stressing that our finding that COMELECs act of differentiating LGBTs from heterosexuals insofar as the
party-list system is concerned does not imply that any other law distinguishing between heterosexuals and
homosexuals under different circumstances would similarly fail. We disagree with the OSGs position that
homosexuals are a class in themselves for the purposes of the equal protection clause.38 We are not prepared
to single out homosexuals as a separate class meriting special or differentiated treatment. We have not
received sufficient evidence to this effect, and it is simply unnecessary to make such a ruling today. Petitioner
itself has merely demanded that it be recognized under the same basis as all other groups similarly situated,
and that the COMELEC made "an unwarranted and impermissible classification not justified by the
circumstances of the case."

Freedom of Expression and Association

Under our system of laws, every group has the right to promote its agenda and attempt to persuade society of
the validity of its position through normal democratic means.39 It is in the public square that deeply held
convictions and differing opinions should be distilled and deliberated upon. As we held in Estrada v. Escritor:40

In a democracy, this common agreement on political and moral ideas is distilled in the public square. Where
citizens are free, every opinion, every prejudice, every aspiration, and every moral discernment has access to
the public square where people deliberate the order of their life together. Citizens are the bearers of opinion,
including opinion shaped by, or espousing religious belief, and these citizens have equal access to the public
square. In this representative democracy, the state is prohibited from determining which convictions and moral
judgments may be proposed for public deliberation. Through a constitutionally designed process, the people
deliberate and decide. Majority rule is a necessary principle in this democratic governance. Thus, when public
deliberation on moral judgments is finally crystallized into law, the laws will largely reflect the beliefs and
preferences of the majority, i.e., the mainstream or median groups. Nevertheless, in the very act of adopting
and accepting a constitution and the limits it specifies including protection of religious freedom "not only for a
minority, however small not only for a majority, however large but for each of us" the majority imposes
upon itself a self-denying ordinance. It promises not to do what it otherwise could do: to ride roughshod over
the dissenting minorities.

Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society, and this freedom
applies not only to those that are favorably received but also to those that offend, shock, or disturb. Any
restriction imposed in this sphere must be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. Absent any compelling
state interest, it is not for the COMELEC or this Court to impose its views on the populace. Otherwise stated, the
COMELEC is certainly not free to interfere with speech for no better reason than promoting an approved
message or discouraging a disfavored one.

This position gains even more force if one considers that homosexual conduct is not illegal in this country. It
follows that both expressions concerning ones homosexuality and the activity of forming a political association
that supports LGBT individuals are protected as well.

Pearliegates

Other jurisdictions have gone so far as to categorically rule that even overwhelming public perception that
homosexual conduct violates public morality does not justify criminalizing same-sex conduct.41 European and
United Nations judicial decisions have ruled in favor of gay rights claimants on both privacy and equality
grounds, citing general privacy and equal protection provisions in foreign and international texts.42 To the
extent that there is much to learn from other jurisdictions that have reflected on the issues we face here, such
jurisprudence is certainly illuminating. These foreign authorities, while not formally binding on Philippine courts,
may nevertheless have persuasive influence on the Courts analysis.

In the area of freedom of expression, for instance, United States courts have ruled that existing free speech
doctrines protect gay and lesbian rights to expressive conduct. In order to justify the prohibition of a particular
expression of opinion, public institutions must show that their actions were caused by "something more than a
mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint."43

With respect to freedom of association for the advancement of ideas and beliefs, in Europe, with its vibrant
human rights tradition, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has repeatedly stated that a political party
may campaign for a change in the law or the constitutional structures of a state if it uses legal and democratic
means and the changes it proposes are consistent with democratic principles. The ECHR has emphasized that
political ideas that challenge the existing order and whose realization is advocated by peaceful means must be
afforded a proper opportunity of expression through the exercise of the right of association, even if such ideas
may seem shocking or unacceptable to the authorities or the majority of the population.44 A political group
should not be hindered solely because it seeks to publicly debate controversial political issues in order to find
solutions capable of satisfying everyone concerned.45 Only if a political party incites violence or puts forward
policies that are incompatible with democracy does it fall outside the protection of the freedom of association
guarantee.46

We do not doubt that a number of our citizens may believe that homosexual conduct is distasteful, offensive, or
even defiant. They are entitled to hold and express that view. On the other hand, LGBTs and their supporters, in
all likelihood, believe with equal fervor that relationships between individuals of the same sex are morally
equivalent to heterosexual relationships. They, too, are entitled to hold and express that view. However, as far
as this Court is concerned, our democracy precludes using the religious or moral views of one part of the
community to exclude from consideration the values of other members of the community.

Of course, none of this suggests the impending arrival of a golden age for gay rights litigants. It well may be
that this Decision will only serve to highlight the discrepancy between the rigid constitutional analysis of this
Court and the more complex moral sentiments of Filipinos. We do not suggest that public opinion, even at its
most liberal, reflect a clear-cut strong consensus favorable to gay rights claims and we neither attempt nor
expect to affect individual perceptions of homosexuality through this Decision.

Election Law Cases


The OSG argues that since there has been neither prior restraint nor subsequent punishment imposed on Ang
Ladlad, and its members have not been deprived of their right to voluntarily associate, then there has been no
restriction on their freedom of expression or association. The OSG argues that:

There was no utterance restricted, no publication censored, or any assembly denied. [COMELEC] simply
exercised its authority to review and verify the qualifications of petitioner as a sectoral party applying to
participate in the party-list system. This lawful exercise of duty cannot be said to be a transgression of Section
4, Article III of the Constitution.

Our Decision today is fully in accord with our international obligations to protect and promote human rights. In
particular, we explicitly recognize the principle of non-discrimination as it relates to the right to electoral
participation, enunciated in the UDHR and the ICCPR.

The principle of non-discrimination is laid out in Article 26 of the ICCPR, as follows:

Article 26
xxxx

A denial of the petition for registration x x x does not deprive the members of the petitioner to freely take part
in the conduct of elections. Their right to vote will not be hampered by said denial. In fact, the right to vote is a
constitutionally-guaranteed right which cannot be limited.

As to its right to be elected in a genuine periodic election, petitioner contends that the denial of Ang Ladlads
petition has the clear and immediate effect of limiting, if not outrightly nullifying the capacity of its members to
fully and equally participate in public life through engagement in the party list elections.

This argument is puerile. The holding of a public office is not a right but a privilege subject to limitations
imposed by law. x x x47

All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the
law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective
protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.

In this context, the principle of non-discrimination requires that laws of general application relating to elections
be applied equally to all persons, regardless of sexual orientation. Although sexual orientation is not specifically
enumerated as a status or ratio for discrimination in Article 26 of the ICCPR, the ICCPR Human Rights
Committee has opined that the reference to "sex" in Article 26 should be construed to include "sexual
orientation."48 Additionally, a variety of United Nations bodies have declared discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation to be prohibited under various international agreements.49

The UDHR provides:


The OSG fails to recall that petitioner has, in fact, established its qualifications to participate in the party-list
system, and as advanced by the OSG itself the moral objection offered by the COMELEC was not a limitation
imposed by law. To the extent, therefore, that the petitioner has been precluded, because of COMELECs action,
from publicly expressing its views as a political party and participating on an equal basis in the political process
with other equally-qualified party-list candidates, we find that there has, indeed, been a transgression of
petitioners fundamental rights.

Article 21.

(1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen
representatives.

Non-Discrimination and International Law


Likewise, the ICCPR states:
In an age that has seen international law evolve geometrically in scope and promise, international human
rights law, in particular, has grown dynamically in its attempt to bring about a more just and humane world
order. For individuals and groups struggling with inadequate structural and governmental support, international
human rights norms are particularly significant, and should be effectively enforced in domestic legal systems
so that such norms may become actual, rather than ideal, standards of conduct.

Pearliegates

Article 25

10

Election Law Cases


Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the distinctions mentioned in article 2 and
without unreasonable restrictions:

(a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives;

At this time, we are not prepared to declare that these Yogyakarta Principles contain norms that are obligatory
on the Philippines. There are declarations and obligations outlined in said Principles which are not reflective of
the current state of international law, and do not find basis in any of the sources of international law
enumerated under Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.52 Petitioner has not
undertaken any objective and rigorous analysis of these alleged principles of international law to ascertain their
true status.

(b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and
shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors;

(c) To have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his country.

As stated by the CHR in its Comment-in-Intervention, the scope of the right to electoral participation is
elaborated by the Human Rights Committee in its General Comment No. 25 (Participation in Public Affairs and
the Right to Vote) as follows:

1. Article 25 of the Covenant recognizes and protects the right of every citizen to take part in the conduct of
public affairs, the right to vote and to be elected and the right to have access to public service. Whatever form
of constitution or government is in force, the Covenant requires States to adopt such legislative and other
measures as may be necessary to ensure that citizens have an effective opportunity to enjoy the rights it
protects. Article 25 lies at the core of democratic government based on the consent of the people and in
conformity with the principles of the Covenant.

xxxx

15. The effective implementation of the right and the opportunity to stand for elective office ensures that
persons entitled to vote have a free choice of candidates. Any restrictions on the right to stand for election,
such as minimum age, must be justifiable on objective and reasonable criteria. Persons who are otherwise
eligible to stand for election should not be excluded by unreasonable or discriminatory requirements such as
education, residence or descent, or by reason of political affiliation. No person should suffer discrimination or
disadvantage of any kind because of that person's candidacy. States parties should indicate and explain the
legislative provisions which exclude any group or category of persons from elective office.50

We also hasten to add that not everything that society or a certain segment of society wants or demands is
automatically a human right. This is not an arbitrary human intervention that may be added to or subtracted
from at will. It is unfortunate that much of what passes for human rights today is a much broader context of
needs that identifies many social desires as rights in order to further claims that international law obliges
states to sanction these innovations. This has the effect of diluting real human rights, and is a result of the
notion that if "wants" are couched in "rights" language, then they are no longer controversial.1avvphi1

Using even the most liberal of lenses, these Yogyakarta Principles, consisting of a declaration formulated by
various international law professors, are at best de lege ferenda and do not constitute binding obligations
on the Philippines. Indeed, so much of contemporary international law is characterized by the "soft law"
nomenclature, i.e., international law is full of principles that promote international cooperation, harmony, and
respect for human rights, most of which amount to no more than well-meaning desires, without the support of
either State practice or opinio juris.53

As a final note, we cannot help but observe that the social issues presented by this case are emotionally
charged, societal attitudes are in flux, even the psychiatric and religious communities are divided in opinion.
This Courts role is not to impose its own view of acceptable behavior. Rather, it is to apply the Constitution and
laws as best as it can, uninfluenced by public opinion, and confident in the knowledge that our democracy is
resilient enough to withstand vigorous debate.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Resolutions of the Commission on Elections dated November
11, 2009 and December 16, 2009 in SPP No. 09-228 (PL) are hereby SET ASIDE. The Commission on Elections is
directed to GRANT petitioners application for party-list accreditation.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 203766

We stress, however, that although this Court stands willing to assume the responsibility of giving effect to the
Philippines international law obligations, the blanket invocation of international law is not the panacea for all
social ills. We refer now to the petitioners invocation of the Yogyakarta Principles (the Application of
International Human Rights Law In Relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity),51 which petitioner
declares to reflect binding principles of international law.

Pearliegates

April 2, 2013

ATONG PAGLAUM, INC., represented by its President, Mr. Alan Igot, Petitioner,
vs.

11

Election Law Cases


COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
G.R. No. 203958
x-----------------------x
KAPATIRAN NG MGA NAKULONG NA WALANG SALA, INC. (KAKUSA), Petitioner,
G.R. Nos. 203818-19

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

AKO BICOL POLITICAL PARTY (AKB), Petitioner,


vs.

x-----------------------x

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.


G.R. No. 203960
x-----------------------x
1st CONSUMERS ALLIANCE FOR RURAL ENERGY, INC. (1-CARE), Petitioner,
G.R. No. 203922

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.

ASSOCIATION OF PHILIPPINE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES (APEC),represented by its President Congressman


Ponciano D. Payuyo, Petitioner,

x-----------------------x

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 203976

ALLIANCE FOR RURAL AND AGRARIAN RECONSTRUCTION, INC. (ARARO), Petitioner,


vs.

G.R. No. 203936

AKSYON MAGSASAKA-PARTIDO TINIG NG MASA, represented by its President Michael Abas Kida, Petitioner,

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.

G.R. No. 203981

x-----------------------x

Pearliegates

12

Election Law Cases


ASSOCIATION FOR RIGHTEOUSNESS ADVOCACY ON LEADERSHIP (ARAL) PARTY-LIST, represented herein by Ms.
Lourdes L. Agustin, the partys Secretary General, Petitioner,

x-----------------------x

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204122

1 GUARDIANS NATIONALIST PHILIPPINES, INC., (1GANAP/GUARDIANS), Petitioner,


vs.

G.R. No. 204002

ALLIANCE FOR RURAL CONCERNS, Petitioner,

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC composed of SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR., Chairman, RENE V. SARMIENTO,
Commissioner,LUCENITO N. TAGLE, Commissioner,ARMANDO C. VELASCO, Commissioner,ELIAS R. YUSOPH,
Commissioner, andCHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM, Commissioner, Respondents.

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204094

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204125

AGAPAY NG INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ALLIANCE, INC. (A-IPRA), represented by its Secretary
General,Ronald D. Macaraig, Petitioner,
vs.

ALLIANCE FOR NATIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY (ANAD), Petitioner,

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204126

G.R. No. 204100

KAAGAPAY NG NAGKAKAISANG AGILANG PILIPINONG MAGSASAKA (KAP), formerly known as AKO


AGILA NG NAGKAKAISANG MAGSASAKA (AKO AGILA), represented by its Secretary General, Leo R.
San Buenaventura, Petitioner,

1-BRO PHILIPPINE GUARDIANS BROTHERHOOD, INC., (1BRO-PGBI) formerly PGBI, Petitioner,


vs.

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.

Pearliegates

13

Election Law Cases


x-----------------------x
ABROAD PARTY LIST, Petitioner,
G.R. No. 204139

vs.

ALAB NG MAMAMAHAYAG (ALAM), represented by Atty. Berteni Catalua Causing, Petitioner,

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, CHAIRMAN SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR., COMMISSIONERS RENE V. SARMIENTO,


ARMANDO C. VELASCO, ELIAS R. YUSOPH, CHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM, MARIA GRACIA CIELO M. PADACA,
LUCENITO TAGLE, AND ALL OTHER PERSONS ACTING ON THEIR BEHALF, Respondents.

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204174

G.R. No. 204141

AANGAT TAYO PARTY LIST-PARTY, represented by its President Simeon T. Silva, Jr., Petitioner,
vs.

BANTAY PARTY LIST, represented by Maria Evangelina F. Palparan, President, Petitioner,

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204216

G.R. No. 204153

COCOFED-PHILIPPINE COCONUT PRODUCERS FEDERATION, INC., Petitioner,


vs.

PASANG MASDA NATIONWIDE PARTY by its President Roberto "Ka Obet" Martin, Petitioner,

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204220

G.R. No. 204158

ABANG LINGKOD PARTY-LIST, Petitioner,

Pearliegates

14

Election Law Cases


vs.

x-----------------------x

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.


G.R. No. 204240
x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204236

AGRI-AGRA NA REPORMA PARA SA MAGSASAKA NG PILIPINAS MOVEMENT (AGRI), represented by its Secretary
General, Michael Ryan A. Enriquez, Petitioner,
vs.

FIRM 24-K ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioner,

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204238

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204263

A BLESSED PARTY LIST A.K.A. BLESSEDFEDERATION OF FARMERS AND FISHERMEN INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
Petitioner,
vs.

ALLIANCE OF BICOLNON PARTY (ABP), Petitioner,

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204318

G.R. No. 204239

UNITED MOVEMENT AGAINST DRUGS FOUNDATION (UNIMAD) PARTY-LIST, Petitioner,


vs.

GREEN FORCE FOR THE ENVIRONMENT SONS AND DAUGHTERS OF MOTHER EARTH (GREENFORCE), Petitioner,

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

Pearliegates

x-----------------------x

15

Election Law Cases


G.R. No. 204321
BUTIL FARMERS PARTY, Petitioner,
ANG AGRIKULTURA NATIN ISULONG (AANI), represented by its Secretary General Jose C. Policarpio, Jr.,
Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204323

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204358

ALLIANCE OF ADVOCATES IN MININGADVANCEMENT FOR NATIONAL PROGRESS (AAMA), Petitioner,


vs.

BAYANI PARTYLIST as represented byHomer Bueno, Fitrylin Dalhani,Israel de Castro, Dante Navarroand Guiling
Mamondiong, Petitioner,

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, CHAIRMAN SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR., COMMISSIONERS RENE V. SARMIENTO,
LUCENITO N. TAGLE, ARMANDO C. VELASCO, ELIAS R. YUSOPH, CHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM, and MARIA GRACIA
CIELO M. PADACA, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204359


x-----------------------x
SOCIAL MOVEMENT FOR ACTIVEREFORM AND TRANSPARENCY (SMART), represented by its Chairman, Carlito B.
Cubelo, Petitioner,
G.R. No. 204341

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.

ACTION LEAGUE OF INDIGENOUS MASSES(ALIM) PARTY-LIST, represented herein by its President Fatani S. Abdul
Malik, Petitioner,
x-----------------------x

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

G.R. No. 204364


x-----------------------x
ADHIKAIN AT KILUSAN NG ORDINARYONG-TAO, PARA SA LUPA, PABAHAY, HANAPBUHAY AT KAUNLARAN (AKO
BUHAY), Petitioner,
G.R. No. 204356

Pearliegates

16

Election Law Cases


vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR., RENE V. SARMIENTO, LUCENITO N. TAGLE,
ARMANDO C. VELASCO, ELIAS R. YUSOPH, CHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM, and MA. GRACIA CIELO M. PADACA, in
their capacities as Commissioners thereof, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204379


x-----------------------x
ALAGAD NG SINING (ASIN) represented by its President, Faye Maybelle Lorenz, Petitioner,
G.R. No. 204367

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

AKBAY KALUSUGAN INCORPORATION(AKIN), Petitioner,


x-----------------------x

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

G.R. No. 204394


x-----------------------x
ASSOCIATION OF GUARD UTILITY HELPER, AIDER, RIDER, DRIVER/DOMESTIC HELPER, JANITOR, AGENT AND
NANNY OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (GUARDJAN), Petitioner,
G.R. No. 204370

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

AKO AN BISAYA (AAB), represented by itsSecretary General, Rodolfo T. Tuazon, Petitioner,


vs.

x-----------------------x

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.


G.R. No. 204402
x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204374

KALIKASAN PARTY-LIST, represented by its President, Clemente G. Bautista, Jr., and Secretary General, Frances
Q. Quimpo, Petitioner,
vs.

BINHI-PARTIDO NG MGA MAGSASAKA PARA SA MGA MAGSASAKA, Petitioner,

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.

Pearliegates

x-----------------------x

17

Election Law Cases


COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC., Petitioner,
G.R. No. 204408

PILIPINO ASSOCIATION FOR COUNTRY-URBAN POOR YOUTH ADVANCEMENT AND WELFARE (PACYAW), Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ANY OF ITS OFFICERS AND AGENTS, ACTING FOR AND IN ITS BEHALF,
INCLUDING THE CHAIR AND MEMBERSOF THE COMMISSION, Respondents.

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204410

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204426

ASSOCIATION OF LOCAL ATHLETICS ENTREPRENEURS AND HOBBYISTS, INC. (ALA-EH), Petitioner,


vs.

1-UNITED TRANSPORT KOALISYON (1-UTAK), Petitioner,


vs.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR., RENE V. SARMIENTO, LUCENITO N. TAGLE,
ARMANDO C. VELASCO, ELIAS R. YUSOPH, CHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM, and MA. GRACIA CIELO M. PADACA, in
their respective capacities as COMELEC Chairperson and Commissioners, Respondents.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.


x-----------------------x
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204428
G.R. No. 204421
ANG GALING PINOY (AG), represented by its Secretary General, Bernardo R. Corella, Jr., Petitioner,
COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC. SENIOR CITIZEN PARTY-LIST,
represented herein by its 1st nominee and Chairman, Francisco G. Datol, Jr., Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204435

G.R. No. 204425

1 ALLIANCE ADVOCATING AUTONOMY PARTY (1AAAP), Petitioner,


vs.

Pearliegates

18

Election Law Cases


COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
G.R. No. 204485
x-----------------------x
ALLIANCE OF ORGANIZATIONS, NETWORKS AND ASSOCIATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (ALONA), Petitioner,
G.R. No. 204436

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.

ABYAN ILONGGO PARTY (AI), represented byits Party President, Rolex T. Suplico, Petitioner,
vs.

x-----------------------x

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.


G.R. No. 204486
x-----------------------x
1st KABALIKAT NG BAYAN GINHAWANG SANGKATAUHAN (1st KABAGIS), Petitioner,
G.R. No. 204455

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

MANILA TEACHER SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioner,


vs.

x-----------------------x

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.


G.R. No. 204490
x-----------------------x
PILIPINAS PARA SA PINOY (PPP), Petitioner,
G.R. No. 204484

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.

PARTIDO NG BAYAN ANG BIDA (PBB), represented by its Secretary General, Roger M. Federazo, Petitioner,
vs.

PERLAS-BERNABE,*

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.


DECISION
x-----------------------x

Pearliegates

19

Election Law Cases


CARPIO, J.:

Ang Bagong Bayani.


Omnibus Resolution dated 27 November 20129

The Cases

These cases constitute 54 Petitions for Certiorari and Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition1 filed by 52 partylist groups and organizations assailing the Resolutions issued by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
disqualifying them from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections, either by denial of their petitions
for registration under the party-list system, or cancellation of their registration and accreditation as party-list
organizations.

204455 12-041

(PLM)

Manila Teachers

Savings and
Loan
Association, Inc.
(Manila

This Court resolved to consolidate the 54 petitions in the Resolutions dated 13 November 2012,2 20 November
2012,3 27 November 2012,4 4 December 2012,5 11 December 2012,6 and 19 February 2013.7

Teachers)

- A non-stock savings and

loan association cannot be


considered marginalized and

The Facts Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941) and COMELEC Resolution Nos.
9366 and 9531, approximately 280 groups and organizations registered and manifested their desire to
participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections.

underrepresented; and
- The first and second
nominees are not teachers by

G.R. No. SPP No. Group

Grounds for Denial

profession.

A. Via the COMELEC En Bancs automatic review of the COMELEC

204426 12-011

Divisions resolutions approving registration of groups/organizations

(PLM)

Association of

Resolution dated 23 November 20128

Local Athletics

204379 12-099

Entrepreneurs

(PLM)

Alagad ng

and Hobbyists,

Sining (ASIN)

- The "artists" sector is not

Inc. (ALA-EH)

- Failure to show that its

considered marginalized and

members belong to the

underrepresented;

marginalized; and

- Failure to prove track

- Failure of the nominees to

record; and

qualify.

- Failure of the nominees to

Resolution dated 27 November 201210

qualify under RA 7941 and

Pearliegates

204435 12-057

20

Election Law Cases


(PLM)

1 Alliance

- Lack of track record in

Advocating

representing peasants and

Autonomy Party

farmers; and

(1AAAP) - Failure of the nominees to

- Nominees are neither

qualify: although registering

farmers nor peasants.

as a regional political party,

Resolution dated 4 December 201213

two of the nominees are not

residents of the region; and

12-165

four of the five nominees do

(PLM)

not belong to the

Party (AI)

marginalized and underrepresented.

party represents a

Resolution dated 27 November 201211

marginalized and

underrepresented sector, as

204367 12-104 (PL)

Akbay

Kalusugan
(AKIN), Inc.

204436 12-009 (PP),

Abyan Ilonggo
- Failure to show that the

the Province of Iloilo has


- Failure of the group to show

district representatives;

that its nominees belong to

- Untruthful statements in the

the urban poor sector.

memorandum; and

Resolution dated 29 November 201212

- Withdrawal of three of its

204370 12-011 (PP)

five nominees.

(AAB)

- Failure to represent a

Ako An Bisaya

Resolution dated 4 December 201214

marginalized sector of

society, despite the formation

Organizations,

of a sectoral wing for the

Networks and Associations of

benefit of farmers of Region

the Philippines,

8;

Inc. (ALONA)

- Constituency has district

group can represent 14

representatives;

sectors; - The sectors of homeowners

Pearliegates

204485 12-175 (PL)

Alliance of

- Failure to establish that the

21

Election Law Cases


associations, entrepreneurs

representative of the

and cooperatives are not

marginalized and

marginalized and

underrepresented;

underrepresented; and

- There is no proof that

- The nominees do not belong

majority of its members

to the marginalized and

belong to the marginalized

underrepresented.

and underrepresented;

B. Via the COMELEC En Bancs review on motion for reconsideration

- The group represents

of the COMELEC Divisions resolutions denying registration of groups

sectors with conflicting

and organizations

interests; and

Resolution dated 7 November 201215

- The nominees do not belong

to the sector which the group

204139 12-127 (PL)

Alab ng

Mamamahayag

claims to represent.

(ALAM) - Failure to prove track

Resolution dated 14 November 201217

record as an organization;

11

- Failure to show that the

Guard, Utility

group actually represents the

Helper, Aider,

marginalized and

Rider, Driver/

underrepresented; and

Domestic

- Failure to establish that the

Helper,

group can represent all

Janitor, Agent

sectors it seeks to represent.

and

Resolution dated 7 November 201216

Nanny of the

10

Philippines, Inc.

204402 12-061 (PP)

(KALIKASAN)

Kalikasan Party-List

- The group reflects an

204394 12-145 (PL)

(GUARDJAN)

- Failure to prove

advocacy for the

membership base and track

environment, and is not

record;

Pearliegates

Association of

22

Election Law Cases


- Failure to present activities
that sufficiently benefited its
intended constituency; and

Pursuant to paragraph 222 of Resolution No. 9513, the COMELEC En Banc scheduled summary evidentiary
hearings to determine whether the groups and organizations that filed manifestations of intent to participate in
the 13 May 2013 party-list elections have continually complied with the requirements of R.A. No. 7941 and Ang
Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC23 (Ang Bagong Bayani). The COMELEC disqualified the following
groups and organizations from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections:

- The nominees do not belong


to any of the sectors which
the group seeks to represent.
Resolution dated 5 December 201218
12

204490 12-073

(PLM)

Pilipinas Para sa

Pinoy (PPP)

- Failure to show that the

group represents a
marginalized and
underrepresented sector, as
Region 12 has district
representatives; and
- Failure to show a track
record of undertaking
programs for the welfare of
the sector the group seeks to
represent.
In a Resolution dated 5 December 2012,19 the COMELEC En Banc affirmed the COMELEC Second Divisions
resolution to grant Partido ng Bayan ng Bidas (PBB) registration and accreditation as a political party in the
National Capital Region. However, PBB was denied participation in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections because
PBB does not represent any "marginalized and underrepresented" sector; PBB failed to apply for registration as
a party-list group; and PBB failed to establish its track record as an organization that seeks to uplift the lives of
the "marginalized and underrepresented."20
These 13 petitioners (ASIN, Manila Teachers, ALA-EH, 1AAAP, AKIN, AAB, AI, ALONA, ALAM, KALIKASAN,
GUARDJAN, PPP, and PBB) were not able to secure a mandatory injunction from this Court. The COMELEC, on 7
January 2013 issued Resolution No. 9604,21 and excluded the names of these 13 petitioners in the printing of
the official ballot for the 13 May 2013 party-list elections.

G.R. No. SPP No. Group

Resolution dated 10 October 201224


1

203818-19

12-154

(PLM)
12-177
(PLM)

AKO Bicol

Political Party
(AKB)

Retained registration and

accreditation as a political
party, but denied participation
in the May 2013 party-list
elections
- Failure to represent any
marginalized and
underrepresented sector;
- The Bicol region already
has representatives in
Congress; and
- The nominees are not
marginalized and
underrepresented.
Omnibus Resolution dated 11 October 201225
2

Pearliegates

Grounds for Denial

203766 12-161

23

Election Law Cases


(PLM)

Atong Paglaum,

Inc. (Atong
Paglaum)

(PLM)

Alliance for

Rural Concerns
Cancelled registration and

(ARC)

Cancelled registration and

accreditation

accreditation

- The nominees do not belong

- Failure of the nominees to

to the sectors which the party

qualify; and

represents; and

- Failure of the party to prove

- The party failed to file its

that majority of its members

Statement of Contributions

belong to the sectors it seeks

and Expenditures for the

to represent.

2010 Elections.

204318 12-220

203981 12-187

(PLM)

United

(PLM)

Association for

Movement

Righteousness

Against Drugs

Advocacy on

Foundation

Leadership

(UNIMAD)

(ARAL)

accreditation

Cancelled registration and

Cancelled registration and

accreditation

- The sectors of drug

- Failure to comply, and for

counsellors and lecturers,

violation of election laws;

veterans and the youth, are

- The nominees do not

not marginalized and

represent the sectors which

underrepresented;

the party represents; and

- Failure to establish track

- There is doubt that the party

record; and

is organized for religious

- Failure of the nominees to

purposes.

qualify as representatives of

the youth and young urban

204002 12-188

Pearliegates

24

Election Law Cases


professionals.

workers.

Omnibus Resolution dated 16 October 201226

20426

204100 12-196

(PLM)

Blessed

(PLM)

1-Bro Philippine

Federation of

12-257

Guardians

Farmers and

Brotherhood,

Fishermen

Inc. (1BRO-PGBI) Cancelled registration

International,

- Failure to define the sector

Inc. (A

it seeks to represent; and

BLESSED

- The nominees do not belong

Party-List)

to a marginalized and

- Three of the seven

underrepresented sector.

nominees do not belong to

204122 12-223

the sector of farmers and

(PLM)

1 Guardians

fishermen, the sector sought

Cancelled registration

Nationalist

to be represented; and

Philippines, Inc.

- None of the nominees are

(1GANAP/

registered voters of Region

GUARDIANS)

Cancelled registration

XI, the region sought to be

- The party is a military

represented.

fraternity;

Resolution dated 16 October 201227

- The sector of community

203960 12-260

volunteer workers is too

(PLM)

1st

broad to allow for meaningful

Consumers

representation; and

Alliance for

- The nominees do not appear

Rural Energy,

to belong to the sector of

Inc. (1-CARE)

community volunteer

- The sector of rural energy

Pearliegates

Cancelled registration

25

Election Law Cases


consumers is not

Party-List Party

marginalized and

( AT )

underrepresented;

accreditation

- The partys track record is

- The incumbent

related to electric

representative in Congress

cooperatives and not rural

failed to author or sponsor

energy consumers; and

bills that are beneficial to the

- The nominees do not belong

sectors that the party

to the sector of rural energy

represents (women, elderly,

consumers.

youth, urban poor); and

Resolution dated 16 October 201228

- The nominees do not belong

10

203922 12-201

to the marginalized sectors

(PLM)

Association of

that the party seeks to

Cancelled registration and

Philippine

represent.

Electric

Omnibus Resolution dated 24 October 201230

Cooperatives

12

203976 12-288

(APEC)

(PLM)

Alliance for

Cancelled registration and

accreditation

Rural and

- Failure to represent a

Agrarian

marginalized and

Reconstruction,

underrepresented sector; and

Inc. (ARARO)

- The nominees do not belong

accreditation

to the sector that the party

- The interests of the peasant

claims to represent.

and urban poor sectors that

Resolution dated 23 October 201229

the party represents differ;

11

204174 12-232

- The nominees do not belong

(PLM)

Aangat Tayo

to the sectors that the party

Pearliegates

Cancelled registration and

26

Election Law Cases


seeks to represent;

14

203936 12-248

- Failure to show that three of

(PLM)

Aksyon

the nominees are bona fide

Magsasaka-Partido Tinig ng

party members; and

Masa (AKMA-PTM)

- Lack of a Board resolution

- Failure to show that

to participate in the party-list

majority of its members are

elections.

marginalized and

Omnibus Resolution dated 24 October 201231

underrepresented;

13

204240 12-279

- Failure to prove that four of

(PLM)

Agri-Agra na

its nine nominees actually

Cancelled registration

Reporma Para sa

belong to the farmers sector;

Magsasaka ng

and

Pilipinas

- Failure to show that five of

Movement

its nine nominees work on

(AGRI)

uplifting the lives of the

Cancelled registration

- The party ceased to exist for

members of the sector.

more than a year immediately

15

204126 12-263

after the May 2010 elections;

(PLM)

Kaagapay ng

- The nominees do not belong

Nagkakaisang

to the sector of peasants and

Agilang

farmers that the party seeks to

Pilipinong

represent;

Magsasaka

- Only four nominees were

(KAP)

submitted to the COMELEC;

- The Manifestation of Intent

and

and Certificate of Nomination

- Failure to show meaningful

were not signed by an

activities for its constituency.

appropriate officer of the

Pearliegates

Cancelled registration

27

Election Law Cases


party;

Country and

- Failure to show track record

People)

for the farmers and peasants

Association of

sector; and

the Philippines,

- Failure to show that

Inc. (BANTAY)

nominees actually belong to

- Failure to show that

the sector, or that they have

majority of its members are

undertaken meaningful

marginalized and

activities for the sector.

underrepresented; and

16

204364 12-180

- Failure to prove that two of

(PLM)

Adhikain at

its nominees actually belong

Cancelled registration

Kilusan ng

to the marginalized and

Ordinaryong

underrepresented.

Tao Para sa

18

204408 12-217

Lupa, Pabahay,

(PLM)

Pilipino

Hanapbuhay at

Association for

Kaunlaran

Country Urban

(AKO-BAHAY)

Cancelled registration

Poor Youth

- Failure to show that

Advancement

nominees actually belong to

and Welfare

the sector, or that they have

( PA C YAW )

undertaken meaningful

- Change of sector (from

activities for the sector.

urban poor youth to urban

17

204141 12-229

poor) necessitates a new

(PLM)

The True

application;

Cancelled registration

Marcos Loyalist

- Failure to show track record

(for God,

for the marginalized and

Pearliegates

28

Election Law Cases


underrepresented;

members belong to the

- Failure to prove that

marginalized and

majority of its members and

underrepresented;

officers are from the urban

- The incumbent

poor sector; and

representative in Congress

- The nominees are not

failed to author or sponsor

members of the urban poor

bills that are beneficial to the

sector.

sector that the party

19

204153 12-277

represents (persons

(PLM)

Pasang Masda

imprisoned without proof of

Nationwide

guilt beyond reasonable

Party (PASANG

doubt);

MASDA) Cancelled registration

- Failure to show track record

- The party represents drivers

for the marginalized and

and operators, who may have

underrepresented; and

conflicting interests; and

- The nominees did not

- Nominees are either

appear to be marginalized and

operators or former operators.

underrepresented.

20

203958 12-015

Resolution dated 30 October 201232

(PLM)

Kapatiran ng

21

204428 12-256

mga Nakulong

(PLM)

Ang Galing

na Walang Sala,

Pinoy (AG)

Inc. (KAKUSA)

Cancelled registration

Cancelled registration and

accreditation

- Failure to prove that

- Failure to attend the

na Walang Sala,

summary hearing;

Inc. (KAKUSA)

- Failure to show track record

majority of its officers and

for the marginalized and

Pearliegates

29

Election Law Cases


underrepresented; and

Sons and

- The nominees did not

Daughters of

appear to be marginalized and

Mother Earth

underrepresented.

(GREENFORCE)

Resolution dated 7 November 201233

accreditation

22

204094 12-185

- The party is an advocacy

(PLM)

Alliance for

group and does not represent

Cancelled registration and

Nationalism and

the marginalized and

Democracy

underrepresented;

(ANAD) Cancelled registration and

- Failure to comply with the

accreditation

track record requirement; and

- Failure to represent an

- The nominees are not

identifiable marginalized and

marginalized citizens.

underrepresented sector;

24

204236 12-254

- Only three nominees were

(PLM)

Firm 24-K

submitted to the COMELEC;

Association, Inc.

- The nominees do not

(FIRM 24-K)

belong to the marginalized

accreditation

and underrepresented; and

- The nominees do not

- Failure to submit its

belong to the sector that the

Statement of Contribution

party seeks to represent

and Expenditures for the

(urban poor and peasants of

2007 Elections.

the National Capital Region);

Omnibus Resolution dated 7 November 201234

- Only two of its nominees

23

204239 12-060

reside in the National Capital

(PLM)

Green Force for

Region; and

the Environment

Pearliegates

Cancelled registration and

- Failure to comply with the

30

Election Law Cases


track record requirement.

(AAMA) Cancelled registration

25

204341 12-269

- The sector it represents is a

(PLM)

Action League

specifically defined group

of Indigenous
Masses (ALIM)

which may not be allowed


Cancelled registration and

registration under the party-list system; and

accreditation

- Failure to establish that the

- Failure to establish that its

nominees actually belong to

nominees are members of the

the sector.

indigenous people in the

Resolution dated 7 November 201236

Mindanao and Cordilleras

27

204359 12-272

sector that the party seeks to

(PLM)

Social

represent;

Movement for

- Only two of the partys

Active Reform

nominees reside in the

and

Mindanao and Cordilleras;

Transparency

and

(SMART) Cancelled registration

- Three of the nominees do

- The nominees are

not appear to belong to the

disqualified from

marginalized.

representing the sectors that

Resolution dated 7 November 201235

the party represents;

26

204358 12-204

- Failure to comply with the

(PLM)

Alliance of

track record requirement; and

Advocates in

- There is doubt as to whether

Mining

majority of its members are

Advancement

marginalized and

for National

underrepresented.

Progress

Resolution dated 7 November 201237

Pearliegates

31

Election Law Cases


28

204238 12-173

30

204321 12-252

(PLM)

Alliance of

(PLM)

Ang Agrikultura

Bicolnon Party

Natin Isulong

(ABP)

(AANI)

Cancelled registration and

Cancelled registration and

accreditation

accreditation

- Defective registration and

- Failure to establish a track

accreditation dating back to

record of enhancing the lives

2010;

of the marginalized and

- Failure to represent any

underrepresented farmers

sector; and

which it claims to represent;

- Failure to establish that the

and

nominees are employed in the construction industry, the

- More than a majority of the

sector it claims to represent.

partys nominees do not

Resolution dated 7 November 201238

belong to the farmers sector.

29

204323 12-210

Resolution dated 7 November 201240

(PLM)

Bayani Party

31

204125 12-292

(PLM)

Agapay ng

List (BAYANI)

Cancelled registration and

accreditation

Indigenous

- Failure to prove a track

Peoples Rights

record of trying to uplift the

Alliance, Inc.

marginalized and

(A-IPRA) Cancelled registration and

underrepresented sector of

accreditation

professionals; and

- Failure to prove that its five

- One nominee was declared

nominees are members of the

unqualified to represent the

indigenous people sector;

sector of professionals.

- Failure to prove that its five

Resolution dated 7 November 201239

nominees actively

Pearliegates

32

Election Law Cases


participated in the

(ABANG

undertakings of the party; and

LINGKOD)

- Failure to prove that its five nominees are bona fide

- Failure to establish a track

members.

record of continuously

Resolution dated 7 November 201241

representing the peasant

32

204216 12-202

farmers sector;

(PLM)

Philippine

- Failure to show that its

Cancelled registration

Coconut

members actually belong to

Producers

the peasant farmers sector;

Federation, Inc.

and

(COCOFED)

Cancelled registration and

- Failure to show that its

accreditation

nominees are marginalized

- The party is affiliated with

and underrepresented, have

private and government

actively participated in

agencies and is not

programs for the

marginalized;

advancement of farmers, and

- The party is assisted by the

adhere to its advocacies.

government in various

Resolution dated 14 November 201243

projects; and

34

204158 12-158

- The nominees are not

(PLM)

Action

members of the marginalized

Brotherhood for Active

sector of coconut farmers and

Dreamers, Inc.

producers.

(ABROAD)

Resolution dated 7 November 201242

accreditation - Failure to show that the

33

204220 12-238

party is actually able to

(PLM)

Abang Lingkod

represent all of the sectors it

Party-List

Pearliegates

Cancelled registration and

claims to represent;

33

Election Law Cases


- Failure to show a complete

- Failure to establish that the

track record of its activities

agriculture and cooperative

since its registration; and

sectors are marginalized and

- The nominees are not part

underrepresented; and

of any of the sectors which

- The partys nominees

the party seeks to represent.

neither appear to belong to

Resolution dated 28 November 201244

the sectors they seek to

35

204374 12-228

represent, nor to have

(PLM)

Binhi-Partido ng

actively participated in the

mga Magsasaka

undertakings of the party.

Para sa mga

Resolution dated 3 December 201246

Magsasaka

37

204486 12-194

(BINHI) Cancelled registration and

(PLM)

1st

accreditation

Kabalikat ng

- The party receives

Bayan

assistance from the

Ginhawang

government through the

Sangkatauhan

Department of Agriculture;

(1st

and

KABAGIS)

- Failure to prove that the

accreditation

group is marginalized and

- Declaration of untruthful

underrepresented.

statements;

Resolution dated 28 November 201245

- Failure to exist for at least

36

204356 12-136

one year; and

(PLM)

Butil Farmers

- None of its nominees

Party (BUTIL)

Cancelled registration and

accreditation

Pearliegates

Cancelled registration and

belong to the labor,


fisherfolk, and urban poor

34

Election Law Cases


indigenous cultural

had a term-sharing

communities sectors which it

agreement.

seeks to represent.

These 39 petitioners (AKB, Atong Paglaum, ARAL, ARC, UNIMAD, 1BRO-PGBI, 1GANAP/GUARDIANS, A BLESSED
Party-List, 1-CARE, APEC, AT, ARARO, AGRI, AKMA-PTM, KAP, AKO-BAHAY, BANTAY, PACYAW, PASANG MASDA,
KAKUSA, AG, ANAD, GREENFORCE, FIRM 24-K, ALIM, AAMA, SMART, ABP, BAYANI, AANI, A-IPRA, COCOFED,
ABANG LINGKOD, ABROAD, BINHI, BUTIL, 1st KABAGIS, 1-UTAK, SENIOR CITIZENS) were able to secure a
mandatory injunction from this Court, directing the COMELEC to include the names of these 39 petitioners in
the printing of the official ballot for the 13 May 2013 party-list elections.

Resolution dated 4 December 201247


38

204410 12-198

(PLM)

1-United

Transport
Koalisyon (1-UTAK)

Cancelled accreditation

Petitioners prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. This
Court issued Status Quo Ante Orders in all petitions. This Decision governs only the 54 consolidated petitions
that were granted Status Quo Ante Orders, namely:

- The party represents drivers


and operators, who may have

G.R. No. SPP No. Group

conflicting interests; and

Resolution dated 13 November 2012

- The partys nominees do not

203818-19

belong to any marginalized

(PLM)

and underrepresented sector.

12-177

Resolution dated 4 December 201248

(PLM)

39

203981 12-187

204421,

12-154

AKO Bicol Political Party (AKB)

204425 12-157

(PLM)

(PLM),

Leadership (ARAL)

12-191

204002 12-188

(PLM)

Coalition of

(PLM)

Association for Righteousness Advocacy on

Alliance for Rural Concerns (ARC)

Senior Citizens

203922 12-201

in the

(PLM)

Philippines, Inc.

(APEC)

(SENIOR

203960 12-260

CITIZENS)

Cancelled registration

(PLM)

Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives

1st

- The party violated election

Consumers Alliance for Rural Energy, Inc.

laws because its nominees

(1-CARE)

Pearliegates

35

Election Law Cases


203936 12-248

204216 12-202

(PLM)

(PLM)

Aksyon Magsasaka-Partido Tinig ng Masa

Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc.

(AKMA-PTM)

(COCOFED)

203958 12-015

204158 12-158

(PLM)

(PLM)

Kapatiran ng mga Nakulong na Walang Sala,

Action Brotherhood for Active Dreamer, Inc.

Inc. (KAKUSA)

(ABROAD)

203976 12-288

Resolutions dated 4 December 2012

(PLM)

204122 12-223

Alliance for Rural and Agrarian Reconstruction,

Inc. (ARARO)

(PLM)

Resolution dated 20 November 2012

(1GANAP/GUARDIANS)

204094 12-185

203766 12-161

(PLM)

(PLM)

Alliance for Nationalism and Democracy

1 Guardians Nationalist Philippines, Inc.

Atong Paglaum, Inc. (Atong Paglaum)

(ANAD)

204318 12-220

204125 12-292

(PLM)

(PLM)

(UNIMAD)

Agapay ng Indigenous Peoples Rights Alliance,

United Movement Against Drugs Foundation

Inc. (A-IPRA)

204263 12-257

204100 12-196

(PLM)

(PLM)

International, Inc. (A BLESSED Party-List)

1-Bro Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc.

Blessed Federation of Farmers and Fishermen

(1BRO-PGBI)

204174 12-232

Resolution dated 27 November 2012

(PLM)

204141 12-229

204126 12-263

(PLM)

(PLM)

The True Marcos Loyalist (for God, Country

Aangat Tayo Party-List Party (AT)

Kaagapay ng Nagkakaisang Agilang Pilipinong

and People) Association of the Philippines, Inc.

Magsasaka (KAP)

(BANTAY)

204364 12-180

204240 12-279

(PLM)

(PLM)

Lupa, Pabahay, Hanapbuhay at Kaunlaran

Agri-Agra na Reporma Para sa Magsasaka ng

Pilipinas Movement (AGRI)

Pearliegates

Adhikain at Kilusan ng Ordinaryong Tao Para sa

(AKO-BAHAY)

36

Election Law Cases


204139 12-127 (PL)

Alab ng Mamamahayag (ALAM)

204394 12-145 (PL)

Association of Guard, Utility Helper, Aider,

204220 12-238

Rider, Driver/Domestic Helper, Janitor, Agent

(PLM)

and Nanny of the Philippines, Inc.

Abang Lingkod Party-List (ABANG

LINGKOD)

(GUARDJAN)

204236 12-254

204408 12-217

(PLM)

(PLM)

Firm 24-K Association, Inc. (FIRM 24-K)

Pilipino Association for Country Urban Poor

204238 12-173

Youth Advancement and Welfare (PACYAW)

(PLM)

204428 12-256

Alliance of Bicolnon Party (ABP)

204239 12-060

(PLM)

(PLM)

204490 12-073

Green Force for the Environment Sons and

Ang Galing Pinoy (AG)

Daughters of Mother Earth (GREENFORCE)

(PLM)

204321 12-252

204379 12-099

(PLM)

(PLM)

Ang Agrikultura Natin Isulong (AANI)

Pilipinas Para sa Pinoy (PPP)

Alagad ng Sining (ASIN)

204323 12-210

204367 12-104 (PL)

(PLM)

204426 12-011

Bayani Party List (BAYANI)

Akbay Kalusugan (AKIN)

204341 12-269

(PLM)

(PLM)

and Hobbyists, Inc. (ALA-EH)

Action League of Indigenous Masses (ALIM)

Association of Local Athletics Entrepreneurs

204358 12-204

204455 12-041

(PLM)

(PLM)

Alliance of Advocates in Mining Advancement

Manila Teachers Savings and Loan Association,

for National Progress (AAMA)

Inc. (Manila Teachers)

204359 12-272

204374 12-228

(PLM)

(PLM)

Social Movement for Active Reform and

Binhi-Partido ng mga Magsasaka Para sa mga

Transparency (SMART)

Magsasaka (BINHI)

204356 12-136

204370 12-011 (PP)

(PLM)

204435 12-057

Butil Farmers Party (BUTIL)

Resolution dated 11 December 2012

(PLM)

204402 12-061 (PL)

(1AAAP)

Pearliegates

Kalikasan Party-List (KALIKASAN)

Ako An Bisaya (AAB)

1 Alliance Advocating Autonomy Party

37

Election Law Cases


204486 12-194
(PLM)

1st Kabalikat ng Bayan Ginhawang

The Courts Ruling

Sangkatauhan (1st KABAGIS)


204410 12-198
(PLM)

1-United Transport Koalisyon (1-UTAK)

204421,
204425 12-157

We hold that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in following prevailing decisions of this
Court in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections. However,
since the Court adopts in this Decision new parameters in the qualification of national, regional, and sectoral
parties under the party-list system, thereby abandoning the rulings in the decisions applied by the COMELEC in
disqualifying petitioners, we remand to the COMELEC all the present petitions for the COMELEC to determine
who are qualified to register under the party-list system, and to participate in the coming 13 May 2013 partylist elections, under the new parameters prescribed in this Decision.

(PLM)
12-191

The Party-List System

(PLM)

Coalition of Senior Citizens in the Philippines,

Inc. (SENIOR CITIZENS)


204436 12-009 (PP),
12-165
(PLM)

Abyan Ilonggo Party (AI)

204485 12-175 (PL)

The 1987 Constitution provides the basis for the party-list system of representation. Simply put, the party-list
system is intended to democratize political power by giving political parties that cannot win in legislative
district elections a chance to win seats in the House of Representatives.50 The voter elects two representatives
in the House of Representatives: one for his or her legislative district, and another for his or her party-list group
or organization of choice. The 1987 Constitution provides:

Alliance of Organizations, Networks and

Associations of the Philippines, Inc. (ALONA)

Section 5, Article VI

204484 11-002 Partido ng Bayan ng Bida (PBB)


Resolution dated 11 December 2012
204153 12-277
(PLM)

Pasang Masda Nationwide Party (PASANG

(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless
otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities,
and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the
basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a partylist system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.

MASDA)
The Issues

We rule upon two issues: first, whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections,
either by denial of their new petitions for registration under the party-list system, or by cancellation of their
existing registration and accreditation as party-list organizations; and second, whether the criteria for
participating in the party-list system laid down in Ang Bagong Bayani and Barangay Association for National
Advancement and Transparency v. Commission on Elections49 (BANAT) should be applied by the COMELEC in
the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections.

Pearliegates

(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives
including those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, onehalf of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or
election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other
sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.

Sections 7 and 8, Article IX-C

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Sec. 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization, or coalition shall be valid, except for those
registered under the party-list system as provided in this Constitution.

Sec. 8. Political parties, or organizations or coalitions registered under the party-list system, shall not be
represented in the voters registration boards, boards of election inspectors, boards of canvassers, or other
similar bodies. However, they shall be entitled to appoint poll watchers in accordance with law.

Commissioner Christian S. Monsod, the main sponsor of the party-list system, stressed that "the party-list
system is not synonymous with that of the sectoral representation."51 The constitutional provisions on the
party-list system should be read in light of the following discussion among its framers:

not be a farmer to say that he wants the farmers' party to be represented in the Assembly. Any citizen can vote
for any party. At the end of the day, the COMELEC will then tabulate the votes that had been garnered by each
party or each organization one does not have to be a political party and register in order to participate as a
party and count the votes and from there derive the percentage of the votes that had been cast in favor of a
party, organization or coalition.

When such parties register with the COMELEC, we are assuming that 50 of the 250 seats will be for the party
list system. So, we have a limit of 30 percent of 50. That means that the maximum that any party can get out
of these 50 seats is 15. When the parties register they then submit a list of 15 names. They have to submit
these names because these nominees have to meet the minimum qualifications of a Member of the National
Assembly. At the end of the day, when the votes are tabulated, one gets the percentages. Let us say, UNIDO
gets 10 percent or 15 percent of the votes; KMU gets 5 percent; a womens party gets 2 1/2 percent and
anybody who has at least 2 1/2 percent of the vote qualifies and the 50 seats are apportioned among all of
these parties who get at least 2 1/2 percent of the vote.

MR. MONSOD: x x x.

I would like to make a distinction from the beginning that the proposal for the party list system is not
synonymous with that of the sectoral representation. Precisely, the party list system seeks to avoid the
dilemma of choice of sectors and who constitute the members of the sectors. In making the proposal on the
party list system, we were made aware of the problems precisely cited by Commissioner Bacani of which
sectors will have reserved seats. In effect, a sectoral representation in the Assembly would mean that certain
sectors would have reserved seats; that they will choose among themselves who would sit in those reserved
seats. And then, we have the problem of which sector because as we will notice in Proclamation No. 9, the
sectors cited were the farmers, fishermen, workers, students, professionals, business, military, academic,
ethnic and other similar groups. So these are the nine sectors that were identified here as "sectoral
representatives" to be represented in this Commission. The problem we had in trying to approach sectoral
representation in the Assembly was whether to stop at these nine sectors or include other sectors. And we
went through the exercise in a caucus of which sector should be included which went up to 14 sectors. And as
we all know, the longer we make our enumeration, the more limiting the law become because when we make
an enumeration we exclude those who are not in the enumeration. Second, we had the problem of who
comprise the farmers. Let us just say the farmers and the laborers. These days, there are many citizens who
are called "hyphenated citizens." A doctor may be a farmer; a lawyer may also be a farmer. And so, it is up to
the discretion of the person to say "I am a farmer" so he would be included in that sector.

The third problem is that when we go into a reserved seat system of sectoral representation in the Assembly,
we are, in effect, giving some people two votes and other people one vote. We sought to avoid these problems
by presenting a party list system. Under the party list system, there are no reserved seats for sectors. Let us
say, laborers and farmers can form a sectoral party or a sectoral organization that will then register and
present candidates of their party. How do the mechanics go? Essentially, under the party list system, every
voter has two votes, so there is no discrimination. First, he will vote for the representative of his legislative
district. That is one vote. In that same ballot, he will be asked: What party or organization or coalition do you
wish to be represented in the Assembly? And here will be attached a list of the parties, organizations or
coalitions that have been registered with the COMELEC and are entitled to be put in that list. This can be a
regional party, a sectoral party, a national party, UNIDO, Magsasaka or a regional party in Mindanao. One need

Pearliegates

What does that mean? It means that any group or party who has a constituency of, say, 500,000 nationwide
gets a seat in the National Assembly. What is the justification for that? When we allocate legislative districts, we
are saying that any district that has 200,000 votes gets a seat. There is no reason why a group that has a
national constituency, even if it is a sectoral or special interest group, should not have a voice in the National
Assembly. It also means that, let us say, there are three or four labor groups, they all register as a party or as a
group. If each of them gets only one percent or five of them get one percent, they are not entitled to any
representative. So, they will begin to think that if they really have a common interest, they should band
together, form a coalition and get five percent of the vote and, therefore, have two seats in the Assembly.
Those are the dynamics of a party list system.

We feel that this approach gets around the mechanics of sectoral representation while at the same time
making sure that those who really have a national constituency or sectoral constituency will get a chance to
have a seat in the National Assembly. These sectors or these groups may not have the constituency to win a
seat on a legislative district basis. They may not be able to win a seat on a district basis but surely, they will
have votes on a nationwide basis.

The purpose of this is to open the system. In the past elections, we found out that there were certain groups or
parties that, if we count their votes nationwide; have about 1,000,000 or 1,500,000 votes. But they were
always third place or fourth place in each of the districts. So, they have no voice in the Assembly. But this way,
they would have five or six representatives in the Assembly even if they would not win individually in legislative
districts. So, that is essentially the mechanics, the purpose and objectives of the party list system.

BISHOP BACANI: Madam President, am I right in interpreting that when we speak now of party list system
though we refer to sectors, we would be referring to sectoral party list rather than sectors and party list?

39

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MR. MONSOD: As a matter of fact, if this body accepts the party list system, we do not even have to mention
sectors because the sectors would be included in the party list system. They can be sectoral parties within the
party list system.

MR. MONSOD. Suppose Senator Taada wants to run under BAYAN group and says that he represents the
farmers, would he qualify?

MR. VILLACORTA. No, Senator Taada would not qualify.


xxxx

MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I just want to say that we suggested or proposed the party list system
because we wanted to open up the political system to a pluralistic society through a multiparty system. x x x
We are for opening up the system, and we would like very much for the sectors to be there. That is why one of
the ways to do that is to put a ceiling on the number of representatives from any single party that can sit within
the 50 allocated under the party list system. x x x.

MR. MONSOD. But UNIDO can field candidates under the party list system and say Juan dela Cruz is a farmer.
Who would pass on whether he is a farmer or not?

MR. TADEO. Kay Commissioner Monsod, gusto ko lamang linawin ito. Political parties, particularly minority
political parties, are not prohibited to participate in the party list election if they can prove that they are also
organized along sectoral lines.

xxx

MR. MONSOD. Madam President, the candidacy for the 198 seats is not limited to political parties. My question
is this: Are we going to classify for example Christian Democrats and Social Democrats as political parties? Can
they run under the party list concept or must they be under the district legislation side of it only?

MR. VILLACORTA. In reply to that query, I think these parties that the Commissioner mentioned can field
candidates for the Senate as well as for the House of Representatives. Likewise, they can also field sectoral
candidates for the 20 percent or 30 percent, whichever is adopted, of the seats that we are allocating under
the party list system.

MR. MONSOD. In other words, the Christian Democrats can field district candidates and can also participate in
the party list system?

MR. VILLACORTA. Why not? When they come to the party list system, they will be fielding only sectoral
candidates.

MR. MONSOD. What the Commissioner is saying is that all political parties can participate because it is
precisely the contention of political parties that they represent the broad base of citizens and that all sectors
are represented in them. Would the Commissioner agree?

MR. TADEO. Ang punto lamang namin, pag pinayagan mo ang UNIDO na isang political party, it will dominate
the party list at mawawalang saysay din yung sector. Lalamunin mismo ng political parties ang party list
system. Gusto ko lamang bigyan ng diin ang "reserve." Hindi ito reserve seat sa marginalized sectors. Kung
titingnan natin itong 198 seats, reserved din ito sa political parties.

MR. MONSOD. Hindi po reserved iyon kasi anybody can run there. But my question to Commissioner Villacorta
and probably also to Commissioner Tadeo is that under this system, would UNIDO be banned from running
under the party list system?

MR. VILLACORTA. No, as I said, UNIDO may field sectoral candidates. On that condition alone, UNIDO may be
allowed to register for the party list system.

MR. MONSOD. May I inquire from Commissioner Tadeo if he shares that answer?
MR. MONSOD. May I be clarified on that? Can UNIDO participate in the party list system?
MR. TADEO. The same.
MR. VILLACORTA. Yes, why not? For as long as they field candidates who come from the different marginalized
sectors that we shall designate in this Constitution.
MR. VILLACORTA. Puwede po ang UNIDO, pero sa sectoral lines.

Pearliegates

40

Election Law Cases

MR. MONSOD: Sino po ang magsasabi kung iyong kandidato ng UNIDO ay hindi talagang labor leader or isang
laborer? Halimbawa, abogado ito.

MR. TADEO: Iyong mechanics.

MR. MONSOD: Hindi po mechanics iyon because we are trying to solve an inherent problem of sectoral
representation. My question is: Suppose UNIDO fields a labor leader, would he qualify?

MR. TADEO: The COMELEC may look into the truth of whether or not a political party is really organized along a
specific sectoral line. If such is verified or confirmed, the political party may submit a list of individuals who are
actually members of such sectors. The lists are to be published to give individuals or organizations belonging to
such sector the chance to present evidence contradicting claims of membership in the said sector or to
question the claims of the existence of such sectoral organizations or parties. This proceeding shall be
conducted by the COMELEC and shall be summary in character. In other words, COMELEC decisions on this
matter are final and unappealable.52 (Emphasis supplied)

Indisputably, the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended the party-list system to include not only sectoral
parties but also non-sectoral parties. The framers intended the sectoral parties to constitute a part, but not the
entirety, of the party-list system. As explained by Commissioner Wilfredo Villacorta, political parties can
participate in the party-list system "For as long as they field candidates who come from the different
marginalized sectors that we shall designate in this Constitution."53

In fact, the framers voted down, 19-22, a proposal to reserve permanent seats to sectoral parties in the House
of Representatives, or alternatively, to reserve the party-list system exclusively to sectoral parties. As clearly
explained by Justice Jose C. Vitug in his Dissenting Opinion in Ang Bagong Bayani:

The draft provisions on what was to become Article VI, Section 5, subsection (2), of the 1987 Constitution took
off from two staunch positions the first headed by Commissioner Villacorta, advocating that of the 20 per
centum of the total seats in Congress to be allocated to party-list representatives half were to be reserved to
appointees from the marginalized and underrepresented sectors. The proposal was opposed by some
Commissioners. Mr. Monsod expressed the difficulty in delimiting the sectors that needed representation. He
was of the view that reserving seats for the marginalized and underrepresented sectors would stunt their
development into full-pledged parties equipped with electoral machinery potent enough to further the sectoral
interests to be represented. The Villacorta group, on the other hand, was apprehensive that pitting the
unorganized and less-moneyed sectoral groups in an electoral contest would be like placing babes in the lion's
den, so to speak, with the bigger and more established political parties ultimately gobbling them up. R.A. 7941
recognized this concern when it banned the first five major political parties on the basis of party representation

Pearliegates

in the House of Representatives from participating in the party-list system for the first party-list elections held
in 1998 (and to be automatically lifted starting with the 2001 elections). The advocates for permanent seats for
sectoral representatives made an effort towards a compromise that the party-list system be open only to
underrepresented and marginalized sectors. This proposal was further whittled down by allocating only half of
the seats under the party-list system to candidates from the sectors which would garner the required number
of votes. The majority was unyielding. Voting 19-22, the proposal for permanent seats, and in the alternative
the reservation of the party-list system to the sectoral groups, was voted down. The only concession the
Villacorta group was able to muster was an assurance of reserved seats for selected sectors for three
consecutive terms after the enactment of the 1987 Constitution, by which time they would be expected to
gather and solidify their electoral base and brace themselves in the multi-party electoral contest with the more
veteran political groups.54 (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, in the end, the proposal to give permanent reserved seats to certain sectors was outvoted. Instead, the
reservation of seats to sectoral representatives was only allowed for the first three consecutive terms.55 There
can be no doubt whatsoever that the framers of the 1987 Constitution expressly rejected the proposal to make
the party-list system exclusively for sectoral parties only, and that they clearly intended the party-list system to
include both sectoral and non-sectoral parties.

The common denominator between sectoral and non-sectoral parties is that they cannot expect to win in
legislative district elections but they can garner, in nationwide elections, at least the same number of votes
that winning candidates can garner in legislative district elections. The party-list system will be the entry point
to membership in the House of Representatives for both these non-traditional parties that could not compete in
legislative district elections.

The indisputable intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution to include in the party-list system both sectoral
and non-sectoral parties is clearly written in Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution, which states:

Section 5. (1) The House of Representative shall be composed of not more that two hundred and fifty members,
unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces,
cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on
the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a
party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. (Emphasis supplied)

Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution is crystal-clear that there shall be "a party-list system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations." The commas after the words "national," and
"regional," separate national and regional parties from sectoral parties. Had the framers of the 1987
Constitution intended national and regional parties to be at the same time sectoral, they would have stated
"national and regional sectoral parties." They did not, precisely because it was never their intention to make
the party-list system exclusively sectoral.

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What the framers intended, and what they expressly wrote in Section 5(1), could not be any clearer: the partylist system is composed of three different groups, and the sectoral parties belong to only one of the three
groups. The text of Section 5(1) leaves no room for any doubt that national and regional parties are separate
from sectoral parties.

Thus, the party-list system is composed of three different groups: (1) national parties or organizations; (2)
regional parties or organizations; and (3) sectoral parties or organizations. National and regional parties or
organizations are different from sectoral parties or organizations. National and regional parties or organizations
need not be organized along sectoral lines and need not represent any particular sector.

Moreover, Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution mandates that, during the first three consecutive
terms of Congress after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, "one-half of the seats allocated to party-list
representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the
religious sector." This provision clearly shows again that the party-list system is not exclusively for sectoral
parties for two obvious reasons.

(b) A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties.

(c) A political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and
policies for the general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of securing their
adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office.

It is a national party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a majority of the
regions. It is a regional party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a
majority of the cities and provinces comprising the region.

(d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in
Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector.

(e) A sectoral organization refers to a group of citizens or a coalition of groups of citizens who share similar
physical attributes or characteristics, employment, interests or concerns.
First, the other one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives would naturally be open to nonsectoral party-list representatives, clearly negating the idea that the party-list system is exclusively for sectoral
parties representing the "marginalized and underrepresented." Second, the reservation of one-half of the partylist seats to sectoral parties applies only for the first "three consecutive terms after the ratification of this
Constitution," clearly making the party-list system fully open after the end of the first three congressional
terms. This means that, after this period, there will be no seats reserved for any class or type of party that
qualifies under the three groups constituting the party-list system.

Hence, the clear intent, express wording, and party-list structure ordained in Section 5(1) and (2), Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution cannot be disputed: the party-list system is not for sectoral parties only, but also for nonsectoral parties.

(f) A coalition refers to an aggrupation of duly registered national, regional, sectoral parties or organizations for
political and/or election purposes. (Emphasis supplied)

Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7941 defines a "party" as "either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of
parties." Clearly, a political party is different from a sectoral party. Section 3(c) of R.A. No. 7941 further
provides that a "political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform,
principles and policies for the general conduct of government." On the other hand, Section 3(d) of R.A. No.
7941 provides that a "sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors
enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their
sector." R.A. No. 7941 provides different definitions for a political and a sectoral party. Obviously, they are
separate and distinct from each other.

Republic Act No. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, which is the law that implements the party-list system
prescribed in the Constitution, provides:

Section 3. Definition of Terms. (a) The party-list system is a mechanism of proportional representation in the
election of representatives to the House of Representatives from national, regional and sectoral parties or
organizations or coalitions thereof registered with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). Component parties
or organizations of a coalition may participate independently provided the coalition of which they form part
does not participate in the party-list system.

Pearliegates

R.A. No. 7941 does not require national and regional parties or organizations to represent the "marginalized
and underrepresented" sectors. To require all national and regional parties under the party-list system to
represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" is to deprive and exclude, by judicial fiat, ideology-based
and cause-oriented parties from the party-list system. How will these ideology-based and cause-oriented
parties, who cannot win in legislative district elections, participate in the electoral process if they are excluded
from the party-list system? To exclude them from the party-list system is to prevent them from joining the
parliamentary struggle, leaving as their only option the armed struggle. To exclude them from the party-list
system is, apart from being obviously senseless, patently contrary to the clear intent and express wording of
the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941.

42

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(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;
Under the party-list system, an ideology-based or cause-oriented political party is clearly different from a
sectoral party. A political party need not be organized as a sectoral party and need not represent any particular
sector. There is no requirement in R.A. No. 7941 that a national or regional political party must represent a
"marginalized and underrepresented" sector. It is sufficient that the political party consists of citizens who
advocate the same ideology or platform, or the same governance principles and policies, regardless of their
economic status as citizens.

Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941 states that "the sectors shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and
professionals."56 The sectors mentioned in Section 5 are not all necessarily "marginalized and
underrepresented." For sure, "professionals" are not by definition "marginalized and underrepresented," not
even the elderly, women, and the youth. However, professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth may "lack
well-defined political constituencies," and can thus organize themselves into sectoral parties in advocacy of the
special interests and concerns of their respective sectors.

Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941 provides another compelling reason for holding that the law does not require
national or regional parties, as well as certain sectoral parties in Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941, to represent the
"marginalized and underrepresented." Section 6 provides the grounds for the COMELEC to refuse or cancel the
registration of parties or organizations after due notice and hearing.

Section 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration. The COMELEC may, motu proprio or upon verified
complaint of any interested party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any
national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the following grounds:

(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;

(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or

(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of
the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has
registered.

None of the 8 grounds to refuse or cancel registration refers to non-representation of the "marginalized and
underrepresented."

The phrase "marginalized and underrepresented" appears only once in R.A. No. 7941, in Section 2 on
Declaration of Policy.57 Section 2 seeks "to promote proportional representation in the election of
representatives to the House of Representatives through the party-list system," which will enable Filipinos
belonging to the "marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack welldefined political constituencies," to become members of the House of Representatives. While the policy
declaration in Section 2 of R.A. No. 7941 broadly refers to "marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties," the specific implementing provisions of R.A. No. 7941 do not define or require that
the sectors, organizations or parties must be "marginalized and underrepresented." On the contrary, to even
interpret that all the sectors mentioned in Section 5 are "marginalized and underrepresented" would lead to
absurdities.

(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association organized for religious purposes;
How then should we harmonize the broad policy declaration in Section 2 of R.A. No. 7941 with its specific
implementing provisions, bearing in mind the applicable provisions of the 1987 Constitution on the matter?
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;

(3) It is a foreign party or organization;

(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation, organization,
whether directly or through any of its officers or members or indirectly through third parties for partisan
election purposes;

Pearliegates

The phrase "marginalized and underrepresented" should refer only to the sectors in Section 5 that are, by their
nature, economically "marginalized and underrepresented." These sectors are: labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban
poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other similar sectors. For
these sectors, a majority of the members of the sectoral party must belong to the "marginalized and
underrepresented." The nominees of the sectoral party either must belong to the sector, or must have a track
record of advocacy for the sector represented. Belonging to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector
does not mean one must "wallow in poverty, destitution or infirmity." It is sufficient that one, or his or her
sector, is below the middle class. More specifically, the economically "marginalized and underrepresented" are
those who fall in the low income group as classified by the National Statistical Coordination Board.58

43

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The recognition that national and regional parties, as well as sectoral parties of professionals, the elderly,
women and the youth, need not be "marginalized and underrepresented" will allow small ideology-based and
cause-oriented parties who lack "well-defined political constituencies" a chance to win seats in the House of
Representatives. On the other hand, limiting to the "marginalized and underrepresented" the sectoral parties
for labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas
workers, and other sectors that by their nature are economically at the margins of society, will give the
"marginalized and underrepresented" an opportunity to likewise win seats in the House of Representatives.

This interpretation will harmonize the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 and will give rise to a multi-party
system where those "marginalized and underrepresented," both in economic and ideological status, will have
the opportunity to send their own members to the House of Representatives. This interpretation will also make
the party-list system honest and transparent, eliminating the need for relatively well-off party-list
representatives to masquerade as "wallowing in poverty, destitution and infirmity," even as they attend
sessions in Congress riding in SUVs.

The major political parties are those that field candidates in the legislative district elections. Major political
parties cannot participate in the party-list elections since they neither lack "well-defined political
constituencies" nor represent "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors. Thus, the national or regional
parties under the party-list system are necessarily those that do not belong to major political parties. This
automatically reserves the national and regional parties under the party-list system to those who "lack welldefined political constituencies," giving them the opportunity to have members in the House of
Representatives.

To recall, Ang Bagong Bayani expressly declared, in its second guideline for the accreditation of parties under
the party-list system, that "while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the
Constitution to participate in the party-list system, they must comply with the declared statutory policy of
enabling Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors xxx to be elected to the
House of Representatives. "However, the requirement in Ang Bagong Bayani, in its second guideline, that "the
political party xxx must represent the marginalized and underrepresented," automatically disqualified major
political parties from participating in the party-list system. This inherent inconsistency in Ang Bagong Bayani
has been compounded by the COMELECs refusal to register sectoral wings officially organized by major
political parties. BANAT merely formalized the prevailing practice when it expressly prohibited major political
parties from participating in the party-list system, even through their sectoral wings.

Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941 expressly prohibited the "first five (5) major political parties on the basis of party
representation in the House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress" from participating in the May
1988 party-list elections.59 Thus, major political parties can participate in subsequent party-list elections since
the prohibition is expressly limited only to the 1988 party-list elections. However, major political parties should
participate in party-list elections only through their sectoral wings. The participation of major political parties
through their sectoral wings, a majority of whose members are "marginalized and underrepresented" or lacking
in "well-defined political constituencies," will facilitate the entry of the "marginalized and underrepresented"
and those who "lack well-defined political constituencies" as members of the House of Representatives.

Pearliegates

The 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 allow major political parties to participate in party-list elections so as
to encourage them to work assiduously in extending their constituencies to the "marginalized and
underrepresented" and to those who "lack well-defined political constituencies." The participation of major
political parties in party-list elections must be geared towards the entry, as members of the House of
Representatives, of the "marginalized and underrepresented" and those who "lack well-defined political
constituencies," giving them a voice in law-making. Thus,to participate in party-list elections, a major political
party that fields candidates in the legislative district elections must organize a sectoral wing, like a labor,
peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, professional, women or youth wing, that can register under the party-list
system.

Such sectoral wing of a major political party must have its own constitution, by-laws, platform or program of
government, officers and members, a majority of whom must belong to the sector represented. The sectoral
wing is in itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a major political party through a coalition. This
linkage is allowed by Section 3 of R.A. No. 7941, which provides that "component parties or organizations of a
coalition may participate independently (in party-list elections) provided the coalition of which they form part
does not participate in the party-list system."

Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941 prescribes the qualifications of party-list nominees. This provision prescribes a
special qualification only for the nominee from the youth sector.

Section 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated as party-list representative


unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period
of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read and write, a bona fide
member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the
day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election.

In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30)
years of age on the day of the election.

Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to
continue in office until the expiration of his term.1wphi1

A party-list nominee must be a bona fide member of the party or organization which he or she seeks to
represent. In the case of sectoral parties, to be a bona fide party-list nominee one must either belong to the
sector represented, or have a track record of advocacy for such sector.

44

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In disqualifying petitioners, the COMELEC used the criteria prescribed in Ang Bagong Bayani and BANAT. Ang
Bagong Bayani laid down the guidelines for qualifying those who desire to participate in the party-list system:

First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition must represent the marginalized and underrepresented
groups identified in Section 5 of RA 7941. x x x

Second, while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the Constitution to participate
in the party-list system, they must comply with the declared statutory policy of enabling "Filipino citizens
belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors x x x to be elected to the House of Representatives." x
x x.

(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;

(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or

(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of
the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has
registered."

xxxx

Fifth, the party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a project organized or an entity funded or assisted
by, the government. x x x.

Third, x x x the religious sector may not be represented in the party-list system. x x x.

xxxx

xxxx

Sixth, the party must not only comply with the requirements of the law; its nominees must likewise do so.
Section 9 of RA 7941 reads as follows:

Fourth, a party or an organization must not be disqualified under Section 6 of RA 7941, which enumerates the
grounds for disqualification as follows:

"(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association, organized for religious purposes;

(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;

"SEC 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. - No person shall be nominated as party-list representative unless
he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not
less than one (1)year immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read and write, a bona fide
member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the
day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election.

In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30)
years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30)
during his term shall be allowed to continue in office until the expiration of his term."

(3) It is a foreign party or organization;

(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation, organization,
whether directly or through any of its officers or members or indirectly through third parties for partisan
election purposes;

Seventh, not only the candidate party or organization must represent marginalized and underrepresented
sectors; so also must its nominees. x x x.

Eighth, x x x the nominee must likewise be able to contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate
legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole. (Emphasis supplied)
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;

Pearliegates

45

Election Law Cases


In 2009, by a vote of 8-7 in BANAT, this Court stretched the Ang Bagong Bayani ruling further. In BANAT, the
majority officially excluded major political parties from participating in party-list elections,60 abandoning even
the lip-service that Ang Bagong Bayani accorded to the 1987 Constitution and R.A.No. 7941 that major political
parties can participate in party-list elections.

The minority in BANAT, however, believed that major political parties can participate in the party-list system
through their sectoral wings. The minority expressed that "[e]xcluding the major political parties in party-list
elections is manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional Commission, and R.A. No. 7941.
This Court cannot engage in socio-political engineering and judicially legislate the exclusion of major political
parties from the party-list elections in patent violation of the Constitution and the law."61 The experimentations
in socio-political engineering have only resulted in confusion and absurdity in the party-list system. Such
experimentations, in clear contravention of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941, must now come to an end.

We cannot, however, fault the COMELEC for following prevailing jurisprudence in disqualifying petitioners. In
following prevailing jurisprudence, the COMELEC could not have committed grave abuse of discretion.
However, for the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections, we must now impose and mandate the party-list
system actually envisioned and authorized under the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941. In BANAT, this Court
devised a new formula in the allocation of party-list seats, reversing the COMELEC's allocation which followed
the then prevailing formula in Ang Bagong Bayani. In BANAT, however, the Court did not declare that the
COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion. Similarly, even as we acknowledge here that the COMELEC did
not commit grave abuse of discretion, we declare that it would not be in accord with the 1987 Constitution and
R.A. No. 7941 to apply the criteria in Ang Bagong Bayani and BANAT in determining who are qualified to
participate in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections. For this purpose, we suspend our rule62 that a party
may appeal to this Court from decisions or orders of the COMELEC only if the COMELEC committed grave abuse
of discretion.

Thus, we remand all the present petitions to the COMELEC. In determining who may participate in the coming
13 May 2013 and subsequent party-list elections, the COMELEC shall adhere to the following parameters:

1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or organizations, (2)
regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.

that can separately register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral
party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition.

4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be "marginalized and underrepresented" or lacking in "welldefined political constituencies." It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and
concerns of their sector. The sectors that are "marginalized and underrepresented" include labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The
sectors that lack "well-defined political constituencies" include professionals, the elderly, women, and the
youth.

5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the "marginalized and
underrepresented" must belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector they represent. Similarly, a
majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack "well-defined political constituencies"
must belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the
"marginalized and underrepresented," or that represent those who lack "well-defined political constituencies,"
either must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their respective
sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide members of such
parties or organizations.

6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their nominees
are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.

The COMELEC excluded from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections those that did not satisfy
these two criteria: (1) all national, regional, and sectoral groups or organizations must represent the
"marginalized and underrepresented" sectors, and (2) all nominees must belong to the "marginalized and
underrepresented" sector they represent. Petitioners may have been disqualified by the COMELEC because as
political or regional parties they are not organized along sectoral lines and do not represent the "marginalized
and underrepresented." Also, petitioners' nominees who do not belong to the sectors they represent may have
been disqualified, although they may have a track record of advocacy for their sectors. Likewise, nominees of
non-sectoral parties may have been disqualified because they do not belong to any sector. Moreover, a party
may have been disqualified because one or more of its nominees failed to qualify, even if the party has at least
one remaining qualified nominee. As discussed above, the disqualification of petitioners, and their nominees,
under such circumstances is contrary to the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941.

2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize along sectoral
lines and do not need to represent any "marginalized and underrepresented" sector.

3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-list system and
do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or not, that fields
candidates in legislative district elections can participate in party-list elections only through its sectoral wing

Pearliegates

This Court is sworn to uphold the 1987 Constitution, apply its provisions faithfully, and desist from engaging in
socio-economic or political experimentations contrary to what the Constitution has ordained. Judicial power
does not include the power to re-write the Constitution. Thus, the present petitions should be remanded to the
COMELEC not because the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying petitioners, but
because petitioners may now possibly qualify to participate in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections
under the new parameters prescribed by this Court.

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Election Law Cases

WHEREFORE, all the present 54 petitions are GRANTED. The 13 petitions, which have been granted Status Quo
Ante Orders but without mandatory injunction to include the names of petitioners in the printing of ballots, are
remanded to the Commission on Elections only for determination whether petitioners are qualified to register
under the party-list system under the parameters prescribed in this Decision but they shall not participate in
the 13 May 2013 part-list elections. The 41 petitions, which have been granted mandatory injunctions to
include the names of petitioners in the printing of ballots, are remanded to the Commission on Elections for
determination whether petitioners are qualified to register under the party-list system and to participate in the
13 May 2013 party-list elections under the parameters prescribed in this Decision. The Commission on
Elections may conduct summary evidentiary hearings for this purpose. This Decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 147589

June 25, 2003

ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY (under the acronym OFW), represented herein by its
Secretary-General, MOHAMMAD OMAR FAJARDO, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; CITIZENS DRUG WATCH; MAMAMAYAN AYAW SA DROGA; GO! GO!
PHILIPPINES; THE TRUE MARCOS LOYALIST ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES; PHILIPPINE LOCAL
AUTONOMY; CITIZENS MOVEMENT FOR JUSTICE, ECONOMY, ENVIRONMENT AND PEACE; CHAMBER
OF REAL ESTATE BUILDERS ASSOCIATION; SPORTS & HEALTH ADVANCEMENT FOUNDATION, INC.;
ANG LAKAS NG OVERSEAS CONTRACT WORKERS (OCW); BAGONG BAYANI ORGANIZATION and
others under "Organizations/Coalitions" of Omnibus Resolution No. 3785; PARTIDO NG MASANG
PILIPINO; LAKAS NUCD-UMDP; NATIONALIST PEOPLE'S COALITION; LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG
PILIPINO; AKSYON DEMOKRATIKO; PDP-LABAN; LIBERAL PARTY; NACIONALISTA PARTY; ANG BUHAY
HAYAANG YUMABONG; and others under "Political Parties" of Omnibus Resolution No. 3785,
Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 147613

June 25, 2003

BAYAN MUNA, Petitioner,

DROGA; CREBA; NATIONAL FEDERATION OF SUGARCANE PLANTERS; JEEP; and BAGONG BAYANI ORGANIZATION,
Respondents.

RESOLUTION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Before the Court are Motions for proclamation filed by various party-list participants. The ultimate question
raised is this: Aside from those already validly proclaimed1 pursuant to earlier Resolutions of this Court, are
there other party-list candidates that should be proclaimed winners? The answer to this question is
circumscribed by the eight-point guideline given in our June 26, 2001 Decision in these consolidated cases, as
well as by the four unique parameters of the Philippine party-list system:

"First, the twenty percent allocation -- the combined number of all party-list congressmen shall not exceed
twenty percent of the total membership of the House of Representatives, including those elected under the
party-list.

"Second, the two percent threshold -- only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of the total valid
votes cast for the party-list system are qualified to have a seat in the House of Representatives.

"Third, the three-seat limit -- each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained, is
entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one qualifying and two additional seats.

"Fourth, proportional representation -- the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be
computed in proportion to their total number of votes."2

The Antecedents

To fully understand the matter on hand, we deem it wise to recapitulate some relevant antecedents.

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; NATIONALIST PEOPLE'S COALITION (NPC); LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO
(LDP); PARTIDO NG MASANG PILIPINO (PMP); LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP, LIBERAL PARTY; MAMAMAYANG AYAW SA

Pearliegates

On June 26, 2001, the Court promulgated in these consolidated cases its Decision requiring Comelec to do the
following:

47

Election Law Cases

"x x x [I]mmediately conduct summary evidentiary hearings on the qualifications of the party-list participants in
the light of the guidelines enunciated in this Decision. Considering the extreme urgency of determining the
winners in the last party-list elections, the Comelec is directed to begin its hearings for the parties and
organizations that appear to have garnered such number of votes as to qualify for seats in the House of
Representatives. The Comelec is further directed to submit to this Court its compliance report within 30 days
from notice hereof.

"The Resolution of this Court dated May 9, 2001, directing the Comelec to refrain from proclaiming any winner
during the last party-list election, shall remain in force until after the Comelec itself will have complied and
reported its compliance with the foregoing disposition."3

7. SANLAKAS

It also recommended the disqualification of the following party-list participants for their failure to pass the
guidelines:

MAMAMAYAN AYAW SA DROGA (MAD)

ASSOCIATION OF PHILIPPINE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES (APEC)


Comelecs First Partial
VETERANS FEDERATION PARTY (VFP)
Compliance Report
ABAG PROMDI (PROMDI)
In its First Partial Compliance Report dated July 27, 2001, Comelec recommended that the following party-list
participants be deemed to have hurdled the eight-point guideline referred to in the aforementioned Court
Decision:

1. BAYAN MUNA (BAYAN MUNA)

2. AKBAYAN! CITIZENS ACTION PARTY (AKBAYAN!)

3. LUZON FARMERS PARTY (BUTIL)

4. ANAK MINDANAO (AMIN)

5. ALYANSANG BAYANIHAN NG MGA MAGSASAKA, MANGGAGAWANG BUKID AT MANGINGISDA (ABA)

6. PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA (PM)

Pearliegates

NATIONALIST PEOPLES COALITION (NPC)

LAKAS NUCD-UMDP (LAKAS)

CITIZENS BATTLE AGAINST CORRUPTION (CIBAC)

LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO (LDP)

BUHAY HAYAANG YUMABONG (BUHAY)

COCOFED-PHILIPPINE COCONUT PRODUCERS FEDERATION, INC. (COCOFED)

COOPERATIVE NATCCO NETWORK PARTY (COOP-NATCCO)

48

Election Law Cases


NATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF IRRIGATORS ASSOCIATION (NCIA)

Thereafter, in another Resolution dated January 29, 2002,5 the Court agreed to qualify APEC and CIBAC, which
had previously been disqualified by Comelec in its First Compliance Report.

ASOSASYON PARA SA KAUNLARAN NG INDUSTRIYA NG AKLAT, INC. (AKLAT)


Thus, in the same Resolution, the Court once more lifted its May 9, 2001 TRO to enable the Comelec to
proclaim APEC and CIBAC as winners in the party-list elections. The Court said:
THE TRUE MARCOS LOYALIST (FOR GOD, COUNTRY, AND PEOPLE) ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES (MARCOS
LOYALIST)

CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE AND BUILDERS ASSOCIATION, INC. (CREBA)

BIGKIS PINOY FOUNDATION (BIGKIS)

AKSYON DEMOKRATIKO (AKSYON)

In response to this Report, the Court issued its August 14, 2001 Resolution which partially lifted its May 9, 2001
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO). The Court did so to enable Comelec to proclaim Bayan Muna as the first
"winner in the last party-list election, with the caveat that all proclamations should be made in accordance not
only with the Decision of the Court in the instant case but also with Veterans Federation Party v. Comelec, GR
Nos. 136781, 136786, and 136795, October 6, 2000, on how to determine and compute the winning parties
and nominees in the party-list elections."

"we accept Comelecs submission, per the OSG, that APEC and CIBAC have sufficiently met the 8-point
guidelines of this Court and have garnered sufficient votes to entitle them to seats in Congress. Since these
issues are factual in character, we are inclined to adopt the Commissions findings, absent any patent
arbitrariness or abuse or negligence in its action. There is no substantial proof that CIBAC is merely an arm of
JIL, or that APEC is an extension of PHILRECA. The OSG explained that these are separate entities with separate
memberships. Although APECs nominees are all professionals, its membership is composed not only of
professionals but also of peasants, elderly, youth and women. Equally important, APEC addresses the issues of
job creation, poverty alleviation and lack of electricity. Likewise, CIBAC is composed of the underrepresented
and marginalized and is concerned with their welfare. CIBAC is particularly interested in the youth and
professional sectors."6

To summarize, after the Court had accepted and approved the First Partial Compliance Report and its
amendments, the following nominees were validly proclaimed winners: BAYAN MUNA (Satur C. Ocampo, Crispin
B. Beltran and Liza L. Maza), AKBAYAN (Loretta Ann P. Rosales), BUTIL (Benjamin A. Cruz), APEC (Ernesto C.
Pablo) and CIBAC (Joel J. Villanueva).

Comelecs Second Partial


Compliance Report

In another Resolution dated August 24, 2001, the Court again partially lifted its May 9, 2001 TRO to enable the
Comelec to proclaim Akbayan and Butil "as winning party-list groups, in accordance not only with the Decision
of the Court in the instant case but also with Veterans Federation Party v. Comelec, GR Nos. 136781, 136786,
and 136795, October 6, 2000."

In its Consolidated Reply dated October 15, 2001, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on behalf of the
Comelec, recommended that -- "except for the modification that the APEC, BUHAY, COCOFED and CIBAC be
declared as having complied with the guidelines set forth in the June 26, 2001 Decision in the instant cases [--]
the Partial Compliance Report dated July 27, 2001 be affirmed."4 But because of (1) the conflicting Comelec
reports regarding the qualifications of APEC and CIBAC and (2) the disparity in the percentage of votes
obtained by AMIN, the Court in a Resolution dated November 13, 2001, required the parties to file within 20
days from notice their respective final position papers on why APEC, CIBAC, and/or AMIN should or should not
be proclaimed winners in the last party-list elections.

In its Second Compliance Report dated August 22, 2001 and received by this Court on August 28, 2001,
Comelec recommended that the following party-list participants7 be deemed qualified under the Courts
guidelines:

10. ABANSE! PINAY

11. ADHIKAIN AT KILUSAN NG ORDINARYONG TAO PARA SA LUPA, PABAHAY, AT HANAPBUHAY (AKO)

12. ALAGAD

Pearliegates

49

Election Law Cases


PARTIDO NG MASANG PILIPINO (PMP)
13. SENIOR CITIZENS/ELDERY SECTORAL PARTY (ELDERLY)
ANG LAKAS NG BAGONG KOOPERATIBA (ALAB)
14. ALL TRADE UNION CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES (ATUCP)
PARTIDO NG MARALITANG PILIPINO PINATUBO PARTY (PMP-PINATUBO)
15. MARITIME PARTY (MARITIME)
REBOLUSYONARYONG ALYANSANG MAKABANSA (RAM)
16. ANG BAGONG BAYANI OFW LABOR PARTY (OFW)
BAYAN NG NAGTATAGUYOD NG DEMOKRATIKONG IDEOLOGIYA AT LAYUNIN, INC. (BANDILA)
17. ANIBAN NG MGA MAGSASAKA, MANGINGISDA, AT MANGGAGAWA SA AGRIKULTURA KATIPUNAN (AMMMA)
BAGONG BAYANI ORGANIZATION (BAGONG BAYANI)
18. ALYANSA NG NAGKAKAISANG KABATAAN NG SAMBAYANAN PARA SA KAUNLARAN (ANAKBAYAN)
KABATAAN NG MASANG PILIPINO (KAMPIL)
19. ALYANSA NG MGA MAY KAPANSANAN SA PILIPINAS (AKAP)
AARANGKADA ANG MGA HANDA ORAS-ORAS (AHOY)
20. MINDANAO FEDERATION OF SMALL COCONUT FARMERS ORGANIZATION, INC. (MSCFO)
PHILIPPINE MEDICAL ASSOCIATION (PMA)
21. WOMENPOWER, INC. (WPI)
ALLIANCE TO ALLEVIATE THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ORDER, INC. (AASENSO KA)
22. AGGRUPATION AND ALLIANCE OF FARMERS AND FISHERFOLKS OF THE PHILIPPINES (AAAFPI)
PARTIDO DEMOKRATIKO SOSYALISTA NG PILIPINAS (PDSP)
23. ALL WORKERS ALLIANCE TRADE UNIONS (AWATU)
COOPERATIVE UNION OF THE PHILIPPINES (CUP)
In the same Compliance Report, the poll body classified the following party-list groups as unqualified:
ATIN (FORMERLY ABANTE BISAYA)
GREEN PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION (GREEN PHIL)
VOLUNTEERS AGAINST CRIME AND CORRUPTION (VACC)

Pearliegates

50

Election Law Cases


ALLIANCE FOR GREATER ACHIEVEMENTS IN PEACE AND PROSPERITY (AGAP)
ASSOCIATION OF BUILDERS CONSULTANTS AND DESIGNERS, INC. (ABCD)
ALYANSA NG KOOPERATIBANG PANGKABUHAYAN PARTY (ANGKOP)
LIBERAL PARTY (LP)
NATIONAL ALLIANCE FOR DEMOCRACY (NAD)
CITIZENS DRUGWATCH FOUNDATION, INC. (DRUGWATCH)
PEOPLE POWER PARTY (PEOPLE POWER)
ALAY SA BAYAN PARA SA KALAYAAN AT DEMOKRASYA (ABAKADA)
PHILIPPINE TECHNOLOGICAL COUNCIL (PTC)
ASOSASYON NG MGA TAGA INSURANCE SA PILIPINAS, INC. (ATIP)
PHILIPPINE LOCAL AUTONOMY MOVEMENT, INC. (PLAM)
ANG LAKAS NG OVERSEAS CONTRACT WORKERS (OCW)
PROFESSIONAL CRIMINOLOGIST ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES (PCAP)
NATIONAL FEDERATION OF SUGAR PLANTERS (NFSP)
CITIZENS MOVEMENT FOR JUSTICE, ECONOMY, ENVIRONMENT, AND PEACE (JEEP)
KABALIKAT NG BAYAN PARTY (KABALIKAT)
Comelecs Final Partial
PARTIDO DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO LAKAS NG BAYAN (PDP-LABAN)

Compliance Report

BANTAY BAYAN FOUNDATION PARTY, INC. (BANTAY-BAYAN)

In its Final Partial Compliance Report dated September 27, 2001 and received by the Court a day later, Comelec
recommended that the following be considered as qualified party-list participants:

ABANTE KILUSANG KOOPERATIBA SA GITNANG LUZON [AKK COALITION]


24. NATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF TRICYCLE OPERATORS AND DRIVERS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES
(NACTODAP)
GREEN PHILIPPINES (GREEN)
25. NATIONAL FEDERATION OF SMALL COCONUT FARMERS ORGANIZATION, INC. (SCFO)
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF DETECTIVE AND PROTECTIVE AGENCY OPERATORS (PADPAO)
26. TRIBAL COMMUNITIES ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES (TRICAP)

Pearliegates

51

Election Law Cases


40. KILOS KABATAAN PILIPINO (KILOS)
27. PILIPINONG MAY KAPANSANAN (PINOY MAY K)
41. KALOOB-KA ISANG LOOB PARA SA MARANGAL NA PANINIRAHAN (KALOOB)
28. VETERANS CARE AND WELFARE ORGANIZATION (VETERANS CARE)
42. ALYANSA NG MGA MAMAMAYAN AT MANDARAGAT SA LAWA NG LAGUNA, INC. (ALYANSA)
29. UNION OF THE FILIPINO OVERSEAS WORKERS, INC. (OCW-UNIFIL)
43. DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION OF THE PHILIPPINES (DFP)
30. DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE (DA)
44. PARTIDO KATUTUBONG PILIPINO (KATUTUBO)
31. PILIPINO WORKERS PARTY (PWP)
Further, the Comelec recommended the disqualification of the following party-list groups:
32. PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF RETIRED PERSONS (PARP)
AALAGAHAN ANG ATING KALIKASAN (ALAS)
33. ALLIANCE OF RETIRED POSTAL EMPLOYEES AND SENIOR CITIZENS, INC. (ARPES)
PHILIPPINE SOCIETY OF AGRICULTURAL ENGINEERS (PSAE)
34. AGRARIAN REFORM BENEFICIARIES ASSOCIATION, INC. (ARBA)
PARTIDO PARA SA DEMOKRATIKONG REPORMA (PDR)
35. FEDERATION OF JEEPNEY OPERATORS AND DRIVERS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES (FEJODAP)
CONSUMERS UNION OF THE PHILIPPINES (CONSUMERS)
36. GABAY NG MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO PARTY (GABAY-OFW)
CONFEDERATION OF NON-STOCK SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, INC. (CONSLA)
37. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES OF SETTLERS (AASAHAN)

38. ALLIANCE FOR YOUTH SOLIDARITY (AYOS)

39. PARTY FOR OVERSEAS WORKERS AND EMPOWERMENT AND RE-INTEGRATION (POWER)

PEOPLES PROGRESSIVE ALLIANCE FOR PEACE AND GOOD GOVERNMENT TOWARDS ALLEVIATION OF POVERTY
AND SOCIAL ADVANCEMENT (PAG-ASA)

AHONBAYAN, INC. (AHONBAYAN)

ANGAT

Pearliegates

52

Election Law Cases


NATIONAL URBAN POOR ASSEMBLY (NUPA)
SAMA-SAMA KAYA NATIN TO FOUNDATION, INC. (KASAMA)
ALLIANCE FOR MERITOCRACY (AFM)
A PEACEFUL ORGANIZATION LEADERSHIP, FRIENDSHIP, SERVICE MOVEMENT (APO)
BALIKATAN SA KABUHAYAN BUHAY COALITION (BSK)
PHILIPPINE DENTAL ASSOCIATION (PDA)
BANTAY DAGAT, INC. (BDI)
PUSYON (BISAYA) PILIPINO (PUSYON)

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS)

CITIZENS ANTI-CRIME ASSISTANCE GROUP, INC. (CAAG)

ASA AT SAMAHAN NG KARANIWANG PILIPINO (ASAKAPIL)

BUSINESSMEN AND ENTREPRENEURS ASSOCIATION, INC. (BEA)

UNITED ARCHITECTS OF THE PHILIPPINES (UAP)

ABAY PAMILYA FOUNDATION, INC. (ABAY PAMILYA)

PEOPLES REFORM PARTY (PRP)

COALITION FOR CONSUMER PROTECTION AND WELFARE (COALITION 349)

RIZALIST PARTY (RP)

CONFEDERATION OF HOME OWNERS ASSOCIATION FOR REFORMS IN GOVERNANCE AND ENVIRONMENT, INC.
(HOMEOWNERS)

PORT USERS CONFEDERATION, INC. (PUC)

LABAN PARA SA KAPAYAPAAN, KATARUNGAN, AT KAUNLARAN (KKK)

BONDING IDEALISM FOR NATIONAL HUMAN INITIATIVE (BINHI)

KATIPUNAN NG MGA BANTAY BAYAN SA PILIPINAS (KABAYAN)

FEDERATION OF SONS AND DAUGHTERS OF PHIL. VETERANS, INC. (LAHING VETERANO)

PRIME MOVERS FOR PEACE AND PROGRESS (PRIMO)

PROGRESSIVE ALLIANCE OF CITIZENS FOR DEMOCRACY (PACD)

COUNCIL OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCERS (CAP)

TAPAT FOUNDATION, INC. (TAPAT)

Pearliegates

53

Election Law Cases


ALTERNATIVE ACTION (AA)
ALLIANCE FOR ALLEVIATION OF NATIONAL GOVERNANCE AND TRUST PARTY (AKA)
DEMOCRATIC WORKERS PARTY (DWP)
ANG IPAGLABAN MO FOUNDATION (AIM)
SECURITY UNITED LEAGUE NATIONWIDE GUARDS, INC. (SULONG)
PHILIPPINE MINE SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENT (PMSEA)
ORGANISASYONG KAUGNAYAN NASYONAL SA PAG-UNLAD (O.K. NAPU)
BICOL SARO PARTY (BSP)
PAMBANSANG SANGGUNIANG KATIPUNAN NG BARANGAY KAGAWAD SA PILIPINAS (KATIPUNAN)
AABANTE KA PILIPINAS PARTY (SAGIP BAYAN MOVEMENT) (APIL)
NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR COMMUNITY ORGANIZER (NCCO)
PHILIPPINE PEOPLES PARLIAMENT (PPP-YOUTH)
NATIONWIDE ASSOCIATION OF CONSUMERS, INC. (NACI)
SPORTS AND HEALTH ADVANCEMENT FOUNDATION, INC. (SHAF)
LUZVIMINDA ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION, INC. (LEDFI)
KILUSAN TUNGO SA PAMBANSANG TANGKILIKAN, INC. (KATAPAT)
TINDOG PARA HAN KABUBUWASON HAN WARAYNON (TINDOG WARAY)
CITIZENS FOUNDATION FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRIMES AND INJUSTICES, INC. (CITIZEN)
FEDERATION OF LAND REFORM FARMERS OF THE PHILIPPINES (FLRF)
NACIONALISTA PARTY (NP) (Withdrew participation in the party-list election)
KATRIBU MINDANAO, INC. (KATRIBU)
SANDIGANG MARALITA (SM)
DEMOKRATIKONG UGNAYAN TAPAT SA SAMBAYANAN (DUGTUNGAN)
ONEWAY PRINTING TECHNICAL FOUNDATION, INC. (ONEWAY PRINT)
KATARUNGAN SA BAYAN TAGAPAGTANGGOL NG SAMBAYANAN (KABATAS)
PHILIPPINE JURY MOVEMENT (JURY)
GO! GO! PHILIPPINES MOVEMENT

Pearliegates

54

Election Law Cases

PAMBANSANG SAMAHANG LINGKOD NG BAYAN, INC. (PASALBA)

PHILIPPINE REFORMIST SOCIETY (PRS)

GABAYBAYAN (GAD)

However, in its November 25, 2002 Comment, the OSG contended that NCIA, "which is not a qualified party or
organization per the Comelec [First] Partial Compliance Report dated July 27, 2001, cannot be proclaimed as
winner in the last party-list elections."13 It also recommended that ABAs Motion to lift the TRO with respect to
its proclamation should be likewise granted, because it is a "qualified party or organization that hurdled the 2%
threshold in the last party-list elections. For, ABA received 3.54% of the votes cast in the said party-list
elections, as shown in COMELEC Resolution No. NBC-02-001. ABAs proclamation as winner is therefore in
order."14

Preparatory to resolving the present Motions and in observance of due process, the Court resolved on February
18, 2003 to require the parties, including the OSG, to submit their respective Position Papers on the following
issues:

ALUHAY NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION, INC. (ALUHAI)

ORGANIZED SUPPORT FOR THE MOVEMENT TO ENHANCE THE NATIONAL AGENDA (OSMEA)

All these Compliance Reports have already been affirmed by this Court except that, in regard to the First
Compliance Report, it agreed -- as earlier stated -- to add APEC and CIBAC to the list of qualified groups.

1) Whether Labo v. Comelec,15 Grego v. Comelec16 and related cases should be deemed applicable to the
determination of winners in party-list elections

2) Whether the votes cast for parties/organizations that were subsequently disqualified for having failed to
meet the eight-point guideline contained in our June 26, 2001 Decision should be deducted from the "total
votes cast for the party-list system" during the said elections

Other Significant
Orders and Pleadings

Under its Resolution No. NBC-02-001,8 Comelec motu proprio amended its Compliance Reports by, inter alia,
adding four more party-list participants (BUHAY, COCOFED, NCIA and BAGONG BAYANI) to the list of qualified
candidates for the May 14, 2001 elections.

In its Comment dated November 15, 2002, the OSG opined that "Comelec acted correctly in revising its PartyList Canvass Report No. 26, so as to reflect the correct number of votes cast in favor of qualified party-list
parties and organizations."9 Consequently, it moved to lift our TRO with respect to COCOFED, BUHAY,
SANLAKAS and PM, because "[a]s shown in the revised COMELEC Party-list Canvass Report No. 26, movants
BUHAY, COCOFED, SANLAKAS and PM received 4.25%, 3.35%, 2.21% and 3.17%, respectively, of the total votes
cast10 in the May 14, 2001 party-list election."11

It added that "the proclamation by the COMELEC of BUHAY, COCOFED, SANLAKAS and PM (as well as all other
qualified parties and organizations which received at least 2% of the total votes cast in the same party-list
election) as winners in the said party-list is in order."12

Pearliegates

The Courts Ruling

At the outset, the Court needs to pass upon the claims of the OSG that the initial recommendation contained in
Comelecs First Compliance Report dated July 27, 2001, regarding BUHAY and COCOFED should be
reconsidered, and that these two party-list groups should be deemed qualified.

Qualification of
BUHAY and COCOFED

In recommending the disqualification of BUHAY for being "most probably merely an extension of the El
Shaddai," a religious group, Comelec said in the above-mentioned Report:

"Upon hearing the case for BUHAY, the Commission determined that, based upon BUHAYs declarations of
intent in its constitution, upon its avowed platform of government which both mirror the sentiments of the El
Shaddai Movement and upon the circumstances surrounding its relationship with the El Shaddai Movement,
BUHAY is most probably merely an extension of the El Shaddai. In this light, it is very likely that the relationship

55

Election Law Cases


between the leader of the El Shaddai, and the nominee of BUHAY is less a matter of serendipity than an
attempt to circumvent the statutory prohibition against sects or denominations from participating in the partylist elections."17

In the same Report, Comelec also stated that COCOFED did not deserve a seat in the House of Representatives,
because it was allegedly an "adjunct of the government." Explained the Commission:

It added that while the primary purposes of COCOFEDs Articles of Incorporation authorize the organization "to
help explore and obtain possible technical and financial assistance for industry development from private or
governmental sources x x x," this statement does not "by itself constitute such substantial evidence to support
a conclusion that the COCOFED is an entity funded or assisted by the government."

We are convinced. For the same reasons that we concurred in the earlier accreditation of APEC and CIBAC, we
accept the OSGs position that indeed Comelec erred in disqualifying BUHAY and COCOFED.20

"COCOFED is a sectoral party representing the peasantry. It is a non-stock, non-profit organization of coconut
farmers and producers, established in 1947. It has no religious affiliations. However, the records indicate that it
is an adjunct of the government.

Therefore, we now add these two groups to the list of 44 qualified groups earlier mentioned and thereby
increase the total to 46.

"COCOFEDs Amended By-Laws specifically provides that:

We shall now take up the main question of which parties/organizations won during the last party-list election.

The Chairman of the Philippine Coconut Authority or his duly authorized representative shall automatically be a
member of the National Board.

Legal Effect of the Disqualifications on the "Total Votes Cast"

The Philippine Coconut Authority is an administrative agency of the government which receives support and
funding from the national government. Thus, to have the Chairman of the Philippine Coconut Authority sit on
the National Board of COCOFED clearly amounts to participation of the government in the affairs of candidate
which, as this Court has said, would be unfair to the other parties, and deleterious to the objectives of the
law.

"Furthermore, in the Articles of Incorporation of COCOFED, it declared, as one of its primary purposes, the
obtaining of possible technical and financial assistance for industry development from private or governmental
sources."18

On the other hand, in its Consolidated Reply dated October 15, 2001, the OSG -- in representation of the poll
agency -- argued that the above findings of the Comelec in regard, inter alia, to BUHAY and COCOFED are "not
supported by substantial evidence" and, thus, "should be modified accordingly." This opinion is buttressed by
the OSGs Comment dated November 15, 2002.19

The instant Motions for proclamation contend that the disqualification of many party-list organizations has
reduced the "total number of votes cast for the party-list elections." Because of this reduction, the two-percent
benchmark required by law has now been allegedly attained by movants. Hence, they now pray for their
proclamation as winners in the last party-list elections.

Recall that under Section 11(b)21 of RA 7941 (the Party-List Act), only those parties garnering a minimum of
two percent of the total votes cast for the party-list system are entitled to have a seat in the House of
Representatives. The critical question now is this: To determine the "total votes cast for the party-list system,"
should the votes tallied for the disqualified candidates be deducted? Otherwise stated, does the clause "total
votes cast for the party-list system" include only those ballots cast for qualified party-list candidates?

To answer this question, there is a need to review related jurisprudence on the matter, especially Labo v.
Comelec22 and Grego v. Comelec,23 which were mentioned in our February 18, 2003 Resolution.

Labo and Grego Not Applicable


The OSG stressed that the Comelec report on BUHAY was "merely anchored on conjectures or speculations." On
COCOFED, the OSG explained that the bylaws making the chairman of the Philippine Coconut Authority an
automatic member of the COCOFED National Board "has already been deleted as early as May, 1988."

Pearliegates

In Labo, the Court declared that "the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle the
eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. A minority or defeated

56

Election Law Cases


candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office."24 In other words, the votes cast for an ineligible or
disqualified candidate cannot be considered "stray."

7941, the latter is a qualification of the former ruling and law. On the other hand, Grego and other related cases
that came after the enactment of RA 7941 should be construed as inapplicable to the latter.30

However, "this rule would be different if the electorate, fully aware in fact and in law of a candidates
disqualification so as to bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety, would nonetheless cast their votes
in favor of the ineligible candidate. In such case, the electorate may be said to have waived the validity and
efficacy of their votes by notoriously misapplying their franchise or throwing away their votes, in which case,
the eligible candidate obtaining the next higher number of votes may be deemed elected."25 In short, the
votes cast for a "notoriously disqualified" candidate may be considered "stray" and excluded from the canvass.

Subtracting the votes garnered by these disqualified party-list groups from the total votes cast under the partylist system will reduce the base figure to 6,523,185. This means that the two-percent threshold can be more
easily attained by the qualified marginalized and under-represented groups. Hence, disregarding the votes of
disqualified party-list participants will increase and broaden the number of representatives from these sectors.
Doing so will further concretize and give flesh to the policy declaration in RA 7941, which we reproduce thus:

The foregoing pronouncement was reiterated in Grego, which held that the exception mentioned in Labo v.
Comelec "is predicated on the concurrence of two assumptions, namely: (1) the one who obtained the highest
number of votes is disqualified; and (2) the electorate is fully aware in fact and in law of a candidates
disqualification so as to bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety but would nonetheless cast their
votes in favor of the ineligible candidate."26

Note, however, that the foregoing pronouncements (1) referred to regular elections for local offices and (2)
involved the interpretation of Section 6 of RA 6646.27 They were not meant to cover party-list elections, which
are specifically governed by RA 7941. Section 10 of this latter law clearly provides that the votes cast for a
party, a sectoral organization or a coalition "not entitled to be voted for shall not be counted":

"SEC. 10. Manner of Voting. Every voter shall be entitled to two (2) votes: the first vote is a vote for candidate
for membership of the House of Representatives in his legislative district, and the second, a vote for the party,
organization, or coalition he wants represented in the House of Representatives: Provided, That a vote cast for
a party, sectoral organization, or coalition not entitled to be voted for shall not be counted: Provided, finally,
That the first election under the party-list system shall be held in May 1998." (Emphasis supplied)

The language of the law is clear; hence, there is room, not for interpretation, but merely for application.28
Likewise, no recourse to extrinsic aids is warranted when the language of the law is plain and unambiguous.29

Another reason for not applying Labo and Grego is that these cases involve single elective posts, while the
present controversy pertains to the acquisition of a number of congressional seats depending on the total
election results -- such that even those garnering second, third, fourth or lesser places could be proclaimed
winners depending on their compliance with other requirements.

RA 7941 is a special statute governing the elections of party-list representatives and is the controlling law in
matters pertaining thereto. Since Labo and Section 6 of RA 6646 came into being prior to the enactment of RA

Pearliegates

"SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. -- The State shall promote proportional representation in the election of
representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of
registered, national and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens
belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined
political constituencies but who could contribute to the enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit
the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall
develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadest possible
representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing their chances
to compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible."

Need for Patience and Perseverance

BAYAN MUNA contends that the deduction of votes obtained by party-list candidates disqualified after the
holding of the party-list elections will result in the instability of the system. The reason is that qualified partylist candidates would be encouraged to seek the disqualification of the other candidates for the sole purpose of
attaining the needed percentage of the votes cast. Although such scenario may be possible, we believe that
the perceived "instability" can be alleviated because, (1) unlike in the past elections, Comelec now has the
herein qualified and disqualified participants list, which can be used for future elections; and (2) in the light of
recent jurisprudential developments, Comelec will now be guided accordingly when accrediting new candidates
for the next party-list elections and will be able to set the period for accreditation in such time and manner as
to enable it to determine their qualifications long before the elections are held.

Indeed, it takes patience and perseverance to have the marginalized and under-represented sectors ably
represented in Congress. The controversies churned during the 1998 and the 2001 party-list elections should
further embolden, not distract, the nation in the process of implementing a genuine and sound Philippine-style
party-list system. At this point, the Court needs to stress what it said in Veterans:

"[T]he dismal result of the first election for party-list representatives should serve as a challenge to our sectoral
parties and organizations. It should stir them to be more active and vigilant in their campaign for

57

Election Law Cases


representation in the States lawmaking body. It should also serve as a clarion call for innovation and creativity
in adopting this novel system of popular democracy.

"With adequate information and dissemination to the public and more active sectoral parties, we are confident
our people will be more responsive to future party-list elections. Armed with patience, perseverance and
perspicacity, our marginalized sectors, in time, will fulfill the Filipino dream of full representation in Congress
under the aegis of the party-list system, Philippine style."31

We also take this opportunity to emphasize that the formulas devised in Veterans for computing the number of
nominees that the party-list winners are entitled to cannot be disregarded by the concerned agencies of
government, especially the Commission on Elections. These formulas ensure that the number of seats allocated
to the winning party-list candidates conform to the principle of proportional representation mandated by the
law.

The Party-List Winners

As discussed earlier, the votes obtained by disqualified party-list candidates are not to be counted in
determining the total votes cast for the party-list system. In the present cases, the votes they obtained should
be deducted from the canvass of the total number of votes cast during the May 14, 2001 elections.
Consequently, following Section 12 of RA 7941, a new tally and ranking of qualified party-list candidates is now
in order, according to the percentage of votes they obtained as compared with the total valid votes cast
nationwide.

Accordingly, we will now tally and rank the qualified party-list participants during the last elections, pursuant to
the approved Comelec Compliance Reports32 and our various Resolutions in these consolidated cases. Based
on our foregoing discussion, we will deduct the votes obtained by the 11633 disqualified candidates from the
total votes cast for the May 14, 2001 elections. The votes for these disqualified groups total 8,595,630.
Subtracting this figure from 15,118,815 (the total votes cast as reported in the Compliance Reports) will result
in a new total of 6,523,185 valid votes cast for the May 14, 2001 party-list elections. This new figure
representing the votes cast for the 46 qualified party-list participants will now be the basis for computing the
two-percent threshold for victory and the number of seats the winners are entitled to.

To repeat, there are only 46 qualified party-list participants. Be it remembered that the Commission
recommended for qualification only 42 party-list candidates in its three Compliance Reports. To this figure
should be added the two participants we approved in our January 29, 2002 Resolution, plus another two
(BUHAY and COCOFED) per our earlier discussion in this ruling. Table No. 1 below-lists the 46 qualified parties.

Rank

Party-List

Group

Votes Cast

Percentage

to Total Votes
Cast (%)
1

BAYAN MUNA

1,708,253

APEC

AKBAYAN!

BUTIL

330,282 5.06

CIBAC

323,810 4.96

BUHAY

290,760 4.46

AMIN

252,051 3.86

ABA

242,199 3.71

COCOFED

10

PM

11

SANLAKAS

151,017 2.31

12

ABANSE! PINAY

135,211 2.07

13

AKO

14

ALAGAD 117,161 1.80

15

ELDERLY 106,496 1.63

16

ATUCP

17

MARITIME

98,946

18

OFW

97,085

1.49

19

AMMMA 65,735

1.01

20

ANAKBAYAN

63,312

21

AKAP

54,925

0.84

22

MSCFO 49,914

0.76

26.19

802,060 12.29
377,852 5.79

229,165 3.51

216,823 3.32

126,012 1.93

103,273 1.58
1.52

0.97

Table No. 134

Pearliegates

58

Election Law Cases


23

WPI

46,831

0.72

24

AAAFPI 43,882

0.67

25

AWATU 42,149

0.65

26

NACTODAP

38,898

27

SCFO

37,470

0.57

28

TRICAP 35,807

0.55

29

PINOY MAY K

32,151

0.49

Rank

Party-List

30

VETERANS CARE 31,694

0.49

Group

Votes Cast

31

OCW-UNIFIL

29,400

0.45

to Total Votes

32

PWP

24,182

0.37

Cast (%)

33

DA

24,029

0.37

BAYAN MUNA

34

PARP

23,297

0.36

APEC

35

ARPES

22,497

0.34

AKBAYAN!

36

ARBA

22,345

0.34

BUTIL

330,282 5.06

37

FEJODAP 21,335

0.33

CIBAC

323,810 4.96

38

GABAY OFW

17,777

0.27

BUHAY

290,760 4.46

39

AASAHAN

16,787

0.26

AMIN

252,051 3.86

40

AYOS

15,871

0.24

ABA

242,199 3.71

41

POWER 13,050

0.20

COCOFED

42

KILOS

0.17

10

PM

43

KALOOB 9,137

0.14

11

SANLAKAS

151,017 2.31

44

ALYANSA7,882

0.12

12

ABANSE! PINAY

135,211 2.07

45

KATUTUBO

6,602

46

DFP

0.10

Total

6,523,185

11,170

6,600

The Winners and


Their Nominees

Pearliegates

Using simple mathematics, we find that only 12 of the 46 qualified parties obtained at least two percent of the
6,523,185 total valid votes cast. Two percent of this number is 130,464. Hence, only those qualified parties that
obtained at least 130,464 votes may be declared winners. On this basis, the winners are as follows:
0.60
Table No. 2

0.10

Percentage

1,708,253

26.19

802,060 12.29
377,852 5.79

229,165 3.51

216,823 3.32

We shall now determine the number of nominees each winning party is entitled to, in accordance with the
formula in Veterans. For purposes of determining the number of its nominees, BAYAN MUNA (the party that
obtained the highest number of votes) is considered the first party. The applicable formula35 is as follows:

Number of votes of first party


Total votes for party-list system

Proportion of votes of first party relative to

59

Election Law Cases


total votes for party-list system

Additional Seats =

Votes Cast for Qualified Party

Applying this formula, we arrive at 26.19 percent:

Votes Cast for First Party

=
1,708,253

290,760

1,708,253

6,523,185

26.19%

Allotted Seats for First Party

0.51

Having obtained 26.19 percent, BAYAN MUNA is entitled to three (3) seats.1wphi1 This finding is pursuant to
our ruling in Veterans, the pertinent portions of which we reproduce as follows:

Since 0.51 is less than one, BUHAY is not entitled to any additional seat.37 It is entitled to only one qualifying
seat like all the other qualified parties that are ranked below it, as shown in Table No. 3:

"If the proportion of votes received by the first party without rounding it off is equal to at least six percent of
the total valid votes cast for all the party list groups, then the first party shall be entitled to two additional seats
or a total of three seats overall. If the proportion of votes without a rounding off is equal to or greater than four
percent, but less than six percent, then the first party shall have one additional or a total of two seats. And if
the proportion is less than four percent, then the first party shall not be entitled to any additional seat."

Table No. 3

Rank

Party-List

Votes

Percentage(%)

Additional

Seats38
xxx

xxx

xxx

"Note that the above formula will be applicable only in determining the number of additional seats the first
party is entitled to. It cannot be used to determine the number of additional seats of the other qualified parties.
As explained earlier, the use of the same formula for all would contravene the proportional representation
parameter. For example, a second party obtains six percent of the total number of votes cast. According to the
above formula, the said party would be entitled to two additional seats or a total of three seats overall.
However, if the first party received a significantly higher amount of votes -- say, twenty percent -- to grant it
the same number of seats as the second party would violate the statutory mandate of proportional
representation, since a party getting only six percent of the votes will have an equal number of representatives
as the one obtaining twenty percent. The proper solution, therefore, is to grant the first party a total of three
seats; and the party receiving six percent, additional seats in proportion to those of the first party." 36

As adverted to earlier, the issue of whether additional seats should be allocated to APEC, AKBAYAN, BUTIL and
CIBAC will not be addressed in this Resolution; a separate Motion (with Supplemental Motion) challenging their
entitlement thereto has been filed by BAYAN MUNA and is still pending completion as of this writing. Hence, we
shall compute only the additional seat or seats to be allocated, if any, to the other qualified parties BUHAY,
AMIN, ABA, COCOFED, PM, SANLAKAS and ABANSE! PINAY.

Applying the relevant formula in Veterans to BUHAY, we arrive at 0.51:

Pearliegates

APEC

802,060 12.29

n/c

AKBAYAN!

BUTIL

330,282 5.06

n/c

CIBAC

323,810 4.96

n/c

BUHAY

290,760 4.46

0.51

AMIN

252,051 3.86

0.44

ABA

242,199 3.71

0.42

COCOFED

10

PM

11

SANLAKAS

151,017 2.31

0.26

12

ABANSE! PINAY

135,211 2.07

0.24

377,852 5.79

229,165 3.51

216,823 3.32

n/c

0.40

0.38

In sum, the above-named party-list winners, excluding those with a separate pending challenge, are entitled to
the following congressional seats:

1. BAYAN MUNA three (3) seats [one qualifying and two additional seats]

60

Election Law Cases


2. BUHAY one qualifying seat only

2. Of the various parties and organizations39 which Comelec allowed to participate in the 2001 party-list
elections, it recommended -- in its three Compliance Reports to the Court -- 42 to be qualified. Later on, four
more groups were added, for a total of 46.

3. AMIN one qualifying seat only

4. ABA one qualifying seat only

3. Next, we determined which of the 46 qualified parties garnered at least two percent of the total votes cast
for the party-list system. To do so, we subtracted the votes obtained by the disqualified candidates from the
"total votes cast." Those parties, organizations and coalitions that had obtained at least two percent of this
balance were declared winners.

5. COCOFED one qualifying seat only


4. After identifying the winners, we determined, by using the formulas mandated in Veterans v. Comelec, how
many nominees each winning party was entitled to.
6. PM one qualifying seat only

7. SANLAKAS one qualifying seat only

8. ABANSE! PINAY one qualifying seat only

5. The foregoing process would have been finished long ago and the winners proclaimed before the end of the
year 2002, had Comelec been more resolute and exacting in the factual determinations contained in its
Compliance Reports.

6. In the interest of due process, the Court required Position Papers on the issue of whether the votes of
disqualified candidates should be deducted from the "total votes cast" nationwide.

Epilogue

The determination of the winners in the last party-list elections has been neither easy nor simple. The novelty
of the party-list system in our country necessarily demanded careful study and deliberation by the Court.
Principles and precedents in other democracies of the world have not been very helpful, because our party-list
law (RA 7941) has earmarked unique parameters, giving rise to an equally distinctive Philippine-style party-list
system. Our difficulties have also been aggravated by the less than firm actions of the Commission on Elections
referred to earlier, which had to be reversed based on the OSGs later submissions.

To help all concerned, especially the Commission on Elections, speed up the process of determining the partylist winners in the future, we deem it wise to summarize the implementing process we followed in this
Resolution, as follows:

1. After the promulgation of our Decision on June 26, 2001, we directed Comelec to conduct a factual
determination as to which of the various party-list candidates had passed the eight-point guideline we
instituted in that Decision. Although we gave Comelec only 30 days to undertake the work, it was able to
submit its Final Compliance Report only on September 27, 2001.

Pearliegates

7. The two rollos of these two consolidated cases contain about 14,000 pages, because almost all of the
original party-list participants filed -- some repeatedly -- motions, pleas, position papers and so on, which all
needed attention. Thus, the Court had to devote an enormous amount of time and effort poring over,
understanding, and ruling upon these submissions.

8. In the interest of speedy justice, this matter was deliberated upon; and this Resolution was discussed,
finalized and promulgated by the Court within weeks after it had received the last Position Paper mentioned in
item 6 above.

IN THE FUTURE, the determination of the winners can truly be made much more expeditiously, now that there
are precedents to guide all concerned, especially the Commission on Elections. For one thing, Comelec already
has the herein base list of 46 qualified parties. For another, given the lessons and experiences in these
proceedings, it can now more speedily, more carefully and more prudently pass upon the qualifications of new
candidates. Such process can even be done in advance under such rules and regulations it may issue,
consistent with the law and with our Decisions and Resolutions here and in Veterans, to pre-qualify participants
well in advance of the elections.

61

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In closing, the Court hopes that, with each bit of wisdom they learned and after the arduous journey they
experienced in our one-of-a-kind Philippine-style party-list system, the marginalized and under-represented
sectors of our country will be accorded ever-widening opportunities to participate in nation-building, so that
they can help develop -- in peace and harmony -- a society that is just, humane, progressive and free.

WHEREFORE, we HOLD that, having obtained at least two percent of the total valid votes cast in the last partylist elections, the following qualified participants are DECLARED elected with one nominee each: BUHAY, AMIN,
ABA, COCOFED, PM, SANLAKAS and ABANSE! PINAY. To enable the Commission on Elections to proclaim -- upon
finality of this Resolution -- these winners and their respective nominees, we hereby partially LIFT our
Temporary Restraining Order dated May 9, 2001, in regard to them only. It is made permanent in regard to the
rest that did not qualify and win.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 162203

April 14, 2004

qualify and participate as such in the party-list elections. Accordingly, Aklat "re-organized itself in order that it
will comply with the 8-point guidelines enunciated by the Supreme Court"7 in the said case.

In its assailed Resolution dated January 8, 2004, the Comelec dismissed the petition stating that Aklat cannot
be considered as an organization representing the marginalized and underrepresented groups as identified
under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. 7941). According to the Comelec, Aklats statement that it has
re-organized itself does not cure this defect as "there is nothing in the petition which will help us identify what
particular marginalized and underrepresented group AKLAT is now representing."8 Further, the Comelec held
that "AKLAT lumped all the sectoral groups imaginable under the classification of regular members just to
convince us that it is now cured of its defect."9

On January 15, 2004, Aklat filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated January 14, 2004, substantially averring
that it has reorganized itself and taken the necessary steps to make it an organization of, by and for the
marginalized and underrepresented groups of society, particularly the indigenous cultural communities and the
youth. To this end, it has allegedly effected a fundamental change in its purposes as an organization, nature of
its membership and focus of its programs.10

AKLAT-ASOSASYON PARA SA KAUNLARAN NG LIPUNAN AT ADHIKAIN PARA SA TAO, INC., petitioner,


vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC), respondent.

The Comelec denied the motion in its questioned Resolution dated February 13, 2004, on three grounds,
namely: the petition was filed beyond the deadline set by the Comelec in Resolution No. 6320 for registration of
party-list organizations; the petition was not one for re-qualification as Aklat was never a registered party-list
organization having failed to meet the eight-point guidelines set by the Court in the Bagong Bayani case; and
that its decision not to extend the deadline for registration of party-list organizations is valid, the Comelec
being in the best position to make such a determination.11

RESOLUTION

TINGA, J.:

For resolution is the Petition1 for certiorari and mandamus filed by Aklat-Asosasyon Para Sa Kaunlaran Ng
Lipunan At Adhikain Para Sa Tao, Inc. (Aklat) assailing the Commission on Elections (Comelec) Resolution2
dated January 8, 2004, which dismissed its Petition3 for re-qualification as a party-list organization, and the
Resolution4 dated February 13, 2004, which denied its Motion for Reconsideration.5

Briefly, the facts are as follows:

On November 20, 2003, Aklat filed a Petition for declaration of re-qualification as a party-list organization for
purposes of the May 2004 elections. It alleged in its petition that it participated in the 2001 elections but was
disqualified by the Comelec as it was found not to have complied with the guidelines set by the Court in the
case of Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Comelec (Bagong Bayani case)6 for party-list organizations to

Pearliegates

In the instant Petition, Aklat asserts that under Section 5 of R.A. 7941, petitions for registration as a party-list
organization may be filed not later than ninety (90) days before the elections. It therefore had until February
10, 2004, the ninetieth (90th) day before the elections on May 10, 2004, within which to file its petition. Hence,
its petition, which was filed on November 20, 2003, was filed within the allowed period. Section 5 of Resolution
No. 632012 which requires the filing of such petitions not later than September 30, 2003, is null and void as it
amends R.A. 7941.

It further maintains that it has complied with the eight-point guidelines set in the Bagong Bayani case.
Allegedly, Aklat has a total membership of over 4,000 persons who belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented groups. It has established information and coordination centers throughout the country for
the benefit and in representation of indigenous cultural communities, farm and factory workers including
fisherfolk and the youth. Aklat also asserts that it is different from Asosasyon Para sa Kaunlaran ng Industria ng
Aklat (A.K.L.A.T.) which was previously de-registered by the Comelec. Because of all these, Aklat contends that
the Comelec gravely abused its discretion when it denied its petition for re-qualification.

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The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Comment dated March 26, 2004, stating that the Comelec did
not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed Resolutions. According to the OSG, Resolution No.
6320 is not in conflict with and is, in fact, germane to the purpose of R.A. 7941. It was within the scope of the
authority granted to the Comelec that it issued Resolution No. 6320 setting the deadline for filing petitions for
registration under the party-list system on September 30, 2003. In line with the purpose of R.A. 7941 to enable
marginalized sectors to actively participate in legislation, the Comelec must be given sufficient time to
evaluate all petitions for registration, at the same time allowing oppositions to be filed to the end that only
those truly qualified may be accredited under the party-list system. Besides, Republic Act No. 843613 allows
the Comelec to change the periods and dates prescribed by law for certain pre-election acts to ensure their
accomplishment.

The OSG further maintains that the petition for re-qualification failed to comply with the provisions of
Resolution No. 6320. According to the OSG, the petition was not properly verified there being no showing that
Mr. Dominador Buhain, the signatory of the verification and certification of non-forum shopping, was duly
authorized by Aklat to verify or cause the preparation and filing of the petition on its behalf. Moreover, Aklat
was registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission only on October 20, 2003, a month before it filed
its petition for re-qualification. Hence, it has not existed for a period of at least one (1) year prior to the filing of
the petition as required by Section 6 of Resolution No. 6320. The OSG also points out that Aklat failed to
support its petition with the documents required under Section 7 of Resolution No. 6320, namely: a list of its
officers and members particularly showing that the majority of its membership belongs to the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors it seeks to represent, and a track record or summary showing that it represents and
seeks to uplift the marginalized and underrepresented sectors of society.

Moreover, the OSG notes that the incorporators and directors of Aklat are invariably known as pillars of the
book publishing industry or authors. Hence, even as re-organized, Aklat remains to be an association of
authors, book publishers, and publishing companies, rather than the organization of indigenous cultural
communities, farm and factory workers, fisherfolk and youth it claims to be.

For its part, the Comelec filed a Comment dated March 29, 2004, stating that the period of ninety (90) days
prescribed in R.A. 7941 refers to the prohibitive period beyond which petitions for registration may no longer be
filed. Furthermore, the documents submitted by Aklat do not prove that its members belong to the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors of society.

Aklats contention that Resolution No. 6320 is null and void as it amends and amplifies R.A. 7941 deserves
scant consideration. R.A. 7941 provides:

Sec. 5. Registration.Any organized group of persons may register as a party, organization or coalition for
purposes of the party-list system by filing with the COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before the election
a petition verified by its president or secretary stating its desire to participate in the party-list system as a
national, regional or sectoral party or organization or a coalition of such parties or organizations, attaching
thereto its constitution, by-laws, platform or program of government, list of officers, coalition agreement and

Pearliegates

other relevant information as the COMELEC may require: Provided, That the sectors shall include labor,
peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth,
veterans, overseas workers, and professionals[Italics supplied.]

By its wording, R.A. 7941 itself supports the Comelecs position that the period stated therein refers to the
prohibitive period beyond which petitions for registration should no longer be filed nor entertained. Put
elsewise, it is simply the minimum countback period which is not subject to reduction since it is prescribed by
law, but it is susceptible of protraction on account of administrative necessities and other exigencies perceived
by the poll body.

Verily, the Comelec has the power to promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to enforce and administer
election laws. This power includes the determination, within the parameters fixed by law, of appropriate periods
for the accomplishment of certain pre-election acts like filing petitions for registration under the party-list
system. This is exactly what the Comelec did when it issued its Resolution No. 6320 declaring September 30,
2003, as the deadline for filing petitions for registration under the party-list system. Considering these, as well
as the multifarious pre-election activities that the Comelec is mandated to undertake, the issuance of its
Resolution No. 6320 cannot be considered tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

Neither is there grave abuse of discretion in the Comelecs denial of Aklats petition on the ground that it failed
to substantiate its claim that it represents the marginalized and underrepresented sectors of society. It should
be noted that it was Aklat which asserted in its petition before the poll body that it has re-organized and is now
applying for re-qualification after its de-registration for failure to comply with the guidelines set forth in the
Bagong Bayani case. Thus, the Comelec cannot be faulted for relying on its earlier finding, absent any evidence
in Aklats petition to the contrary, that Aklat is not an organization representing the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, but is actually a business interest or economic lobby group which seeks the
promotion and protection of the book publishing industry.

Significantly, Aklat and A.K.L.A.T. have substantially the same incorporators. In fact, four (4) of Aklats six (6)
incorporators14 are also incorporators of A.K.L.A.T.15 This substantial similarity is hard to ignore and bolsters
the conclusion that the supposed re-organization undertaken by Aklat is plain window-dressing as it has not
really changed its character as a business interest of persons in the book publishing industry.

The Court observes that Aklats articles of incorporation and document entitled The Facts About Aklat which
were attached to its petition for re-qualification contain general averments that it supposedly represents
marginalized groups such as the youth, indigenous communities, urban poor and farmers/fisherfolk. These
general statements do not measure up to the first guideline set by the Bagong Bayani case for screening partylist participants, i.e., that "the political party, sector, organization or coalition must represent the marginalized
and underrepresented groups identified in Section 5 of R.A. 7941. In other words, it must showthrough its
constitution, articles of incorporation, bylaws, history, platform of government and track recordthat it
represents and seeks to uplift marginalized and underrepresented sectors. Verily, majority of its membership

63

Election Law Cases


should belong to the marginalized and underrepresented. And it must demonstrate that in a conflict of
interests, it has chosen or is likely to choose the interest of such sectors."16

BAYAN MUNA, ADVOCACY FOR TEACHER EMPOWERMENT THROUGH ACTION, COOPERATION AND HARMONY
TOWARDS EDUCATIONAL REFORMS, INC., and ABONO, Petitioners,
vs.

In this regard, the Court notes with approval the OSGs contention that Aklat has no track record to speak of
concerning its representation of marginalized and underrepresented constituencies considering that it has been
in existence for only a month prior to the filing of its petition for re-qualification.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

DECISION
It should finally be emphasized that the findings of fact by the Comelec, or any other administrative agency
exercising particular expertise in its field of endeavor, are binding on the Supreme Court.17

In view of the foregoing, the Comelec can, by no means, be held to have committed grave abuse of discretion
to justify the setting aside of the assailed Resolutions.

ACCORDINGLY, the Petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 179271

April 21, 2009

BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FOR NATIONAL ADVANCEMENT AND TRANSPARENCY (BANAT), Petitioner,

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Petitioner in G.R. No. 179271 Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT)
in a petition for certiorari and mandamus,1 assails the Resolution2 promulgated on 3 August 2007 by the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in NBC No. 07-041 (PL). The COMELECs resolution in NBC No. 07-041 (PL)
approved the recommendation of Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head of the National Board of Canvassers (NBC) Legal
Group, to deny the petition of BANAT for being moot. BANAT filed before the COMELEC En Banc, acting as NBC,
a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives Provided by the Constitution.

The following are intervenors in G.R. No. 179271: Arts Business and Science Professionals (ABS), Aangat Tayo
(AT), and Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines, Inc. (Senior Citizens).

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (sitting as the National Board of Canvassers), Respondent.
ARTS BUSINESS AND SCIENCE PROFESSIONALS, Intervenor.
AANGAT TAYO, Intervenor.
COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (SENIOR CITIZENS),
Intervenor.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 179295

Pearliegates

April 21, 2009

Petitioners in G.R. No. 179295 Bayan Muna, Abono, and Advocacy for Teacher Empowerment Through Action,
Cooperation and Harmony Towards Educational Reforms (A Teacher) in a petition for certiorari with
mandamus and prohibition,3 assails NBC Resolution No. 07-604 promulgated on 9 July 2007. NBC No. 07-60
made a partial proclamation of parties, organizations and coalitions that obtained at least two percent of the
total votes cast under the Party-List System. The COMELEC announced that, upon completion of the canvass of
the party-list results, it would determine the total number of seats of each winning party, organization, or
coalition in accordance with Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC5 (Veterans).

Estrella DL Santos, in her capacity as President and First Nominee of the Veterans Freedom Party, filed a motion
to intervene in both G.R. Nos. 179271 and 179295.

The Facts

64

Election Law Cases


The 14 May 2007 elections included the elections for the party-list representatives. The COMELEC counted
15,950,900 votes cast for 93 parties under the Party-List System.6

On 27 June 2002, BANAT filed a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives Provided by
the Constitution, docketed as NBC No. 07-041 (PL) before the NBC. BANAT filed its petition because "[t]he
Chairman and the Members of the [COMELEC] have recently been quoted in the national papers that the
[COMELEC] is duty bound to and shall implement the Veterans ruling, that is, would apply the Panganiban
formula in allocating party-list seats."7 There were no intervenors in BANATs petition before the NBC. BANAT
filed a memorandum on 19 July 2007.

On 9 July 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the NBC, promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-60. NBC Resolution No.
07-60 proclaimed thirteen (13) parties as winners in the party-list elections, namely: Buhay Hayaan Yumabong
(BUHAY), Bayan Muna, Citizens Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC), Gabrielas Women Party (Gabriela),
Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives (APEC), A Teacher, Akbayan! Citizens Action Party (AKBAYAN),
Alagad, Luzon Farmers Party (BUTIL), Cooperative-Natco Network Party (COOP-NATCCO), Anak Pawis, Alliance of
Rural Concerns (ARC), and Abono. We quote NBC Resolution No. 07-60 in its entirety below:

WHEREAS, the Commission on Elections sitting en banc as National Board of Canvassers, thru its SubCommittee for Party-List, as of 03 July 2007, had officially canvassed, in open and public proceedings, a total of
fifteen million two hundred eighty three thousand six hundred fifty-nine (15,283,659) votes under the Party-List
System of Representation, in connection with the National and Local Elections conducted last 14 May 2007;

The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the
party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each: provided, that those garnering more than two percent (2%)
of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes: provided, finally,
that each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.

WHEREAS, for the 2007 Elections, based on the above projected total of party-list votes, the presumptive two
percent (2%) threshold can be pegged at three hundred thirty four thousand four hundred sixty-two (334,462)
votes;

WHEREAS, the Supreme Court, in Citizens Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) versus COMELEC, reiterated its
ruling in Veterans Federation Party versus COMELEC adopting a formula for the additional seats of each party,
organization or coalition receving more than the required two percent (2%) votes, stating that the same shall
be determined only after all party-list ballots have been completely canvassed;

WHEREAS, the parties, organizations, and coalitions that have thus far garnered at least three hundred thirty
four thousand four hundred sixty-two (334,462) votes are as follows:

RANK

PARTY/ORGANIZATION/

COALITION
WHEREAS, the study conducted by the Legal and Tabulation Groups of the National Board of Canvassers reveals
that the projected/maximum total party-list votes cannot go any higher than sixteen million seven hundred
twenty three thousand one hundred twenty-one (16,723,121) votes given the following statistical data:

Projected/Maximum Party-List Votes for May 2007 Elections

i.

Total party-list votes already canvassed/tabulated

15,283,659

ii.

Total party-list votes remaining uncanvassed/ untabulated (i.e. canvass deferred)

1,337,032

iii.
Maximum party-list votes (based on 100% outcome) from areas not yet submitted for canvass (Bogo,
Cebu; Bais City; Pantar, Lanao del Norte; and Pagalungan, Maguindanao)
102,430

Maximum Total Party-List Votes

16,723,121

WHEREAS, Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7941 (Party-List System Act) provides in part:

Pearliegates

VOTES

RECEIVED
1

BUHAY

1,163,218

BAYAN MUNA

CIBAC

GABRIELA

APEC

A TEACHER

476,036

AKBAYAN

470,872

ALAGAD 423,076

BUTIL

10

COOP-NATCO

972,730

760,260
610,451

538,971

405,052
390,029

65

Election Law Cases


11

BATAS

386,361

12

ANAK PAWIS

13

ARC

14

ABONO 337,046

This is without prejudice to the proclamation of other parties, organizations, or coalitions which may later on be
established to have obtained at least two percent (2%) of the total actual votes cast under the Party-List
System.

376,036

338,194

WHEREAS, except for Bagong Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod ng Adhikaing Sambayanan (BATAS), against which an
URGENT PETITION FOR CANCELLATION/REMOVAL OF REGISTRATION AND DISQUALIFICATION OF PARTY-LIST
NOMINEE (With Prayer for the Issuance of Restraining Order) has been filed before the Commission, docketed
as SPC No. 07-250, all the parties, organizations and coalitions included in the aforementioned list are therefore
entitled to at least one seat under the party-list system of representation in the meantime.

NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in it by the Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code,
Executive Order No. 144, Republic Act Nos. 6646, 7166, 7941, and other election laws, the Commission on
Elections, sitting en banc as the National Board of Canvassers, hereby RESOLVES to PARTIALLY PROCLAIM,
subject to certain conditions set forth below, the following parties, organizations and coalitions participating
under the Party-List System:

Buhay Hayaan Yumabong BUHAY

Bayan Muna

Citizens Battle Against Corruption

Gabriela Womens Party

Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives

APEC

6
Advocacy for Teacher Empowerment Through Action, Cooperation and Harmony Towards Educational
Reforms, Inc.
A TEACHER

Alagad

Luzon Farmers Party

10

Cooperative-Natco Network Party

11

Anak Pawis

12

Alliance of Rural Concerns ARC

13

Abono

Finally, all proclamation of the nominees of concerned parties, organizations and coalitions with pending
disputes shall likewise be held in abeyance until final resolution of their respective cases.

Let the Clerk of the Commission implement this Resolution, furnishing a copy thereof to the Speaker of the
House of Representatives of the Philippines.

CIBAC

GABRIELA

Akbayan! Citizens Action Party

The proclamation of Bagong Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod ng Adhikaing Sambayanan (BATAS) is hereby deferred
until final resolution of SPC No. 07-250, in order not to render the proceedings therein moot and academic.

SO ORDERED.8 (Emphasis in the original)

BAYAN MUNA

The total number of seats of each winning party, organization or coalition shall be determined pursuant to
Veterans Federation Party versus COMELEC formula upon completion of the canvass of the party-list results.

AKBAYAN

ALAGAD

Pursuant to NBC Resolution No. 07-60, the COMELEC, acting as NBC, promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-72,
which declared the additional seats allocated to the appropriate parties. We quote from the COMELECs
interpretation of the Veterans formula as found in NBC Resolution No. 07-72:

WHEREAS, on July 9, 2007, the Commission on Elections sitting en banc as the National Board of Canvassers
proclaimed thirteen (13) qualified parties, organization[s] and coalitions based on the presumptive two percent
(2%) threshold of 334,462 votes from the projected maximum total number of party-list votes of 16,723,121,
and were thus given one (1) guaranteed party-list seat each;

BUTIL

ANAKPAWIS

COOP-NATCCO

WHEREAS, per Report of the Tabulation Group and Supervisory Committee of the National Board of Canvassers,
the projected maximum total party-list votes, as of July 11, 2007, based on the votes actually canvassed, votes
canvassed but not included in Report No. 29, votes received but uncanvassed, and maximum votes expected
for Pantar, Lanao del Norte, is 16,261,369; and that the projected maximum total votes for the thirteen (13)
qualified parties, organizations and coalition[s] are as follows:

ABONO
Party-List

Pearliegates

Projected total number of votes

66

Election Law Cases


1

BUHAY

1,178,747

BAYAN MUNA

CIBAC

GABRIELA

APEC

A TEACHER

492,369

AKBAYAN

462,674

ALAGAD 423,190

BUTIL

10

COOP-NATCO

412,920

11

ANAKPAWIS

370,165

12

ARC

13

ABONO 340,151

wherein the proportion of votes received by the first party (without rounding off) shall entitle it to additional
seats:

977,476

755,964
Proportion of votes received

621,718

by the first party Additional seats

622,489

Equal to or at least 6%

Two (2) additional seats

Equal to or greater than 4% but less than 6%


Less than 4%

One (1) additional seat

No additional seat

WHEREAS, applying the above formula, Buhay obtained the following percentage:

409,298

1,178,747
16,261,369

375,846

0.07248 or 7.2%

which entitles it to two (2) additional seats.

WHEREAS, based on the above Report, Buhay Hayaan Yumabong (Buhay) obtained the highest number of votes
among the thirteen (13) qualified parties, organizations and coalitions, making it the "first party" in accordance
with Veterans Federation Party versus COMELEC, reiterated in Citizens Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC)
versus COMELEC;

WHEREAS, in determining the additional seats for the other qualified parties, organizations and coalitions, the
correct formula as expressed in Veterans and reiterated in CIBAC is, as follows:

Additional seats for


WHEREAS, qualified parties, organizations and coalitions participating under the party-list system of
representation that have obtained one guaranteed (1) seat may be entitled to an additional seat or seats based
on the formula prescribed by the Supreme Court in Veterans;

a concerned party

No. of votes of

concerned party
No. of votes of

WHEREAS, in determining the additional seats for the "first party", the correct formula as expressed in
Veterans, is:

first party

No. of additional

seats allocated
to first party

Number of votes of first party


Total votes for party-list system

Proportion of votes of first

WHEREAS, applying the above formula, the results are as follows:

party relative to total votes for


party-list system

Pearliegates

Party List

Percentage

BAYAN MUNA

1.65

Additional Seat

67

Election Law Cases


CIBAC

1.28

GABRIELA

1.05

APEC

1.05

A TEACHER

0.83

AKBAYAN

0.78

ALAGAD 0.71

BUTIL

0.69

0.69

ANAKPAWIS

0.62

ARC

0.63

ABONO 0.57

NOW THEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in it by the Constitution, Omnibus Election Code, Executive
Order No. 144, Republic Act Nos. 6646, 7166, 7941 and other elections laws, the Commission on Elections en
banc sitting as the National Board of Canvassers, hereby RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to proclaim the
following parties, organizations or coalitions as entitled to additional seats, to wit:

BUHAY

CIBAC

This pertains to the Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives Provided by the
Constitution filed by the Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT).

Acting on the foregoing Petition of the Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency
(BANAT) party-list, Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head, National Board of Canvassers Legal Group submitted his
comments/observations and recommendation thereon [NBC 07-041 (PL)], which reads:

COMMENTS / OBSERVATIONS:

Petitioner Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT), in its Petition to Proclaim
the Full Number of Party-List Representatives Provided by the Constitution prayed for the following reliefs, to
wit:

GABRIELA
APEC

Additional Seats

BAYAN MUNA

SO ORDERED.9

Acting on BANATs petition, the NBC promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-88 on 3 August 2007, which reads as
follows:

COOP-NATCO

Party List

Let the National Board of Canvassers Secretariat implement this Resolution, furnishing a copy hereof to the
Speaker of the House of Representatives of the Philippines.

1. That the full number -- twenty percent (20%) -- of Party-List representatives as mandated by Section 5,
Article VI of the Constitution shall be proclaimed.

This is without prejudice to the proclamation of other parties, organizations or coalitions which may later on be
established to have obtained at least two per cent (2%) of the total votes cast under the party-list system to
entitle them to one (1) guaranteed seat, or to the appropriate percentage of votes to entitle them to one (1)
additional seat.

2. Paragraph (b), Section 11 of RA 7941 which prescribes the 2% threshold votes, should be harmonized with
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution and with Section 12 of the same RA 7941 in that it should be applicable
only to the first party-list representative seats to be allotted on the basis of their initial/first ranking.

3. The 3-seat limit prescribed by RA 7941 shall be applied; and


Finally, all proclamation of the nominees of concerned parties, organizations and coalitions with pending
disputes shall likewise be held in abeyance until final resolution of their respective cases.
4. Initially, all party-list groups shall be given the number of seats corresponding to every 2% of the votes they
received and the additional seats shall be allocated in accordance with Section 12 of RA 7941, that is, in
proportion to the percentage of votes obtained by each party-list group in relation to the total nationwide votes

Pearliegates

68

Election Law Cases


cast in the party-list election, after deducting the corresponding votes of those which were allotted seats under
the 2% threshold rule. In fine, the formula/procedure prescribed in the "ALLOCATION OF PARTY-LIST SEATS,
ANNEX "A" of COMELEC RESOLUTION 2847 dated 25 June 1996, shall be used for [the] purpose of determining
how many seats shall be proclaimed, which party-list groups are entitled to representative seats and how many
of their nominees shall seat [sic].

5. In the alternative, to declare as unconstitutional Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7941 and that the procedure
in allocating seats for party-list representative prescribed by Section 12 of RA 7941 shall be followed.

R E C O M M E N D A T I O N:

The petition of BANAT is now moot and academic.

The Commission En Banc in NBC Resolution No. 07-60 promulgated July 9, 2007 re "In the Matter of the
Canvass of Votes and Partial Proclamation of the Parties, Organizations and Coalitions Participating Under the
Party-List System During the May 14, 2007 National and Local Elections" resolved among others that the total
number of seats of each winning party, organization or coalition shall be determined pursuant to the Veterans
Federation Party versus COMELEC formula upon completion of the canvass of the party-list results."1awphi1

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the National Board of Canvassers RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to
approve and adopt the recommendation of Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head, NBC Legal Group, to DENY the herein
petition of BANAT for being moot and academic.

Let the Supervisory Committee implement this resolution.

SO ORDERED.10

BANAT filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing the ruling in NBC Resolution No. 07-88. BANAT did
not file a motion for reconsideration of NBC Resolution No. 07-88.

On 9 July 2007, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher asked the COMELEC, acting as NBC, to reconsider its
decision to use the Veterans formula as stated in its NBC Resolution No. 07-60 because the Veterans formula is
violative of the Constitution and of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941). On the same day, the COMELEC
denied reconsideration during the proceedings of the NBC.11

Pearliegates

Aside from the thirteen party-list organizations proclaimed on 9 July 2007, the COMELEC proclaimed three other
party-list organizations as qualified parties entitled to one guaranteed seat under the Party-List System:
Agricultural Sector Alliance of the Philippines, Inc. (AGAP),12 Anak Mindanao (AMIN),13 and An Waray.14 Per
the certification15 by COMELEC, the following party-list organizations have been proclaimed as of 19 May 2008:

Party-List

No. of Seat(s)

1.1

Buhay

1.2

Bayan Muna

1.3

CIBAC

1.4

Gabriela 2

1.5

APEC

1.6

A Teacher

1.7

Akbayan 1

1.8

Alagad

1.9

Butil

1.10

Coop-Natco [sic] 1

1.11

Anak Pawis

1.12

ARC

1.13

Abono

1.14

AGAP

1.15

AMIN

2
1

The proclamation of Bagong Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod ng Adhikaing Sambayanan (BATAS), against which an
Urgent Petition for Cancellation/Removal of Registration and Disqualification of Party-list Nominee (with Prayer
for the Issuance of Restraining Order) has been filed before the COMELEC, was deferred pending final resolution
of SPC No. 07-250.

Issues

BANAT brought the following issues before this Court:

69

Election Law Cases

1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives provided in Section 5(2), Article VI of the
Constitution mandatory or is it merely a ceiling?

2. Is the three-seat limit provided in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?

3. Is the two percent threshold and "qualifier" votes prescribed by the same Section 11(b) of RA 7941
constitutional?

4. How shall the party-list representatives be allocated?16

C. Violates the "Four Inviolable Parameters" of the Philippine party-list system as provided for under the same
case of Veterans Federation Party, et al. v. COMELEC.

II. Presuming that the Commission on Elections did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when it implemented the First-Party Rule in the allocation of seats to qualified party-list
organizations, the same being merely in consonance with the ruling in Veterans Federations Party, et al. v.
COMELEC, the instant Petition is a justiciable case as the issues involved herein are constitutional in nature,
involving the correct interpretation and implementation of RA 7941, and are of transcendental importance to
our nation.17

Considering the allegations in the petitions and the comments of the parties in these cases, we defined the
following issues in our advisory for the oral arguments set on 22 April 2008:

Bayan Muna, A Teacher, and Abono, on the other hand, raised the following issues in their petition:

1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives in Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution
mandatory or merely a ceiling?

I. Respondent Commission on Elections, acting as National Board of Canvassers, committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-60 to
implement the First-Party Rule in the allocation of seats to qualified party-list organizations as said rule:

2. Is the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?

3. Is the two percent threshold prescribed in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 to qualify for one seat constitutional?
A. Violates the constitutional principle of proportional representation.
4. How shall the party-list representative seats be allocated?
B. Violates the provisions of RA 7941 particularly:

1. The 2-4-6 Formula used by the First Party Rule in allocating additional seats for the "First Party" violates the
principle of proportional representation under RA 7941.

5. Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties from participating in the party-list elections? If not,
can the major political parties be barred from participating in the party-list elections?18

The Ruling of the Court


2. The use of two formulas in the allocation of additional seats, one for the "First Party" and another for the
qualifying parties, violates Section 11(b) of RA 7941.
The petitions have partial merit. We maintain that a Philippine-style party-list election has at least four
inviolable parameters as clearly stated in Veterans. For easy reference, these are:
3. The proportional relationships under the First Party Rule are different from those required under RA 7941;
First, the twenty percent allocation the combined number of all party-list congressmen shall not exceed
twenty percent of the total membership of the House of Representatives, including those elected under the
party list;

Pearliegates

70

Election Law Cases

Second, the two percent threshold only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of the total valid
votes cast for the party-list system are "qualified" to have a seat in the House of Representatives;

Third, the three-seat limit each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained, is
entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one "qualifying" and two additional seats;

Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per
centum (20%) of the total number of the members of the House of Representatives including those under the
party-list.

xxx

Fourth, proportional representation the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be
computed "in proportion to their total number of votes."19

Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution states that the "House of Representatives shall be composed of not
more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law." The House of Representatives shall
be composed of district representatives and party-list representatives. The Constitution allows the legislature to
modify the number of the members of the House of Representatives.1avvphi1.zw+

However, because the formula in Veterans has flaws in its mathematical interpretation of the term
"proportional representation," this Court is compelled to revisit the formula for the allocation of additional seats
to party-list organizations.

Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution, on the other hand, states the ratio of party-list representatives to the
total number of representatives. We compute the number of seats available to party-list representatives from
the number of legislative districts. On this point, we do not deviate from the first formula in Veterans, thus:

Number of Party-List Representatives:

Number of seats

The Formula Mandated by the Constitution

available to legislative districts


.80

Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides:

x .20 = Number of seats available to


party-list representatives

Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty
members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the
provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be
elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.

This formula allows for the corresponding increase in the number of seats available for party-list
representatives whenever a legislative district is created by law. Since the 14th Congress of the Philippines has
220 district representatives, there are 55 seats available to party-list representatives.

220
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives
including those under the party-list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, onehalf of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or
election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other
sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.

.80

x .20 = 55

The first paragraph of Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941 reads:

Allocation of Seats for Party-List Representatives:

After prescribing the ratio of the number of party-list representatives to the total number of representatives,
the Constitution left the manner of allocating the seats available to party-list representatives to the wisdom of
the legislature.

The Statutory Limits Presented by the Two Percent Threshold

Pearliegates

71

Election Law Cases


and the Three-Seat Cap

The first interpretation allegedly harmonizes the provisions of Section 11(b) on the 2% requirement with
Section 12 of R.A. No. 7941. BANAT described this procedure as follows:

All parties agree on the formula to determine the maximum number of seats reserved under the Party-List
System, as well as on the formula to determine the guaranteed seats to party-list candidates garnering at least
two-percent of the total party-list votes. However, there are numerous interpretations of the provisions of R.A.
No. 7941 on the allocation of "additional seats" under the Party-List System. Veterans produced the First Party
Rule,20 and Justice Vicente V. Mendozas dissent in Veterans presented Germanys Niemeyer formula21 as an
alternative.

(a) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty percent (20%) of the total Members of the House of
Representatives including those from the party-list groups as prescribed by Section 5, Article VI of the
Constitution, Section 11 (1st par.) of RA 7941 and Comelec Resolution No. 2847 dated 25 June 1996. Since
there are 220 District Representatives in the 14th Congress, there shall be 55 Party-List Representatives. All
seats shall have to be proclaimed.

The Constitution left to Congress the determination of the manner of allocating the seats for party-list
representatives. Congress enacted R.A. No. 7941, paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 11 and Section 12 of which
provide:

(b) All party-list groups shall initially be allotted one (1) seat for every two per centum (2%) of the total partylist votes they obtained; provided, that no party-list groups shall have more than three (3) seats (Section 11, RA
7941).

Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. x x x

(c) The remaining seats shall, after deducting the seats obtained by the party-list groups under the
immediately preceding paragraph and after deducting from their total the votes corresponding to those seats,
the remaining seats shall be allotted proportionately to all the party-list groups which have not secured the
maximum three (3) seats under the 2% threshold rule, in accordance with Section 12 of RA 7941.23

In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote,22 the following procedure shall be observed:

(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the
number of votes they garnered during the elections.

(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the
party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each: Provided, That those garnering more than two percent (2%)
of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes: Provided, finally,
That each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.

Forty-four (44) party-list seats will be awarded under BANATs first interpretation.

The second interpretation presented by BANAT assumes that the 2% vote requirement is declared
unconstitutional, and apportions the seats for party-list representatives by following Section 12 of R.A. No.
7941. BANAT states that the COMELEC:

(a) shall tally all the votes for the parties, organizations, or coalitions on a nationwide basis;
Section 12. Procedure in Allocating Seats for Party-List Representatives. The COMELEC shall tally all the votes
for the parties, organizations, or coalitions on a nationwide basis, rank them according to the number of votes
received and allocate party-list representatives proportionately according to the percentage of votes obtained
by each party, organization, or coalition as against the total nationwide votes cast for the party-list system.
(Emphasis supplied)

In G.R. No. 179271, BANAT presents two interpretations through three formulas to allocate party-list
representative seats.

Pearliegates

(b) rank them according to the number of votes received; and,

(c) allocate party-list representatives proportionately according to the percentage of votes obtained by each
party, organization or coalition as against the total nationwide votes cast for the party-list system.24

BANAT used two formulas to obtain the same results: one is based on the proportional percentage of the votes
received by each party as against the total nationwide party-list votes, and the other is "by making the votes of

72

Election Law Cases


a party-list with a median percentage of votes as the divisor in computing the allocation of seats."25 Thirty-four
(34) party-list seats will be awarded under BANATs second interpretation.

In G.R. No. 179295, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher criticize both the COMELECs original 2-4-6 formula and
the Veterans formula for systematically preventing all the party-list seats from being filled up. They claim that
both formulas do not factor in the total number of seats alloted for the entire Party-List System. Bayan Muna,
Abono, and A Teacher reject the three-seat cap, but accept the 2% threshold. After determining the qualified
parties, a second percentage is generated by dividing the votes of a qualified party by the total votes of all
qualified parties only. The number of seats allocated to a qualified party is computed by multiplying the total
party-list seats available with the second percentage. There will be a first round of seat allocation, limited to
using the whole integers as the equivalent of the number of seats allocated to the concerned party-list. After all
the qualified parties are given their seats, a second round of seat allocation is conducted. The fractions, or
remainders, from the whole integers are ranked from highest to lowest and the remaining seats on the basis of
this ranking are allocated until all the seats are filled up.26

We examine what R.A. No. 7941 prescribes to allocate seats for party-list representatives.

Section 11(a) of R.A. No. 7941 prescribes the ranking of the participating parties from the highest to the lowest
based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.

Table 1. Ranking of the participating parties from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes
garnered during the elections.27

Rank

Party

Votes Garnered

Rank

Party

BUHAY

1,169,234

48

KALAHI 88,868

BAYAN MUNA

CIBAC

GABRIELA

APEC

A TEACHER

490,379 53

PMAP

AKBAYAN

466,112 54

AKAPIN 74,686

ALAGAD 423,149 55

COOP-NATCCO

979,039 49

755,686 50

621,171 51

619,657 52

Pearliegates

BP

BIGKIS

PBA

409,883 56

APOI

Votes Garnered

79,386

78,541
AHONBAYAN
77,327
75,200

71,544
GRECON 62,220

78,424

10

BUTIL

409,160 57

BTM

11

BATAS

385,810 58

A SMILE 58,717

12

ARC

374,288 59

NELFFI

13

ANAKPAWIS

14

ABONO 339,990 61

BAGO

15

AMIN

338,185 62

BANDILA54,751

16

AGAP

328,724 63

AHON

17

AN WARAY

18

YACAP

310,889 65

AGBIAG! 50,837

19

FPJPM

300,923 66

SPI

20

UNI-MAD245,382 67

BAHANDI

21

ABS

ADD

22

KAKUSA 228,999 69

23

KABATAAN

24

ABA-AKO218,818 71

BABAE KA

25

ALIF

SB

26

SENIOR CITIZENS 213,058 73

ASAP

27

AT

197,872 74

PEP

33,938

28

VFP

196,266 75

ABA ILONGGO

33,903

29

ANAD

188,521 76

VENDORS

33,691

30

BANAT

177,028 77

ADD-TRIBAL

32,896

31

ANG KASANGGA 170,531 78

32

BANTAY 169,801 79

33

ABAKADA

34

1-UTAK 164,980 81

HAPI

35

TUCP

AAWAS 22,946

36

COCOFED

370,261 60

321,503 64

235,086 68

AKSA

57,012

55,846

54,522
ASAHAN MO

51,722

50,478
46,612

45,624

ABAY PARAK

155,920 83

42,282

36,512

34,835
34,098

ALMANA 32,255

AANGAT KA PILIPINO

166,747 80

162,647 82

57,872

AMANG 43,062

228,637 70

217,822 72

60,993

AAPS

29,130

26,271

25,781

SM

20,744

73

Election Law Cases


37

AGHAM 146,032 84

AG

COOP-NATCCO

38

ANAK

AGING PINOY

16,729

10

BUTIL

409,160 2.57%

39

ABANSE! PINAY

16,421

11

BATAS29385,810 2.42%

40

PM

119,054 87

BIYAYANG BUKID 16,241

12

ARC

41

AVE

110,769 88

ATS

14,161

13

ANAKPAWIS

42

SUARA

110,732 89

UMDJ

9,445

14

ABONO 339,990 2.13%

43

ASSALAM

BUKLOD FILIPINA 8,915

15

AMIN

338,185 2.12%

44

DIWA

107,021 91

LYPAD

8,471

16

AGAP

328,724 2.06%

45

ANC

99,636

92

AA-KASOSYO

17

AN WARAY

46

SANLAKAS

97,375

93

47

ABC

TOTAL

15,950,900

141,817 85

130,356 86

110,440 90

16,916

APO

8,406

KASAPI 6,221

The first clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 states that "parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at
least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each." This
clause guarantees a seat to the two-percenters. In Table 2 below, we use the first 20 party-list candidates for
illustration purposes. The percentage of votes garnered by each party is arrived at by dividing the number of
votes garnered by each party by 15,950,900, the total number of votes cast for all party-list candidates.

Table 2. The first 20 party-list candidates and their respective percentage of votes garnered over the total votes
for the party-list.28

Party

Votes Garnered

Votes Garnered over Total Votes for Party-List, in %

BUHAY

1,169,234

7.33%

BAYAN MUNA

979,039 6.14%

CIBAC

GABRIELA

APEC

A TEACHER

490,379 3.07%

AKBAYAN

466,112 2.92%

ALAGAD 423,149 2.65%

755,686 4.74%

621,171 3.89%

619,657 3.88%

Pearliegates

1
1

374,288 2.35%

370,261 2.32%

321,503 2.02%

Total

90,058

Rank

409,883 2.57%

Guaranteed Seat

17

18

YACAP

310,889 1.95%

19

FPJPM

300,923 1.89%

20

UNI-MAD245,382 1.54%

From Table 2 above, we see that only 17 party-list candidates received at least 2% from the total number of
votes cast for party-list candidates. The 17 qualified party-list candidates, or the two-percenters, are the partylist candidates that are "entitled to one seat each," or the guaranteed seat. In this first round of seat allocation,
we distributed 17 guaranteed seats.

The second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 provides that "those garnering more than two percent (2%)
of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes." This is where
petitioners and intervenors problem with the formula in Veterans lies. Veterans interprets the clause "in
proportion to their total number of votes" to be in proportion to the votes of the first party. This interpretation is
contrary to the express language of R.A. No. 7941.

We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the two percent
threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No.
7941 is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible to
achieve the maximum number of available party list seats when the number of available party list seats
exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two percent threshold in the distribution of the additional seats
frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the House of Representatives
shall consist of party-list representatives.

To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there are 50 million votes cast for the 100
participants in the party list elections. A party that has two percent of the votes cast, or one million votes, gets

74

Election Law Cases


a guaranteed seat. Let us further assume that the first 50 parties all get one million votes. Only 50 parties get
a seat despite the availability of 55 seats. Because of the operation of the two percent threshold, this situation
will repeat itself even if we increase the available party-list seats to 60 seats and even if we increase the votes
cast to 100 million. Thus, even if the maximum number of parties get two percent of the votes for every party,
it is always impossible for the number of occupied party-list seats to exceed 50 seats as long as the two
percent threshold is present.

We therefore strike down the two percent threshold only in relation to the distribution of the additional seats as
found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941. The two percent threshold presents an
unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the
attainment of "the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of
Representatives."30

party-list candidates. There are two steps in the second round of seat allocation. First, the percentage is
multiplied by the remaining available seats, 38, which is the difference between the 55 maximum seats
reserved under the Party-List System and the 17 guaranteed seats of the two-percenters. The whole integer of
the product of the percentage and of the remaining available seats corresponds to a partys share in the
remaining available seats. Second, we assign one party-list seat to each of the parties next in rank until all
available seats are completely distributed. We distributed all of the remaining 38 seats in the second round of
seat allocation. Finally, we apply the three-seat cap to determine the number of seats each qualified party-list
candidate is entitled. Thus:

Table 3. Distribution of Available Party-List Seats

Rank
In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941, the
following procedure shall be observed:

Party

Votes Garnered

Votes Garnered over

Total Votes for Party List, in %


(A)

Guaranteed Seat

(First Round)
1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the
number of votes they garnered during the elections.

(B)

Additional

Seats
2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the
party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.

3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to
additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated.

4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.

In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because they have already
been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation as
"additional seats" are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less the guaranteed seats.
Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of
fractional seats.

In declaring the two percent threshold unconstitutional, we do not limit our allocation of additional seats in
Table 3 below to the two-percenters. The percentage of votes garnered by each party-list candidate is arrived
at by dividing the number of votes garnered by each party by 15,950,900, the total number of votes cast for

Pearliegates

(Second Round)
(C)

(B) plus (C), in whole integers

(D)

Applying the three seat cap

(E)
1

BUHAY

1,169,234

7.33%

2.79

N.A.

BAYAN MUNA

979,039 6.14%

2.33

N.A.

CIBAC

1.80

N.A.

GABRIELA

1.48

APEC

1.48

N.A.

A Teacher

490,379 3.07%

1.17

N.A.

AKBAYAN

466,112 2.92%

1.11

N.A.

ALAGAD 423,149 2.65%

1.01

N.A.

931

COOP-NATCCO

755,686 4.74%

621,171 3.89%

619,657 3.88%

409,883 2.57%

N.A.

N.A.

75

Election Law Cases


10

BUTIL

409,160 2.57%

N.A.

11

BATAS

385,810 2.42%

N.A.

12

ARC

374,288 2.35%

N.A.

13

ANAKPAWIS

14

ABONO 339,990 2.13%

N.A.

55

15

AMIN

338,185 2.12%

N.A.

16

AGAP

328,724 2.06%

N.A.

17

AN WARAY

Applying the procedure of seat allocation as illustrated in Table 3 above, there are 55 party-list representatives
from the 36 winning party-list organizations. All 55 available party-list seats are filled. The additional seats
allocated to the parties with sufficient number of votes for one whole seat, in no case to exceed a total of three
seats for each party, are shown in column (D).

18

YACAP

310,889 1.95%

N.A.

19

FPJPM

300,923 1.89%

N.A.

20

UNI-MAD245,382 1.54%

N.A.

21

ABS

235,086 1.47%

N.A.

22

KAKUSA 228,999 1.44%

N.A.

23

KABATAAN

24

ABA-AKO218,818 1.37%

N.A.

25

ALIF

N.A.

26

SENIOR CITIZENS 213,058 1.34%

27

AT

197,872 1.24%

N.A.

28

VFP

196,266 1.23%

N.A.

29

ANAD

188,521 1.18%

N.A.

30

BANAT

177,028 1.11%

N.A.

31

ANG KASANGGA 170,531 1.07%

32

BANTAY 169,801 1.06%

N.A.

33

ABAKADA

34

1-UTAK 164,980 1.03%

N.A.

35

TUCP

N.A.

36

COCOFED

370,261 2.32%

321,503 2.02%

228,637 1.43%

217,822 1.37%

166,747 1.05%

162,647 1.02%

Pearliegates

155,920 0.98%

Total

N.A.

N.A.

17

Participation of Major Political Parties in Party-List Elections

The Constitutional Commission adopted a multi-party system that allowed all political parties to participate in
the party-list elections. The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission clearly bear this out, thus:

N.A.

MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I just want to say that we suggested or proposed the party list system
because we wanted to open up the political system to a pluralistic society through a multiparty system. x x x
We are for opening up the system, and we would like very much for the sectors to be there. That is why one of
the ways to do that is to put a ceiling on the number of representatives from any single party that can sit within
the 50 allocated under the party list system. x x x.

N.A.
xxx

N.A.

N.A.

N.A.

MR. MONSOD. Madam President, the candidacy for the 198 seats is not limited to political parties. My question
is this: Are we going to classify for example Christian Democrats and Social Democrats as political parties? Can
they run under the party list concept or must they be under the district legislation side of it only?

MR. VILLACORTA. In reply to that query, I think these parties that the Commissioner mentioned can field
candidates for the Senate as well as for the House of Representatives. Likewise, they can also field sectoral
candidates for the 20 percent or 30 percent, whichever is adopted, of the seats that we are allocating under
the party list system.

MR. MONSOD. In other words, the Christian Democrats can field district candidates and can also participate in
the party list system?

76

Election Law Cases

MR. VILLACORTA. Why not? When they come to the party list system, they will be fielding only sectoral
candidates.

MR. VILLACORTA. No, as I said, UNIDO may field sectoral candidates. On that condition alone, UNIDO may be
allowed to register for the party list system.

MR. MONSOD. May I be clarified on that? Can UNIDO participate in the party list system?

MR. MONSOD. May I inquire from Commissioner Tadeo if he shares that answer?

MR. VILLACORTA. Yes, why not? For as long as they field candidates who come from the different marginalized
sectors that we shall designate in this Constitution.

MR. TADEO. The same.

MR. VILLACORTA. Puwede po ang UNIDO, pero sa sectoral lines.


MR. MONSOD. Suppose Senator Taada wants to run under BAYAN group and says that he represents the
farmers, would he qualify?
xxxx
MR. VILLACORTA. No, Senator Taada would not qualify.

MR. MONSOD. But UNIDO can field candidates under the party list system and say Juan dela Cruz is a farmer.
Who would pass on whether he is a farmer or not?

MR. TADEO. Kay Commissioner Monsod, gusto ko lamang linawin ito. Political parties, particularly minority
political parties, are not prohibited to participate in the party list election if they can prove that they are also
organized along sectoral lines.

MR. MONSOD. What the Commissioner is saying is that all political parties can participate because it is
precisely the contention of political parties that they represent the broad base of citizens and that all sectors
are represented in them. Would the Commissioner agree?

MR. TADEO. Ang punto lamang namin, pag pinayagan mo ang UNIDO na isang political party, it will dominate
the party list at mawawalang saysay din yung sector. Lalamunin mismo ng political parties ang party list
system. Gusto ko lamang bigyan ng diin ang "reserve." Hindi ito reserve seat sa marginalized sectors. Kung
titingnan natin itong 198 seats, reserved din ito sa political parties.

MR. MONSOD. Hindi po reserved iyon kasi anybody can run there. But my question to Commissioner Villacorta
and probably also to Commissioner Tadeo is that under this system, would UNIDO be banned from running
under the party list system?

Pearliegates

MR. OPLE. x x x In my opinion, this will also create the stimulus for political parties and mass organizations to
seek common ground. For example, we have the PDP-Laban and the UNIDO. I see no reason why they should
not be able to make common goals with mass organizations so that the very leadership of these parties can be
transformed through the participation of mass organizations. And if this is true of the administration parties,
this will be true of others like the Partido ng Bayan which is now being formed. There is no question that they
will be attractive to many mass organizations. In the opposition parties to which we belong, there will be a
stimulus for us to contact mass organizations so that with their participation, the policies of such parties can be
radically transformed because this amendment will create conditions that will challenge both the mass
organizations and the political parties to come together. And the party list system is certainly available,
although it is open to all the parties. It is understood that the parties will enter in the roll of the COMELEC the
names of representatives of mass organizations affiliated with them. So that we may, in time, develop this
excellent system that they have in Europe where labor organizations and cooperatives, for example, distribute
themselves either in the Social Democratic Party and the Christian Democratic Party in Germany, and their very
presence there has a transforming effect upon the philosophies and the leadership of those parties.

It is also a fact well known to all that in the United States, the AFL-CIO always vote with the Democratic Party.
But the businessmen, most of them, always vote with the Republican Party, meaning that there is no reason at
all why political parties and mass organizations should not combine, reenforce, influence and interact with each
other so that the very objectives that we set in this Constitution for sectoral representation are achieved in a
wider, more lasting, and more institutionalized way. Therefore, I support this [Monsod-Villacorta] amendment. It
installs sectoral representation as a constitutional gift, but at the same time, it challenges the sector to rise to
the majesty of being elected representatives later on through a party list system; and even beyond that, to
become actual political parties capable of contesting political power in the wider constitutional arena for major
political parties.

77

Election Law Cases


x x x 32 (Emphasis supplied)

R.A. No. 7941 provided the details for the concepts put forward by the Constitutional Commission. Section 3 of
R.A. No. 7941 reads:

Definition of Terms. (a) The party-list system is a mechanism of proportional representation in the election of
representatives to the House of Representatives from national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or
coalitions thereof registered with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). Component parties or organizations
of a coalition may participate independently provided the coalition of which they form part does not participate
in the party-list system.

(b) A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties.

(c) A political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and
policies for the general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of securing their
adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office.

It is a national party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a majority of the
regions. It is a regional party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a
majority of the cities and provinces comprising the region.

(d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in
Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interests and concerns of their sector,

(e) A sectoral organization refers to a group of citizens or a coalition of groups of citizens who share similar
physical attributes or characteristics, employment, interests or concerns.

(f) A coalition refers to an aggrupation of duly registered national, regional, sectoral parties or organizations for
political and/or election purposes.

Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating in the party-list
system. On the contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major political parties to
participate in party-list elections through their sectoral wings. In fact, the members of the Constitutional
Commission voted down, 19-22, any permanent sectoral seats, and in the alternative the reservation of the
party-list system to the sectoral groups.33 In defining a "party" that participates in party-list elections as either
"a political party or a sectoral party," R.A. No. 7941 also clearly intended that major political parties will
participate in the party-list elections. Excluding the major political parties in party-list elections is manifestly
against the Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. This Court cannot
engage in socio-political engineering and judicially legislate the exclusion of major political parties from the
party-list elections in patent violation of the Constitution and the law.

Read together, R.A. No. 7941 and the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission state that major political
parties are allowed to establish, or form coalitions with, sectoral organizations for electoral or political
purposes. There should not be a problem if, for example, the Liberal Party participates in the party-list election
through the Kabataang Liberal ng Pilipinas (KALIPI), its sectoral youth wing. The other major political parties
can thus organize, or affiliate with, their chosen sector or sectors. To further illustrate, the Nacionalista Party
can establish a fisherfolk wing to participate in the party-list election, and this fisherfolk wing can field its
fisherfolk nominees. Kabalikat ng Malayang Pilipino (KAMPI) can do the same for the urban poor.

The qualifications of party-list nominees are prescribed in Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941:

Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated as party-list representative unless he is


a natural born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less
than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the elections, able to read and write, bona fide member of
the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the
election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election.

In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30)
years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30)
during his term shall be allowed to continue until the expiration of his term.

Under Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941, it is not necessary that the party-list organizations nominee "wallow in
poverty, destitution and infirmity"34 as there is no financial status required in the law. It is enough that the
nominee of the sectoral party/organization/coalition belongs to the marginalized and underrepresented
sectors,35 that is, if the nominee represents the fisherfolk, he or she must be a fisherfolk, or if the nominee
represents the senior citizens, he or she must be a senior citizen.

Congress, in enacting R.A. No. 7941, put the three-seat cap to prevent any party from dominating the party-list
elections.
Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 mandates the filling-up of the entire 20% allocation of party-list
representatives found in the Constitution. The Constitution, in paragraph 1, Section 5 of Article VI, left the

Pearliegates

78

Election Law Cases


determination of the number of the members of the House of Representatives to Congress: "The House of
Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by
law, x x x." The 20% allocation of party-list representatives is merely a ceiling; party-list representatives cannot
be more than 20% of the members of the House of Representatives. However, we cannot allow the continued
existence of a provision in the law which will systematically prevent the constitutionally allocated 20% party-list
representatives from being filled. The three-seat cap, as a limitation to the number of seats that a qualified
party-list organization may occupy, remains a valid statutory device that prevents any party from dominating
the party-list elections. Seats for party-list representatives shall thus be allocated in accordance with the
procedure used in Table 3 above.

G.R. No. 179295

BAYAN MUNA, ADVOCACY FOR TEACHER EMPOWERMENT THROUGH ACTION, COOPERATION AND HARMONY
TOWARDS EDUCATIONAL REFORMS, INC., and ABONO, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

However, by a vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing major political
parties from participating in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly. Those who voted to continue
disallowing major political parties from the party-list elections joined Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno in his
separate opinion. On the formula to allocate party-list seats, the Court is unanimous in concurring with this
ponencia.

RESOLUTION

CARPIO, J.:
WHEREFORE, we PARTIALLY GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the Resolution of the COMELEC dated 3 August
2007 in NBC No. 07-041 (PL) as well as the Resolution dated 9 July 2007 in NBC No. 07-60. We declare
unconstitutional the two percent threshold in the distribution of additional party-list seats. The allocation of
additional seats under the Party-List System shall be in accordance with the procedure used in Table 3 of this
Decision. Major political parties are disallowed from participating in party-list elections. This Decision is
immediately executory. No pronouncement as to costs.

The House of Representatives, represented by Speaker Prospero C. Nograles, filed a motion for leave to
intervene in G.R. Nos. 179271 and 179295. The House of Representatives filed a motion for clarification in
intervention and enumerated the issues for clarification as follows:

SO ORDERED.

A. There are only 219 legislative districts and not 220. Accordingly, the alloted seats for party-list
representation should only be 54 and not 55. The House of Representatives seeks clarification on which of the
party-list representatives shall be admitted to the Roll of Members considering that the Court declared as
winners 55 party-list representatives.

G.R. No. 179271

July 8, 2009

BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FOR NATIONAL ADVANCEMENT AND TRANSPARENCY (BANAT), Petitioner,


vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (sitting as the National Board of Canvassers), Respondent.

B. The House of Representatives wishes to be guided on whether it should enroll in its Roll of Members the 32
named party-list representatives enumerated in Table 3 or only such number of representatives that would
complete the 250 member maximum prescribed by Article VI, Sec. 5(1) of the Constitution. In the event that it
is ordered to admit all 32, will this act not violate the above-cited Constitutional provision considering that the
total members would now rise to 270.

ARTS BUSINESS AND SCIENCE PROFESSIONALS, Intervenor.


AANGAT TAYO, Intervenor.
COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (SENIOR CITIZENS),
Intervenor.

C. The Court declared as unconstitutional the 2% threshold only in relation to the distribution of additional
seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941. Yet, it distributed first seats to party-list
groups which did not attain the minimum number of votes that will entitle them to one seat. Clarification is,
therefore, sought whether the term "additional seats" refer to 2nd and 3rd seats only or all remaining available
seats. Corollary thereto, the House of Representatives wishes to be clarified whether there is no more minimum
vote requirement to qualify as a party-list representative.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

Pearliegates

79

Election Law Cases


D. For the guidance of the House of Representatives, clarification is sought as to whether the principle laid
down in Veterans that "the filling up of the allowable seats for party-list representatives is not mandatory," has
been abandoned.1

On the other hand, Armi Jane Roa-Borje (Roa-Borje), third nominee of Citizens Battle Against Corruption
(CIBAC), filed a motion for leave for partial reconsideration-in-intervention, alleging that:

The Supreme Court, in ruling on the procedure for distribution of seats, has deprived without due process and
in violation of the equal protection clause, parties with more significant constituencies, such as CIBAC, Gabriela
and APEC, in favor of parties who did not even meet the 2% threshold.2

Following the Courts Decision of 21 April 2009, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) submitted to this
Court on 27 April 2009 National Board of Canvassers (NBC) Resolution No. 09-001. NBC Resolution No. 09-001
updated the data used by this Court in its Decision of 21 April 2009. The total votes for party-list is now
15,723,764 following the cancellation of the registration of party-list group Filipinos for Peace, Justice and
Progress Movement (FPJPM). Moreover, the total number of legislative districts is now 219 following the
annulment of Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 creating the province of Shariff Kabunsuan. Thus, the
percentage and ranking of the actual winning party-list groups are different from Table 3 of the Decision in G.R.
Nos. 179271 and 179295.

The Number of Members of the House of Representatives


in the 2007 Elections

Section 5(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution reads:

The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless
otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities,
and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the
basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a partylist system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. (Emphasis supplied)

The 1987 Constitution fixes the maximum number of members of the House of Representatives at 250.
However, the 1987 Constitution expressly allows for an increase in the number of members of the House of
Representatives provided a law is enacted for the purpose. This is clear from the phrase "unless otherwise
provided by law" in Section 5(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. The Legislature has the option to choose
whether the increase in the number of members of the House of Representatives is done by piecemeal

Pearliegates

legislation or by enactment of a law authorizing a general increase. Legislation that makes piecemeal increases
of the number of district representatives is no less valid than legislation that makes a general increase.

In 1987, there were only 200 legislative districts. Twenty legislative districts were added by piecemeal
legislation after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution:

Republic Act

Year Signed

into Law Legislative District


1

7160

1992

Biliran

7675

1994

Mandaluyong City

7854

1994

Makati (2nd District)

7878

1995

Apayao

7896 and 7897

1995

7926

1995

Muntinlupa City

8470

1998

Compostela Valley

8487

1998

Taguig City (2nd District)

8526

1998

Valenzuela City (2nd District)

10

9229

2003

Paraaque (2nd District)

11

9230

2003

San Jose del Monte City

12

8508 and 9232

1998 and 2003

13

9232

2003

Antipolo (2nd District)

14

9269

2004

Zamboanga City (2nd District)

15

9355

2006

Dinagat Island

16

9357

2006

Sultan Kudarat (2nd District)

17

9360

2006

Zamboanga Sibugay (2nd District)

18

9364

2006

Marikina City (2nd District)

19

9371

2007

Cagayan de Oro (2nd District)

Guimaras

Antipolo (1st District)

80

Election Law Cases


20

9387

2007

Navotas City

Thus, for purposes of the 2007 elections, there were only 219 district representatives. Navotas City became a
separate district on 24 June 2007, more than a month after the 14 May 2007 elections.

1992

200

50

250

1995

206

51

257

New Districts:
The Number of Party-List Seats

Biliran

in the 2007 Elections

Mandaluyong City
Makati (2nd District)

Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution reads in part:

Apayao
Guimaras

The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives
including those under the party-list. x x x

Muntinlupa City
1998

The 1987 Constitution fixes the ratio of party-list representatives to district representatives. This ratio
automatically applies whenever the number of district representatives is increased by law. The mathematical
formula for determining the number of seats available to party-list representatives is

209

52

261

New Districts:
Compostela Valley
Taguig City (2nd District)

Number of seats available

Valenzuela City (2nd District)

to legislative districts
.80

.20

Number of seats available to

party-list representatives
As we stated in our Decision of 21 April 2009, "[t]his formula allows for the corresponding increase in the
number of seats available for party-list representatives whenever a legislative district is created by law." Thus,
for every four district representatives, the 1987 Constitution mandates that there shall be one party-list
representative. There is no need for legislation to create an additional party-list seat whenever four additional
legislative districts are created by law. Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution automatically creates
such additional party-list seat.

2001

209

52

261

2004

214

53

267

New Districts:
Paraaque City (2nd District)
San Jose del Monte City

We use the table below to illustrate the relationship between the number of legislative districts and the number
of party-list seats for every election year after 1987.

Antipolo (1st District)


Antipolo (2nd District)
Zamboanga City (2nd District)

Election Year
Number of Legislative Districts
the House of Representatives

Pearliegates

Number of Party-List Seats Total Number of Members of

81

Election Law Cases


2007

219

54

273

Under Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941, garnering 2% of the total votes cast guarantees a party one seat. This 2%
threshold for the first round of seat allocation does not violate any provision of the 1987 Constitution. Thus, the
Court upholds this 2% threshold for the guaranteed seats as a valid exercise of legislative power.1avvphi1

New Districts:
Dinagat Island
Sultan Kudarat (2nd District)
Zamboanga Sibugay (2nd District)
Marikina City (2nd District)

In the second round allocation of additional seats, there is no minimum vote requirement to obtain a party-list
seat because the Court has struck down the application of the 2% threshold in the allocation of additional
seats. Specifically, the provision in Section 11(b) of the Party-List Act stating that "those garnering more than
two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in the proportion to their total number of
votes" can no longer be given any effect. Otherwise, the 20 percent party-list seats in the total membership of
the House of Representatives as provided in the 1987 Constitution will mathematically be impossible to fill up.

Cagayan de Oro (2nd District)

2010

220

55

275

New District:

However, a party-list organization has to obtain a sufficient number of votes to gain a seat in the second round
of seat allocation. What is deemed a sufficient number of votes is dependent upon the circumstances of each
election, such as the number of participating parties, the number of available party-list seats, and the number
of parties with guaranteed seats received in the first round of seat allocation. To continue the example above, if
only ten parties participated in the 2007 party-list election and each party received only one thousand votes,
then each of the ten parties would receive 10% of the votes cast. All are guaranteed one seat, and are further
entitled to receive two more seats in the second round of seat allocation.

Navotas City
(assuming no additional districts are created)

We see that, as early as the election year of 1995, the total number of members of the House of
Representatives is already beyond the initial maximum of 250 members as fixed in the 1987 Constitution.

Any change in the number of legislative districts brings a corresponding change in the number of party-list
seats. However, the increase in the number of members of the House of Representatives went unnoticed as the
available seats for party-list representatives have never been filled up before. As of the oral arguments in G.R.
Nos. 179271 and 179295, there were 220 legislative districts. Fifty-five party-list seats were thus allocated.
However, the number of legislative districts was subsequently reduced to 219 with our ruling on 16 July 2008
declaring void the creation of the Province of Sharif Kabunsuan.3 Thus, in the 2007 elections, the number of
party-list seats available for distribution should be correspondingly reduced from 55 to 54.

The filling-up of all available party-list seats is not mandatory. Actual occupancy of the party-list seats depends
on the number of participants in the party-list election. If only ten parties participated in the 2007 party-list
election, then, despite the availability of 54 seats, the maximum possible number of occupied party-list seats
would only be 30 because of the three-seat cap. In such a case, the three-seat cap prevents the mandatory
allocation of all the 54 available seats.

Pearliegates

Similarly, a presidential candidate may win the elections even if he receives only one thousand votes as long as
all his opponents receive less than one thousand votes. A winning presidential candidate only needs to receive
more votes than his opponents. The same policy applies in every election to public office, from the presidential
to the barangay level. Except for the guaranteed party-list seat, there is no minimum vote requirement before a
candidate in any election, for any elective office, can be proclaimed the winner. Of course, the winning
candidate must receive at least one vote, assuming he has no opponents or all his opponents do not receive a
single vote.

In the absence of a minimum vote requirement in the second round of party-list seat allocation, there is no
need to belabor the disparity between the votes obtained by the first and last ranked winning parties in the
2007 party-list elections. In the same manner, no one belabors the disparity between the votes obtained by the
highest and lowest ranked winners in the senatorial elections. However, for those interested in comparing the
votes received by party-list representatives vis-a-vis the votes received by district representatives, the 162,678
votes cast in favor of TUCP, the last party to obtain a party-list seat, is significantly higher than the votes
received by 214 of the 218 elected district representatives.4

The Actual Number of Party-List Representatives


in the 2007 Elections

82

Election Law Cases


The data used in Table 3 of our Decision promulgated on 21 April 2009 was based on the submissions of the
parties. We used the figures from Party-List Canvass Report No. 32, as of 6:00 p.m. of 31 August 2007. The NBC
issued NBC Report No. 33 on 11 June 2008, updating the 31 August 2007 report. The parties did not furnish this
Court with a copy of NBC Report No. 33. In any case, we stated in the dispositive portion of our Decision that
"[t]he allocation of additional seats under the Party-List System shall be in accordance with the procedure used
in Table 3 of this decision." Party-List Canvass Report No. 32 is not part of the procedure.1avvphi1

N.A.

N.A.

385,956 2.45%

N.A.

374,349 2.38%

N.A.

N.A.

ABONO 340,002 2.16%

N.A.

16

YACAP

331,623 2.11%

N.A.

17

AGAP

328,814 2.09%

N.A.

18

AN WARAY

Total Votes for Party List, in %

19

UNI-MAD251,804 1.60%

N.A.

(A)

20

ABS

235,152 1.50%

N.A.

(First Round)

21

ALIF

229,267 1.46%

N.A.

(B)

22

KAKUSA 229,036 1.46%

N.A.

Seats

23

KABATAAN

(Second Round)

24

ABA-AKO219,363 1.40%

N.A.

(C)

(B) plus (C), in whole integers

25

SENIOR CITIZENS 213,095 1.36%

(D)

Applying the three seat cap

26

AT

200,030 1.27%

N.A.

27

VFP

196,358 1.25%

N.A.

The computation of the COMELEC in NBC No. 09-001 applying the procedure laid down in our Decision requires
correction for purposes of accuracy. Instead of multiplying the percentage of votes garnered over the total
votes for party-list by 36, the COMELEC multiplied the percentage by 37. Thirty-six is the proper multiplier as it
is the difference between 54, the number of available party-list seats, and 18, the number of guaranteed seats.
Only the figures in column (C) are affected. The allocation of seats to the winning party-list organizations,
however, remains the same as in NBC No. 09-001. Our modification of the COMELECs computation in NBC No.
09-001 is shown below:

Rank

Party

Votes Garnered

Votes Garnered over

Guaranteed Seat

Additional

(E)
1

BUHAY

BAYAN MUNA

CIBAC

GABRIELA

APEC

A Teacher

AKBAYAN

ALAGAD 423,165 2.69%

COOP-NATCCO

10

BUTIL

409,168 2.60%

11

BATAS

12

ARC

13

ANAKPAWIS

14

AMIN

347,527 2.21%

15

409,987 2.61%

370,323 2.36%

321,516 2.04%

228,700 1.45%
0

7.44%

2.68

N.A.

28

ANAD

188,573 1.20%

N.A.

979,189 6.23%

2.24

N.A.

29

BANAT

177,068 1.13%

N.A.

1.73

N.A.

30

ANG KASANGGA 170,594 1.08%

1.42

31

BANTAY 169,869 1.08%

N.A.

1.42

N.A.

32

ABAKADA

490,853 3.12%

1.12

N.A.

33

1-UTAK 165,012 1.05%

N.A.

466,448 2.97%

1.07

N.A.

34

TUCP

N.A.

1,169,338

755,735 4.81%

621,266 3.95%

619,733 3.94%

Pearliegates

85

N.A.

166,897 1.06%

162,678 1.03%

N.A.

N.A.

N.A.

N.A.

N.A.

N.A.

N.A.

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Election Law Cases


35

COCOFED

Total

18

156,007 0.99%

N.A.

54
Bagong Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod ng Adhikaing Sambayanan (BATAS) and Ang Laban ng Indiginong Filipino
(ALIF) both have pending cases before the COMELEC. The COMELEC correctly deferred the proclamation of both
BATAS and ALIF as the outcome of their cases may affect the final composition of party-list representatives. The
computation and allocation of seats may still be modified in the event that the COMELEC decides against
BATAS and/or ALIF.

To address Roa-Borjes motion for partial reconsideration-in-intervention and for purposes of computing the
results in future party-list elections, we reiterate that in the second step of the second round of seat allocation,
the preference in the distribution of seats should be in accordance with the higher percentage and higher rank,
without limiting the distribution

The phrase "legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in
accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive
ratio" in Section 5(1) of Article VI requires that legislative districts shall be apportioned according to
proportional representation. However, this principle of proportional representation applies only to legislative
districts, not to the party-list system. The allocation of seats under the party-list system is governed by the last
phrase of Section 5(1), which states that the party-list representatives shall be "those who, as provided by law,
shall be elected through a party-list system," giving the Legislature wide discretion in formulating the allocation
of party-list seats. Clearly, there is no constitutional requirement for absolute proportional representation in the
allocation of party-list seats in the House of Representatives.

Section 2, on Declaration of Policy, of R.A. No. 7941 provides that the "State shall promote proportional
representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of
registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof x x x." However, this
proportional representation in Section 2 is qualified by Section 11(b)8 of the same law which mandates a threeseat cap, which is intended to bar any single party-list organization from dominating the party-list system.
Section 11(b) also qualifies this proportional representation by imposing a two percent cut-off for those entitled
to the guaranteed seats. These statutory qualifications are valid because they do not violate the Constitution,
which does not require absolute proportional representation for the party-list system.

to parties receiving two-percent of the votes.6 To limit the distribution of seats to the two-percenters would
mathematically prevent the filling up of all the available party-list seats.
To summarize, there are four parameters in a Philippine-style party-list election system:
In the table above, CIBAC cannot claim a third seat from the seat allocated to TUCP, the last ranked party
allocated with a seat. CIBAC's 2.81% (from the percentage of 4.81% less the 2% for its guaranteed seat) has a
lower fractional seat value after the allocation of its second seat compared to TUCP's 1.03%. CIBAC's fractional
seat after receiving two seats is only 0.03 compared to TUCP's 0.38 fractional seat. Multiplying CIBAC's 2.81%
by 37, the additional seats for distribution in the second round, gives 1.03 seat, leaving 0.03 fractional seat.
Multiplying TUCP's 1.03% by 37 gives a fractional seat of 0.38, higher than CIBAC's fractional seat of 0.03. The
fractional seats become material only in the second step of the second round of seat allocation to determine
the ranking of parties. Thus, for purposes of the second step in the second round of seat allocation,7 TUCP has
a higher rank than CIBAC.

Roa-Borjes position stems from the perceived need for absolute proportionality in the allocation of party-list
seats. However, the 1987 Constitution does not require absolute proportionality in the allocation of party-list
seats. Section 5(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides:

(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless
otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities,
and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the
basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a partylist system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties and organizations. (Boldfacing and italicization
supplied)

Pearliegates

1. Twenty percent of the total number of the membership of the House of Representatives is the maximum
number of seats available to party-list organizations, such that there is automatically one party-list seat for
every four existing legislative districts.

2. Garnering two percent of the total votes cast in the party-list elections guarantees a party-list organization
one seat. The guaranteed seats shall be distributed in a first round of seat allocation to parties receiving at
least two percent of the total party-list votes.

3. The additional seats, that is, the remaining seats after allocation of the guaranteed seats, shall be
distributed to the party-list organizations including those that received less than two percent of the total votes.
The continued operation of the two percent threshold as it applies to the allocation of the additional seats is
now unconstitutional because this threshold mathematically and physically prevents the filling up of the
available party-list seats. The additional seats shall be distributed to the parties in a second round of seat
allocation according to the two-step procedure laid down in the Decision of 21 April 2009 as clarified in this
Resolution.

4. The three-seat cap is constitutional. The three-seat cap is intended by the Legislature to prevent any party
from dominating the party-list system. There is no violation of the Constitution because the 1987 Constitution

84

Election Law Cases


does not require absolute proportionality for the party-list system. The well-settled rule is that courts will not
question the wisdom of the Legislature as long as it is not violative of the Constitution.

1. Penera was not yet a candidate at the time of the incident under Section 11 of RA 8436 as amended by
Section 13 of RA 9369.

These four parameters allow the mathematical and practical fulfillment of the Constitutional provision that
party-list representatives shall comprise twenty percent of the members of the House of Representatives. At
the same time, these four parameters uphold as much as possible the Party-List Act, striking down only that
provision of the Party-List Act that could not be reconciled anymore with the 1987 Constitution.

2. The petition for disqualification failed to submit convincing and substantial evidence against Penera for
violation of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code.

3. Penera never admitted the allegations of the petition for disqualification and has consistently disputed the
charge of premature campaigning.
WHEREFORE, the Courts Decision of 21 April 2009 in the present case is clarified accordingly.
4. The admission that Penera participated in a motorcade is not the same as admitting she engaged in
premature election campaigning.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 181613

November 25, 2009

ROSALINDA A. PENERA, Petitioner,


vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EDGAR T. ANDANAR, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

CARPIO, J.:

We grant Rosalinda A. Peneras (Penera) motion for reconsideration of this Courts Decision of 11 September
2009 (Decision).

The assailed Decision dismissed Peneras petition and affirmed the Resolution dated 30 July 2008 of the
COMELEC En Banc as well as the Resolution dated 24 July 2007 of the COMELEC Second Division. The Decision
disqualified Penera from running for the office of Mayor in Sta. Monica, Surigao del Norte and declared that the
Vice-Mayor should succeed Penera.

Section 79(a) of the Omnibus Election Code defines a "candidate" as "any person aspiring for or seeking an
elective public office, who has filed a certificate of candidacy x x x." The second sentence, third paragraph,
Section 15 of RA 8436, as amended by Section 13 of RA 9369, provides that "[a]ny person who files his
certificate of candidacy within [the period for filing] shall only be considered as a candidate at the start of the
campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy." The immediately succeeding proviso in the
same third paragraph states that "unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect only
upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period." These two provisions determine the resolution of this case.

The Decision states that "[w]hen the campaign period starts and [the person who filed his certificate of
candidacy] proceeds with his/her candidacy, his/her intent turning into actuality, we can already consider
his/her acts, after the filing of his/her COC and prior to the campaign period, as the promotion of his/her
election as a candidate, hence, constituting premature campaigning, for which he/she may be disqualified."1

Under the Decision, a candidate may already be liable for premature campaigning after the filing of the
certificate of candidacy but even before the start of the campaign period. From the filing of the certificate of
candidacy, even long before the start of the campaign period, the Decision considers the partisan political acts
of a person so filing a certificate of candidacy "as the promotion of his/her election as a candidate." Thus, such
person can be disqualified for premature campaigning for acts done before the start of the campaign period. In
short, the Decision considers a person who files a certificate of candidacy already a "candidate" even before
the start of the campaign period. lawphil

The assailed Decision is contrary to the clear intent and letter of the law.
In support of her motion for reconsideration, Penera submits the following arguments:

Pearliegates

85

Election Law Cases


The Decision reverses Lanot v. COMELEC,2 which held that a person who files a certificate of candidacy is not a
candidate until the start of the campaign period. In Lanot, this Court explained:

Thus, the essential elements for violation of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code are: (1) a person engages
in an election campaign or partisan political activity; (2) the act is designed to promote the election or defeat of
a particular candidate or candidates; (3) the act is done outside the campaign period.

The second element requires the existence of a "candidate." Under Section 79(a), a candidate is one who "has
filed a certificate of candidacy" to an elective public office. Unless one has filed his certificate of candidacy, he
is not a "candidate." The third element requires that the campaign period has not started when the election
campaign or partisan political activity is committed.

Assuming that all candidates to a public office file their certificates of candidacy on the last day, which under
Section 75 of the Omnibus Election Code is the day before the start of the campaign period, then no one can be
prosecuted for violation of Section 80 for acts done prior to such last day. Before such last day, there is no
"particular candidate or candidates" to campaign for or against. On the day immediately after the last day of
filing, the campaign period starts and Section 80 ceases to apply since Section 80 covers only acts done
"outside" the campaign period.

Thus, if all candidates file their certificates of candidacy on the last day, Section 80 may only apply to acts
done on such last day, which is before the start of the campaign period and after at least one candidate has
filed his certificate of candidacy. This is perhaps the reason why those running for elective public office usually
file their certificates of candidacy on the last day or close to the last day.

There is no dispute that Eusebios acts of election campaigning or partisan political activities were committed
outside of the campaign period. The only question is whether Eusebio, who filed his certificate of candidacy on
29 December 2003, was a "candidate" when he committed those acts before the start of the campaign period
on 24 March 2004.

Section 11 of Republic Act No. 8436 ("RA 8436") moved the deadline for the filing of certificates of candidacy to
120 days before election day. Thus, the original deadline was moved from 23 March 2004 to 2 January 2004, or
81 days earlier. The crucial question is: did this change in the deadline for filing the certificate of candidacy
make one who filed his certificate of candidacy before 2 January 2004 immediately liable for violation of Section
80 if he engaged in election campaign or partisan political activities prior to the start of the campaign period on
24 March 2004?

SECTION 11. Official Ballot. The Commission shall prescribe the size and form of the official ballot which shall
contain the titles of the positions to be filled and/or the propositions to be voted upon in an initiative,
referendum or plebiscite. Under each position, the names of candidates shall be arranged alphabetically by
surname and uniformly printed using the same type size. A fixed space where the chairman of the Board of
Election Inspectors shall affix his/her signature to authenticate the official ballot shall be provided.

Both sides of the ballots may be used when necessary.

For this purpose, the deadline for the filing of certificate of candidacy/petition for registration/ manifestation to
participate in the election shall not be later than one hundred twenty (120) days before the elections: Provided,
That, any elective official, whether national or local, running for any office other than the one which he/she is
holding in a permanent capacity, except for president and vice-president, shall be deemed resigned only upon
the start of the campaign period corresponding to the position for which he/she is running: Provided, further,
That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect upon the start of the aforesaid
campaign period: Provided, finally, That, for purposes of the May 11, 1998 elections, the deadline for filing of
the certificate of candidacy for the positions of President, Vice-President, Senators and candidates under the
party-list system as well as petitions for registration and/or manifestation to participate in the party-list system
shall be on February 9, 1998 while the deadline for the filing of certificate of candidacy for other positions shall
be on March 27, 1998.

The official ballots shall be printed by the National Printing Office and/or the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas at the
price comparable with that of private printers under proper security measures which the Commission shall
adopt. The Commission may contract the services of private printers upon certification by the National Printing
Office/Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas that it cannot meet the printing requirements. Accredited political parties and
deputized citizens arms of the Commission may assign watchers in the printing, storage and distribution of
official ballots.

To prevent the use of fake ballots, the Commission through the Committee shall ensure that the serial number
on the ballot stub shall be printed in magnetic ink that shall be easily detectable by inexpensive hardware and
shall be impossible to reproduce on a photocopying machine, and that identification marks, magnetic strips,
bar codes and other technical and security markings, are provided on the ballot.

The official ballots shall be printed and distributed to each city/municipality at the rate of one (1) ballot for
every registered voter with a provision of additional four (4) ballots per precinct.

Section 11 of RA 8436 provides:

Pearliegates

86

Election Law Cases


Under Section 11 of RA 8436, the only purpose for the early filing of certificates of candidacy is to give ample
time for the printing of official ballots. This is clear from the following deliberations of the Bicameral Conference
Committee:

xxxx

SENATOR GONZALES. How about prohibition against campaigning or doing partisan acts which apply
immediately upon being a candidate?
SENATOR GONZALES. Okay. Then, how about the campaign period, would it be the same[,] uniform for local
and national officials?

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. TANJUATCO). Personally, I would agree to retaining it at the present periods.

SENATOR GONZALES. But the moment one files a certificate of candidacy, hes already a candidate, and there
are many prohibited acts on the part of candidate.

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. TANJUATCO). Again, since the intention of this provision is just to afford the Comelec
enough time to print the ballots, this provision does not intend to change the campaign periods as presently, or
rather election periods as presently fixed by existing law.

THE ACTING CHAIRMAN (SEN. FERNAN). So, it should be subject to the other prohibition.

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. TANJUATCO). Thats right.


THE CHAIRMAN (REP. TANJUATCO). Unless we. . . .
THE ACTING CHAIRMAN (SEN. FERNAN). Okay.
SENATOR GONZALES. And you cannot say that the campaign period has not yet began (sic).

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. TANJUATCO). If we dont provide that the filing of the certificate will not bring about ones
being a candidate.

SENATOR GONZALES. If thats a fact, the law cannot change a fact.

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. TANJUATCO). No, but if we can provide that the filing of the certificate of candidacy will
not result in that official vacating his position, we can also provide that insofar he is concerned, election period
or his being a candidate will not yet commence. Because here, the reason why we are doing an early filing is to
afford enough time to prepare this machine readable ballots.

So, with the manifestations from the Commission on Elections, Mr. Chairman, the House Panel will withdraw its
proposal and will agree to the 120-day period provided in the Senate version.

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. TANJUATCO). In other words, actually, there would be no conflict anymore because we are
talking about the 120-day period before election as the last day of filing a certificate of candidacy, election
period starts 120 days also. So that is election period already. But he will still not be considered as a candidate.

Thus, because of the early deadline of 2 January 2004 for purposes of printing of official ballots, Eusebio filed
his certificate of candidacy on 29 December 2003. Congress, however, never intended the filing of a certificate
of candidacy before 2 January 2004 to make the person filing to become immediately a "candidate" for
purposes other than the printing of ballots. This legislative intent prevents the immediate application of Section
80 of the Omnibus Election Code to those filing to meet the early deadline. The clear intention of Congress was
to preserve the "election periods as x x x fixed by existing law" prior to RA 8436 and that one who files to meet
the early deadline "will still not be considered as a candidate."3 (Emphasis in the original)

Lanot was decided on the ground that one who files a certificate of candidacy is not a candidate until the start
of the campaign period. This ground was based on the deliberations of the legislators who explained the intent
of the provisions of RA 8436, which laid the legal framework for an automated election system. There was no
express provision in the original RA 8436 stating that one who files a certificate of candidacy is not a candidate
until the start of the campaign period.

THE CHAIRMAN (SENATOR FERNAN). Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Pearliegates

87

Election Law Cases


When Congress amended RA 8436, Congress decided to expressly incorporate the Lanot doctrine into law,
realizing that Lanot merely relied on the deliberations of Congress in holding that

The clear intention of Congress was to preserve the "election periods as x x x fixed by existing law" prior to RA
8436 and that one who files to meet the early deadline "will still not be considered as a candidate."4 (Emphasis
supplied)

Congress wanted to insure that no person filing a certificate of candidacy under the early deadline required by
the automated election system would be disqualified or penalized for any partisan political act done before the
start of the campaign period. Thus, in enacting RA 9369, Congress expressly wrote the Lanot doctrine into the
second sentence, third paragraph of the amended Section 15 of RA 8436, thus:

x x x Provided, further, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect upon the
start of the aforesaid campaign period, x x x.

In RA 9369, Congress inserted the word "only" so that the first proviso now reads

x x x Provided, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start
of the aforesaid campaign period x x x. (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, Congress not only reiterated but also strengthened its mandatory directive that election offenses can be
committed by a candidate "only" upon the start of the campaign period. This clearly means that before the
start of the campaign period, such election offenses cannot be so committed.

xxx

For this purpose, the Commission shall set the deadline for the filing of certificate of candidacy/petition for
registration/manifestation to participate in the election. Any person who files his certificate of candidacy within
this period shall only be considered as a candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his
certificate of candidacy: Provided, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect
only upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period: Provided, finally, That any person holding a public
appointive office or position, including active members of the armed forces, and officers and employees in
government-owned or -controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his/her office and
must vacate the same at the start of the day of the filing of his/her certificate of candidacy. (Boldfacing and
underlining supplied)

Congress elevated the Lanot doctrine into a statute by specifically inserting it as the second sentence of the
third paragraph of the amended Section 15 of RA 8436, which cannot be annulled by this Court except on the
sole ground of its unconstitutionality. The Decision cannot reverse Lanot without repealing this second
sentence, because to reverse Lanot would mean repealing this second sentence.

The assailed Decision, however, in reversing Lanot does not claim that this second sentence or any portion of
Section 15 of RA 8436, as amended by RA 9369, is unconstitutional. In fact, the Decision considers the entire
Section 15 good law. Thus, the Decision is self-contradictory reversing Lanot but maintaining the
constitutionality of the second sentence, which embodies the Lanot doctrine. In so doing, the Decision is
irreconcilably in conflict with the clear intent and letter of the second sentence, third paragraph, Section 15 of
RA 8436, as amended by RA 9369.

In enacting RA 9369, Congress even further clarified the first proviso in the third paragraph of Section 15 of RA
8436. The original provision in RA 8436 states

Pearliegates

When the applicable provisions of RA 8436, as amended by RA 9369, are read together, these provisions of law
do not consider Penera a candidate for purposes other than the printing of ballots, until the start of the
campaign period. There is absolutely no room for any other interpretation.

We quote with approval the Dissenting Opinion of Justice Antonio T. Carpio:

x x x The definition of a "candidate" in Section 79(a) of the Omnibus Election Code should be read together
with the amended Section 15 of RA 8436. A "candidate refers to any person aspiring for or seeking an elective
public office, who has filed a certificate of candidacy by himself or through an accredited political party,
aggroupment or coalition of parties." However, it is no longer enough to merely file a certificate of candidacy
for a person to be considered a candidate because "any person who files his certificate of candidacy within [the
filing] period shall only be considered a candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his
certificate of candidacy." Any person may thus file a certificate of candidacy on any day within the prescribed
period for filing a certificate of candidacy yet that person shall be considered a candidate, for purposes of
determining ones possible violations of election laws, only during the campaign period. Indeed, there is no
"election campaign" or "partisan political activity" designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular
candidate or candidates to public office simply because there is no "candidate" to speak of prior to the start of
the campaign period. Therefore, despite the filing of her certificate of candidacy, the law does not consider
Penera a candidate at the time of the questioned motorcade which was conducted a day before the start of the
campaign period. x x x

The campaign period for local officials began on 30 March 2007 and ended on 12 May 2007. Penera filed her
certificate of candidacy on 29 March 2007. Penera was thus a candidate on 29 March 2009 only for purposes of
printing the ballots. On 29 March 2007, the law still did not consider Penera a candidate for purposes other

88

Election Law Cases


than the printing of ballots. Acts committed by Penera prior to 30 March 2007, the date when she became a
"candidate," even if constituting election campaigning or partisan political activities, are not punishable under
Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code. Such acts are within the realm of a citizens protected freedom of
expression. Acts committed by Penera within the campaign period are not covered by Section 80 as Section 80
punishes only acts outside the campaign period.5

Penera is liable for premature campaigning for partisan political acts before the start of the campaigning, the
assailed Decision ignores the clear and express provision of the law.

The assailed Decision gives a specious reason in explaining away the first proviso in the third paragraph, the
amended Section 15 of RA 8436 that election offenses applicable to candidates take effect only upon the start
of the campaign period. The Decision states that:

The Decision rationalizes that a candidate who commits premature campaigning can be disqualified or
prosecuted only after the start of the campaign period. This is not what the law says. What the law says is "any
unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the campaign period."
The plain meaning of this provision is that the effective date when partisan political acts become unlawful as to
a candidate is when the campaign period starts. Before the start of the campaign period, the same partisan
political acts are lawful.

x x x [T]he line in Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, which provides that "any unlawful act or
omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the campaign period," does not mean
that the acts constituting premature campaigning can only be committed, for which the offender may be
disqualified, during the campaign period. Contrary to the pronouncement in the dissent, nowhere in said
proviso was it stated that campaigning before the start of the campaign period is lawful, such that the offender
may freely carry out the same with impunity.

The law does not state, as the assailed Decision asserts, that partisan political acts done by a candidate before
the campaign period are unlawful, but may be prosecuted only upon the start of the campaign period. Neither
does the law state that partisan political acts done by a candidate before the campaign period are temporarily
lawful, but becomes unlawful upon the start of the campaign period. This is clearly not the language of the law.
Besides, such a law as envisioned in the Decision, which defines a criminal act and curtails freedom of
expression and speech, would be void for vagueness.

As previously established, a person, after filing his/her COC but prior to his/her becoming a candidate (thus,
prior to the start of the campaign period), can already commit the acts described under Section 79(b) of the
Omnibus Election Code as election campaign or partisan political activity, However, only after said person
officially becomes a candidate, at the beginning of the campaign period, can said acts be given effect as
premature campaigning under Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code. Only after said person officially
becomes a candidate, at the start of the campaign period, can his/her disqualification be sought for acts
constituting premature campaigning. Obviously, it is only at the start of the campaign period, when the person
officially becomes a candidate, that the undue and iniquitous advantages of his/her prior acts, constituting
premature campaigning, shall accrue to his/her benefit. Compared to the other candidates who are only about
to begin their election campaign, a candidate who had previously engaged in premature campaigning already
enjoys an unfair headstart in promoting his/her candidacy.6 (Emphasis supplied)

Congress has laid down the law a candidate is liable for election offenses only upon the start of the
campaign period. This Court has no power to ignore the clear and express mandate of the law that "any person
who files his certificate of candidacy within [the filing] period shall only be considered a candidate at the start
of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy." Neither can this Court turn a blind eye to
the express and clear language of the law that "any unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall
take effect only upon the start of the campaign period."

It is a basic principle of law that any act is lawful unless expressly declared unlawful by law. This is specially
true to expression or speech, which Congress cannot outlaw except on very narrow grounds involving clear,
present and imminent danger to the State. The mere fact that the law does not declare an act unlawful ipso
facto means that the act is lawful. Thus, there is no need for Congress to declare in Section 15 of RA 8436, as
amended by RA 9369, that political partisan activities before the start of the campaign period are lawful. It is
sufficient for Congress to state that "any unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect
only upon the start of the campaign period." The only inescapable and logical result is that the same acts, if
done before the start of the campaign period, are lawful.

In laymans language, this means that a candidate is liable for an election offense only for acts done during the
campaign period, not before. The law is clear as daylight any election offense that may be committed by a
candidate under any election law cannot be committed before the start of the campaign period. In ruling that

Pearliegates

The forum for examining the wisdom of the law, and enacting remedial measures, is not this Court but the
Legislature. This Court has no recourse but to apply a law that is as clear, concise and express as the second
sentence, and its immediately succeeding proviso, as written in the third paragraph of Section 15 of RA 8436,
as amended by RA 9369.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT petitioner Rosalinda A. Peneras Motion for Reconsideration. We SET ASIDE the
Decision of this Court in G.R. No. 181613 promulgated on 11 September 2009, as well as the Resolutions dated
24 July 2007 and 30 January 2008 of the COMELEC Second Division and the COMELEC En Banc, respectively, in
SPA No. 07-224. Rosalinda A. Penera shall continue as Mayor of Sta. Monica, Surigao del Norte.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-52365

January 22, 1980

AMADO F. GADOR, petitioner,

89

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vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AS REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRMAN, HON. LEONARDO PEREZ,
respondent.
FERNANDEZ, J.:

This petition for mandamus with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction was filed on January 21, 1980 at
4:47 o'clock in the afternoon seeking the following relief:

In as much as the election is only eight (8) days away, it is to the interest of all concerned, specially the
petitioner himself, that this matter be resolved immediately.

WHEREFORE, the petition for mandamus is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 139801

WHEREFORE, it is most respectably prayed that the respondent be immediately ordered to include the name of
the herein petitioner in the list of candidates for Mayor of the City of Ozamiz which shall be printed and
distributed soon to all voting centers in the City of Ozamis.

May 31, 2000

ROBERTO CONQUILLA, petitioner,


vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EDUARDO A. ALARILLA, respondents.

The petition alleges that the petitioner is a candidate for the Office of Mayor of the City of Ozamiz as
Independent this coming January 30, 1980 local election; that he filed his certificate of candidacy with the
Election Registrar of Ozamis City on January 7, 1980; that the petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for
Mayor on January 7, 1980 on the basis of a news item in the Bulletin Today, January 6, issue; that on January 8,
1980, the petitioner wired the Chairman of the Commission on Elections informing him of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy and at the time requesting him to release the approval of the said certificate; that on
January 11, 1980, the petitioner caused the Election Registrar of Ozamiz City to wire the Chairman, Commission
on Elections, reiterating the information that the petitioner had filed a certificate of candidacy on January 7;
that he was already in the thick of campaigns and was asking about the status of his candidacy; that in view of
the President's announcement that the resolution of the respondent, Commission on Elections, for the
extension of time for filing certificates of candidacy from January 4 to January 10 had been denied, there is a
strong probability that the petitioner's name as candidate for Mayor may not be included in the list of
candidates to be voted which is to be printed soon and distributed in Ozamiz City; and that on grounds of
fairness, principles of equity and for the best interest of the people of Ozamiz City, judgment should be
rendered commanding the respondent, Commission on Elections, to immediately include the petitioner in the
list of candidates for Mayor.

The only issue is whether or not the certificate of candidacy of the petitioner which was filed on January 7, 1980
is valid. Section 7, Batasang Pambansa Bilang 52, provides that "The sworn certificate of candidacy shag be
filed in triplicate not later than January 4, 1980." It is a fact admitted by the petitioner that the President had
not extended the period within which to file the certificate of candidacy.

BELLOSILLO, J.:
ROBERTO CONQUILLA assails in this special civil action for certiorari the En Banc Resolution of the Commission
on Elections (COMELEC) dated 7 September 1999 which affirmed the Resolution of its First Division dated 21
May 1998 dismissing his Petition for Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy and Disqualification against
private respondent EDUARDO A. ALARILLA 1 for lack of merit.

On 27 March 1998 ALARILLA filed his Certificate of Candidacy with the Municipal Election Officer of
Meycauayan, Bulacan, without however indicating the elective position which he was aspiring for. Thus in the
blank space provided therefor appeared merely

CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY

I hereby announce my candidacy for the office of Meycauayan, Bulacan, Republic of the Philippines, in the May
11, 1998 elections . . . .

However, attached thereto and filed with his Certificate of Candidacy was ALARILLA's Certificate of Nomination
and Acceptance to wit
This Court is powerless to grant the remedy prayed for in the petition. Having been filed beyond January 4,
1980, the certificate of candidacy of the petitioner is void.
CERTIFICATE OF NOMINATION AND ACCEPTANCE

Pearliegates

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I, JOSE DE VENECIA, JR., by virtue of the powers and authority vested in me by the Constitution and By-Laws of
the Lakas National Union of Christian Democrats-United Muslim Democrats of the Philippines (LAKAS NUCDUMDP) as its Secretary-General, hereby nominate:

Candidacy be expunged and cancelled on the ground that it was null and void for failing to specify the elective
position he was running for and, consequently, he be disqualified to run for any position n Meycauayan,
Bulacan.

EDUARDO A. ALARILLA

During the pendency of SPA No. 98-132 the Board of Canvassers proclaimed ALARILLA as the Mayor-elect of
Meycauayan, Bulacan. As a consequence, CONQUILLA filed an "Urgent Motion to Annul the Proclamation and/or
to Suspend the Effects of Proclamation" of ALARILLA contending that any decision in SPA No. 98-132 would be
pre-empted unless his proclamation was nullified. The records do not show that the motion was properly acted
upon.

as the Party's official candidate in the May 11, 1998 elections for the position of MUNICIPAL MAYOR of the
Municipality of Meycauayan in the Fourth District of Bulacan.

WITNESS MY HAND this 18th day of March 1998 in Makati City, Metro Manila.

(signed)

JOSE DE VENECIA, JR.

Secretary-General

xxx

xxx

xxx

ACCEPTANCE

I hereby accept the foregoing nomination and pledge to work for the total victory of the Party in my area of
responsibility.

(signed)

EDUARDO A. ALARILLA

On 21 May 1998 the First Division of COMELEC dismissed SPA No. 98-132 for lack of merit. It ruled that
ALARILLA's failure to specify the public office he was seeking in his Certificate of Candidacy was not a fatal
defect because the required information was supplied in the Certificate of Nomination and Acceptance attached
to his Certificate of Candidacy. In addition, the First Division ruled that ALARILLA was able to correct his
omission by filing an Amended Certificate of Candidacy on 21 April 1998 clearly indicating therein that he was
running for the position of Municipal Mayor, Meycauayan, Bulacan.

On 1 June 1998 CONQUILLA filed an "Appeal with Urgent Motion for Annulment and/or Suspension of
Proclamation with Prayer for Issuance of a Restraining Order." He also prayed that the Resolution of the First
Division be set aside. The "Appeal with Urgent Motion for Annulment . . ." was treated as a motion for
reconsideration under Rule 19 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure and accordingly certified to the COMELEC En
Banc pursuant to Sec. 5
thereof. 2

On 7 September 1998 the COMELEC En Banc denied the motion for reconsideration for being pro-forma and for
late filing.3 The COMELEC ruled that under Sec. 9, Rule 19, of the Comelec Rules of Procedure4 CONQUILLA had
only until 31 March 1998, i.e., five (5) days within which to move for reconsideration counted from the time he
allegedly received the questioned Resolution of the First Division on 26 March 1998. Hence, the "Appeal with
Urgent Motion for Annulment and/or Suspension of Proclamation with Prayer for Issuance of a Restraining
Order" was late having been filed on 1 June 1998.

CONQUILLA contends that public respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion: (a) in affirming in
toto the Resolution of the First Division dismissing SPA No. 98-132 for lack of merit; (b) in ruling that the
Certificate of Nomination and Acceptance attached to private respondent's Certificate of Candidacy could be
used as basis in determining the elective position private respondent was seeking; and, (c) in not resolving the
motion to suspend private respondent's proclamation as Mayor-elect of Meycauayan, Bulacan. Additionally,
CONQUILLA contends that COMELEC erred in dismissing his appeal for late filing.

On 14 April 1998 CONQUILLA filed with the COMELEC a Petition for Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy and
Disqualification, docketed as SPA No. 98-132, praying that private respondent ALARILLA's Certificate of

Pearliegates

91

Election Law Cases


We agree with CONQUILLA that his motion for reconsideration was not filed late on 1 June 1998 considering
that 31 May 1998 was a Sunday, hence, he had until the next working day, which was 1 June 1998, within
which to ask for reconsideration.5 However, we cannot agree that ALARILLA's failure to specify the public office
he was seeking in his Certificate of Candidacy was a fatal defect, for several reasons.

First. As correctly observed by the First Division of COMELEC and affirmed by COMELEC En Banc, the
information omitted in the Certificate of Candidacy was supplied in the Certificate of Nomination and
Acceptance attached thereto specifying that ALARILLA was nominated as the Lakas NUCD-UMDP's official
candidate for the position of Municipal Mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan, and that such nomination had been
accepted by ALARILLA. As the COMELEC itself has clarified, certificates of nomination and acceptance are
procedurally required to be filed with, and form an integral part of, the certificates of candidacy of official
candidates of political parties.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed En Banc Resolution dated 7 September 1999 of public
respondent Commission on Elections which affirmed the Resolution dated 21 May 1998 of its First Division
dismissing the Petition for Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy and Disqualification filed by petitioner
ROBERTO CONQUILLA against private respondent EDUARDO A. ALARILLA is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 147741

May 10, 2001

REP. MA. CATALINA L. GO, petitioner,


Second. ALARILLA timely rectified the deficiency in his original Certificate of Candidacy by filing an Amended
Certificate on 21 April 1998 specifically stating that he was running for the position of Municipal Mayor of
Meycauayan, Bulacan, in the 11 May 1998 elections. In Alialy v. Commission on Elections6 where petitioners
sought the reversal of a COMELEC resolution denying due course to a certificate of candidacy on the ground
that it was not subscribed under oath by the secretary of the Nacionalista Party as required by Sec. 35 of the
Revised Election Code, this Court ruling on the effectiveness of the amended certificate of candidacy filed to
correct the defect declared that the filing of an amended certificate even after the deadline but before the
election was substantial compliance with the law which cured the defect. The Court further said

. . . when the Election Law does not provide that a departure from a prescribed form will be fatal and such
departure has been due to an honest mistake or misinterpretation of the Election Law on the part of him who
was obligated to observe it, and that such departure has not been used as a means for fraudulent practices . . .
the law will be held directory and such departure will be considered a harmless irregularity (Gardiner v. Romulo,
26 Phil. 521, cited in the De Guzman v. Bd. of Canvassers of La Union and Lucero, 48 Phil. 211, 214-215). For
inconsequential deviations which cannot affect the result of the election, or deviations from provisions intended
primarily to secure timely and orderly conduct of elections, a directory construction is generally applied (III
Sutherland Stat. Const., 3rd Ed. Sec. 5820, pp. 113-114 - cases cited therein). The same ruling is given on acts
not calculated to affect the integrity of the elections (Hunt v. Mann, 136 Miss. 590).

Third. The purpose in requiring a certificate of candidacy (which is to enable the voters to know before the
elections the candidates among whom they are to make a choice) was deemed satisfied not only by the
Amended Certificate of Candidacy filed before the elections but also by the Certified List of Candidates issued
by the Office of the Election Officer, Meycauayan, Bulacan, indubitably listing therein EDUARDO A. ALARILLA as
candidate for the position of "mayor" of said municipality.

Finally, it cannot be denied that ALARILLA was elected Mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan, in the 11 May 1998
elections. If substantial compliance with the Election Law should give way to a mere technicality, the will of the
electorate, as far as ALARILLA is concerned, would be frustrated.7

Pearliegates

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, FELIPE V. MONTEJO and ARVIN V. ANTONI, respondents.
The Case

In her petition for certiorari,1 petitioner seeks to nullify the resolution of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) en banc declaring her disqualified to run for the office of governor of Leyte and mayor of Baybay,
Leyte, because she filed certificates of candidacy for both positions and the withdrawal of her certificate of
candidacy for mayor was filed late by twenty eight minutes from the deadline.

Forthwith, we issued an order2 to maintain the status quo ante, in effect allowing petitioner's certificate of
candidacy for governor in the meantime.

In its Comment,3 the COMELEC justified its resolution on the ground that petitioner's affidavit of withdrawal of
her certificate of candidacy for mayor of Baybay, Leyte was ineffectual because it was submitted twenty eight
(28) minutes late at the office of the municipal election officer at Baybay. The facsimile copy thereof was filed
with said office at 12:28 a.m., 1 March 2001, and the original copy thereof was actually received by the office
of the municipal election officer of Baybay at 1:15 p.m., the same day. The provincial election supervisor of
Leyte, with office at Tacloban City, to whom petitioner filed her certificate of candidacy for governor at 11:47
p.m., 28 February 2001, refused to accept the affidavit of withdrawal tendered simultaneously therewith
because, as he claimed, the affidavit must be filed with the office of the municipal election officer of Baybay,
Leyte where petitioner filed certificate of candidacy for mayor.1wphi1.nt

The Facts

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Petitioner is the incumbent representative of the Fifth District, province of Leyte, whose term of office will
expire at noon on 30 June 2001.

On 27 February 2001, petitioner filed with the municipal election officer of the municipality of Baybay, Leyte, a
certificate of candidacy for mayor of Baybay, Leyte.

On 28 February 2001, at 11:47 p.m., petitioner filed with the provincial election supervisor of Leyte, with office
at Tacloban City, another certificate of candidacy for governor of the province of Leyte. Simultaneously
therewith, she attempted to file with the provincial election supervisor an affidavit of withdrawal of her
candidacy for mayor of the municipality of Baybay, Leyte. Hiowever, the provincial election supervisor of Leyte
refused to accept the affidavit of withdrawal and suggested that, pursuant to a COMELEC resolution, she should
file it with the municipal election officer of Baybay, Leyte where she filed her certificate of candidacy for mayor.

"Submitted for due consideration is the petition filed by Atty. Felipe V. Montejo and Atty. Arvin V. Antoni on
March 5, 2001, before the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor of Leyte, seeking to deny due course
and/or to cancel the certificate of candidacy of Catalina L. Go for Governor of Leyte.

"Both petitions which are exactly worded in the same language allege, as follows:

"This petition is heretofore filed pursuant to the provisions of Rule 23 of the COMELEC RULES OF PROCEDURE
and Section 15, as well, of RESOLUTION NO. 3253-A of the COMELEC EN BANC promulgated on November 20,
2000. Ditto, this petition is filed within the reglementary period following the last day for the filing of
certificates of candidacy on February 28, 2001.

'Petitioner Atty. Felipe V. Montejo is of voting age, Filipino, lawyer by profession, married, and a resident of #50
Juan Luna Street, Tacloban City, of which locality he is a registered voter.
At that later hour, with only minutes left to midnight, the deadline for filing certificates of candidacy or
withdrawal thereof, and considering that the travel time from Tacloban to Baybay was two (2) hours, petitioner
decided to send her affidavit of withdrawal by fax4 to her father at Baybay, Leyte and the latter submitted the
same to the office of the election officer of Baybay, Leyte at 12:28 a.m., 01 March 2001.5 On the same day, at
1:15 p.m., the election officer of Baybay Leyte, received the original of the affidavit of withdrawal.6

On 05 March 2001 respondent Montejo filed with the provincial election supervisor of Leyte, at Tacloban City a
petition to deny due course and/or to cancel the certificates of candidacy of petitioner.7 Respondent Antoni
filed a similar petitions, namely, that for mayor of Baybay, Leyte, and that for governor of Leyte, thus, making
her ineligible for both.1wphi1.nt

On 06 March 2001, Atty. Manuel L. Villegas, the provincial election supervisor of Leyte, by 1st indorsement,
referred the cases to the Commission on Election, Manila, Law Department, on the ground that he was
inhibiting himself due to his prior action of refusing to receive the petitioner's affidavit of withdrawal tendered
simultaneously with the filing of the certificate of candidacy for governor on 28 February 2001.9

In the meantime, the Law Department, COMELEC, under Director Jose P. Balbuena, made a study of the cases
without affording petitioner an opportunity to be heard or to submit responsive pleadings. On 05 April 2001,
they submitted a report and recommendation to the COMELEC en banc10

The report and recommendation reads:

Pearliegates

'Respondent re. Catalina L. Go, on the other hand, is likewise of legal age, married, resident of Baybay, Leyte,
of which locality she is a registered voter, and the incumbent Member of the House of Representatives
representing the 5th Congressional District of Leyte.

'Respondent CATALINA L. GO filed a certificate of candidacy for the office of Mayor of the Municipality of
Baybay, Leyte on February 27, 2001. Without canceling or withdrawing the said certificate of candidacy this
time for the office of Provincial Governor of Leyte on February 28, 2001. However, before the expiration of the
period for the filing of certificates of candidacy, respondent indubitably failed to declare under oath the office
for which she desires to be eligible and cancel the certificate of candidacy for the other office.

'Verily, at the time respondent filed her certificate of candidacy for Provincial Governor, she knew fully well that
she was ineligible for the said office, having filed, a day earlier, a certificate of candidacy for Mayor of Baybay,
Leyte. Hence, respondent falsely represented in her certificate of candidacy for provincial Governor, and under
oath, that she is ELIGIBLE for the said office; a material fact required by law to be sworn to and contained in
certificates of candidacy. In fine, respondent likewise falsely represented in her certificates of candidacy, under
oath, the she will OBEY THE LAWS, ORDERS, DECRESS, RESOLUTIONS AND REGULATIONS PROMULGATED AND
ISSUED BY THE DULY CONSTITUTED AUTHORITIES; a material fact required by law to be sworn to and contained
in certificates of candidacy.'

"Petitioners' ground to deny due course and/or to cancel the said certificate of candidacy is anchored on
Section 73 of the Omnibus Election Code, quoted hereunder.

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'No person shall be eligible for more than one office to be filed in the same election, and if he files his
certificate of candidacy within the period fixed herein.

"2. That due to political exigency and influence form my political leaders urging me to run for mayor of the
Municipality of baybay, leyte, I have no other recourse but to follow desire of my political constituents;

'No person shall be eligible for more than one office to be filled in the same election, and if he files his
certificate of candidacy for more than one office, he shall not be eligible for any of them. However, before the
expiration of the period for the filing of certificates of candidacy, the person who has filed more than one
certificate of candidacy may declare under oath the office for which he desires to be eligible and cancel the
certificate of candidacy for the other office or offices.'

"3. That therefore, I am formally withdrawing my certificate of candidacy for Mayor of the Municipality of
Baybay, leyte and in it stead I am formally filing my certificate for Governor of Leyte.

"In relation to Section (1) (b) of the Comelec Resolution No. 3253-A, to wit:

'SECTION 1. Certificate of Candidacy. xxxxxx (b) No person shall be eligible for more than one office to be filed
in the same election. If he files a certificate of candidacy for more than one office he shall not be eligible for
either. However, before the expiration of the period for the filing of certificate of candidacy, he may declare
under oath the office for which he desire to be eligible and cancel the certificate of candidacy for the office or
offices.'

"Moreover, petitioners contended that CATALINA LOPEZ LORETO-Go is ineligible to run either Mayor of Baybay,
Leyte or Governor of Leyte Province.

"Based on the certified list of candidate for the provincial candidates of Leyte on March 7, 2001, the certificate
of candidacy of Catalina Lopez Loreto-Go for the position of Governor of Leyte was filed with the Office of the
Provincial Election Supervisor on February 28, 2001 at 11:47 p.m., the last day for filing certificates of
candidacy.

"In support of the petitions of Atty. Montejo and Atty. Antoni, is a certified machine copy of the affidavit of
withdrawal of Catalina L. Loreto-Go, which was filed on march 01, 2001 at the Office of the Election Officer of
Baybay, Leyte, which she filed on February 28, 2001.

"A careful scrutiny and examination of Catalina Loreto-Go certificate of candidacy for Governor of Leyte
Province although filed on the last day of February 28, 2001, her affidavit of withdrawal for Mayor of Baybay,
Leyte, was filed only on March 1, 2001 or one (1) day after the February 28, 2001 deadline. In other word, there
are two (2) certificates of candidacy filed by Catalina Loreto-Go, one for governor of Leyte and the other for
Mayor of Baybay, Leyte.

"Clearly, on March 1, 2001 when she filed her affidavit of withdrawal for Mayor of baybay, Leyte, both her
certificates of candidacy for Mayor of Baybay, leyte and Governor of Leyte were still subsisting and effective
making her liable for filing two certificates of candidacy on different elective positions, thus, rendering her
ineligible for both positions, in accordance with Section (1) (b) of Comelec Resolution No. 3253-A.

"PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Law Department RECOMMENDS as follows:

"1.) To give due course to the petition of Atty. Felipe V. Montejo and Atty. Arvin V. Antonio against the
certificates of candidacy of Catalina Loreto-Go for Governor of Leyte; and

"2.) To direct the Provincial Election Suprevisor of Leyte and the Election Officer to delete/cancel the name of
CATALINA LOPEZ LORETO-GO from the certified list of candidates for Governor of Leyte and Mayoralty
candidates of Baybay, Leyte, and to accordingly notify the parties and the above-named Comelec Officials."11

On 23 April 2001, the COMELEC en banc approved the recommendation of the Director, Law Department and
adopted the resolution in question as set out in the opening paragraph of this decision.12

"The affidavit of withdrawal of Catalina Loreto-Go, a portion of which reads:


Hence, this petition.13
"1. That last February 27, 2001 I filed my certificate of candidacy for mayor for the MUNICIPALITY OF BAYBAY,
LEYTE;

Pearliegates

The Issues

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At the oral argument on 07 May 2001, at 3:00 p.m., we defined the following issues to be addressed by the
parties:

I. Is petitioner disqualified to be candidate for governor of Leyte and mayor of Baybay, Leyte because she filed
certificates of candidacy for both positions?

II. Was there a valid withdrawal of the certificate of candidacy for municipal mayor of Baybay, Leyte?

"No person shall be eligible for more than one office to be filled in the same election, and if he files his
certificate of candidacy for more than one office, he shall not be eligible for any of them. However, before the
expiration of the period for the filing of certificates of candidacy, the person who has file more than one
certificate of candidacy may declare under oath the office for which he desires to be eligible and cancel the
certificate of candidacy for the other office or offices."

There is nothing in this Section which mandates that the affidavit of withdrawal must be filed with the same
office where the certificate of candidacy to be withdrawn was filed. Thus, it can be filed directly with the main
office of the COMELEC, the office of the regional election director concerned, the office of the provincial election
supervisor of the province to which the municipality involved belongs, or the office of the municipal election
officer of the said municipality.

(a) Must the affidavit of withdrawal be filed with the election officer of the place where the certificate of
candidacy was filed?

(b) May the affidavit of withdrawal be validly filed by fax?

III. Was there denial to petitioner of procedural due process of law?

While it may be true that Section 12 of COMELEC Resolution No. 3253-A, adopted on 20 November 2000,
requires that the withdrawal be filed before the election officer of the place where the certificate of candidacy
was filed,16 such requirement is merely directory, and is intended for convenience. It is not mandatory or
jurisdictional. An administrative resolution can not contradict, much less amend or repeal a law, or supply a
deficiency in the law.17 Hence, the filing of petitioner's affidavit of withdrawal of candidacy for mayor of
Baybay with the provincial election supervisor of Leyte sufficed to effectively withdraw such candidacy. the
COMELEC thus acted with grave abuse of discretion when it declare petitioner ineligible for both positions for
which she filed certificates of candidacy.

The Court's Ruling

We grant the petition. We annul the COMELEC resolution declaring petitioner disqualified for both positions of
governor of Leyte and mayor of the municipality of Baybay, Leyte. The filing of the affidavit of withdrawal with
the election officer of Baybay, Leyte, at 12:28 a.m., 1 March 2001 was a substantial compliance with the
requirement of the law.14 We hold that petitioner's withdrawal of her certificate of candidacy for mayor of
Baybay, Leyte was effective for all legal purposes, and left in full force her certificate of candidacy for
governor.15

There is another important moiety that affects the validity of the COMELEC resolution canceling petitioner's
certificates of candidacy. It is that petitioner was deprived of procedural due process of law.18 The petition to
cancel her certificate of candidacy or to deny due course to both were filed before the provincial election
supervisor of Leyte who inhibited himself and referred the cases to the Law Department, COMELEC, Manila. On
11 April 2001, the COMELEC, First Division, acting on the first indorsement of Atty. Villegas approved his
inhibition and required the provincial election supervisor of Leyte to immediately forward his copy of the
records of these cases to the Regional Election Director, Region 08, at Tacloban, Leyte, for hearing.19 On 18
April 2001, Regional Election Director, Region 08, Atty. Adolfo A. Ibaez issued summons/subpoena to petitioner
Go to submit her consolidated answer to the petitions and counter-affidavits including position paper within
three (3) days form notice.20 On 23 April 2001, petitioner submitted her consolidated position paper.21 On 25
April 2001, at 9:00 a.m., Director Ibaez set the cases for hearing for reception of evidence of the parties.

Section 73, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code, provides that:

"SEC. 73. Certificate of candidacy. - No person shall be eligible for any elective public office unless he files a
sworn certificate of candidacy within the period fixed herein.

"A person who has filed a certificate of candidacy may, prior to the election, withdraw the same by submitting
to the office concerned a written declaration under oath.

Pearliegates

In the meantime, however, the Law Department, COMELCE conducted an ex-parte study of the cases. It did not
give petitioner an opportunity to be heard. Petitioner was not required to submit a comment or opposition to
the petitions for cancellation of her certificates of candidacy and/or for disqualification. It did not set the cases
for hearing. It was not even aware of the proceedings before Director Ibaez in Tacloban. After an ex-parte
study of the cases, on 05 April 2001, the Law Department submitted its report and recommendation, approved
by Director Balbuena, to the COMELEC en banc.

95

Election Law Cases


During the oral argument on 07 May 2001, Director Balbuena candidly admitted that the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure requires that notice be given to the respondent . Indeed, Section 3, Rule 23 of said Rules on petition
to deny due course to or cancel certificates of candidacy explicitly provides:

Alikpala, Gomez & Associates Law Office for petitioners.

Filomeno A. Zieta for private respondent.


"Rule 23 - Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificates of Candidacy

"xxxx

"Sec. 3. Summary Proceeding. - The petition shall be heard summarily after due notice. (emphasis supplied)

Obviously, the COMELEC en banc in approving the report and recommendation of the Law Department,
deprived the petitioner of procedural due process of law.22 The COMELEC, acting as a quasi-judicial tribunal,
cannot ignore the requirements of procedural due process in resolving cases before it.23

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition. The Court ANNULS COMELEC Resolution No. 3982, adopted on 23
April 2001, and DECLARES valid petitioner's certificate of candidacy for Governor of Leyte. The Chairman,
Commission on Elections, Manila, and the provincial election supervisor of Leyte shall immediately order the
inclusion of petitioner's name in the certified list of candidates for Governor, province of Leyte, to be posted in
each polling place,/voting booth in every precinct throughout the province of Leyte, in the voters information
sheet to be given to each registered voter therein, in the election returns, statement of votes by percents, and
certificate of canvass, and all other election papers.

The applicability to private respondent Manuel S. Pineda of Section 66 of the Election Code is what is chiefly
involved in the case at bar. Said section reads as follows:

Sec. 66. Candidates holding appointive office or position. Any person holding a public appointive office or
position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and employees in
government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the
filing of his certificate of candidacy.

Manuel S. Pineda was employed with the Philippine National Oil Co.-Energy Development Corp. (PNOC-EDC), as
subsidiary of the Philippine National Oil Co., from September 17, 1981, when he was hired as clerk, to January
26, 1989, when his employment was terminated. The events leading to his dismissal from his job are not
disputed.

In November, 1987, while holding the position of Geothermal Construction Secretary, Engineering and
Construction Department, at Tongonan Geothermal Project, Ormoc City, Pineda decided to run for councilor of
the Municipality of Kananga, Leyte, in the local elections scheduled in January, 1988, and filed the
corresponding certificate of candidacy for the position. Objection to Pineda's being a candidate while retaining
his job in the PNOC-EDC was shortly thereafter registered by Mayor Arturo Cornejos of Kananga, Leyte. The
mayor communicated with the PNOC-EDC thru Engr. Ernesto Patanao, Resident Manager, Tongonan
Geothermal Project to express the view that Pineda could not actively participate in politics unless he
officially resigned from PNOC-EDC. 1 Nothing seems to have resulted from this protest.

The status quo ante order heretofore issued is made permanent.

This decision is immediately executory. No motion for reconsideration shall be entertained.


SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 100947

May 31, 1993

PNOC ENERGY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and MARCELINO TONGCO, petitioners,


vs.

The local elections in Leyte, scheduled for January, 1988, were reset to and held on February 1, 1988. Pineda
was among the official candidates voted for, and eventually proclaimed elected to, the office of councilor. Some
vacillation appears to have been evinced by Pineda at about this time. On February 8, 1988, he wrote to the
COMELEC Chairman, expressing his desire to withdraw from the political contest on account of what he
considered to be election irregularities; 2 and on March 19, 1988, he wrote to the Secretary of Justice seeking
legal opinion on the question, among others, of whether or not he was "considered automatically resigned upon
. . . filing of . . . (his) certificate of candidacy," and whether or not, in case he was elected, he could "remain
appointed to any corporate offspring of a government-owned or controlled corporation." 3 Nevertheless, Pineda
took his oath of office in June, 1988 as councilor-elect of the Municipality of Kananga, Leyte. 4 And despite so
qualifying as councilor, and assuming his duties as such, he continued working for PNOC-EDC as the latter's
Geothermal Construction Secretary, Engineering and Construction Department, at Tongonan Geothermal
Project, Ormoc City.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and MANUEL S. PINEDA, respondents.

Pearliegates

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On June 7, 1988, Marcelino M. Tongco, Department Manager of the Engineering and Construction Department,
PNOC-EDC, addressed an inquiry to the latter's Legal Department regarding the status of Manuel S. Pineda as
employee in view of his candidacy for the office of municipal councilor. 5 In response, the Legal Department
rendered an opinion to the effect that Manuel S. Pineda should be considered ipso facto resigned upon the filing
of his Certificate of Candidacy in November, 1987, in accordance with Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code.
6

Juco, 12 had already been abandoned; and that "as early as November 29, 1988," the governing principle laid
down by case law in light of Section 2 (1), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution 13 has been that
government-owned or controlled corporations incorporated under the Corporation Code, the general law as
distinguished from those created by special charter are not deemed to be within the coverage of the Civil
Service Law, and consequently their employees, like those of the PNOC-EDC, are subject to the provisions of
the Labor Code rather than the Civil Service Law. 14

Pineda appealed the PNOC-EDC Legal Department's ruling to N.C. Vasquez, the Vice-President of PNOC-EDC, on
July 14, 1988. In his letter of appeal, 7 he invoked a "court ruling in the case of Caagusan and Donato vs. PNOCExploration Corp. . . . (to the effect that) while the government-owned or controlled corporations are covered by
the Civil Service Law (as is taken to mean in Sec. 66 of the Omnibus Election Code of 1985) (sic), the
subsidiaries or corporate offsprings are not." In the same letter he declared his wish to continue resign from his
position as councilor/member of the Sangguniang Bayan.

The PNOC-EDC filed an appeal with the National Labor Relations Commission. The latter dismissed the appeal
for lack of merit in a decision dated April 24, 1991. 15 PNOC-EDC sought reconsideration; 16 its motion was
denied by the Commission in a Resolution dated June 21, 1991. 17

He also wrote a letter dated October 1, 1988 to the Department of Local Government inquiring about the status
of his employment with PNOC-EDC in relation to his election as member of the Sangguniang Bayan. He was
advised by DLG Undersecretary Jacinto T. Rubillo, Jr., by letter dated March 31, 1989, that there was no legal
impediment to his continuing in his employment with PNOC-EDC while holding at the same time the elective
position of municipal councilor. Cited as basis by Undersecretary Rubillo was Section 2(1) Article IX-B of the
1987 Constitution and this Court's ruling in NASECO vs. NLRC, 168 SCRA 122. Undersecretary Rubillo went on to
say that Pineda could receive his per diems as municipal councilor as well as the corresponding representation
and transportation allowance [RATA] "provided the PNOC-EDC charter does not provide otherwise and public
shall not be prejudiced." 8

The PNOC-EDC did not, however, share the Undersecretary's views. On January 26, 1989, the PNOC-EDC,
through Marcelino Tongco (Manager, Engineering and Construction Department), notified Manuel S. Pineda in
writing (1) that after having given him "ample time" to make some major adjustments before . . . separation
from the company," his employment was being terminated pursuant to Section 66 of the Omnibus Election
Code, effective upon receipt of notice, and (2) that he was entitled to "proper compensation" for the services
rendered by him from the time he filed his certificate of candidacy until his actual separation from the service.
9

On October 16, 1989, Pineda lodged a complaint for illegal dismissal in the Regional Arbitration Branch No. VIII,
NLRC, Tacloban City. Impleaded as respondents were the PNOC-EDC and the Manager of its Engineering and
Construction Department, Marcelino M. Tongco. 10

After due proceedings, Labor Arbiter Araceli H. Maraya, to whom the case was assigned, rendered a decision on
December 28, 1990, 11 declaring Manuel S. Pineda's dismissal from the service illegal, and ordering his
reinstatement to his former position without loss of seniority rights and payment of full back wages
corresponding to the period from his illegal dismissal up to the time of actual reinstatement. The Arbiter
pointed out that the ruling relied upon by PNOC-EDC to justify Pineda's dismissal from the service, i.e., NHA v.

Pearliegates

It is this decision of April 24, 1991 and the Resolution of June 21, 1991 that the PNOC-EDC seeks to be annulled
and set aside in the special civil action for certiorari at bar. It contends that the respondent Commission gravely
abused its discretion:

1)
when it ruled that Manuel S. Pineda was not covered by the Civil Service Rules when he filed his
candidacy for the 1988 local government elections in November 1987;

2)
when it ruled that Pineda was not covered by the Omnibus Election Code at the time he filed his
certificate of candidacy for the 1988 local elections;

3)
when it ruled that Pineda was illegally dismissed despite the fact that he was considered automatically
resigned pursuant to Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code; and

4)
when it ruled that Pineda could occupy a local government position and be simultaneously employed
in a government-owned or controlled corporation, a situation patently violative of the constitutional prohibition
on additional compensation.

Acting on the petition, this Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondent NLRC from
implementing or enforcing its decision and resolution dated April 24, 1991 and June 21, 1991, respectively.

In the comment required of him by the Court, the Solicitor General expressed agreement with the respondent
Commission's holding that Manuel Pineda had indeed been illegally separated from his employment in the
PNOC-EDC; in other words, that his running for public office and his election thereto had no effect on his
employment with the PNOC-EDC, a corporation not embraced within the Civil Service.

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Petitioner PNOC-EDC argues that at the time that Pineda filed his certificate of candidacy for municipal
councilor in November, 1987, the case law "applicable as far as coverage of government-owned or controlled
corporations are concerned . . . ( was to the following effect): 18

As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, the issue of jurisdiction had been resolved in a string of cases
starting with the National Housing Authority vs. Juco (134 SCRA 172) followed by Metropolitan Waterworks and
Sewerage System vs. Hernandez (143 SCRA 602) and the comparatively recent case of Quimpo vs.
Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 72553, Dec. 2, 1986) in which this Court squarely ruled that PNOC subsidiaries,
whether or not originally created as government-owned or controlled corporations are governed by the Civil
Service Law.

This doctrine, petitioner further argues, was not "automatically reversed" by the 1987 Constitution because not
"amended or repealed by the Supreme Court or the Congress;" 19 and this Court's decision in November, 1988,
in National Service Corporation vs. NLRC, supra 20 abandoning the Juco ruling "cannot be given
retroactive effect . . . (in view of ) the time-honored principle . . . that laws (judicial decisions included) shall
have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided (Articles 4 and 8 of the New Civil Code of the
Philippines)."

Section 2 (1), Article IX of the 1987 Constitution provides as follows:

Lumanta, et al. v. NLRC, et al., 25 decided on February 8, 1989, made the same pronouncement: that Juco had
been superseded by the 1987 Constitution for implicit in the language of Section 2 (1), Article IX thereof, is the
proposition that government-owned or controlled corporations without original charter do not fall under the
Civil Service Law but under the Labor Code.

And in PNOC-EDC v. Leogardo, etc., et al., 26 promulgated on July 5, 1989, this Court ruled that conformably
with the apparent intendment of the NASECO case, supra, since the PNOC-EDC, a government-owned or
controlled company had been incorporated under the general Corporation Law, its employees are subject to
the provisions of the Labor Code.

It is thus clear that the Juco doctrine prevailing at the time of the effectivity of the fundamental charter in 1987
i.e., that government-owned or controlled corporations were part of the Civil Service and its employees
subject to Civil Service laws and regulations, 27 regardless of the manner of the mode of their organization or
incorporation is no longer good law, being at "stark variance," to paraphrase NASECO, with the 1987
Constitution. In other words, and contrary to the petitioner's view, as of the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution,
government-owned or controlled corporations without original charters, or, as Mr. Justice Cruz insists in his
concurring opinion in NASECO v. NLRC, 28 a legislative charter (i.e., those organized under the Corporation
Code), ceased to pertain to the Civil Service and its employees could no longer be considered as subject to Civil
Service Laws, rules or regulations.

The basic question is whether an employee in a government-owned or controlled corporations without an


original charter (and therefore not covered by Civil Service Law) nevertheless falls within the scope of Section
66 of the Omnibus Election Code, viz.:

The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government,
including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters.

Implicit in the provision is that government-owned or controlled corporations without original charters i.e.,
organized under the general law, the Corporation Code are not comprehended within the Civil Service Law.
So has this Court construed the provision. 21

In National Service Corporation (NASECO), et al. v. NLRC, et al., etc., 22 decided on November 29, 1988, it was
ruled that the 1987 Constitution "starkly varies" from the 1973 charter upon which the Juco doctrine rested
in that unlike the latter, the present constitution qualifies the term, "government-owned or controlled
corporations," by the phrase, "with original charter;" hence, the clear implication is that the Civil Service no
longer includes government-owned or controlled corporations without original charters, i.e., those organized
under the general corporation law. 23 NASECO further ruled that the Juco ruling should not apply retroactively,
considering that prior to its promulgation on January 17, 1985, this Court had expressly recognized the
applicability of the Labor Code to government-owned or controlled corporations. 24

Pearliegates

Sec. 66. Candidates holding appointive office or position. Any person holding a public appointive office or
position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and employees in
government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the
filing of his certificate of candidacy.

When the Congress of the Philippines reviewed the Omnibus Election Code of 1985, in connection with its
deliberations on and subsequent enactment of related and repealing legislation i.e., Republic Acts Numbered
7166: "An Act Providing for Synchronized National and Local Elections and for Electoral Reforms, Authorizing
Appropriations Therefor, and for Other Purposes" (effective November 26, 1991), 6646: "An Act Introducing
Additional Reforms in the Electoral System and for Other Purposes" (effective January 5, 1988) and 6636: "An
Act Resetting the Local Elections, etc., (effective November 6, 1987), it was no doubt aware that in light of
Section 2 (1), Article IX of the 1987 Constitution: (a) government-owned or controlled corporations were of two
(2) categories those with original charters, and those organized under the general law and (b) employees
of these corporations were of two (2) kinds those covered by the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations
because employed in corporations having original charters, and those not subject to Civil Service Law but to
the Labor Code because employed in said corporations organized under the general law, or the Corporation
Code. Yet Congress made no effort to distinguish between these two classes of government-owned or

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controlled corporations or their employees in the Omnibus Election Code or subsequent related statutes,
particularly as regards the rule that any employee "in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be
considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy." 29

Be this as it may, it seems obvious to the Court that a government-owned or controlled corporation does not
lose its character as such because not possessed of an original charter but organized under the general law. If
a corporation's capital stock is owned by the Government, or it is operated and managed by officers charged
with the mission of fulfilling the public objectives for which it has been organized, it is a government-owned or
controlled corporation even if organized under the Corporation Code and not under a special statute; and
employees thereof, even if not covered by the Civil Service but by the Labor Code, are nonetheless "employees
in government-owned or controlled corporations," and come within the letter of Section 66 of the Omnibus
Election Code, declaring them "ipso facto resigned from . . . office upon the filing of . . . (their) certificate of
candidacy."

The assailed Decision granted the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A.
Tolentino, Jr. and declared as unconstitutional the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of
Republic Act No. 9369,2 Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code3 and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No.
8678,4 mainly on the ground that they violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution and suffer from
overbreadth. The assailed Decision thus paved the way for public appointive officials to continue discharging
the powers, prerogatives and functions of their office notwithstanding their entry into the political arena.

In support of their respective motions for reconsideration, respondent COMELEC and movants-intervenors
submit the following arguments:

(1) The assailed Decision is contrary to, and/or violative of, the constitutional proscription against the
participation of public appointive officials and members of the military in partisan political activity;
What all this imports is that Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code applies to officers and employees in
government-owned or controlled corporations, even those organized under the general laws on incorporation
and therefore not having an original or legislative charter, and even if they do not fall under the Civil Service
Law but under the Labor Code. In other words, Section 66 constitutes just cause for termination of employment
in addition to those set forth in the Labor Code, as amended.

The conclusions here reached make unnecessary discussion and resolution of the other issues raised in this
case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED; the decision of public respondent National Labor Relations Commission
dated April 24, 1991 and its Resolution dated June 21, 1991 are NULLIFIED AND SET ASIDE; and the complaint
of Manuel S. Pineda is DISMISSED. No costs.

(2) The assailed provisions do not violate the equal protection clause when they accord differential treatment to
elective and appointive officials, because such differential treatment rests on material and substantial
distinctions and is germane to the purposes of the law;

(3) The assailed provisions do not suffer from the infirmity of overbreadth; and

(4) There is a compelling need to reverse the assailed Decision, as public safety and interest demand such
reversal.

We find the foregoing arguments meritorious.


SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 189698

February 22, 2010

ELEAZAR P. QUINTO and GERINO A. TOLENTINO, JR., Petitioners,

I.

Procedural Issues

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
Upon a careful review of the case at bar, this Court resolves to grant the respondent Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) motion for reconsideration, and the movants-intervenors motions for reconsideration-inintervention, of this Courts December 1, 2009 Decision (Decision).1

Pearliegates

First, we shall resolve the procedural issues on the timeliness of the COMELECs motion for reconsideration
which was filed on December 15, 2009, as well as the propriety of the motions for reconsideration-inintervention which were filed after the Court had rendered its December 1, 2009 Decision.

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i. Timeliness of COMELECs Motion for Reconsideration

Pursuant to Section 2, Rule 56-A of the 1997 Rules of Court,5 in relation to Section 1, Rule 52 of the same
rules,6 COMELEC had a period of fifteen days from receipt of notice of the assailed Decision within which to
move for its reconsideration. COMELEC received notice of the assailed Decision on December 2, 2009, hence,
had until December 17, 2009 to file a Motion for Reconsideration.

The Motion for Reconsideration of COMELEC was timely filed. It was filed on December 14, 2009. The
corresponding Affidavit of Service (in substitution of the one originally submitted on December 14, 2009) was
subsequently filed on December 17, 2009 still within the reglementary period.

This rule, however, is not inflexible. Interventions have been allowed even beyond the period prescribed in the
Rule, when demanded by the higher interest of justice. Interventions have also been granted to afford
indispensable parties, who have not been impleaded, the right to be heard even after a decision has been
rendered by the trial court,8 when the petition for review of the judgment has already been submitted for
decision before the Supreme Court,9 and even where the assailed order has already become final and
executory.10 In Lim v. Pacquing,11 the motion for intervention filed by the Republic of the Philippines was
allowed by this Court to avoid grave injustice and injury and to settle once and for all the substantive issues
raised by the parties.

In fine, the allowance or disallowance of a motion for intervention rests on the sound discretion of the court12
after consideration of the appropriate circumstances.13 We stress again that Rule 19 of the Rules of Court is a
rule of procedure whose object is to make the powers of the court fully and completely available for justice.14
Its purpose is not to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice.15

ii. Propriety of the Motions for Reconsideration-in-Intervention


We rule that, with the exception of the IBP Cebu City Chapter, all the movants-intervenors may properly
intervene in the case at bar.
Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court provides:
First, the movants-intervenors have each sufficiently established a substantial right or interest in the case.
A person who has legal interest in the matter in litigation or in the success of either of the parties, or an
interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of
property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in
the action. The court shall consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the
adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and whether or not the intervenors rights may be fully
protected in a separate proceeding.

Pursuant to the foregoing rule, this Court has held that a motion for intervention shall be entertained when the
following requisites are satisfied: (1) the would-be intervenor shows that he has a substantial right or interest in
the case; and (2) such right or interest cannot be adequately pursued and protected in another proceeding.7

Upon the other hand, Section 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court provides the time within which a motion for
intervention may be filed, viz.:

SECTION 2. Time to intervene. The motion for intervention may be filed at any time before rendition of
judgment by the trial court. A copy of the pleading-in-intervention shall be attached to the motion and served
on the original parties. (italics supplied)

Pearliegates

As a Senator of the Republic, Senator Manuel A. Roxas has a right to challenge the December 1, 2009 Decision,
which nullifies a long established law; as a voter, he has a right to intervene in a matter that involves the
electoral process; and as a public officer, he has a personal interest in maintaining the trust and confidence of
the public in its system of government.

On the other hand, former Senator Franklin M. Drilon and Tom V. Apacible are candidates in the May 2010
elections running against appointive officials who, in view of the December 1, 2009 Decision, have not yet
resigned from their posts and are not likely to resign from their posts. They stand to be directly injured by the
assailed Decision, unless it is reversed.

Moreover, the rights or interests of said movants-intervenors cannot be adequately pursued and protected in
another proceeding. Clearly, their rights will be foreclosed if this Courts Decision attains finality and forms part
of the laws of the land.

With regard to the IBP Cebu City Chapter, it anchors its standing on the assertion that "this case involves the
constitutionality of elections laws for this coming 2010 National Elections," and that "there is a need for it to be
allowed to intervene xxx so that the voice of its members in the legal profession would also be heard before
this Highest Tribunal as it resolves issues of transcendental importance."16

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Prescinding from our rule and ruling case law, we find that the IBP-Cebu City Chapter has failed to present a
specific and substantial interest sufficient to clothe it with standing to intervene in the case at bar. Its invoked
interest is, in character, too indistinguishable to justify its intervention.

We now turn to the substantive issues.

Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution 8678 is a faithful reflection of the present state of the law and
jurisprudence on the matter, viz.:

Incumbent Appointive Official. - Under Section 13 of RA 9369, which reiterates Section 66 of the Omnibus
Election Code, any person holding a public appointive office or position, including active members of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, and officers and employees in government-owned or -controlled corporations, shall be
considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.

II.

Substantive Issues

The assailed Decision struck down Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, the second proviso in the third paragraph of
Section 13 of Republic Act (RA) 9369, and Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, on the following grounds:

(1) They violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because of the differential treatment of persons
holding appointive offices and those holding elective positions;

(2) They are overbroad insofar as they prohibit the candidacy of all civil servants holding appointive posts: (a)
without distinction as to whether or not they occupy high/influential positions in the government, and (b) they
limit these civil servants activity regardless of whether they be partisan or nonpartisan in character, or
whether they be in the national, municipal or barangay level; and

Incumbent Elected Official. Upon the other hand, pursuant to Section 14 of RA 9006 or the Fair Election Act,17
which repealed Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code18 and rendered ineffective Section 11 of R.A. 8436
insofar as it considered an elected official as resigned only upon the start of the campaign period
corresponding to the positions for which they are running,19 an elected official is not deemed to have resigned
from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy for the same or any other elected office or position.
In fine, an elected official may run for another position without forfeiting his seat.

These laws and regulations implement Section 2(4), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, which prohibits civil
service officers and employees from engaging in any electioneering or partisan political campaign.

The intention to impose a strict limitation on the participation of civil service officers and employees in partisan
political campaigns is unmistakable. The exchange between Commissioner Quesada and Commissioner Foz
during the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission is instructive:

MS. QUESADA.
(3) Congress has not shown a compelling state interest to restrict the fundamental right of these public
appointive officials.

We grant the motions for reconsideration. We now rule that Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, Section 66 of the
Omnibus Election Code, and the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of RA 9369 are not
unconstitutional, and accordingly reverse our December 1, 2009 Decision.

xxxx

Secondly, I would like to address the issue here as provided in Section 1 (4), line 12, and I quote: "No officer or
employee in the civil service shall engage, directly or indirectly, in any partisan political activity." This is almost
the same provision as in the 1973 Constitution. However, we in the government service have actually
experienced how this provision has been violated by the direct or indirect partisan political activities of many
government officials.

III.

Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution 8678 Compliant with Law

Pearliegates

So, is the Committee willing to include certain clauses that would make this provision more strict, and which
would deter its violation?

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MR. FOZ. Madam President, the existing Civil Service Law and the implementing rules on the matter are more
than exhaustive enough to really prevent officers and employees in the public service from engaging in any
form of partisan political activity. But the problem really lies in implementation because, if the head of a
ministry, and even the superior officers of offices and agencies of government will themselves violate the
constitutional injunction against partisan political activity, then no string of words that we may add to what is
now here in this draft will really implement the constitutional intent against partisan political activity. x x x20
(italics supplied)

To emphasize its importance, this constitutional ban on civil service officers and employees is presently
reflected and implemented by a number of statutes. Section 46(b)(26), Chapter 7 and Section 55, Chapter 8
both of Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 respectively provide in relevant part:

Section 261(i) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (the Omnibus Election Code) further makes intervention by civil
service officers and employees in partisan political activities an election offense, viz.:

SECTION 261. Prohibited Acts. The following shall be guilty of an election offense:

xxxx

(i) Intervention of public officers and employees. Any officer or employee in the civil service, except those
holding political offices; any officer, employee, or member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, or any police
force, special forces, home defense forces, barangay self-defense units and all other para-military units that
now exist or which may hereafter be organized who, directly or indirectly, intervenes in any election campaign
or engages in any partisan political activity, except to vote or to preserve public order, if he is a peace officer.

Section 44. Discipline: General Provisions:


The intent of both Congress and the framers of our Constitution to limit the participation of civil service officers
and employees in partisan political activities is too plain to be mistaken.

xxxx

(b) The following shall be grounds for disciplinary action:

xxxx

But Section 2(4), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution and the implementing statutes apply only to civil
servants holding apolitical offices. Stated differently, the constitutional ban does not cover elected officials,
notwithstanding the fact that "[t]he civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and
agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters."21
This is because elected public officials, by the very nature of their office, engage in partisan political activities
almost all year round, even outside of the campaign period.22 Political partisanship is the inevitable essence of
a political office, elective positions included.23

(26) Engaging directly or indirectly in partisan political activities by one holding a non-political office.
The prohibition notwithstanding, civil service officers and employees are allowed to vote, as well as express
their views on political issues, or mention the names of certain candidates for public office whom they support.
This is crystal clear from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, viz.:

xxxx

Section 55. Political Activity. No officer or employee in the Civil Service including members of the Armed
Forces, shall engage directly or indirectly in any partisan political activity or take part in any election except to
vote nor shall he use his official authority or influence to coerce the political activity of any other person or
body. Nothing herein provided shall be understood to prevent any officer or employee from expressing his
views on current political problems or issues, or from mentioning the names of his candidates for public office
whom he supports: Provided, That public officers and employees holding political offices may take part in
political and electoral activities but it shall be unlawful for them to solicit contributions from their subordinates
or subject them to any of the acts involving subordinates prohibited in the Election Code.

Pearliegates

MS. AQUINO: Mr. Presiding Officer, my proposed amendment is on page 2, Section 1, subparagraph 4, lines 13
and 14. On line 13, between the words "any" and "partisan," add the phrase ELECTIONEERING AND OTHER; and
on line 14, delete the word "activity" and in lieu thereof substitute the word CAMPAIGN.

May I be allowed to explain my proposed amendment?

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THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Treas): Commissioner Aquino may proceed.

MS. AQUINO: The draft as presented by the Committee deleted the phrase "except to vote" which was adopted
in both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions. The phrase "except to vote" was not intended as a guarantee to the
right to vote but as a qualification of the general prohibition against taking part in elections.

Voting is a partisan political activity. Unless it is explicitly provided for as an exception to this prohibition, it will
amount to disenfranchisement. We know that suffrage, although plenary, is not an unconditional right. In other
words, the Legislature can always pass a statute which can withhold from any class the right to vote in an
election, if public interest so required. I would only like to reinstate the qualification by specifying the prohibited
acts so that those who may want to vote but who are likewise prohibited from participating in partisan political
campaigns or electioneering may vote.

In Farias, the constitutionality of Section 14 of the Fair Election Act, in relation to Sections 66 and 67 of the
Omnibus Election Code, was assailed on the ground, among others, that it unduly discriminates against
appointive officials. As Section 14 repealed Section 67 (i.e., the deemed-resigned provision in respect of elected
officials) of the Omnibus Election Code, elected officials are no longer considered ipso facto resigned from their
respective offices upon their filing of certificates of candidacy. In contrast, since Section 66 was not repealed,
the limitation on appointive officials continues to be operative they are deemed resigned when they file their
certificates of candidacy.

The petitioners in Farias thus brought an equal protection challenge against Section 14, with the end in view
of having the deemed-resigned provisions "apply equally" to both elected and appointive officials. We held,
however, that the legal dichotomy created by the Legislature is a reasonable classification, as there are
material and significant distinctions between the two classes of officials. Consequently, the contention that
Section 14 of the Fair Election Act, in relation to Sections 66 and 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, infringed on
the equal protection clause of the Constitution, failed muster. We ruled:

MR. FOZ: There is really no quarrel over this point, but please understand that there was no intention on the
part of the Committee to disenfranchise any government official or employee. The elimination of the last clause
of this provision was precisely intended to protect the members of the civil service in the sense that they are
not being deprived of the freedom of expression in a political contest. The last phrase or clause might have
given the impression that a government employee or worker has no right whatsoever in an election campaign
except to vote, which is not the case. They are still free to express their views although the intention is not
really to allow them to take part actively in a political campaign.24

The petitioners' contention, that the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code pertaining to elective
officials gives undue benefit to such officials as against the appointive ones and violates the equal protection
clause of the constitution, is tenuous.

IV.

The equal protection of the law clause in the Constitution is not absolute, but is subject to reasonable
classification. If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one
class may be treated and regulated differently from the other. The Court has explained the nature of the equal
protection guarantee in this manner:

Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, Section 13 of RA 9369, and Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code Do Not
Violate the Equal Protection Clause

We now hold that Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, and the second
proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of RA 9369 are not violative of the equal protection clause of the
Constitution.

The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile
discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation which is limited either in
the object to which it is directed or by territory within which it is to operate. It does not demand absolute
equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances
and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not
infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to
all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall
within such class and those who do not.

i. Farias, et al. v. Executive Secretary, et al. is Controlling

In truth, this Court has already ruled squarely on whether these deemed-resigned provisions challenged in the
case at bar violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution in Farias, et al. v. Executive Secretary, et
al.25

Pearliegates

Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The former occupy their
office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite term and may be
removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On the other hand, appointive officials hold their office by
virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold their office in a
permanent capacity and are entitled to security of tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing
authority.

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Another substantial distinction between the two sets of officials is that under Section 55, Chapter 8, Title I,
Subsection A. Civil Service Commission, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292),
appointive officials, as officers and employees in the civil service, are strictly prohibited from engaging in any
partisan political activity or take (sic) part in any election except to vote. Under the same provision, elective
officials, or officers or employees holding political offices, are obviously expressly allowed to take part in
political and electoral activities.

By repealing Section 67 but retaining Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, the legislators deemed it
proper to treat these two classes of officials differently with respect to the effect on their tenure in the office of
the filing of the certificates of candidacy for any position other than those occupied by them. Again, it is not
within the power of the Court to pass upon or look into the wisdom of this classification.

Since the classification justifying Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, i.e., elected officials vis--vis appointive
officials, is anchored upon material and significant distinctions and all the persons belonging under the same
classification are similarly treated, the equal protection clause of the Constitution is, thus, not infringed.26

The case at bar is a crass attempt to resurrect a dead issue. The miracle is that our assailed Decision gave it
new life. We ought to be guided by the doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere. This doctrine, which is
really "adherence to precedents," mandates that once a case has been decided one way, then another case
involving exactly the same point at issue should be decided in the same manner.27 This doctrine is one of
policy grounded on the necessity for securing certainty and stability of judicial decisions. As the renowned jurist
Benjamin Cardozo stated in his treatise The Nature of the Judicial Process:

reached might have been the same if the court had held, on the particular point, otherwise than it did.31 As we
held in Villanueva, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, et al.:32

A decision which the case could have turned on is not regarded as obiter dictum merely because, owing to
the disposal of the contention, it was necessary to consider another question, nor can an additional reason in a
decision, brought forward after the case has been disposed of on one ground, be regarded as dicta. So, also,
where a case presents two (2) or more points, any one of which is sufficient to determine the ultimate issue,
but the court actually decides all such points, the case as an authoritative precedent as to every point decided,
and none of such points can be regarded as having the status of a dictum, and one point should not be denied
authority merely because another point was more dwelt on and more fully argued and considered, nor does a
decision on one proposition make statements of the court regarding other propositions dicta.33 (italics
supplied)

ii. Classification Germane to the Purposes of the Law

The Farias ruling on the equal protection challenge stands on solid ground even if reexamined.

To start with, the equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or
things without distinction.34 What it simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a
valid classification.35 The test developed by jurisprudence here and yonder is that of reasonableness,36 which
has four requisites:

(1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions;


It will not do to decide the same question one way between one set of litigants and the opposite way between
another. "If a group of cases involves the same point, the parties expect the same decision. It would be a gross
injustice to decide alternate cases on opposite principles. If a case was decided against me yesterday when I
was a defendant, I shall look for the same judgment today if I am plaintiff. To decide differently would raise a
feeling of resentment and wrong in my breast; it would be an infringement, material and moral, of my rights."
Adherence to precedent must then be the rule rather than the exception if litigants are to have faith in the
even-handed administration of justice in the courts.28

Our Farias ruling on the equal protection implications of the deemed-resigned provisions cannot be
minimalized as mere obiter dictum. It is trite to state that an adjudication on any point within the issues
presented by the case cannot be considered as obiter dictum.29 This rule applies to all pertinent questions that
are presented and resolved in the regular course of the consideration of the case and lead up to the final
conclusion, and to any statement as to the matter on which the decision is predicated.30 For that reason, a
point expressly decided does not lose its value as a precedent because the disposition of the case is, or might
have been, made on some other ground; or even though, by reason of other points in the case, the result

Pearliegates

(2) It is germane to the purposes of the law;

(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and

(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.37

Our assailed Decision readily acknowledged that these deemed-resigned provisions satisfy the first, third and
fourth requisites of reasonableness. It, however, proffers the dubious conclusion that the differential treatment
of appointive officials vis--vis elected officials is not germane to the purpose of the law, because "whether one
holds an appointive office or an elective one, the evils sought to be prevented by the measure remain," viz.:

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For example, the Executive Secretary, or any Member of the Cabinet for that matter, could wield the same
influence as the Vice-President who at the same time is appointed to a Cabinet post (in the recent past, elected
Vice-Presidents were appointed to take charge of national housing, social welfare development, interior and
local government, and foreign affairs). With the fact that they both head executive offices, there is no valid
justification to treat them differently when both file their [Certificates of Candidacy] for the elections. Under the
present state of our law, the Vice-President, in the example, running this time, let us say, for President, retains
his position during the entire election period and can still use the resources of his office to support his
campaign.38

Sad to state, this conclusion conveniently ignores the long-standing rule that to remedy an injustice, the
Legislature need not address every manifestation of the evil at once; it may proceed "one step at a time."39 In
addressing a societal concern, it must invariably draw lines and make choices, thereby creating some inequity
as to those included or excluded.40 Nevertheless, as long as "the bounds of reasonable choice" are not
exceeded, the courts must defer to the legislative judgment.41 We may not strike down a law merely because
the legislative aim would have been more fully achieved by expanding the class.42 Stated differently, the fact
that a legislative classification, by itself, is underinclusive will not render it unconstitutionally arbitrary or
invidious.43 There is no constitutional requirement that regulation must reach each and every class to which it
might be applied;44 that the Legislature must be held rigidly to the choice of regulating all or none.

Thus, any person who poses an equal protection challenge must convincingly show that the law creates a
classification that is "palpably arbitrary or capricious."45 He must refute all possible rational bases for the
differing treatment, whether or not the Legislature cited those bases as reasons for the enactment,46 such that
the constitutionality of the law must be sustained even if the reasonableness of the classification is "fairly
debatable."47 In the case at bar, the petitioners failed and in fact did not even attempt to discharge this
heavy burden. Our assailed Decision was likewise silent as a sphinx on this point even while we submitted the
following thesis:

... [I]t is not sufficient grounds for invalidation that we may find that the statutes distinction is unfair,
underinclusive, unwise, or not the best solution from a public-policy standpoint; rather, we must find that there
is no reasonably rational reason for the differing treatment.48

In the instant case, is there a rational justification for excluding elected officials from the operation of the
deemed resigned provisions? I submit that there is.

An election is the embodiment of the popular will, perhaps the purest expression of the sovereign power of the
people.49 It involves the choice or selection of candidates to public office by popular vote.50 Considering that
elected officials are put in office by their constituents for a definite term, it may justifiably be said that they
were excluded from the ambit of the deemed resigned provisions in utmost respect for the mandate of the
sovereign will. In other words, complete deference is accorded to the will of the electorate that they be served

Pearliegates

by such officials until the end of the term for which they were elected. In contrast, there is no such expectation
insofar as appointed officials are concerned.

The dichotomized treatment of appointive and elective officials is therefore germane to the purposes of the law.
For the law was made not merely to preserve the integrity, efficiency, and discipline of the public service; the
Legislature, whose wisdom is outside the rubric of judicial scrutiny, also thought it wise to balance this with the
competing, yet equally compelling, interest of deferring to the sovereign will.51 (emphasis in the original)

In fine, the assailed Decision would have us "equalize the playing field" by invalidating provisions of law that
seek to restrain the evils from running riot. Under the pretext of equal protection, it would favor a situation in
which the evils are unconfined and vagrant, existing at the behest of both appointive and elected officials, over
another in which a significant portion thereof is contained. The absurdity of that position is self-evident, to say
the least.

The concern, voiced by our esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Nachura, in his dissent, that elected officials (vis-vis appointive officials) have greater political clout over the electorate, is indeed a matter worth exploring but
not by this Court. Suffice it to say that the remedy lies with the Legislature. It is the Legislature that is given the
authority, under our constitutional system, to balance competing interests and thereafter make policy choices
responsive to the exigencies of the times. It is certainly within the Legislatures power to make the deemedresigned provisions applicable to elected officials, should it later decide that the evils sought to be prevented
are of such frequency and magnitude as to tilt the balance in favor of expanding the class. This Court cannot
and should not arrogate unto itself the power to ascertain and impose on the people the best state of affairs
from a public policy standpoint.

iii. Mancuso v. Taft Has Been Overruled

Finding no Philippine jurisprudence to prop up its equal protection ruling, our assailed Decision adverted to, and
extensively cited, Mancuso v. Taft.52 This was a decision of the First Circuit of the United States Court of
Appeals promulgated in March 1973, which struck down as unconstitutional a similar statutory provision.
Pathetically, our assailed Decision, relying on Mancuso, claimed:

(1) The right to run for public office is "inextricably linked" with two fundamental freedoms freedom of
expression and association;

(2) Any legislative classification that significantly burdens this fundamental right must be subjected to strict
equal protection review; and

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(3) While the state has a compelling interest in maintaining the honesty and impartiality of its public work
force, the deemed-resigned provisions pursue their objective in a far too heavy-handed manner as to render
them unconstitutional.

It then concluded with the exhortation that since "the Americans, from whom we copied the provision in
question, had already stricken down a similar measure for being unconstitutional[,] it is high-time that we, too,
should follow suit."

Our assailed Decisions reliance on Mancuso is completely misplaced. We cannot blink away the fact that the
United States Supreme Court effectively overruled Mancuso three months after its promulgation by the United
States Court of Appeals. In United States Civil Service Commission, et al. v. National Association of Letter
Carriers AFL-CIO, et al.53 and Broadrick, et al. v. State of Oklahoma, et al.,54 the United States Supreme Court
was faced with the issue of whether statutory provisions prohibiting federal55 and state56 employees from
taking an active part in political management or in political campaigns were unconstitutional as to warrant
facial invalidation. Violation of these provisions results in dismissal from employment and possible criminal
sanctions.

The Court declared these provisions compliant with the equal protection clause. It held that (i) in regulating the
speech of its employees, the state as employer has interests that differ significantly from those it possesses in
regulating the speech of the citizenry in general; (ii) the courts must therefore balance the legitimate interest
of employee free expression against the interests of the employer in promoting efficiency of public services;
(iii) if the employees expression interferes with the maintenance of efficient and regularly functioning services,
the limitation on speech is not unconstitutional; and (iv) the Legislature is to be given some flexibility or
latitude in ascertaining which positions are to be covered by any statutory restrictions.57 Therefore, insofar as
government employees are concerned, the correct standard of review is an interest-balancing approach, a
means-end scrutiny that examines the closeness of fit between the governmental interests and the prohibitions
in question.58

Letter Carriers elucidated on these principles, as follows:

Until now, the judgment of Congress, the Executive, and the country appears to have been that partisan
political activities by federal employees must be limited if the Government is to operate effectively and fairly,
elections are to play their proper part in representative government, and employees themselves are to be
sufficiently free from improper influences. The restrictions so far imposed on federal employees are not aimed
at particular parties, groups, or points of view, but apply equally to all partisan activities of the type described.
They discriminate against no racial, ethnic, or religious minorities. Nor do they seek to control political opinions
or beliefs, or to interfere with or influence anyone's vote at the polls.

Pearliegates

But, as the Court held in Pickering v. Board of Education,59 the government has an interest in regulating the
conduct and the speech of its employees that differ(s) significantly from those it possesses in connection with
regulation of the speech of the citizenry in general. The problem in any case is to arrive at a balance between
the interests of the (employee), as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of
the (government), as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its
employees. Although Congress is free to strike a different balance than it has, if it so chooses, we think the
balance it has so far struck is sustainable by the obviously important interests sought to be served by the
limitations on partisan political activities now contained in the Hatch Act.

It seems fundamental in the first place that employees in the Executive Branch of the Government, or those
working for any of its agencies, should administer the law in accordance with the will of Congress, rather than
in accordance with their own or the will of a political party. They are expected to enforce the law and execute
the programs of the Government without bias or favoritism for or against any political party or group or the
members thereof. A major thesis of the Hatch Act is that to serve this great end of Government-the impartial
execution of the laws-it is essential that federal employees, for example, not take formal positions in political
parties, not undertake to play substantial roles in partisan political campaigns, and not run for office on
partisan political tickets. Forbidding activities like these will reduce the hazards to fair and effective
government.

There is another consideration in this judgment: it is not only important that the Government and its employees
in fact avoid practicing political justice, but it is also critical that they appear to the public to be avoiding it, if
confidence in the system of representative Government is not to be eroded to a disastrous extent.

Another major concern of the restriction against partisan activities by federal employees was perhaps the
immediate occasion for enactment of the Hatch Act in 1939. That was the conviction that the rapidly expanding
Government work force should not be employed to build a powerful, invincible, and perhaps corrupt political
machine. The experience of the 1936 and 1938 campaigns convinced Congress that these dangers were
sufficiently real that substantial barriers should be raised against the party in power-or the party out of power,
for that matter-using the thousands or hundreds of thousands of federal employees, paid for at public expense,
to man its political structure and political campaigns.

A related concern, and this remains as important as any other, was to further serve the goal that employment
and advancement in the Government service not depend on political performance, and at the same time to
make sure that Government employees would be free from pressure and from express or tacit invitation to vote
in a certain way or perform political chores in order to curry favor with their superiors rather than to act out
their own beliefs. It may be urged that prohibitions against coercion are sufficient protection; but for many
years the joint judgment of the Executive and Congress has been that to protect the rights of federal
employees with respect to their jobs and their political acts and beliefs it is not enough merely to forbid one
employee to attempt to influence or coerce another. For example, at the hearings in 1972 on proposed
legislation for liberalizing the prohibition against political activity, the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission
stated that the prohibitions against active participation in partisan political management and partisan political
campaigns constitute the most significant safeguards against coercion . . .. Perhaps Congress at some time will

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come to a different view of the realities of political life and Government service; but that is its current view of
the matter, and we are not now in any position to dispute it. Nor, in our view, does the Constitution forbid it.

Neither the right to associate nor the right to participate in political activities is absolute in any event.60 x x x

[Appellants] nevertheless maintain that the statute is overbroad and purports to reach protected, as well as
unprotected conduct, and must therefore be struck down on its face and held to be incapable of any
constitutional application. We do not believe that the overbreadth doctrine may appropriately be invoked in this
manner here.

xxxx

xxxx

As we see it, our task is not to destroy the Act if we can, but to construe it, if consistent with the will of
Congress, so as to comport with constitutional limitations. (italics supplied)

The consequence of our departure from traditional rules of standing in the First Amendment area is that any
enforcement of a statute thus placed at issue is totally forbidden until and unless a limiting construction or
partial invalidation so narrows it as to remove the seeming threat or deterrence to constitutionally protected
expression. Application of the overbreadth doctrine in this manner is, manifestly, strong medicine. It has been
employed by the Court sparingly and only as a last resort. x x x

Broadrick likewise definitively stated that the assailed statutory provision is constitutionally permissible, viz.:

Appellants do not question Oklahoma's right to place even-handed restrictions on the partisan political conduct
of state employees. Appellants freely concede that such restrictions serve valid and important state interests,
particularly with respect to attracting greater numbers of qualified people by insuring their job security, free
from the vicissitudes of the elective process, and by protecting them from political extortion. Rather,
appellants maintain that however permissible, even commendable, the goals of s 818 may be, its language is
unconstitutionally vague and its prohibitions too broad in their sweep, failing to distinguish between conduct
that may be proscribed and conduct that must be permitted. For these and other reasons, appellants assert
that the sixth and seventh paragraphs of s 818 are void in toto and cannot be enforced against them or anyone
else.

We have held today that the Hatch Act is not impermissibly vague.61 We have little doubt that s 818 is
similarly not so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning.62 Whatever
other problems there are with s 818, it is all but frivolous to suggest that the section fails to give adequate
warning of what activities it proscribes or fails to set out explicit standards' for those who must apply it. In the
plainest language, it prohibits any state classified employee from being an officer or member of a partisan
political club or a candidate for any paid public office. It forbids solicitation of contributions for any political
organization, candidacy or other political purpose and taking part in the management or affairs of any political
party or in any political campaign. Words inevitably contain germs of uncertainty and, as with the Hatch Act,
there may be disputes over the meaning of such terms in s 818 as partisan, or take part in, or affairs of
political parties. But what was said in Letter Carriers, is applicable here: there are limitations in the English
language with respect to being both specific and manageably brief, and it seems to us that although the
prohibitions may not satisfy those intent on finding fault at any cost, they are set out in terms that the ordinary
person exercising ordinary common sense can sufficiently understand and comply with, without sacrifice to the
public interest.' x x x

xxxx

Pearliegates

x x x But the plain import of our cases is, at the very least, that facial over-breadth adjudication is an exception
to our traditional rules of practice and that its function, a limited one at the outset, attenuates as the otherwise
unprotected behavior that it forbids the State to sanction moves from pure speech toward conduct and that
conduct-even if expressive-falls within the scope of otherwise valid criminal laws that reflect legitimate state
interests in maintaining comprehensive controls over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct. Although
such laws, if too broadly worded, may deter protected speech to some unknown extent, there comes a point
where that effect-at best a prediction-cannot, with confidence, justify invalidating a statute on its face and so
prohibiting a State from enforcing the statute against conduct that is admittedly within its power to proscribe.
To put the matter another way, particularly where conduct and not merely speech is involved, we believe that
the overbreadth of a statute must not only be real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute's
plainly legitimate sweep. It is our view that s 818 is not substantially overbroad and that whatever overbreadth
may exist should be cured through case-by-case analysis of the fact situations to which its sanctions,
assertedly, may not be applied.

Unlike ordinary breach-of-the peace statutes or other broad regulatory acts, s 818 is directed, by its terms, at
political expression which if engaged in by private persons would plainly be protected by the First and
Fourteenth Amendments. But at the same time, s 818 is not a censorial statute, directed at particular groups or
viewpoints. The statute, rather, seeks to regulate political activity in an even-handed and neutral manner. As
indicted, such statutes have in the past been subject to a less exacting overbreadth scrutiny. Moreover, the fact
remains that s 818 regulates a substantial spectrum of conduct that is as manifestly subject to state regulation
as the public peace or criminal trespass. This much was established in United Public Workers v. Mitchell, and
has been unhesitatingly reaffirmed today in Letter Carriers. Under the decision in Letter Carriers, there is no
question that s 818 is valid at least insofar as it forbids classified employees from: soliciting contributions for
partisan candidates, political parties, or other partisan political purposes; becoming members of national, state,
or local committees of political parties, or officers or committee members in partisan political clubs, or
candidates for any paid public office; taking part in the management or affairs of any political party's partisan
political campaign; serving as delegates or alternates to caucuses or conventions of political parties;
addressing or taking an active part in partisan political rallies or meetings; soliciting votes or assisting voters at

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the polls or helping in a partisan effort to get voters to the polls; participating in the distribution of partisan
campaign literature; initiating or circulating partisan nominating petitions; or riding in caravans for any political
party or partisan political candidate.

x x x It may be that such restrictions are impermissible and that s 818 may be susceptible of some other
improper applications. But, as presently construed, we do not believe that s 818 must be discarded in toto
because some persons arguably protected conduct may or may not be caught or chilled by the statute.
Section 818 is not substantially overbroad and it not, therefore, unconstitutional on its face. (italics supplied)

It bears stressing that, in his Dissenting Opinion, Mr. Justice Nachura does not deny the principles enunciated in
Letter Carriers and Broadrick. He would hold, nonetheless, that these cases cannot be interpreted to mean a
reversal of Mancuso, since they "pertain to different types of laws and were decided based on a different set of
facts," viz.:

In Letter Carriers, the plaintiffs alleged that the Civil Service Commission was enforcing, or threatening to
enforce, the Hatch Acts prohibition against "active participation in political management or political
campaigns." The plaintiffs desired to campaign for candidates for public office, to encourage and get federal
employees to run for state and local offices, to participate as delegates in party conventions, and to hold office
in a political club.

In Broadrick, the appellants sought the invalidation for being vague and overbroad a provision in the (sic)
Oklahomas Merit System of Personnel Administration Act restricting the political activities of the States
classified civil servants, in much the same manner as the Hatch Act proscribed partisan political activities of
federal employees. Prior to the commencement of the action, the appellants actively participated in the 1970
reelection campaign of their superior, and were administratively charged for asking other Corporation
Commission employees to do campaign work or to give referrals to persons who might help in the campaign,
for soliciting money for the campaign, and for receiving and distributing campaign posters in bulk.

We hold, however, that his position is belied by a plain reading of these cases. Contrary to his claim, Letter
Carriers, Broadrick and Mancuso all concerned the constitutionality of resign-to-run laws, viz.:

(1) Mancuso involved a civil service employee who filed as a candidate for nomination as representative to the
Rhode Island General Assembly. He assailed the constitutionality of 14.09(c) of the City Home Rule Charter,
which prohibits "continuing in the classified service of the city after becoming a candidate for nomination or
election to any public office."

(2) Letter Carriers involved plaintiffs who alleged that the Civil Service Commission was enforcing, or
threatening to enforce, the Hatch Acts prohibition against "active participation in political management or
political campaigns"63 with respect to certain defined activities in which they desired to engage. The plaintiffs
relevant to this discussion are:

(a) The National Association of Letter Carriers, which alleged that its members were desirous of, among others,
running in local elections for offices such as school board member, city council member or mayor;

(b) Plaintiff Gee, who alleged that he desired to, but did not, file as a candidate for the office of Borough
Councilman in his local community for fear that his participation in a partisan election would endanger his job;
and

(c) Plaintiff Myers, who alleged that he desired to run as a Republican candidate in the 1971 partisan election
for the mayor of West Lafayette, Indiana, and that he would do so except for fear of losing his job by reason of
violation of the Hatch Act.

The Hatch Act defines "active participation in political management or political campaigns" by cross-referring to
the rules made by the Civil Service Commission. The rule pertinent to our inquiry states:
Mancuso, on the other hand, involves, as aforesaid, an automatic resignation provision. Kenneth Mancuso, a full
time police officer and classified civil service employee of the City of Cranston, filed as a candidate for
nomination as representative to the Rhode Island General Assembly. The Mayor of Cranston then began the
process of enforcing the resign-to-run provision of the City Home Rule Charter.

Clearly, as the above-cited US cases pertain to different types of laws and were decided based on a different
set of facts, Letter Carriers and Broadrick cannot be interpreted to mean a reversal of Mancuso. x x x (italics in
the original)

Pearliegates

30. Candidacy for local office: Candidacy for a nomination or for election to any National, State, county, or
municipal office is not permissible. The prohibition against political activity extends not merely to formal
announcement of candidacy but also to the preliminaries leading to such announcement and to canvassing or
soliciting support or doing or permitting to be done any act in furtherance of candidacy. The fact that
candidacy, is merely passive is immaterial; if an employee acquiesces in the efforts of friends in furtherance of
such candidacy such acquiescence constitutes an infraction of the prohibitions against political activity. (italics
supplied)

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Section 9(b) requires the immediate removal of violators and forbids the use of appropriated funds thereafter to
pay compensation to these persons.64

(3) Broadrick was a class action brought by certain Oklahoma state employees seeking a declaration of
unconstitutionality of two sub-paragraphs of Section 818 of Oklahomas Merit System of Personnel
Administration Act. Section 818 (7), the paragraph relevant to this discussion, states that "[n]o employee in the
classified service shall be a candidate for nomination or election to any paid public office" Violation of
Section 818 results in dismissal from employment, possible criminal sanctions and limited state employment
ineligibility.

Consequently, it cannot be denied that Letter Carriers and Broadrick effectively overruled Mancuso. By no
stretch of the imagination could Mancuso still be held operative, as Letter Carriers and Broadrick (i) concerned
virtually identical resign-to-run laws, and (ii) were decided by a superior court, the United States Supreme
Court. It was thus not surprising for the First Circuit Court of Appeals the same court that decided Mancuso
to hold categorically and emphatically in Magill v. Lynch65 that Mancuso is no longer good law. As we priorly
explained:

Magill involved Pawtucket, Rhode Island firemen who ran for city office in 1975. Pawtuckets "Little Hatch Act"
prohibits city employees from engaging in a broad range of political activities. Becoming a candidate for any
city office is specifically proscribed,66 the violation being punished by removal from office or immediate
dismissal. The firemen brought an action against the city officials on the ground that that the provision of the
city charter was unconstitutional. However, the court, fully cognizant of Letter Carriers and Broadrick, took the
position that Mancuso had since lost considerable vitality. It observed that the view that political candidacy was
a fundamental interest which could be infringed upon only if less restrictive alternatives were not available,
was a position which was no longer viable, since the Supreme Court (finding that the governments interest in
regulating both the conduct and speech of its employees differed significantly from its interest in regulating
those of the citizenry in general) had given little weight to the argument that prohibitions against the coercion
of government employees were a less drastic means to the same end, deferring to the judgment of Congress,
and applying a "balancing" test to determine whether limits on political activity by public employees
substantially served government interests which were "important" enough to outweigh the employees First
Amendment rights.67

It must be noted that the Court of Appeals ruled in this manner even though the election in Magill was
characterized as nonpartisan, as it was reasonable for the city to fear, under the circumstances of that case,
that politically active bureaucrats might use their official power to help political friends and hurt political foes.
Ruled the court:

The question before us is whether Pawtucket's charter provision, which bars a city employee's candidacy in
even a nonpartisan city election, is constitutional. The issue compels us to extrapolate two recent Supreme
Court decisions, Civil Service Comm'n v. Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers and Broadrick v. Oklahoma. Both dealt
with laws barring civil servants from partisan political activity. Letter Carriers reaffirmed United Public Workers

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v. Mitchell, upholding the constitutionality of the Hatch Act as to federal employees. Broadrick sustained
Oklahoma's "Little Hatch Act" against constitutional attack, limiting its holding to Oklahoma's construction that
the Act barred only activity in partisan politics. In Mancuso v. Taft, we assumed that proscriptions of candidacy
in nonpartisan elections would not be constitutional. Letter Carriers and Broadrick compel new analysis.

xxxx

What we are obligated to do in this case, as the district court recognized, is to apply the Courts interest
balancing approach to the kind of nonpartisan election revealed in this record. We believe that the district court
found more residual vigor in our opinion in Mancuso v. Taft than remains after Letter Carriers. We have
particular reference to our view that political candidacy was a fundamental interest which could be trenched
upon only if less restrictive alternatives were not available. While this approach may still be viable for citizens
who are not government employees, the Court in Letter Carriers recognized that the government's interest in
regulating both the conduct and speech of its employees differs significantly from its interest in regulating
those of the citizenry in general. Not only was United Public Workers v. Mitchell "unhesitatingly" reaffirmed, but
the Court gave little weight to the argument that prohibitions against the coercion of government employees
were a less drastic means to the same end, deferring to the judgment of the Congress. We cannot be more
precise than the Third Circuit in characterizing the Court's approach as "some sort of 'balancing' process".68 It
appears that the government may place limits on campaigning by public employees if the limits substantially
serve government interests that are "important" enough to outweigh the employees' First Amendment rights. x
x x (italics supplied)

Upholding thus the constitutionality of the law in question, the Magill court detailed the major governmental
interests discussed in Letter Carriers and applied them to the Pawtucket provision as follows:

In Letter Carriers[,] the first interest identified by the Court was that of an efficient government, faithful to the
Congress rather than to party. The district court discounted this interest, reasoning that candidates in a local
election would not likely be committed to a state or national platform. This observation undoubtedly has
substance insofar as allegiance to broad policy positions is concerned. But a different kind of possible political
intrusion into efficient administration could be thought to threaten municipal government: not into broad policy
decisions, but into the particulars of administration favoritism in minute decisions affecting welfare, tax
assessments, municipal contracts and purchasing, hiring, zoning, licensing, and inspections. Just as the Court in
Letter Carriers identified a second governmental interest in the avoidance of the appearance of "political
justice" as to policy, so there is an equivalent interest in avoiding the appearance of political preferment in
privileges, concessions, and benefits. The appearance (or reality) of favoritism that the charter's authors
evidently feared is not exorcised by the nonpartisan character of the formal election process. Where, as here,
party support is a key to successful campaigning, and party rivalry is the norm, the city might reasonably fear
that politically active bureaucrats would use their official power to help political friends and hurt political foes.
This is not to say that the city's interest in visibly fair and effective administration necessarily justifies a blanket
prohibition of all employee campaigning; if parties are not heavily involved in a campaign, the danger of
favoritism is less, for neither friend nor foe is as easily identified.

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A second major governmental interest identified in Letter Carriers was avoiding the danger of a powerful
political machine. The Court had in mind the large and growing federal bureaucracy and its partisan potential.
The district court felt this was only a minor threat since parties had no control over nominations. But in fact
candidates sought party endorsements, and party endorsements proved to be highly effective both in
determining who would emerge from the primary election and who would be elected in the final election. Under
the prevailing customs, known party affiliation and support were highly significant factors in Pawtucket
elections. The charter's authors might reasonably have feared that a politically active public work force would
give the incumbent party, and the incumbent workers, an unbreakable grasp on the reins of power. In
municipal elections especially, the small size of the electorate and the limited powers of local government may
inhibit the growth of interest groups powerful enough to outbalance the weight of a partisan work force. Even
when nonpartisan issues and candidacies are at stake, isolated government employees may seek to influence
voters or their co-workers improperly; but a more real danger is that a central party structure will mass the
scattered powers of government workers behind a single party platform or slate. Occasional misuse of the
public trust to pursue private political ends is tolerable, especially because the political views of individual
employees may balance each other out. But party discipline eliminates this diversity and tends to make abuse
systematic. Instead of a handful of employees pressured into advancing their immediate superior's political
ambitions, the entire government work force may be expected to turn out for many candidates in every
election. In Pawtucket, where parties are a continuing presence in political campaigns, a carefully orchestrated
use of city employees in support of the incumbent party's candidates is possible. The danger is scarcely
lessened by the openness of Pawtucket's nominating procedure or the lack of party labels on its ballots.

The third area of proper governmental interest in Letter Carriers was ensuring that employees achieve
advancement on their merits and that they be free from both coercion and the prospect of favor from political
activity. The district court did not address this factor, but looked only to the possibility of a civil servant using
his position to influence voters, and held this to be no more of a threat than in the most nonpartisan of
elections. But we think that the possibility of coercion of employees by superiors remains as strong a factor in
municipal elections as it was in Letter Carriers. Once again, it is the systematic and coordinated exploitation of
public servants for political ends that a legislature is most likely to see as the primary threat of employees'
rights. Political oppression of public employees will be rare in an entirely nonpartisan system. Some superiors
may be inclined to ride herd on the politics of their employees even in a nonpartisan context, but without party
officials looking over their shoulders most supervisors will prefer to let employees go their own ways.

In short, the government may constitutionally restrict its employees' participation in nominally nonpartisan
elections if political parties play a large role in the campaigns. In the absence of substantial party involvement,
on the other hand, the interests identified by the Letter Carriers Court lose much of their force. While the
employees' First Amendment rights would normally outbalance these diminished interests, we do not suggest
that they would always do so. Even when parties are absent, many employee campaigns might be thought to
endanger at least one strong public interest, an interest that looms larger in the context of municipal elections
than it does in the national elections considered in Letter Carriers. The city could reasonably fear the prospect
of a subordinate running directly against his superior or running for a position that confers great power over his
superior. An employee of a federal agency who seeks a Congressional seat poses less of a direct challenge to
the command and discipline of his agency than a fireman or policeman who runs for mayor or city council. The
possibilities of internal discussion, cliques, and political bargaining, should an employee gather substantial
political support, are considerable. (citations omitted)

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The court, however, remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings in respect of the
petitioners overbreadth charge. Noting that invalidating a statute for being overbroad is "not to be taken
lightly, much less to be taken in the dark," the court held:

The governing case is Broadrick, which introduced the doctrine of "substantial" overbreadth in a closely
analogous case. Under Broadrick, when one who challenges a law has engaged in constitutionally unprotected
conduct (rather than unprotected speech) and when the challenged law is aimed at unprotected conduct, "the
overbreadth of a statute must not only be real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute's plainly
legitimate sweep." Two major uncertainties attend the doctrine: how to distinguish speech from conduct, and
how to define "substantial" overbreadth. We are spared the first inquiry by Broadrick itself. The plaintiffs in that
case had solicited support for a candidate, and they were subject to discipline under a law proscribing a wide
range of activities, including soliciting contributions for political candidates and becoming a candidate. The
Court found that this combination required a substantial overbreadth approach. The facts of this case are so
similar that we may reach the same result without worrying unduly about the sometimes opaque distinction
between speech and conduct.

The second difficulty is not so easily disposed of. Broadrick found no substantial overbreadth in a statute
restricting partisan campaigning. Pawtucket has gone further, banning participation in nonpartisan campaigns
as well. Measuring the substantiality of a statute's overbreadth apparently requires, inter alia, a rough
balancing of the number of valid applications compared to the number of potentially invalid applications. Some
sensitivity to reality is needed; an invalid application that is far-fetched does not deserve as much weight as
one that is probable. The question is a matter of degree; it will never be possible to say that a ratio of one
invalid to nine valid applications makes a law substantially overbroad. Still, an overbreadth challenger has a
duty to provide the court with some idea of the number of potentially invalid applications the statute permits.
Often, simply reading the statute in the light of common experience or litigated cases will suggest a number of
probable invalid applications. But this case is different. Whether the statute is overbroad depends in large part
on the number of elections that are insulated from party rivalry yet closed to Pawtucket employees. For all the
record shows, every one of the city, state, or federal elections in Pawtucket is actively contested by political
parties. Certainly the record suggests that parties play a major role even in campaigns that often are entirely
nonpartisan in other cities. School committee candidates, for example, are endorsed by the local Democratic
committee.

The state of the record does not permit us to find overbreadth; indeed such a step is not to be taken lightly,
much less to be taken in the dark. On the other hand, the entire focus below, in the short period before the
election was held, was on the constitutionality of the statute as applied. Plaintiffs may very well feel that
further efforts are not justified, but they should be afforded the opportunity to demonstrate that the charter
forecloses access to a significant number of offices, the candidacy for which by municipal employees would not
pose the possible threats to government efficiency and integrity which Letter Carriers, as we have interpreted
it, deems significant. Accordingly, we remand for consideration of plaintiffs' overbreadth claim. (italics supplied,
citations omitted)

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Clearly, Letter Carriers, Broadrick, and Magill demonstrate beyond doubt that Mancuso v. Taft, heavily relied
upon by the ponencia, has effectively been overruled.69 As it is no longer good law, the ponencias exhortation
that "[since] the Americans, from whom we copied the provision in question, had already stricken down a
similar measure for being unconstitutional[,] it is high-time that we, too, should follow suit" is misplaced and
unwarranted.70

Accordingly, our assailed Decisions submission that the right to run for public office is "inextricably linked" with
two fundamental freedoms those of expression and association lies on barren ground. American case law
has in fact never recognized a fundamental right to express ones political views through candidacy,71 as to
invoke a rigorous standard of review.72 Bart v. Telford73 pointedly stated that "[t]he First Amendment does not
in terms confer a right to run for public office, and this court has held that it does not do so by implication
either." Thus, ones interest in seeking office, by itself, is not entitled to constitutional protection.74 Moreover,
one cannot bring ones action under the rubric of freedom of association, absent any allegation that, by running
for an elective position, one is advancing the political ideas of a particular set of voters.75

Prescinding from these premises, it is crystal clear that the provisions challenged in the case at bar, are not
violative of the equal protection clause. The deemed-resigned provisions substantially serve governmental
interests (i.e., (i) efficient civil service faithful to the government and the people rather than to party; (ii)
avoidance of the appearance of "political justice" as to policy; (iii) avoidance of the danger of a powerful
political machine; and (iv) ensuring that employees achieve advancement on their merits and that they be free
from both coercion and the prospect of favor from political activity). These are interests that are important
enough to outweigh the non-fundamental right of appointive officials and employees to seek elective
office.1avvphi1

En passant, we find it quite ironic that Mr. Justice Nachura cites Clements v. Fashing76 and Morial, et al. v.
Judiciary Commission of the State of Louisiana, et al.77 to buttress his dissent. Maintaining that resign-to-run
provisions are valid only when made applicable to specified officials, he explains:

U.S. courts, in subsequent cases, sustained the constitutionality of resign-to-run provisions when applied to
specified or particular officials, as distinguished from all others,78 under a classification that is germane to the
purposes of the law. These resign-to-run legislations were not expressed in a general and sweeping provision,
and thus did not violate the test of being germane to the purpose of the law, the second requisite for a valid
classification. Directed, as they were, to particular officials, they were not overly encompassing as to be
overbroad. (emphasis in the original)

This reading is a regrettable misrepresentation of Clements and Morial. The resign-to-run provisions in these
cases were upheld not because they referred to specified or particular officials (vis--vis a general class); the
questioned provisions were found valid precisely because the Court deferred to legislative judgment and found
that a regulation is not devoid of a rational predicate simply because it happens to be incomplete. In fact, the
equal protection challenge in Clements revolved around the claim that the State of Texas failed to explain why

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some public officials are subject to the resign-to-run provisions, while others are not. Ruled the United States
Supreme Court:

Article XVI, 65, of the Texas Constitution provides that the holders of certain offices automatically resign their
positions if they become candidates for any other elected office, unless the unexpired portion of the current
term is one year or less. The burdens that 65 imposes on candidacy are even less substantial than those
imposed by 19. The two provisions, of course, serve essentially the same state interests. The District Court
found 65 deficient, however, not because of the nature or extent of the provision's restriction on candidacy,
but because of the manner in which the offices are classified. According to the District Court, the classification
system cannot survive equal protection scrutiny, because Texas has failed to explain sufficiently why some
elected public officials are subject to 65 and why others are not. As with the case of 19, we conclude that
65 survives a challenge under the Equal Protection Clause unless appellees can show that there is no rational
predicate to the classification scheme.

The history behind 65 shows that it may be upheld consistent with the "one step at a time" approach that this
Court has undertaken with regard to state regulation not subject to more vigorous scrutiny than that sanctioned
by the traditional principles. Section 65 was enacted in 1954 as a transitional provision applying only to the
1954 election. Section 65 extended the terms of those offices enumerated in the provision from two to four
years. The provision also staggered the terms of other offices so that at least some county and local offices
would be contested at each election. The automatic resignation proviso to 65 was not added until 1958. In
that year, a similar automatic resignation provision was added in Art. XI, 11, which applies to officeholders in
home rule cities who serve terms longer than two years. Section 11 allows home rule cities the option of
extending the terms of municipal offices from two to up to four years.

Thus, the automatic resignation provision in Texas is a creature of the State's electoral reforms of 1958. That
the State did not go further in applying the automatic resignation provision to those officeholders whose terms
were not extended by 11 or 65, absent an invidious purpose, is not the sort of malfunctioning of the State's
lawmaking process forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause. A regulation is not devoid of a rational predicate
simply because it happens to be incomplete. The Equal Protection Clause does not forbid Texas to restrict one
elected officeholder's candidacy for another elected office unless and until it places similar restrictions on other
officeholders. The provision's language and its history belie any notion that 65 serves the invidious purpose of
denying access to the political process to identifiable classes of potential candidates. (citations omitted and
italics supplied)

Furthermore, it is unfortunate that the dissenters took the Morial line that "there is no blanket approval of
restrictions on the right of public employees to become candidates for public office" out of context. A correct
reading of that line readily shows that the Court only meant to confine its ruling to the facts of that case, as
each equal protection challenge would necessarily have to involve weighing governmental interests vis--vis
the specific prohibition assailed. The Court held:

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The interests of public employees in free expression and political association are unquestionably entitled to the
protection of the first and fourteenth amendments. Nothing in today's decision should be taken to imply that
public employees may be prohibited from expressing their private views on controversial topics in a manner
that does not interfere with the proper performance of their public duties. In today's decision, there is no
blanket approval of restrictions on the right of public employees to become candidates for public office. Nor do
we approve any general restrictions on the political and civil rights of judges in particular. Our holding is
necessarily narrowed by the methodology employed to reach it. A requirement that a state judge resign his
office prior to becoming a candidate for non-judicial office bears a reasonably necessary relation to the
achievement of the state's interest in preventing the actuality or appearance of judicial impropriety. Such a
requirement offends neither the first amendment's guarantees of free expression and association nor the
fourteenth amendment's guarantee of equal protection of the laws. (italics supplied)

i. Limitation on Candidacy Regardless of Incumbent Appointive Officials Position, Valid

According to the assailed Decision, the challenged provisions of law are overly broad because they apply
indiscriminately to all civil servants holding appointive posts, without due regard for the type of position being
held by the employee running for elective office and the degree of influence that may be attendant thereto.

Its underlying assumption appears to be that the evils sought to be prevented are extant only when the
incumbent appointive official running for elective office holds an influential post.
Indeed, the Morial court even quoted Broadrick and stated that:

In any event, the legislature must have some leeway in determining which of its employment positions require
restrictions on partisan political activities and which may be left unregulated. And a State can hardly be faulted
for attempting to limit the positions upon which such restrictions are placed. (citations omitted)

V.

Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, Section 13 of RA 9369, and Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code Do Not
Suffer from Overbreadth

Apart from nullifying Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, Section 13 of RA 9369, and Section 66 of the Omnibus
Election Code on equal protection ground, our assailed Decision struck them down for being overbroad in two
respects, viz.:

(1) The assailed provisions limit the candidacy of all civil servants holding appointive posts without due regard
for the type of position being held by the employee seeking an elective post and the degree of influence that
may be attendant thereto;79 and

(2) The assailed provisions limit the candidacy of any and all civil servants holding appointive positions without
due regard for the type of office being sought, whether it be partisan or nonpartisan in character, or in the
national, municipal or barangay level.

Such a myopic view obviously fails to consider a different, yet equally plausible, threat to the government
posed by the partisan potential of a large and growing bureaucracy: the danger of systematic abuse
perpetuated by a "powerful political machine" that has amassed "the scattered powers of government workers"
so as to give itself and its incumbent workers an "unbreakable grasp on the reins of power."80 As elucidated in
our prior exposition:81

Attempts by government employees to wield influence over others or to make use of their respective positions
(apparently) to promote their own candidacy may seem tolerable even innocuous particularly when viewed
in isolation from other similar attempts by other government employees. Yet it would be decidedly foolhardy to
discount the equally (if not more) realistic and dangerous possibility that such seemingly disjointed attempts,
when taken together, constitute a veiled effort on the part of an emerging central party structure to advance its
own agenda through a "carefully orchestrated use of [appointive and/or elective] officials" coming from various
levels of the bureaucracy.

[T]he avoidance of such a "politically active public work force" which could give an emerging political
machine an "unbreakable grasp on the reins of power" is reason enough to impose a restriction on the
candidacies of all appointive public officials without further distinction as to the type of positions being held by
such employees or the degree of influence that may be attendant thereto. (citations omitted)

ii. Limitation on Candidacy Regardless of Type of Office Sought, Valid

The assailed Decision also held that the challenged provisions of law are overly broad because they are made
to apply indiscriminately to all civil servants holding appointive offices, without due regard for the type of
elective office being sought, whether it be partisan or nonpartisan in character, or in the national, municipal or
barangay level.

Again, on second look, we have to revise our assailed Decision.

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This erroneous ruling is premised on the assumption that "the concerns of a truly partisan office and the
temptations it fosters are sufficiently different from those involved in an office removed from regular party
politics [so as] to warrant distinctive treatment,"82 so that restrictions on candidacy akin to those imposed by
the challenged provisions can validly apply only to situations in which the elective office sought is partisan in
character. To the extent, therefore, that such restrictions are said to preclude even candidacies for nonpartisan
elective offices, the challenged restrictions are to be considered as overbroad.

Any elective or appointive municipal, city, provincial or national official or employee, or those in the civil or
military service, including those in government-owned or-controlled corporations, shall be considered
automatically resigned upon the filing of certificate of candidacy for a barangay office.

Again, a careful study of the challenged provisions and related laws on the matter will show that the alleged
overbreadth is more apparent than real. Our exposition on this issue has not been repudiated, viz.:

Since barangay elections are governed by a separate deemed resignation rule, under the present state of law,
there would be no occasion to apply the restriction on candidacy found in Section 66 of the Omnibus Election
Code, and later reiterated in the proviso of Section 13 of RA 9369, to any election other than a partisan one. For
this reason, the overbreadth challenge raised against Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and the
pertinent proviso in Section 13 of RA 9369 must also fail. 85

A perusal of Resolution 8678 will immediately disclose that the rules and guidelines set forth therein refer to
the filing of certificates of candidacy and nomination of official candidates of registered political parties, in
connection with the May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections.83 Obviously, these rules and guidelines,
including the restriction in Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, were issued specifically for purposes of the May 10,
2010 National and Local Elections, which, it must be noted, are decidedly partisan in character. Thus, it is clear
that the restriction in Section 4(a) of RA 8678 applies only to the candidacies of appointive officials vying for
partisan elective posts in the May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections. On this score, the overbreadth
challenge leveled against Section 4(a) is clearly unsustainable.

Similarly, a considered review of Section 13 of RA 9369 and Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, in
conjunction with other related laws on the matter, will confirm that these provisions are likewise not intended
to apply to elections for nonpartisan public offices.

The only elections which are relevant to the present inquiry are the elections for barangay offices, since these
are the only elections in this country which involve nonpartisan public offices.84

In this regard, it is well to note that from as far back as the enactment of the Omnibus Election Code in 1985,
Congress has intended that these nonpartisan barangay elections be governed by special rules, including a
separate rule on deemed resignations which is found in Section 39 of the Omnibus Election Code. Said
provision states:

Section 39. Certificate of Candidacy. No person shall be elected punong barangay or kagawad ng
sangguniang barangay unless he files a sworn certificate of candidacy in triplicate on any day from the
commencement of the election period but not later than the day before the beginning of the campaign period
in a form to be prescribed by the Commission. The candidate shall state the barangay office for which he is a
candidate.

xxxx

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In any event, even if we were to assume, for the sake of argument, that Section 66 of the Omnibus Election
Code and the corresponding provision in Section 13 of RA 9369 are general rules that apply also to elections for
nonpartisan public offices, the overbreadth challenge would still be futile. Again, we explained:

In the first place, the view that Congress is limited to controlling only partisan behavior has not received judicial
imprimatur, because the general proposition of the relevant US cases on the matter is simply that the
government has an interest in regulating the conduct and speech of its employees that differs significantly
from those it possesses in connection with regulation of the speech of the citizenry in general.86

Moreover, in order to have a statute declared as unconstitutional or void on its face for being overly broad,
particularly where, as in this case, "conduct" and not "pure speech" is involved, the overbreadth must not only
be real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the statutes plainly legitimate sweep.87

In operational terms, measuring the substantiality of a statutes overbreadth would entail, among other things,
a rough balancing of the number of valid applications compared to the number of potentially invalid
applications.88 In this regard, some sensitivity to reality is needed; an invalid application that is far-fetched
does not deserve as much weight as one that is probable.89 The question is a matter of degree.90 Thus,
assuming for the sake of argument that the partisan-nonpartisan distinction is valid and necessary such that a
statute which fails to make this distinction is susceptible to an overbreadth attack, the overbreadth challenge
presently mounted must demonstrate or provide this Court with some idea of the number of potentially invalid
elections (i.e. the number of elections that were insulated from party rivalry but were nevertheless closed to
appointive employees) that may in all probability result from the enforcement of the statute.91

The state of the record, however, does not permit us to find overbreadth. Borrowing from the words of Magill v.
Lynch, indeed, such a step is not to be taken lightly, much less to be taken in the dark,92 especially since an
overbreadth finding in this case would effectively prohibit the State from enforcing an otherwise valid measure
against conduct that is admittedly within its power to proscribe.93

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This Court would do well to proceed with tiptoe caution, particularly when it comes to the application of the
overbreadth doctrine in the analysis of statutes that purportedly attempt to restrict or burden the exercise of
the right to freedom of speech, for such approach is manifestly strong medicine that must be used sparingly,
and only as a last resort.94

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court RESOLVES to GRANT the respondents and the intervenors Motions for
Reconsideration; REVERSE and SET ASIDE this Courts December 1, 2009 Decision; DISMISS the Petition; and
ISSUE this Resolution declaring as not UNCONSTITUTIONAL (1) Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678,
(2) the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369, and (3) Section 66 of the
Omnibus Election Code.
SO ORDERED.

In the United States, claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained only where, in the judgment of the
court, the possibility that protected speech of others may be muted and perceived grievances left to fester
(due to the possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes) outweighs the possible harm to society in
allowing some unprotected speech or conduct to go unpunished.95 Facial overbreadth has likewise not been
invoked where a limiting construction could be placed on the challenged statute, and where there are readily
apparent constructions that would cure, or at least substantially reduce, the alleged overbreadth of the
statute.96

In the case at bar, the probable harm to society in permitting incumbent appointive officials to remain in office,
even as they actively pursue elective posts, far outweighs the less likely evil of having arguably protected
candidacies blocked by the possible inhibitory effect of a potentially overly broad statute.a1f

In this light, the conceivably impermissible applications of the challenged statutes which are, at best, bold
predictions cannot justify invalidating these statutes in toto and prohibiting the State from enforcing them
against conduct that is, and has for more than 100 years been, unquestionably within its power and interest to
proscribe.97 Instead, the more prudent approach would be to deal with these conceivably impermissible
applications through case-by-case adjudication rather than through a total invalidation of the statute itself.98

Indeed, the anomalies spawned by our assailed Decision have taken place. In his Motion for Reconsideration,
intervenor Drilon stated that a number of high-ranking Cabinet members had already filed their Certificates of
Candidacy without relinquishing their posts.99 Several COMELEC election officers had likewise filed their
Certificates of Candidacy in their respective provinces.100 Even the Secretary of Justice had filed her certificate
of substitution for representative of the first district of Quezon province last December 14, 2009101 even as
her position as Justice Secretary includes supervision over the City and Provincial Prosecutors,102 who, in turn,
act as Vice-Chairmen of the respective Boards of Canvassers.103 The Judiciary has not been spared, for a
Regional Trial Court Judge in the South has thrown his hat into the political arena. We cannot allow the tilting of
our electoral playing field in their favor.

For the foregoing reasons, we now rule that Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678 and Section 13 of RA 9369, which
merely reiterate Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, are not unconstitutionally overbroad.

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G.R. No. 148326

November 15, 2001

PABLO C. VILLABER, petitioner,


vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and REP. DOUGLAS R. CAGAS, respondents.

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

In this petition for certiorari, Pablo C. Villaber, seeks the nullification of two Resolutions of the Commission on
Election (COMELEC) in SPA-01-058. The first one was issued by its Second Division on April 30, 2001,
disqualifying him as a candidate for the position of Congressman in the First District of the Province of Davao
del Sur in the last May 14, 2001 elections, and cancelling his certificate of candidacy; and the second is the en
banc Resolution dated May 10, 2001 denying his motion for reconsideration.

Both petitioner Villaber and respondent Douglas R. Cagas were rival candidates for a congressional seat in the
First District of Davao del Sur during the May 14, 2001 elections. Villaber filed his certificate of candidacy for
Congressman on February 19, 2001,1 while Cagas filed his on February 28, 2001.2

On March 4, 2001, Cagas filed with the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor, Commission On Elections
(COMELEC), Davao del Sur, a consolidated petition3 to disqualify Villaber and to cancel the latter's certificate of
candidacy. Cagas alleged in the said consolidated petition that on March 2, 1990, Villaber was convicted by the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 15, in Criminal Case No. 86-46197 for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg.
22 and was sentenced to suffer one (1) year imprisonment. The check that bounced was in the sum of
P100,000.00.4 Cagas further alleged that this crime involves moral turpitude; hence, under Section 12 of the
Omnibus Election Code, he is disqualified to run for any public office. On appeal, the Court of Appeals (Tenth
Division), in its Decision dated April23, 1992 in CA-G.R. CR No. 09017,5 affirmed the RTC Decision. Undaunted,
Villaber filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Court of Appeals Decision, docketed
as G. R. No. 106709. However, in its Resolution6 of October 26, 1992, this Court (Third Division) dismissed the
petition. On February 2, 1993, our Resolution became final and executory.7 Cagas also asserted that Villaber
made a false material representation in his certificate of candidacy that he is "Eligible for the office I seek to be
elected " - which false statement is a ground to deny due course or cancel the said certificate pursuant to
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code.

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In his answers8 to the disqualification suit, Villaber countered mainly that his conviction has not become final
and executory because the affirmed Decision was not remanded to the trial court for promulgation in his
presence.9 Furthermore, even if the judgment of conviction was already final and executory, it cannot be the
basis for his disqualification since violation of B.P. Blg. 22 does not involve moral turpitude.

As to the meaning of "moral turpitude," we have consistently adopted the definition in Black's Law Dictionary
as "an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to
society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman, or
conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals."13

After the opposing parties submitted their respective position papers, the case was forwarded to the COMELEC,
Manila, for resolution.1wphi1.nt

In In re Vinzon,14 the term "moral turpitude" is considered as encompassing "everything which is done contrary
to justice, honesty , or good morals."

On April 30, 2001, the COMELEC (Second Division), finding merit in Cagas' petition, issued the challenged
Resolution10 in SPA A 01-058 declaring Villaber disqualified as "a candidate for and from holding any elective
public office" and canceling his certificate of candidacy. The COMELEC ruled that a conviction for violation of
B.P. BIg. 22 involves moral turpitude following the ruling of this Court en banc in the administrative case of
People vs. Atty. Fe Tuanda.11

We, however, clarified in Dela Torre vs. Commission on Elections15 that "not every criminal act involves moral
turpitude," and that ''as to what crime involves moral turpitude is for the Supreme Court to determine."16 We
further pronounced therein that:

Villaber fIled a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the COMELEC en banc in a Resolution12 dated
May 10, 2001.

"...in International Rice Research Institute vs. NLRC (221 SCRA 760 [1993]), the Court admitted that it cannot
always be ascertained whether moral turpitude does or does not exist by merely classifying a crime as malum
in se or as malum prohibitum. There are crimes which are mala in se and yet but rarely involve moral turpitude,
and there are crimes which involve moral turpitude and are mala prohibita only. In the final analysis, whether or
not a crime involves moral turpitude is ultimately a question of fact and frequently depends on all the
circumstances surrounding the violation of the statute." (Emphasis ours)

Hence, this petition.

The sole issue for our Resolution is whether or not violation of B.P. Blg. 22 involves moral turpitude.

The COMELEC believes it is. In disqualifying petitioner Villaber from being a candidate for Congressman, the
COMELEC applied Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code which provides:

"Sec. 12. Disqualifications. - Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or incompetent,
or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion, or for any offense for which he
has been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months, or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall
be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted
amnesty.

"The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed upon the declaration by
competent authority that said insanity or incompetence had been removed or after the expiration of a period of
five years from his service of sentence, unless within the same period he again becomes disqualified."
(Emphasis ours)

Pearliegates

We reiterate here our ruling in Dela Torre17 that the determination of whether a crime involves moral turpitude
is a question of fact and frequently depends on all the circumstances surrounding the violation of the statute.

In the case at bar, petitioner does not assail the facts and circumstances surrounding the commission of the
crime. In effect, he admits all the elements of the crime for which he was convicted. At any rate, the question
of whether or not the crime involves moral turpitude can be resolved by analyzing its elements alone, as we did
in Dela Torre which involves the crime of fencing punishable by a special law.18

Petitioner was charged for violating B.P. Blg. 22 under the following Information:

"That on or about February 13, 1986, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously make or draw and issue to Efren D. Sawal to apply on account or for value
Bank of Philippine Islands (Plaza Cervantes, Manila) Check No. 958214 dated February 13, 1986 payable to
Efren D. Sawal in the amount of P100,000.00, said accused well knowing that at the time of issue he did not
have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for payment of such check in full upon its presentment,
which check, when presented for payment within ninety (90) days from the date thereof, was subsequently
dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds, and despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, said

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accused failed to pay said Efren D. Sawal the amount of said check or to make arrangement for full payment of
the same within five (5) banking days after receiving said notice." (Emphasis ours)

Petitioner contends that this Court's pronouncement in People v. Atty. Fe Tuanda,24 insofar as it states that
conviction under B.P. BIg. 22 involves moral turpitude, does not apply to him since he is not a lawyer.

He was convicted for violating Section 1 of B.P. Blg. 22 provides :

This argument is erroneous.

"SECTION 1. Checks without sufficient funds. - Any person who makes or draws and issues any check to apply
on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the
drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check is subsequently
dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same
reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment, shall be punished by
imprisonment of not less than thirty days but not more than one (1) year or by a fine of not less than but not
more than double the amount of the check which fine shall in no case exceed Two Hundred Thousand Pesos, or
both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court." (Emphasis ours).

In that case, the Court of Appeals affirmed Atty. Fe Tuanda's conviction for violation of B.P. BIg. 22 and, in
addition, suspended her from the practice of law pursuant to Sections 27 and 28 of Rule 138 of the Revised
Rules of Court. Her motion seeking the lifting of her suspension was denied by this Court on the ground that the
said offense involves moral turpitude. There we said in part:

The elements of the offense under the above provision are:

1. The accused makes, draws or issues any check to apply to account or for value;

"We should add that the crimes of which respondent was convicted also import deceit and violation of her
attorney's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility, under both of which she was bound to 'obey the
laws of the land.' Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude might not (as in the instant case, violation of
B.P. Blg. 22 does not) relate to the exercise of the profession of a lawyer; however, it certainly relates to and
affects the good moral character of a person convicted of such offense. x x x."25 (Emphasis ours)

Clearly, in Tuanda, this Court did not make a distinction whether the offender is a lawyer or a non-lawyer. Nor
did it declare that such offense constitutes moral turpitude when committed by a member of the Bar but is not
so when committed by a non-member.

2. The accused knows at the time of the issuance that he or she does not have sufficient funds in, or credit
with, the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and

3. The check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit, or it would
have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to
stop payment.19

The presence of the second element manifests moral turpitude. In People vs. Atty. Fe Tuanda20 we held that a
conviction for violation of B.P. BIg. 22 "imports deceit" and "certainly relates to and affects the good moral
character of a person."21 The effects of the issuance of a worthless check, as we held in the landmark case
of Lozano vs. Martinez,22 through Justice Pedro L. Yap, "transcends the private interests of the parties directly
involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not
only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public" since the circulation of valueless
commercial papers "can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and
eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest."23 Thus, paraphrasing Black's definition, a
drawer who issues an unfunded check deliberately reneges on his private duties he owes his fellow men or
society in a manner contrary to accepted and customary rule of right and duty, justice, honesty or good morals.

We cannot go along with petitioner's contention that this Court's ruling in Tuanda has been abandoned or
modified in the recent case of Rosa Lim vs. People of the Philippines,26 which reiterated the ruling in Vaca vs.
Court of Appeals.27 In these two latter cases, the penalty of imprisonment imposed on the accused for
violation of B.P. BIg. 22 was deleted by this Court. Only a fine was imposed. Petitioner insists that with the
deletion of the prison sentence, the offense no longer involves moral turpitude. We made no such
pronouncement. This is what we said in Rosa Lim:

"In Vaca v. Court of Appeals, we held that in determining the penalty to be imposed for violation of B.P. Blg. 22,
the philosophy underlying the Indeterminate Sentence Law applies. The philosophy is to redeem valuable
human material, and to prevent unnecessary deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness with due
regard to the protection of the social order. There we deleted the prison sentence imposed on petitioners. We
imposed on them only a fine double the amount of the check issued. We considered the fact that petitioners
brought the appeal, believing in good faith, that no violation of B.P. Blg. 22 was committed, 'otherwise, they
would have simply accepted the judgment of the trial court and applied for probation to evade prison term.' We
do the same here. We believe such would best serve the ends of criminal justice."
In fine, we find no grave abuse of discretion committed by respondent COMELEC in issuing the assailed
Resolutions.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Costs against petitioner.1wphi1.nt

Pearliegates

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SO ORDERED.

The case was forwarded to the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor of Samar for preliminary hearing.
After due proceedings, the Investigating Officer recommended that Moreno be disqualified from running for
Punong Barangay.

G.R. No. 168550 August 10, 2006

URBANO M. MORENO, Petitioner,


vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and NORMA L. MEJES, CHICO-NAZARIO, Respondents.

The Comelec First Division adopted this recommendation. On motion for reconsideration filed with the Comelec
en banc, the Resolution of the First Division was affirmed. According to the Comelec en banc, Sec. 40(a) of the
Local Government Code provides that those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral
turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after
serving sentence, are disqualified from running for any elective local position. 5 Since Moreno was released
from probation on December 20, 2000, disqualification shall commence on this date and end two (2) years
thence. The grant of probation to Moreno merely suspended the execution of his sentence but did not affect his
disqualification from running for an elective local office.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

Further, the Comelec en banc held that the provisions of the Local Government Code take precedence over the
case of Baclayon v. Mutia cited by Moreno and the Probation Law because it is a much later enactment and a
special law setting forth the qualifications and disqualifications of elective local officials.

In this Petition 1 dated July 6, 2005, Urbano M. Moreno (Moreno) assails the Resolution 2 of the Commission on
Elections (Comelec) en banc dated June 1, 2005, affirming the Resolution 3 of the Comelec First Division dated
November 15, 2002 which, in turn, disqualified him from running for the elective office of Punong Barangay of
Barangay Cabugao, Daram, Samar in the July 15, 2002 Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan
Elections.

In this petition, Moreno argues that the disqualification under the Local Government Code applies only to those
who have served their sentence and not to probationers because the latter do not serve the adjudged
sentence. The Probation Law should allegedly be read as an exception to the Local Government Code because
it is a special law which applies only to probationers. Further, even assuming that he is disqualified, his
subsequent election as Punong Barangay allegedly constitutes an implied pardon of his previous misconduct.

The following are the undisputed facts:

In its Comment 6 dated November 18, 2005 on behalf of the Comelec, the Office of the Solicitor General argues
that this Court in Dela Torre v. Comelec 7 definitively settled a similar controversy by ruling that conviction for
an offense involving moral turpitude stands even if the candidate was granted probation. The disqualification
under Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code subsists and remains totally unaffected notwithstanding the
grant of probation.

Norma L. Mejes (Mejes) filed a petition to disqualify Moreno from running for Punong Barangay on the ground
that the latter was convicted by final judgment of the crime of Arbitrary Detention and was sentenced to suffer
imprisonment of Four (4) Months and One (1) Day to Two (2) Years and Four (4) Months by the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 28 of Catbalogan, Samar on August 27, 1998.

Moreno filed an answer averring that the petition states no cause of action because he was already granted
probation. Allegedly, following the case of Baclayon v. Mutia, 4 the imposition of the sentence of imprisonment,
as well as the accessory penalties, was thereby suspended. Moreno also argued that under Sec. 16 of the
Probation Law of 1976 (Probation Law), the final discharge of the probation shall operate to restore to him all
civil rights lost or suspended as a result of his conviction and to fully discharge his liability for any fine imposed.
The order of the trial court dated December 18, 2000 allegedly terminated his probation and restored to him all
the civil rights he lost as a result of his conviction, including the right to vote and be voted for in the July 15,
2002 elections.

Pearliegates

Moreno filed a Reply to Comment 8 dated March 27, 2006, reiterating his arguments and pointing out material
differences between his case and Dela Torre v. Comelec which allegedly warrant a conclusion favorable to him.
According to Moreno, Dela Torre v. Comelec involves a conviction for violation of the Anti-Fencing Law, an
offense involving moral turpitude covered by the first part of Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code. Dela
Torre, the petitioner in that case, applied for probation nearly four (4) years after his conviction and only after
appealing his conviction, such that he could not have been eligible for probation under the law.

In contrast, Moreno alleges that he applied for and was granted probation within the period specified therefor.
He never served a day of his sentence as a result. Hence, the disqualification under Sec. 40(a) of the Local
Government Code does not apply to him.

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The resolution of the present controversy depends on the application of the phrase "within two (2) years after
serving sentence" found in Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code, which reads:

Sec. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position:

(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by
one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence; [Emphasis supplied.]

Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code appears innocuous enough at first glance. The phrase "service of
sentence," understood in its general and common sense, means the confinement of a convicted

person in a penal facility for the period adjudged by the court. 10 This seemingly clear and unambiguous
provision, however, has spawned a controversy worthy of this Courts attention because the Comelec, in the
assailed resolutions, is alleged to have broadened the coverage of the law to include even those who did not
serve a day of their sentence because they were granted probation.

Moreno argues, quite persuasively, that he should not have been disqualified because he did not serve the
adjudged sentence having been granted probation and finally discharged by the trial court.

....

We should mention at this juncture that there is no need to rule on whether Arbitrary Detention, the crime of
which Moreno was convicted by final judgment, involves moral turpitude falling under the first part of the
above-quoted provision. The question of whether Arbitrary Detention is a crime involving moral turpitude was
never raised in the petition for disqualification because the ground relied upon by Mejes, and which the
Comelec used in its assailed resolutions, is his alleged disqualification from running for a local elective office
within two (2) years from his discharge from probation after having been convicted by final judgment for an
offense punishable by Four (4) Months and One (1) Day to Two (2) Years and Four (4) Months. Besides, a
determination that the crime of Arbitrary Detention involves moral turpitude is not decisive of this case, the
crucial issue being whether Morenos sentence was in fact served.

In this sense, Dela Torre v. Comelec is not squarely applicable. Our pronouncement therein that the grant of
probation does not affect the disqualification under Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code was based
primarily on the finding that the crime of fencing of which petitioner was convicted involves moral turpitude, a
circumstance which does not obtain in this case. At any rate, the phrase "within two (2) years after serving
sentence" should have been interpreted and understood to apply both to those who have been sentenced by
final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude and to those who have been sentenced by final
judgment for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment. The placing of the comma (,) in
the provision means that the phrase modifies both parts of Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code.

The Courts declaration on the effect of probation on Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code, we should add,
ought to be considered an obiter in view of the fact that Dela Torre was not even entitled to probation because
he appealed his conviction to the Regional Trial Court which, however, affirmed his conviction. It has been held
that the perfection of an appeal is a relinquishment of the alternative remedy of availing of the Probation Law,
the purpose of which is to prevent speculation or opportunism on the part of an accused who, although already
eligible, did not at once apply for probation, but did so only after failing in his appeal. 9

Pearliegates

In Baclayon v. Mutia, the Court declared that an order placing defendant on probation is not a sentence but is
rather, in effect, a suspension of the imposition of sentence. We held that the grant of probation to petitioner
suspended the imposition of the principal penalty of imprisonment, as well as the accessory penalties of
suspension from public office and from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special
disqualification from the right of suffrage. We thus deleted from the order granting probation the paragraph
which required that petitioner refrain from continuing with her teaching profession.

Applying this doctrine to the instant case, the accessory penalties of suspension from public office, from the
right to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage,
attendant to the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period
11 imposed upon Moreno were similarly suspended upon the grant of probation.

It appears then that during the period of probation, the probationer is not even disqualified from running for a
public office because the accessory penalty of suspension from public office is put on hold for the duration of
the probation.

Clearly, the period within which a person is under probation cannot be equated with service of the sentence
adjudged. Sec. 4 of the Probation Law specifically provides that the grant of probation suspends the execution
of the sentence. During the period of probation, 12 the probationer does not serve the penalty imposed upon
him by the court but is merely required to comply with all the conditions prescribed in the probation order. 13

It is regrettable that the Comelec and the OSG have misapprehended the real issue in this case. They focused
on the fact that Morenos judgment of conviction attained finality upon his application for probation instead of
the question of whether his sentence had been served.

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The Comelec could have correctly resolved this case by simply applying the law to the letter. Sec. 40(a) of the
Local Government Code unequivocally disqualifies only those who have been sentenced by final judgment for
an offense punishable by imprisonment of one (1) year or more, within two (2) years after serving sentence.

This omission is significant because it offers a glimpse into the legislative intent to treat probationers as a
distinct class of offenders not covered by the disqualification.

This is as good a time as any to clarify that those who have not served their sentence by reason of the grant of
probation which, we reiterate, should not be equated with service of sentence, should not likewise be
disqualified from running for a local elective office because the two (2)-year period of ineligibility under Sec.
40(a) of the Local Government Code does not even begin to run.

Further, it should be mentioned that the present Local Government Code was enacted in 1991, some seven (7)
years after Baclayon v. Mutia was decided. When the legislature approved the enumerated disqualifications
under Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code, it is presumed to have knowledge of our ruling in Baclayon v.
Mutia on the effect of probation on the disqualification from holding public office. That it chose not to include
probationers within the purview of the provision is a clear expression of the legislative will not to disqualify
probationers.

The fact that the trial court already issued an order finally discharging Moreno fortifies his position. Sec. 16 of
the Probation Law provides that "[t]he final discharge of the probationer shall operate to restore to him all civil
rights lost or suspended as a result of his conviction and to fully discharge his liability for any fine imposed as
to the offense for which probation was granted." Thus, when Moreno was finally discharged upon the courts
finding that he has fulfilled the terms and conditions of his probation, his case was deemed terminated and all
civil rights lost or suspended as a result of his conviction were restored to him, including the right to run for
public office.

On this score, we agree with Moreno that the Probation Law should be construed as an exception to the Local
Government Code. While the Local Government Code is a later law which sets forth the qualifications and
disqualifications of local elective officials, the Probation Law is a special legislation which applies only to
probationers. It is a canon of statutory construction that a later statute, general in its terms and not expressly
repealing a prior special statute, will ordinarily not affect the special provisions of such earlier statute. 17

Even assuming that there is an ambiguity in Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code which gives room for
judicial interpretation, 14 our conclusion will remain the same.

In construing Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code in a way that broadens the scope of the disqualification
to include Moreno, the Comelec committed an egregious error which we here correct. We rule that Moreno was
not disqualified to run for Punong Barangay of Barangay Cabugao, Daram, Samar in the July 15, 2002
Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections.

It is unfortunate that the deliberations on the Local Government Code afford us no clue as to the intended
meaning of the phrase "service of sentence," i.e., whether the legislature also meant to disqualify those who
have been granted probation. The Courts function, in the face of this seeming dissonance, is to interpret and
harmonize the Probation Law and the Local Government Code. Interpretare et concordare legis legibus est
optimus interpretandi.

Probation is not a right of an accused but a mere privilege, an act of grace and clemency or immunity conferred
by the state, which is granted to a deserving defendant who thereby escapes the extreme rigors of the penalty
imposed by law for the offense of which he was convicted. 15 Thus, the Probation Law lays out rather stringent
standards regarding who are qualified for probation. For instance, it provides that the benefits of probation shall
not be extended to those sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than six (6) years;
convicted of any offense against the security of the State; those who have previously been convicted by final
judgment of an offense punished by imprisonment of not less than one (1) month and one (1) day and/or a fine
of not less than P200.00; those who have been once on probation; and those who are already serving sentence
at the time the substantive provisions of the Probation Law became applicable. 16

It is important to note that the disqualification under Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code covers offenses
punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, a penalty which also covers probationable offenses. In
spite of this, the provision does not specifically disqualify probationers from running for a local elective office.

Pearliegates

Finally, we note that Moreno was the incumbent Punong Barangay at the time of his conviction of the crime of
Arbitrary Detention. He claims to have obtained a fresh mandate from the people of Barangay Cabugao,
Daram, Samar in the July 15, 2002 elections. This situation calls to mind the poignant words of Mr. Justice now
Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban in Frivaldo v. Comelec 18 where he said that "it would be far better to err in
favor of popular sovereignty than to be right in complex but little understood legalisms."

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the Commission on Elections en banc dated June 1,
2005 and the Resolution of its First Division dated November 15, 2002, as well as all other actions and orders
issued pursuant thereto, are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The Commission on Elections is directed to proceed in
accordance with this Decision. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 137000

August 9, 2000

CIRILO R. VALLES, petitioner,


vs.

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COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ROSALIND YBASCO LOPEZ, respondents.

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, assailing Resolutions dated July 17, 1998 and January 15, 1999, respectively, of the Commission on
Elections in SPA No. 98-336, dismissing the petition for disqualification filed by the herein petitioner, Cirilo R.
Valles, against private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, in the May 1998 elections for governor of Davao
Oriental.

Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Napier Terrace, Broome, Western Australia, to the spouses,
Telesforo Ybasco, a Filipino citizen and native of Daet, Camarines Norte, and Theresa Marquez, an Australian. In
1949, at the age of fifteen, she left Australia and came to settle in the Philippines.

On June 27, 1952, she was married to Leopoldo Lopez, a Filipino citizen, at the Malate Catholic Church in
Manila. Since then, she has continuously participated in the electoral process not only as a voter but as a
candidate, as well. She served as Provincial Board Member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Davao Oriental.
In 1992, she ran for and was elected governor of Davao Oriental. Her election was contested by her opponent,
Gil Taojo, Jr., in a petition for quo warranto, docketed as EPC No. 92-54, alleging as ground therefor her alleged
Australian citizenship. However, finding no sufficient proof that respondent had renounced her Philippine
citizenship, the Commission on Elections en banc dismissed the petition, ratiocinating thus:

"A cursory reading of the records of this case vis-a-vis the impugned resolution shows that respondent was able
to produce documentary proofs of the Filipino citizenship of her late father... and consequently, prove her own
citizenship and filiation by virtue of the Principle of Jus Sanguinis, the perorations of the petitioner to the
contrary notwithstanding.

On the other hand, except for the three (3) alleged important documents . . . no other evidence substantial in
nature surfaced to confirm the allegations of petitioner that respondent is an Australian citizen and not a
Filipino. Express renunciation of citizenship as a mode of losing citizenship under Commonwealth Act No. 63 is
an equivocal and deliberate act with full awareness of its significance and consequence. The evidence adduced
by petitioner are inadequate, nay meager, to prove that respondent contemplated renunciation of her Filipino
citizenship".1

In the 1995 local elections, respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez ran for re-election as governor of Davao Oriental.
Her opponent, Francisco Rabat, filed a petition for disqualification, docketed as SPA No. 95-066 before the
COMELEC, First Division, contesting her Filipino citizenship but the said petition was likewise dismissed by the
COMELEC, reiterating substantially its decision in EPC 92-54.

Pearliegates

The citizenship of private respondent was once again raised as an issue when she ran for re-election as
governor of Davao Oriental in the May 11, 1998 elections. Her candidacy was questioned by the herein
petitioner, Cirilo Valles, in SPA No. 98-336.

On July 17, 1998, the COMELECs First Division came out with a Resolution dismissing the petition, and
disposing as follows:

"Assuming arguendo that res judicata does not apply and We are to dispose the instant case on the merits
trying it de novo, the above table definitely shows that petitioner herein has presented no new evidence to
disturb the Resolution of this Commission in SPA No. 95-066. The present petition merely restates the same
matters and incidents already passed upon by this Commission not just in 1995 Resolution but likewise in the
Resolution of EPC No. 92-54. Not having put forth any new evidence and matter substantial in nature,
persuasive in character or sufficiently provocative to compel reversal of such Resolutions, the dismissal of the
present petition follows as a matter of course.

xxx

xxx

xxx

"WHEREFORE, premises considered and there being no new matters and issues tendered, We find no
convincing reason or impressive explanation to disturb and reverse the Resolutions promulgated by this
Commission in EPC 92-54 and SPA. 95-066. This Commission RESOLVES as it hereby RESOLVES to DISMISS the
present petition.

SO ORDERED."2

Petitioner interposed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid Resolution but to no avail. The same was
denied by the COMELEC in its en banc Resolution of January 15, 1999.

Undaunted, petitioner found his way to this Court via the present petition; questioning the citizenship of private
respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez.

The Commission on Elections ruled that private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez is a Filipino citizen and
therefore, qualified to run for a public office because (1) her father, Telesforo Ybasco, is a Filipino citizen, and by
virtue of the principle of jus sanguinis she was a Filipino citizen under the 1987 Philippine Constitution; (2) she
was married to a Filipino, thereby making her also a Filipino citizen ipso jure under Section 4 of Commonwealth
Act 473; (3) and that, she renounced her Australian citizenship on January 15, 1992 before the Department of
Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of Australia and her Australian passport was accordingly cancelled as certified to

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by the Australian Embassy in Manila; and (4) furthermore, there are the COMELEC Resolutions in EPC No. 92-54
and SPA Case No. 95-066, declaring her a Filipino citizen duly qualified to run for the elective position of Davao
Oriental governor.

not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and again as the occasion may
demand. xxx"

The petition is unmeritorious.


Petitioner, on the other hand, maintains that the private respondent is an Australian citizen, placing reliance on
the admitted facts that:

a) In 1988, private respondent registered herself with the Bureau of Immigration as an Australian national and
was issued Alien Certificate of Registration No. 404695 dated September 19, 1988;

b) On even date, she applied for the issuance of an Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR), and

c) She was issued Australian Passport No. H700888 on March 3, 1988.

Petitioner theorizes that under the aforestated facts and circumstances, the private respondent had renounced
her Filipino citizenship. He contends that in her application for alien certificate of registration and immigrant
certificate of residence, private respondent expressly declared under oath that she was a citizen or subject of
Australia; and said declaration forfeited her Philippine citizenship, and operated to disqualify her to run for
elective office.

As regards the COMELECs finding that private respondent had renounced her Australian citizenship on January
15, 1992 before the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of Australia and had her Australian passport
cancelled on February 11, 1992, as certified to by the Australian Embassy here in Manila, petitioner argues that
the said acts did not automatically restore the status of private respondent as a Filipino citizen. According to
petitioner, for the private respondent to reacquire Philippine citizenship she must comply with the mandatory
requirements for repatriation under Republic Act 8171; and the election of private respondent to public office
did not mean the restoration of her Filipino citizenship since the private respondent was not legally repatriated.
Coupled with her alleged renunciation of Australian citizenship, private respondent has effectively become a
stateless person and as such, is disqualified to run for a public office in the Philippines; petitioner concluded.

Petitioner theorizes further that the Commission on Elections erred in applying the principle of res judicata to
the case under consideration; citing the ruling in Moy Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner of Immigration,3 that:

"xxx Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative case,
whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally

Pearliegates

The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis. Thereunder, a child follows the
nationality or citizenship of the parents regardless of the place of his/her birth, as opposed to the doctrine of jus
soli which determines nationality or citizenship on the basis of place of birth.

Private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Napier Terrace, Broome, Western
Australia, to the spouses, Telesforo Ybasco, a Filipino citizen and native of Daet, Camarines Norte, and Theresa
Marquez, an Australian. Historically, this was a year before the 1935 Constitution took into effect and at that
time, what served as the Constitution of the Philippines were the principal organic acts by which the United
States governed the country. These were the Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Act of
August 29, 1916, also known as the Jones Law.

Among others, these laws defined who were deemed to be citizens of the Philippine islands. The Philippine Bill
of 1902 defined Philippine citizens as:

SEC. 4 xxx all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein who were Spanish subjects on
the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in the Philippine Islands, and
their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands and as
such entitled to the protection of the United States, except such as shall have elected to preserve their
allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United
States and Spain signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight. (underscoring ours)

The Jones Law, on the other hand, provides:

SEC. 2 That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April,
eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto,
shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands, except such as shall have elected to preserve
their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the
United States and Spain, signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, and except such
others as have since become citizens of some other country: Provided, That the Philippine Legislature, herein
provided for, is hereby authorized to provide by law for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives
of the Philippine Islands who cannot come within the foregoing provisions, the natives of the insular
possessions of the United States, and such other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who are citizens of

121

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the United States, or who could become citizens of the United States under the laws of the United States if
residing therein. (underscoring ours)

respondents application for an Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR) and Immigrant Certificate of Residence
(ICR), on September 19, 1988, and the issuance to her of an Australian passport on March 3, 1988.

Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899 and
resided therein including their children are deemed to be Philippine citizens. Private respondents father,
Telesforo Ybasco, was born on January 5, 1879 in Daet, Camarines Norte, a fact duly evidenced by a certified
true copy of an entry in the Registry of Births. Thus, under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law,
Telesforo Ybasco was deemed to be a Philippine citizen. By virtue of the same laws, which were the laws in
force at the time of her birth, Telesforos daughter, herein private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is likewise
a citizen of the Philippines.

Under Commonwealth Act No. 63, a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship:

(1) By naturalization in a foreign country;

(2) By express renunciation of citizenship;


The signing into law of the 1935 Philippine Constitution has established the principle of jus sanguinis as basis
for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship, to wit:

(3) By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the constitution or laws of a foreign country upon
attaining twenty-one years of age or more;

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this Constitution.
(4) By accepting commission in the military, naval or air service of a foreign country;
(2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of this Constitution had
been elected to public office in the Philippine Islands.

(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.

(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine
citizenship.

(5) By cancellation of the certificate of naturalization;

(6) By having been declared by competent authority, a deserter of the Philippine armed forces in time of war,
unless subsequently, a plenary pardon or amnesty has been granted: and

(7) In case of a woman, upon her marriage, to a foreigner if, by virtue of the laws in force in her husbands
country, she acquires his nationality.

(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

So also, the principle of jus sanguinis, which confers citizenship by virtue of blood relationship, was
subsequently retained under the 19734 and 19875 Constitutions. Thus, the herein private respondent, Rosalind
Ybasco Lopez, is a Filipino citizen, having been born to a Filipino father. The fact of her being born in Australia is
not tantamount to her losing her Philippine citizenship. If Australia follows the principle of jus soli, then at most,
private respondent can also claim Australian citizenship resulting to her possession of dual citizenship.

In order that citizenship may be lost by renunciation, such renunciation must be express. Petitioners
contention that the application of private respondent for an alien certificate of registration, and her Australian
passport, is bereft of merit. This issue was put to rest in the case of Aznar vs. COMELEC6 and in the more
recent case of Mercado vs. Manzano and COMELEC.7

In the case of Aznar, the Court ruled that the mere fact that respondent Osmena was a holder of a certificate
stating that he is an American did not mean that he is no longer a Filipino, and that an application for an alien
certificate of registration was not tantamount to renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.

Petitioner also contends that even on the assumption that the private respondent is a Filipino citizen, she has
nonetheless renounced her Philippine citizenship. To buttress this contention, petitioner cited private

Pearliegates

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Election Law Cases


And, in Mercado vs. Manzano and COMELEC, it was held that the fact that respondent Manzano was registered
as an American citizen in the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation and was holding an American passport on
April 22, 1997, only a year before he filed a certificate of candidacy for vice-mayor of Makati, were just
assertions of his American nationality before the termination of his American citizenship.

Thus, the mere fact that private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was a holder of an Australian passport and
had an alien certificate of registration are not acts constituting an effective renunciation of citizenship and do
not militate against her claim of Filipino citizenship. For renunciation to effectively result in the loss of
citizenship, the same must be express.8 As held by this court in the aforecited case of Aznar, an application for
an alien certificate of registration does not amount to an express renunciation or repudiation of ones
citizenship. The application of the herein private respondent for an alien certificate of registration, and her
holding of an Australian passport, as in the case of Mercado vs. Manzano, were mere acts of assertion of her
Australian citizenship before she effectively renounced the same. Thus, at the most, private respondent had
dual citizenship - she was an Australian and a Filipino, as well.

Moreover, under Commonwealth Act 63, the fact that a child of Filipino parent/s was born in another country
has not been included as a ground for losing ones Philippine citizenship. Since private respondent did not lose
or renounce her Philippine citizenship, petitioners claim that respondent must go through the process of
repatriation does not hold water.

Petitioner also maintains that even on the assumption that the private respondent had dual citizenship, still,
she is disqualified to run for governor of Davao Oriental; citing Section 40 of Republic Act 7160 otherwise
known as the Local Government Code of 1991, which states:

"SEC. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position:

xxx

xxx

xxx

xxx

Again, petitioners contention is untenable.

Pearliegates

"xxx the phrase dual citizenship in R.A. No. 7160, xxx 40 (d) and in R.A. No. 7854, xxx 20 must be understood
as referring to dual allegiance. Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this
disqualification."

Thus, the fact that the private respondent had dual citizenship did not automatically disqualify her from running
for a public office. Furthermore, it was ruled that for candidates with dual citizenship, it is enough that they
elect Philippine citizenship upon the filing of their certificate of candidacy, to terminate their status as persons
with dual citizenship.10 The filing of a certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce foreign citizenship,
effectively removing any disqualification as a dual citizen.11 This is so because in the certificate of candidacy,
one declares that he/she is a Filipino citizen and that he/she will support and defend the Constitution of the
Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto. Such declaration, which is under oath, operates
as an effective renunciation of foreign citizenship. Therefore, when the herein private respondent filed her
certificate of candidacy in 1992, such fact alone terminated her Australian citizenship.

Then, too, it is significant to note that on January 15 1992, private respondent executed a Declaration of
Renunciation of Australian Citizenship, duly registered in the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of
Australia on May 12, 1992. And, as a result, on February 11, 1992, the Australian passport of private
respondent was cancelled, as certified to by Second Secretary Richard F. Munro of the Embassy of Australia in
Manila. As aptly appreciated by the COMELEC, the aforesaid acts were enough to settle the issue of the alleged
dual citizenship of Rosalind Ybasco Lopez. Since her renunciation was effective, petitioners claim that private
respondent must go through the whole process of repatriation holds no water.

xxx

(d) Those with dual citizenship;

xxx

In the aforecited case of Mercado vs. Manzano, the Court clarified "dual citizenship" as used in the Local
Government Code and reconciled the same with Article IV, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution on dual
allegiance.9 Recognizing situations in which a Filipino citizen may, without performing any act, and as an
involuntary consequence of the conflicting laws of different countries, be also a citizen of another state, the
Court explained that dual citizenship as a disqualification must refer to citizens with dual allegiance. The Court
succinctly pronounced:

Petitioner maintains further that when citizenship is raised as an issue in judicial or administrative proceedings,
the resolution or decision thereon is generally not considered res judicata in any subsequent proceeding
challenging the same; citing the case of Moy Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner of Immigration.12 He insists that the
same issue of citizenship may be threshed out anew.

Petitioner is correct insofar as the general rule is concerned, i.e. the principle of res judicata generally does not
apply in cases hinging on the issue of citizenship. However, in the case of Burca vs. Republic,13 an exception to
this general rule was recognized. The Court ruled in that case that in order that the doctrine of res judicata may
be applied in cases of citizenship, the following must be present:

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1) a persons citizenship be raised as a material issue in a controversy where said person is a party;

A Filipino-American or any dual citizen cannot run for any elective public position in the Philippines unless he or
she personally swears to a renunciation of all foreign citizenship at the time of filing the certificate of
candidacy.

2) the Solicitor General or his authorized representative took active part in the resolution thereof, and
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, in relation to Rule 64 of the Rules on Civil Procedure assailing the
(1) Resolution1 and (2) Omnibus Order2 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), Second Division,
disqualifying petitioner from running as Barangay Chairman.

3) the finding on citizenship is affirmed by this Court.

Although the general rule was set forth in the case of Moy Ya Lim Yao, the case did not foreclose the weight of
prior rulings on citizenship. It elucidated that reliance may somehow be placed on these antecedent official
findings, though not really binding, to make the effort easier or simpler.14 Indeed, there appears sufficient
basis to rely on the prior rulings of the Commission on Elections in SPA. No. 95-066 and EPC 92-54 which
resolved the issue of citizenship in favor of the herein private respondent. The evidence adduced by petitioner
is substantially the same evidence presented in these two prior cases. Petitioner failed to show any new
evidence or supervening event to warrant a reversal of such prior resolutions. However, the procedural issue
notwithstanding, considered on the merits, the petition cannot prosper.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the COMELEC Resolutions, dated July 17, 1998 and January
15, 1999, respectively, in SPA No. 98-336 AFFIRMED.
Private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez is hereby adjudged qualified to run for governor of Davao Oriental.
No pronouncement as to costs.

Petitioner Eusebio Eugenio K. Lopez was a candidate for the position of Chairman of Barangay Bagacay, San
Dionisio, Iloilo City in the synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections held on October 29,
2007.

On October 25, 2007, respondent Tessie P. Villanueva filed a petition3 before the Provincial Election Supervisor
of the Province of Iloilo, praying for the disqualification of petitioner on the ground that he is an American
citizen, hence, ineligible from running for any public office. In his Answer,4 petitioner argued that he is a dual
citizen, a Filipino and at the same time an American, by virtue of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225, otherwise known
as the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003.5 He returned to the Philippines and resided in
Barangay Bagacay. Thus, he said, he possessed all the qualifications to run for Barangay Chairman.

After the votes for Barangay Chairman were canvassed, petitioner emerged as the winner.6

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 182701

July 23, 2008

On February 6, 2008, COMELEC issued the assailed Resolution granting the petition for disqualification,
disposing as follows:

EUSEBIO EUGENIO K. LOPEZ, Petitioner,


vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and TESSIE P. VILLANUEVA, Respondents.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Disqualification is GRANTED and respondent Eusebio
Eugenio K. Lopez is DISQUALIFIED from running as Barangay Chairman of Barangay Bagacay, San Dionisio,
Iloilo.

RESOLUTION

SO ORDERED.7

REYES, R.T., J.:

In ruling against petitioner, the COMELEC found that he was not able to regain his Filipino citizenship in the
manner provided by law. According to the poll body, to be able to qualify as a candidate in the elections,
petitioner should have made a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship. This,
petitioner failed to do.

Pearliegates

124

Election Law Cases


His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner resorted to the present petition, imputing grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC for disqualifying him from running and assuming the office of
Barangay Chairman.

Petitioner re-acquired his Filipino citizenship under the cited law. This new law explicitly provides that should
one seek elective public office, he should first "make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath."

We dismiss the petition.

Petitioner failed to comply with this requirement. We quote with approval the COMELEC observation on this
point:

Relying on Valles v. Commission on Elections,8 petitioner argues that his filing of a certificate of candidacy
operated as an effective renunciation of foreign citizenship.

We note, however, that the operative facts that led to this Courts ruling in Valles are substantially different
from the present case. In Valles, the candidate, Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, was a dual citizen by accident of birth
on foreign soil.9 Lopez was born of Filipino parents in Australia, a country which follows the principle of jus
soli.lauuphi1 As a result, she acquired Australian citizenship by operation of Australian law, but she was also
considered a Filipino citizen under Philippine law. She did not perform any act to swear allegiance to a country
other than the Philippines.

In contrast, petitioner was born a Filipino but he deliberately sought American citizenship and renounced his
Filipino citizenship. He later on became a dual citizen by re-acquiring Filipino citizenship.1awphi1

More importantly, the Courts 2000 ruling in Valles has been superseded by the enactment of R.A. No. 922510
in 2003. R.A. No. 9225 expressly provides for the conditions before those who re-acquired Filipino citizenship
may run for a public office in the Philippines. Section 5 of the said law states:

Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under
this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities
under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:

While respondent was able to regain his Filipino Citizenship by virtue of the Dual Citizenship Law when he took
his oath of allegiance before the Vice Consul of the Philippine Consulate Generals Office in Los Angeles,
California, the same is not enough to allow him to run for a public office. The above-quoted provision of law
mandates that a candidate with dual citizenship must make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all
foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath. There is no evidence presented
that will show that respondent complied with the provision of R.A. No. 9225. Absent such proof we cannot allow
respondent to run for Barangay Chairman of Barangay Bagacay.

For the renunciation to be valid, it must be contained in an affidavit duly executed before an officer of law who
is authorized to administer an oath. The affiant must state in clear and unequivocal terms that he is renouncing
all foreign citizenship for it to be effective. In the instant case, respondent Lopezs failure to renounce his
American citizenship as proven by the absence of an affidavit that will prove the contrary leads this
Commission to believe that he failed to comply with the positive mandate of law. For failure of respondent to
prove that he abandoned his allegiance to the United States, this Commission holds him disqualified from
running for an elective position in the Philippines.11 (Emphasis added)

While it is true that petitioner won the elections, took his oath and began to discharge the functions of
Barangay Chairman, his victory can not cure the defect of his candidacy. Garnering the most number of votes
does not validate the election of a disqualified candidate because the application of the constitutional and
statutory provisions on disqualification is not a matter of popularity.12

In sum, the COMELEC committed no grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying petitioner as candidate for
Chairman in the Barangay elections of 2007.
xxxx

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.


SO ORDERED.

(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding such public
office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of
candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath. (Emphasis added)

G.R. No. 112889

April 18, 1995

BIENVENIDO O. MARQUEZ, JR., petitioner,


vs.

Pearliegates

125

Election Law Cases


COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EDUARDO T. RODRIGUEZ, respondents.

VITUG, J.:

The Court is called upon, in this petition for certiorari, to resolve the conflicting claims of the parties on the
meaning of the term "fugitive from justice as that phrase is so used under the provisions of Section 40(e) of the
Local Government Code (Republic Act No. 7160). That law states:

Sec. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position:

xxx

xxx

xxx

(e)

Fugitive from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad(.)

Bienvenido Marquez, a defeated candidate for the elective position for the elective position in the Province of
Quezon in the 11th May 1992 elections filed this petition for certiorari praying for the reversal of the resolution
of the Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") which dismissed his petition for quo warranto against the winning
candidate, herein private respondent Eduardo Rodriguez, for being allegedly a fugitive from justice.

It is averred that at the time private respondent filed his certificate of candidacy, a criminal charge against him
for ten (10) counts of insurance fraud or grand theft of personal property was still pending before the Municipal
Court of Los Angeles Judicial District, County of Los Angeles, State of California, U.S.A. A warrant issued by said
court for his arrest, it is claimed, has yet to be served on private respondent on account of his alleged "flight"
from that country.

Before the 11th May 1992 elections, a petition for cancellation (SPA 92-065) of respondent's certificate of
candidacy, on the ground of the candidate's disqualification under Section 40(e) of the Local Government Code,
was filed by petitioner with the COMELEC. On 08 May 1992, the COMELEC dismissed the petition.

Pearliegates

Petitioner's subsequent recourse to this Court (in G.R. No. 105310) from the 08th May 1992 resolution of
COMELEC was dismissed without prejudice, however, to the filing in due time of a possible post-election quo
warranto proceeding against private respondent. The Court, in its resolution of 02 June 1992, held:

Evidently, the matter elevated to this Court was a pre-proclamation controversy. Since the private respondent
had already been proclaimed as the duly elected Governor of the Province of Quezon, the petition below for
disqualification has ceased to be a pre-proclamation controversy. In Casimiro vs. Commission on Elections, G.R.
Nos. 84462-63 and Antonio vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 84678-79, jointly decided on 29 March
1989, 171 SCRA 468, this court held that a pre-proclamation controversy is no longer viable at this point of
time and should be dismissed. The proper remedy of the petitioner is to pursue the disqualification suit in a
separate proceeding.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the petition, without prejudice to the filing of the appropriate
proceedings in the proper forum, if so desired, within ten (10) days from notice. 1

Private respondent was proclaimed Governor-elect of Quezon on 29 May 1992. Forthwith, petitioner instituted
quo warranto proceedings (EPC 92-28) against private respondent before the COMELEC. In its 02 February 1993
resolution, the COMELEC (Second Division) dismissed the petition. The COMELEC En Banc, on 02 December
1993, denied a reconsideration of the resolution.

Hence, this petition for certiorari, the core issue of which, such as to be expected, focuses on whether private
respondent who, at the time of the filing of his certificate of candidacy (and to date), is said to be facing a
criminal charge before a foreign court and evading a warrant for his arrest comes within the term "fugitive from
justice" contemplated by Section 40(e) of the Local Government Code and, therefore, disqualified from being a
candidate for, and thereby ineligible from holding on to, an elective local office.

Petitioner's position is perspicuous and to the point. The law, he asseverates, needs no further interpretation
and construction. Section 40(e) of Republic Act No. 7160, is rather clear, he submits, and it disqualifies "fugitive
from justice" includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those who,
after being charged flee to avoid prosecution. This definition truly finds support from jurisprudence (Philippine
Law Dictionary, Third Edition, p. 399, by F.B. Moreno; Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, p. 671; King vs. Noe,
244 S.C. 344, 137 S.E. 2d 102, 103; Hughes vs. PFlanz, 138 Federal Reporter 980; Tobin vs. Casaus, 275 Pacific
Reporter, 2d., p. 792), and it may be so conceded as expressing the general and ordinary connotation of the
term.

In turn, private respondent would have the Court respect the conclusions of the Oversight Committee which,
conformably with Section 533 2 of R.A. 7160, was convened by the President to "formulate and issue the
appropriate rules and regulations necessary for the efficient and effective implementation of any and all
provisions of the Code to ensure compliance with the principles of Local Autonomy.

126

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Here are some excerpts from the committee's deliberations:

THE CHAIRMAN. Whether we have this rule or not she can run. She is not a fugitive from justice. Mrs. Marcos
can run at this point and I have held that for a long time ago. So can. . .

CHAIRMAN MERCADO. Session is resumed.


MS. DOCTOR. Mr. Chairman. . .
So, we are in agreement to retain Line 12, Page 36, as is. So next, Page 39.
THE CHAIRMAN. Yes.
CHAIRMAN DE PEDRO. Kay Benny Marquez.
MS. DOCTOR. Let's move to. . .
REP. CUENCO: What does he want?
THE CHAIRMAN. Wait, wait, wait. Can we just agree on the wording, this is very important. Manny, can you
come up?
CHAIRMAN DE PEDRO. Kung puwede i-retain lang iyan. Bahala na kung kuwestiyunin ang constitutionality nito
before the Supreme Court later on.
MR. REYES. Let's use the word conviction by final judgment.
REP. CUENCO. Anong nakalagay diyan?

CHAIRMAN DE PEDRO. Iyong disqualification to run for public office.

Any person who is a fugitive from justice in criminal or nonpolitical cases here or abroad.

THE CHAIRMAN. Fugitive means somebody who is convicted by final judgment. Okay,. Fugitive means
somebody who is convicted by final judgment. Insert that on Line 43 after the semi-colon. Is that approved? No
objection, approved (TSN, Oversight Committee, 07 May 1991).

xxx

xxx

xxx

Mabigat yung abroad. One who is facing criminal charges with the warrant of arrest pending, unserved. . .

THE CHAIRMAN. Andy, saan ba naman itong amendment on page 2? Sino ba ang gumawa nito? Okay, on page
2, lines 43 and 44, "fugitive from justice". What "fugitive"? Sino ba ang gumawa nito, ha?

HONORABLE SAGUISAG. I think that is even a good point, ano what is a fugitive? It is not defined. We have
loose understanding. . .

MR. SANCHEZ. Yes, I think, well, last time, Mr. Chairman, we agree to clarify the word "fugitive".

CHAIRMAN DE PEDRO. So isingit na rin sa definition of terms iyong fugitive.

Si Benny umalis na, with the understanding na okay na sa atin ito.

Pearliegates

THE CHAIRMAN. "Fugitive from justice means a person" ba ito, ha?

MR. SANCHEZ. Means a person...

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Election Law Cases


THE CHAIRMAN. Ha?

(a)

HON. REYES. A person who has been convicted.

(e)
Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad. Fugitive from justice refers to a
person who has been convicted by final judgment. 5 (Emphasis supplied)

THE CHAIRMAN; Yes, fugitive from justice, oo. Fugitive from justice shall mean or means one who has been
convicted by final judgment. It means one who has been convicted by final judgment.

HON. DE PEDRO. Kulang pa rin ang ibig sabihin niyan.

THE CHAIRMAN. Ano? Sige, tingnan natin.

HON. DE PEDRO. Kung nasa loob ng presuhan, fugitive pa rin siya?

THE CHAIRMAN. O, tama na yan, fugitive from justice. He has been convicted by final judgment, meaning that
if he is simply in jail and because he put up, post bail, but the case is still being reviewed, that is not yet
conviction by final judgment. 3

The Oversight Committee evidently entertained serious apprehensions on the possible constitutional infirmity
of Section 40(e) of Republic Act No. 7160 if the disqualification therein meant were to be so taken as to
embrace those who merely were facing criminal charges. A similar concern was expressed by Senator R. A. V.
Saguisag who, during the bicameral conference committee of the Senate and the House of Representatives,
made this reservation:

...

Private respondent reminds us that the construction placed upon law by the officials in charge of its
enforcement deserves great and considerable weight (Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corp. vs.
CA, 182 SCRA 166, 181). The Court certainly agrees; however, when there clearly is no obscurity and ambiguity
in an enabling law, it must merely be made to apply as it is so written. An administrative rule or regulation can
neither expand nor constrict the law but must remain congruent to it. The Court believes and thus holds, albeit
with some personal reservations of the ponente (expressed during the Court's en banc deliberations), that
Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991, to the extent that it
confines the term "fugitive from justice" to refer only to a person (the fugitive) "who has been convicted by
final judgment." is an inordinate and undue circumscription of the law.

Unfortunately, the COMELEC did not make any definite finding on whether or not, in fact, private respondent is
a "fugitive from justice" as such term must be interpreted and applied in the light of the Court's opinion. The
omission is understandable since the COMELEC dismissed outrightly the petition for quo warranto on the basis
instead of Rule 73 of the Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Oversight Committee. The Court itself, not
being a trier of facts, is thus constrained to remand the case to the COMELEC for a determination of this
unresolved factual matter.

WHEREFORE, the questioned resolutions of the Commission on Elections are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the
case is hereby REMANDED to the Commission which is DIRECTED to proceed and resolve the case with dispatch
conformably with the foregoing opinion. No special pronouncement on costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 120099

. . . de ipa-refine lang natin 'yung language especially 'yung, the scope of fugitive. Medyo bothered ako doon, a.
4

July 24, 1996

EDUARDO T. RODRIGUEZ, petitioner,


vs.

The Oversight Committee finally came out with Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local
Government Code of 1991. It provided:

Art. 73. Disqualifications. The following persons shall be disqualified from running for any elective local
position:

Pearliegates

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, BIENVENIDO O. MARQUEZ, JR., respondents.

FRANCISCO, J.:p

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Petitioner Eduardo T. Rodriguez and private respondent Bienvenido O. Marquez Jr. (Rodriguez and Marquez, for
brevity) were protagonists for the gubernatorial post of Quezon Province in the May 1992 elections. Rodriguez
won and was proclaimed duly-elected governor.

principally on the same allegation that Rodriguez is a "fugitive from justice." This petition for disqualification
(SPA No. 95-089) was filed by Marquez on April 11, 1995 when Rodriguez' petition for certiorari (112889)
from where the April 18, 1995 MARQUEZ Decision sprung was still then pending before the Court.

Marquez challenged Rodriguez' victory via petition for quo warranto before the COMELEC (EPC No. 92-28).
Marquez revealed that Rodriguez left the United States where a charge, filed on November 12, 1985, is pending
against the latter before the Los Angeles Municipal Court for fraudulent insurance claims, grand theft and
attempted grand theft of personal property. Rodriguez is therefore a "fugitive from justice" which is a ground for
his disqualification/ineligibility under Section 40(e) of the Local Government Code (R.A. 7160), so argued
Marquez.

On May 7, 1995 and after the promulgation of the MARQUEZ Decision, the COMELEC promulgated a
Consolidated Resolution for EPC No. 92-28 (quo warranto case) and SPA NO. 95-089 (disqualification case). In
justifying a joint resolution of these two (2) cases, the COMELEC explained that:

The COMELEC dismissed Marquez' quo warranto petition (EPC No. 92-28) in a resolution of February 2, 1993,
and likewise denied a reconsideration thereof.

Marquez challenged the COMELEC dismissal of EPC No. 92-28 before this Court via petition for certiorari,
docketed as G.R. No. 112889. The crux of said petition is whether Rodriguez, is a "fugitive from justice" as
contemplated by Section 40 (e) of the Local Government Code based on the alleged pendency of a criminal
charge against him (as previously mentioned).

1.

EPC No. 92-28 and SPA No. 95-089 are inherently related cases

2.

the parties, facts and issue involved are identical in both cases

3.
the same evidence is to be utilized in both cases in determining the common issue of whether
Rodriguez is a "fugitive from justice"

4.
on consultation with the Commission En Banc, the Commissioners unanimously agreed that a
consolidated resolution of the two (2) cases is not procedurally flawed.
In resolving that Marquez petition (112889), the Court in "Marquez, Jr. vs. COMELEC"' promulgated on April 18,
1995, now appearing in Volume 243, page 538 of the SCRA and hereinafter referred to as the MARQUEZ
Decision, declared that:

. . . , "fugitive from justice" includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise
those who, after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution. This definition truly finds support from jurisprudence
(. . .), and it may be so conceded as expressing the general and ordinary connotation of the term. 1

Whether or not Rodriguez is a "fugitive from justice" under the definition thus given was not passed upon by
the Court. That task was to devolve on the COMELEC upon remand of the case to it, with the directive to
proceed therewith with dispatch conformably with the MARQUEZ Decision. Rodriguez sought a reconsideration
thereof. He also filed an "Urgent Motion to Admit Additional Argument in Support of the Motion for
Reconsideration" to which was attached a certification from the Commission on Immigration showing that
Rodriguez left the US on June 25, 1985 roughly five (5) months prior to the institution of the criminal
complaint filed against him before the Los Angeles court. The Court however denied a reconsideration of the
MARQUEZ Decision.

Going now into the meat of that Consolidated Resolution, the COMELEC, allegedly having kept in mind the
MARQUEZ Decision definition of "fugitive from justice", found Rodriguez to be one. Such finding was essentially
based on Marquez' documentary evidence consisting of

1.
an authenticated copy of the November 12, 1995 warrant of arrest issued by the Los Angeles
municipal court against Rodriguez, and

2.

an authenticated copy of the felony complaint

which the COMELEC allowed to be presented ex-parte after Rodriguez walked-out of the hearing of the case on
April 26, 1995 following the COMELEC's denial of Rodriguez' motion for postponement. With the walk-out, the
COMELEC considered Rodriguez as having waived his right to disprove the authenticity of Marquez'
aforementioned documentary evidence. The COMELEC thus made the following analysis:

In the May 8, 1995 election, Rodriguez and Marquez renewed their rivalry for the same position of governor.
This time, Marquez challenged Rodriguez' candidacy via petition for disqualification before the COMELEC, based

Pearliegates

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The authenticated documents submitted by petitioner (Marquez) to show the pendency of a criminal complaint
against the respondent (Rodriguez) in the Municipal Court of Los Angeles, California, U.S.A., and the fact that
there is an outstanding warrant against him amply proves petitioner's contention that the respondent is a
fugitive from justice. The Commission cannot look with favor on respondent's defense that long before the
felony complaint was allegedly filed, respondent was already in the Philippines and he did not know of the filing
of the same nor was he aware that he was being proceeded against criminally. In a sense, thru this defense,
respondent implicitly contends that he cannot be deemed a fugitive from justice, because to be so, one must
be aware of the filing of the criminal complaint, and his disappearance in the place where the long arm of the
law, thru the warrant of arrest, may reach him is predicated on a clear desire to avoid and evade the warrant.
This allegation in the Answer, however, was not even fortified with any attached document to show when he
left the United States and when he returned to this country, facts upon which the conclusion of absence of
knowledge about the criminal complaint may be derived. On the contrary, the fact of arrest of respondent's
wife on November 6, 1985 in the United States by the Fraud Bureau investigators in an apartment paid for
respondent in that country can hardly rebut whatever presumption of knowledge there is against the
respondent. 2

Acting on Marquez' omnibus motion, the COMELEC, in its Resolution of June 23, 1995, nullified Rodriguez'
proclamation and ordered certain members of the Quezon Province Provincial Board of Canvassers to explain
why they should not be cited in contempt for disobeying the poll body's May 11, 1995 Resolution suspending
Rodriguez' proclamation. But with respect to Marquez' motion for his proclamation, the COMELEC deferred
action until after this Court has resolved the instant petition (G.R. No. 120099).

Rodriguez filed a motion to admit supplemental petition to include the aforesaid COMELEC June 23, 1995
Resolution, apart from the May 7 and May 11, 1995 Resolutions (Consolidated Resolution and Order to suspend
Rodriguez' proclamation, respectively).

As directed by the Court, oral arguments were had in relation to the instant petition (G.R. No. 120099) on July
13, 1995.
And proceeding therefrom, the COMELEC, in the dispositive portion, declared:

WHEREFORE, considering that respondent has been proven to be fugitive from justice, he is hereby ordered
disqualified or ineligible from assuming and performing the functions of Governor of Quezon Province.
Respondent is ordered to immediately vacate said office. Further, he is hereby disqualified from running for
Governor for Quezon Province in the May 8, 1995 elections. Lastly, his certificate of candidacy for the May 8,
1995 elections is hereby set aside.

At any rate, Rodriguez again emerge as the victorious candidate in the May 8, 1995 election for the position of
governor.

On May 10 and 11, 1995, Marquez filed urgent motions to suspend Rodriguez' proclamation which the
COMELEC granted on May 11, 1995. The Provincial Board of Canvassers nonetheless proclaimed Rodriguez on
May 12, 1995.

The COMELEC Consolidated Resolution in EPC No. 92-28 and SPA No. 95-089 and the May 11, 1995 Resolution
suspending Rodriguez' proclamation thus gave rise to the filing of the instant petition for certiorari (G.R. No.
120099) on May 16, 1995.

On May 22, 1995, Marquez filed an "Omnibus Motion To Annul The Proclamation of Rodriguez, To Proclaim
Marquez And To Cite The Provincial Board of Canvassers in Contempt" before the COMELEC (in EPC No. 92-28
and SPA No. 95-089).

Pearliegates

Marquez, on August 3, 1995, filed an "Urgent Motion for Temporary Restraining Order Or Preliminary Injunction"
which sought to retain and enjoin Rodriguez "from exercising the powers, functions and prerogatives of
Governor of Quezon . . . ." Acting favorably thereon, the Court in a Resolution dated August 8, 1995 issued a
temporary restraining order. Rodriguez' "Urgent Motion to Lift Temporary Restraining Order And/Or For
Reconsideration" was denied by the Court in an August 15, 1995 Resolution. Another similar urgent motion was
later on filed by Rodriguez which the Court also denied.

In a Resolution dated October 24, 1995, the Court

. . . RESOLVED to DIRECT the Chairman of the Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") to designate a


Commissioner or a ranking official of the COMELEC to RECEIVE AND EVALUATE such legally admissible evidence
as herein petitioner Eduardo Rodriguez may be minded to present by way of refuting the evidence heretofore
submitted by private respondent Bienvenido Marquez, Sr., or that which can tend to establish petitioner's
contention that he does not fall within the legal concept of a "fugitive from justice." Private respondent
Marquez may likewise, if he so desires, introduce additional and admissible evidence in support of his own
position. The provisions of Sections 3 to 10, Rule 33, of the Rules of Court may be applied in the reception of
the evidence. The Chairman of the COMELEC shall have the proceedings completed and the corresponding
report submitted to this Court within thirty (30) days from notice hereof.

The COMELEC complied therewith by filing before the Court, on December 26, 1995, a report entitled
"'EVIDENCE OF THE PARTIES and COMMISSION'S EVALUATION" wherein the COMELEC, after calibrating the
parties' evidence, declared that Rodriguez is NOT a "fugitive from justice" as defined in the main opinion in the
MARQUEZ Decision, thus making a 180-degree turnaround from its finding in the Consolidated Resolution. In
arriving at this new conclusion, the COMELEC opined that intent to evade is a material element of the

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MARQUEZ Decision definition. Such intent to evade is absent in Rodriguez' case because evidence has
established that Rodriguez arrived in the Philippines (June 25, 1985) long before the criminal charge was
instituted in the Los Angeles Court (November 12, 1985).

But the COMELEC report did not end there. The poll body expressed what it describes as its "persistent
discomfort" on whether it read and applied correctly the MARQUEZ Decision definition of "fugitive from justice".
So as not to miss anything, we quote the COMELEC's observations in full:

Moreno's Philippine Law Dictionary, 5th Ed. considers the term as an:

expression which refers to one having committed, or being accused, of a crime in one jurisdiction and is absent
for any reason from that jurisdiction.

Specifically, one who flees to avoid punishment . . . (emphasis ours)


. . . The main opinion's definition of a "fugitive from justice" "include not only those who flee after conviction to
avoid punishment but also those who, after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution." It proceeded to state
that:

This definition truly finds support from jurisprudence (Philippine Law Dictionary Third Edition, p. 399 by F.B.
Moreno; Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, p. 671; King v. Noe, 244 SC 344; 137 SE 2d 102, 103; Hughes v.
Pflanz, 138 Federal Reporter 980; Tobin v. Casaus 275 Pacific Reporter 2d p. 792), and it may be so conceded as
expressing the general and ordinary connotation of the term.

But in the majority of the cases cited, the definition of the term "fugitive from justice" contemplates other
instances not explicitly mentioned in the main opinion. Black's Law Dictionary begins the definition of the term
by referring to a "fugitive from justice" as:

(A) person, who, having committed a crime, flees from jurisdiction of the court where crime was committed or
departs from his usual place of abode and conceals himself within the district. . . .

Then, citing King v. Noe, the definition continues and conceptualizes a "fugitive from justice" as:

. . . a person who, having committed or been charged with a crime in one state, has left its jurisdiction and is
found within the territory of another when it is sought to subject him to the criminal process of the former
state. (our emphasis)

From the above rulings, it can be gleaned that the objective facts sufficient to constitute flight from justice are:
(a) a person committed a "crime" or has been charged for the commission thereof; and (b) thereafter, leaves
the jurisdiction of the court where said crime was committed or his usual place of abode.

Filing of charges prior to flight is not always an antecedent requirement to label one a "fugitive from justice".
Mere commission of a "crime" without charges having been filed for the same and flight subsequent thereto
sufficiently meet the definition. Attention is directed at the use of the word "crime" which is not employed to
connote guilt or conviction for the commission thereof. Justice Davide's separate opinion in G.R. No. 112889
elucidates that the disqualification for being a fugitive does not involve the issue of the presumption of
innocence, the reason for disqualification being that a person "was not brought within the jurisdiction of the
court because he had successfully evaded arrest; or if he was brought within the jurisdiction of the court and
was tried and convicted, he has successfully evaded service of sentence because he had jumped bail or
escaped. The disqualification then is based on his flight from justice."

Other rulings of the United States Supreme Court further amplify the view that intent and purpose for
departure is inconsequential to the inquiry. The texts, which are persuasive in our jurisdiction, are more
unequivocal in their pronouncements. In King v. US (144 F. 2nd 729), citing Roberts v. Reilly (116 US 80) the
United States Supreme Court held:

. . . it is not necessary that the party should have left the state or the judicial district where the crime is alleged
to have been committed, after an indictment found, or for the purpose of avoiding an anticipated prosecution,
but that, having committed a crime within a state or district, he has left and is found in another jurisdiction
(emphasis supplied)

In Hughes v. Pflanz, the term was defined as:


Citing State v. Richter (37 Minn. 436), the Court further ruled in unmistakeable language:
a person who, having committed within a state a crime, when sought for, to be subjected to criminal process, is
found within the territory of another state.

Pearliegates

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The simple fact that they (person who have committed crime within a state) are not within the state to answer
its criminal process when required renders them, in legal intendment, fugitives from justice.

THEREFORE, IT APPEARS THAT GIVEN THE AUTHORITIES CITED IN G.R. NO. 112889, THE MERE FACT THAT
THERE ARE PENDING CHARGES IN THE UNITED STATES AND THAT PETITIONER RODRIGUEZ IS IN THE
PHILIPPINES MAKE PETITIONER A "FUGITIVE FROM JUSTICE".

From the foregoing discussions, the determination of whether or not Rodriguez is a fugitive from justice hinges
on whether or not Rodriguez' evidence shall be measured against the two instances mentioned in the main
opinion, or is to be expanded as to include other situations alluded to by the foreign jurisprudence cited by the
Court. In fact, the spirited legal fray between the parties in this case focused on each camp's attempt to
construe the Court's definition so as to fit or to exclude petitioner within the definition of a "fugitive from
justice". Considering, therefore, the equally valid yet different interpretations resulting from the Supreme Court
decision in G.R. No. 112889, the Commission deems it most conformable to said decision to evaluate the
evidence in light of the varied constructions open to it and to respectfully submit the final determination of the
case to the Honorable Supreme Court as the final interpreter of the law.

The instant petition dwells on that nagging issue of whether Rodriguez is a "fugitive from justice", the
determination of which, as we have directed the COMELEC on two (2) occasions (in the MARQUEZ Decision and
in the Court's October 24, 1995 Resolution), must conform to how such term has been defined by the Court in
the MARQUEZ Decision. To reiterate, a "fugitive from justice":

. . . includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise who, after being
charged, flee to avoid prosecution.

The definition thus indicates that the intent to evade is the compelling factor that animates one's flight from a
particular jurisdiction. And obviously, there can only be an intent to evade prosecution or punishment when
there is knowledge by the fleeing subject of an already instituted indictment, or of a promulgated judgment of
conviction.

Rodriguez' case just cannot fit in this concept. There is no dispute that his arrival in the Philippines from the US
on June 25, 1985, as per certifications issued by the Bureau of Immigrations dated April 27 3 and June 26 of
1995, 4 preceded the filing of the felony complaint in the Los Angeles Court on November 12, 1985 and of the
issuance on even date of the arrest warrant by the same foreign court, by almost five (5) months. It was clearly
impossible for Rodriguez to have known about such felony complaint and arrest warrant at the time he left the
US, as there was in fact no complaint and arrest warrant much less conviction to speak of yet at such
time. What prosecution or punishment then was Rodriguez deliberately running away from with his departure
from the US? The very essence of being a "fugitive from justice" under the MARQUEZ Decision definition, is just
nowhere to be found in the circumstances of Rodriguez.

Pearliegates

With that, the Court gives due credit to the COMELEC in having made the same analysis in its ". . .
COMMISSION'S EVALUATION". There are, in fact, other observations consistent with such analysis made by the
poll body that are equally formidable so as to merit their adoption as part of this decision, to wit:

It is acknowledged that there was an attempt by private respondent to show Rodriguez' intent to evade the law.
This was done by offering for admission a voluminous copy of an investigation report (Exhibits I to I-17 and J to
J-87 inclusive) on the alleged crimes committed which led to the filing of the charges against petitioner. It was
offered for the sole purpose of establishing the fact that it was impossible for petitioner not to have known of
said investigation due to its magnitude. Unfortunately, such conclusion misleads because investigations of this
nature, no matter how extensive or prolonged, are shrouded with utmost secrecy to afford law enforcers the
advantage of surprise and effect the arrest of those who would be charged. Otherwise, the indiscreet conduct
of the investigation would be nothing short of a well-publicized announcement to the perpetrators of the
imminent filing of charges against them. And having been forewarned, every effort to sabotage the
investigation may be resorted to by its intended objects. But if private respondent's attempt to show Rodriguez'
intent to evade the law at the time he left the United States has any legal consequence at all, it will be nothing
more than proof that even private respondent accepts that intent to evade the law is a material element in the
definition of a fugitive.

The circumstantial fact that it was seventeen (17) days after Rodriguez' departure that charges against him
were filed cannot overturn the presumption of good faith in his favor. The same suggests nothing more than the
sequence of events which transpired. A subjective fact as that of petitioner's purpose cannot be inferred from
the objective data at hand in the absence of further proof to substantiate such claim. In fact, the evidence of
petitioner Rodriguez sufficiently proves that his compulsion to return to the Philippines was due to his desire to
join and participate vigorously in the political campaigns against former President Ferdinand E. Marcos. For
indeed, not long after petitioner's arrival in the country, the upheaval wrought by the political forces and the
avalanche of events which occurred resulted in one of the more colorful events in the Philippine history. The
EDSA Revolution led to the ouster of former Pres. Marcos and precipitated changes in the political climate. And
being a figure in these developments, petitioner Rodriguez began serving his home province as OIC-Board
Member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan ng Quezon in 1986. Then, he was elected Governor in 1988 and
continues to be involved in politics in the same capacity as re-elected Governor in 1992 and the disputed reelection in 1995. Altogether, these landmark dates hem in for petitioner a period of relentless, intensive and
extensive activity of varied political campaigns first against the Marcos government, then for the
governorship. And serving the people of Quezon province as such, the position entails absolute dedication of
one's time to the demands of the office.

Having established petitioner's lack of knowledge of the charges to be filed against him at the time he left the
United States, it becomes immaterial under such construction to determine the exact time when he was made
aware thereof. While the law, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, does not countenance flight from justice in
the instance that a person flees the jurisdiction of another state after charges against him or a warrant for his
arrest was issued or even in view of the imminent filing and issuance of the same, petitioner's plight is
altogether a different situation. When, in good faith, a person leaves the territory of a state not his own,
homeward bound, and learns subsequently of charges filed against him while in the relative peace and service

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of his own country, the fact that he does not subject himself to the jurisdiction of the former state does not
qualify him outright as a fugitive from justice.

the instant petition. The various definitions of that doctrine have been laid down in People v. Pinuila, 103 Phil.
992, 999, to wit:

The severity of the law construed in the manner as to require of a person that he subject himself to the
jurisdiction of another state while already in his country or else be disqualified from office, is more apparent
when applied in petitioner's case. The criminal process of the United States extends only within its territorial
jurisdiction. That petitioner has already left said country when the latter sought to subject him to its criminal
process is hardly petitioner's fault. In the absence of an intent to evade the laws of the United States, petitioner
had every right to depart therefrom at the precise time that he did and to return to the Philippines. Not
justifiable reason existed to curtail or fetter petitioner's exercise of his right to leave the United State and
return home. Hence, sustaining the contrary proposition would be to unduly burden and punish petitioner for
exercising a right as he cannot be faulted for the circumstances that brought him within Philippine territory at
the time he was sought to be placed under arrest and to answer for charges filed against him.

"Law of the case" has been defined as the opinion delivered on a former appeal. More specifically, it means
that whatever is once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule of decision between the same parties
in the same case continues to be the law of the case, whether correct on a general principles or not, so long as
the facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court. (21 C.J.S.
330)

Granting, as the evidence warrants, that petitioner Rodriguez came to know of the charges only later, and
under his circumstances, is there a law that requires petitioner to travel to the United States and subject
himself to the monetary burden and tedious process of defending himself before the country's courts?

It must be noted that moral uprightness is not a standard too far-reaching as to demand of political candidate
the performance of duties and obligations that are supererogatory in nature. We do not dispute that an alleged
"fugitive from justice" must perform acts in order not to be so categorized. Clearly, a person who is aware of
the imminent filing of charges against him or of the same already filed in connection with acts he committed in
the jurisdiction of a particular state, is under an obligation not to flee said place of commission. However, as in
petitioner's case, his departure from the United States may not place him under a similar obligation. His
subsequent knowledge while in the Philippines and non-submission to the jurisdiction of the former country
does not operate to label petitioner automatically a fugitive from justice. As he was a public officer appointed
and elected immediately after his return to the country, petitioner Rodriguez had every reason to devote
utmost priority to the service of his office. He could not have gone back to the United States in the middle of
his term nor could he have traveled intermittently thereto without jeopardizing the interest of the public he
serves. The require that of petitioner would be to put him in a paradoxical quandary where he is compelled to
violate the very functions of his office.

However, Marquez and the COMELEC (in its "COMMISSION'S EVALUATION" as earlier quoted) seem to urge the
Court to re-define "fugitive from justice". They espouse the broader concept of the term and culled from foreign
authorities (mainly of U.S. vintage) cited in the MARQUEZ Decision itself, i.e., that one becomes a "fugitive from
justice" by the mere fact that he leaves the jurisdiction where a charge is pending against him, regardless of
whether or not the charge has already been filed at the time of his flight.

Suffice it to say that the "law of the case" doctrine forbids the Court to craft an expanded re-definition of
"fugitive from justice" (which is at variance with the MARQUEZ Decision) and proceed therefrom in resolving

Pearliegates

It may be stated as a rule of general application that, where the evidence on a second or succeeding appeal is
substantially the same as that on the first or preceding appeal, all matters, questions, points, or issues
adjudicated on the prior appeal are the law of the case on all subsequent appeals and will not be considered or
readjudicated therein. (5 C.J.S. 1267)

In accordance with the general rule stated in Section 1821, where, after a definite determination, the court has
remanded the cause for further action below, it will refuse to examine question other than those arising
subsequently to such determination and remand, or other than the propriety of the compliance with its
mandate; and if the court below has proceeded in substantial conformity to the directions of the appellate
court, its action will not be questioned on a second appeal.

As a general rule a decision on a prior appeal of the same case is held to be the law of the case whether that
decision is right or wrong, the remedy of the party deeming himself aggrieved being to seek a rehearing. (5
C.J.S. 1276-77).

Questions necessarily involved in the decision on a former appeal will be regarded as the law of the case on a
subsequent appeal, although the questions are not expressly treated in the opinion of the court, as the
presumption is that all the facts in the case bearing on the point decided have received due consideration
whether all or none of them are mentioned in the opinion. (5 C.J.S. 1286-87).

To elaborate, the same parties (Rodriguez and Marquez) and issue (whether or not Rodriguez is a "fugitive from
justice") are involved in the MARQUEZ Decision and the instant petition. The MARQUEZ Decision was an appeal
from EPC No. 92-28 (the Marquez' quo warranto petition before the COMELEC). The instant petition is also an
appeal from EPC No. 92-28 although the COMELEC resolved the latter jointly with SPA No. 95-089 (Marquez'
petition for the disqualification of Rodriguez). Therefore, what was irrevocably established as the controlling
legal rule in the MARQUEZ Decision must govern the instant petition. And we specifically refer to the concept of
"fugitive from justice" as defined in the main opinion in the MARQUEZ Decision which highlights the
significance of an intent to evade but which Marquez and the COMELEC, with their proposed expanded
definition, seem to trivialize.

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Besides, to re-define "fugitive from justice" would only foment instability in our jurisprudence when hardly has
the ink dried in the MARQUEZ Decision.

Ireneo B. Orlino for petitioner in G.R. Nos. 88831 & 84508.

Montemayor & Montemayor Law Office for private respondent.


To summarize, the term "fugitive from justice" as a ground for the disqualification or ineligibility of a person
seeking to run for any elective local petition under Section 40(e) of the Local Government Code, should be
understood according to the definition given in the MARQUEZ Decision, to wit:

A "fugitive from justice" includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise
those who, after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution. (Emphasis ours.)

Intent to evade on the part of a candidate must therefore be established by proof that there has already been a
conviction or at least, a charge has already been filed, at the time of flight. Not being a "fugitive from justice"
under this definition, Rodriguez cannot be denied the Quezon Province gubernatorial post.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed Resolutions of
the COMELEC dated May 7, 1995 (Consolidated Resolution), May 11, 1995 (Resolution suspending Rodriguez'
proclamation) and June 23, 1995 (Resolution nullifying Rodriguez' proclamation and ordering the Quezon
Province Provincial Board and Canvassers to explain why they should not be cited in contempt) are SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.

GRIO-AQUINO, J.:

These two cases were consolidated because they have the same objective; the disqualification under Section
68 of the Omnibus Election Code of the private respondent, Merito Miguel for the position of municipal mayor of
Bolinao, Pangasinan, to which he was elected in the local elections of January 18, 1988, on the ground that he
is a green card holder, hence, a permanent resident of the United States of America, not of Bolinao.

G.R. No. 84508 is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision dated January 13, 1988 of the COMELEC First
Division, dismissing the three (3) petitions of Anecito Cascante (SPC No. 87-551), Cederico Catabay (SPC No.
87-595) and Josefino C. Celeste (SPC No. 87-604), for the disqualification of Merito C. Miguel filed prior to the
local elections on January 18, 1988.

G.R. No. 88831 November 8, 1990

MATEO CAASI, petitioner,

G.R. No. 88831, Mateo Caasi vs. Court of Appeals, et al., is a petition for review of the decision dated June 21,
1989, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 14531 dismissing the petition for quo warranto filed by Mateo
Caasi, a rival candidate for the position of municipal mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan, also to disqualify Merito
Miguel on account of his being a green card holder.

vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MERITO C. MIGUEL, respondents.

G.R. No. 84508 November 13, 1990

In his answer to both petitions, Miguel admitted that he holds a green card issued to him by the US Immigration
Service, but he denied that he is a permanent resident of the United States. He allegedly obtained the green
card for convenience in order that he may freely enter the United States for his periodic medical examination
and to visit his children there. He alleged that he is a permanent resident of Bolinao, Pangasinan, that he voted
in all previous elections, including the plebiscite on February 2,1987 for the ratification of the 1987
Constitution, and the congressional elections on May 18,1987.

ANECITO CASCANTE petitioner,


vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and MERITO C. MIGUEL, respondents.

Pearliegates

After hearing the consolidated petitions before it, the COMELEC with the exception of Commissioner Anacleto
Badoy, Jr., dismissed the petitions on the ground that:

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The possession of a green card by the respondent (Miguel) does not sufficiently establish that he has
abandoned his residence in the Philippines. On the contrary, inspite (sic) of his green card, Respondent has
sufficiently indicated his intention to continuously reside in Bolinao as shown by his having voted in successive
elections in said municipality. As the respondent meets the basic requirements of citizenship and residence for
candidates to elective local officials (sic) as provided for in Section 42 of the Local Government Code, there is
no legal obstacle to his candidacy for mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan. (p. 12, Rollo, G.R. No. 84508).

In the same vein, but not quite, Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines (B.P. Blg. 881)
provides:

SEC. 68. Disqualifications ... Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country
shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as
permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided
for in the election laws. (Sec. 25, 1971, EC).

In his dissenting opinion, Commissioner Badoy, Jr. opined that:

A green card holder being a permanent resident of or an immigrant of a foreign country and respondent having
admitted that he is a green card holder, it is incumbent upon him, under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election
Code, to prove that he "has waived his status as a permanent resident or immigrant" to be qualified to run for
elected office. This respondent has not done. (p. 13, Rollo, G.R. No. 84508.)

In G.R. No. 88831, "Mateo Caasi, petitioner vs. Court of Appeals and Merito Miguel, respondents," the petitioner
prays for a review of the decision dated June 21, 1989 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 14531 "Merito
C. Miguel, petitioner vs. Hon. Artemio R. Corpus, etc., respondents," reversing the decision of the Regional Trial
Court which denied Miguel's motion to dismiss the petition for quo warranto filed by Caasi. The Court of
Appeals ordered the regional trial court to dismiss and desist from further proceeding in the quo warranto case.
The Court of Appeals held:

... it is pointless for the Regional Trial Court to hear the case questioning the qualification of the petitioner as
resident of the Philippines, after the COMELEC has ruled that the petitioner meets the very basic requirements
of citizenship and residence for candidates to elective local officials (sic) and that there is no legal obstacles
(sic) for the candidacy of the petitioner, considering that decisions of the Regional Trial Courts on quo warranto
cases under the Election Code are appealable to the COMELEC. (p. 22, Rollo, G.R. No. 88831.)

These two cases pose the twin issues of: (1) whether or not a green card is proof that the holder is a permanent
resident of the United States, and (2) whether respondent Miguel had waived his status as a permanent
resident of or immigrant to the U.S.A. prior to the local elections on January 18, 1988.

Section 18, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Sec. 18. Public officers and employees owe the State and this Constitution allegiance at all times, and any
public officer or employee who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the status of an immigrant of another
country during his tenure shall be dealt with by law.

Pearliegates

In view of current rumor that a good number of elective and appointive public officials in the present
administration of President Corazon C. Aquino are holders of green cards in foreign countries, their effect on the
holders' right to hold elective public office in the Philippines is a question that excites much interest in the
outcome of this case.

In the case of Merito Miguel, the Court deems it significant that in the "Application for Immigrant Visa and Alien
Registration" (Optional Form No. 230, Department of State) which Miguel filled up in his own handwriting and
submitted to the US Embassy in Manila before his departure for the United States in 1984, Miguel's answer to
Question No. 21 therein regarding his "Length of intended stay (if permanently, so state)," Miguel's answer was,
"Permanently."

On its face, the green card that was subsequently issued by the United States Department of Justice and
Immigration and Registration Service to the respondent Merito C. Miguel identifies him in clear bold letters as a
RESIDENT ALIEN. On the back of the card, the upper portion, the following information is printed:

Alien Registration Receipt Card.

Person identified by this card is entitled to reside permanently and work in the United States." (Annex A pp.
189-190, Rollo of G.R. No. 84508.)

Despite his vigorous disclaimer, Miguel's immigration to the United States in 1984 constituted an abandonment
of his domicile and residence in the Philippines. For he did not go to the United States merely to visit his
children or his doctor there; he entered the limited States with the intention to have there permanently as
evidenced by his application for an immigrant's (not a visitor's or tourist's) visa. Based on that application of
his, he was issued by the U.S. Government the requisite green card or authority to reside there permanently.

Immigration is the removing into one place from another; the act of immigrating the entering into a country
with the intention of residing in it.

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An immigrant is a person who removes into a country for the purpose of permanent residence. As shown infra
84, however, statutes sometimes give a broader meaning to the term "immigrant." (3 CJS 674.)

As a resident alien in the U.S., Miguel owes temporary and local allegiance to the U.S., the country in which he
resides (3 CJS 527). This is in return for the protection given to him during the period of his residence therein.

Aliens reading in the limited States, while they are permitted to remain, are in general entitled to the protection
of the laws with regard to their rights of person and property and to their civil and criminal responsibility.

In general, aliens residing in the United States, while they are permitted to remain are entitled to the
safeguards of the constitution with regard to their rights of person and property and to their civil and criminal
responsibility. Thus resident alien friends are entitled to the benefit of the provision of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the federal constitution that no state shall deprive "any person" of life liberty, or property
without due process of law, or deny to any person the equal protection of the law, and the protection of this
amendment extends to the right to earn a livelihood by following the ordinary occupations of life. So an alien is
entitled to the protection of the provision of the Fifth Amendment to the federal constitution that no person
shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. (3 CJS 529-530.)

Section 18, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that "any public officer or employee who seeks to
change his citizenship or acquire the status of an immigrant of another country during his tenure shall be dealt
with by law" is not applicable to Merito Miguel for he acquired the status of an immigrant of the United States
before he was elected to public office, not "during his tenure" as mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan.

The law applicable to him is Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), which provides:

xxx

xxx

xxx

To be "qualified to run for elective office" in the Philippines, the law requires that the candidate who is a green
card holder must have "waived his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country."
Therefore, his act of filing a certificate of candidacy for elective office in the Philippines, did not of itself
constitute a waiver of his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of the United States. The waiver of his
green card should be manifested by some act or acts independent of and done prior to filing his candidacy for
elective office in this country. Without such prior waiver, he was "disqualified to run for any elective office"
(Sec. 68, Omnibus Election Code).

Respondent Merito Miguel admits that he holds a green card, which proves that he is a permanent resident or
immigrant it of the United States, but the records of this case are starkly bare of proof that he had waived his
status as such before he ran for election as municipal mayor of Bolinao on January 18, 1988. We, therefore,
hold that he was disqualified to become a candidate for that office.

The reason for Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code is not hard to find. Residence in the municipality where
he intends to run for elective office for at least one (1) year at the time of filing his certificate of candidacy, is
one of the qualifications that a candidate for elective public office must possess (Sec. 42, Chap. 1, Title 2, Local
Government Code). Miguel did not possess that qualification because he was a permanent resident of the
United States and he resided in Bolinao for a period of only three (3) months (not one year) after his return to
the Philippines in November 1987 and before he ran for mayor of that municipality on January 18, 1988.

In banning from elective public office Philippine citizens who are permanent residents or immigrants of a
foreign country, the Omnibus Election Code has laid down a clear policy of excluding from the right to hold
elective public office those Philippine citizens who possess dual loyalties and allegiance. The law has reserved
that privilege for its citizens who have cast their lot with our country "without mental reservations or purpose of
evasion." The assumption is that those who are resident aliens of a foreign country are incapable of such entire
devotion to the interest and welfare of their homeland for with one eye on their public duties here, they must
keep another eye on their duties under the laws of the foreign country of their choice in order to preserve their
status as permanent residents thereof.

Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for
any elective office under this Code, unless such person has waived his status as permanent resident or
immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws.'

Miguel insists that even though he applied for immigration and permanent residence in the United States, he
never really intended to live there permanently, for all that he wanted was a green card to enable him to come
and go to the U.S. with ease. In other words, he would have this Court believe that he applied for immigration
to the U.S. under false pretenses; that all this time he only had one foot in the United States but kept his other
foot in the Philippines. Even if that were true, this Court will not allow itself to be a party to his duplicity by
permitting him to benefit from it, and giving him the best of both worlds so to speak.

Did Miguel, by returning to the Philippines in November 1987 and presenting himself as a candidate for mayor
of Bolinao in the January 18,1988 local elections, waive his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of the
United States?

Miguel's application for immigrant status and permanent residence in the U.S. and his possession of a green
card attesting to such status are conclusive proof that he is a permanent resident of the U.S. despite his
occasional visits to the Philippines. The waiver of such immigrant status should be as indubitable as his

Pearliegates

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Election Law Cases


application for it. Absent clear evidence that he made an irrevocable waiver of that status or that he
surrendered his green card to the appropriate U.S. authorities before he ran for mayor of Bolinao in the local
elections on January 18, 1988, our conclusion is that he was disqualified to run for said public office, hence, his
election thereto was null and void.
WHEREFORE, the appealed orders of the COMELEC and the Court of Appeals in SPC Nos. 87-551, 87-595 and
87-604, and CA-G.R. SP No. 14531 respectively, are hereby set aside. The election of respondent Merito C.
Miguel as municipal mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan is hereby annulled. Costs against the said respondent.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 157870

November 3, 2008

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS), petitioner

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

In these kindred petitions, the constitutionality of Section 36 of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, otherwise known as
the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, insofar as it requires mandatory drug testing of candidates
for public office, students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and private
offices, and persons charged before the prosecutor's office with certain offenses, among other personalities, is
put in issue.

As far as pertinent, the challenged section reads as follows:

vs.
DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD and PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY (PDEA), respondents.

x-----------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 158633

SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing. - Authorized drug testing shall be done by any government forensic
laboratories or by any of the drug testing laboratories accredited and monitored by the DOH to safeguard the
quality of the test results. x x x The drug testing shall employ, among others, two (2) testing methods, the
screening test which will determine the positive result as well as the type of drug used and the confirmatory
test which will confirm a positive screening test. x x x The following shall be subjected to undergo drug testing:

November 3, 2008
xxxx

ATTY. MANUEL J. LASERNA, JR., petitioner


vs.
DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD and PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY, respondents.

x-----------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 161658

November 3, 2008

(c) Students of secondary and tertiary schools. - Students of secondary and tertiary schools shall, pursuant to
the related rules and regulations as contained in the school's student handbook and with notice to the parents,
undergo a random drug testing x x x;

(d) Officers and employees of public and private offices. - Officers and employees of public and private offices,
whether domestic or overseas, shall be subjected to undergo a random drug test as contained in the
company's work rules and regulations, x x x for purposes of reducing the risk in the workplace. Any officer or
employee found positive for use of dangerous drugs shall be dealt with administratively which shall be a
ground for suspension or termination, subject to the provisions of Article 282 of the Labor Code and pertinent
provisions of the Civil Service Law;

AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., petitioner


vs.

xxxx

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.

Pearliegates

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Election Law Cases


(f) All persons charged before the prosecutor's office with a criminal offense having an imposable penalty of
imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and one (1) day shall undergo a mandatory drug test;

NOW THEREFORE, The [COMELEC], pursuant to the authority vested in it under the Constitution, Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code), [RA] 9165 and other election laws, RESOLVED to promulgate, as it
hereby promulgates, the following rules and regulations on the conduct of mandatory drug testing to
candidates for public office[:]

(g) All candidates for public office whether appointed or elected both in the national or local government shall
undergo a mandatory drug test.

In addition to the above stated penalties in this Section, those found to be positive for dangerous drugs use
shall be subject to the provisions of Section 15 of this Act.

SECTION 1. Coverage. - All candidates for public office, both national and local, in the May 10, 2004
Synchronized National and Local Elections shall undergo mandatory drug test in government forensic
laboratories or any drug testing laboratories monitored and accredited by the Department of Health.

SEC. 3. x x x
G.R. No. 161658 (Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. v. Commission on Elections)

On December 23, 2003, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) issued Resolution No. 6486, prescribing the
rules and regulations on the mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office in connection with the May
10, 2004 synchronized national and local elections. The pertinent portions of the said resolution read as
follows:

WHEREAS, Section 36 (g) of Republic Act No. 9165 provides:

On March 25, 2004, in addition to the drug certificates filed with their respective offices, the Comelec Offices
and employees concerned shall submit to the Law Department two (2) separate lists of candidates. The first list
shall consist of those candidates who complied with the mandatory drug test while the second list shall consist
of those candidates who failed to comply x x x.

SEC. 4. Preparation and publication of names of candidates. - Before the start of the campaign period, the
[COMELEC] shall prepare two separate lists of candidates. The first list shall consist of those candidates who
complied with the mandatory drug test while the second list shall consist of those candidates who failed to
comply with said drug test. x x x

SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing. - x x x


SEC. 5. Effect of failure to undergo mandatory drug test and file drug test certificate. - No person elected to any
public office shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has undergone mandatory drug test and filed with
the offices enumerated under Section 2 hereof the drug test certificate herein required. (Emphasis supplied.)

xxxx

(g) All candidates for public office x x x both in the national or local government shall undergo a mandatory
drug test.

WHEREAS, Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides that public officers and employees must at all
times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency;

Petitioner Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., a senator of the Republic and a candidate for re - election in the May 10,
2004 elections,1 filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65. In it, he seeks (1) to nullify Sec.
36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 dated December 23, 2003 for being unconstitutional in
that they impose a qualification for candidates for senators in addition to those already provided for in the
1987 Constitution; and (2) to enjoin the COMELEC from implementing Resolution No. 6486.

Pimentel invokes as legal basis for his petition Sec. 3, Article VI of the Constitution, which states:
WHEREAS, by requiring candidates to undergo mandatory drug test, the public will know the quality of
candidates they are electing and they will be assured that only those who can serve with utmost responsibility,
integrity, loyalty, and efficiency would be elected x x x.

Pearliegates

SECTION 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural - born citizen of the Philippines, and, on the day
of the election, is at least thirty - five years of age, able to read and write, a registered voter, and a resident of
the Philippines for not less than two years immediately preceding the day of the election.

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Election Law Cases

According to Pimentel, the Constitution only prescribes a maximum of five (5) qualifications for one to be a
candidate for, elected to, and be a member of the Senate. He says that both the Congress and COMELEC, by
requiring, via RA 9165 and Resolution No. 6486, a senatorial aspirant, among other candidates, to undergo a
mandatory drug test, create an additional qualification that all candidates for senator must first be certified as
drug free. He adds that there is no provision in the Constitution authorizing the Congress or COMELEC to
expand the qualification requirements of candidates for senator.

G.R. No. 157870 (Social Justice Society v. Dangerous


Drugs Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency)

In its Petition for Prohibition under Rule 65, petitioner Social Justice Society (SJS), a registered political party,
seeks to prohibit the Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB) and the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) from
enforcing paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36 of RA 9165 on the ground that they are constitutionally
infirm. For one, the provisions constitute undue delegation of legislative power when they give unbridled
discretion to schools and employers to determine the manner of drug testing. For another, the provisions
trench in the equal protection clause inasmuch as they can be used to harass a student or an employee
deemed undesirable. And for a third, a person's constitutional right against unreasonable searches is also
breached by said provisions.

It is basic that the power of judicial review can only be exercised in connection with a bona fide controversy
which involves the statute sought to be reviewed.3 But even with the presence of an actual case or
controversy, the Court may refuse to exercise judicial review unless the constitutional question is brought
before it by a party having the requisite standing to challenge it.4 To have standing, one must establish that he
or she has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the
government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a
favorable action.5

The rule on standing, however, is a matter of procedure; hence, it can be relaxed for non - traditional plaintiffs,
like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter
is of transcendental importance, of overarching significance to society, or of paramount public interest.6 There
is no doubt that Pimentel, as senator of the Philippines and candidate for the May 10, 2004 elections,
possesses the requisite standing since he has substantial interests in the subject matter of the petition, among
other preliminary considerations. Regarding SJS and Laserna, this Court is wont to relax the rule on locus standi
owing primarily to the transcendental importance and the paramount public interest involved in the
enforcement of Sec. 36 of RA 9165.

The Consolidated Issues

The principal issues before us are as follows:


G.R. No. 158633 (Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr. v. Dangerous
Drugs Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency)

(1) Do Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 impose an additional qualification for
candidates for senator? Corollarily, can Congress enact a law prescribing qualifications for candidates for
senator in addition to those laid down by the Constitution? and

Petitioner Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr., as citizen and taxpayer, also seeks in his Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition under Rule 65 that Sec. 36(c), (d), (f), and (g) of RA 9165 be struck down as unconstitutional for
infringing on the constitutional right to privacy, the right against unreasonable search and seizure, and the
right against self - incrimination, and for being contrary to the due process and equal protection guarantees.

(2) Are paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36, RA 9165 unconstitutional? Specifically, do these paragraphs
violate the right to privacy, the right against unreasonable searches and seizure, and the equal protection
clause? Or do they constitute undue delegation of legislative power?

The Issue on Locus Standi

Pimentel Petition
(Constitutionality of Sec. 36[g] of RA 9165 and

First off, we shall address the justiciability of the cases at bench and the matter of the standing of petitioners
SJS and Laserna to sue. As respondents DDB and PDEA assert, SJS and Laserna failed to allege any incident
amounting to a violation of the constitutional rights mentioned in their separate petitions.2

COMELEC Resolution No. 6486)

In essence, Pimentel claims that Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 illegally impose an
additional qualification on candidates for senator. He points out that, subject to the provisions on nuisance
candidates, a candidate for senator needs only to meet the qualifications laid down in Sec. 3, Art. VI of the

Pearliegates

139

Election Law Cases


Constitution, to wit: (1) citizenship, (2) voter registration, (3) literacy, (4) age, and (5) residency. Beyond these
stated qualification requirements, candidates for senator need not possess any other qualification to run for
senator and be voted upon and elected as member of the Senate. The Congress cannot validly amend or
otherwise modify these qualification standards, as it cannot disregard, evade, or weaken the force of a
constitutional mandate,7 or alter or enlarge the Constitution.

Pimentel's contention is well - taken. Accordingly, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 should be, as it is hereby declared as,
unconstitutional. It is basic that if a law or an administrative rule violates any norm of the Constitution, that
issuance is null and void and has no effect. The Constitution is the basic law to which all laws must conform; no
act shall be valid if it conflicts with the Constitution.8 In the discharge of their defined functions, the three
departments of government have no choice but to yield obedience to the commands of the Constitution.
Whatever limits it imposes must be observed.9

Congress' inherent legislative powers, broad as they may be, are subject to certain limitations. As early as
1927, in Government v. Springer, the Court has defined, in the abstract, the limits on legislative power in the
following wise:

Someone has said that the powers of the legislative department of the Government, like the boundaries of the
ocean, are unlimited. In constitutional governments, however, as well as governments acting under delegated
authority, the powers of each of the departments x x x are limited and confined within the four walls of the
constitution or the charter, and each department can only exercise such powers as are necessarily implied from
the given powers. The Constitution is the shore of legislative authority against which the waves of legislative
enactment may dash, but over which it cannot leap.10

Thus, legislative power remains limited in the sense that it is subject to substantive and constitutional
limitations which circumscribe both the exercise of the power itself and the allowable subjects of legislation.11
The substantive constitutional limitations are chiefly found in the Bill of Rights12 and other provisions, such as
Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution prescribing the qualifications of candidates for senators.

to the validity of a certificate of candidacy for senator or, with like effect, a condition sine qua non to be voted
upon and, if proper, be proclaimed as senator - elect. The COMELEC resolution completes the chain with the
proviso that "[n]o person elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has
undergone mandatory drug test." Viewed, therefore, in its proper context, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and the
implementing COMELEC Resolution add another qualification layer to what the 1987 Constitution, at the
minimum, requires for membership in the Senate. Whether or not the drug - free bar set up under the
challenged provision is to be hurdled before or after election is really of no moment, as getting elected would
be of little value if one cannot assume office for non - compliance with the drug - testing requirement.

It may of course be argued, in defense of the validity of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, that the provision does not
expressly state that non - compliance with the drug test imposition is a disqualifying factor or would work to
nullify a certificate of candidacy. This argument may be accorded plausibility if the drug test requirement is
optional. But the particular section of the law, without exception, made drug - testing on those covered
mandatory, necessarily suggesting that the obstinate ones shall have to suffer the adverse consequences for
not adhering to the statutory command. And since the provision deals with candidates for public office, it
stands to reason that the adverse consequence adverted to can only refer to and revolve around the election
and the assumption of public office of the candidates. Any other construal would reduce the mandatory nature
of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 into a pure jargon without meaning and effect whatsoever.

While it is anti - climactic to state it at this juncture, COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 is no longer enforceable, for
by its terms, it was intended to cover only the May 10, 2004 synchronized elections and the candidates running
in that electoral event. Nonetheless, to obviate repetition, the Court deems it appropriate to review and rule, as
it hereby rules, on its validity as an implementing issuance.

It ought to be made abundantly clear, however, that the unconstitutionality of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 is rooted
on its having infringed the constitutional provision defining the qualification or eligibility requirements for one
aspiring to run for and serve as senator.

SJS Petition
In the same vein, the COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and administering election laws or
promulgating rules and regulations to implement Sec. 36(g), validly impose qualifications on candidates for
senator in addition to what the Constitution prescribes. If Congress cannot require a candidate for senator to
meet such additional qualification, the COMELEC, to be sure, is also without such power. The right of a citizen in
the democratic process of election should not be defeated by unwarranted impositions of requirement not
otherwise specified in the Constitution.13

Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, as sought to be implemented by the assailed COMELEC resolution, effectively enlarges
the qualification requirements enumerated in the Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution. As couched, said Sec. 36(g)
unmistakably requires a candidate for senator to be certified illegal - drug clean, obviously as a pre - condition

Pearliegates

(Constitutionality of Sec. 36[c], [d], [f], and [g] of RA 9165)

The drug test prescribed under Sec. 36(c), (d), and (f) of RA 9165 for secondary and tertiary level students and
public and private employees, while mandatory, is a random and suspicionless arrangement. The objective is to
stamp out illegal drug and safeguard in the process "the well being of [the] citizenry, particularly the youth,
from the harmful effects of dangerous drugs." This statutory purpose, per the policy - declaration portion of the
law, can be achieved via the pursuit by the state of "an intensive and unrelenting campaign against the
trafficking and use of dangerous drugs x x x through an integrated system of planning, implementation and
enforcement of anti - drug abuse policies, programs and projects."14 The primary legislative intent is not
criminal prosecution, as those found positive for illegal drug use as a result of this random testing are not

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necessarily treated as criminals. They may even be exempt from criminal liability should the illegal drug user
consent to undergo rehabilitation. Secs. 54 and 55 of RA 9165 are clear on this point:

Sec. 54. Voluntary Submission of a Drug Dependent to Confinement, Treatment and Rehabilitation. - A drug
dependent or any person who violates Section 15 of this Act may, by himself/herself or through his/her parent,
[close relatives] x x x apply to the Board x x x for treatment and rehabilitation of the drug dependency. Upon
such application, the Board shall bring forth the matter to the Court which shall order that the applicant be
examined for drug dependency. If the examination x x x results in the certification that the applicant is a drug
dependent, he/she shall be ordered by the Court to undergo treatment and rehabilitation in a Center
designated by the Board x x x.

xxxx

Sec. 55. Exemption from the Criminal Liability Under the Voluntary Submission Program. - A drug dependent
under the voluntary submission program, who is finally discharged from confinement, shall be exempt from the
criminal liability under Section 15 of this Act subject to the following conditions:

xxxx

School children, the US Supreme Court noted, are most vulnerable to the physical, psychological, and addictive
effects of drugs. Maturing nervous systems of the young are more critically impaired by intoxicants and are
more inclined to drug dependency. Their recovery is also at a depressingly low rate.15

The right to privacy has been accorded recognition in this jurisdiction as a facet of the right protected by the
guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure16 under Sec. 2, Art. III17 of the Constitution. But while the
right to privacy has long come into its own, this case appears to be the first time that the validity of a state decreed search or intrusion through the medium of mandatory random drug testing among students and
employees is, in this jurisdiction, made the focal point. Thus, the issue tendered in these proceedings is
veritably one of first impression.

US jurisprudence is, however, a rich source of persuasive jurisprudence. With respect to random drug testing
among school children, we turn to the teachings of Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton (Vernonia) and Board of
Education of Independent School District No. 92 of Pottawatomie County, et al. v. Earls, et al. (Board of
Education),18 both fairly pertinent US Supreme Court - decided cases involving the constitutionality of
governmental search.

In Vernonia, school administrators in Vernonia, Oregon wanted to address the drug menace in their respective
institutions following the discovery of frequent drug use by school athletes. After consultation with the parents,
they required random urinalysis drug testing for the school's athletes. James Acton, a high school student, was
denied participation in the football program after he refused to undertake the urinalysis drug testing. Acton
forthwith sued, claiming that the school's drug testing policy violated, inter alia, the Fourth Amendment19 of
the US Constitution.

The US Supreme Court, in fashioning a solution to the issues raised in Vernonia, considered the following: (1)
schools stand in loco parentis over their students; (2) school children, while not shedding their constitutional
rights at the school gate, have less privacy rights; (3) athletes have less privacy rights than non - athletes since
the former observe communal undress before and after sports events; (4) by joining the sports activity, the
athletes voluntarily subjected themselves to a higher degree of school supervision and regulation; (5) requiring
urine samples does not invade a student's privacy since a student need not undress for this kind of drug
testing; and (6) there is need for the drug testing because of the dangerous effects of illegal drugs on the
young. The US Supreme Court held that the policy constituted reasonable search under the Fourth20 and 14th
Amendments and declared the random drug - testing policy constitutional.

In Board of Education, the Board of Education of a school in Tecumseh, Oklahoma required a drug test for high
school students desiring to join extra - curricular activities. Lindsay Earls, a member of the show choir,
marching band, and academic team declined to undergo a drug test and averred that the drug - testing policy
made to apply to non - athletes violated the Fourth and 14th Amendments. As Earls argued, unlike athletes
who routinely undergo physical examinations and undress before their peers in locker rooms, non - athletes are
entitled to more privacy.

The US Supreme Court, citing Vernonia, upheld the constitutionality of drug testing even among non - athletes
on the basis of the school's custodial responsibility and authority. In so ruling, said court made no distinction
between a non - athlete and an athlete. It ratiocinated that schools and teachers act in place of the parents
with a similar interest and duty of safeguarding the health of the students. And in holding that the school could
implement its random drug - testing policy, the Court hinted that such a test was a kind of search in which
even a reasonable parent might need to engage.

In sum, what can reasonably be deduced from the above two cases and applied to this jurisdiction are: (1)
schools and their administrators stand in loco parentis with respect to their students; (2) minor students have
contextually fewer rights than an adult, and are subject to the custody and supervision of their parents,
guardians, and schools; (3) schools, acting in loco parentis, have a duty to safeguard the health and well being of their students and may adopt such measures as may reasonably be necessary to discharge such duty;
and (4) schools have the right to impose conditions on applicants for admission that are fair, just, and nondiscriminatory.

Guided by Vernonia and Board of Education, the Court is of the view and so holds that the provisions of RA
9165 requiring mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing of students are constitutional. Indeed, it is

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within the prerogative of educational institutions to require, as a condition for admission, compliance with
reasonable school rules and regulations and policies. To be sure, the right to enroll is not absolute; it is subject
to fair, reasonable, and equitable requirements.

The Court can take judicial notice of the proliferation of prohibited drugs in the country that threatens the well being of the people,21 particularly the youth and school children who usually end up as victims. Accordingly,
and until a more effective method is conceptualized and put in motion, a random drug testing of students in
secondary and tertiary schools is not only acceptable but may even be necessary if the safety and interest of
the student population, doubtless a legitimate concern of the government, are to be promoted and protected.
To borrow from Vernonia, "[d]eterring drug use by our Nation's schoolchildren is as important as enhancing
efficient enforcement of the Nation's laws against the importation of drugs"; the necessity for the State to act is
magnified by the fact that the effects of a drug - infested school are visited not just upon the users, but upon
the entire student body and faculty.22 Needless to stress, the random testing scheme provided under the law
argues against the idea that the testing aims to incriminate unsuspecting individual students.

Just as in the case of secondary and tertiary level students, the mandatory but random drug test prescribed by
Sec. 36 of RA 9165 for officers and employees of public and private offices is justifiable, albeit not exactly for
the same reason. The Court notes in this regard that petitioner SJS, other than saying that "subjecting almost
everybody to drug testing, without probable cause, is unreasonable, an unwarranted intrusion of the individual
right to privacy,"23 has failed to show how the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing under Sec.
36(c) and (d) of RA 9165 violates the right to privacy and constitutes unlawful and/or unconsented search
under Art. III, Secs. 1 and 2 of the Constitution.24 Petitioner Laserna's lament is just as simplistic, sweeping,
and gratuitous and does not merit serious consideration. Consider what he wrote without elaboration:

The US Supreme Court and US Circuit Courts of Appeals have made various rulings on the constitutionality of
mandatory drug tests in the school and the workplaces. The US courts have been consistent in their rulings
that the mandatory drug tests violate a citizen's constitutional right to privacy and right against unreasonable
search and seizure. They are quoted extensively hereinbelow.25

The essence of privacy is the right to be left alone.26 In context, the right to privacy means the right to be free
from unwarranted exploitation of one's person or from intrusion into one's private activities in such a way as to
cause humiliation to a person's ordinary sensibilities. 27 And while there has been general agreement as to the
basic function of the guarantee against unwarranted search, "translation of the abstract prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures' into workable broad guidelines for the decision of particular cases is a
difficult task," to borrow from C. Camara v. Municipal Court.28 Authorities are agreed though that the right to
privacy yields to certain paramount rights of the public and defers to the state's exercise of police power.29

As the warrantless clause of Sec. 2, Art III of the Constitution is couched and as has been held,
"reasonableness" is the touchstone of the validity of a government search or intrusion.30 And whether a search
at issue hews to the reasonableness standard is judged by the balancing of the government - mandated
intrusion on the individual's privacy interest against the promotion of some compelling state interest.31 In the

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criminal context, reasonableness requires showing of probable cause to be personally determined by a judge.
Given that the drug - testing policy for employees--and students for that matter--under RA 9165 is in the nature
of administrative search needing what was referred to in Vernonia as "swift and informal disciplinary
procedures," the probable - cause standard is not required or even practicable. Be that as it may, the review
should focus on the reasonableness of the challenged administrative search in question.

The first factor to consider in the matter of reasonableness is the nature of the privacy interest upon which the
drug testing, which effects a search within the meaning of Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution, intrudes. In this
case, the office or workplace serves as the backdrop for the analysis of the privacy expectation of the
employees and the reasonableness of drug testing requirement. The employees' privacy interest in an office is
to a large extent circumscribed by the company's work policies, the collective bargaining agreement, if any,
entered into by management and the bargaining unit, and the inherent right of the employer to maintain
discipline and efficiency in the workplace. Their privacy expectation in a regulated office environment is, in fine,
reduced; and a degree of impingement upon such privacy has been upheld.

Just as defining as the first factor is the character of the intrusion authorized by the challenged law. Reduced to
a question form, is the scope of the search or intrusion clearly set forth, or, as formulated in Ople v. Torres, is
the enabling law authorizing a search "narrowly drawn" or "narrowly focused"?32

The poser should be answered in the affirmative. For one, Sec. 36 of RA 9165 and its implementing rules and
regulations (IRR), as couched, contain provisions specifically directed towards preventing a situation that would
unduly embarrass the employees or place them under a humiliating experience. While every officer and
employee in a private establishment is under the law deemed forewarned that he or she may be a possible
subject of a drug test, nobody is really singled out in advance for drug testing. The goal is to discourage drug
use by not telling in advance anyone when and who is to be tested. And as may be observed, Sec. 36(d) of RA
9165 itself prescribes what, in Ople, is a narrowing ingredient by providing that the employees concerned shall
be subjected to "random drug test as contained in the company's work rules and regulations x x x for purposes
of reducing the risk in the work place."

For another, the random drug testing shall be undertaken under conditions calculated to protect as much as
possible the employee's privacy and dignity. As to the mechanics of the test, the law specifies that the
procedure shall employ two testing methods, i.e., the screening test and the confirmatory test, doubtless to
ensure as much as possible the trustworthiness of the results. But the more important consideration lies in the
fact that the test shall be conducted by trained professionals in access - controlled laboratories monitored by
the Department of Health (DOH) to safeguard against results tampering and to ensure an accurate chain of
custody.33 In addition, the IRR issued by the DOH provides that access to the drug results shall be on the "need
to know" basis;34 that the "drug test result and the records shall be [kept] confidential subject to the usual
accepted practices to protect the confidentiality of the test results."35 Notably, RA 9165 does not oblige the
employer concerned to report to the prosecuting agencies any information or evidence relating to the violation
of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act received as a result of the operation of the drug testing. All told,
therefore, the intrusion into the employees' privacy, under RA 9165, is accompanied by proper safeguards,
particularly against embarrassing leakages of test results, and is relatively minimal.

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To reiterate, RA 9165 was enacted as a measure to stamp out illegal drug in the country and thus protect the
well - being of the citizens, especially the youth, from the deleterious effects of dangerous drugs. The law
intends to achieve this through the medium, among others, of promoting and resolutely pursuing a national
drug abuse policy in the workplace via a mandatory random drug test.36 To the Court, the need for drug
testing to at least minimize illegal drug use is substantial enough to override the individual's privacy interest
under the premises. The Court can consider that the illegal drug menace cuts across gender, age group, and
social - economic lines. And it may not be amiss to state that the sale, manufacture, or trafficking of illegal
drugs, with their ready market, would be an investor's dream were it not for the illegal and immoral
components of any of such activities. The drug problem has hardly abated since the martial law public
execution of a notorious drug trafficker. The state can no longer assume a laid back stance with respect to this
modern - day scourge. Drug enforcement agencies perceive a mandatory random drug test to be an effective
way of preventing and deterring drug use among employees in private offices, the threat of detection by
random testing being higher than other modes. The Court holds that the chosen method is a reasonable and
enough means to lick the problem.

Taking into account the foregoing factors, i.e., the reduced expectation of privacy on the part of the employees,
the compelling state concern likely to be met by the search, and the well - defined limits set forth in the law to
properly guide authorities in the conduct of the random testing, we hold that the challenged drug test
requirement is, under the limited context of the case, reasonable and, ergo, constitutional.

Like their counterparts in the private sector, government officials and employees also labor under reasonable
supervision and restrictions imposed by the Civil Service law and other laws on public officers, all enacted to
promote a high standard of ethics in the public service.37 And if RA 9165 passes the norm of reasonableness
for private employees, the more reason that it should pass the test for civil servants, who, by constitutional
command, are required to be accountable at all times to the people and to serve them with utmost
responsibility and efficiency.38

Petitioner SJS' next posture that Sec. 36 of RA 9165 is objectionable on the ground of undue delegation of
power hardly commends itself for concurrence. Contrary to its position, the provision in question is not so
extensively drawn as to give unbridled options to schools and employers to determine the manner of drug
testing. Sec. 36 expressly provides how drug testing for students of secondary and tertiary schools and
officers/employees of public/private offices should be conducted. It enumerates the persons who shall undergo
drug testing. In the case of students, the testing shall be in accordance with the school rules as contained in
the student handbook and with notice to parents. On the part of officers/employees, the testing shall take into
account the company's work rules. In either case, the random procedure shall be observed, meaning that the
persons to be subjected to drug test shall be picked by chance or in an unplanned way. And in all cases,
safeguards against misusing and compromising the confidentiality of the test results are established.

Lest it be overlooked, Sec. 94 of RA 9165 charges the DDB to issue, in consultation with the DOH, Department
of the Interior and Local Government, Department of Education, and Department of Labor and Employment,
among other agencies, the IRR necessary to enforce the law. In net effect then, the participation of schools and

Pearliegates

offices in the drug testing scheme shall always be subject to the IRR of RA 9165. It is, therefore, incorrect to say
that schools and employers have unchecked discretion to determine how often, under what conditions, and
where the drug tests shall be conducted.

The validity of delegating legislative power is now a quiet area in the constitutional landscape.39 In the face of
the increasing complexity of the task of the government and the increasing inability of the legislature to cope
directly with the many problems demanding its attention, resort to delegation of power, or entrusting to
administrative agencies the power of subordinate legislation, has become imperative, as here.

Laserna Petition (Constitutionality of Sec. 36[c], [d],


[f], and [g] of RA 9165)

Unlike the situation covered by Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165, the Court finds no valid justification for
mandatory drug testing for persons accused of crimes. In the case of students, the constitutional viability of the
mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing for students emanates primarily from the waiver by the
students of their right to privacy when they seek entry to the school, and from their voluntarily submitting their
persons to the parental authority of school authorities. In the case of private and public employees, the
constitutional soundness of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing proceeds from the
reasonableness of the drug test policy and requirement.

We find the situation entirely different in the case of persons charged before the public prosecutor's office with
criminal offenses punishable with six (6) years and one (1) day imprisonment. The operative concepts in the
mandatory drug testing are "randomness" and "suspicionless." In the case of persons charged with a crime
before the prosecutor's office, a mandatory drug testing can never be random or suspicionless. The ideas of
randomness and being suspicionless are antithetical to their being made defendants in a criminal complaint.
They are not randomly picked; neither are they beyond suspicion. When persons suspected of committing a
crime are charged, they are singled out and are impleaded against their will. The persons thus charged, by the
bare fact of being haled before the prosecutor's office and peaceably submitting themselves to drug testing, if
that be the case, do not necessarily consent to the procedure, let alone waive their right to privacy.40 To
impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for
criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of RA 9165. Drug testing in this case would violate a
persons' right to privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons
are veritably forced to incriminate themselves.

WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to GRANT the petition in G.R. No. 161658 and declares Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165
and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 as UNCONSTITUTIONAL; and to PARTIALLY GRANT the petition in G.R. Nos.
157870 and 158633 by declaring Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165 CONSTITUTIONAL, but declaring its Sec. 36(f)
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. All concerned agencies are, accordingly, permanently enjoined from implementing Sec.
36(f) and (g) of RA 9165. No costs.

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term of his predecessor. Consequently, such succession into office is not counted as one (1) term for purposes
of the computation of the three-term limitation under the Constitution and the Local Government Code.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 133495

September 3, 1998

BENJAMIN U. BORJA, JR., petitioner,


vs.

Accordingly, private respondent was voted for in the elections. He received 16,558 votes against petitioner's
7,773 votes and was proclaimed elected by the Municipal Board of Canvassers.

This is a petition for certiorari brought to set aside the resolution, dated My 7, 1998, of the COMELEC and to
seek a declaration that private respondent is disqualified to serve another term as mayor of Pateros, Metro
Manila.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSE T. CAPCO, JR., respondents.


MENDOZA, J.:
This case presents for determination the scope of the constitutional provision barring elective local officials,
with the exception of barangay officials, from serving more than three consecutive terms. In particular, the
question is whether a vice-mayor who succeeds to the office of mayor by operation of law and serves the
remainder of the term is considered to have served a term in that office for the purpose of the three-term limit.

Private respondent Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected vice-mayor of Pateros on January 18, 1988 for a term ending
June 30, 1992. On September 2, 1989, he became mayor, by operation of law, upon the death of the
incumbent, Cesar Borja. On May 11, 1992, he ran and was elected mayor for a term of three years which ended
on June 30, 1995. On May 8, 1995, he was reelected mayor for another term of three years ending June 30,
1998. 1

On March 27, 1998, private respondent Capco filed a certificate of candidacy for mayor of Pateros relative to
the May 11, 1998 elections. Petitioner Benjamin U. Borja Jr., who was also a candidate for mayor, sought
Capco's disqualification on the theory that the latter would have already served as mayor for three consecutive
terms by June 30, 1998 and would therefore be ineligible to serve for another term after that.

Petitioner contends that private respondent Capco's service as mayor from September 2, 1989 to June 30, 1992
should be considered as service for one full term, and since he thereafter served from 1992 to 1998 two more
terms as mayor, he should be considered to have served three consecutive terms within the contemplation of
Art. X, 8 of the Constitution and 43(b) of the Local Government Code. Petitioner stresses the fact that, upon
the death of Mayor Cesar Borja on September 2, 1989, private respondent became the mayor and thereafter
served the remainder of the term. Petitioner argues that it is irrelevant that private respondent became mayor
by succession because the purpose of the constitutional provision in limiting the number of terms elective local
officials may serve is to prevent a monopolization of political power.

This contention will not bear analysis. Article X, 8 of the Constitution provides:

Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by
law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of
his service for the full term for which he was elected.

This provision is restated in 43(b) of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160):
On April 30, 1998, the Second Division of the Commission on Elections ruled in favor of petitioner and declared
private respondent Capco disqualified from running for reelection as mayor of Pateros. 2 However, on motion of
private respondent the COMELEC en banc, voting 5-2, reversed the decision and declared Capco eligible to run
for mayor in the May 11, 1998 elections. 3 The majority stated in its decision:

In both the Constitution and the Local Government Code, the three-term limitation refers to the term of office
for which the local official was elected. It made no reference to succession to an office to which he was not
elected. In the case before the Commission, respondent Capco was not elected to the position of Mayor in the
January 18, 1988 local elections. He succeeded to such office by operation of law and served for the unexpired

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Sec. 43. Term of Office. . . .

(b)
No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected. . . .

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First, to prevent the establishment of political dynasties is not the only policy embodied in the constitutional
provision in question. The other policy is that of enhancing the freedom of choice of the people. To consider,
therefore, only stay in office regardless of how the official concerned came to that office whether by election
or by succession by operation of law would be to disregard one of the purposes of the constitutional
provision in question.

Thus, a consideration of the historical background of Article X, 8 of the Constitution reveals that the members
of the Constitutional Commission were as much concerned with preserving the freedom of choice of the people
as they were with preventing the monopolization of political power. Indeed, they rejected a proposal put forth
by Commissioner Edmundo F. Garcia that after serving three consecutive terms or nine years there should be
no further reelection for local and legislative officials. Instead, they adopted the alternative proposal of
Commissioner Christian Monsod that such officials be simply barred from running for the same position in the of
the succeeding election following the expiration of the third consecutive term. 4 Monsod warned against
"prescreening candidates [from] whom the people will choose" as a result of the proposed absolute
disqualification, considering that the draft constitution contained provisions "recognizing people's power." 5

Commissioner Blas F. Ople, who supported the Monsod proposal, said:

The principle involved is really whether this Commission shall impose a temporary or a perpetual
disqualification on those who have served their terms in accordance with the limits on consecutive service as
decided by the Constitutional Commission. I would be very wary about this Commission exercising a sort of
omnipotent power in order to disqualify those who will already have served their terms from perpetuating
themselves in office. I think the Commission achieves its purpose in establishing safeguards against the
excessive accumulation of power as a result of consecutive terms. We do put a cap on consecutive service in
the case of the President, six years, in the case of the Vice-President, unlimited; and in the case of the
Senators, one reelection. In the case of the Members of Congress, both from the legislative districts and from
the party list and sectoral representation, this is now under discussion and later on the policy concerning local
officials will be taken up by the Committee on Local Governments. The principle remains the same. I think we
want to prevent future situations where, as a result of continuous service and frequent reelections, officials
from the President down to the municipal mayor tend to develop a proprietary interest in their positions and to
accumulate those powers and perquisites that permit them to stay on indefinitely or to transfer these posts to
members of their families in a subsequent election. I think that is taken care of because we put a gap on the
continuity or the unbroken service of all of these officials. But where we now decide to put these prospective
servants of the people or politicians, if we want to use the coarser term, under a perpetual disqualification, I
have a feeling that we are taking away too much from the people, whereas we should be giving as much to the
people as we can in terms of their own freedom of choice. . . . 6

Other commissioners went on record against "perpetually disqualifying" elective officials who have served a
certain number of terms as this would deny the right of the people to choose. As Commissioner Yusup R.
Abubakar asked, "why should we arrogate unto ourselves the right to decide what the people want?" 7

Pearliegates

Commissioner Felicitas S. Aquino spoke in the same vein when she called on her colleagues to "allow the
people to exercise their own sense of proportion and [rely] on their own strength to curtail power when it
overreaches itself." 8

Commissioner Teodoro C. Bacani stressed: "Why should we not leave [perpetual disqualification after serving a
number of terms] to the premise accepted by practically everybody here that our people are politically mature?
Should we use this assumption only when it is convenient for us, and not when it may also lead to a freedom of
choice for the people and for politicians who may aspire to serve them longer?" 9

Two ideas thus emerge from a consideration of the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission. The first is
the notion of service of term, derived from the concern about the accumulation of power as a result of a
prolonged stay in office. The second is the idea of election, derived from the concern that the right of the
people to choose those whom they wish to govern them be preserved.

It is likewise noteworthy that, in discussing term limits, the drafters of the Constitution did so on the
assumption that the officials concerned were serving by reason of election. This is clear from the following
exchange in the Constitutional Commission concerning term limits, now embodied in Art. VI, 4 and 7 of the
Constitution, for members of Congress:

MR. GASCON.
I would like to ask a question with regard to the issue after the second term. We will allow the
Senator to rest for a period of time before he can run again?

MR. DAVIDE.

That is correct.

MR. GASCON.
And the question that we left behind before if the Gentlemen will remember was: How
long will that period of rest be? Will it be one election which is three years or one term which is six years?

MR. DAVIDE.
If the Gentlemen will remember, Commissioner Rodrigo expressed the view that during the
election following the expiration of the first 12 years, whether such election will be on the third year or on the
sixth year thereafter, this particular member of the Senate can run. So, it is not really a period of hibernation
for six years. That was the Committee's stand. 10

Indeed a fundamental tenet of representative democracy is that the people should be allowed to choose those
whom they please to govern them. 11 To bar the election of a local official because he has already served three
terms, although the first as a result of succession by operation of law rather than election, would therefore be
to violate this principle.

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Second, not only historical examination but textual analysis as well supports the ruling of the COMELEC that
Art. X, 8 contemplates service by local officials for three consecutive terms as a result of election. The first
sentence speaks of "the term of office of elective local officials" and bars "such official[s]" from serving for
more than three consecutive terms. The second sentence, in explaining when an elective local official may be
deemed to have served his full term of office, states that "voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of
time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was
elected." The term served must therefore be one "for which [the official concerned] was elected." The purpose
of this provision is to prevent a circumvention of the limitation on the number of terms an elective local official
may serve. Conversely, if he is not serving a term for which he was elected because he is simply continuing the
service of the official he succeeds, such official cannot be considered to have fully served the term
notwithstanding his voluntary renunciation of office prior to its expiration.

Reference is made to Commissioner Bernas' comment on Art. VI, 7, which similarly bars members of the
House of Representatives from serving for more than three terms. Commissioner Bernas states that "if one is
elected Representative to serve the unexpired term of another, that unexpired term, no matter how short, will
be considered one term for the purpose of computing the number of successive terms allowed." 12

This is actually based on the opinion expressed by Commissioner Davide in answer to a query of Commissioner
Suarez: "For example, a special election is called for a Senator, and the Senator newly elected would have to
serve the unexpired portion of the term. Would that mean that serving the unexpired portion of the term is
already considered one term? So, half a term, which is actually the correct statement, plus one term would
disqualify the Senator concerned from running? Is that the meaning of this provision on disqualification, Madam
President?" Commissioner Davide said: "Yes, because we speak of "term," and if there is a special election, he
will serve only for the unexpired portion of that particular term plus one more term for the Senator and two
more terms for the Members of the Lower House." 13

There is a difference, however, between the case of a vice-mayor and that of a member of the House of
Representatives who succeeds another who dies, resigns, becomes incapacitated, or is removed from office.
The vice-mayor succeeds to the mayorship by operation of law. 14 On the other hand, the Representative is
elected to fill the vacancy. 15 In a real sense, therefore, such Representative serves a term for which he was
elected. As the purpose of the constitutional provision is to limit the right to be elected and to serve in
Congress, his service of the unexpired term is rightly counted as his first term. Rather than refute what we
believe to be the intendment of Art. X, 8 with regard to elective local officials, the case of a Representative
who succeeds another confirms the theory.

Petitioner also cites Art. VII, 4 of the Constitution which provides for succession of the Vice-President to the
Presidency in case of vacancy in that office. After stating that "The President shall not be eligible for any
reelection," this provision says that "No person who has succeeded as President and has served as such for
more than four years shall be qualified for election to the same office at any time." Petitioner contends that, by
analogy, the vice-mayor should likewise be considered to have served a full term as mayor if he succeeds to
the latter's office and serves for the remainder of the term.

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The framers of the Constitution included such a provision because, without it, the Vice-President, who simply
steps into the Presidency by succession, would be qualified to run President even if he has occupied that office
for more than four years. The absence of a similar provision in Art. X, 8 on elective local officials throws in bold
relief the difference between the two cases. It underscores the constitutional intent to cover only the terms of
office to which one may have been elected for purposes of the three-term limit on local elective officials,
disregarding for this purpose service by automatic succession.

There is another reason why the Vice-President who succeeds to the Presidency and serves in that office for
more than four years is ineligible for election as President. The Vice-President is elected primarily to succeed
the President in the event of the latter's death, permanent disability, removal, or resignation. While he may be
appointed to the cabinet, his becoming, so is entirely dependent on the good graces of the President. In
running for Vice-President, he may thus be said to also seek the Presidency. For their part, the electors likewise
choose as Vice-President the candidate who they think can fill the Presidency in the event it becomes vacant.
Hence, service in the Presidency for more than four years may rightly be considered as service for a full term.

This is not so in the case of the vice-mayor. Under the Local Government Code, he is the presiding officer of the
sanggunian and he appoints all officials and employees of such local assembly. He has distinct powers and
functions, succession to mayorship in the event of vacancy therein being only one of
them. 16 It cannot be said of him, as much as of the Vice-President in the event of a vacancy in the Presidency,
that, in running for vice-mayor, he also seeks the mayorship. His assumption of the mayorship in the event of
vacancy is more a matter of chance than of design. Hence, his service in that office should not be counted in
the application of any term limit.

To recapitulate, the term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well
as the right to serve in the same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served
three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same position for the
same number of times before the disqualification can apply. This point can be made clearer by considering the
following cases or situations:

Case No. 1.
Suppose A is a vice-mayor who becomes mayor by reason of the death of the incumbent. Six
months before the next election, he resigns and is twice elected thereafter. Can he run again for mayor in the
next election?

Yes, because although he has already first served as mayor by succession and subsequently resigned from
office before the full term expired, he has not actually served three full terms in all for the purpose of applying
the term limit. Under Art. X, 8, voluntary renunciation of the office is not considered as an interruption in the
continuity of his service for the full term only if the term is one "for which he was elected." Since A is only

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completing the service of the term for which the deceased and not he was elected, A cannot be considered to
have completed one term. His resignation constitutes an interruption of the full term.

IBARRA vs. COMELEC

Case No. 2.
Suppose B is elected mayor and, during his first term, he is twice suspended for misconduct
for a total of 1 year. If he is twice reelected after that, can he run for one more term in the next election?

EN BANC
Gentlemen:

Yes, because he has served only two full terms successively.

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated MAR 25 2003.
G.R. No. 149736 (Melanio L. Mendoza and Mario E. Ibarra, petitioners, vs. Commission on Elections and
Leonardo B. Roman, respondents.)

In both cases, the mayor is entitled to run for reelection because the two conditions for the application of the
disqualification provisions have not concurred, namely, that the local official concerned has been elected three
consecutive times and that he has fully served three consecutive terms. In the first case, even if the local
official is considered to have served three full terms notwithstanding his resignation before the end of the first
term, the fact remains that he has not been elected three times. In the second case, the local official has been
elected three consecutive times, but he has not fully served three consecutive terms.

Case No. 3.
The case of vice-mayor C who becomes mayor by succession involves a total failure of the
two conditions to concur for the purpose of applying Art. X, 8. Suppose he is twice elected after that term, is
he qualified to run again in the next election?

Yes, because he was not elected to the office of mayor in the first term but simply found himself thrust into it
by operation of law. Neither had he served the full term because he only continued the service, interrupted by
the death, of the deceased mayor.

To consider C in the third case to have served the first term in full and therefore ineligible to run a third time for
reelection would be not only to falsify reality but also to unduly restrict the right of the people to choose whom
they wish to govern them. If the vice-mayor turns out to be a bad mayor, the people can remedy the situation
by simply not reelecting him for another term. But if, on the other hand, he proves to be a good mayor, there
will be no way the people can return him to office (even if it is just the third time he is standing for reelection) if
his service of the first term is counted as one for the purpose of applying the term limit.
To consider C as eligible for reelection would be in accord with the understanding of the Constitutional
Commission that while the people should be protected from the evils that a monopoly of political power may
bring about, care should be taken that their freedom of choice is not unduly curtailed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 149736. March 25, 2003]

Pearliegates

For resolution is the motion for reconsideration dated January 24, 2003, filed by petitioners Melanio L. Mendoza
and Mario E. Ibarra, of the December 17, 2002 resolution herein which dismissed the petition.

Petitioners-movants argue that:

1.
The application of the constitutional ban in Art. X, 8 cannot be made to depend on the vagaries
of election results, and

2.
The resolution is inconsistent with the statement and ruling of the Court in the Hagedorn case
(Socrates v. Comelec, G.R. Nos. 154512, 154683 & 155083-84, 12 November 2002) that a recall term is itself
one term.

After due deliberation, eight Justices voted to deny the motion for reconsideration.

VITUG, J., joined by YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., is of the view that as revealed by the records of the Constitutional
Commission, the Constitution envisions a continuous and uninterrupted service for three full terms before the
proscription applies. Therefore, not being a full term, a recall term should not be counted or used as a basis for
the disqualification whether served prior (as in this case) or subsequent (as in the Socrates case) to the nineyear, full three-term limit.

MENDOZA, J., joined by QUISUMBING, J., reiterates his opinion to dismiss that, in accordance with the ruling in
Borja, Jr. v. COMELEC, 295 SCRA 157 (1998); Arcos v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 133639, October 6, 1998 (res.);
Lonzanida v. COMELEC, 311 SCRA 602 (1999); and Adormeo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 147927, February 4, 2002, a
term during which succession to a local elective office takes place or a recall election is held should not be
counted in determining whether an elective local official has served more than three consecutive terms. He
believes that the Constitution does not prohibit elective local officials from serving for more than three

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consecutive terms because, in fact, it excludes from the three-term limit interruptions in the continuity of
service, so long as such interruptions are not due to the voluntary renunciation of the office by an incumbent.
Hence, the period from June 28, 1994 to June 30, 1995, during which respondent Leonardo B. Roman served as
governor of Bataan by virtue of a recall election held in 1993, should not be counted. Since on May 14, 2001
respondent had previously served as governor of Bataan for only two consecutive terms (1995-1998 and 19982001), his election on that day was actually only his third term for the same position. For this reason, he votes
to deny the motion for reconsideration.

CARPIO, J., joined by CARPIO MORALES J., also dissented and voted to grant the motion. He holds that a recall
term constitutes one term and that totally to ignore a recall term in determining the three-term limit would
allow local officials to serve for more than nine consecutive years contrary to the manifest intent of the framers
of the Constitution. He contends that respondent Roman's election in 2001 cannot exempt him from the threeterm limit imposed by the Constitution.

WHEREFORE, by the same vote stated in the resolution of December 17, 2002, petitioners' motion for
reconsideration is DENIED with FINALITY.
PANGANIBAN, J., joined by PUNO, J., maintains his position that a recall term should not be considered as one
full term, because a contrary interpretation would in effect cut short the elected official's service to less than
nine years and shortchange his constituents. The desire to prevent monopoly of political power should be
balanced against the need to uphold the voters' obvious preferences who, in the present case, is Roman
received 97 percent of the votes cast. He explains that, in Socrates, he also voted to affirm the clear choice of
the electorate, because in a democracy the people should, as much as legally possible, be governed by leaders
freely chosen by them in credible elections. He concludes that, in election cases, when two conflicting legal
positions are of almost equal weight, the scales of justice should be tilted in favor of the people's overwhelming
choice.

AZCUNA, J., joined by BELLOSILLO, J., holds the view that the Hagedorn case is different from the present one.
There, the proscription had attached, since three full and consecutive terms had been served. The issue was
whether, after serving three full consecutive terms, Hagedorn could run in the recall election, there having
been an interruption by way of the regular election next following the end of his third term in which he did not
run. He was deemed not disqualified to run in the recall election because the remaining portion of the term
following the recall election was held not consecutive to his third term, in view of the interruption
aforementioned. Whereas, in the present case, the question is whether there has been service of three
consecutive terms so that the proscription would apply, and the resolution held that there was none because
the service after the recall election is not service for a full term, and the constitutional ban applies only after
full and continuous service of three consecutive terms. Stated otherwise, Hagedorn was not disqualified
because his service after the recall election is not service of a consecutive term; whereas, here, Roman is not
disqualified because his service after the recall election does not constitute service for a full term. Finally, the
principle of supremacy of the sovereign will was cited in the resolution as an aid in the interpretation of the
provision of the Constitution, in the sense that in election cases involving conflicting legal positions of almost
equal weight, the scales of justice should tilt in favor of the people's overwhelming choice.

G.R. No. 184836

December 23, 2009

SIMON B. ALDOVINO, JR., DANILO B. FALLER AND FERDINAND N. TALABONG, Petitioners,


vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND WILFREDO F. ASILO, Respondents.

BRION, J.:

Is the preventive suspension of an elected public official an interruption of his term of office for purposes of the
three-term limit rule under Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of Republic Act No. 7160
(RA 7160, or the Local Government Code)?

The respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) ruled that preventive suspension is an effective
interruption because it renders the suspended public official unable to provide complete service for the full
term; thus, such term should not be counted for the purpose of the three-term limit rule.

The present petition1 seeks to annul and set aside this COMELEC ruling for having been issued with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

On the other hand, seven Justices voted to grant the motion for reconsideration.
THE ANTECEDENTS
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J., with whom DAVIDE, C.J., and AUSTRIA- MARTINEZ, CORONA, and CALLEJO, SR., JJ.
concurred, holds the view that the recall term served by respondent Roman, comprising the period June 28,
1994 to June 30, 1995, should be considered as one term. Since he thereafter served for two consecutive terms
from 1995 to 1998 and from 1998 to 2001, his election on May 14, 2001 was actually his fourth term and
contravenes Art. X, 8 of the Constitution. For this reason, she votes to grant the motion for reconsideration.

Pearliegates

The respondent Wilfredo F. Asilo (Asilo) was elected councilor of Lucena City for three consecutive terms: for
the 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007 terms, respectively. In September 2005 or during his 2004-2007
term of office, the Sandiganbayan preventively suspended him for 90 days in relation with a criminal case he
then faced. This Court, however, subsequently lifted the Sandiganbayans suspension order; hence, he
resumed performing the functions of his office and finished his term.

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In the 2007 election, Asilo filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position. The petitioners Simon B.
Aldovino, Jr., Danilo B. Faller, and Ferdinand N. Talabong (the petitioners) sought to deny due course to Asilos
certificate of candidacy or to cancel it on the ground that he had been elected and had served for three terms;
his candidacy for a fourth term therefore violated the three-term limit rule under Section 8, Article X of the
Constitution and Section 43(b) of RA 7160.

The COMELECs Second Division ruled against the petitioners and in Asilos favour in its Resolution of
November 28, 2007. It reasoned out that the three-term limit rule did not apply, as Asilo failed to render
complete service for the 2004-2007 term because of the suspension the Sandiganbayan had ordered.

The COMELEC en banc refused to reconsider the Second Divisions ruling in its October 7, 2008 Resolution;
hence, the PRESENT PETITION raising the following ISSUES:

1. Whether preventive suspension of an elected local official is an interruption of the three-term limit rule; and

2. Whether preventive suspension is considered involuntary renunciation as contemplated in Section 43(b) of


RA 7160

Thus presented, the case raises the direct issue of whether Asilos preventive suspension constituted an
interruption that allowed him to run for a 4th term.

a. The Three-term Limit Rule:

The Constitutional Provision Analyzed

Section 8, Article X of the Constitution states:

Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by
law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of
his service for the full term for which he was elected.

Section 43 (b) of RA 7160 practically repeats the constitutional provision, and any difference in wording does
not assume any significance in this case.

As worded, the constitutional provision fixes the term of a local elective office and limits an elective officials
stay in office to no more than three consecutive terms. This is the first branch of the rule embodied in Section
8, Article X.

Significantly, this provision refers to a "term" as a period of time three years during which an official has
title to office and can serve. Appari v. Court of Appeals,3 a Resolution promulgated on November 28, 2007,
succinctly discusses what a "term" connotes, as follows:

THE COURTS RULING

We find the petition meritorious.

General Considerations

The present case is not the first before this Court on the three-term limit provision of the Constitution, but is the
first on the effect of preventive suspension on the continuity of an elective officials term. To be sure,
preventive suspension, as an interruption in the term of an elective public official, has been mentioned as an
example in Borja v. Commission on Elections.2 Doctrinally, however, Borja is not a controlling ruling; it did not
deal with preventive suspension, but with the application of the three-term rule on the term that an elective
official acquired by succession.

Pearliegates

The word "term" in a legal sense means a fixed and definite period of time which the law describes that an
officer may hold an office. According to Mechem, the term of office is the period during which an office may be
held. Upon expiration of the officers term, unless he is authorized by law to holdover, his rights, duties and
authority as a public officer must ipso facto cease. In the law of public officers, the most and natural frequent
method by which a public officer ceases to be such is by the expiration of the terms for which he was elected or
appointed. [Emphasis supplied].1avvphi1

A later case, Gaminde v. Commission on Audit,4 reiterated that "[T]he term means the time during which the
officer may claim to hold office as of right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall
succeed one another."

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The "limitation" under this first branch of the provision is expressed in the negative "no such official shall
serve for more than three consecutive terms." This formulation no more than three consecutive terms is a
clear command suggesting the existence of an inflexible rule. While it gives no exact indication of what to
"serve. . . three consecutive terms" exactly connotes, the meaning is clear reference is to the term, not to the
service that a public official may render.1awphi1 In other words, the limitation refers to the term.

The second branch relates to the provisions express initiative to prevent any circumvention of the limitation
through voluntary severance of ties with the public office; it expressly states that voluntary renunciation of
office "shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he
was elected." This declaration complements the term limitation mandated by the first branch.

A notable feature of the second branch is that it does not textually state that voluntary renunciation is the only
actual interruption of service that does not affect "continuity of service for a full term" for purposes of the
three-term limit rule. It is a pure declaratory statement of what does not serve as an interruption of service for
a full term, but the phrase "voluntary renunciation," by itself, is not without significance in determining
constitutional intent.

The word "renunciation" carries the dictionary meaning of abandonment. To renounce is to give up, abandon,
decline, or resign.5 It is an act that emanates from its author, as contrasted to an act that operates from the
outside. Read with the definition of a "term" in mind, renunciation, as mentioned under the second branch of
the constitutional provision, cannot but mean an act that results in cutting short the term, i.e., the loss of title
to office. The descriptive word "voluntary" linked together with "renunciation" signifies an act of surrender
based on the surenderees own freely exercised will; in other words, a loss of title to office by conscious choice.
In the context of the three-term limit rule, such loss of title is not considered an interruption because it is
presumed to be purposely sought to avoid the application of the term limitation.

The following exchanges in the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission on the term "voluntary
renunciation" shed further light on the extent of the term "voluntary renunciation":

MR. MAAMBONG. Could I address the clarificatory question to the Committee? This term "voluntary
renunciation" does not appear in Section 3 [of Article VI]; it also appears in Section 6 [of Article VI].

MR DAVIDE. Yes.

MR. MAAMBONG. It is also a recurring phrase all over the Constitution. Could the Committee please enlighten
us exactly what "voluntary renunciation" mean? Is this akin to abandonment?

Pearliegates

MR. DAVIDE. Abandonment is voluntary. In other words, he cannot circumvent the restriction by merely
resigning at any given time on the second term.

MR. MAAMBONG. Is the Committee saying that the term "voluntary renunciation" is more general than
abandonment and resignation?

MR. DAVIDE. It is more general, more embracing.6

From this exchange and Commissioner Davides expansive interpretation of the term "voluntary renunciation,"
the framers intent apparently was to close all gaps that an elective official may seize to defeat the three-term
limit rule, in the way that voluntary renunciation has been rendered unavailable as a mode of defeating the
three-term limit rule. Harking back to the text of the constitutional provision, we note further that
Commissioner Davides view is consistent with the negative formulation of the first branch of the provision and
the inflexible interpretation that it suggests.

This examination of the wording of the constitutional provision and of the circumstances surrounding its
formulation impresses upon us the clear intent to make term limitation a high priority constitutional objective
whose terms must be strictly construed and which cannot be defeated by, nor sacrificed for, values of less than
equal constitutional worth. We view preventive suspension vis--vis term limitation with this firm mindset.

b. Relevant Jurisprudence on the

Three-term Limit Rule

Other than the above-cited materials, jurisprudence best gives us a lead into the concepts within the
provisions contemplation, particularly on the "interruption in the continuity of service for the full term" that it
speaks of.

Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections7 presented the question of whether the disqualification on the basis of
the three-term limit applies if the election of the public official (to be strictly accurate, the proclamation as
winner of the public official) for his supposedly third term had been declared invalid in a final and executory
judgment. We ruled that the two requisites for the application of the disqualification (viz., 1. that the official
concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post; and 2. that he has
fully served three consecutive terms) were not present. In so ruling, we said:

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The clear intent of the framers of the constitution to bar any attempt to circumvent the three-term limit by a
voluntary renunciation of office and at the same time respect the peoples choice and grant their elected
official full service of a term is evident in this provision. Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the
renounced term in the computation of the three term limit; conversely, involuntary severance from office for
any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service. The
petitioner vacated his post a few months before the next mayoral elections, not by voluntary renunciation but
in compliance with the legal process of writ of execution issued by the COMELEC to that effect. Such
involuntary severance from office is an interruption of continuity of service and thus, the petitioner did not fully
serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term. [Emphasis supplied]

Our intended meaning under this ruling is clear: it is severance from office, or to be exact, loss of title, that
renders the three-term limit rule inapplicable.

Ong v. Alegre8 and Rivera v. COMELEC,9 like Lonzanida, also involved the issue of whether there had been a
completed term for purposes of the three-term limit disqualification. These cases, however, presented an
interesting twist, as their final judgments in the electoral contest came after the term of the contested office
had expired so that the elective officials in these cases were never effectively unseated.

Despite the ruling that Ong was never entitled to the office (and thus was never validly elected), the Court
concluded that there was nevertheless an election and service for a full term in contemplation of the threeterm rule based on the following premises: (1) the final decision that the third-termer lost the election was
without practical and legal use and value, having been promulgated after the term of the contested office had
expired; and (2) the official assumed and continuously exercised the functions of the office from the start to the
end of the term. The Court noted in Ong the absurdity and the deleterious effect of a contrary view that the
official (referring to the winner in the election protest) would, under the three-term rule, be considered to have
served a term by virtue of a veritably meaningless electoral protest ruling, when another actually served the
term pursuant to a proclamation made in due course after an election. This factual variation led the Court to
rule differently from Lonzanida.

In the same vein, the Court in Rivera rejected the theory that the official who finally lost the election contest
was merely a "caretaker of the office" or a mere "de facto officer." The Court obeserved that Section 8, Article X
of the Constitution is violated and its purpose defeated when an official fully served in the same position for
three consecutive terms. Whether as "caretaker" or "de facto" officer, he exercised the powers and enjoyed the
perquisites of the office that enabled him "to stay on indefinitely."

Ong and Rivera are important rulings for purposes of the three-term limitation because of what they directly
imply. Although the election requisite was not actually present, the Court still gave full effect to the three-term
limitation because of the constitutional intent to strictly limit elective officials to service for three terms. By so
ruling, the Court signalled how zealously it guards the three-term limit rule. Effectively, these cases teach us to
strictly interpret the term limitation rule in favor of limitation rather than its exception.

Pearliegates

Adormeo v. Commission on Elections10 dealt with the effect of recall on the three-term limit disqualification.
The case presented the question of whether the disqualification applies if the official lost in the regular election
for the supposed third term, but was elected in a recall election covering that term. The Court upheld the
COMELECs ruling that the official was not elected for three (3) consecutive terms. The Court reasoned out that
for nearly two years, the official was a private citizen; hence, the continuity of his mayorship was disrupted by
his defeat in the election for the third term.

Socrates v. Commission on Elections11 also tackled recall vis--vis the three-term limit disqualification. Edward
Hagedorn served three full terms as mayor. As he was disqualified to run for a fourth term, he did not
participate in the election that immediately followed his third term. In this election, the petitioner Victorino
Dennis M. Socrates was elected mayor. Less than 1 years after Mayor Socrates assumed the functions of the
office, recall proceedings were initiated against him, leading to the call for a recall election. Hagedorn filed his
certificate of candidacy for mayor in the recall election, but Socrates sought his disqualification on the ground
that he (Hagedorn) had fully served three terms prior to the recall election and was therefore disqualified to run
because of the three-term limit rule. We decided in Hagedorns favor, ruling that:

After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate reelection for a fourth term. The
prohibited election refers to the next regular election for the same office following the end of the third
consecutive term. Any subsequent election, like a recall election, is no longer covered by the prohibition for two
reasons. First, a subsequent election like a recall election is no longer an immediate reelection after three
consecutive terms. Second, the intervening period constitutes an involuntary interruption in the continuity of
service.

When the framers of the Constitution debated on the term limit of elective local officials, the question asked
was whether there would be no further election after three terms, or whether there would be "no immediate
reelection" after three terms.

xxxx

Clearly, what the Constitution prohibits is an immediate reelection for a fourth term following three consecutive
terms. The Constitution, however, does not prohibit a subsequent reelection for a fourth term as long as the
reelection is not immediately after the end of the third consecutive term. A recall election mid-way in the term
following the third consecutive term is a subsequent election but not an immediate reelection after the third
term.

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Neither does the Constitution prohibit one barred from seeking immediate reelection to run in any other
subsequent election involving the same term of office. What the Constitution prohibits is a consecutive fourth
term.12

by operation of law. Thus, for a time he ceased to be councilor an interruption that effectively placed him
outside the ambit of the three-term limit rule.

c. Conclusion Based on Law and Jurisprudence


Latasa v. Commission on Elections13 presented the novel question of whether a municipal mayor who had fully
served for three consecutive terms could run as city mayor in light of the intervening conversion of the
municipality into a city. During the third term, the municipality was converted into a city; the cityhood charter
provided that the elective officials of the municipality shall, in a holdover capacity, continue to exercise their
powers and functions until elections were held for the new city officials. The Court ruled that the conversion of
the municipality into a city did not convert the office of the municipal mayor into a local government post
different from the office of the city mayor the territorial jurisdiction of the city was the same as that of the
municipality; the inhabitants were the same group of voters who elected the municipal mayor for 3 consecutive
terms; and they were the same inhabitants over whom the municipal mayor held power and authority as their
chief executive for nine years. The Court said:

This Court reiterates that the framers of the Constitution specifically included an exception to the peoples
freedom to choose those who will govern them in order to avoid the evil of a single person accumulating
excessive power over a particular territorial jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged stay in the same office. To
allow petitioner Latasa to vie for the position of city mayor after having served for three consecutive terms as a
municipal mayor would obviously defeat the very intent of the framers when they wrote this exception. Should
he be allowed another three consecutive terms as mayor of the City of Digos, petitioner would then be possibly
holding office as chief executive over the same territorial jurisdiction and inhabitants for a total of eighteen
consecutive years. This is the very scenario sought to be avoided by the Constitution, if not abhorred by it.14

Latasa instructively highlights, after a review of Lonzanida, Adormeo and Socrates, that no three-term limit
violation results if a rest period or break in the service between terms or tenure in a given elective post
intervened. In Lonzanida, the petitioner was a private citizen with no title to any elective office for a few
months before the next mayoral elections. Similarly, in Adormeo and Socrates, the private respondents lived as
private citizens for two years and fifteen months, respectively. Thus, these cases establish that the law
contemplates a complete break from office during which the local elective official steps down and ceases to
exercise power or authority over the inhabitants of the territorial jurisdiction of a particular local government
unit.

Seemingly differing from these results is the case of Montebon v. Commission on Elections,15 where the
highest-ranking municipal councilor succeeded to the position of vice-mayor by operation of law. The question
posed when he subsequently ran for councilor was whether his assumption as vice-mayor was an interruption
of his term as councilor that would place him outside the operation of the three-term limit rule. We ruled that
an interruption had intervened so that he could again run as councilor. This result seemingly deviates from the
results in the cases heretofore discussed since the elective official continued to hold public office and did not
become a private citizen during the interim. The common thread that identifies Montebon with the rest,
however, is that the elective official vacated the office of councilor and assumed the higher post of vice-mayor

Pearliegates

From all the above, we conclude that the "interruption" of a term exempting an elective official from the threeterm limit rule is one that involves no less than the involuntary loss of title to office. The elective official must
have involuntarily left his office for a length of time, however short, for an effective interruption to occur. This
has to be the case if the thrust of Section 8, Article X and its strict intent are to be faithfully served, i.e., to limit
an elective officials continuous stay in office to no more than three consecutive terms, using "voluntary
renunciation" as an example and standard of what does not constitute an interruption.

Thus, based on this standard, loss of office by operation of law, being involuntary, is an effective interruption of
service within a term, as we held in Montebon. On the other hand, temporary inability or disqualification to
exercise the functions of an elective post, even if involuntary, should not be considered an effective
interruption of a term because it does not involve the loss of title to office or at least an effective break from
holding office; the office holder, while retaining title, is simply barred from exercising the functions of his office
for a reason provided by law.

An interruption occurs when the term is broken because the office holder lost the right to hold on to his office,
and cannot be equated with the failure to render service. The latter occurs during an office holders term when
he retains title to the office but cannot exercise his functions for reasons established by law. Of course, the
term "failure to serve" cannot be used once the right to office is lost; without the right to hold office or to serve,
then no service can be rendered so that none is really lost.

To put it differently although at the risk of repetition, Section 8, Article X both by structure and substance
fixes an elective officials term of office and limits his stay in office to three consecutive terms as an inflexible
rule that is stressed, no less, by citing voluntary renunciation as an example of a circumvention. The provision
should be read in the context of interruption of term, not in the context of interrupting the full continuity of the
exercise of the powers of the elective position. The "voluntary renunciation" it speaks of refers only to the
elective officials voluntary relinquishment of office and loss of title to this office. It does not speak of the
temporary "cessation of the exercise of power or authority" that may occur for various reasons, with preventive
suspension being only one of them. To quote Latasa v. Comelec:16

Indeed, [T]he law contemplates a rest period during which the local elective official steps down from office and
ceases to exercise power or authority over the inhabitants of the territorial jurisdiction of a particular local
government unit. [Emphasis supplied].

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Preventive Suspension and the Three-Term Limit Rule

a. Nature of Preventive Suspension

Preventive suspension whether under the Local Government Code,17 the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act,18 or the Ombudsman Act19 is an interim remedial measure to address the situation of an official who
have been charged administratively or criminally, where the evidence preliminarily indicates the likelihood of or
potential for eventual guilt or liability.

Term limitation and preventive suspension are two vastly different aspects of an elective officials service in
office and they do not overlap. As already mentioned above, preventive suspension involves protection of the
service and of the people being served, and prevents the office holder from temporarily exercising the power of
his office. Term limitation, on the other hand, is triggered after an elective official has served his three terms in
office without any break. Its companion concept interruption of a term on the other hand, requires loss of
title to office. If preventive suspension and term limitation or interruption have any commonality at all, this
common point may be with respect to the discontinuity of service that may occur in both. But even on this
point, they merely run parallel to each other and never intersect; preventive suspension, by its nature, is a
temporary incapacity to render service during an unbroken term; in the context of term limitation, interruption
of service occurs after there has been a break in the term.

b. Preventive Suspension and the Intent of the Three-Term Limit Rule


Preventive suspension is imposed under the Local Government Code "when the evidence of guilt is strong and
given the gravity of the offense, there is a possibility that the continuance in office of the respondent could
influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence." Under
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, it is imposed after a valid information (that requires a finding of
probable cause) has been filed in court, while under the Ombudsman Act, it is imposed when, in the judgment
of the Ombudsman, the evidence of guilt is strong; and (a) the charge involves dishonesty, oppression or grave
misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; or (b) the charges would warrant removal from the service;
or (c) the respondents continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him.

Notably in all cases of preventive suspension, the suspended official is barred from performing the functions of
his office and does not receive salary in the meanwhile, but does not vacate and lose title to his office; loss of
office is a consequence that only results upon an eventual finding of guilt or liability.

Preventive suspension is a remedial measure that operates under closely-controlled conditions and gives a
premium to the protection of the service rather than to the interests of the individual office holder. Even then,
protection of the service goes only as far as a temporary prohibition on the exercise of the functions of the
officials office; the official is reinstated to the exercise of his position as soon as the preventive suspension is
lifted. Thus, while a temporary incapacity in the exercise of power results, no position is vacated when a public
official is preventively suspended. This was what exactly happened to Asilo.

That the imposition of preventive suspension can be abused is a reality that is true in the exercise of all powers
and prerogative under the Constitution and the laws. The imposition of preventive suspension, however, is not
an unlimited power; there are limitations built into the laws20 themselves that the courts can enforce when
these limitations are transgressed, particularly when grave abuse of discretion is present. In light of this welldefined parameters in the imposition of preventive suspension, we should not view preventive suspension from
the extreme situation that it can totally deprive an elective office holder of the prerogative to serve and is
thus an effective interruption of an election officials term.

Pearliegates

Strict adherence to the intent of the three-term limit rule demands that preventive suspension should not be
considered an interruption that allows an elective officials stay in office beyond three terms. A preventive
suspension cannot simply be a term interruption because the suspended official continues to stay in office
although he is barred from exercising the functions and prerogatives of the office within the suspension period.
The best indicator of the suspended officials continuity in office is the absence of a permanent replacement
and the lack of the authority to appoint one since no vacancy exists.

To allow a preventively suspended elective official to run for a fourth and prohibited term is to close our eyes to
this reality and to allow a constitutional violation through sophistry by equating the temporary inability to
discharge the functions of office with the interruption of term that the constitutional provision contemplates. To
be sure, many reasons exist, voluntary or involuntary some of them personal and some of them by operation
of law that may temporarily prevent an elective office holder from exercising the functions of his office in the
way that preventive suspension does. A serious extended illness, inability through force majeure, or the
enforcement of a suspension as a penalty, to cite some involuntary examples, may prevent an office holder
from exercising the functions of his office for a time without forfeiting title to office. Preventive suspension is no
different because it disrupts actual delivery of service for a time within a term. Adopting such interruption of
actual service as the standard to determine effective interruption of term under the three-term rule raises at
least the possibility of confusion in implementing this rule, given the many modes and occasions when actual
service may be interrupted in the course of serving a term of office. The standard may reduce the enforcement
of the three-term limit rule to a case-to-case and possibly see-sawing determination of what an effective
interruption is.

c. Preventive Suspension and Voluntary Renunciation

Preventive suspension, because it is imposed by operation of law, does not involve a voluntary act on the part
of the suspended official, except in the indirect sense that he may have voluntarily committed the act that
became the basis of the charge against him. From this perspective, preventive suspension does not have the
element of voluntariness that voluntary renunciation embodies. Neither does it contain the element of

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renunciation or loss of title to office as it merely involves the temporary incapacity to perform the service that
an elective office demands. Thus viewed, preventive suspension is by its very nature the exact opposite of
voluntary renunciation; it is involuntary and temporary, and involves only the actual delivery of service, not the
title to the office. The easy conclusion therefore is that they are, by nature, different and non-comparable.

But beyond the obvious comparison of their respective natures is the more important consideration of how they
affect the three-term limit rule.

Voluntary renunciation, while involving loss of office and the total incapacity to render service, is disallowed by
the Constitution as an effective interruption of a term. It is therefore not allowed as a mode of circumventing
the three-term limit rule.

Preventive suspension, by its nature, does not involve an effective interruption of a term and should therefore
not be a reason to avoid the three-term limitation. It can pose as a threat, however, if we shall disregard its
nature and consider it an effective interruption of a term. Let it be noted that a preventive suspension is easier
to undertake than voluntary renunciation, as it does not require relinquishment or loss of office even for the
briefest time. It merely requires an easily fabricated administrative charge that can be dismissed soon after a
preventive suspension has been imposed. In this sense, recognizing preventive suspension as an effective
interruption of a term can serve as a circumvention more potent than the voluntary renunciation that the
Constitution expressly disallows as an interruption.

NORLAINIE MITMUG LIMBONA, petitioner,


vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and MALIK "BOBBY" T. ALINGAN, respondents.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for certiorari with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction seeks to reverse and nullify the September 4, 2007 Resolution1 of the Commission on Elections
(Comelec) in SPA Case No. 07-611 disqualifying petitioner to run as mayor of the municipality of Pantar, Lanao
del Norte, as well as the January 9, 2008 Resolution2 denying the motion for reconsideration.

Petitioner Norlainie Mitmug Limbona (Norlainie), her husband, Mohammad G. Limbona (Mohammad), and
respondent Malik "Bobby" T. Alingan (Malik) were mayoralty candidates in Pantar, Lanao del Norte during the
2007 Synchronized National and Local Elections. Mohammad and Norlainie filed their certificates of candidacy
with Acting Election Officer, Alauya S. Tago, on January 22, 2007 and March 29, 2007, respectively; while Malik
filed his certificate of candidacy with the Office of the Election Officer on March 26, 2007.

On April 2, 2007, Malik filed a petition to disqualify Mohammad for failure to comply with the residency
requirement. The petition was docketed as SPA No. 07-188. Subsequently, or on April 12, 2007, Malik filed
another petition to disqualify Norlainie also on the ground of lack of the one-year residency requirement. The
petition was docketed as SPA No. 07-611.3

Conclusion

To recapitulate, Asilos 2004-2007 term was not interrupted by the Sandiganbayan-imposed preventive
suspension in 2005, as preventive suspension does not interrupt an elective officials term. Thus, the COMELEC
refused to apply the legal command of Section 8, Article X of the Constitution when it granted due course to
Asilos certificate of candidacy for a prohibited fourth term. By so refusing, the COMELEC effectively committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; its action was a refusal to perform a
positive duty required by no less than the Constitution and was one undertaken outside the contemplation of
law.21

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we GRANT the petition and accordingly NULLIFY the assailed COMELEC
rulings. The private respondent Wilfredo F. Asilo is declared DISQUALIFIED to run, and perforce to serve, as
Councilor of Lucena City for a prohibited fourth term. Costs against private respondent Asilo.

On April 21, 2007, Norlainie filed an Affidavit of Withdrawal of Certificate of Candidacy.4 Thereafter, or on May
2, 2007, she filed before the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor a Motion to Dismiss5 the petition for
disqualification in SPA No. 07-611 on the ground that the petition had become moot in view of the withdrawal of
her certificate of candidacy.

The Comelec en banc granted the withdrawal of Norlainies certificate of candidacy in Resolution No. 79496
dated May 13, 2007, the dispositive portion of which provides:

The Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to approve the foregoing recommendations of the Law
Department, as concurred in by Commissioner Florentino A. Tuason, Jr., as follows:

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 181097

Pearliegates

June 25, 2008

1. To GIVE due course to the Affidavits of Withdrawal of Certificates of Candidacy of the following candidates:

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xxxx

The Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to approve the foregoing recommendations of the Law
Department, as follows:

Norlaine M. Limbona Mayor Pantar, Lanao del Norte


1. To GIVE due course to the Certificate of Candidacy and Certificate of Nomination and Acceptance of Norlainie
"Lai-Exchan" Mitmug Limbona as substitute candidate for Mohammad "Exchan" G. Limbona for Mayor, Pantar,
Lanao del Norte; and

xxxx

2. To direct the Election Officers concerned to DELETE the aforementioned names of candidates from the
Certified List of Candidates.

Let the Law Department implement this resolution with dispatch.

SO ORDERED.

Meanwhile, the First Division of Comelec issued on May 24, 2007 a Resolution7 in SPA No. 07-188 granting the
petition filed by Malik and disqualifying Mohammad from running as municipal mayor of Pantar, Lanao del
Norte for failing to satisfy the one year residency requirement and for not being a registered voter of the said
place, thus:

2. To direct the Election Officer of Pantar, Lanao del Norte to DELETE the name of Mohammad "Exchan" G.
Limbona from the Certified List of Candidates for Mayor, Pantar, Lanao del Norte and to INCLUDE therein the
name of Norlainie "Lai-Exchan" Mitmug Limbona.

Let the Law Department implement this resolution with dispatch.

SO ORDERED.

Thus, Malik filed a second petition for disqualification against Norlainie docketed as SPA No. 07-621.

After the elections, Norlainie emerged as the winning candidate and accordingly took her oath and assumed
office.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED. Respondent Mohammad "Exchan" G.
Limbona is hereby disqualified. Accordingly, his name is ordered deleted from the official list of candidates for
the position of mayor of the municipality of Pantar, Lanao del Norte.

SO ORDERED.

The May 24, 2007 Resolution became final and executory on June 2, 2007.8

Consequently, Norlainie filed a new certificate of candidacy as substitute candidate for Mohammad which was
given due course by the Comelec en banc in its Resolution No. 82559 dated July 23, 2007, the dispositive
portion of which states:

Pearliegates

However, on September 4, 2007, the Second Division of Comelec in SPA No. 07-611 disqualified Norlainie on
three grounds: lack of the one-year residency requirement; not being a registered voter of the municipality;
and, nullity of her certificate of candidacy for having been filed at a place other than the Office of the Election
Officer.

Norlainie filed an Omnibus Motion to declare the petition in SPA No. 07-611 moot and/or for reconsideration,
arguing that the Comelec en banc had approved the withdrawal of her first certificate of candidacy and had
given due course to her new certificate of candidacy as a substitute candidate for Mohammad. Malik opposed
the omnibus motion.

Meanwhile, the Second Division of Comelec in SPA No. 07-621, promulgated on November 23, 2007 a
Resolution10 disqualifying Norlainie from running as mayor of Pantar, Lanao del Norte. It held thus:

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As regards the residency requirement, We rule for petitioner.

As borne out from the record, respondents domicile of origin was in Maguing, Lanao del Norte, which is her
place of birth. When she got married, she became a resident of Marawi City, specifically, in Barangay Rapasun
where her husband served as Barangay Chairman until November 2006. This is her domicile by operation of
law pursuant to the Family Code as applied in the case of Larrazabal v. Comelec (G.R. No. 100739, September
3, 1991).

What respondent now is trying to impress upon Us is that she has changed her aforesaid domicile and resided
in Pantar, Lanao del Norte. x x x

In the present case, the evidence adduced by respondent, which consists merely of self-serving affidavits
cannot persuade Us that she has abandoned her domicile of origin or her domicile in Marawi City. It is alleged
that respondent "has been staying, sleeping and doing business in her house for more than 20 months" in
Lower Kalanganan and yet, there is no independent and competent evidence that would corroborate such
statement.

Further, We find no other act that would indicate respondents intention to stay in Pantar for an indefinite
period of time. The filing of her Certificate of Candidacy in Pantar, standing alone, is not sufficient to hold that
she has chosen Pantar as her new residence. We also take notice of the fact that in SPA No. 07-611, this
Commission has even found that she is not a registered voter in the said municipality warranting her
disqualification as a candidate.11

On January 9, 2008, the Comelec en banc in SPA No. 07-611 denied Norlainies motion for reconsideration.

Hence, the instant petition alleging that the Comelec gravely abused its discretion in proceeding to resolve the
petition in SPA No. 07-611 despite the approval of petitioners withdrawal of certificate of candidacy.12

On January 29, 2008, the Court resolved to issue a temporary restraining order effective immediately enjoining
respondents from enforcing and implementing the Comelec Resolutions disqualifying petitioner as a candidate
for mayor in Pantar, Lanao del Norte.13

The petition lacks merit.

Pearliegates

The withdrawal of a certificate of candidacy does not necessarily render the certificate void ab initio. Once
filed, the permanent legal effects produced thereby remain even if the certificate itself be subsequently
withdrawn.14 Section 73 of the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines (B.P. Blg. 881, as amended) provides:

Sec. 73. Certificate of candidacy. No person shall be eligible for any elective public office unless he files a
sworn certificate of candidacy within the period fixed herein. A person who has filed a certificate of candidacy
may, prior to the election, withdraw the same by submitting to the office concerned a written declaration under
oath. No person shall be eligible for more than one office to be filled in the same election, and if he files his
certificate of candidacy for more than one office, he shall not be eligible for any of them. However, before the
expiration of the period for the filing of certificate of candidacy, the person who has filed more than one
certificate of candidacy may declare under oath the office for which he desires to be eligible and cancel the
certificate of candidacy for the other office or offices. The filing or withdrawal of a certificate of candidacy shall
not affect whatever civil, criminal or administrative liabilities which a candidate may have incurred. (Emphasis
supplied)

Thus, when petitioner filed her certificate of candidacy on March 29, 2007, such act produced legal effects, and
the withdrawal of the same, despite the approval of the Comelec, did not bar or render nugatory the legal
proceedings it had set in motion. As such, the Comelec did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it ruled
on the merits of the petition despite the withdrawal of petitioners certificate of candidacy. The Comelec
correctly held that a case only becomes moot when "there is no more actual controversy between the parties
or no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the merits."15 In the instant case, although petitioner
withdrew her first certificate of candidacy, the subsequent disqualification of her husband required that she file
a new certificate of candidacy as a substitute candidate. The second filing of a certificate of candidacy thus
once again put her qualifications in issue. Hence, a ruling upon the same is necessary.

The fact that petitioners certificate of candidacy as a substitute candidate was given due course by the
Comelec did not bar the Comelec from deciding on her qualifications to run as municipal mayor. As correctly
found by the Comelec:

Said resolution (Comelec Resolution No. 8255) discloses only the following: a) movant is given the green lights
to be the substitute candidate for her husband who was disqualified; b) her certificate of candidacy was duly
accomplished in form and substance and c) the certificate of candidacy will not cause confusion among the
voters. Clearly, no issue of disqualification was passed upon by the Commission in the said resolution.

Movant may have been given the impression that the Commissions act of giving due course to her substitute
certificate of candidacy constitutes a pronouncement that she is not disqualified. It must be pointed out,
however, that the bases for giving due course to a certificate of candidacy are totally different from those for
enunciating that the candidate is not disqualified. x x x16

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Moreover, the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 (R.A. No. 6646) "authorizes the Commission (Comelec) to try and
decide petitions for disqualifications even after the elections,"17 thus:

SEC. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be
disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate
is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the
winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of
the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency
thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is
strong. (Emphasis ours)

As such, the Comelec did not err when it continued with the trial and hearing of the petition for disqualification.

The Comelec correctly found that petitioner failed to satisfy the one-year residency requirement. The term
"residence" as used in the election law is synonymous with "domicile," which imports not only intention to
reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such
intention.18 The manifest intent of the law in fixing a residence qualification is to exclude a stranger or
newcomer, unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a community and not identified with the latter, from
an elective office to serve that community.19

For purposes of election law, the question of residence is mainly one of intention. There is no hard and fast rule
by which to determine where a person actually resides.20 Three rules are, however, well established: first, that
a man must have a residence or domicile somewhere; second, that where once established it remains until a
new one is acquired; and third, a man can have but one domicile at a time.21

In order to acquire a domicile by choice, there must concur (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality,
(2) an intention to remain there, and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile.22 A persons "domicile" once
established is considered to continue and will not be deemed lost until a new one is established.23

To successfully effect a change of domicile one must demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change of
domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one, and
definite acts which correspond with the purpose. In other words, there must basically be animus manendi
coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an
indefinite period of time; the change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for
the new domicile must be actual.24

Petitioners claim that she has been physically present and actually residing in Pantar for almost 20 months
prior to the elections,25 is self-serving and unsubstantiated. As correctly observed by the Comelec:

Pearliegates

In the present case, the evidence adduced by respondent, which consists merely of self-serving affidavits
cannot persuade Us that she has abandoned her domicile of origin or her domicile in Marawi City. It is alleged
that respondent "has been staying, sleeping and doing business in her house for more than 20 months" in
Lower Kalanganan and yet, there is no independent and competent evidence that would corroborate such
statement.

Further, We find no other act that would indicate respondents intention to stay in Pantar for an indefinite
period of time. The filing of her Certificate of Candidacy in Pantar, standing alone, is not sufficient to hold that
she has chosen Pantar as her new residence. We also take notice of the fact that in SPA No. 07-611, this
Commission has even found that she is not a registered voter in the said municipality warranting her
disqualification as a candidate.26

We note the findings of the Comelec that petitioners domicile of origin is Maguing, Lanao del Norte,27 which is
also her place of birth; and that her domicile by operation of law (by virtue of marriage) is Rapasun, Marawi
City. The Comelec found that Mohammad, petitioners husband, effected the change of his domicile in favor of
Pantar, Lanao del Norte only on November 11, 2006. Since it is presumed that the husband and wife live
together in one legal residence,28 then it follows that petitioner effected the change of her domicile also on
November 11, 2006. Articles 68 and 69 of the Family Code provide:

Art. 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and
render mutual help and support.

Art. 69. The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. In case of disagreement, the court shall decide. The
court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if the latter should live abroad or there are other valid
and compelling reasons for the exemption. However, such exemption shall not apply if the same is not
compatible with the solidarity of the family. (Emphasis ours)

Considering that petitioner failed to show that she maintained a separate residence from her husband, and as
there is no evidence to prove otherwise, reliance on these provisions of the Family Code is proper and is in
consonance with human experience.29

Thus, for failure to comply with the residency requirement, petitioner is disqualified to run for the office of
mayor of Pantar, Lanao del Norte. However, petitioners disqualification would not result in Maliks proclamation
who came in second during the special election.

The rules on succession under the Local Government Code shall apply, to wit:

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Election Law Cases

SECTION 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice-Governor, Mayor, and Vice-Mayor. If a
permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the xxx mayor, the xxx vice-mayor concerned shall become the xxx
mayor.

Petitioner Rommel Jalosjos was born in Quezon City on October 26, 1973. He migrated to Australia in 1981
when he was eight years old and there acquired Australian citizenship. On November 22, 2008, at age 35, he
decided to return to the Philippines and lived with his brother, Romeo, Jr., in Barangay Veterans Village, Ipil,
Zamboanga Sibugay. Four days upon his return, he took an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines,
resulting in his being issued a Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by the Bureau of
Immigration.1 On September 1, 2009 he renounced his Australian citizenship, executing a sworn renunciation
of the same2 in compliance with Republic Act (R.A.) 9225.3

xxxx

For purposes of this Chapter, a permanent vacancy arises when an elective local official fills a higher vacant
office, refuses to assume office, fails to qualify or is removed from office, voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise
permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office.

From the time of his return, Jalosjos acquired a residential property in the same village where he lived and a
fishpond in San Isidro, Naga, Zamboanga Sibugay. He applied for registration as a voter in the Municipality of
Ipil but respondent Dan Erasmo, Sr., the Barangay Captain of Barangay Veterans Village, opposed the same.
Acting on the application, the Election Registration Board approved it and included Jalosjos name in the
Commission on Elections (COMELECs) voters list for Precinct 0051F of Barangay Veterans Village, Ipil,
Zamboanga Sibugay.4

x x x x (Emphasis ours)
Considering the disqualification of petitioner to run as mayor of Pantar, Lanao del Norte, the proclaimed ViceMayor shall then succeed as mayor.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. The September 4, 2007 Resolution of the Commission on
Elections in SPA Case No. 07-611 disqualifying petitioner Norlainie Mitmug Limbona from running for office of
the Mayor of Pantar, Lanao del Norte, and the January 9, 2008 Resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration, are AFFIRMED. In view of the permanent vacancy in the Office of the Mayor, the proclaimed
Vice-Mayor shall SUCCEED as Mayor. The temporary restraining order issued on January 29, 2008 is ordered
LIFTED.

Undaunted, Erasmo filed before the 1st Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Ipil-Tungawan-R.T. Lim in Ipil a
petition for the exclusion of Jalosjos name from the official voters list. After hearing, the MCTC rendered a
decision, denying the petition.5 On appeal,6 the Regional Trial Court (RTC) affirmed the MCTC decision. The RTC
decision became final and executory.

On November 28, 2009 Jalosjos filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for Governor of Zamboanga Sibugay
Province for the May 10, 2010 elections. Erasmo promptly filed a petition to deny due course or to cancel
Jalosjos COC7 on the ground that the latter made material misrepresentation in the same since he failed to
comply with (1) the requirements of R.A. 9225 and (2) the one-year residency requirement of the Local
Government Code.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 191970

April 24, 2012

ROMMEL APOLINARIO JALOSJOS, Petitioner,

After hearing, the Second Division of the COMELEC ruled that, while Jalosjos had regained Philippine citizenship
by complying with the requirements of R.A. 9225, he failed to prove the residency requirement for a
gubernatorial candidate. He failed to present ample proof of a bona fide intention to establish his domicile in
Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. On motion for reconsideration, the COMELEC En Banc affirmed the Second Divisions
decision, ruling that Jalosjos had been a mere guest or transient visitor in his brothers house and, for this
reason, he cannot claim Ipil as his domicile.

vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and DAN ERASMO, SR.,

This case is about the proof required to establish the domicile of a reinstated Filipino citizen who seeks election
as governor of a province.
The Facts and the Case

Pearliegates

Acting on Jalosjos prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order, the Court resolved on May 7, 2010
to issue a status quo ante order, enjoining the COMELEC from enforcing its February 11, 2010 decision pending
further orders. Meanwhile, Jolosjos won the election and was proclaimed winner of the 2010 gubernatorial race
in the Province of Zamboanga Sibugay.8

The Issue Presented

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The sole issue presented in this case is whether or not the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling that Jalosjos failed to present ample proof of a bona fide
intention to establish his domicile in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.

To hold that Jalosjos has not establish a new domicile in Zamboanga Sibugay despite the loss of his domicile of
origin (Quezon City) and his domicile of choice and by operation of law (Australia) would violate the settled
maxim that a man must have a domicile or residence somewhere.

The Courts Ruling

Two. The COMELEC concluded that Jalosjos has not come to settle his domicile in Ipil since he has merely been
staying at his brothers house. But this circumstance alone cannot support such conclusion. Indeed, the Court
has repeatedly held that a candidate is not required to have a house in a community to establish his residence
or domicile in a particular place. It is sufficient that he should live there even if it be in a rented house or in the
house of a friend or relative.15 To insist that the candidate own the house where he lives would make property
a qualification for public office. What matters is that Jalosjos has proved two things: actual physical presence in
Ipil and an intention of making it his domicile.

The Local Government Code requires a candidate seeking the position of provincial governor to be a resident of
the province for at least one year before the election.9 For purposes of the election laws, the requirement of
residence is synonymous with domicile,10 meaning that a person must not only intend to reside in a particular
place but must also have personal presence in such place coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.11

There is no hard and fast rule to determine a candidates compliance with residency requirement since the
question of residence is a question of intention.12 Still, jurisprudence has laid down the following guidelines:
(a) every person has a domicile or residence somewhere; (b) where once established, that domicile remains
until he acquires a new one; and (c) a person can have but one domicile at a time.13

Jalosjos presented the affidavits of next-door neighbors, attesting to his physical presence at his residence in
Ipil. These adjoining neighbors are no doubt more credible since they have a better chance of noting his
presence or absence than his other neighbors, whose affidavits Erasmo presented, who just sporadically
passed by the subject residence. Further, it is not disputed that Jalosjos bought a residential lot in the same
village where he lived and a fish pond in San Isidro, Naga, Zamboanga Sibugay. He showed correspondences
with political leaders, including local and national party-mates, from where he lived. Moreover, Jalosjos is a
registered voter of Ipil by final judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga Sibugay.1wphi1

It is inevitable under these guidelines and the precedents applying them that Jalosjos has met the residency
requirement for provincial governor of Zamboanga Sibugay.

One. The COMELEC appears hasty in concluding that Jalosjos failed to prove that he successfully changed his
domicile to Zamboanga Sibugay. The COMELEC points out that, since he was unable to discharge the burden of
proving Zamboanga Sibugay to be his rightful domicile, it must be assumed that his domicile is either Quezon
City or Australia.

But it is clear from the facts that Quezon City was Jalosjos domicile of origin, the place of his birth. It may be
taken for granted that he effectively changed his domicile from Quezon City to Australia when he migrated
there at the age of eight, acquired Australian citizenship, and lived in that country for 26 years. Australia
became his domicile by operation of law and by choice.14

On the other hand, when he came to the Philippines in November 2008 to live with his brother in Zamboanga
Sibugay, it is evident that Jalosjos did so with intent to change his domicile for good. He left Australia, gave up
his Australian citizenship, and renounced his allegiance to that country. In addition, he reacquired his old
citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, resulting in his being issued a
Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by the Bureau of Immigration. By his acts, Jalosjos forfeited
his legal right to live in Australia, clearly proving that he gave up his domicile there. And he has since lived
nowhere else except in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.

Pearliegates

Three. While the Court ordinarily respects the factual findings of administrative bodies like the COMELEC, this
does not prevent it from exercising its review powers to correct palpable misappreciation of evidence or wrong
or irrelevant considerations.16 The evidence Jalosjos presented is sufficient to establish Ipil, Zamboanga
Sibugay, as his domicile. The COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in holding otherwise.

Four. Jalosjos won and was proclaimed winner in the 2010 gubernatorial race for Zamboanga Sibugay. The
Court will respect the decision of the people of that province and resolve all doubts regarding his qualification
in his favor to breathe life to their manifest will.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition and SETS ASIDE the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division
dated February 11, 2010 and the Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc dated May 4, 2010 that disqualified
petitioner Rommel Jalosjos from seeking election as Governor of Zamboanga Sibugay.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 191124

April 27, 2010

LUIS A. ASISTIO, Petitioner,

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vs.
HON. THELMA CANLAS TRINIDAD-PE AGUIRRE, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Caloocan City,
Branch 129; HON. ARTHUR O. MALABAGUIO, Presiding Judge, Metropolitan Trial Court, Caloocan
City, Branch 52; ENRICO R. ECHIVERRI, Board of Election Inspectors of Precinct 1811A, Barangay
15, Caloocan City; and the CITY ELECTION OFFICER, Caloocan City, Respondents.

voters8 duly registered in the 2009 CVL using the address No. 123 P. Zamora St., Barangay 17, Caloocan City
did not include Asistio.9

On January 28, 2010, the MeTC issued a Notice of Hearing10 notifying Asistio, through Atty. Carlos M. Caliwara,
his counsel of record in SPA No. 09-151 (DC), entitled "Asistio v. Echiverri," before the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC), of the scheduled hearings of the case on February 1, 2 and 3, 2010.

RESOLUTION
NACHURA, J.:
This is a petition1 for certiorari, with prayer for the issuance of a status quo ante order, under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, assailing the Order2 dated February 15, 2010 issued, allegedly with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, by public respondent Judge Thelma Canlas Trinidad-Pe Aguirre
(Judge Aguirre) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 129, Caloocan City in SCA No. 997. The petition
likewise ascribes error in, and seeks to nullify, the decision dated February 5, 2010, promulgated by the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 52, Caloocan City in SCA No. 10-582.

The Antecedents

On January 26, 2010, private respondent Enrico R. Echiverri (Echiverri) filed against petitioner Luis A. Asistio
(Asistio) a Petition3 for Exclusion of Voter from the Permanent List of Voters of Caloocan City (Petition for
Exclusion) before the MeTC, Branch 52, Caloocan City. Public respondent Judge Arthur O. Malabaguio (Judge
Malabaguio) presides over MeTC Branch 52. The petition was docketed as SCA No. 10-582, entitled "Atty. Enrico
R. Echiverri v. Luis Aquino Asistio, the Board of Election Inspectors of Precinct No. 1811A, Barangay 15,
Caloocan City and the City Election Officer of Caloocan."

In his petition, Echiverri alleged that Asistio is not a resident of Caloocan City, specifically not of 123 Interior P.
Zamora St., Barangay 15, Caloocan City, the address stated in his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for Mayor in
the 2010 Automated National and Local Elections. Echiverri, also a candidate for Mayor of Caloocan City, was
the respondent in a Petition to Deny Due Course and/or Cancellation of the Certificate of Candidacy filed by
Asistio. According to Echiverri, when he was about to furnish Asistio a copy of his Answer to the latters petition,
he found out that Asistios address is non-existent. To support this, Echiverri attached to his petition a
Certification4 dated December 29, 2009 issued by the Tanggapan ng Punong Barangay of Barangay 15
Central, Zone 2, District II of Caloocan City. He mentioned that, upon verification of the 2009 Computerized
Voters List (CVL) for Barangay 15, Asistios name appeared under voter number 8, with address at 109 Libis
Gochuico, Barangay 15, Caloocan City.5

Echiverri also claimed that Asistio was no longer residing in this address, since what appeared in the latters
COC for Mayor6 in the 2007 elections was No. 110 Unit 1, P. Zamora St., Barangay 15, Caloocan City,7 but that
the address used in Asistios current COC is situated in Barangay 17. He said that, per his verification, the

Pearliegates

On February 2, 2010, Asistio filed his Answer Ex Abundante Ad Cautelam with Affirmative Defenses.11 Asistio
alleged that he is a resident of No. 116, P. Zamora St., Caloocan City, and a registered voter of Precinct No.
1811A because he mistakenly relied on the address stated in the contract of lease with Angelina dela Torre
Tengco (Tengco), which was 123 Interior P. Zamora St., Barangay 15, Caloocan City.121avvphi1

Trial on the merits ensued, after which Judge Malabaguio directed the parties to file their respective position
papers on or before February 4, 2010.

Echiverri filed his Memorandum13 on February 4, 2010. Asistio, on the other hand, failed to file his
memorandum since the complete transcripts of stenographic notes (TSN) were not yet available.14

On February 5, 2010, Judge Malabaguio rendered a decision,15 disposing, as follows

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Election Registration Board, Caloocan City is hereby directed to remove
the name of LUIS AQUINO ASISTIO from the list of permanent voters of Caloocan City.

SO ORDERED.16

Meanwhile, on January 26, 2010, Echiverri filed with the COMELEC a Petition for Disqualification,17 which was
docketed as SPA No. 10-013 (DC). The Petition was anchored on the grounds that Asistio is not a resident of
Caloocan City and that he had been previously convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. Asistio, in his
Answer with Special and Affirmative Defenses (Com Memorandum),18 raised the same arguments with respect
to his residency and also argued that the President of the Philippines granted him an absolute pardon.

On February 10, 2010, Asistio filed his Notice of Appeal19 and his Appeal (from the Decision dated February 5,
2010)20 and paid the required appeal fees through postal money orders.21

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On February 11, 2010, Echiverri filed a Motion22 to Dismiss Appeal, arguing that the RTC did not acquire
jurisdiction over the Appeal on the ground of failure to file the required appeal fees.

On the scheduled hearing of February 15, 2010, Asistio opposed the Motion and manifested his intention to file
a written comment or opposition thereto. Judge Aguirre directed Echiverris counsel to file the appropriate
responsive pleading to Asistios appeal in her Order23 of same date given in open court.

Judge Aguirre, however, cancelled her February 15, 2010 Order, and issued an Amended Order24 on that date
holding in abeyance the filing of the responsive pleading of Echiverris counsel and submitting the Motion for
resolution.

In another Order also dated February 15, 2010, Judge Aguirre granted the Motion on the ground of nonpayment of docket fees essential for the RTC to acquire jurisdiction over the appeal. It stated that Asistio paid
his docket fee only on February 11, 2010 per the Official Receipt of the MeTC, Office of the Clerk of Court.

Hence, this petition.

Per Resolution25 dated February 23, 2010, this Court required the respondents to comment on the petition, and
issued the Status Quo Ante Order prayed for.

On March, 8, 2010, Echiverri filed his Comment to the Petition (with Motion to Quash Status Quo Ante Order).
Departing from Echiverris position against the Petition, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on March 30,
2010, filed its Comment via registered mail. The OSG points out that Asistios family is "known to be one of the
prominent political families in Caloocan City, and that there is no indication whatsoever that [Asistio] has ever
intended to abandon his domicile, Caloocan City." Further, the OSG proposes that the issue at hand is better
resolved by the people of Caloocan City. In all, the OSG propounds that technicalities and procedural niceties
should bow to the sovereign will of the people of Caloocan City.

Our Ruling

In her assailed Order, Judge Aguirre found The payment of docket fees is an essential requirement for the
perfection of an appeal.

Pearliegates

The record shows that Respondent-Appellant paid his docket fee only on February 11, 2010, evidenced by O.R.
No. 05247240 for Php1,510.00 at the Metropolitan Trial Court, Office of the Clerk of Court, yet the Notice of
Appeal was filed on February 10, 2010, at 5:30 p.m., which is way beyond the official office hours, and a copy
thereof was filed at the Office of the Clerk of Court, Metropolitan Trial Court at 5:00 p.m. of February 10, 2010.
Thus, it is clear that the docket fee was not paid simultaneously with the filing of the Notice of Appeal.

It taxes the credulity of the Court why the Notice of Appeal was filed beyond the regular office hours, and why
did respondent-appellant had to resort to paying the docket fee at the Mall of Asia when he can conveniently
pay it at the Office of the Clerk of Court, Metropolitan Trial Court along with the filing of the Notice of Appeal on
February 10, 2010 at 5:30 p.m. at the Metropolitan Trial Court, which is passed [sic] the regular office
hours.1awphi1

The conclusion is then inescapable that for failure to pay the appellate docket fee, the Court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the case.26

This Court observes, that while Judge Aguirre declares in her Order that the appellate docket fees were paid on
February 11, 2010, she conveniently omits to mention that the postal money orders obtained by Asistio for the
purpose were purchased on February 10, 2010.27 It is noteworthy that, as early as February 4, 2010, Asistio
already manifested that he could not properly file his memorandum with the MeTC due to the non-availability of
the TSNs. Obviously, these TSNs were needed in order to prepare an intelligent appeal from the questioned
February 5, 2010 MeTC Order. Asistio was able to get copies of the TSNs only on February 10, 2010, the last
day to file his appeal, and, naturally, it would take some time for him to review and incorporate them in his
arguments on appeal. Understandably, Asistio filed his notice of appeal and appeal, and purchased the postal
money orders in payment of the appeal fees on the same day. To our mind, Asistio, by purchasing the postal
money orders for the purpose of paying the appellate docket fees on February 10, 2010, although they were
tendered to the MeTC only on February 11, 2010, had already substantially complied with the procedural
requirements in filing his appeal.

This appeal to the RTC assails the February 5, 2010 MeTC Order directing Asistios name to be removed from
the permanent list of voters [in Precinct 1811A] of Caloocan City. The Order, if implemented, would deprive
Asistio of his right to vote.

The right to vote is a most precious political right, as well as a bounden duty of every citizen, enabling and
requiring him to participate in the process of government to ensure that it can truly be said to derive its power
solely from the consent of its constituents.28 Time and again, it has been said that every Filipinos right to vote
shall be respected, upheld, and given full effect.29 A citizen cannot be disenfranchised for the flimsiest of
reasons. Only on the most serious grounds, and upon clear and convincing proof, may a citizen be deemed to
have forfeited this precious heritage of freedom.

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In this case, even if we assume for the sake of argument, that the appellate docket fees were not filed on time,
this incident alone should not thwart the proper determination and resolution of the instant case on substantial
grounds. Blind adherence to a technicality, with the inevitable result of frustrating and nullifying the
constitutionally guaranteed right of suffrage, cannot be countenanced.30

SEC. 9. Who May Register.All citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law who are at least
eighteen (18) years of age and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one (1) year and in the
place wherein they propose to vote for at least six (6) months immediately preceding the election, may register
as a voter.

On more than one occasion, this Court has recognized the emerging trend towards a liberal construction of
procedural rules to serve substantial justice. Courts have the prerogative to relax rules of even the most
mandatory character, mindful of the duty to reconcile both the need to speedily end litigation and the parties
right to due process.

Any person who temporarily resides in another city, municipality or country solely by reason of his occupation,
profession, employment in private or public service, educational activities, work in the military or naval
reservations within the Philippines, service in the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the National Police Force, or
confinement or detention in government institutions in accordance with law, shall not be deemed to have lost
his original residence.

It is true that, faced with an appeal, the court has the discretion whether to dismiss it or not. However, this
discretion must be sound; it is to be exercised pursuant to the tenets of justice, fair play and equity, in
consideration of the circumstances obtaining in each case. Thus, dismissal of appeals on purely technical
grounds is frowned upon as the policy of the Court is to encourage resolution of cases on their merits over the
very rigid and technical application of rules of procedure used only to help secure, not override, substantial
justice. Verily, it is far better and more prudent for the court to excuse a technical lapse and afford the parties a
review of the case on appeal rather than dispose of it on a technicality that would cause grave injustice to the
parties.31

The primordial issue in this case is whether Asistio should be excluded from the permanent list of voters of
[Precinct 1811A] of Caloocan City for failure to comply with the residency required by law.

Section 117 of The Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Bilang 881) states:

SECTION 117. Qualifications of a voter.Every citizen of the Philippines, not otherwise disqualified by law,
eighteen years of age or over, who shall have resided in the Philippines for one year and in the city or
municipality wherein he proposes to vote for at least six months immediately preceding the election, may be
registered as a voter.

Any person who transfers residence to another city, municipality or country solely by reason of his occupation;
profession; employment in private or public service; educational activities; work in military or naval
reservations; service in the army, navy or air force; the constabulary or national police force; or confinement or
detention in government institutions in accordance with law, shall be deemed not to have lost his original
residence.

This provision is echoed in Section 9 of The Voters Registration Act of 1996 (Republic Act No. 8189), to wit:

Pearliegates

Any person who, on the day of registration may not have reached the required age or period of residence but
who, on the day of election shall possess such qualifications, may register as a voter.

From these provisions, the residency requirement of a voter is at least one (1) year residence in the Philippines
and at least six (6) months in the place where the person proposes or intends to vote. "Residence," as used in
the law prescribing the qualifications for suffrage and for elective office, is doctrinally settled to mean
"domicile," importing not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place,
coupled with conduct indicative of such intention32 inferable from a persons acts, activities, and utterances.33
"Domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence where, when absent for business or pleasure, or for like
reasons, one intends to return.34 In the consideration of circumstances obtaining in each particular case, three
rules must be borne in mind, namely: (1) that a person must have a residence or domicile somewhere; (2) once
established, it remains until a new one is acquired; and (3) that a person can have but one residence or
domicile at a time.35

Domicile is not easily lost. To successfully effect a transfer thereof, one must demonstrate: (1) an actual
removal or change of domicile; (2) a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and
establishing a new one; and (3) acts which correspond with that purpose.36 There must be animus manendi
coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an
indefinite period of time; the change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for
the new domicile must be actual.37

Asistio has always been a resident of Caloocan City since his birth or for more than 72 years. His family is
known to be among the prominent political families in Caloocan City. In fact, Asistio served in public office as
Caloocan City Second District representative in the House of Representatives, having been elected as such in
the 1992, 1995, 1998, and 2004 elections. In 2007, he also sought election as City Mayor. In all of these
occasions, Asistio cast his vote in the same city. Taking these circumstances into consideration, gauged in the
light of the doctrines above enunciated, it cannot be denied that Asistio has qualified, and continues to qualify,
as a voter of Caloocan City. There is no showing that he has established domicile elsewhere, or that he had
consciously and voluntarily abandoned his residence in Caloocan City. He should, therefore, remain in the list of
permanent registered voters of Precinct No. 1811A, Barangay 15, Caloocan City.

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PANGANIBAN, J.:p
That Asistio allegedly indicated in his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor, both for the 2007 and 2010 elections,
a non-existent or false address, or that he could not be physically found in the address he indicated when he
registered as a voter, should not operate to exclude him as a voter of Caloocan City. These purported
misrepresentations in Asistios COC, if true, might serve as basis for an election offense under the Omnibus
Election Code (OEC),38 or an action to deny due course to the COC.39 But to our mind, they do not serve as
proof that Asistio has abandoned his domicile in Caloocan City, or that he has established residence outside of
Caloocan City.

The ultimate question posed before this Court in these twin cases is: Who should be declared the rightful
governor of Sorsogon -

(i)
Juan G. Frivaldo, who unquestionably obtained the highest number of votes in three successive
elections but who was twice declared by this Court to be disqualified to hold such office due to his alien
citizenship, and who now claims to have re-assumed his lost Philippine citizenship thru repatriation;

With this disquisition, we find no necessity to discuss the other issues raised in the petition.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order dated February 15, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 129, Caloocan City in SCA No. 997 and the decision dated February 5, 2010 of the Metropolitan Trial
Court, Branch 52, Caloocan City in SCA No. 10-582 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Luis A. Asistio
remains a registered voter of Precinct No. 1811A, Barangay 15, Caloocan City. The Status Quo Ante Order
issued by this Court on February 23, 2010 is MADE PERMANENT.

(ii)
Raul R. Lee, who was the second placer in the canvass, but who claims that the votes cast in favor of
Frivaldo should be considered void; that the electorate should be deemed to have intentionally thrown away
their ballots; and that legally, he secured the most number of valid votes; or

(iii)
The incumbent Vice-Governor, Oscar G. Deri, who obviously was not voted directly to the position of
governor, but who according to prevailing jurisprudence should take over the said post inasmuch as, by the
ineligibility of Frivaldo, a "permanent vacancy in the contested office has occurred"?

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 120295

June 28, 1996

In ruling for Frivaldo, the Court lays down new doctrines on repatriation, clarifies/reiterates/amplifies existing
jurisprudence on citizenship and elections, and upholds the superiority of substantial justice over pure
legalisms.

JUAN G. FRIVALDO, petitioner,


vs.

G.R. No. 123755

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and RAUL R. LEE, respondents.

G.R. No. 123755

June 28, 1996

This is a special civil action under Rules 65 and 58 of the Rules of Court for certiorari and preliminary injunction
to review and annul a Resolution of the respondent Commission on Elections (Comelec), First Division, 1
promulgated on December 19, 1995 2 and another Resolution of the Comelec en banc promulgated February
23, 1996 3 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

RAUL R. LEE, petitioner,


vs.

The Facts

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JUAN G. FRIVALDO, respondents.


On March 20, 1995, private respondent Juan G. Frivaldo filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the office of
Governor of Sorsogon in the May 8, 1995 elections. On March 23, 1995, petitioner Raul R. Lee, another
candidate, filed a petition 4 with the Comelec docketed as SPA No. 95-028 praying that Frivaldo "be disqualified

Pearliegates

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from seeking or holding any public office or position by reason of not yet being a citizen of the Philippines", and
that his Certificate of Candidacy be canceled. On May 1, 1995, the Second Division of the Comelec
promulgated a Resolution 5 granting the petition with the following disposition 6:

WHEREFORE, this Division resolves to GRANT the petition and declares that respondent is DISQUALIFIED to run
for the Office of Governor of Sorsogon on the ground that he is NOT a citizen of the Philippines. Accordingly,
respondent's certificate of candidacy is canceled.

The Motion for Reconsideration filed by Frivaldo remained unacted upon until after the May 8, 1995 elections.
So, his candidacy continued and he was voted for during the elections held on said date. On May 11, 1995, the
Comelec en banc 7 affirmed the aforementioned Resolution of the Second Division.

On July 6, 1995, Frivaldo filed with the Comelec a new petition, 11 docketed as SPC No. 95-317, praying for the
annulment of the June 30, 1995 proclamation of Lee and for his own proclamation. He alleged that on June 30,
1995, at 2:00 in the afternoon, he took his oath of allegiance as a citizen of the Philippines after "his petition for
repatriation under P.D. 725 which he filed with the Special Committee on Naturalization in September 1994 had
been granted". As such, when "the said order (dated June 21, 1995) (of the Comelec) . . . was released and
received by Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 at 5:30 o'clock in the evening, there was no more legal impediment to
the proclamation (of Frivaldo) as governor . . ." In the alternative, he averred that pursuant to the two cases of
Labo vs. Comelec, 12 the Vice-Governor - not Lee - should occupy said position of governor.

On December 19, 1995, the Comelec First Division promulgated the herein assailed Resolution 13 holding that
Lee, "not having garnered the highest number of votes," was not legally entitled to be proclaimed as dulyelected governor; and that Frivaldo, "having garnered the highest number of votes,
and . . . having reacquired his Filipino citizenship by repatriation on June 30, 1995 under the provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 725 . . . (is) qualified to hold the office of governor of Sorsogon"; thus:

The Provincial Board of Canvassers completed the canvass of the election returns and a Certificate of Votes 8
dated May 27, 1995 was issued showing the following votes obtained by the candidates for the position of
Governor of Sorsogon:

Antonio H. Escudero, Jr.

Juan G. Frivaldo

73,440

Raul R. Lee

53,304

Isagani P. Ocampo

51,060

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Commission (First Division), therefore RESOLVES to GRANT the Petition.

Consistent with the decisions of the Supreme Court, the proclamation of Raul R. Lee as Governor of Sorsogon is
hereby ordered annulled, being contrary to law, he not having garnered the highest number of votes to warrant
his proclamation.

Upon the finality of the annulment of the proclamation of Raul R. Lee, the Provincial Board of Canvassers is
directed to immediately reconvene and, on the basis of the completed canvass, proclaim petitioner Juan G.
Frivaldo as the duly elected Governor of Sorsogon having garnered the highest number of votes, and he having
reacquired his Filipino citizenship by repatriation on June 30, 1995 under the provisions of Presidential Decree
No. 725 and, thus, qualified to hold the office of Governor of Sorsogon.
1,925

On June 9, 1995, Lee filed in said SPA No. 95-028, a (supplemental) petition 9 praying for his proclamation as
the duly-elected Governor of Sorsogon.

Conformably with Section 260 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), the Clerk of the Commission is
directed to notify His Excellency the President of the Philippines, and the Secretary of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of the Province of Sorsogon of this resolution immediately upon the due implementation thereof.

In an order 10 dated June 21, 1995, but promulgated according to the petition "only on June 29, 1995," the
Comelec en banc directed "the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Sorsogon to reconvene for the purpose of
proclaiming candidate Raul Lee as the winning gubernatorial candidate in the province of Sorsogon on June 29,
1995 . . ." Accordingly, at 8:30 in the evening of June 30, 1995, Lee was proclaimed governor of Sorsogon.

On December 26, 1995, Lee filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the Comelec en banc in its
Resolution 14 promulgated on February 23, 1996. On February 26, 1996, the present petition was filed. Acting
on the prayer for a temporary restraining order, this Court issued on February 27, 1996 a Resolution which inter
alia directed the parties "to maintain the status quo prevailing prior to the filing of this petition."

The Issues in G.R. No. 123755

Pearliegates

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Petitioner Lee's "position on the matter at hand may briefly be capsulized in the following propositions" 15:

First -- The initiatory petition below was so far insufficient in form and substance to warrant the exercise by the
COMELEC of its jurisdiction with the result that, in effect, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction in taking
cognizance of and deciding said petition;

The facts of this case are essentially the same as those in G.R. No. 123755. However, Frivaldo assails the
above-mentioned resolutions on a different ground: that under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, which
is reproduced hereinunder:

Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy. -- A verified petition seeking to deny
due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that
any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be
filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and
shall be decided, after notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election. (Emphasis supplied.)

Second -- The judicially declared disqualification of respondent was a continuing condition and rendered him
ineligible to run for, to be elected to and to hold the Office of Governor;
the Comelec had no jurisdiction to issue said Resolutions because they were not rendered "within the period
allowed by law" i.e., "not later than fifteen days before the election."
Third -- The alleged repatriation of respondent was neither valid nor is the effect thereof retroactive as to cure
his ineligibility and qualify him to hold the Office of Governor; and

Fourth -- Correctly read and applied, the Labo Doctrine fully supports the validity of petitioner's proclamation as
duly elected Governor of Sorsogon.

G.R. No. 120295

This is a petition to annul three Resolutions of the respondent Comelec, the first two of which are also at issue
in G.R. No. 123755, as follows:

Otherwise stated, Frivaldo contends that the failure of the Comelec to act on the petition for disqualification
within the period of fifteen days prior to the election as provided by law is a jurisdictional defect which renders
the said Resolutions null and void.

By Resolution on March 12, 1996, the Court consolidated G.R. Nos. 120295 and 123755 since they are
intimately related in their factual environment and are identical in the ultimate question raised, viz., who
should occupy the position of governor of the province of Sorsogon.

On March 19, 1995, the Court heard oral argument from the parties and required them thereafter to file
simultaneously their respective memoranda.

1.
Resolution 16 of the Second Division, promulgated on May 1, 1995, disqualifying Frivaldo from running
for governor of Sorsogon in the May 8, 1995 elections "on the ground that he is not a citizen of the Philippines";

The Consolidated Issues

2.

From the foregoing submissions, the consolidated issues may be restated as follows:

Resolution 17 of the Comelec en banc, promulgated on May 11, 1995; and

3.
Resolution 18 of the Comelec en banc, promulgated also on May 11, 1995 suspending the
proclamation of, among others, Frivaldo.

The Facts and the Issue

Pearliegates

1.
Was the repatriation of Frivaldo valid and legal? If so, did it seasonably cure his lack of citizenship as to
qualify him to be proclaimed and to hold the Office of Governor? If not, may it be given retroactive effect? If so,
from when?

2.
Is Frivaldo's "judicially declared" disqualification for lack of Filipino citizenship a continuing bar to his
eligibility to run for, be elected to or hold the governorship of Sorsogon?

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3.
Did the respondent Comelec have jurisdiction over the initiatory petition in SPC No. 95-317
considering that said petition is not "a pre-proclamation case, an election protest or a quo warranto case"?

4.
Was the proclamation of Lee, a runner-up in the election, valid and legal in light of existing
jurisprudence?

5.
Did the respondent Commission on Elections exceed its jurisdiction in promulgating the assailed
Resolutions, all of which prevented Frivaldo from assuming the governorship of Sorsogon, considering that they
were not rendered within the period referred to in Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, viz., "not later than
fifteen days before the elections"?

The First Issue: Frivaldo's Repatriation

The validity and effectivity of Frivaldo's repatriation is the lis mota, the threshold legal issue in this case. All the
other matters raised are secondary to this.

The Local Government Code of 1991 19 expressly requires Philippine citizenship as a qualification for elective
local officials, including that of provincial governor, thus:

Sec. 39. Qualifications. -- (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in
the barangay, municipality, city, or province or, in the case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan,
sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the district where he intends to be elected; a resident therein
for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or
any other local language or dialect.

(b)
Candidates for the position of governor, vice governor or member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, or
mayor, vice mayor or member of the sangguniang panlungsod of highly urbanized cities must be at least
twenty-three (23) years of age on election day.

xxx

xxx

Inasmuch as Frivaldo had been declared by this Court 20 as a non-citizen, it is therefore incumbent upon him to
show that he has reacquired citizenship; in fine, that he possesses the qualifications prescribed under the said
statute (R.A. 7160).

Under Philippine law, 21 citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization or by
repatriation. Frivaldo told this Court in G.R. No. 104654 22 and during the oral argument in this case that he
tried to resume his citizenship by direct act of Congress, but that the bill allowing him to do so "failed to
materialize, notwithstanding the endorsement of several members of the House of Representatives" due,
according to him, to the "maneuvers of his political rivals." In the same case, his attempt at naturalization was
rejected by this Court because of jurisdictional, substantial and procedural defects.

Despite his lack of Philippine citizenship, Frivaldo was overwhelmingly elected governor by the electorate of
Sorsogon, with a margin of 27,000 votes in the 1988 elections, 57,000 in 1992, and 20,000 in 1995 over the
same opponent Raul Lee. Twice, he was judicially declared a non-Filipino and thus twice disqualified from
holding and discharging his popular mandate. Now, he comes to us a third time, with a fresh vote from the
people of Sorsogon and a favorable decision from the Commission on Elections to boot. Moreover, he now
boasts of having successfully passed through the third and last mode of reacquiring citizenship: by repatriation
under P.D. No. 725, with no less than the Solicitor General himself, who was the prime opposing counsel in the
previous cases he lost, this time, as counsel for co-respondent Comelec, arguing the validity of his cause (in
addition to his able private counsel Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr.). That he took his oath of allegiance under the
provisions of said Decree at 2:00 p.m. on June 30, 1995 is not disputed. Hence, he insists that he -- not Lee -should have been proclaimed as the duly-elected governor of Sorsogon when the Provincial Board of
Canvassers met at 8:30 p.m. on the said date since, clearly and unquestionably, he garnered the highest
number of votes in the elections and since at that time, he already reacquired his citizenship.

En contrario, Lee argues that Frivaldo's repatriation is tainted with serious defects, which we shall now discuss
in seriatim.

First, Lee tells us that P.D. No. 725 had "been effectively repealed", asserting that "then President Corazon
Aquino exercising legislative powers under the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution, forbade the grant
of citizenship by Presidential Decree or Executive Issuances as the same poses a serious and contentious issue
of policy which the present government, in the exercise of prudence and sound discretion, should best leave to
the judgment of the first Congress under the 1987 Constitution", adding that in her memorandum dated March
27, 1987 to the members of the Special Committee on Naturalization constituted for purposes of Presidential
Decree No. 725, President Aquino directed them "to cease and desist from undertaking any and all proceedings
within your functional area of responsibility as defined under Letter of Instructions (LOI) No. 270 dated April 11,
1975, as amended." 23

xxx
This memorandum dated March 27, 1987 24 cannot by any stretch of legal hermeneutics be construed as a law
sanctioning or authorizing a repeal of P.D. No. 725. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones 25 and a repeal
may be express or implied. It is obvious that no express repeal was made because then President Aquino in her

Pearliegates

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memorandum -- based on the copy furnished us by Lee -- did not categorically and/or impliedly state that P.D.
725 was being repealed or was being rendered without any legal effect. In fact, she did not even mention it
specifically by its number or text. On the other hand, it is a basic rule of statutory construction that repeals by
implication are not favored. An implied repeal will not be allowed "unless it is convincingly and unambiguously
demonstrated that the two laws are clearly repugnant and patently inconsistent that they cannot co-exist". 26

The memorandum of then President Aquino cannot even be regarded as a legislative enactment, for not every
pronouncement of the Chief Executive even under the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution can nor
should be regarded as an exercise of her law-making powers. At best, it could be treated as an executive policy
addressed to the Special Committee to halt the acceptance and processing of applications for repatriation
pending whatever "judgment the first Congress under the 1987 Constitution" might make. In other words, the
former President did not repeal P.D. 725 but left it to the first Congress -- once created -- to deal with the
matter. If she had intended to repeal such law, she should have unequivocally said so instead of referring the
matter to Congress. The fact is she carefully couched her presidential issuance in terms that clearly indicated
the intention of "the present government, in the exercise of prudence and sound discretion" to leave the matter
of repeal to the new Congress. Any other interpretation of the said Presidential Memorandum, such as is now
being proffered to the Court by Lee, would visit unmitigated violence not only upon statutory construction but
on common sense as well.

Second, Lee also argues that "serious congenital irregularities flawed the repatriation proceedings," asserting
that Frivaldo's application therefor was "filed on June 29, 1995 . . . (and) was approved in just one day or on
June 30, 1995 . . .", which "prevented a judicious review and evaluation of the merits thereof." Frivaldo counters
that he filed his application for repatriation with the Office of the President in Malacaang Palace on August 17,
1994. This is confirmed by the Solicitor General. However, the Special Committee was reactivated only on June
8, 1995, when presumably the said Committee started processing his application. On June 29, 1995, he filled
up and re-submitted the FORM that the Committee required. Under these circumstances, it could not be said
that there was "indecent haste" in the processing of his application.

Anent Lee's charge that the "sudden reconstitution of the Special Committee on Naturalization was intended
solely for the personal interest of respondent," 27 the Solicitor General explained during the oral argument on
March 19, 1996 that such allegation is simply baseless as there were many others who applied and were
considered for repatriation, a list of whom was submitted by him to this Court, through a Manifestation 28 filed
on April 3, 1996.

On the basis of the parties' submissions, we are convinced that the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty and the presumption of legality in the repatriation of Frivaldo have not been
successfully rebutted by Lee. The mere fact that the proceedings were speeded up is by itself not a ground to
conclude that such proceedings were necessarily tainted. After all, the requirements of repatriation under P.D.
No. 725 are not difficult to comply with, nor are they tedious and cumbersome. In fact, P.D.
725 29 itself requires very little of an applicant, and even the rules and regulations to implement the said
decree were left to the Special Committee to promulgate. This is not unusual since, unlike in naturalization
where an alien covets a first-time entry into Philippine political life, in repatriation the applicant is a former

Pearliegates

natural-born Filipino who is merely seeking to reacquire his previous citizenship. In the case of Frivaldo, he was
undoubtedly a natural-born citizen who openly and faithfully served his country and his province prior to his
naturalization in the United States -- a naturalization he insists was made necessary only to escape the iron
clutches of a dictatorship he abhorred and could not in conscience embrace -- and who, after the fall of the
dictator and the re-establishment of democratic space, wasted no time in returning to his country of birth to
offer once more his talent and services to his people.

So too, the fact that ten other persons, as certified to by the Solicitor General, were granted repatriation argues
convincingly and conclusively against the existence of favoritism vehemently posited by Raul Lee. At any rate,
any contest on the legality of Frivaldo's repatriation should have been pursued before the Committee itself,
and, failing there, in the Office of the President, pursuant to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies.

Third, Lee further contends that assuming the assailed repatriation to be valid, nevertheless it could only be
effective as at 2:00 p.m. of June 30, 1995 whereas the citizenship qualification prescribed by the Local
Government Code "must exist on the date of his election, if not when the certificate of candidacy is filed," citing
our decision in G.R. 104654 30 which held that "both the Local Government Code and the Constitution require
that only Philippine citizens can run and be elected to public office." Obviously, however, this was a mere obiter
as the only issue in said case was whether Frivaldo's naturalization was valid or not -- and NOT the effective
date thereof. Since the Court held his naturalization to be invalid, then the issue of when an aspirant for public
office should be a citizen was NOT resolved at all by the Court. Which question we shall now directly rule on.

Under Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code, "(a)n elective local official must be:

a citizen of the Philippines;

a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province . . . where he intends to be elected;

a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election;

able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.

*
In addition, "candidates for the position of governor . . . must be at least twenty-three (23) years of
age on election day.

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From the above, it will be noted that the law does not specify any particular date or time when the candidate
must possess citizenship, unlike that for residence (which must consist of at least one year's residency
immediately preceding the day of election) and age (at least twenty three years of age on election day).

Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective public office, 31 and the purpose
of the citizenship qualification is none other than to ensure that no alien, i.e., no person owing allegiance to
another nation, shall govern our people and our country or a unit of territory thereof. Now, an official begins to
govern or to discharge his functions only upon his proclamation and on the day the law mandates his term of
office to begin. Since Frivaldo re-assumed his citizenship on June 30, 1995 -- the very day 32 the term of office
of governor (and other elective officials) began -- he was therefore already qualified to be proclaimed, to hold
such office and to discharge the functions and responsibilities thereof as of said date. In short, at that time, he
was already qualified to govern his native Sorsogon. This is the liberal interpretation that should give spirit, life
and meaning to our law on qualifications consistent with the purpose for which such law was enacted. So too,
even from a literal (as distinguished from liberal) construction, it should be noted that Section 39 of the Local
Government Code speaks of "Qualifications" of "ELECTIVE OFFICIALS", not of candidates. Why then should such
qualification be required at the time of election or at the time of the filing of the certificates of candidacies, as
Lee insists? Literally, such qualifications -- unless otherwise expressly conditioned, as in the case of age and
residence -- should thus be possessed when the "elective [or elected] official" begins to govern, i.e., at the time
he is proclaimed and at the start of his term -- in this case, on June 30, 1995. Paraphrasing this Court's ruling in
Vasquez vs. Giap and Li Seng Giap & Sons, 33 if the purpose of the citizenship requirement is to ensure that our
people and country do not end up being governed by aliens, i.e., persons owing allegiance to another nation,
that aim or purpose would not be thwarted but instead achieved by construing the citizenship qualification as
applying to the time of proclamation of the elected official and at the start of his term.

But perhaps the more difficult objection was the one raised during the oral argument 34 to the effect that the
citizenship qualification should be possessed at the time the candidate (or for that matter the elected official)
registered as a voter. After all, Section 39, apart from requiring the official to be a citizen, also specifies as
another item of qualification, that he be a "registered voter". And, under the law 35 a "voter" must be a citizen
of the Philippines. So therefore, Frivaldo could not have been a voter -- much less a validly registered one -- if
he was not a citizen at the time of such registration.

Before this Court, Frivaldo has repeatedly emphasized -- and Lee has not disputed -- that he "was and is a
registered voter of Sorsogon, and his registration as a voter has been sustained as valid by judicial declaration .
. . In fact, he cast his vote in his precinct on May 8, 1995." 36

So too, during the oral argument, his counsel steadfastly maintained that "Mr. Frivaldo has always been a
registered voter of Sorsogon. He has voted in 1987, 1988, 1992, then he voted again in 1995. In fact, his
eligibility as a voter was questioned, but the court dismissed (sic) his eligibility as a voter and he was allowed
to vote as in fact, he voted in all the previous elections including on May 8, 1995." 37

It is thus clear that Frivaldo is a registered voter in the province where he intended to be elected.

There is yet another reason why the prime issue of citizenship should be reckoned from the date of
proclamation, not necessarily the date of election or date of filing of the certificate of candidacy. Section 253 of
the Omnibus Election Code 38 gives any voter, presumably including the defeated candidate, the opportunity
to question the ELIGIBILITY (or the disloyalty) of a candidate. This is the only provision of the Code that
authorizes a remedy on how to contest before the Comelec an incumbent's ineligibility arising from failure to
meet the qualifications enumerated under Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code. Such remedy of Quo
Warranto can be availed of "within ten days after proclamation" of the winning candidate. Hence, it is only at
such time that the issue of ineligibility may be taken cognizance of by the Commission. And since, at the very
moment of Lee's proclamation (8:30 p.m., June 30, 1995), Juan G. Frivaldo was already and indubitably a
citizen, having taken his oath of allegiance earlier in the afternoon of the same day, then he should have been
the candidate proclaimed as he unquestionably garnered the highest number of votes in the immediately
preceding elections and such oath had already cured his previous "judicially-declared" alienage. Hence, at such
time, he was no longer ineligible.

But to remove all doubts on this important issue, we also hold that the repatriation of Frivaldo RETROACTED to
the date of the filing of his application on August 17, 1994.
The answer to this problem again lies in discerning the purpose of the requirement. If the law intended the
citizenship qualification to be possessed prior to election consistent with the requirement of being a registered
voter, then it would not have made citizenship a SEPARATE qualification. The law abhors a redundancy. It
therefore stands to reason that the law intended CITIZENSHIP to be a qualification distinct from being a VOTER,
even if being a voter presumes being a citizen first. It also stands to reason that the voter requirement was
included as another qualification (aside from "citizenship"), not to reiterate the need for nationality but to
require that the official be registered as a voter IN THE AREA OR TERRITORY he seeks to govern, i.e., the law
states: "a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province . . . where he intends to be elected."
It should be emphasized that the Local Government Code requires an elective official to be a registered voter. It
does not require him to vote actually. Hence, registration -- not the actual voting -- is the core of this
"qualification". In other words, the law's purpose in this second requirement is to ensure that the prospective
official is actually registered in the area he seeks to govern -- and not anywhere else.

Pearliegates

It is true that under the Civil Code of the Philippines, 39 "(l)aws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the
contrary is provided." But there are settled exceptions 40 to this general rule, such as when the statute is
CURATIVE or REMEDIAL in nature or when it CREATES NEW RIGHTS.

According to Tolentino, 41 curative statutes are those which undertake to cure errors and irregularities, thereby
validating judicial or administrative proceedings, acts of public officers, or private deeds and contracts which
otherwise would not produce their intended consequences by reason of some statutory disability or failure to
comply with some technical requirement. They operate on conditions already existing, and are necessarily
retroactive in operation. Agpalo, 42 on the other hand, says that curative statutes are

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"healing acts . . . curing defects and adding to the means of enforcing existing obligations . . . (and) are
intended to supply defects, abridge superfluities in existing laws, and curb certain evils. . . . By their very
nature, curative statutes are retroactive . . . (and) reach back to past events to correct errors or irregularities
and to render valid and effective attempted acts which would be otherwise ineffective for the purpose the
parties intended."

On the other hand, remedial or procedural laws, i.e., those statutes relating to remedies or modes of procedure,
which do not create new or take away vested rights, but only operate in furtherance of the remedy or
confirmation of such rights, ordinarily do not come within the legal meaning of a retrospective law, nor within
the general rule against the retrospective operation of statutes. 43

A reading of P.D. 725 immediately shows that it creates a new right, and also provides for a new remedy,
thereby filling certain voids in our laws. Thus, in its preamble, P.D. 725 expressly recognizes the plight of "many
Filipino women (who) had lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens" and who could not, under the
existing law (C.A. No. 63, as amended) avail of repatriation until "after the death of their husbands or the
termination of their marital status" and who could neither be benefitted by the 1973 Constitution's new
provision allowing "a Filipino woman who marries an alien to retain her Philippine citizenship . . ." because
"such provision of the new Constitution does not apply to Filipino women who had married aliens before said
constitution took effect." Thus, P.D. 725 granted a new right to these women -- the right to re-acquire Filipino
citizenship even during their marital coverture, which right did not exist prior to P.D. 725. On the other hand,
said statute also provided a new remedy and a new right in favor of other "natural born Filipinos who (had) lost
their Philippine citizenship but now desire to re-acquire Philippine citizenship", because prior to the
promulgation of P.D. 725 such former Filipinos would have had to undergo the tedious and cumbersome
process of naturalization, but with the advent of P.D. 725 they could now re-acquire their Philippine citizenship
under the simplified procedure of repatriation.

The Solicitor General 44 argues:

By their very nature, curative statutes are retroactive, (DBP vs. CA, 96 SCRA 342), since they are intended to
supply defects, abridge superfluities in existing laws (Del Castillo vs. Securities and Exchange Commission, 96
Phil. 119) and curb certain evils (Santos vs. Duata, 14 SCRA 1041).

In this case, P.D. No. 725 was enacted to cure the defect in the existing naturalization law, specifically C.A. No.
63 wherein married Filipino women are allowed to repatriate only upon the death of their husbands, and
natural-born Filipinos who lost their citizenship by naturalization and other causes faced the difficulty of
undergoing the rigid procedures of C.A. 63 for reacquisition of Filipino citizenship by naturalization.

Presidential Decree No. 725 provided a remedy for the aforementioned legal aberrations and thus its provisions
are considered essentially remedial and curative.

Pearliegates

In light of the foregoing, and prescinding from the wording of the preamble, it is unarguable that the legislative
intent was precisely to give the statute retroactive operation. "(A) retrospective operation is given to a statute
or amendment where the intent that it should so operate clearly appears from a consideration of the act as a
whole, or from the terms thereof." 45 It is obvious to the Court that the statute was meant to "reach back" to
those persons, events and transactions not otherwise covered by prevailing law and jurisprudence. And
inasmuch as it has been held that citizenship is a political and civil right equally as important as the freedom of
speech, liberty of abode, the right against unreasonable searches and seizures and other guarantees enshrined
in the Bill of Rights, therefore the legislative intent to give retrospective operation to P.D. 725 must be given
the fullest effect possible. "(I)t has been said that a remedial statute must be so construed as to make it effect
the evident purpose for which it was enacted, so that if the reason of the statute extends to past transactions,
as well as to those in the future, then it will be so applied although the statute does not in terms so direct,
unless to do so would impair some vested right or violate some constitutional guaranty." 46 This is all the more
true of P.D. 725, which did not specify any restrictions on or delimit or qualify the right of repatriation granted
therein.

At this point, a valid question may be raised: How can the retroactivity of P.D. 725 benefit Frivaldo considering
that said law was enacted on June 5, 1975, while Frivaldo lost his Filipino citizenship much later, on January 20,
1983, and applied for repatriation even later, on August 17, 1994?

While it is true that the law was already in effect at the time that Frivaldo became an American citizen,
nevertheless, it is not only the law itself (P.D. 725) which is to be given retroactive effect, but even the
repatriation granted under said law to Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 is to be deemed to have retroacted to the date
of his application therefor, August 17, 1994. The reason for this is simply that if, as in this case, it was the
intent of the legislative authority that the law should apply to past events -- i.e., situations and transactions
existing even before the law came into being -- in order to benefit the greatest number of former Filipinos
possible thereby enabling them to enjoy and exercise the constitutionally guaranteed right of citizenship, and
such legislative intention is to be given the fullest effect and expression, then there is all the more reason to
have the law apply in a retroactive or retrospective manner to situations, events and transactions subsequent
to the passage of such law. That is, the repatriation granted to Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 can and should be
made to take effect as of date of his application. As earlier mentioned, there is nothing in the law that would
bar this or would show a contrary intention on the part of the legislative authority; and there is no showing that
damage or prejudice to anyone, or anything unjust or injurious would result from giving retroactivity to his
repatriation. Neither has Lee shown that there will result the impairment of any contractual obligation,
disturbance of any vested right or breach of some constitutional guaranty.

Being a former Filipino who has served the people repeatedly, Frivaldo deserves a liberal interpretation of
Philippine laws and whatever defects there were in his nationality should now be deemed mooted by his
repatriation.

Another argument for retroactivity to the date of filing is that it would prevent prejudice to applicants. If P.D.
725 were not to be given retroactive effect, and the Special Committee decides not to act, i.e., to delay the

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processing of applications for any substantial length of time, then the former Filipinos who may be stateless, as
Frivaldo -- having already renounced his American citizenship -- was, may be prejudiced for causes outside their
control. This should not be. In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is to be presumed
that the law-making body intended right and justice to prevail. 47

And as experience will show, the Special Committee was able to process, act upon and grant applications for
repatriation within relatively short spans of time after the same were filed. 48 The fact that such interregna
were relatively insignificant minimizes the likelihood of prejudice to the government as a result of giving
retroactivity to repatriation. Besides, to the mind of the Court, direct prejudice to the government is possible
only where a person's repatriation has the effect of wiping out a liability of his to the government arising in
connection with or as a result of his being an alien, and accruing only during the interregnum between
application and approval, a situation that is not present in the instant case.

And it is but right and just that the mandate of the people, already twice frustrated, should now prevail. Under
the circumstances, there is nothing unjust or iniquitous in treating Frivaldo's repatriation as having become
effective as of the date of his application, i.e., on August 17, 1994. This being so, all questions about his
possession of the nationality qualification -- whether at the date of proclamation (June 30, 1995) or the date of
election (May 8, 1995) or date of filing his certificate of candidacy (March 20, 1995) would become moot.

Based on the foregoing, any question regarding Frivaldo's status as a registered voter would also be deemed
settled. Inasmuch as he is considered as having been repatriated -- i.e., his Filipino citizenship restored -- as of
August 17, 1994, his previous registration as a voter is likewise deemed validated as of said date.

It is not disputed that on January 20, 1983 Frivaldo became an American. Would the retroactivity of his
repatriation not effectively give him dual citizenship, which under Sec. 40 of the Local Government Code would
disqualify him "from running for any elective local position?" 49 We answer this question in the negative, as
there is cogent reason to hold that Frivaldo was really STATELESS at the time he took said oath of allegiance
and even before that, when he ran for governor in 1988. In his Comment, Frivaldo wrote that he "had long
renounced and had long abandoned his American citizenship -- long before May 8, 1995. At best, Frivaldo was
stateless in the interim -- when he abandoned and renounced his US citizenship but before he was repatriated
to his Filipino citizenship." 50

On this point, we quote from the assailed Resolution dated December 19, 1995: 51

By the laws of the United States, petitioner Frivaldo lost his American citizenship when he took his oath of
allegiance to the Philippine Government when he ran for Governor in 1988, in 1992, and in 1995. Every
certificate of candidacy contains an oath of allegiance to the Philippine Government."

Pearliegates

These factual findings that Frivaldo has lost his foreign nationality long before the elections of 1995 have not
been effectively rebutted by Lee. Furthermore, it is basic that such findings of the Commission are conclusive
upon this Court, absent any showing of capriciousness or arbitrariness or
abuse. 52

The Second Issue:

Is Lack of Citizenship

a Continuing Disqualification?

Lee contends that the May 1, 1995 Resolution 53 of the Comelec Second Division in SPA No. 95-028 as affirmed
in toto by Comelec En Banc in its Resolution of May 11, 1995 "became final and executory after five (5) days or
on May 17, 1995, no restraining order having been issued by this Honorable Court. 54 Hence, before Lee "was
proclaimed as the elected governor on June 30, 1995, there was already a final and executory judgment
disqualifying" Frivaldo. Lee adds that this Court's two rulings (which Frivaldo now concedes were legally
"correct") declaring Frivaldo an alien have also become final and executory way before the 1995 elections, and
these "judicial pronouncements of his political status as an American citizen absolutely and for all time
disqualified (him) from running for, and holding any public office in the Philippines."

We do not agree.

It should be noted that our first ruling in G.R. No. 87193 disqualifying Frivaldo was rendered in connection with
the 1988 elections while that in G.R. No. 104654 was in connection with the 1992 elections. That he was
disqualified for such elections is final and can no longer be changed. In the words of the respondent
Commission (Second Division) in its assailed Resolution: 55

The records show that the Honorable Supreme Court had decided that Frivaldo was not a Filipino citizen and
thus disqualified for the purpose of the 1988 and 1992 elections. However, there is no record of any "final
judgment" of the disqualification of Frivaldo as a candidate for the May 8, 1995 elections. What the Commission
said in its Order of June 21, 1995 (implemented on June 30, 1995), directing the proclamation of Raul R. Lee,
was that Frivaldo was not a Filipino citizen "having been declared by the Supreme Court in its Order dated
March 25, 1995, not a citizen of the Philippines." This declaration of the Supreme Court, however, was in
connection with the 1992 elections.

Indeed, decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of citizenship cannot govern a person's future status with
finality. This is because a person may subsequently reacquire, or for that matter lose, his citizenship under any
of the modes recognized by law for the purpose. Hence, in Lee vs. Commissioner of Immigration, 56 we held:

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Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative case, whatever
the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not
considered res judicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and again, as the occasion demands.

The Third Issue:

Comelec's Jurisdiction

Over The Petition in SPC No. 95-317

Lee also avers that respondent Comelec had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition in SPC No. 95-317 because
the only "possible types of proceedings that may be entertained by the Comelec are a pre-proclamation case,
an election protest or a quo warranto case". Again, Lee reminds us that he was proclaimed on June 30, 1995
but that Frivaldo filed SPC No. 95-317 questioning his (Lee's) proclamation only on July 6, 1995 -- "beyond the
5-day reglementary period." Hence, according to him, Frivaldo's "recourse was to file either an election protest
or a quo warranto action."

First. To paraphrase this Court in Labo vs. COMELEC, 60 "the fact remains that he (Lee) was not the choice of
the sovereign will," and in Aquino vs. COMELEC, 61 Lee is "a second placer, . . . just that, a second placer."

In spite of this, Lee anchors his claim to the governorship on the pronouncement of this Court in the aforesaid
Labo 62 case, as follows:

The rule would have been different if the electorate fully aware in fact and in law of a candidate's
disqualification so as to bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety, would nonetheless cast their votes
in favor of the ineligible candidate. In such case, the electorate may be said to have waived the validity and
efficacy of their votes by notoriously misapplying their franchise or throwing away their votes, in which case,
the eligible candidate obtaining the next higher number of votes may be deemed elected.

But such holding is qualified by the next paragraph, thus:


This argument is not meritorious. The Constitution 57 has given the Comelec ample power to "exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of all
elective . . . provincial . . . officials." Instead of dwelling at length on the various petitions that Comelec, in the
exercise of its constitutional prerogatives, may entertain, suffice it to say that this Court has invariably
recognized the Commission's authority to hear and decide petitions for annulment of proclamations -- of which
SPC No. 95-317 obviously is one. 58 Thus, in Mentang vs. COMELEC, 59 we ruled:

The petitioner argues that after proclamation and assumption of office, a pre-proclamation controversy is no
longer viable. Indeed, we are aware of cases holding that pre-proclamation controversies may no longer be
entertained by the COMELEC after the winning candidate has been proclaimed. (citing Gallardo vs. Rimando,
187 SCRA 463; Salvacion vs. COMELEC, 170 SCRA 513; Casimiro vs. COMELEC, 171 SCRA 468.) This rule,
however, is premised on an assumption that the proclamation is no proclamation at all and the proclaimed
candidate's assumption of office cannot deprive the COMELEC of the power to make such declaration of nullity.
(citing Aguam vs. COMELEC, 23 SCRA 883; Agbayani vs. COMELEC, 186 SCRA 484.)

The Court however cautioned that such power to annul a proclamation must "be done within ten (10) days
following the proclamation." Inasmuch as Frivaldo's petition was filed only six (6) days after Lee's proclamation,
there is no question that the Comelec correctly acquired jurisdiction over the same.

The Fourth Issue: Was Lee's Proclamation Valid?

But this is not the situation obtaining in the instant dispute. It has not been shown, and none was alleged, that
petitioner Labo was notoriously known as an ineligible candidate, much less the electorate as having known of
such fact. On the contrary, petitioner Labo was even allowed by no less than the Comelec itself in its resolution
dated May 10, 1992 to be voted for the office of the city Payor as its resolution dated May 9, 1992 denying due
course to petitioner Labo's certificate of candidacy had not yet become final and subject to the final outcome of
this case.

The last-quoted paragraph in Labo, unfortunately for Lee, is the ruling appropriate in this case because Frivaldo
was in 1995 in an identical situation as Labo was in 1992 when the Comelec's cancellation of his certificate of
candidacy was not yet final on election day as there was in both cases a pending motion for reconsideration,
for which reason Comelec issued an (omnibus) resolution declaring that Frivaldo (like Labo in 1992) and several
others can still be voted for in the May 8, 1995 election, as in fact, he was.

Furthermore, there has been no sufficient evidence presented to show that the electorate of Sorsogon was
"fully aware in fact and in law" of Frivaldo's alleged disqualification as to "bring such awareness within the
realm of notoriety;" in other words, that the voters intentionally wasted their ballots knowing that, in spite of
their voting for him, he was ineligible. If Labo has any relevance at all, it is that the vice-governor -- and not Lee
-- should be pro- claimed, since in losing the election, Lee was, to paraphrase Labo again, "obviously not the
choice of the people" of Sorsogon. This is the emphatic teaching of Labo:

Frivaldo assails the validity of the Lee proclamation. We uphold him for the following reasons:

Pearliegates

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The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle the eligible
candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. A minority or defeated candidate
cannot be deemed elected to the office.

Second. As we have earlier declared Frivaldo to have seasonably reacquired his citizenship and inasmuch as he
obtained the highest number of votes in the 1995 elections, he -- not Lee -- should be proclaimed. Hence, Lee's
proclamation was patently erroneous and should now be corrected.

The Fifth Issue:

Is Section 78 of the

Election Code Mandatory?

In G.R. No. 120295, Frivaldo claims that the assailed Resolution of the Comelec (Second Division) dated May 1,
1995 and the confirmatory en banc Resolution of May 11, 1995 disqualifying him for want of citizenship should
be annulled because they were rendered beyond the fifteen (15) day period prescribed by Section 78, of the
Omnibus Election Code which reads as follows:

Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy. -- A verified petition seeking to deny
due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that
any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be
filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and
shall be decided after notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election. (Emphasis supplied.)

This claim is now moot and academic inasmuch as these resolutions are deemed superseded by the
subsequent ones issued by the Commission (First Division) on December 19, 1995, affirmed en banc 63 on
February 23, 1996; which both upheld his election. At any rate, it is obvious that Section 78 is merely directory
as Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 authorizes the Commission to try and decide petitions for disqualifications even
after the elections, thus:

Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. -- Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be
disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate
is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the
winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of
the action, inquiry or protest and upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency
thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is
strong. (emphasis supplied)

Refutation of

Pearliegates

Mr. Justice Davide's Dissent

In his dissenting opinion, the esteemed Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. argues that President Aquino's
memorandum dated March 27, 1987 should be viewed as a suspension (not a repeal, as urged by Lee) of P.D.
725. But whether it decrees a suspension or a repeal is a purely academic distinction because the said issuance
is not a statute that can amend or abrogate an existing law.
The existence and subsistence of P.D. 725 were recognized in the first Frivaldo case; 64 viz., "(u)nder CA No. 63
as amended by CA No. 473 and P.D. No. 725, Philippine citizenship maybe reacquired by . . . repatriation". He
also contends that by allowing Frivaldo to register and to remain as a registered voter, the Comelec and in
effect this Court abetted a "mockery" of our two previous judgments declaring him a non-citizen. We do not see
such abetting or mockery. The retroactivity of his repatriation, as discussed earlier, legally cured whatever
defects there may have been in his registration as a voter for the purpose of the 1995 elections. Such
retroactivity did not change his disqualifications in 1988 and 1992, which were the subjects of such previous
rulings.

Mr. Justice Davide also believes that Quo Warranto is not the sole remedy to question the ineligibility of a
candidate, citing the Comelec's authority under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code allowing the denial of
a certificate of candidacy on the ground of a false material representation therein as required by Section 74.
Citing Loong, he then states his disagreement with our holding that Section 78 is merely directory. We really
have no quarrel. Our point is that Frivaldo was in error in his claim in G.R. No. 120295 that the Comelec
Resolutions promulgated on May 1, 1995 and May 11, 1995 were invalid because they were issued "not later
than fifteen days before the election" as prescribed by Section 78. In dismissing the petition in G.R. No.
120295, we hold that the Comelec did not commit grave abuse of discretion because "Section 6 of R.A. 6646
authorizes the Comelec to try and decide disqualifications even after the elections." In spite of his
disagreement with us on this point, i.e., that Section 78 "is merely directory", we note that just like us, Mr.
Justice Davide nonetheless votes to "DISMISS G.R. No. 120295". One other point. Loong, as quoted in the
dissent, teaches that a petition to deny due course under Section 78 must be filed within the 25-day period
prescribed therein. The present case however deals with the period during which the Comelec may decide such
petition. And we hold that it may be decided even after the fifteen day period mentioned in Section 78. Here,
we rule that a decision promulgated by the Comelec even after the elections is valid but Loong held that a
petition filed beyond the 25-day period is out of time. There is no inconsistency nor conflict.

Mr. Justice Davide also disagrees with the Court's holding that, given the unique factual circumstances of
Frivaldo, repatriation may be given retroactive effect. He argues that such retroactivity "dilutes" our holding in
the first Frivaldo case. But the first (and even the second Frivaldo) decision did not directly involve repatriation
as a mode of acquiring citizenship. If we may repeat, there is no question that Frivaldo was not a Filipino for
purposes of determining his qualifications in the 1988 and 1992 elections. That is settled. But his supervening
repatriation has changed his political status -- not in 1988 or 1992, but only in the 1995 elections.

Our learned colleague also disputes our holding that Frivaldo was stateless prior to his repatriation, saying that
"informal renunciation or abandonment is not a ground to lose American citizenship". Since our courts are
charged only with the duty of determining who are Philippine nationals, we cannot rule on the legal question of

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Election Law Cases


who are or who are not Americans. It is basic in international law that a State determines ONLY those who are
its own citizens -- not who are the citizens of other countries. 65 The issue here is: the Comelec made a finding
of fact that Frivaldo was stateless and such finding has not been shown by Lee to be arbitrary or whimsical.
Thus, following settled case law, such finding is binding and final.

The dissenting opinion also submits that Lee who lost by chasmic margins to Frivaldo in all three previous
elections, should be declared winner because "Frivaldo's ineligibility for being an American was publicly
known". First, there is absolutely no empirical evidence for such "public" knowledge. Second, even if there is,
such knowledge can be true post facto only of the last two previous elections. Third, even the Comelec and now
this Court were/are still deliberating on his nationality before, during and after the 1995 elections. How then
can there be such "public" knowledge?

Mr. Justice Davide submits that Section 39 of the Local Government Code refers to the qualifications of elective
local officials, i.e., candidates, and not elected officials, and that the citizenship qualification [under par. (a) of
that section] must be possessed by candidates, not merely at the commencement of the term, but by election
day at the latest. We see it differently. Section 39, par. (a) thereof speaks of "elective local official" while par.
(b) to (f) refer to "candidates". If the qualifications under par. (a) were intended to apply to "candidates" and
not elected officials, the legislature would have said so, instead of differentiating par. (a) from the rest of the
paragraphs. Secondly, if Congress had meant that the citizenship qualification should be possessed at election
day or prior thereto, it would have specifically stated such detail, the same way it did in pars. (b) to (f) far other
qualifications of candidates for governor, mayor, etc.

Mr. Justice Davide also questions the giving of retroactive effect to Frivaldo's repatriation on the ground, among
others, that the law specifically provides that it is only after taking the oath of allegiance that applicants shall
be deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship. We do not question what the provision states. We hold
however that the provision should be understood thus: that after taking the oath of allegiance the applicant is
deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship, which reacquisition (or repatriation) is deemed for all
purposes and intents to have retroacted to the date of his application therefor.

In any event, our "so too" argument regarding the literal meaning of the word "elective" in reference to Section
39 of the Local Authority Code, as well as regarding Mr. Justice Davide's thesis that the very wordings of P.D.
725 suggest non-retroactivity, were already taken up rather extensively earlier in this Decision.

Mr. Justice Davide caps his paper with a clarion call: "This Court must be the first to uphold the Rule of Law." We
agree -- we must all follow the rule of law. But that is NOT the issue here. The issue is how should the law be
interpreted and applied in this case so it can be followed, so it can rule!

At balance, the question really boils down to a choice of philosophy and perception of how to interpret and
apply laws relating to elections: literal or liberal; the letter or the spirit, the naked provision or its ultimate

Pearliegates

purpose; legal syllogism or substantial justice; in isolation or in the context of social conditions; harshly against
or gently in favor of the voters' obvious choice. In applying election laws, it would be far better to err in favor of
popular sovereignty than to be right in complex but little understood legalisms. Indeed, to inflict a thrice
rejected candidate upon the electorate of Sorsogon would constitute unmitigated judicial tyranny and an
unacceptable assault upon this Court's conscience.

EPILOGUE

In sum, we rule that the citizenship requirement in the Local Government Code is to be possessed by an
elective official at the latest as of the time he is proclaimed and at the start of the term of office to which he
has been elected. We further hold P.D. No. 725 to be in full force and effect up to the present, not having been
suspended or repealed expressly nor impliedly at any time, and Frivaldo's repatriation by virtue thereof to have
been properly granted and thus valid and effective. Moreover, by reason of the remedial or curative nature of
the law granting him a new right to resume his political status and the legislative intent behind it, as well as his
unique situation of having been forced to give up his citizenship and political aspiration as his means of
escaping a regime he abhorred, his repatriation is to be given retroactive effect as of the date of his application
therefor, during the pendency of which he was stateless, he having given up his U.S. nationality. Thus, in
contemplation of law, he possessed the vital requirement of Filipino citizenship as of the start of the term of
office of governor, and should have been proclaimed instead of Lee. Furthermore, since his reacquisition of
citizenship retroacted to August 17, 1994, his registration as a voter of Sorsogon is deemed to have been
validated as of said date as well. The foregoing, of course, are precisely consistent with our holding that lack of
the citizenship requirement is not a continuing disability or disqualification to run for and hold public office. And
once again, we emphasize herein our previous rulings recognizing the Comelec's authority and jurisdiction to
hear and decide petitions for annulment of proclamations.

This Court has time and again liberally and equitably construed the electoral laws of our country to give fullest
effect to the manifest will of our people, 66 for in case of doubt, political laws must be interpreted to give life
and spirit to the popular mandate freely expressed through the ballot. Otherwise stated, legal niceties and
technicalities cannot stand in the way of the sovereign will. Consistently, we have held:

. . . (L)aws governing election contests must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in the
choice of public officials may not be defeated by mere technical objections (citations omitted). 67

The law and the courts must accord Frivaldo every possible protection, defense and refuge, in deference to the
popular will. Indeed, this Court has repeatedly stressed the importance of giving effect to the sovereign will in
order to ensure the survival of our democracy. In any action involving the possibility of a reversal of the popular
electoral choice, this Court must exert utmost effort to resolve the issues in a manner that would give effect to
the will of the majority, for it is merely sound public policy to cause elective offices to be filled by those who are
the choice of the majority. To successfully challenge a winning candidate's qualifications, the petitioner must
clearly demonstrate that the ineligibility is so patently antagonistic 68 to constitutional and legal principles that
overriding such ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the apparent will of the people, would ultimately create

173

Election Law Cases


greater prejudice to the very democratic institutions and juristic traditions that our Constitution and laws so
zealously protect and promote. In this undertaking, Lee has miserably failed.

MAYOR JOSE UGDORACION, JR., petitioner,


vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EPHRAIM M. TUNGOL, respondents.

In Frivaldo's case. it would have been technically easy to find fault with his cause. The Court could have refused
to grant retroactivity to the effects of his repatriation and hold him still ineligible due to his failure to show his
citizenship at the time he registered as a voter before the 1995 elections. Or, it could have disputed the factual
findings of the Comelec that he was stateless at the time of repatriation and thus hold his consequent dual
citizenship as a disqualification "from running for any elective local position." But the real essence of justice
does not emanate from quibblings over patchwork legal technicality. It proceeds from the spirit's gut
consciousness of the dynamic role of law as a brick in the ultimate development of the social edifice. Thus, the
Court struggled against and eschewed the easy, legalistic, technical and sometimes harsh anachronisms of the
law in order to evoke substantial justice in the larger social context consistent with Frivaldo's unique situation
approximating venerability in Philippine political life. Concededly, he sought American citizenship only to
escape the clutches of the dictatorship. At this stage, we cannot seriously entertain any doubt about his loyalty
and dedication to this country. At the first opportunity, he returned to this land, and sought to serve his people
once more. The people of Sorsogon overwhelmingly voted for him three times. He took an oath of allegiance to
this Republic every time he filed his certificate of candidacy and during his failed naturalization bid. And let it
not be overlooked, his demonstrated tenacity and sheer determination to re-assume his nationality of birth
despite several legal set-backs speak more loudly, in spirit, in fact and in truth than any legal technicality, of
his consuming intention and burning desire to re-embrace his native Philippines even now at the ripe old age of
81 years. Such loyalty to and love of country as well as nobility of purpose cannot be lost on this Court of
justice and equity. Mortals of lesser mettle would have given up. After all, Frivaldo was assured of a life of ease
and plenty as a citizen of the most powerful country in the world. But he opted, nay, single-mindedly insisted
on returning to and serving once more his struggling but beloved land of birth. He therefore deserves every
liberal interpretation of the law which can be applied in his favor. And in the final analysis, over and above
Frivaldo himself, the indomitable people of Sorsogon most certainly deserve to be governed by a leader of their
overwhelming choice.

WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing:

(1)
The petition in G.R. No. 123755 is hereby DISMISSED. The assailed Resolutions of the respondent
Commission are AFFIRMED.

(2)
The petition in G.R. No. 120295 is also DISMISSED for being moot and academic. In any event, it has
no merit.

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

At bar is a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court filed by petitioner Jose
Ugdoracion, Jr., pursuant to Article IX-A, Section 7 of the Constitution, challenging the May 8, 2007 and
September 28, 2007 Resolutions1 of the public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) First Division
and En Banc, respectively.

The facts:

Ugdoracion and private respondent, Ephraim Tungol, were rival mayoralty candidates in the Municipality of
Albuquerque, Province of Bohol in the May 14, 2007 elections. Both filed their respective Certificates of
Candidacy (COC).

On April 11, 2007, Tungol filed a Petition to Deny Due Course or Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of Jose
Ugdoracion, Jr., contending that Ugdoracion's declaration of eligibility for Mayor constituted material
misrepresentation because Ugdoracion is actually a "green card" holder or a permanent resident of the United
States of America (USA). Specifically, Ugdoracion stated in his COC that he had resided in Albuquerque, Bohol,
Philippines for forty-one years before May 14, 2007 and he is not a permanent resident or an immigrant to a
foreign country.

It appears that Ugdoracion became a permanent resident of the USA on September 26, 2001. Accordingly, the
United States Immigration and Naturalization Services2 (USINS) issued him Alien Number 047-894-254.3

No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 179851

Pearliegates

April 18, 2008

For his part, Ugdoracion argued that, in our jurisdiction, domicile is equivalent to residence, and he retained his
domicile of origin (Albuquerque, Bohol) notwithstanding his ostensible acquisition of permanent residency in
the USA. Ugdoracion then pointed to the following documents as proof of his substantial compliance with the
residency requirement: (1) a residence certificate dated May 5, 2006; (2) an application for a new voter's

174

Election Law Cases


registration dated October 12, 2006; and (3) a photocopy of Abandonment of Lawful Permanent Resident
Status dated October 18, 2006.

6. He served his community for twelve (12) years and had been the former Mayor for three (3) terms;

7. From 1986 to 1988, he was appointed as Officer-in-Charge;


On May 8, 2007, the COMELEC First Division promulgated one of the herein questioned resolutions canceling
Ugdoracion's COC and removing his name from the certified list of candidates for the position of Mayor of
Albuquerque, Bohol. Posthaste, on May 11, 2007, Ugdoracion filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid
resolution arguing in the main that his status as a "green card" holder was not of his own making but a mere
offshoot of a petition filed by his sister. He admitted his intermittent travels to the USA, but only to visit his
siblings, and short working stint thereat to cover his subsistence for the duration of his stay.

8. He ran for the same position in 1988 and won;

9. He continued his public service as Mayor until his last term in the year 1998;
In yet another setback, the COMELEC En Banc issued the other questioned resolution denying Ugdoracion's
motion for reconsideration and affirming the First Division's finding of material misrepresentation in
Ugdoracion's COC.

Hence, this petition imputing grave abuse of discretion to the COMELEC. Subsequently, Tungol and the
COMELEC filed their respective Comments4 on the petition. On March 7, 2008, Ugdoracion filed an Extremely
Urgent Motion to Reiterate Issuance of an Injunctive Writ.5 On March 11, 2008, we issued a Status Quo Order.
The next day, March 12, 2008, Ugdoracion filed a Consolidated Reply to respondents' Comments.

Ugdoracion's argument focuses on his supposed involuntary acquisition of a permanent resident status in the
USA which, as he insists, did not result in the loss of his domicile of origin. He bolsters this contention with the
following facts:

10. After his term as Mayor, he served his people again as Councilor;

11. He built his house at the very place where his ancestral home was situated;

12. He still acquired several real properties at the same place;

13. He never lost contact with the people of his town; and

14. He secured a residence certificate on May 5, 2006 at Western Poblacion, Albuquerque, Bohol and faithfully
paid real property taxes.6
1. He was born in Albuquerque, Bohol, on October 15, 1940 and as such, is a natural-born Filipino citizen;

2. He was baptized in the Catholic Church of Sta. Monica Paris in Albuquerque, Bohol on February 2, 1941;

The sole issue for our resolution is whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in canceling
Ugdoracion's COC for material misrepresentation. Essentially, the issue hinges on whether the representations
contained in Ugdoracion's COC, specifically, that he complied with the residency requirement and that he does
not have "green card" holder status, are false.

3. He was raised in said municipality;

4. He grew up in said municipality;

5. He raised his own family and established a family home thereat;

Pearliegates

We find no grave abuse of discretion in the COMELEC's cancellation of Ugdoracion's COC for material
misrepresentation. Accordingly, the petition must fail.

Section 74, in relation to Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, in unmistakable terms, requires that the
facts stated in the COC must be true, and any false representation therein of a material fact shall be a ground
for cancellation thereof, thus:

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Election Law Cases


xxxx
SEC. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. - The certificate of candidacy shall state that the person filing it is
announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and that he is eligible for said office; if for Member of the
Batasang Pambansa, the province, including its component cities, highly urbanized city or district or sector
which he seeks to represent; the political party to which he belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence; his
post office address for all election purposes; his profession or occupation; that he will support and defend the
Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; that he will obey the laws,
legal orders, and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent resident
or immigrant to a foreign country; that the obligation assumed by his oath is assumed voluntarily, without
mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in the certificate of candidacy are true to
the best of his knowledge.

Therefore, it may be concluded that the material misrepresentation contemplated by Section 78 of the Code
refer[s] to qualifications for elective office. This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that the consequences
imposed upon a candidate guilty of having made a false representation in [the] certificate of candidacy are
grave-to prevent the candidate from running or, if elected, from serving, or to prosecute him for violation of the
election laws. It could not have been the intention of the law to deprive a person of such a basic and
substantive political right to be voted for a public office upon just any innocuous mistake.

xxxx
xxxx

SEC. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. - A verified petition seeking to deny
due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that
any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be
filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and
shall be decided, after due notice and hearing not later than fifteen days before the election.

The false representation contemplated by Section 78 of the Code pertains to material fact, and is not simply an
innocuous mistake. A material fact refers to a candidate's qualification for elective office such as one's
citizenship and residence.7 Our holding in Salcedo II v. COMELEC8 reiterated in Lluz v. COMELEC9 is instructive,
thus:

In case there is a material misrepresentation in the certificate of candidacy, the Comelec is authorized to deny
due course to or cancel such certificate upon the filing of a petition by any person pursuant to Section 78. x x x

xxxx

As stated in the law, in order to justify the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy under Section 78, it is
essential that the false representation mentioned therein pertain[s] to a material matter for the sanction
imposed by this provision would affect the substantive rights of a candidate- the right to run for the elective
post for which he filed the certificate of candidacy. Although the law does not specify what would be considered
as a "material representation," the court has interpreted this phrase in a line of decisions applying Section 78
of [B.P. 881].

Pearliegates

Aside from the requirement of materiality, a false representation under Section 78 must consist of a "deliberate
attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible." In other
words, it must be made with an intention to deceive the electorate as to one's qualifications for public office.

Viewed in this light, the question posed by Ugdoracion is hardly a novel one.

Ugdoracion urges us, however, that he did not lose his domicile of origin because his acquisition of a "green
card" was brought about merely by his sister's petition. He maintains that, except for this unfortunate detail, all
other facts demonstrate his retention of residence in Albuquerque, Bohol. Believing in the truth of these
circumstances, he simply echoed in his COC a truthful statement that he is a resident of Albuquerque, Bohol,
and, therefore, eligible and qualified to run for Mayor thereof.

We are not convinced. Ugdoracion's assertions miss the mark completely. The dust had long settled over the
implications of a "green card" holder status on an elective official's qualification for public office. We ruled in
Caasi v. Court of Appeals10 that a Filipino citizen's acquisition of a permanent resident status abroad
constitutes an abandonment of his domicile and residence in the Philippines. In short, the "green card" status in
the USA is a renunciation of one's status as a resident of the Philippines.11

We agree with Ugdoracion that residence, in contemplation of election laws, is synonymous to domicile.
Domicile is the place where one actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where
he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return (animus revertendi) and remain (animus
manendi).12 It consists not only in the intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that
place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.13

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Domicile is classified into (1) domicile of origin, which is acquired by every person at birth; (2) domicile of
choice, which is acquired upon abandonment of the domicile of origin; and (3) domicile by operation of law,
which the law attributes to a person independently of his residence or intention.

In a controversy such as the one at bench, given the parties' naturally conflicting perspectives on domicile, we
are guided by three basic rules, namely: (1) a man must have a residence or domicile somewhere; (2) domicile,
once established, remains until a new one is validly acquired; and (3) a man can have but one residence or
domicile at any given time.14

The general rule is that the domicile of origin is not easily lost; it is lost only when there is an actual removal or
change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former residence and establishing a new one, and
acts which correspond with such purpose.15 In the instant case, however, Ugdoracion's acquisition of a lawful
permanent resident status in the United States amounted to an abandonment and renunciation of his status as
a resident of the Philippines; it constituted a change from his domicile of origin, which was Albuquerque, Bohol,
to a new domicile of choice, which is the USA.

The contention that Ugdoracion's USA resident status was acquired involuntarily, as it was simply the result of
his sister's beneficence, does not persuade. Although immigration to the USA through a petition filed by a
family member (sponsor) is allowed by USA immigration laws,16 the petitioned party is very much free to
accept or reject the grant of resident status. Permanent residency in the USA is not conferred upon the
unwilling; unlike citizenship, it is not bestowed by operation of law.17 And to reiterate, a person can have only
one residence or domicile at any given time.

Moreover, Ugdoracion's contention is decimated by Section 6818 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section
40(f)19 of the Local Government Code, which disqualifies a permanent resident of, or an immigrant to, a
foreign country, unless said person waives his status. Corollary thereto, we are in complete accord with the
COMELEC's ruling on the validity and effect of the waiver of permanent resident status supposedly executed by
Ugdoracion, to wit:

Following the Caasi case, in order to reacquire residency in the Philippines, there must be a waiver of status as
a greencard holder as manifested by some acts or acts independent of and prior to the filing of the certificate
of candidacy. In the case at bar, [Ugdoracion] presented a photocopy of a document entitled Abandonment of
Lawful Permanent Resident Status dated October 18, 2006. A close scrutiny of this document however discloses
that it is a mere application for abandonment of his status as lawful permanent resident of the USA. It does not
bear any note of approval by the concerned US official. Thus, [w]e cannot consider the same as sufficient
waiver of [Ugdoracion's] status of permanent residency in the USA. Besides, it is a mere photocopy,
unauthenticated and uncertified by the legal custodian of such document.

Assuming arguendo that said application was duly approved, [Ugdoracion] is still disqualified for he failed to
meet the one-year residency requirement. [Ugdoracion] has applied for abandonment of residence only on 18
October 2006 or for just about seven (7) months prior to the May 14, 2007 elections, which clearly fall short of
the required period.

The Permanent Resident Card or the so-called "greencard" issued by the US government to respondent does
not merely signify transitory stay in the USA for purpose of work, pleasure, business or study but to live there
permanently. This is the reason why the law considers immigrants to have lost their residency in the
Philippines.20

Concededly, a candidate's disqualification to run for public office does not necessarily constitute material
misrepresentation which is the sole ground for denying due course to, and for the cancellation of, a COC.
Further, as already discussed, the candidate's misrepresentation in his COC must not only refer to a material
fact (eligibility and qualifications for elective office), but should evince a deliberate intent to mislead, misinform
or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. It must be made with an intention to
deceive the electorate as to one's qualifications to run for public office.21

Ugdoracion claims that he did not misrepresent his eligibility for the public office of Mayor. He categorically
declares that he merely stated in his COC that he is a resident of the Philippines and in possession of all the
qualifications and suffers from none of the disqualifications prescribed by law. Unfortunately for Ugdoracion,
Section 74 specifically requires a statement in the COC that the candidate is "not a permanent resident or an
immigrant to a foreign country." Ugdoracion's cause is further lost because of the explicit pronouncement in his
COC that he had resided in Albuquerque, Bohol, Philippines before the May 14, 2007 elections for forty-one (41)
years.22 Ineluctably, even if Ugdoracion might have been of the mistaken belief that he remained a resident of
the Philippines, he hid the fact of his immigration to the USA and his status as a "green card" holder.

Finally, we are not unmindful of the fact that Ugdoracion appears to have won the election as Mayor of
Albuquerque, Bohol. Sadly, winning the election does not substitute for the specific requirements of law on a
person's eligibility for public office which he lacked, and does not cure his material misrepresentation which is a
valid ground for the cancellation of his COC.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The COMELEC Resolutions dated May 8,
2007 and September 28, 2007 are AFFIRMED. The STATUS QUO Order issued on March 11, 2008 is hereby
LIFTED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 163256

Pearliegates

November 10, 2004

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Election Law Cases


CICERON P. ALTAREJOS, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JOSE ALMIE and VERNON VERSOZA, respondents.

On January 26, 2004, petitioner filed an Answer3 stating, among others, that he did not commit false
representation in his application for candidacy as mayor because as early as December 17, 1997, he was
already issued a Certificate of Repatriation by the Special Committee on Naturalization, after he filed a petition
for repatriation pursuant to Republic Act No. 8171. Thus, petitioner claimed that his Filipino citizenship was
already restored, and he was qualified to run as mayor in the May 10, 2004 elections. Petitioner sought the
dismissal of the petition.

DECISION

On the date of the hearing, the parties were required to submit their Memoranda within three days. Private
respondents filed their Memorandum, while petitioner did not file one within the required period.4 Petitioner,
however, filed a Reply Memorandum5 subsequently.

AZCUNA, J.:

Atty. Zacarias C. Zaragoza, Jr., regional election director for Region V and hearing officer of this case,
recommended that petitioner Altarejos be disqualified from being a candidate for the position of mayor of San
Jacinto, Masbate in the May 10, 2004 national and local elections. He found, thus:

This is a petition for certiorari, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or a writ of
prohibitory and mandatory injunction, to set aside the Resolution promulgated by the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC), First Division, on March 22, 2004 disqualifying petitioner Ciceron P. Altarejos from running as mayor
of San Jacinto, Masbate, and another resolution of the COMELEC en banc promulgated on May 7, 2004 denying
petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

The factual antecedents are as follows:

Petitioner Altarejos was a candidate for mayor in the Municipality of San Jacinto, Masbate in the May 10, 2004
national and local elections.

On January 15, 2004, private respondents Jose Almie Altiche and Vernon Versoza, registered voters of San
Jacinto, Masbate, filed with the COMELEC, a petition to disqualify and to deny due course or cancel the
certificate of candidacy of petitioner on the ground that he is not a Filipino citizen and that he made a false
representation in his certificate of candidacy that "[he] was not a permanent resident of or immigrant to a
foreign country."

Private respondents alleged that based on a letter1 from the Bureau of Immigration dated June 25, 2001,
petitioner was a holder of a permanent U.S. resident visa, an Alien Certificate of Registration No. E139507
issued on November 3, 1997, and an Immigration Certificate of Residence No. 320846 issued on November 3,
1997 by the Bureau of Immigration.2

Pearliegates

xxx

The provisions of law governing the qualifications and disqualifications of elective local officials are found in
Sections 39 and 40 of Republic Act No. 7160 otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, which
provide as follows:

SEC. 39. Qualifications. (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in
the barangay, municipality, city or province or, in the case of member of the sangguniang panlalawigan,
sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the district where he intends to be elected; a resident therein
for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or
any other local language or dialect.

xxx.

(c) Candidates for the position of mayor or vice-mayor of independent component cities, component cities or
municipalities must be at least twenty-one (21) years of age on election day.

[SEC. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective position:]

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xxx.

xxx

(d) Those with dual citizenship.

Not having been able to prove that he has fully reacquired his Filipino citizenship after being naturalized as a
citizen of the United States, it is clear that respondent is not qualified to be candidate for the position of Mayor
of San Jacinto, Masbate, in the 10 May 2004 National and Local Elections, pursuant to the aforequoted Sections
39 and 40 of the Local Government Code of 1991.

xxx.

(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to reside abroad and continue
to avail of the same right after the effectivity of this Code; xxx

Under the terms of the above quoted statutory provisions, it is required that an elective local official must be a
citizen of the Philippines, and he must not have a dual citizenship; must not be a permanent resident in a
foreign country or must not have acquired the right to reside abroad.

In the present case, it has been established by clear and convincing evidence that respondent is a citizen of the
United States of America. Such fact is proven by his Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR) No. E139507 issued
on 3 November 1997 and Immigration Certificate of Residence (ICR) with No. 320846 issued on 3 November
1997 by the Alien Registration Division, Bureau of Immigration and Deportation. This was further confirmed in a
letter dated 25 June 2001 of then Commissioner ANDREA D. DOMINGO of the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation.

Although respondent had petitioned for his repatriation as a Filipino citizen under Republic Act No. 8171 on 17
December 1997, this did not restore to respondent his Filipino citizenship, because Section 2 of the aforecited
Republic Act No. 8171 specifically provides that "repatriation shall be effected by taking the necessary oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registration in the proper civil registry and in the Bureau of
Immigration."

As a further consequence of his not being a Filipino citizen, respondent has also committed false representation
in his certificate of candidacy by stating therein that he is a natural-born Filipino citizen, when in fact, he has
not yet even perfected the reacquisition of Filipino citizenship. Such false representation constitutes a material
misrepresentation as it relates to his qualification as a candidate for public office, which could be a valid ground
for the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code x x x. 6

In its Resolution promulgated on March 22, 2004, the COMELEC, First Division, adopted the findings and
recommendation of Director Zaragoza. The dispositive portion of said Resolution stated, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent CICERON PEREZ ALTAREJOS is hereby disqualified to run as
Mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate. Accordingly, his certificate of candidacy for the position of Municipal Mayor of
San Jacinto, Masbate is denied due course and cancelled and his name deleted from the certified list of
candidates for the May 10, 2004 elections.7

On March 25, 2004, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and attached the following documents to prove
that he had completed all the requirements for repatriation which thus entitled him to run for an elective office,
viz:

(1) Oath of Allegiance dated December 17, 1997;


It appears from the records of this case that respondent failed to prove that he has fully complied with
requirements of the above-quoted Section 2 of Republic Act 8171 to perfect his repatriation and reacquire his
Filipino citizenship. Respondent has not submitted any document to prove that he has taken his oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and that he has registered his fact of repatriation in the proper civil
registry and in the Bureau of Immigration. In fact, in a letter date 25 June 2001, Commissioner ANDREA
DOMINGO stated that RESPONDENT is still a holder of visa under Section 13 (g) of the Philippine Immigration
Act of 1940 as amended, with an indefinite authorized stay in the Philippines, implying that respondent did not
register his supposed Certificate of Repatriation with the Bureau of Immigration otherwise his Alien Visa would
have already been cancelled. The rule is that in case of doubt concerning the grant of citizenship, such doubt
should be resolved in favor of the State and against the applicant (Cheng vs. Republic, L-16999, 22 June 1965).

Pearliegates

(2) Identification Certificate No. 116543 issued by the Bureau of Immigration on March 1, 2004;

(3) Certification from the City Civil Registration Office, Makati City, that the Certificate of Repatriation and Oath
of Allegiance of petitioner was received by said office and registered, with the corresponding fee paid, on
February 18, 2004;

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(4) A letter dated December 17, 1997 from the Special Committee on Naturalization to the Bureau on
Immigration and Deportation that it was furnishing said office with the Oath of Allegiance and Certificate of
Repatriation of petitioner for the cancellation of petitioner's registration in said office as an alien, and the
issuance to him of the corresponding Identification Card as Filipino citizen;

(5) A letter dated December 17, 1997 from the Special Committee on Naturalization to the Local Registrar of
San Jacinto, Masbate that it was sending petitioner's Oath of Allegiance and Certificate of Repatriation for
registration in their records and for petitioner's reacquisition of his former Philippine citizenship.

On May 7, 2004, the COMELEC en banc promulgated a resolution denying the motion for reconsideration, the
dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission (En Banc) RESOLVED as it hereby RESOLVES to DENY the
Motion for Reconsideration for UTTER LACK OF MERIT and AFFIRMS the Resolution of the First Division.8

The Comelec en banc held, thus:

The Comelec Rules of Procedure provides that insufficiency of evidence to justify the decision is a ground for a
motion for reconsideration (Rule 19, Section 1). The evidence referred to in the above provision and to be
considered in the Motion for Reconsideration are those which were submitted during the hearing and attached
to the respective Memoranda of the parties which are already part of the records of the case. In this regard, the
evidence of the respondent were not able to overcome the evidence of the petitioners.

When the entire records of the case was forwarded to the Commission (First Division) the respondent's only
evidence was his Certificate of Repatriation dated 17 December 1977 and marked as Annex 1 of his answer.
This piece of evidence was not enough to controvert the evidence of the petitioners which consist of the letter
of the then Bureau of Immigration Commissioner Andrea Domingo dated 25 June 2001 which stated that as of
the even date respondent is a holder of permanent resident visa (page 15 of the records) and the certification
of Josephine C. Camata dated 28 January 2004 certifying, that the name of the respondent could not be found
in the records of repatriation. (page 42 of the records) The questioned resolution, is therefore, in order as the
evidence submitted by the respondent were insufficient to rebut the evidence of the petitioner.

Now, the respondent, in his Motion for Reconsideration, attempted to introduce to the record new pieces of
evidence, which introduction is not anymore allowed in a Motion for Reconsideration. These are the following a)
Annex "2" Oath of Allegiance; b) Annex "3" Bureau of Immigration Identification Certificate; c) Annex "4"
Certification of the City Civil Registrar of Makati City; d) Annex "5" Letter addressed to the Local Civil Registrar
of San Jacinto, Masbate by Aurora P. Cortes of Special Committee on Naturalization; and e) Annex "6" Letter

Pearliegates

addressed to the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation by Aurora P. Cortes of Special Committee on
Naturalization.

Assuming that the new evidence of the respondent are admitted, with more reason should we cancel his
certificate of candidacy for his act of [misrepresenting] himself as a Filipino citizen when at the time he filed his
certificate of candidacy, he has not yet perfected the process of repatriation. He failed to comply with the
requirements under Section 2 of [Republic Act No.] 8171 which provides that repatriation shall be effected by
taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registration in the proper civil
registry and in the Bureau of Immigration.

The certification was issued by the same Ms. Josephine C. Camata, City Civil Registrar, dated February 18,
2004. This time, she certifies that Ciceron Perez Altarejos was registered under Registry No. 1, Page 19, Book
No. 1, Series of 2004 and paid under OR nos. 88325/8833256 dated February 18, 2004. (page 65 of the
records). Obviously, he was able to register in the proper civil registry only on February 18, 2004.

The respondent was able to register with the Bureau of Immigration only on March 1, 2004 as evidenced by the
Bureau of Immigration Identification Certificate attached to the Motion as Annex "3."

This fact confirms the finding of the Commission (First Division) that at the time respondent filed his certificate
of candidacy he is yet to complete the requirement under section two (2) of RA 8171.

As a consequence of not being a Filipino citizen, he has committed false representation in his certificate of
candidacy. Such false representation constitutes a material misrepresentation as it relates to his qualification as
a candidate. As such the certificate of candidacy may be cancelled on such ground. (Ycain vs. Caneja, 18 Phil.
778)9

On May 10, 2004, the election day itself, petitioner filed this petition praying that: (1) The petition be given due
course and a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction be issued ex parte restraining
the respondents and all persons acting on their behalf, from fully implementing the questioned COMELEC
Resolutions promulgated on March 22, 2004 and May 7, 2004; (2) a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction be
issued ordering the COMELEC and all persons acting on its behalf to allow petitioner to run as Mayor of San
Jacinto, Masbate in the May 10, 2004 elections, and to count and canvass the votes cast in his favor and to
proclaim him as the winning mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate; and (3) after proper proceedings, judgment be
rendered declaring null and void and setting aside the COMELEC Resolutions promulgated on March 22, 2004
and May 7, 2004 and other related Orders of the COMELEC or its representatives which have the effect of
illegally preventing petitioner from running as Mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate.

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In its Comment,10 the Office of the Solicitor General stated that, based on the information relayed to it by the
COMELEC, petitioner's name, as a mayoralty candidate in San Jacinto, Masbate, was retained in the list of
candidates voted upon by the electorate in the said municipality. Hence, the cancellation of petitioner's
certificate of candidacy was never implemented. The COMELEC also informed the Office of the Solicitor General
that petitioner's opponent, Dr. Emilio Aris V. Espinosa, was already proclaimed duly elected Mayor of San
Jacinto, Masbate.

with the proper civil registry and with the Bureau of

The Office of the Solicitor General contends that said supervening event has rendered the instant petition moot
and academic, and it prayed for the dismissal of the petition.

SEC. 2. Repatriation shall be effected by taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines and registration in the proper civil registry and in the Bureau of Immigration. The Bureau of
Immigration shall thereupon cancel the pertinent alien certificate of registration and issue the certificate of
identification as Filipino citizen to the repatriated citizen.

In his Reply,11 petitioner opposed the dismissal of his petition. He claims that the COMELEC resolutions
disqualifying him from running as a mayoralty candidate adversely affected his candidacy, since his supporters
were made to believe that his votes would not be counted. Moreover, he stated that said COMELEC resolutions
cast a doubt on his Philippine citizenship.

Petitioner points out that he took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on December 17,
1997. In view thereof, he ran and was even elected as Mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate during the 1998 elections.
He argues that if there was delay in the registration of his Certificate of Repatriation with the Bureau of
Immigration and with the proper civil registry, the same was brought about by the inaction on the part of said
offices since the records of the Special Committee on Naturalization show that his Certificate of Repatriation
and Oath of Allegiance have long been transmitted to said offices.

Petitioner also asserts that the subsequent registration of his Certificate of Repatriation with the Bureau of
Immigration and with the Civil Registry of Makati City prior to the May 10, 2004 elections has the effect of
curing the defect, if any, in the reacquisition of his Filipino citizenship as his repatriation retroacted to the date
of his application for repatriation as held in Frivaldo v. Comelec.

The pertinent issues raised are the following: (1) Is the registration of petitioner's repatriation with the proper
civil registry and with the Bureau of Immigration a prerequisite in effecting repatriation; and (2) whether or not
the COMELEC en banc committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in
affirming the Resolution of the COMELEC, First Division.

As stated by the Office of the Solicitor General, where the issues have become moot and academic, there is no
justiciable controversy, thereby rendering the resolution of the same of no practical use or value.12
Nonetheless, courts will decide a question otherwise moot and academic if it is capable of repetition, yet
evading review.13

Immigration a prerequisite in effecting repatriation?

The provision of law applicable in this case is Section 2 of Republic Act No. 8171,14 thus:

The law is clear that repatriation is effected "by taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
and registration in the proper civil registry and in the Bureau of Immigration." Hence, in addition to taking the
Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, the registration of the Certificate of Repatriation in the
proper civil registry and the Bureau of Immigration is a prerequisite in effecting the repatriation of a citizen.

In this case, petitioner took his Oath of Allegiance on December 17, 1997, but his Certificate of Repatriation
was registered with the Civil Registry of Makati City only after six years or on February 18, 2004, and with the
Bureau of Immigration on March 1, 2004. Petitioner, therefore, completed all the requirements of repatriation
only after he filed his certificate of candidacy for a mayoralty position, but before the elections.

When does the citizenship qualification of a candidate for an elective office apply?

In Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections,15 the Court ruled that the citizenship qualification must be construed as
"applying to the time of proclamation of the elected official and at the start of his term." The Court, through
Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, discussed, thus:

Under Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code, "(a)n elective local official must be:

* a citizen of the Philippines;

* a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province x x x where he intends to be elected;

First Issue: Is the registration of petitioner's repatriation

Pearliegates

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* a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election;

* able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect."

* In addition, "candidates for the position of governor x x x must be at least twenty-three (23) years of age on
election day."

effect and expression, then there is all the more reason to have the law apply in a retroactive or retrospective
manner to situations, events and transactions subsequent to the passage of such law. That is, the repatriation
granted to Frivaldo x x x can and should be made to take effect as of date of his application. As earlier
mentioned, there is nothing in the law that would bar this or would show a contrary intention on the part of the
legislative authority; and there is no showing that damage or prejudice to anyone, or anything unjust or
injurious would result from giving retroactivity to his repatriation. Neither has Lee shown that there will result
the impairment of any contractual obligation, disturbance of any vested right or breach of some constitutional
guaranty.

xxx
From the above, it will be noted that the law does not specify any particular date or time when the candidate
must possess citizenship, unlike that for residence (which must consist of at least one year's residency
immediately preceding the day of election) and age (at least twenty three years of age on election day).

Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective public office, and the purpose of
the citizenship qualification is none other than to ensure that no alien, i.e., no person owing allegiance to
another nation, shall govern our people and our country or a unit of territory thereof. Now, an official begins to
govern or to discharge his functions only upon his proclamation and on the day the law mandates his term of
office to begin. Since Frivaldo re-assumed his citizenship on June 30, 1995the very day the term of office of
governor (and other elective officials) beganhe was therefore already qualified to be proclaimed, to hold such
office and to discharge the functions and responsibilities thereof as of said date. In short, at that time, he was
already qualified to govern his native Sorsogon. This is the liberal interpretation that should give spirit, life and
meaning to our law on qualifications consistent with the purpose for which such law was enacted. x x x
Paraphrasing this Court's ruling in Vasquez v. Giap and Li Seng Giap & Sons, if the purpose of the citizenship
requirement is to ensure that our people and country do not end up being governed by aliens, i.e., persons
owing allegiance to another nation, that aim or purpose would not be thwarted but instead achieved by
construing the citizenship qualification as applying to the time of proclamation of the elected official and at the
start of his term.16 (Emphasis supplied.)

Moreover, in the case of Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, the Court ruled that "the repatriation of Frivaldo
RETROACTED to the date of the filing of his application." In said case, the repatriation of Frivaldo was by virtue
of Presidential Decree No. 725, which took effect on June 5, 1975. The Court therein declared that Presidential
Decree No. 725 was a curative statute, which is retroactive in nature. The retroactivity of Frivaldo's repatriation
to the date of filing of his application was justified by the Court, thus:

Another argument for retroactivity to the date of filing is that it would prevent prejudice to applicants. If P.D.
725 were not to be given retroactive effect, and the Special Committee decides not to act, i.e., to delay the
processing of applications for any substantial length of time, then the former Filipinos who may be stateless, as
Frivaldohaving already renounced his American citizenshipwas, may be prejudiced for causes outside their
control. This should not be. In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is to be presumed
that the law-making body intended right and justice to prevail.17

Republic Act No. 817118 has impliedly repealed Presidential `Decree No. 725. They cover the same subject
matter: Providing for the repatriation of Filipino women who have lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to
aliens and of natural-born Filipinos. The Court's ruling in Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections that repatriation
retroacts to the date of filing of one's application for repatriation subsists for the same reasons quoted above.

Accordingly, petitioner's repatriation retroacted to the date he filed his application in 1997. Petitioner was,
therefore, qualified to run for a mayoralty position in the government in the May 10, 2004 elections.
Apparently, the COMELEC was cognizant of this fact since it did not implement the assailed Resolutions
disqualifying petitioner to run as mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate.

Second Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC en banc


gravely abused its discretion in affirming the
Resolution of the COMELEC, First Division?

xxx

The reason for this is simply that if, as in this case, it was the intent of the legislative authority that the law
should apply to past eventsi.e., situations and transactions existing even before the law came into beingin
order to benefit the greatest number of former Filipinos possible thereby enabling them to enjoy and exercise
the constitutionally guaranteed right of citizenship, and such legislative intention is to be given the fullest

Pearliegates

The Court cannot fault the COMELEC en banc for affirming the decision of the COMELEC, First Division,
considering that petitioner failed to prove before the COMELEC that he had complied with the requirements of
repatriation. Petitioner submitted the necessary documents proving compliance with the requirements of
repatriation only during his motion for reconsideration, when the COMELEC en banc could no longer consider
said evidence. As the COMELEC en banc correctly stated:

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The Comelec Rules of Procedure provides that insufficiency of evidence to justify the decision is a ground for a
motion for reconsideration (Rule 19, Section 1). The evidence referred to in the above provision and to be
considered in the Motion for Reconsideration are those which were submitted during the hearing and attached
to the respective Memoranda of the parties which are already part of the records of the case. In this regard, the
evidence of the respondent were not able to overcome the evidence of the petitioners.19

It is, therefore, incumbent upon candidates for an elective office, who are repatriated citizens, to be ready with
sufficient evidence of their repatriation in case their Filipino citizenship is questioned to prevent a repetition of
this case.

WHEREFORE, the petition seeking the nullification of the Resolution of the COMELEC en banc of May 7, 2004,
affirming the Resolution of its First Division dated March 22, 2004, is hereby DENIED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 198742

August 10, 2012

Failure to renounce foreign citizenship in accordance with the exact tenor of Section 5(2) of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 9225 renders a dual citizen ineligible to run for and thus hold any elective public office.

The Case

At bar is a special civil action for certiorari1 under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court seeking to nullify Resolution2
dated September 6, 2011 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) en banc in EAC (AE) No. A-44-2010. The
assailed resolution (a) reversed the Order3 dated November 30, 2010 of COMELEC Second Division dismissing
petitioners appeal; and (b) affirmed the consolidated Decision4 dated October 22, 2010 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Bauang, La Union, Branch 33, declaring petitioner Teodora Sobejana-Condon (petitioner)
disqualified and ineligible to her position as Vice-Mayor of Caba, La Union.

The Undisputed Facts

The petitioner is a natural-born Filipino citizen having been born of Filipino parents on August 8, 1944. On
December 13, 1984, she became a naturalized Australian citizen owing to her marriage to a certain Kevin
Thomas Condon.

TEODORA SOBEJANA-CONDON, Petitioner,


vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, LUIS M. BAUTISTA, ROBELITO V. PICAR and WILMA P. PAGADUAN,
Respondents.

SERENO,*

On December 2, 2005, she filed an application to re-acquire Philippine citizenship before the Philippine
Embassy in Canberra, Australia pursuant to Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225 otherwise known as the "Citizenship
Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003."5 The application was approved and the petitioner took her oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on December 5, 2005.

On September 18, 2006, the petitioner filed an unsworn Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship
before the Department of Immigration and Indigenous Affairs, Canberra, Australia, which in turn issued the
Order dated September 27, 2006 certifying that she has ceased to be an Australian citizen.6

PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ *

DECISION

REYES, J.:

Pearliegates

The petitioner ran for Mayor in her hometown of Caba, La Union in the 2007 elections. She lost in her bid. She
again sought elective office during the May 10, 2010 elections this time for the position of Vice-Mayor. She
obtained the highest numbers of votes and was proclaimed as the winning candidate. She took her oath of
office on May 13, 2010.

Soon thereafter, private respondents Robelito V. Picar, Wilma P. Pagaduan7 and Luis M. Bautista,8 (private
respondents) all registered voters of Caba, La Union, filed separate petitions for quo warranto questioning the
petitioners eligibility before the RTC. The petitions similarly sought the petitioners disqualification from holding
her elective post on the ground that she is a dual citizen and that she failed to execute a "personal and sworn

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renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath" as
imposed by Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225.

The petitioner denied being a dual citizen and averred that since September 27, 2006, she ceased to be an
Australian citizen. She claimed that the Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship she executed in
Australia sufficiently complied with Section 5(2), R.A. No. 9225 and that her act of running for public office is a
clear abandonment of her Australian citizenship.

2011. In the same issuance, the substantive merits of the appeal were given due course. The COMELEC en
banc concurred with the findings and conclusions of the RTC; it also granted the Motion for Execution Pending
Appeal filed by the private respondents.

The decretal portion of the resolution reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered the Commission RESOLVED as it hereby RESOLVES as follows:


Ruling of the RTC
1. To DISMISS the instant appeal for lack of merit;
In its consolidated Decision dated October 22, 2010, the trial court held that the petitioners failure to comply
with Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 rendered her ineligible to run and hold public office. As admitted by the
petitioner herself during trial, the personal declaration of renunciation she filed in Australia was not under oath.
The law clearly mandates that the document containing the renunciation of foreign citizenship must be sworn
before any public officer authorized to administer oath. Consequently, the RTCs decision disposed as follows:

2. To AFFIRM the DECISION dated 22 October 2010 of the court a quo; and

3. To GRANT the Motion for Execution filed on November 12, 2010.


WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court renders judgment in FAVOR of [private respondents] and AGAINST
(petitioner):

1) DECLARING [petitioner] TEODORA SOBEJANA-CONDON, disqualified and ineligible to hold the office of ViceMayor of Caba, La Union;

2) NULLIFYING her proclamation as the winning candidate for Vice-Mayor of said municipality; and

3) DECLARING the position of Vice-Mayor in said municipality vacant.

SO ORDERED.12 (Emphasis supplied)

Hence, the present petition ascribing grave abuse of discretion to the COMELEC en banc.

The Petitioners Arguments

The petitioner contends that since she ceased to be an Australian citizen on September 27, 2006, she no longer
held dual citizenship and was only a Filipino citizen when she filed her certificate of candidacy as early as the
2007 elections. Hence, the "personal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship" imposed by Section 5(2) of
R.A. No. 9225 to dual citizens seeking elective office does not apply to her.

SO ORDERED.9

Ruling of the COMELEC

The petitioner appealed to the COMELEC but the appeal was dismissed by the Second Division in its Order10
dated November 30, 2010 for failure to pay the docket fees within the prescribed period. On motion for
reconsideration, the appeal was reinstated by the COMELEC en banc in its Resolution11 dated September 6,

Pearliegates

She further argues that a sworn renunciation is a mere formal and not a mandatory requirement. In support
thereof, she cites portions of the Journal of the House of Representatives dated June 2 to 5, 2003 containing the
sponsorship speech for House Bill (H.B.) No. 4720, the precursor of R.A. No. 9225.

She claims that the private respondents are estopped from questioning her eligibility since they failed to do so
when she filed certificates of candidacy for the 2007 and 2010 elections.

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Lastly, she disputes the power of the COMELEC en banc to: (a) take cognizance of the substantive merits of her
appeal instead of remanding the same to the COMELEC Second Division for the continuation of the appeal
proceedings; and (b) allow the execution pending appeal of the RTCs judgment.

The Issues

Posed for resolution are the following issues: I) Whether the COMELEC en banc may resolve the merits of an
appeal after ruling on its reinstatement; II) Whether the COMELEC en banc may order the execution of a
judgment rendered by a trial court in an election case; III) Whether the private respondents are barred from
questioning the qualifications of the petitioner; and IV) For purposes of determining the petitioners eligibility to
run for public office, whether the "sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship" in Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 is a
mere pro-forma requirement.

The Courts Ruling

Any motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order or ruling of a Division shall be resolved by the
Commission en banc except motions on interlocutory orders of the division which shall be resolved by the
division which issued the order.

Considering that the above cited provisos do not set any limits to the COMELEC en bancs prerogative in
resolving a motion for reconsideration, there is nothing to prevent the body from directly adjudicating the
substantive merits of an appeal after ruling for its reinstatement instead of remanding the same to the division
that initially dismissed it.

We thus see no impropriety much more grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC en banc when it
proceeded to decide the substantive merits of the petitioners appeal after ruling for its reinstatement.

Further, records show that, in her motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc, the petitioner not
only proffered arguments on the issue on docket fees but also on the issue of her eligibility. She even filed a
supplemental motion for reconsideration attaching therewith supporting documents13 to her contention that
she is no longer an Australian citizen. The petitioner, after obtaining an unfavorable decision, cannot be
permitted to disavow the en bancs exercise of discretion on the substantial merits of her appeal when she
herself invoked the same in the first place.

I. An appeal may be simultaneously


reinstated and definitively resolved
by the COMELEC en banc in a
resolution disposing of a motion for

The fact that the COMELEC en banc had remanded similar appeals to the Division that initially dismissed them
cannot serve as a precedent to the disposition of the petitioners appeal. A decision or resolution of any
adjudicating body can be disposed in several ways. To sustain petitioners argument would be virtually putting
a straightjacket on the COMELEC en bancs adjudicatory powers.

reconsideration.

The power to decide motions for reconsideration in election cases is arrogated unto the COMELEC en banc by
Section 3, Article IX-C of the Constitution, viz:

More significantly, the remand of the appeal to the COMELEC Second Division would be unnecessarily circuitous
and repugnant to the rule on preferential disposition of quo warranto cases espoused in Rule 36, Section 15 of
the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.14

II. The COMELEC en banc has the


Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of
procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All such
election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions
shall be decided by the Commission en banc.

A complementary provision is present in Section 5(c), Rule 3 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, to wit:

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power to order discretionary


execution of judgment.

We cannot subscribe to petitioners submission that the COMELEC en banc has no power to order the issuance
of a writ of execution and that such function belongs only to the court of origin.

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There is no reason to dispute the COMELECs authority to order discretionary execution of judgment in view of
the fact that the suppletory application of the Rules of Court is expressly sanctioned by Section 1, Rule 41 of
the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.15

Under Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, execution pending appeal may be issued by an appellate court
after the trial court has lost jurisdiction. In Batul v. Bayron,16 we stressed the import of the provision vis--vis
election cases when we held that judgments in election cases which may be executed pending appeal includes
those decided by trial courts and those rendered by the COMELEC whether in the exercise of its original or
appellate jurisdiction.

III. Private respondents are not


estopped from questioning

Philippines shall file a sworn petition for quo warranto with the Commission within ten days after the
proclamation of the results of the election. (Emphasis ours)

Hence, if a person qualified to file a petition to disqualify a certain candidate fails to file the petition within the
twenty-five (25)-day period prescribed by Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code for whatever reasons, the
elections laws do not leave him completely helpless as he has another chance to raise the disqualification of
the candidate by filing a petition for quo warranto within ten (10) days from the proclamation of the results of
the election, as provided under Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code.17

The above remedies were both available to the private respondents and their failure to utilize Section 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code cannot serve to bar them should they opt to file, as they did so file, a quo warranto
petition under Section 253.

petitioners eligibility to hold public


IV. Petitioner is disqualified from

office.

running for elective office for


The fact that the petitioners qualifications were not questioned when she filed certificates of candidacy for
2007 and 2010 elections cannot operate as an estoppel to the petition for quo warranto before the RTC.

failure to renounce her Australian


citizenship in accordance with
Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225.

Under the Batas Pambansa Bilang 881 (Omnibus Election Code), there are two instances where a petition
questioning the qualifications of a registered candidate to run for the office for which his certificate of
candidacy was filed can be raised, to wit:

(1) Before election, pursuant to Section 78 thereof which provides that:

Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy. A verified petition seeking to deny
due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that
any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be
filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and
shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election; and

(2) After election, pursuant to Section 253 thereof, viz:

R.A. No. 9225 allows the retention and re-acquisition of Filipino citizenship for natural-born citizens who have
lost their Philippine citizenship18 by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic, thus:

Section 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, naturalborn citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as
citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have re-acquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the
following oath of allegiance to the Republic:

"I, _____________________, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities
of the Philippines; and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines
and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I imposed this obligation upon myself voluntarily
without mental reservation or purpose of evasion."

Sec. 253. Petition for quo warranto. Any voter contesting the election of any Member of the Batasang
Pambansa, regional, provincial, or city officer on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the

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Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign
country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath.

The oath is an abbreviated repatriation process that restores ones Filipino citizenship and all civil and political
rights and obligations concomitant therewith, subject to certain conditions imposed in Section 5, viz:

Sec. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this
Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under
existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:

Under the provisions of the aforementioned law, the petitioner has validly re-acquired her Filipino citizenship
when she took an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on December 5, 2005. At that point, she
held dual citizenship, i.e., Australian and Philippine.

On September 18, 2006, or a year before she initially sought elective public office, she filed a renunciation of
Australian citizenship in Canberra, Australia. Admittedly, however, the same was not under oath contrary to the
exact mandate of Section 5(2) that the renunciation of foreign citizenship must be sworn before an officer
authorized to administer oath.

(1) Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage must meet the requirements under Section 1, Article V of
the Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known as "The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003" and
other existing laws;

To obviate the fatal consequence of her inutile renunciation, the petitioner pleads the Court to interpret the
"sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship" in Section 5(2) to be a mere pro forma requirement in
conformity with the intent of the Legislature. She anchors her submission on the statement made by
Representative Javier during the floor deliberations on H.B. No. 4720, the precursor of R.A. No. 9225.

(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding such public
office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of
candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath;

At the outset, it bears stressing that the Courts duty to interpret the law according to its true intent is
exercised only when the law is ambiguous or of doubtful meaning. The first and fundamental duty of the Court
is to apply the law. As such, when the law is clear and free from any doubt, there is no occasion for construction
or interpretation; there is only room for application.19 Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 is one such instance.

(3) Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe and swear to an oath of allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines and its duly constituted authorities prior to their assumption of office: Provided, That they
renounce their oath of allegiance to the country where they took that oath;

Ambiguity is a condition of admitting two or more meanings, of being understood in more than one way, or of
referring to two or more things at the same time. For a statute to be considered ambiguous, it must admit of
two or more possible meanings.20

(4) Those intending to practice their profession in the Philippines shall apply with the proper authority for a
license or permit to engage in such practice; and

The language of Section 5(2) is free from any ambiguity. In Lopez v. COMELEC,21 we declared its categorical
and single meaning: a Filipino American or any dual citizen cannot run for any elective public position in the
Philippines unless he or she personally swears to a renunciation of all foreign citizenship at the time of filing the
certificate of candidacy. We also expounded on the form of the renunciation and held that to be valid, the
renunciation must be contained in an affidavit duly executed before an officer of the law who is authorized to
administer an oath stating in clear and unequivocal terms that affiant is renouncing all foreign citizenship.

(5) That right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public office in the Philippines cannot be exercised by,
or extended to, those who:

(a) are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the country of which they are naturalized citizens;
and/or

(b) are in active service as commissioned or non-commissioned officers in the armed forces of the country
which they are naturalized citizens. (Emphasis ours)

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The same meaning was emphasized in Jacot v. Dal,22 when we held that Filipinos re-acquiring or retaining their
Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 must explicitly renounce their foreign citizenship if they wish to run
for elective posts in the Philippines, thus:

The law categorically requires persons seeking elective public office, who either retained their Philippine
citizenship or those who reacquired it, to make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign

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citizenship before a public officer authorized to administer an oath simultaneous with or before the filing of the
certificate of candidacy.

Hence, Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 compels natural-born Filipinos, who have been naturalized as
citizens of a foreign country, but who reacquired or retained their Philippine citizenship (1) to take the oath of
allegiance under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225, and (2) for those seeking elective public offices in the
Philippines, to additionally execute a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before
an authorized public officer prior or simultaneous to the filing of their certificates of candidacy, to qualify as
candidates in Philippine elections.

INTERPELLATION OF REP. JAVIER

Rep. Javier initially inquired whether under the Bill, dual citizenship is only limited to natural-born Filipinos and
not to naturalized Filipinos.

Rep. Libanan replied in the affirmative.

Clearly Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 (on the making of a personal and sworn renunciation of any and
all foreign citizenship) requires of the Filipinos availing themselves of the benefits under the said Act to
accomplish an undertaking other than that which they have presumably complied with under Section 3 thereof
(oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines). This is made clear in the discussion of the Bicameral
Conference Committee on Disagreeing Provisions of House Bill No. 4720 and Senate Bill No. 2130 held on 18
August 2003 (precursors of Republic Act No. 9225), where the Hon. Chairman Franklin Drilon and Hon.
Representative Arthur Defensor explained to Hon. Representative Exequiel Javier that the oath of allegiance is
different from the renunciation of foreign citizenship;

Rep. Javier subsequently adverted to Section 5 of the Bill which provides that natural-born Filipinos who have
dual citizenship shall continue to enjoy full civil and political rights. This being the case, he sought clarification
as to whether they can indeed run for public office provided that they renounce their foreign citizenship.

xxxx

Rep. Javier sought further clarification on this matter, citing that while the Bill provides them with full civil and
political rights as Filipino citizens, the measure also discriminates against them since they are required to make
a sworn renunciation of their other foreign citizenship if and when they run for public office. He thereafter
proposed to delete this particular provision.

The intent of the legislators was not only for Filipinos reacquiring or retaining their Philippine citizenship under
Republic Act No. 9225 to take their oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, but also to explicitly
renounce their foreign citizenship if they wish to run for elective posts in the Philippines. To qualify as a
candidate in Philippine elections, Filipinos must only have one citizenship, namely, Philippine citizenship.23
(Citation omitted and italics and underlining ours)

Rep. Libanan replied in the affirmative, citing that these citizens will only have to make a personal and sworn
renunciation of foreign citizenship before any authorized public officer.

In his rejoinder, Rep. Libanan explained that this serves to erase all doubts regarding any issues that might be
raised pertaining to the citizenship of any candidate. He subsequently cited the case of Afroyim vs. Rusk,
wherein the United States considered a naturalized American still as an American citizen even when he cast his
vote in Israel during one of its elections.

Hence, in De Guzman v. COMELEC,24 we declared petitioner therein to be disqualified from running for the
position of vice-mayor for his failure to make a personal and sworn renunciation of his American citizenship.

We find no reason to depart from the mandatory nature infused by the above rulings to the phrase "sworn
renunciation". The language of the provision is plain and unambiguous. It expresses a single, definite, and
sensible meaning and must thus be read literally.25 The foreign citizenship must be formally rejected through
an affidavit duly sworn before an officer authorized to administer oath.

Rep. Javier however pointed out that the matter of voting is different because in voting, one is not required to
renounce his foreign citizenship. He pointed out that under the Bill, Filipinos who run for public office must
renounce their foreign citizenship. He pointed out further that this is a contradiction in the Bill.

Thereafter, Rep. Javier inquired whether Filipino citizens who had acquired foreign citizenship and are now
entitled to reacquire their Filipino citizenship will be considered as natural-born citizens. As such, he likewise
inquired whether they will also be considered qualified to run for the highest elective positions in the country.

It is conclusively presumed to be the meaning that the Legislature has intended to convey.26 Even a resort to
the Journal of the House of Representatives invoked by the petitioner leads to the same inference, viz:

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Election Law Cases


Rep. Libanan replied in the affirmative, citing that the only requirement is that they make a sworn renunciation
of their foreign citizenship and that they comply with the residency and registration requirements as provided
for in the Constitution.

Rep. Javier said that he does not oppose the Bill but only wants to be fair to other Filipino citizens who are not
considered natural-born. He reiterated that natural-born Filipino citizens who had renounced their citizenship by
pledging allegiance to another sovereignty should not be allowed to revert back to their status of being naturalborn citizens once they decide to regain their Filipino citizenship. He underscored that this will in a way allow
such Filipinos to enjoy dual citizenship.

Whereupon, Rep. Javier noted that under the Constitution, natural-born citizens are those who are citizens at
the time of birth without having to perform an act to complete or perfect his/her citizenship.
On whether the Sponsors will agree to an amendment incorporating the position of Rep. Javier, Rep. Libanan
stated that this will defeat the purpose of the Bill.
Rep. Libanan agreed therewith, citing that this is the reason why the Bill seeks the repeal of CA No. 63. The
repeal, he said, would help Filipino citizens who acquired foreign citizenship to retain their citizenship. With
regard then to Section 5 of the Bill, he explained that the Committee had decided to include this provision
because Section 18, Article XI of the Constitution provides for the accountability of public officers.

Rep. Javier disagreed therewith, adding that natural-born Filipino citizens who acquired foreign citizenships and
later decided to regain their Filipino citizenship, will be considered as repatriated citizens.

In his rejoinder, Rep. Javier maintained that in this case, the sworn renunciation of a foreign citizenship will only
become a pro forma requirement.

Rep. Libanan cited the case of Bengzon vs. HRET wherein the Supreme Court had ruled that only naturalized
Filipino citizens are not considered as natural-born citizens.

On further queries of Rep. Javier, Rep. Libanan affirmed that natural-born Filipino citizens who became foreign
citizens and who have reacquired their Filipino citizenship under the Bill will be considered as natural-born
citizens, and therefore qualified to run for the presidency, the vice-presidency or for a seat in Congress. He also
agreed with the observation of Rep. Javier that a natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the country at
the time of birth. He also explained that the Bill will, in effect, return to a Filipino citizen who has acquired
foreign citizenship, the status of being a natural-born citizen effective at the time he lost his Filipino citizenship.

In reaction, Rep. Javier clarified that only citizens by election or those whose mothers are Filipino citizens under
the 1935 Constitution and who elected Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of maturity, are not deemed
as natural-born citizens.

As a rejoinder, Rep. Javier opined that doing so would be discriminating against naturalized Filipino citizens and
Filipino citizens by election who are all disqualified to run for certain public offices. He then suggested that the
Bill be amended by not considering as natural-born citizens those Filipinos who had renounced their Filipino
citizenship and acquired foreign citizenship. He said that they should be considered as repatriated citizens.

In reply, Rep. Libanan assured Rep. Javier that the Committee will take note of the latters comments on the
matter. He however stressed that after a lengthy deliberation on the subject, the Committees on Justice, and
Foreign Affairs had decided to revert back to the status of being natural-born citizens those natural-born Filipino
citizens who had acquired foreign citizenship but now wished to reacquire their Filipino citizenship.

Rep. Javier then explained that a Filipina who loses her Filipino citizenship by virtue of her marriage to a
foreigner can regain her repatriated Filipino citizenship, upon the death of her husband, by simply taking her
oath before the Department of Justice (DOJ).

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In response, Rep. Libanan maintained that in the Bengzon case, repatriation results in the recovery of ones
original nationality and only naturalized citizens are not considered as natural-born citizens.

On whether the Sponsors would agree to not giving back the status of being natural-born citizens to naturalborn Filipino citizens who acquired foreign citizenship, Rep. Libanan remarked that the Body in plenary session
will decide on the matter.27

The petitioner obviously espouses an isolated reading of Representative Javiers statement; she conveniently
disregards the preceding and succeeding discussions in the records.

The above-quoted excerpts of the legislative record show that Representative Javiers statement ought to be
understood within the context of the issue then being discussed, that is whether former natural-born citizens
who re-acquire their Filipino citizenship under the proposed law will revert to their original status as naturalborn citizens and thus be qualified to run for government positions reserved only to natural-born Filipinos, i.e.
President, Vice-President and Members of the Congress.

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It was Representative Javiers position that they should be considered as repatriated Filipinos and not as
natural-born citizens since they will have to execute a personal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship.
Natural-born citizens are those who need not perform an act to perfect their citizenship. Representative
Libanan, however, maintained that they will revert to their original status as natural-born citizens. To reconcile
the renunciation imposed by Section 5(2) with the principle that natural-born citizens are those who need not
perform any act to perfect their citizenship, Representative Javier suggested that the sworn renunciation of
foreign citizenship be considered as a mere pro forma requirement.

Petitioners argument, therefore, loses its point. The "sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship" must be
deemed a formal requirement only with respect to the re-acquisition of ones status as a natural-born Filipino so
as to override the effect of the principle that natural-born citizens need not perform any act to perfect their
citizenship. Never was it mentioned or even alluded to that, as the petitioner wants this Court to believe, those
who re-acquire their Filipino citizenship and thereafter run for public office has the option of executing an
unsworn affidavit of renunciation.

It is also palpable in the above records that Section 5 was intended to complement Section 18, Article XI of the
Constitution on public officers primary accountability of allegiance and loyalty, which provides:

Sec. 18. Public officers and employees owe the State and this Constitution allegiance at all times and any
public officer or employee who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the status of an immigrant of another
country during his tenure shall be dealt with by law.

An oath is a solemn declaration, accompanied by a swearing to God or a revered person or thing, that ones
statement is true or that one will be bound to a promise. The person making the oath implicitly invites
punishment if the statement is untrue or the promise is broken. The legal effect of an oath is to subject the
person to penalties for perjury if the testimony is false.28

Indeed, the solemn promise, and the risk of punishment attached to an oath ensures truthfulness to the
prospective public officers abandonment of his adopted state and promise of absolute allegiance and loyalty to
the Republic of the Philippines.

To hold the oath to be a mere pro forma requirement is to say that it is only for ceremonial purposes; it would
also accommodate a mere qualified or temporary allegiance from government officers when the Constitution
and the legislature clearly demand otherwise.

Foreign laws are not a matter of judicial notice. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proven.29 To
prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must present a copy thereof and comply with Sections 24 and 25 of
Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court which reads:

Sec. 24. Proof of official record. The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19,
when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by
the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept
in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is
in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general,
consul, vice- consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the
foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office. (Emphasis ours)

Sec. 25. What attestation of copy must state. Whenever a copy of a document or record is attested for the
purpose of the evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the
original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be under the official seal of the
attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such court.

The Court has admitted certain exceptions to the above rules and held that the existence of a foreign law may
also be established through: (1) a testimony under oath of an expert witness such as an attorney-at-law in the
country where the foreign law operates wherein he quotes verbatim a section of the law and states that the
same was in force at the time material to the facts at hand; and (2) likewise, in several naturalization cases, it
was held by the Court that evidence of the law of a foreign country on reciprocity regarding the acquisition of
citizenship, although not meeting the prescribed rule of practice, may be allowed and used as basis for
favorable action, if, in the light of all the circumstances, the Court is "satisfied of the authenticity of the written
proof offered." Thus, in a number of decisions, mere authentication of the Chinese Naturalization Law by the
Chinese Consulate General of Manila was held to be a competent proof of that law.30

The petitioner failed to prove the Australian Citizenship Act of 1948 through any of the above methods. As
uniformly observed by the RTC and COMELEC, the petitioner failed to show proof of the existence of the law
during trial. Also, the letter issued by the Australian government showing that petitioner already renounced her
Australian citizenship was unauthenticated hence, the courts a quo acted judiciously in disregarding the same.

We are bound to arrive at a similar conclusion even if we were to admit as competent evidence the said letter
in view of the photocopy of a Certificate of Authentication issued by Consular Section of the Philippine Embassy
in Canberra, Australia attached to the petitioners motion for reconsideration.

Petitioner contends that the Australian Citizenship Act of 1948, under which she is already deemed to have lost
her citizenship, is entitled to judicial notice. We disagree.

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We have stressed in Advocates and Adherents of Social Justice for School Teachers and Allied Workers (AASJS)
Member v. Datumanong31 that the framers of R.A. No. 9225 did not intend the law to concern itself with the
actual status of the other citizenship.

G.R. No. 179848

November 27, 2008

NESTOR A. JACOT, petitioner,


vs.

This Court as the government branch tasked to apply the enactments of the legislature must do so conformably
with the wisdom of the latter sans the interference of any foreign law. If we were to read the Australian Citizen
Act of 1948 into the application and operation of R.A. No. 9225, we would be applying not what our legislative
department has deemed wise to require. To do so would be a brazen encroachment upon the sovereign will and
power of the people of this Republic.32

ROGEN T. DAL and COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.

DECISION
The petitioners act of running for public office does not suffice to serve as an effective renunciation of her
Australian citizenship. While this Court has previously declared that the filing by a person with dual citizenship
of a certificate of candidacy is already considered a renunciation of foreign citizenship,33 such ruling was
already adjudged superseded by the enactment of R.A. No. 9225 on August 29, 2003 which provides for the
additional condition of a personal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship.34

The fact that petitioner won the elections can not cure the defect of her candidacy. Garnering the most number
of votes does not validate the election of a disqualified candidate because the application of the constitutional
and statutory provisions on disqualification is not a matter of popularity.35

In fine, R.A. No. 9225 categorically demands natural-born Filipinos who re-acquire their citizenship and seek
elective office, to execute a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships before an
authorized public officer prior to or simultaneous to the filing of their certificates of candidacy, to qualify as
candidates in Philippine elections.36 The rule applies to all those who have re-acquired their Filipino citizenship,
like petitioner, without regard as to whether they are still dual citizens or not. It is a pre-requisite imposed for
the exercise of the right to run for public office.

Stated differently, it is an additional qualification for elective office specific only to Filipino citizens who reacquire their citizenship under Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225. It is the operative act that restores their right to run
for public office. The petitioner's failure to comply therewith in accordance with the exact tenor of the law,
rendered ineffectual the Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship she executed on September 18,
2006. As such, she is yet to regain her political right to seek elective office. Unless she executes a sworn
renunciation of her Australian citizenship, she is ineligible to run for and hold any elective office in the
Philippines.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The Resolution dated September 6,
2011 of the Commission on Elections en bane in EAC (AE) No. A-44-2010 is AFFIRMED in toto.

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Petitioner Nestor A. Jacot assails the Resolution1 dated 28 September 2007 of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) En Banc in SPA No. 07-361, affirming the Resolution dated 12 June 2007 of the COMELEC Second
Division2 disqualifying him from running for the position of Vice-Mayor of Catarman, Camiguin, in the 14 May
2007 National and Local Elections, on the ground that he failed to make a personal renouncement of his United
States (US) citizenship.

Petitioner was a natural born citizen of the Philippines, who became a naturalized citizen of the US on 13
December 1989. 3

Petitioner sought to reacquire his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225, otherwise known as the
Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act. He filed a request for the administration of his Oath of Allegiance
to the Republic of the Philippines with the Philippine Consulate General (PCG) of Los Angeles, California. The
Los Angeles PCG issued on 19 June 2006 an Order of Approval4 of petitioners request, and on the same day,
petitioner took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before Vice Consul Edward C. Yulo. 5 On
27 September 2006, the Bureau of Immigration issued Identification Certificate No. 06-12019 recognizing
petitioner as a citizen of the Philippines.6

Six months after, on 26 March 2007, petitioner filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the Position of Vice-Mayor
of the Municipality of Catarman, Camiguin. 7

On 2 May 2007, respondent Rogen T. Dal filed a Petition for Disqualification8 before the COMELEC Provincial
Office in Camiguin against petitioner, arguing that the latter failed to renounce his US citizenship, as required
under Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225, which reads as follows:

SO ORDERED.

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Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities.Those who retain or reacquire Philippine citizenship under
this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities
under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:

xxxx

(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualifications for holding such public
office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of
candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath.

Petitioner sought remedy from this Court via the present Special Civil Action for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court, where he presented for the first time an "Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the
United States and Any and All Foreign Citizenship"17 dated 7 February 2007. He avers that he executed an act
of renunciation of his US citizenship, separate from the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines he
took before the Los Angeles PCG and his filing of his Certificate of Candidacy, thereby changing his theory of
the case during the appeal. He attributes the delay in the presentation of the affidavit to his former counsel,
Atty. Marciano Aparte, who allegedly advised him that said piece of evidence was unnecessary but who,
nevertheless, made him execute an identical document entitled "Oath of Renunciation of Allegiance to the
United States and Renunciation of Any and All Foreign Citizenship" on 27 June 2007 after he had already filed
his Certificate of Candidacy.18

Petitioner raises the following issues for resolution of this Court:


In his Answer9 dated 6 May 2007 and Position Paper10 dated 8 May 2007, petitioner countered that his Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines made before the Los Angeles PCG and the oath contained in his
Certificate of Candidacy operated as an effective renunciation of his foreign citizenship.

In the meantime, the 14 May 2007 National and Local Elections were held. Petitioner garnered the highest
number of votes for the position of Vice Mayor.

On 12 June 2007, the COMELEC Second Division finally issued its Resolution11 disqualifying the petitioner from
running for the position of Vice-Mayor of Catarman, Camiguin, for failure to make the requisite renunciation of
his US citizenship. The COMELEC Second Division explained that the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship
under Republic Act No. 9225 does not automatically bestow upon any person the privilege to run for any
elective public office. It additionally ruled that the filing of a Certificate of Candidacy cannot be considered as a
renunciation of foreign citizenship. The COMELEC Second Division did not consider Valles v. COMELEC12 and
Mercado v. Manzano13 applicable to the instant case, since Valles and Mercado were dual citizens since birth,
unlike the petitioner who lost his Filipino citizenship by means of naturalization. The COMELEC, thus, decreed in
the aforementioned Resolution that:

ACCORDINGLY, NESTOR ARES JACOT is DISQUALIFIED to run for the position of Vice-Mayor of Catarman,
Camiguin for the May 14, 2007 National and Local Elections. If proclaimed, respondent cannot thus assume the
Office of Vice-Mayor of said municipality by virtue of such disqualification.14

WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT EXERCISED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT HELD THAT
PETITIONER FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE PROVISIONS OF R.A. 9225, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE "CITIZENSHIP
RETENTION AND RE-ACQUISITION ACT OF 2003," SPECIFICALLY SECTION 5(2) AS TO THE REQUIREMENTS FOR
THOSE SEEKING ELECTIVE PUBLIC OFFICE;

II

WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT EXERCISED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT HELD THAT
PETITIONER FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE COMELEC RULES OF PROCEDURE AS REGARDS
THE PAYMENT OF THE NECESSARY MOTION FEES; AND

III

WHETHER OR NOT UPHOLDING THE DECISION OF PUBLIC RESPONDENT WOULD RESULT IN THE FRUSTRATION
OF THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE OF CATARMAN, CAMIGUIN.19
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on 29 June 2007 reiterating his position that his Oath of Allegiance
to the Republic of the Philippines before the Los Angeles PCG and his oath in his Certificate of Candidacy
sufficed as an effective renunciation of his US citizenship. Attached to the said Motion was an "Oath of
Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States and Renunciation of Any and All Foreign Citizenship" dated 27
June 2007, wherein petitioner explicitly renounced his US citizenship.15 The COMELEC en banc dismissed
petitioners Motion in a Resolution16 dated 28 September 2007 for lack of merit.

Pearliegates

The Court determines that the only fundamental issue in this case is whether petitioner is disqualified from
running as a candidate in the 14 May 2007 local elections for his failure to make a personal and sworn
renunciation of his US citizenship.

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This Court finds that petitioner should indeed be disqualified.

Contrary to the assertions made by petitioner, his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines made
before the Los Angeles PCG and his Certificate of Candidacy do not substantially comply with the requirement
of a personal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship because these are distinct requirements to be
complied with for different purposes.

Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225 requires that natural-born citizens of the Philippines, who are already
naturalized citizens of a foreign country, must take the following oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines to reacquire or retain their Philippine citizenship:

SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship.Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born
citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens
of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath
of allegiance to the Republic:

"I __________ solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the
Philippines; and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will
maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily, without
mental reservation or purpose of evasion."

Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign
country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath.

By the oath dictated in the afore-quoted provision, the Filipino swears allegiance to the Philippines, but there is
nothing therein on his renunciation of foreign citizenship. Precisely, a situation might arise under Republic Act
No. 9225 wherein said Filipino has dual citizenship by also reacquiring or retaining his Philippine citizenship,
despite his foreign citizenship.

The afore-quoted oath of allegiance is substantially similar to the one contained in the Certificate of Candidacy
which must be executed by any person who wishes to run for public office in Philippine elections. Such an oath
reads:

Pearliegates

I am eligible for the office I seek to be elected. I will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and
will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; that I will obey the laws, legal orders and decrees promulgated
by the duly constituted authorities of the Republic of the Philippines; and that I impose this obligation upon
myself voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of evasion. I hereby certify that the facts stated
herein are true and correct of my own personal knowledge.

Now, Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 specifically provides that:

Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities.Those who retain or reacquire Philippine citizenship under
this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities
under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:

xxxx

(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualifications for holding such public
office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of
candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath.

The law categorically requires persons seeking elective public office, who either retained their Philippine
citizenship or those who reacquired it, to make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship before a public officer authorized to administer an oath simultaneous with or before the filing of the
certificate of candidacy.20

Hence, Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 compels natural-born Filipinos, who have been naturalized as
citizens of a foreign country, but who reacquired or retained their Philippine citizenship (1) to take the oath of
allegiance under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225, and (2) for those seeking elective public offices in the
Philippines, to additionally execute a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before
an authorized public officer prior or simultaneous to the filing of their certificates of candidacy, to qualify as
candidates in Philippine elections.

Clearly Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 (on the making of a personal and sworn renunciation of any and
all foreign citizenship) requires of the Filipinos availing themselves of the benefits under the said Act to
accomplish an undertaking other than that which they have presumably complied with under Section 3 thereof
(oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines). This is made clear in the discussion of the Bicameral
Conference Committee on Disagreeing Provisions of House Bill No. 4720 and Senate Bill No. 2130 held on 18
August 2003 (precursors of Republic Act No. 9225), where the Hon. Chairman Franklin Drilon and Hon.

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Representative Arthur Defensor explained to Hon. Representative Exequiel Javier that the oath of allegiance is
different from the renunciation of foreign citizenship:

REP. A.D. DEFENSOR. No. When he runs he will only have one citizenship. When he runs for office, he will have
only one. (Emphasis ours.)

CHAIRMAN DRILON. Okay. So, No. 2. "Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the
qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of
the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath." I think its very good, ha? No problem?

There is little doubt, therefore, that the intent of the legislators was not only for Filipinos reacquiring or
retaining their Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 to take their oath of allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines, but also to explicitly renounce their foreign citizenship if they wish to run for elective posts in
the Philippines. To qualify as a candidate in Philippine elections, Filipinos must only have one citizenship,
namely, Philippine citizenship.

REP. JAVIER. I think its already covered by the oath.

CHAIRMAN DRILON. Renouncing foreign citizenship.

REP. JAVIER. Ah but he has taken his oath already.

CHAIRMAN DRILON. Nono, renouncing foreign citizenship.

xxxx

CHAIRMAN DRILON. Can I go back to No. 2. Whats your problem, Boy? Those seeking elective office in the
Philippines.

By the same token, the oath of allegiance contained in the Certificate of Candidacy, which is substantially
similar to the one contained in Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225, does not constitute the personal and sworn
renunciation sought under Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225. It bears to emphasize that the said oath of
allegiance is a general requirement for all those who wish to run as candidates in Philippine elections; while the
renunciation of foreign citizenship is an additional requisite only for those who have retained or reacquired
Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 and who seek elective public posts, considering their special
circumstance of having more than one citizenship.

Petitioner erroneously invokes the doctrine in Valles21 and Mercado,22 wherein the filing by a person with dual
citizenship of a certificate of candidacy, containing an oath of allegiance, was already considered a
renunciation of foreign citizenship. The ruling of this Court in Valles and Mercado is not applicable to the
present case, which is now specially governed by Republic Act No. 9225, promulgated on 29 August 2003.

In Mercado, which was cited in Valles, the disqualification of therein private respondent Manzano was sought
under another law, Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code, which reads:

REP. JAVIER. They are trying to make him renounce his citizenship thinking that ano

SECTION 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local
position:

CHAIRMAN DRILON. His American citizenship.

xxxx

REP. JAVIER. To discourage him from running?

(d) Those with dual citizenship.

CHAIRMAN DRILON. No.

The Court in the aforesaid cases sought to define the term "dual citizenship" vis--vis the concept of "dual
allegiance." At the time this Court decided the cases of Valles and Mercado on 26 May 1999 and 9 August 2000,
respectively, the more explicitly worded requirements of Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 were not yet
enacted by our legislature.23

Pearliegates

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Lopez v. Commission on Elections24 is the more fitting precedent for this case since they both share the same
factual milieu. In Lopez, therein petitioner Lopez was a natural-born Filipino who lost his Philippine citizenship
after he became a naturalized US citizen. He later reacquired his Philippine citizenship by virtue of Republic Act
No. 9225. Thereafter, Lopez filed his candidacy for a local elective position, but failed to make a personal and
sworn renunciation of his foreign citizenship. This Court unequivocally declared that despite having garnered
the highest number of votes in the election, Lopez is nonetheless disqualified as a candidate for a local elective
position due to his failure to comply with the requirements of Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225.

Petitioner presents before this Court for the first time, in the instant Petition for Certiorari, an "Affidavit of
Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States and Any and All Foreign Citizenship,"25 which he supposedly
executed on 7 February 2007, even before he filed his Certificate of Candidacy on 26 March 2007. With the said
Affidavit, petitioner puts forward in the Petition at bar a new theory of his casethat he complied with the
requirement of making a personal and sworn renunciation of his foreign citizenship before filing his Certificate
of Candidacy. This new theory constitutes a radical change from the earlier position he took before the
COMELECthat he complied with the requirement of renunciation by his oaths of allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines made before the Los Angeles PCG and in his Certificate of Candidacy, and that there was no
more need for a separate act of renunciation.

As a rule, no question will be entertained on appeal unless it has been raised in the proceedings below. Points
of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the lower court, administrative agency or
quasi-judicial body need not be considered by a reviewing court, as they cannot be raised for the first time at
that late stage. Basic considerations of fairness and due process impel this rule.26 Courts have neither the time
nor the resources to accommodate parties who chose to go to trial haphazardly.27

Likewise, this Court does not countenance the late submission of evidence.28 Petitioner should have offered
the Affidavit dated 7 February 2007 during the proceedings before the COMELEC.

Section 1 of Rule 43 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides that "In the absence of any applicable
provisions of these Rules, the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court in the Philippines shall be applicable by
analogy or in suppletory character and effect." Section 34 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court
categorically enjoins the admission of evidence not formally presented:

SEC. 34. Offer of evidence. - The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The
purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified.

Pearliegates

Since the said Affidavit was not formally offered before the COMELEC, respondent had no opportunity to
examine and controvert it. To admit this document would be contrary to due process. 29 Additionally, the
piecemeal presentation of evidence is not in accord with orderly justice.30

The Court further notes that petitioner had already presented before the COMELEC an identical document,
"Oath of Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States and Renunciation of Any and All Foreign Citizenship"
executed on 27 June 2007, subsequent to his filing of his Certificate of Candidacy on 26 March 2007. Petitioner
attached the said Oath of 27 June 2007 to his Motion for Reconsideration with the COMELEC en banc. The
COMELEC en banc eventually refused to reconsider said document for being belatedly executed. What was
extremely perplexing, not to mention suspect, was that petitioner did not submit the Affidavit of 7 February
2007 or mention it at all in the proceedings before the COMELEC, considering that it could have easily won his
case if it was actually executed on and in existence before the filing of his Certificate of Candidacy, in
compliance with law.

The justification offered by petitioner, that his counsel had advised him against presenting this crucial piece of
evidence, is lame and unconvincing. If the Affidavit of 7 February 2007 was in existence all along, petitioners
counsel, and even petitioner himself, could have easily adduced it to be a crucial piece of evidence to prove
compliance with the requirements of Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225. There was no apparent danger for
petitioner to submit as much evidence as possible in support of his case, than the risk of presenting too little
for which he could lose.

And even if it were true, petitioners excuse for the late presentation of the Affidavit of 7 February 2007 will not
change the outcome of petitioners case.

It is a well-settled rule that a client is bound by his counsels conduct, negligence, and mistakes in handling the
case, and the client cannot be heard to complain that the result might have been different had his lawyer
proceeded differently.31 The only exceptions to the general rule -- that a client is bound by the mistakes of his
counsel -- which this Court finds acceptable are when the reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the
client of due process of law, or when the application of the rule results in the outright deprivation of ones
property through a technicality.32 These exceptions are not attendant in this case.

The Court cannot sustain petitioners averment that his counsel was grossly negligent in deciding against the
presentation of the Affidavit of 7 February 2007 during the proceedings before the COMELEC. Mistakes of
attorneys as to the competency of a witness; the sufficiency, relevancy or irrelevancy of certain evidence; the
proper defense or the burden of proof, failure to introduce evidence, to summon witnesses and to argue the
case -- unless they prejudice the client and prevent him from properly presenting his case -- do not constitute
gross incompetence or negligence, such that clients may no longer be bound by the acts of their counsel.33

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Also belying petitioners claim that his former counsel was grossly negligent was the fact that petitioner
continuously used his former counsels theory of the case. Even when the COMELEC already rendered an
adverse decision, he persistently argues even to this Court that his oaths of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines before the Los Angeles PCG and in his Certificate of Candidacy amount to the renunciation of foreign
citizenship which the law requires. Having asserted the same defense in the instant Petition, petitioner only
demonstrates his continued reliance on and complete belief in the position taken by his former counsel, despite
the formers incongruous allegations that the latter has been grossly negligent.

Petitioner himself is also guilty of negligence. If indeed he believed that his counsel was inept, petitioner should
have promptly taken action, such as discharging his counsel earlier and/or insisting on the submission of his
Affidavit of 7 February 2007 to the COMELEC, instead of waiting until a decision was rendered disqualifying him
and a resolution issued dismissing his motion for reconsideration; and, thereupon, he could have heaped the
blame on his former counsel. Petitioner could not be so easily allowed to escape the consequences of his
former counsels acts, because, otherwise, it would render court proceedings indefinite, tentative, and subject
to reopening at any time by the mere subterfuge of replacing counsel. 34

Petitioner cites De Guzman v. Sandiganbayan,35 where therein petitioner De Guzman was unable to present a
piece of evidence because his lawyer proceeded to file a demurrer to evidence, despite the Sandiganbayans
denial of his prior leave to do so. The wrongful insistence of the lawyer in filing a demurrer to evidence had
totally deprived De Guzman of any chance to present documentary evidence in his defense. This was certainly
not the case in the Petition at bar.

Herein, petitioner was in no way deprived of due process. His counsel actively defended his suit by attending
the hearings, filing the pleadings, and presenting evidence on petitioners behalf. Moreover, petitioners cause
was not defeated by a mere technicality, but because of a mistaken reliance on a doctrine which is not
applicable to his case. A case lost due to an untenable legal position does not justify a deviation from the rule
that clients are bound by the acts and mistakes of their counsel.36

Petitioner also makes much of the fact that he received the highest number of votes for the position of ViceMayor of Catarman during the 2007 local elections. The fact that a candidate, who must comply with the
election requirements applicable to dual citizens and failed to do so, received the highest number of votes for
an elective position does not dispense with, or amount to a waiver of, such requirement.37 The will of the
people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly
believed that the candidate was qualified. The rules on citizenship qualifications of a candidate must be strictly
applied. If a person seeks to serve the Republic of the Philippines, he must owe his loyalty to this country only,
abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other state.38 The application of the constitutional and
statutory provisions on disqualification is not a matter of popularity.39

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The Resolution dated 28 September 2007 of the COMELEC en
banc in SPA No. 07-361, affirming the Resolution dated 12 June 2007 of the COMELEC Second Division, is
AFFIRMED. Petitioner is DISQUALIFIED to run for the position of Vice-Mayor of Catarman, Camiguin in the 14

Pearliegates

May 2007 National and Local Elections, and if proclaimed, cannot assume the Office of Vice-Mayor of said
municipality by virtue of such disqualification. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 161872

April 13, 2004

REV. ELLY CHAVEZ PAMATONG, ESQUIRE, petitioner,


vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

Petitioner Rev. Elly Velez Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy for President on December 17, 2003.
Respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) refused to give due course to petitioners Certificate of
Candidacy in its Resolution No. 6558 dated January 17, 2004. The decision, however, was not unanimous since
Commissioners Luzviminda G. Tancangco and Mehol K. Sadain voted to include petitioner as they believed he
had parties or movements to back up his candidacy.

On January 15, 2004, petitioner moved for reconsideration of Resolution No. 6558. Petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration was docketed as SPP (MP) No. 04-001. The COMELEC, acting on petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration and on similar motions filed by other aspirants for national elective positions, denied the same
under the aegis of Omnibus Resolution No. 6604 dated February 11, 2004. The COMELEC declared petitioner
and thirty-five (35) others nuisance candidates who could not wage a nationwide campaign and/or are not
nominated by a political party or are not supported by a registered political party with a national constituency.
Commissioner Sadain maintained his vote for petitioner. By then, Commissioner Tancangco had retired.

In this Petition For Writ of Certiorari, petitioner seeks to reverse the resolutions which were allegedly rendered
in violation of his right to "equal access to opportunities for public service" under Section 26, Article II of the
1987

Constitution,1 by limiting the number of qualified candidates only to those who can afford to wage a nationwide
campaign and/or are nominated by political parties. In so doing, petitioner argues that the COMELEC indirectly
amended the constitutional provisions on the electoral process and limited the power of the sovereign people
to choose their leaders. The COMELEC supposedly erred in disqualifying him since he is the most qualified
among all the presidential candidates, i.e., he possesses all the constitutional and legal qualifications for the
office of the president, he is capable of waging a national campaign since he has numerous national
organizations under his leadership, he also has the capacity to wage an international campaign since he has
practiced law in other countries, and he has a platform of government. Petitioner likewise attacks the validity of
the form for the Certificate of Candidacy prepared by the COMELEC. Petitioner claims that the form does not

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provide clear and reasonable guidelines for determining the qualifications of candidates since it does not ask
for the candidates bio-data and his program of government.

First, the constitutional and legal dimensions involved.

Implicit in the petitioners invocation of the constitutional provision ensuring "equal access to opportunities for
public office" is the claim that there is a constitutional right to run for or hold public office and, particularly in
his case, to seek the presidency. There is none. What is recognized is merely a privilege subject to limitations
imposed by law. Section 26, Article II of the Constitution neither bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege
to the level of an enforceable right. There is nothing in the plain language of the provision which suggests such
a thrust or justifies an interpretation of the sort.

The "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution, entitled "Declaration of
Principles and State Policies." The provisions under the Article are generally considered not self-executing,2 and
there is no plausible reason for according a different treatment to the "equal access" provision. Like the rest of
the policies enumerated in Article II, the provision does not contain any judicially enforceable constitutional
right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action.3 The disregard of the provision does
not give rise to any cause of action before the courts.4

An inquiry into the intent of the framers5 produces the same determination that the provision is not selfexecutory. The original wording of the present Section 26, Article II had read, "The State shall broaden
opportunities to public office and prohibit public dynasties."6 Commissioner (now Chief Justice) Hilario Davide,
Jr. successfully brought forth an amendment that changed the word "broaden" to the phrase "ensure equal
access," and the substitution of the word "office" to "service." He explained his proposal in this wise:

I changed the word "broaden" to "ENSURE EQUAL ACCESS TO" because what is important would be equal
access to the opportunity. If you broaden, it would necessarily mean that the government would be mandated
to create as many offices as are possible to accommodate as many people as are also possible. That is the
meaning of broadening opportunities to public service. So, in order that we should not mandate the State to
make the government the number one employer and to limit offices only to what may be necessary and
expedient yet offering equal opportunities to access to it, I change the word "broaden."7 (emphasis supplied)

Obviously, the provision is not intended to compel the State to enact positive measures that would
accommodate as many people as possible into public office. The approval of the "Davide amendment"
indicates the design of the framers to cast the provision as simply enunciatory of a desired policy objective and
not reflective of the imposition of a clear State burden.

Pearliegates

Moreover, the provision as written leaves much to be desired if it is to be regarded as the source of positive
rights. It is difficult to interpret the clause as operative in the absence of legislation since its effective means
and reach are not properly defined. Broadly written, the myriad of claims that can be subsumed under this
rubric appear to be entirely open-ended.8 Words and phrases such as "equal access," "opportunities," and
"public service" are susceptible to countless interpretations owing to their inherent impreciseness. Certainly, it
was not the intention of the framers to inflict on the people an operative but amorphous foundation from which
innately unenforceable rights may be sourced.

As earlier noted, the privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be subjected to limitations.
Some valid limitations specifically on the privilege to seek elective office are found in the provisions9 of the
Omnibus Election Code on "Nuisance Candidates" and COMELEC Resolution No. 645210 dated December 10,
2002 outlining the instances wherein the COMELEC may motu proprio refuse to give due course to or cancel a
Certificate of Candidacy.

As long as the limitations apply to everybody equally without discrimination, however, the equal access clause
is not violated. Equality is not sacrificed as long as the burdens engendered by the limitations are meant to be
borne by any one who is minded to file a certificate of candidacy. In the case at bar, there is no showing that
any person is exempt from the limitations or the burdens which they create.

Significantly, petitioner does not challenge the constitutionality or validity of Section 69 of the Omnibus
Election Code and COMELEC Resolution No. 6452 dated 10 December 2003. Thus, their presumed validity
stands and has to be accorded due weight.

Clearly, therefore, petitioners reliance on the equal access clause in Section 26, Article II of the Constitution is
misplaced.

The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance candidates and the disqualification of candidates who
have not evinced a bona fide intention to run for office is easy to divine. The State has a compelling interest to
ensure that its electoral exercises are rational, objective, and orderly. Towards this end, the State takes into
account the practical considerations in conducting elections. Inevitably, the greater the number of candidates,
the greater the opportunities for logistical confusion, not to mention the increased allocation of time and
resources in preparation for the election. These practical difficulties should, of course, never exempt the State
from the conduct of a mandated electoral exercise. At the same time, remedial actions should be available to
alleviate these logistical hardships, whenever necessary and proper. Ultimately, a disorderly election is not
merely a textbook example of inefficiency, but a rot that erodes faith in our democratic institutions. As the
United States Supreme Court held:

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[T]here is surely an important state interest in requiring some preliminary showing of a significant modicum of
support before printing the name of a political organization and its candidates on the ballot the interest, if no
other, in avoiding confusion, deception and even frustration of the democratic [process].11

administration of elections16 and endowed with considerable latitude in adopting means and methods that will
ensure the promotion of free, orderly and honest elections.17 Moreover, the Constitution guarantees that only
bona fide candidates for public office shall be free from any form of harassment and discrimination.18 The
determination of bona fide candidates is governed by the statutes, and the concept, to our mind is,
satisfactorily defined in the Omnibus Election Code.

The COMELEC itself recognized these practical considerations when it promulgated Resolution No. 6558 on 17
January 2004, adopting the study Memorandum of its Law Department dated 11 January 2004. As observed in
the COMELECs Comment:

Now, the needed factual premises.

There is a need to limit the number of candidates especially in the case of candidates for national positions
because the election process becomes a mockery even if those who cannot clearly wage a national campaign
are allowed to run. Their names would have to be printed in the Certified List of Candidates, Voters Information
Sheet and the Official Ballots. These would entail additional costs to the government. For the official ballots in
automated counting and canvassing of votes, an additional page would amount to more or less FOUR
HUNDRED FIFTY MILLION PESOS (P450,000,000.00).

However valid the law and the COMELEC issuance involved are, their proper application in the case of the
petitioner cannot be tested and reviewed by this Court on the basis of what is now before it. The assailed
resolutions of the COMELEC do not direct the Court to the evidence which it considered in determining that
petitioner was a nuisance candidate. This precludes the Court from reviewing at this instance whether the
COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying petitioner, since such a review would
necessarily take into account the matters which the COMELEC considered in arriving at its decisions.

xxx[I]t serves no practical purpose to allow those candidates to continue if they cannot wage a decent
campaign enough to project the prospect of winning, no matter how slim.12

Petitioner has submitted to this Court mere photocopies of various documents purportedly evincing his
credentials as an eligible candidate for the presidency. Yet this Court, not being a trier of facts, can not properly
pass upon the reproductions as evidence at this level. Neither the COMELEC nor the Solicitor General appended
any document to their respective Comments.

The preparation of ballots is but one aspect that would be affected by allowance of "nuisance candidates" to
run in the elections. Our election laws provide various entitlements for candidates for public office, such as
watchers in every polling place,13 watchers in the board of canvassers,14 or even the receipt of electoral
contributions.15 Moreover, there are election rules and regulations the formulations of which are dependent on
the number of candidates in a given election.

Given these considerations, the ignominious nature of a nuisance candidacy becomes even more galling. The
organization of an election with bona fide candidates standing is onerous enough. To add into the mix
candidates with no serious intentions or capabilities to run a viable campaign would actually impair the
electoral process. This is not to mention the candidacies which are palpably ridiculous so as to constitute a onenote joke. The poll body would be bogged by irrelevant minutiae covering every step of the electoral process,
most probably posed at the instance of these nuisance candidates. It would be a senseless sacrifice on the part
of the State.

The question of whether a candidate is a nuisance candidate or not is both legal and factual. The basis of the
factual determination is not before this Court. Thus, the remand of this case for the reception of further
evidence is in order.

A word of caution is in order. What is at stake is petitioners aspiration and offer to serve in the government. It
deserves not a cursory treatment but a hearing which conforms to the requirements of due process.

As to petitioners attacks on the validity of the form for the certificate of candidacy, suffice it to say that the
form strictly complies with Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code. This provision specifically enumerates
what a certificate of candidacy should contain, with the required information tending to show that the
candidate possesses the minimum qualifications for the position aspired for as established by the Constitution
and other election laws.

Owing to the superior interest in ensuring a credible and orderly election, the State could exclude nuisance
candidates and need not indulge in, as the song goes, "their trips to the moon on gossamer wings."

The Omnibus Election Code and COMELEC Resolution No. 6452 are cognizant of the compelling State interest to
ensure orderly and credible elections by excising impediments thereto, such as nuisance candidacies that
distract and detract from the larger purpose. The COMELEC is mandated by the Constitution with the

Pearliegates

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, COMELEC Case No. SPP (MP) No. 04-001 is hereby remanded to the COMELEC for
the reception of further evidence, to determine the question on whether petitioner Elly Velez Lao Pamatong is a
nuisance candidate as contemplated in Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code.

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The COMELEC is directed to hold and complete the reception of evidence and report its findings to this Court
with deliberate dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 133840

November 13, 1998

In view of the conflicting directives, the Regional Election Director of the National Capital Region, responding to
a request made by Atty. Gauttier T. Dupaya, counsel for petitioner, gave instructions to the BEI to tally
separately either in some other portion of the same election return not intended for the tallying of votes for the
candidates for mayor, or in a separate sheet of paper, the votes for "EFREN BAUTISTA", "EFREN", "E. BAUTISTA"
and "BAUTISTA". Said instructions were affirmed in a Memorandum of the then COMELEC Chairman, directing
the BEI to "proceed with the counting of the votes for local officials excluding the votes cast for 'Bautista',
'Efren' and 'Efren Bautista' as stray but to segregate such stray votes into a separate improvised tally sheet in
order to count the total stray votes."

CIPRIANO "EFREN" BAUTISTA, petitioner,


vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MUNICIPAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF NAVOTAS, METRO
MANILA and MIGUELITA DEL ROSARIO, respondents.
MELO, J.:
Petitioner assails the order of the Commission on Elections dated May 28, 1998 which dismissed the petition he
filed seeking to declare illegal the proceeding of the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Navotas for failing to
include in the canvass the Bautista stray votes contained in a separate tally sheet.

Petitioner Cipriano "Efren" Bautista and private respondent were duly registered candidates for the position of
Mayor of Navotas, Metro Manila in the elections of May 11, 1998. Aside from said candidates, a certain Edwin
"Efren" Bautista, hereinafter referred to as Edwin Bautista, also filed a certificate of candidacy for the same
position of mayor. His certificate of candidacy was filed at midnight on March 27, 1997, the last day for such
filing. In fact, the filing was done at the very last minute.

On May 13, 1998, the COMELEC denied Edwin Bautista's motion praying for the reconsideration of the April 30,
1998 resolution declaring him a nuisance candidate.

When the canvass of the election returns was commenced, the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Navotas
refused to canvass as part of the valid votes of petitioner the separate tallies of ballots on which were written
"EFREN BAUTISTA", "EFREN", "E. BAUTISTA", and "BAUTISTA". Said ballots were tallied by the BEI separately
either on some portion of the election return not intended for votes for mayoralty candidates or in separate
sheets of paper. In view of this refusal, objections to the inclusion of the election returns were raised during the
canvass. Consequently, on May 20, 1998, petitioner filed with the COMELEC a Petition to Declare Illegal the
Proceedings of the Municipal Board of Canvassers which was docketed as SPC No. 98-10. The assailed order
resolving said petition reads in relevant part as follows:

The issue before this Commission En Banc is whether or not of the Board of Canvassers not to include in the
canvass the "Bautista stray votes" contained in the separate tally sheet constitutes an illegal proceeding
thereof?

On April 1, 1998, petitioner filed a petition praying that Edwin Bautista be declared a nuisance candidate. The
COMELEC saw merit in the petition and in a resolution dated April 30, 1998, declared Edwin Bautista a nuisance
candidate and consequently ordered the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy for the position of mayor.

We rule in the negative.

Accordingly, the name of Edwin Bautista was not included in the list of candidates for the position of mayor for
Navotas. Copies of said list were distributed by the Office of the Election Officer of Navotas to the boards of
election inspectors (BEI).

The duty of the Board of Canvassers is only to canvass what is on the face of the election returns and not to go
beyond it. Obviously, the stray votes in the separate tally sheet cannot be said to be entries in the election
returns. Thus, the ruling of respondent Board not to Include in the canvass the Bautista stay votes is correct.

On May 8, 1998, Edwin Bautista filed a motion for reconsideration. As a result, on May 10, 1998, the Election
Officer of Navotas issued a directive to the BEI to include the name of Edwin Bautista in the certified list of
candidates. Conversely, on the afternoon of the same day, the Election Officer issued another directive to the
BEI recalling his earlier directive for the inclusion of Edwin Bautista pending resolution of his motion for
reconsideration.

Further, under the Omnibus Election Code, Section 211 (4) which provides:

Pearliegates

4.
When two or more words are written on the same line on the ballot all of which are the surnames of
two or more candidates, the same shall not be counted for any of them, unless one is a surname of an
incumbent who has served for at least one year in which case it shall be counted in favor of the latter.

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Thus, under the circumstances stray votes cannot be considered a vote for either party.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition of Cipriano "Efren" Bautista is hereby DISMISSED for
lack of merit.

(p. 24-25, Rollo.)

Meanwhile, on May 18, 1998, the disqualified nuisance candidate, Edwin "Efren" Bautista, filed a petition for
certiorari with the Court, docketed as G.R No. 133607, where he assailed the actions of the COMELEC Second
Division and of respondent COMELEC En Banc, declaring him a nuisance candidate and ordering the
cancellation of his certificate of candidacy. The Court dismissed said petition on May 21, 1998, ruling that there
is no showing that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in declaring Edwin Bautista a nuisance
candidate. Edwin Bautista's motion for reconsideration of our resolution was denied with finality on July 7,
1998.

copy of the petition. The proceedings being summary, the COMELEC may rely on whatever pleading that may
have been filed by the parties. A hearing wherein the parties engage in oral argument is not required.

In Zaldivar vs. Sandiganbayan (166 SCRA 316 [1988]), we held that the right to be heard does not only refer to
the right to present verbal arguments in court. A party may also be heard through his pleadings. Where
opportunity to be heard is accorded either through oral arguments or pleadings, there is no denial of procedural
due process. As reiterated in National Semiconductor (HK) Distribution, Ltd. vs. NLRC (G.R. No. 123520, June 26,
1998), the essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative
proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side. Hence, in Navarro III vs. Damaso (246 SCRA 260 [1995]), we
held that a formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and not in all instances essential. Plainly, petitioner
was not denied due process.

We nevertheless find merit in petitioner's second argument.

The Municipal Board of Canvassers denied the inclusion, as part of petitioner's valid votes, of those votes that
were separately tallied by the BEI and the Board of Canvassers.
The instant petition posits the following grounds for nullification of the assailed COMELEC order:

UTTER LACK AND DISREGARD OF DUE PROCESS IN THE ISSUANCE OF THE QUESTIONED ORDER; and

RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO EXCESS OR LACK OF


JURISDICTION IN DENYING THE INCLUSION AS PART OF PETITIONER'S VALID VOTES THE VOTES THAT WERE
SEPARATELY TALLIED BY THE BOARDS OF ELECTION INSPECTORS AND THE RESPONDENT BOARD.

Let us first examine the due process issue as regards the issuance of the questioned order.

When petitioner raised the matter to the COMELEC, the commission upheld the act of the Board of Canvassers,
stating that the same cannot go beyond the election returns. In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General
opines that the improvised sheets of paper containing the tally of Bautista stray votes cannot be legally
considered in the canvass.

An examination of the foregoing incidents brings us to the following legal queries: (1) Did the "EFREN
BAUTISTA" (or EFREN/E. BAUTISTA/BAUTISTA) votes which were tallied in separate sheets of paper categorically
pertain to petitioner? Stated otherwise, did said separate tally reflect the intention of the voters?; (2) What is
the legal effect of the final declaration made by the COMELEC that Edwin Bautista was a nuisance candidate?
Further, what are the implications of the final and conclusive ruling of this Court on the issue? and (3) Will there
be a disenfranchisement of the voters' will if the "EFREN BAUTISTA" votes separately tallied are not counted as
votes for petitioner?

The petition resolved by COMELEC in the assailed resolution was lodged to declare illegal the proceedings of
the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Navotas due to non-inclusion of votes which herein petitioner claims to be
valid. On this score, we agree with petitioner that the matter falls under the category of special cases,
particularly a pre-proclamation controversy raising the issue of the illegality of the proceedings of the board of
canvassers (Sec. 3, Rule 27, Part V, Comelec Rules of Procedure).

At the outset and initially setting aside all the ramifications of the substantive issue of the instant petition, the
primordial concern of the Court is to verify whether or not on the day of the election, there was only one "Efren
Bautista" as a validly registered candidate as far as the electorate was concerned.

Sec. 2 of the above-stated Rule provides that all pre-proclamation controversies shall be heard summarily after
due notice. Hence, the COMELEC only has to give notice to the parties by issuing summons and by serving a

We find significant reference in the resolution of the COMELEC dated April 10, 1998 declaring Edwin Bautista a
nuisance candidate, the ratio decidendi of which reads as follows:

Pearliegates

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While Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code does not explicitly provide for grounds to declare a nuisance
candidate, it states clearly some tests, viz:

Sec. 69. Nuisance candidates. The Commission may motu proprio or upon a verified petition of an interested
party, refuse to give due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy, if it shown that said certificate has been
filed to put the election process in mockery or disrepute; or to cause confusion among the voters by the
similarity of the names of the registered candidates; or by other circumstances or acts which clearly
demonstrate that the candidate has no bona fide intention to run for the office for which the certificate of
candidacy has been field and thus prevent a faithful determination of the true will of the electorate.

In the present case, it has been established that respondent's known appellation or nickname is not "Efren" as
stated in his Certificate of Candidacy, but "Boboy" or "Boboy Tarugo". Two "EFRENS" and two "BAUTISTAS" will
necessarily confuse the voters and render worthless a vote for an "Efren" or "Bautista" during the appreciation
of ballots, thus preventing the determination of the choice and true will of the electorate. Respondent's lack of
financial means to support a campaign as an independent candidate is manifested by his inability to file his
Income Tax Returns for calendar years 1995 and 1996. This only amplifies the fact that he has no bona fide
intention to run for the position of municipal mayor of Navotas, a municipality with 104,601 registered voters.

Respondent has not demonstrated any accomplishment/achievement in his twenty-six (26) years of existence
as a person that would surely attract the electorate to choose him as their representative in government.
Elective public officials are respected leaders in the community. Respondent has not shown any.

This Commission as the vanguard of the people in the determination of the chosen representative of the
electorate in government will not be an instrument to subvert that choice. The circumstances in the case at bar
warrant that respondent be declared a nuisance candidate.

To remedy the situation which was bound to affect petitioner's candidacy, his counsel requested the COMELEC
that a directive be issued to all members of the BEI of Navotas for the preparation of a separate tally for all
votes in favor of: "Efren Bautista", "Edwin Bautista", "Efren", "Edwin", "E. Bautista", and "Bautista". The request
for the separate tally was said to have been necessitated by the pendency of the petition before the COMELEC
to disqualify Edwin Bautista for being a nuisance candidate. Since the final resolution of said petition was
delayed due to the filing of a motion for reconsideration, counsel for petitioner stated that the basis must be
laid down "for the ultimate appreciation of all Bautista votes in favor of petitioner," and the requested separate
tally sheet would "protect his substantial rights" as well as the will of the electorate.

Consequently, as mentioned above, the Regional Election Director of the National Capital Region instructed the
various boards of election inspectors to tally separately either in some other portion of the same election return
not intended for the tallying of votes for the candidates for mayor, or in a separate sheet of paper, the votes for
"EFREN BAUTISTA", "EFREN", "E. BAUTISTA", and "BAUTISTA". The then COMELEC Chairman affirmed said
directive in a Memorandum to the Board of Canvassers of Navotas for the purpose of counting the total stray
votes.

An analysis of the foregoing incidents shows that the separate tallies were made to remedy any prejudice that
may be caused by the inclusion of a potential nuisance candidate in the Navotas mayoralty race. Such inclusion
was brought about by technicality, specifically Edwin Bautista's filing of a motion for reconsideration, which
prevented the April 30, 1998 resolution disqualifying him from becoming final at that time.

Ideally, the matter should have been finally resolved prior to election day. Its pendency on election day
exposed petitioner to the evils brought about by the inclusion of a then potential, later shown in reality to be
nuisance candidate. We have ruled that a nuisance candidate is one whose certificate of candidacy is
presented and filed to cause confusion among the electorate by the similarity of the names of the registered
candidate or by other names which demonstrate that the candidate has no bona fide intention to run for the
office for which the certificate of candidacy has been filed and thus prevent a faithful determination of the true
will of the electorate (Fernandez vs. Fernandez, 36 SCRA 1 [1970]).

(pp. 28-29, Rollo.)

Edwin Bautista moved for reconsideration on May 8, 1998. Unfortunately said motion was not resolved as of
election day. Technically, the April 30, 1998 decision was not yet final as of May 11, 1998, and this technicality
created serious problems on election day.

As mentioned earlier, the name of Edwin Bautista was initially not included in the list of candidates for mayor of
Navotas. Then on election day itself May 11, 1998, Edwin Bautista's name was included in the certified list of
candidates. Later that same day, however, Edwin Bautista's name was again stricken off the list.

Pearliegates

It must be emphasized that the instant case involves a ground for disqualification which clearly affects the
voters' will and causes confusion that frustrates the same. This is precisely what election laws are trying to
protect. They give effect to, rather than frustrate, the will of the voter. Thus, extreme caution should be
observed before any ballot is invalidated. Further, in the appreciation of ballots, doubts are resolved in favor of
their validity (Silverio vs. Castro, 19 SCRA 521 [1967]).

Sec. 69 of the Omnibus Election Code sets forth that the COMELEC may motu proprio or upon a verified petition
of an interested party, refuse to give due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy if the following
situations are extant: (1) if it is shown that said certificate has been filed to put the election process in mockery
or disrepute; (2) or if said certificate was filed to cause confusion among the voters by the similarity of the
names of the registered candidate; (3) or if there are other circumstances or acts which clearly demonstrate

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Election Law Cases


that the candidate has no bona fide intention to run for the office for which the certificate of candidacy has
been filed and thus prevent a faithful determination of the true will of the electorate.

As discussed in the COMELEC's April 30, 1998 decision, in accordance with Section 69, Edwin Bautista was
found to be a nuisance candidate. First and foremost, he was running under the name of Edwin "Efren"
Bautista, when it had been established that he was really known as "Boboy" or "Boboy Tarugo". Second, the
following circumstances saliently demonstrate that he had no bona fide intention of running for the office for
which he filed his certificate of candidacy: He is said to be engaged in a "buy and sell" business, but has no
license therefor. He declared that he had a monthly income of P10,000.00, but with expenses totalling
P9,000.00. He does not own any real property. He did not file his income tax return for the years 1995 and 1996
and when asked why, he said he did not have any net income and that he was only earning enough to defray
household expenses. He even violated COMELEC rules since he failed to submit the names of individuals who
paid for his campaign materials as well as the printing press he dealt with. He did not have a political line-up
and had no funds to support his campaign expenses. He merely depended on friends whose names he did not
submit to the COMELEC. And as straightforwardly found by the COMELEC, he "has not demonstrated any
accomplishment/achievement in his twenty-six (26) years of existence as a person that would surely attract the
electorate to choose him as their representative in government."

In contrast, it was shown that petitioner had previously held under his name Cipriano and appellation, "Efren"
Bautista, various elective positions, namely: Barangay Captain of Navotas in 1962, Municipal Councilor of
Navotas in 1970, and Vice-Mayor of Navotas in 1980. He is a duly registered Naval Architect and Marine
Engineer, and a member of various civic organizations such as the Rotary Club of Navotas and the Philippine
Jaycees.

SO ORDERED.

(p. 54, Rollo.)

This important detail only shows that as of May 14, 1998, when Chairman Pardo issued the aforestated
Memorandum, Edwin Bautista had already been finally declared as a nuisance candidate by the COMELEC. And
when Edwin Bautista elevated the matter to this Court, we upheld such declaration. How then can we consider
valid the votes for Edwin Bautista whom we finally ruled as disqualified from the 1998 Navotas mayoralty race?
That is like saying one thing and doing another. These are two incompatible acts the contrariety and
inconsistency of which are all too obvious.

In this light, we now refer to the dispositive portion of COMELEC's April 30, 1998 resolution, which reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent EDWIN "EFREN" BAUTISTA is hereby declared a NUISANCE
CANDIDATE, and consequently, his CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY for the position of Municipal Mayor of Navotas,
Metro Manila is hereby ordered CANCELLED.

(pp. 29-30, Rollo.)


It seems obvious to us that the votes separately tallied are not really stray votes. Then COMELEC Chairman
Bernardo P. Pardo himself, now a respected member of the Court, in his May 14, 1998 Memorandum, allowed
the segregation of the votes for "Bautista", "Efren", and "Efren Bautista", and "E. Bautista" into a separate
improvised tally, for the purpose of later counting the votes. In fine, the COMELEC itself validated the separate
tallies since they were meant to be used in the canvassing later on to the actual number of votes cast. These
separate tallies actually made the will of the electorate determinable despite the apparent confusion caused by
a potential nuisance candidate. What remained unsaid by the COMELEC Chairman was the fact that as early as
May 13, 1998, the COMELEC had already spoken and stated its final position on the issue of whether or not
Edwin Bautista is a nuisance candidate. It had already denied Edwin's motion for reconsideration in its May 13,
1998 Order which reads:

Deliberating on the motion for reconsideration of respondent Edwin "Efren" Bautista on the grounds therein
stated, the Commission, Second Division, maintains its resolution. Commissioners Manolo B. Gorospe, Teresita
Dy-Liacco Flores and Evalyn I. Fetalino concur with the Second Division's resolution.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED. This denial is final.

Pearliegates

Strictly speaking, a cancelled certificate cannot give rise to a valid candidacy, and much less to valid votes.
However, since the aforestated ruling was not yet final on election day, how then do we determine the will of
the electorate? Factual circumstances and logic dictate that the "Bautista" and "Efren" votes which were
mistakenly deemed as "stray votes" refer to only one candidate, herein petitioner. Such votes, which represent
the voice of approximately 21,000 electors, could not have been intended for Edwin Bautista, allegedly known
in Navotas as a mere tricycle driver and worse, a drug addict, and satisfactorily and finally shown as a
candidate with no political line-up, no personal funds that could have supported this own campaign, and no
accomplishments which may be noted and considered by the public, as against a known former public officer
who had served the people of Navotas as barangay official, councilor, and as vice-mayor. To rule other wise will
definitely result in the disenfranchisement of the will of the electorate, which is, as we mentioned, the situation
that our election laws are enacted to prevent.

Verily, Edwin Bautista got only 29 votes, while petitioner under the very restrictive name Cipriano "Efren"
Bautista got 17,981 votes. To be sure, however, there are 12,034 Bautista votes which have been tallied but
not credited to petitioner, and there are 8,982 Bautista votes which were not tallied and credited to petitioner.
These Bautista votes which total 21,016 could only have been meant for petitioner and which added to the
17,981 votes he got as Cipriano "Efren" Bautista would give him a grand aggregate of 38,997 votes.

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Election Law Cases

A stray vote is invalidated because there is no way of determining the real intention of the voter. This is,
however, not the situation in the case at bar. Significantly, it has also been established that by virtue of
newspaper releases and other forms of notification, the voters were informed of the COMELEC's decision to
declare Edwin Bautista a nuisance candidate.

From another angle, it is likewise improper and strained to limit petitioner's votes to the ballots which only
indicate the name "Cipriano" when it is of public knowledge that petitioner is also known by the appellation and
nickname "Efren" which he in fact registered as his nickname.

As we said earlier, the instant petition is laden with an issue which involves several ramifications. Matters tend
to get complicated when technical rules are strictly applied. True it is, the disqualification of Edwin Bautista was
not yet final on election day. However, it is also true that the electorate of Navotas was informed of such
disqualification. The voters had constructive as well as actual knowledge of the action of the COMELEC delisting
Edwin Bautista as a candidate for mayor. Technicalities should not be permitted to defeat the intention of the
voter, especially so if that intention is discoverable from the ballot itself as in this case.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed order of respondent
COMELEC dated May 28, 1998 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is likewise directed
to order the inclusion, as part of the valid votes of petitioner, the following votes that were separately tallied by
the boards of election inspectors: "EFREN BAUTISTA", "EFREN", "E. BAUTISTA" and "BAUTISTA".
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 189034

January 11, 2010

CELESTINO A. MARTINEZ III, Petitioner,


vs.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL AND BENHUR L. SALIMBANGON, Respondents.

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 seeks to nullify the Decision1 dated May 28, 2009 of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal in HRET Case No. 07-035 dismissing the election protest and declaring

Pearliegates

private respondent as the duly elected Representative of the Fourth Legislative District of Cebu, and the
Resolution2 dated July 30, 2009 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration thereof.

The Facts

In the May 14, 2007 elections, petitioner Martinez and private respondent Salimbangon were among the
candidates for Representative in the Fourth Legislative District of Cebu Province. On March 29, 2007, Edilito C.
Martinez, a resident of Barangay Tambongon, Daan-Bantayan, Cebu, filed his certificate of candidacy for the
same position.

On April 3, 2007, Martinez filed a petition to declare Edilito C. Martinez a nuisance candidate.3 However, the
Commission on Elections Second Division issued its Resolution declaring Edilito C. Martinez a nuisance
candidate only on June 12, 2007 or almost one (1) month after the elections.

On July 9, 2007, Salimbangon was proclaimed winner in the congressional elections for the Fourth Legislative
District of Cebu on the basis of official results showing that he garnered sixty-seven thousand two hundred
seventy-seven (67,277) votes as against Martinez who garnered sixty-seven thousand one hundred seventythree (67,173) votes, or a difference of one hundred four (104) votes.

Martinez filed an Election Protest Ad Cautelam on July 18, 2007 and on July 26, 2007, the HRET granted his
motion to convert the same into a Regular Protest of all one thousand one hundred twenty-nine (1,129)
precincts of the Fourth Legislative District of Cebu.

The election protest is based on three hundred (300) ballots more or less with only "MARTINEZ" or "C.
MARTINEZ" written on the line for Representative which the Board of Election Inspectors (BEI) did not count for
Martinez on the ground that there was another congressional candidate (Edilito C. Martinez) who had the same
surname. Martinez further alleged that he lost several thousand votes as a result of incorrect appreciation of
ballots not counted in his favor while clearly marked ballots, groups of ballots which appeared to have been
prepared by one (1) person, individual ballots which appeared to have been prepared by two (2) or more
persons, and fake and unofficial ballots were read and counted in favor of Salimbangon. He also claimed that
the votes reflected in the election returns were unlawfully increased in favor of Salimbangon while votes in his
favor were unlawfully decreased.4

Salimbangon filed his Answer with Counter-Protest stating that the Minutes of Voting (MOV) inside the ballot
boxes in all the protested precincts contain no recorded objections regarding straying of votes claimed by
Martinez, and that it was very seldom, if at all, that there were ballots with only "MARTINEZ" or "C. MARTINEZ"
written on the line for Representative. He counter-protested 954 precincts on grounds of coercion/intimidation

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Election Law Cases


and duress; massive vote-buying; "lansadera"; misreading/miscounting/misappreciation of votes; and other
electoral anomalies and irregularities.

During the revision, ballots with only "MARTINEZ" or "C. MARTINEZ" written on the line for Representative were
not counted and temporarily classified as stray. These comprise majority of the 9,831 stray ballots claimed by
Martinez.5

"As it is, the delay committed by the Comelec in deciding the petition to disqualify Edilito C. Martinez as
nuisance candidate on or before May 14, 2007 election did not only cause injustice to herein protestant but
worst, had resulted to (sic) the disenfranchisement of five thousand four hundred one (5,401) electorates
whose votes could have changed the number of votes garnered by the parties herein if not changed altogether
the outcome of the election itself."91avvphi1

The final overall results of recount and appreciation of ballots, election documents and other evidence in the
entire 1,129 precincts as determined by the HRET are as follows :10
HRET Ruling
Overall Fourth District of Cebu Votes
In its Decision dated May 28, 2009, the HRET resolved each of the claims and objections respectively raised by
protestant and protestee applying the rules for appreciation of ballots. The Tribunal recognized as most crucial
the issue of whether or not ballots with only "MARTINEZ" or "C. MARTINEZ" written on the line for
Representative should be counted in favor of Martinez. Thus, the election protest "will rise or fall on how the
Tribunal [appreciates said] ballots."6

Ruling on the issue, the HRET sustained the BEI in considering the ballots as stray in accordance with Sec. 211
(1) of the Omnibus Election Code which provides:

PROTESTANT
1]

Votes per physical count* in 961 precincts where there was ballot appreciation

2]

Votes in 12 precincts** without ballots found during revision (based on election returns)

Since the name of Edilito C. Martinez was still included in the official list of candidates on election day (May 14,
2007), the HRET held that five thousand four hundred one (5,401) ballots with "MARTINEZ" or "C. MARTINEZ"
only written on the line for Representative were properly denied on the ground that there was no way of
determining the real intention of the voter. These ballots were included in the 7,544 ballots denied as votes for
Martinez in 961 precincts.8

57,758

57,132
998

3]
Votes per election returns in 156 precincts in which several spurious ballots were placed after
elections, counting and/or canvassing of votes
9,937
7,815
68,693

"Where only the first name of a candidate or only his surname is written, the vote for such candidate is valid, if
there is no other candidate with the same first name or surname for the same office."7 [EMPHASIS SUPPLIED.]

PROTESTEE

65,607

Less: Objected ballots rejected***

4,333

860

Add: Claimed ballots admitted***

2,287

2,348

Unclaimed ballots admitted***

11

Restored Ballots

Total Votes in the Contested Precincts After Appreciation of Evidence


PLURALITY OF PROTESTEE'S VOTES

66,655

67,108

453

* Taken from Revision Reports


Commiserating with Martinez on the delayed resolution of SPA Case No. 07-133 (PES), the HRET stated:
** Namely Precinct Nos. 51A, Daan-Bantayan, 40A, 56A, 79A, all of Bantayan,
"We sympathize to (sic) the protestant that he is the victim of the inaction of the Comelec in failing to decide
the petition to disqualify Edilito C. Martinez as nuisance candidate on or before the May 14, 2007 elections.
After all, it appears that the latter did not even lift a finger to oppose the petition for his declaration as
nuisance candidate and that per its decision rendered only twenty-nine (29) days after the May 14, 2007
elections, Edilito C. Martinez was indeed a nuisance candidate.

15C, 19D, 66B/67A, 88A, 105A, all of Bogo, 40A/41A, 70A/71A, all of
Medellin, 30A, Sta. Fe.

*** During appreciation of ballots in 961 precincts.

Pearliegates

204

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Election Law Cases

On the basis of the foregoing, the HRET dismissed the election protest, affirmed the proclamation of
Salimbangon and declared him to be the duly elected Representative of the Fourth Legislative District of Cebu,
having won by a plurality margin of 453 votes.

Representative for the Fourth Legislative District of Cebu as of May 14, 2007. Not a single voter in the district
knew of any nuisance congressional candidate on election day. Private respondent argues that it would be
illogical and most unfair to count the said ballots in favor of petitioner as it is erroneous to base the voter's
intent on the supervening circumstance which was inexistent on the date the ballot was accomplished and
cast. The HRET likewise did not err in holding that the Bautista ruling is inapplicable, there being no announced
declaration yet of one (1) of the candidates as nuisance candidate when the voters cast their ballots on
election day.

Martinez moved for reconsideration of the Decision, but the HRET denied it by Resolution dated July 30, 2009.
[11]
The Issues
The Petition

Petitioner alleges that the HRET gravely abused its discretion when it failed to credit the "MARTINEZ" or "C.
MARTINEZ" votes in his favor despite the finality of the COMELEC resolution declaring Edilito C. Martinez a
nuisance candidate. Petitioner argues that the Decision disenfranchised 5,401 voters when it ruled that said
votes cannot be counted as votes for him since "there is no way of determining the real intention of the voter",
in utter disregard of the mandate of Art. VIII, Sec. 14 of the Constitution. He maintains that there is no clear and
good reason to justify the rejection of those 5,401 ballots, and points out that at the time private respondent
was proclaimed by the Board of Canvassers, only 104 votes separated private respondent from him (private
respondent was credited with 67,277 votes as against 67,173 votes of petitioner, while nuisance candidate
Edilito C. Martinez got a measly 363 votes.)12

What then is the legal effect of declaring a nuisance candidate as such in a final judgment after the elections?
Should ballots containing only the similar surname of two (2) candidates be considered as stray votes or
counted in favor of the bona fide candidate?

Our Ruling

The Court finds the petition meritorious.

Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code provides:


Petitioner further alleges that the HRET invalidated ballots for him without stating the legal and factual bases
therefor, and on grounds other than the objections raised by private respondent. He contends that the HRET
erred in concluding that the ruling in Bautista v. Commission on Elections13 cannot be applied in view of
circumstances which supposedly distinguish the present case from Bautista. Finally, petitioner cites the
dissenting opinion of the Honorable Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura who disagreed with the
majority ruling and posited that the final declaration by COMELEC that Edilito C. Martinez was a nuisance
candidate and the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy should be deemed effective as of the day of the
election.14

In his Comment, private respondent assails the apparent desire of petitioner for this Court to review the
physical appreciation of ballots conducted by the HRET when he assigned as issues the alleged erroneous
invalidation by the HRET of petitioner's ballots which were ruled as written by two (2) persons, and when he
even appreciated ballots that were declared by the HRET as marked ballots. Private respondent details the
mostly post-election anomalies and irregularities, particularly in Bogo City, perpetrated by the petitioner as
found by the HRET such as tampering of election returns and statement of votes and vote padding/tampering.

As to the "MARTINEZ" and "C. MARTINEZ" ballots, private respondent asserts that the HRET correctly refused to
credit petitioner with these votes, stressing that there were admittedly three (3) candidates for the position of

Pearliegates

"Section 69. Nuisance candidates. -- The Commission may motu proprio or upon a verified petition of an
interested party, refuse to give due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy if it is shown that said
certificate has been filed to put the election process in mockery or disrepute or to cause confusion among the
voters by the similarity of the names of the registered candidates or by other circumstances or acts which
clearly demonstrate that the candidate has no bona fide intention to run for the office for which the certificate
of candidacy has been filed and thus prevent a faithful determination of the true will of the electorate."

Republic Act No. 6646, otherwise known as "The Electoral Reforms Law of 1987" provides in Section 5 thereof:

"SEC. 5. Procedure in Cases of Nuisance Candidates. --

(a) A verified petition to declare a duly registered candidate as a nuisance candidate under Section 69 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881 shall be filed personally or through duly authorized representative with the Commission by

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any registered candidate for the same office within five (5) days from the last day for the filing of certificates of
candidacy. Filing by mail shall not be allowed.

"(b) Within three (3) days from the filing of the petition, the Commission shall issue summons to the respondent
candidate together with a copy of the petition and its enclosures, if any.

"(c) The respondent shall be given three (3) days from receipt of the summons within which to file his verified
answer (not a motion to dismiss) to the petition, serving copy thereof upon the petitioner. Grounds for a motion
to dismiss may be raised as affirmative defenses.

"(d) The Commission may designate any of its officials who are lawyers to hear the case and receive evidence.
The proceeding shall be summary in nature. In lieu of oral testimonies, the parties may be required to submit
position papers together with affidavits or counter-affidavits and other documentary evidence. The hearing
officer shall immediately submit to the Commission his findings, reports, and recommendations within five (5)
days from the completion of such submission of evidence. The Commission shall render its decision within five
(5) days from receipt thereof.

"(e) The decision, order, or ruling of the Commission shall, after five (5) days from receipt of a copy thereof by
the parties, be final and executory unless stayed by the Supreme Court.

"(f) The Commission shall within twenty-four hours, through the fastest available means, disseminate its
decision or the decision of the Supreme Court to the city or municipal election registrars, boards of election
inspectors and the general public in the political subdivision concerned." [EMPHASIS SUPPLIED.]

By their very nature, proceedings in cases of nuisance candidates require prompt disposition. The declaration
of a duly registered candidate as nuisance candidate results in the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy.
The law mandates the Commission and the courts to give priority to cases of disqualification to the end that a
final decision shall be rendered not later than seven days before the election in which the disqualification is
sought.15 In many instances, however, proceedings against nuisance candidates remained pending and
undecided until election day and even after canvassing of votes had been completed.

Here, petitioner sought to declare Edilito C. Martinez as a nuisance candidate immediately after the latter filed
his certificate of candidacy as an independent candidate and long before the May 14, 2007 elections. Petitioner
averred that Edilito C. Martinez who was a driver of a motorcycle for hire, locally known as "habal-habal", did
not own any real property in his municipality, had not filed his income tax return for the past years, and being
an independent candidate did not have any political machinery to propel his candidacy nor did he have political
supporters to help him in his campaign. Petitioner claimed that Edilito C. Martinez after the filing of his
certificate of candidacy, was never heard of again and neither did he start an electoral campaign. Given such

Pearliegates

lack of bona fide intention of Edilito C. Martinez to run for the office for which he filed a certificate of candidacy,
petitioner contended that his candidacy would just cause confusion among the voters by the similarity of their
surnames, considering that petitioner was undeniably the frontrunner in the congressional district in the Fourth
Legislative District of Cebu as his mother, Rep. Clavel A. Martinez, was the incumbent Representative of the
district.16

The COMELEC's Second Division granted the petition and declared Edilito C. Martinez as a nuisance candidate.
It noted that the failure of said candidate to answer and deny the accusations against him clearly disclosed the
fact that he had no bona fide intention to run for public office. Thus, it concluded that his only purpose for filing
his certificate of candidacy was to put the election process into mockery and cause confusion among the voters
by the similarity of his surname with that of petitioner.17

No motion for reconsideration was filed by Edilito C. Martinez and neither did he appeal before this Court the
resolution declaring him a nuisance candidate. Said decision had thus become final and executory after five (5)
days from its promulgation in accordance with the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.18 But having come too late,
the decision was an empty victory for petitioner who lost to private respondent by a slim margin of 104 votes.
In his election protest, petitioner sought to have ballots with only "MARTINEZ" or "C. MARTINEZ" written on the
line for Representative counted in his favor. The HRET, however, considered such ballots numbering 5,401 as
stray and rejected petitioner's argument that the ruling in Bautista v. Comelec (supra) is applicable in this case.

Bautista involves a mayoralty candidate (Cipriano "Efren" Bautista) during the May 11, 1998 elections who filed
a petition to declare as nuisance candidate Edwin "Efren" Bautista, who filed a certificate of candidacy for the
same position at the last minute. The COMELEC granted the petition, declared Edwin Bautista a nuisance
candidate and ordered the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy. Consequently, Edwin Bautista's name
was not included in the official list of candidates for the position of mayor of Navotas City and copies of the list
were distributed to the boards of election inspectors (BEI). On May 8, 1998, Edwin filed a motion for
reconsideration and as a result, the Election Officer of Navotas issued a directive to the BEI to include the name
of Edwin Bautista in the certified list of candidates, only to recall said order in the afternoon. In view of the
conflicting directives, counsel for petitioner requested the COMELEC that instructions be given to the BEI to
tally separately the votes for "EFREN BAUTISTA", "EFREN", "E. BAUTISTA" and "BAUTISTA."

On May 13, 1998, the COMELEC denied Edwin Bautista's motion for reconsideration. When the canvass of the
election returns was commenced, the Municipal Board of Canvassers refused to canvass as part of the valid
votes of petitioner the separate tallies of ballots on which were written "EFREN BAUTISTA," "EFREN," "E.
BAUTISTA" and "BAUTISTA." Petitioner then filed with the COMELEC a petition to declare illegal the proceedings
of the Municipal Board of Canvassers. Meanwhile Edwin Bautista filed a petition for certiorari with this Court
assailing the actions of COMELEC declaring him a nuisance candidate and ordering the cancellation of his
certificate of candidacy. The Court dismissed said petition finding no grave abuse of discretion committed by
the COMELEC and subsequently also denied with finality the motion for reconsideration filed by Edwin Bautista.

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As to the petition to declare as illegal the proceedings of the Municipal Board of Canvassers for its refusal to
include the stray votes in the separate tally sheet, the COMELEC dismissed the same, citing Sec. 211 (4)19 of
the Omnibus Election Code. Petitioner Bautista elevated the case to the Supreme Court which ruled in his favor,
thus:

"At the outset and initially setting aside all the ramifications of the substantive issue of the instant petition, the
primordial concern of the Court is to verify whether or not on the day of the election, there was only one 'Efren
Bautista' as a validly registered candidate as far as the electorate was concerned.

"x x x

"Edwin Bautista moved for reconsideration on May 8, 1998. Unfortunately, said motion was not resolved as of
election day. Technically, the April 30, 1998 decision was not yet final as of May 11, 1998, and this technicality
created serious problems on election day.

"x x x

"An analysis of the foregoing incidents shows that the separate tallies were made to remedy any prejudice that
may be caused by the inclusion of a potential nuisance candidate in the Navotas mayoralty race. Such inclusion
was brought about by technicality, specifically Edwin Bautista's filing of a motion for reconsideration, which
prevented the April 30, 1998 resolution disqualifying him from becoming final at that time.

"Ideally, the matter should have been finally resolved prior to election day. Its pendency on election day
exposed petitioner to the evils brought about by the inclusion of a then potential, later shown in reality to be
nuisance candidate. We have ruled that a nuisance candidate is one whose certificate of candidacy is
presented and filed to cause confusion among the electorate by the similarity of the names of the registered
candidate or by other names which demonstrate that the candidate has no bona fide intention to run for the
office for which the certificate of candidacy has been filed and thus prevent a faithful determination of the true
will of the electorate (Fernandez vs. Fernandez, 36 SCRA 1 [1970]).

"It must be emphasized that the instant case involves a ground for disqualification which clearly affects the
voters' will and causes confusion that frustrates the same. This is precisely what election laws are trying to
protect. They give effect to, rather than frustrate, the will of the voter. Thus, extreme caution should be
observed before any ballot is invalidated. Further, in the appreciation of ballots, doubts are resolved in favor of
their validity. (Silverio vs. Castro, 19 SCRA 521 [1967]).

Pearliegates

"x x x x

"As discussed in the COMELEC's April 30, 1998 decision, in accordance with Section 69, Edwin Bautista was
found to be a nuisance candidate. First and foremost, he was running under the name of Edwin 'Efren' Bautista,
when it had been established that he was really known as 'Boboy' or 'Boboy Tarugo.' Second, the following
circumstances saliently demonstrate that he had no bona fide intention of running for the office for which he
filed his certificate of candidacy: He is said to be engaged in a 'buy and sell' business, but he has no license
therefor. He declared that he had a monthly income of P10,000.00 but with expenses totalling P9,000.00. He
does not own any real property. He did not file his income tax return for the years 1995 and 1996 and when
asked why, he said he did not have any net income and that he was only earning enough to defray household
expenses. He even violated COMELEC rules since he failed to submit the names of individuals who paid for his
campaign materials as well as the printing press he dealt with. He did not have a political line-up and had no
funds to support his campaign expenses. He merely depended on friends whose names he did not submit to
the COMELEC. And as straightforwardly found by the COMELEC, he 'has not demonstrated any
accomplishment/achievement in his twenty-six (26) years of existence as a person that would surely attract the
electorate to choose him as their representative in government.'

"In contrast, it was shown that petitioner had previously held under his name Cipriano and appellation, 'Efren'
Bautista, various elective positions, namely: Barangay Captain of Navotas in 1962, Municipal Councilor of
Navotas in 1970, and Vice-Mayor of Navotas in 1980. He is a duly registered Naval Architect and Marine
Engineer, and a member of various civic organizations such as the Rotary Club of Navotas and the Philippine
Jaycees.

"It seems obvious to us that the votes separately tallied are not really stray votes. Then COMELEC Chairman
Bernardo P. Pardo himself, now a respected member of the Court, in his May 14, 1998 Memorandum, allowed
the segregation of the votes for "Bautista," "Efren," and "Efren Bautista," and "E. Bautista" into a separate
improvised tally, for the purpose of later counting the votes. In fine, the COMELEC itself validated the separate
tallies since they were meant to be used in the canvassing later on to the actual number of votes cast. These
separate tallies actually made the will of the electorate determinable despite the apparent confusion caused by
a potential nuisance candidate. What remained unsaid by the COMELEC Chairman was the fact that as early as
May 13, 1998, the COMELEC had already spoken and stated its final position on the issue of whether or not
Edwin Bautista is a nuisance candidate. It had already denied Edwin's motion for reconsideration in its May 13,
1998 Order x x x

"x x x x

"This important detail only shows that as of May 14, 1998, when Chairman Pardo issued the aforestated
Memorandum, Edwin Bautista had already been finally declared as a nuisance candidate by the COMELEC. And
when Edwin Bautista elevated the matter to this Court, we upheld such declaration. How then can we consider
valid the votes for Edwin Bautista whom we finally ruled as disqualified from the 1998 Navotas mayoralty race?

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That is like saying one thing and doing another. These are two incompatible acts the contrariety and
inconsistency of which are all too obvious."20 [EMPHASIS SUPPLIED.]

Petitioner now invokes this Court's pronouncement in Bautista to the effect that votes indicating only the
surname of two (2) candidates should not be considered as stray but counted in favor of the bona fide
candidate after the other candidate with a similar surname was declared a nuisance candidate. In refusing to
apply the ruling in Bautista, the HRET said that the factual circumstances in said case are different, thus:

"Protestant strongly asserts that the 'MARTINEZ' or 'C. MARTINEZ' only votes be counted in his favor invoking
the ruling in the case of Bautista vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 133840, November 13, 1998 (298 SCRA 480) where the
Supreme Court held that the final and conclusive ruling on the declaration of a nuisance candidate retroacts on
the day of the election.

"We disagree.

"While the Bautista vs. Comelec case also involves a candidate declared as nuisance by the Comelec, the case
herein is not on all fours with it. x x x

It is clear that Bautista is anchored on the factual determination that the COMELEC resolution declaring Edwin
Bautista a nuisance candidate was already final since his motion for reconsideration was already denied by the
Commission when canvassing of the votes started. Hence, the segregated and separately tallied votes
containing only the similar first names/nicknames and surnames of the two (2) candidates were considered as
not really stray votes. We held that the separate tallies validated by the COMELEC actually made the will of the
electorate determinable despite the apparent confusion caused by a nuisance candidate.

In the case at bar, there was no segregation or separate tally of votes for petitioner. Unlike in Bautista, there
was simply no opportunity for petitioner to request the segregation and separate tally of expected ballots
containing only the surname "MARTINEZ" as the resolution granting his petition was promulgated only a month
later. The HRET, while not closing its eyes to the prejudice caused to petitioner by COMELEC's inaction and
delay, as well as the disenfranchisement of the 5,401 voters, refused to credit him with those votes on the
ground that there was no way of determining the real intention of the voter.

We disagree.

The purpose of an election protest is to ascertain whether the candidate proclaimed by the board of canvassers
is the lawful choice of the people. What is sought is the correction of the canvass of votes, which was the basis
of proclamation of the winning candidate. Election contests, therefore, involve the adjudication not only of
private and pecuniary interests of rival candidates, but also of paramount public interest considering the need
to dispel uncertainty over the real choice of the electorate.22

"x x x

"It is clear from the foregoing facts of the Bautista case that the nuisance candidate, Edwin Bautista, was
declared as such on April 30, 1998, eleven (11) days before the May 11, 1998 elections. Although the decision
was not yet final on Election Day because of a Motion for Reconsideration that Edwin Bautista had filed on May
8, 1998, nevertheless, his name was not included in the list of candidates for the position of Mayor for Navotas.
This is not the situation in the present case for Edilito C. Martinez was not yet declared disqualified during the
May 14, 2007 elections. There were, therefore, two (2) congressional candidates on the day of the election with
"MARTINEZ" as surname, Celestino A. Martinez and Edilito C. Martinez.

"More importantly, in the Bautista case, while the Comelec's decision declaring Edwin Bautista a nuisance
candidate had not yet attained finality on election day, May 11, 1998, the voters of Navotas were informed of
such disqualification by virtue of newspaper releases and other forms of notification. The voters in said case
had constructive as well as actual knowledge of the action of the Comelec delisting Edwin Bautista as a
candidate for mayor. This is not so in the present case for Edilito C. Martinez was not yet disqualified as
nuisance candidate during the May 14, 2007 elections. There were no newspaper releases and other forms of
notification to the voters of the Fourth District of Cebu on or before May 14, 2007 elections that Edilito C.
Martinez was disqualified as a nuisance candidate."21 [EMPHASIS SUPPLIED.]

Pearliegates

In controversies pertaining to nuisance candidates as in the case at bar, the law contemplates the likelihood of
confusion which the similarity of surnames of two (2) candidates may generate. A nuisance candidate is thus
defined as one who, based on the attendant circumstances, has no bona fide intention to run for the office for
which the certificate of candidacy has been filed, his sole purpose being the reduction of the votes of a strong
candidate, upon the expectation that ballots with only the surname of such candidate will be considered stray
and not counted for either of them.

In elections for national positions such as President, Vice-President and Senator, the sheer logistical challenge
posed by nuisance candidates gives compelling reason for the Commission to exercise its authority to eliminate
nuisance candidates who obviously have no financial capacity or serious intention to mount a nationwide
campaign. Thus we explained in Pamatong v. Commission on Elections23:

"The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance candidates and the disqualification of candidates who
have not evinced a bona fide intention to run for office is easy to divine. The State has a compelling interest to
ensure that its electoral exercises are rational, objective, and orderly. Towards this end, the State takes into
account the practical considerations in conducting elections. Inevitably, the greater the number of candidates,
the greater the opportunities for logistical confusion, not to mention the increased allocation of time and

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resources in preparation for the election. These practical difficulties should, of course, never exempt the State
from the conduct of a mandated electoral exercise. At the same time, remedial actions should be available to
alleviate these logistical hardships, whenever necessary and proper. Ultimately, a disorderly election is not
merely a textbook example of inefficiency, but a rot that erodes faith in our democratic institutions. As the
United States Supreme Court held:

[T]here is surely an important state interest in requiring some preliminary showing of a significant modicum of
support before printing the name of a political organization and its candidates on the ballot -- the interest, if no
other, in avoiding confusion, deception and even frustration of the democratic [process].

"x x x x

"There is a need to limit the number of candidates especially in the case of candidates for national positions
because the election process becomes a mockery even if those who cannot clearly wage a national campaign
are allowed to run. Their names would have to be printed in the Certified List of Candidates, Voters Information
Sheet and the Official Ballots. These would entail additional costs to the government. x x x

"The preparation of ballots is but one aspect that would be affected by allowance of "nuisance candidates" to
run in the elections. Our election laws provide various entitlements for candidates for public office, such as
watchers in every polling place, watchers in the board of canvassers, or even the receipt of electoral
contributions. Moreover, there are election rules and regulations the formulations of which are dependent on
the number of candidates in a given election.

or operators has been attributed to the last-minute disqualification of nuisance candidates by the Commission,
notably its "slow-moving" decision-making.25

As illustrated in Bautista, the pendency of proceedings against a nuisance candidate on election day inevitably
exposes the bona fide candidate to the confusion over the similarity of names that affects the voter's will and
frustrates the same. It may be that the factual scenario in Bautista is not exactly the same as in this case,
mainly because the Comelec resolution declaring Edwin Bautista a nuisance candidate was issued before and
not after the elections, with the electorate having been informed thereof through newspaper releases and other
forms of notification on the day of election. Undeniably, however, the adverse effect on the voter's will was
similarly present in this case, if not worse, considering the substantial number of ballots with only "MARTINEZ"
or "C. MARTINEZ" written on the line for Representative - over five thousand - which have been declared as
stray votes, the invalidated ballots being more than sufficient to overcome private respondent's lead of only
453 votes after the recount.

Bautista upheld the basic rule that the primordial objective of election laws is to give effect to, rather than
frustrate, the will of the voter. The inclusion of nuisance candidates turns the electoral exercise into an uneven
playing field where the bona fide candidate is faced with the prospect of having a significant number of votes
cast for him invalidated as stray votes by the mere presence of another candidate with a similar surname. Any
delay on the part of the COMELEC increases the probability of votes lost in this manner. While political
campaigners try to minimize stray votes by advising the electorate to write the full name of their candidate on
the ballot, still, election woes brought by nuisance candidates persist.

"x x x" 24 [emphasis supplied]

The Court will not speculate on whether the new automated voting system to be implemented in the May 2010
elections will lessen the possibility of confusion over the names of candidates. What needs to be stressed at
this point is the apparent failure of the HRET to give weight to relevant circumstances that make the will of the
electorate determinable, following the precedent in Bautista. These can be gleaned from the findings of the
Commission on the personal circumstances of Edilito C. Martinez clearly indicating lack of serious intent to run
for the position for which he filed his certificate of candidacy, foremost of which is his sudden absence after
such filing. In contrast to petitioner who is a well-known politician, a former municipal mayor for three (3) terms
and a strong contender for the position of Representative of the Fourth Legislative District of Cebu (then
occupied by his mother), it seems too obvious that Edilito C. Martinez was far from the voters' consciousness as
he did not even campaign nor formally launch his candidacy. The HRET likewise failed to mention the total
number of votes actually cast for Edilito C. Martinez, which can support petitioner's contention that the
"MARTINEZ" and "C. MARTINEZ" votes could not have been intended as votes for Edilito C. Martinez.

Given the realities of elections in our country and particularly contests involving local positions, what emerges
as the paramount concern in barring nuisance candidates from participating in the electoral exercise is the
avoidance of confusion and frustration of the democratic process by preventing a faithful determination of the
true will of the electorate, more than the practical considerations mentioned in Pamatong. A report published
by the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism in connection with the May 11, 1998 elections indicated
that the tactic of fielding nuisance candidates with the same surnames as leading contenders had become one
(1) "dirty trick" practiced in at least 18 parts of the country. The success of this clever scheme by political rivals

Petitioner should not be prejudiced by COMELEC's inefficiency and lethargy. Nor should the absence of
objection over straying of votes during the actual counting bar petitioner from raising the issue in his election
protest. The evidence clearly shows that Edilito C. Martinez, who did not even bother to file an answer and
simply disappeared after filing his certificate of candidacy, was an unknown in politics within the district, a
"habal-habal" driver who had neither the financial resources nor political support to sustain his candidacy. The
similarity of his surname with that of petitioner was meant to cause confusion among the voters and spoil
petitioner's chances of winning the congressional race for the Fourth Legislative District of Cebu. As it turned

"Given these considerations, the ignominious nature of a nuisance candidacy becomes even more galling. The
organization of an election with bona fide candidates standing is onerous enough. To add into the mix
candidates with no serious intentions or capabilities to run a viable campaign would actually impair the
electoral process. x x x

Pearliegates

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out, there were thousands of ballots with only "MARTINEZ" or "C. MARTINEZ" written on the line for
Representative, votes considered stray by the BEI and not counted in favor of petitioner, and which the HRET
affirmed to be invalid votes. Had the Commission timely resolved the petition to declare Edilito C. Martinez a
nuisance candidate, all such ballots with "MARTINEZ" or "C. MARTINEZ" would have been counted in favor of
petitioner and not considered stray, pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 4116,26 issued in relation to the
finality of resolutions or decisions in disqualification cases, which provides:

(5) the decision or resolution of a DIVISION on nuisance candidate, particularly where the nuisance candidate
has the same name as the bona fide candidate shall be immediately executory after the lapse of five (5) days
unless a motion for reconsideration is seasonably filed. In which case, the votes cast shall not be considered
stray but shall be counted and tallied for the bona fide candidate.

All resolutions, orders and rules inconsistent herewith are hereby modified or repealed." [emphasis supplied.]
"This pertains to the finality of decisions or resolutions of the Commission en banc or division, particularly on
Special Actions (Disqualification Cases).

Special Action cases refer to the following:

(a) Petition to deny due course to a certificate of candidacy;

(b) Petition to declare a candidate as a nuisance candidate;

(c) Petition to disqualify a candidate; and

(d) Petition to postpone or suspend an election.

Considering the foregoing and in order to guide field officials on the finality of decisions or resolutions on
special action cases (disqualification cases) the Commission, RESOLVES, as it is hereby RESOLVED, as follows:

(1) the decision or resolution of the En Banc of the Commission on disqualification cases shall become final and
executory after five (5) days from its promulgation unless restrained by the Supreme Court;

xxx

(4) the decision or resolution of the En Banc on nuisance candidates, particularly whether the nuisance
candidate has the same name as the bona fide candidate shall be immediately executory;

Pearliegates

We held in several cases that the judgments of the Electoral Tribunals are beyond judicial interference, unless
rendered without or in excess of their jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.27 The power of judicial
review may be invoked in exceptional cases upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use by the
Tribunal of its power as constitutes a clear denial of due process of law, or upon a demonstration of a very clear
unmitigated error, manifestly constituting such grave abuse of direction that there has to be a remedy for such
abuse.28 Grave abuse of discretion implies capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment amounting to lack of
jurisdiction, or arbitrary and despotic exercise of power because of passion or personal hostility. The grave
abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion or refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law.29 Respondent HRET gravely abused its discretion in affirming the proclamation of respondent
Salimbangon as the duly elected Representative of the Fourth Legislative District of Cebu despite the final
outcome of revision showing 5,401 ballots with only "MARTINEZ" or "C. "MARTINEZ" written on the line for
Representative, votes which should have been properly counted in favor of petitioner and not nullified as stray
votes, after considering all relevant circumstances clearly establishing that such votes could not have been
intended for "Edilito C. Martinez" who was declared a nuisance candidate in a final judgment.

Ensconced in our jurisprudence is the well-founded rule that laws and statutes governing election contests
especially appreciation of ballots must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the electorate in the
choice of public officials may not be defeated by technical infirmities. An election protest is imbued with public
interest so much so that the need to dispel uncertainties which becloud the real choice of the people is
imperative. 30 The prohibition against nuisance candidates is aimed precisely at preventing uncertainty and
confusion in ascertaining the true will of the electorate. Thus, in certain situations as in the case at bar, final
judgments declaring a nuisance candidate should effectively cancel the certificate of candidacy filed by such
candidate as of election day. Otherwise, potential nuisance candidates will continue to put the electoral process
into mockery by filing certificates of candidacy at the last minute and delaying resolution of any petition to
declare them as nuisance candidates until elections are held and the votes counted and canvassed.

We therefore hold that ballots indicating only the similar surname of two (2) candidates for the same position
may, in appropriate cases, be counted in favor of the bona fide candidate and not considered stray, even if the
other candidate was declared a nuisance candidate by final judgment after the elections. Accordingly, the
5,401 votes for "MARTINEZ" or "C. MARTINEZ" should be credited to petitioner giving him a total of 72,056
votes as against 67,108 total votes of private respondent. Petitioner thus garnered more votes than private
respondent with a winning margin of 4,948 votes.

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WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated May 28, 2009 and Resolution dated July 30, 2009 of
the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal in HRET Case No. 07-035 are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
Petitioner Celestino A. Martinez III is hereby declared the duly elected Representative of the Fourth Legislative
District of Cebu in the May 14, 2007 elections. This decision is immediately executory.
Let a copy of the decision be served personally upon the parties and their counsels.

Petitioner prays for the following reliefs:

1. Upon the filing of the instant Petition, a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction be
issued enjoining the taking of oath and assumption into office of Private Respondent John Lloyd Pacete as ViceMayor of the Municipality of Bugasong;

No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 192221

2. After the Petition is submitted for resolution, a decision be rendered granting the instant Petition and:
November 13, 2012

CASIMIRA S. DELA CRUZ, Petitioner,

(a) declaring as null and void the portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 8844 considering as stray the votes cast
in favor of the disqualified nuisance candidate Aurelio N. Dela Cruz;

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOHN LLOYD M. PACETE, Respondents.

(b) ordering that the votes cast in favor of Aurelio N. Dela Cruz be counted and tallied in favor of Petitioner
Casimira S. Dela Cruz pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 4116; and

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

With the adoption of automated election system in our country, one of the emerging concerns is the application
of the law on nuisance candidates under a new voting system wherein voters indicate their choice of
candidates by shading the oval corresponding to the name of their chosen candidate printed on the ballots,
instead of writing the candidate's name on the appropriate space provided in the ballots as in previous manual
elections. If the name of a nuisance candidate whose certificate of candidacy had been cancelled by the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) was still included or printed in the official ballots on election day,should
the votes cast for such nuisance candidate be considered stray or counted in favor of the bona fide candidate?

(c) requiring the Regional Trial Court of the Province of Antique where the Petitioners Election Protest is
pending to proclaim as Vice-Mayor of the Municipality of Bugasong the candidate who obtained the highest
number of votes after the votes in favor of nuisance candidate Aurelio N. Dela Cruz is counted and tallied to the
votes garnered by Petitioner Casimira S. Dela Cruz.

3. Permanently enjoining the taking of oath and assumption into office of Private Respondent if Petitioner is
proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of the Municipality of Bugasong, Province of Antique.

Other just and equitable reliefs are likewise prayed for.2

Factual Antecedents
The Case

In this petition for certiorari with prayer for injunctive relief/s under Rule 65 in conjunction with Section 2, Rule
64 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, filed on May 31, 2010, Casimira S. Dela Cruz (petitioner)
assails COMELEC Resolution No. 88441 considering as stray the votes cast in favor of certain candidates who
were either disqualified or whose COCs had been cancelled/denied due course but whose names still appeared
in the official ballots or certified lists of candidates for the May 10, 2010 elections.

Pearliegates

In the 2001, 2004 and 2007 elections, petitioner ran for and was elected member of the Sangguniang
Bayan(SB) of Bugasong, Antique. On November 28, 2009, petitioner filed her certificate of candidacy3 for the
position of Vice-Mayor of the Municipality of Bugasong, Province of Antique under the ticket of the National
Peoples Coalition (NPC). Subsequently, Aurelio N. Dela Cruz (Aurelio) also filed a certificate of candidacy4 for
the same position.

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Election Law Cases


On December 6, 2009, petitioner filed a petition5to declare Aurelio a nuisance candidate on the ground that he
filed his certificate of candidacy for the vice-mayoralty position to put the election process in mockery and to
cause confusion among voters due to the similarity of his surname with petitioners surname. Petitioner
emphasized that she is considered a very strong candidate for the said position having been elected as
member of the SB for three consecutive terms under the ticket of the NPC and obtained the fifth (2001), fourth
(2004) and third (2007) highest number of votes. In contrast, Aurelio is an unknown in the political scene with
no prior political experience as an elective official and no political party membership. Being a retiree and
having no known business, Aurelio has no sufficient source of income but since the 2007 elections petitioners
opponents have been prodding him to run for the same position as petitioner in order to sow confusion and
thwart the will of the voters of Bugasong. Petitioner further cited Aurelios miserable showing in the previous
local elections when he ran and garnered only 126 and 6 votes forthe positionsof SB member (May 2007) and
barangay captain of Barangay Maray, Bugasong (November 2007), respectively. Citing Bautista v. COMELEC,6
petitioner asserted that these circumstances clearly demonstrate Aurelios lack of a bona fide intention and
capability to run for the position of Vice-Mayor, thus preventing a faithful determination of the true will of the
electorate.

On May 1, 2010, the COMELEC En Banc issued Resolution No. 884411 listing the names of disqualified
candidates, including Aurelio, and disposing as follows:

NOW THEREFORE, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, as follows:

1. to delete the names of the foregoing candidates from the certified list of candidates; and

2. to consider stray the votes of said candidates, if voted upon.12 (Emphasis supplied)

On May 10, 2010, the first automated national and local elections proceeded as scheduled. Aurelios name
remained in the official ballots.
On January 29, 2010, the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution7 declaring Aurelio as a nuisance
candidate and cancelling his certificate of candidacy for the vice-mayoralty position in Bugasong.

Despite the declaration of Aurelio as a nuisance candidate, however, his name was not deleted in the Certified
List of Candidates8 and Official Sample Ballot9 issued by the COMELEC. The names of the candidates for ViceMayor, including Aurelio and respondent John Lloyd M. Pacete, appeared on the Official Sample Ballot as
follows:

During the canvassing of the votes by the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBOC) of Bugasong on May 13,
2010, petitioner insisted that the votes cast in favor of Aurelio be counted in her favor. However, the MBOC
refused, citing Resolution No. 8844. The Statement of Votes by Precinct for Vice-Mayor of Antique-Bugasong13
showed the following results of the voting:

TOTAL
VICE-MAYOR
Vote for not more than 1
O 1. DELA CRUZ, Aurelio N.
"REL" (IND.)

O 2. DELA CRUZ, Casimira

RANK

DELA CRUZ, AURELIO N.

532

DELA CRUZ, CASIMIRA S.

6389

PACETE, JOHN LLOYD M.

6428

Consequently, on May 13, 2010, private respondent John Lloyd M. Pacete was proclaimed Vice-Mayor of
Bugasong by the MBOC of Bugasong.14

S. "MIRAY" (NPC) O 3. PACETE, John Lloyd M.


"BINGBING" (NP)
Consequently, petitioner filed on March 23, 2010, an Urgent Ex-Parte Omnibus Motion10 praying, among other
things, that COMELEC issue an order directing the deletion of Aurelios name from the Official List of Candidates
for the position of Vice-Mayor, the Official Ballots, and other election paraphernalia to be used in Bugasong for
the May 2010 elections. She also prayed that in the event Aurelios name can no longer be deleted in time for
the May 10, 2010 elections, the COMELEC issue an order directing that all votes cast in favor of Aurelio be
credited in her favor, in accordance with COMELEC Resolution No. 4116 dated May 7, 2001.

Pearliegates

On May 21, 2010, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court of the Province of Antique an election protest
praying for (1) the tallying in her favor of the 532 votes cast for Aurelio; (2) the annulment of respondent
Pacetes proclamation as Vice-Mayor of Bugasong; and (3) her proclamation as winning candidate for the
position of Vice-Mayor of Bugasong.

Petitioners Arguments

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Election Law Cases


Considering that private respondent won by a margin of only thirty-nine (39) votes over petitioners 6,389
votes, petitioner contends that she would have clearly won the elections for Vice-Mayor of Bugasong had the
MBOC properly tallied or added the votes cast for Aurelio to her votes. Thus, petitioner insists she would have
garnered a total of 6,921 votes as against the 6,428 votes of private respondent. By issuing a directive to
consider the votes cast for Aurelio as stray votes instead of counting the same in favor of petitioner in
accordance with COMELEC Resolution No. 4116, the COMELECs First Division gravely abused its discretion.

Petitioner argues that Resolution No. 8844 violates her constitutional right to equal protection of the laws
because there is no substantial difference between the previous manual elections and the automated elections
conducted in 2010 to justify non-observance of Resolution No. 4116 issued in 2001,particularly on the matter of
votes cast for a candidate who was declared a nuisance candidate in a final judgment where such nuisance
candidate has the same name with that of the bona fide candidate. Moreover, in contrast to the assailed
resolution, COMELEC Resolution No. 4116 properly recognized the substantial distinctions between and among
(a) disqualified candidates, (b) nuisance candidates whose names are similar to those of the bona fide
candidates, (c) nuisance candidates who do not have similar names with those of the bona fide candidates, and
(d) candidates who had voluntarily withdrawn their certificates of candidacy. As a result of the failure of the
COMELECs First Division to make these important distinctions when it issued Resolution No. 8844 that applies
to disqualified candidates, nuisance candidates and all other candidates whose certificates of candidacy had
been cancelled or denied course, petitioners right to due process was clearly violated, and only made possible
the very evil that is sought to be corrected by the former rule not to consider the votes cast for the nuisance
candidate as stray but count them in favor of the bona fide candidate.

Respondents Arguments

COMELEC maintains that there is a presumption of validity with respect to its exercise of supervisory or
regulatory authority in the conduct of elections. Also, the time-honored rule is that a statute is presumed to be
constitutional and that the party assailing it must discharge the burden of clearly and convincingly proving its
invalidity. Thus, to strike down a law as unconstitutional, there must be a clear and unequivocal showing that
what the law prohibits, the statute permits. In this case, petitioner miserably failed to prove a clear breach of
the Constitution; she merely invokes a violation of the equal protection clause and due process of law without
any basis.

On the claim of equal protection violation, COMELEC contends that there is a substantial distinction between a
manual election where Resolution No. 4116 applies, and an automated election governed by Resolution No.
8844. While the votes for the nuisance candidate were not considered stray but counted in favor of the bona
fide candidate, this is no longer the rule for automated elections. COMELEC cites the following factors which
changed the previous rule: (1) the official ballots in automated elections now contain the full names of the
official candidates so that when a voter shaded an oval, it was presumed that he carefully read the name
adjacent to it and voted for that candidate, regardless of whether said candidate was later declared disqualified
or nuisance; (2) since the names of the candidates are clearly printed on the ballots, unlike in manual elections
when these were only listed in a separate sheet of paper attached to the ballot secrecy folder, the voters
intention is clearly to vote for the candidate corresponding to the shaded oval; (3) the rules on appreciation of

Pearliegates

ballots under Section 211, Article XVIII of the Omnibus Election Code apply only to elections where the names
of candidates are handwritten in the ballots; and (4) with the use of the automated election system where the
counting of votes is delegated to the Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS) machines, pre-proclamation
controversies, including complaints regarding the appreciation of ballots and allegations of misreading the
names of the candidates written, were flaws which the automation rectified. Aside from being germane to the
purpose of our election laws, Resolution No. 8844 is not limited to existing conditions as it is applicable to all
persons of the same class even in succeeding elections, and covered all disqualified and nuisance candidates
without distinction.

Lastly, COMELEC asserts there is no violation of the right to due process. For public office is not a property right
and no one has a vested right to any public office.

On his part, private respondent Pacete asserts that petitioner cannot validly claim the votes cast for Aurelio in
view of the rule provided in Section 211 (24) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, which cannot be supplanted by
Resolution No. 4116. He also cites an annotation on election law,15 invoking this Courts ruling in Kare v.
COMELEC16 that the aforesaid provision when read together with Section 72, are understood to mean that "any
vote cast in favor of a candidate, whose disqualification has already been declared final regardless of the
ground therefor, shall be considered stray."

Private respondent also points out the fact that on May 4, 2010, COMELEC caused the publication of Resolution
No. 8844 in two newspapers of general circulation in the country. There was thus an earnest effort on the part
of COMELEC to disseminate the information, especially to the voters in Bugasong, Antique, that the name of
Aurelio was printed on the official ballots as one of the candidates for Vice-Mayor. Said voters were amply
forewarned about the status of Aurelios candidacy and the consequences that will obtain should he still be
voted for. Additionally, the petitioner and Aurelio bear different first names, female and male, respectively;
petitioner and her political party engaged in a massive voter education during the campaign period,
emphasizing to her supporters that she was given the corresponding number ("2") in the official ballots, and
the voters should be very circumspect in filling up their ballots because in case of error in filling up the same,
they will not be given replacement ballots. As to the Judicial Affidavits of those who voted for petitioner
attesting to the fact of mistakenly shading the oval beside the name of Aurelio in the ballots, which was
attached to the petition, petitioner in effect would want this Court to sit in judgment as trier of facts.

Ruling of the Court

The petition is meritorious.

The only question that may be raised in a petition for certiorari under Section 2, Rule 64 of the Revised Rules of
Court is whether or not the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.17 For a petition for certiorari to prosper, there must be a clear showing of caprice and arbitrariness

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Election Law Cases


in the exercise of discretion. There is also grave abuse of discretion when there is a contravention of the
Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence.18

According to the Comelec, Section 211 (24) of the OEC is a clear legislative policy that is contrary to the rule
that the second placer cannot be declared winner.

COMELEC being a specialized agency tasked with the supervision of elections all over the country, its factual
findings, conclusions, rulings and decisions rendered on matters falling within its competence shall not be
interfered with by this Court in the absence of grave abuse of discretion or any jurisdictional infirmity or error of
law.19 In this case, Resolution No. 8844 issued by COMELEC clearly contravened existing law and jurisprudence
on the legal effect of declaration of a candidate as a nuisance candidate, especially in the case of nuisance
candidates who have the same surnames as those of bona fide candidates.

We disagree.

Private respondent argues that no grave abuse of discretion can be imputed on COMELEC when it issued
Resolution No. 8844 which is simply consistent with the rule laid down in Section 211 (24), Article XVIII and
Section 72, Article IX of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code (OEC). Said
provisions state:

SEC. 72. Effects of Disqualification cases and priority. -- The Commission and the courts shall give priority to
cases of disqualification by reason of violation of this Act to the end that a final decision shall be rendered not
later than seven days before the election in which the disqualification is sought.Any candidate who has been
declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be
counted. Nevertheless, if for any reason, a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be
disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, his violation of the
provisions of the preceding sections shall not prevent his proclamation and assumption of office.

SEC. 211. Rules for the appreciation of ballots. In the reading and appreciation of ballots, every ballot shall be
presumed to be valid unless there is clear and good reason to justify its rejection. The board of election
inspectors shall observe the following rules, bearing in mind that the object of the election is to obtain the
expression of the voters will:

The provision that served as the basis of Comelecs Decision to declare the second placer as winner in the
mayoral race should be read in relation with other provisions of the OEC. Section 72 thereof, as amended by RA
6646, provides as follows:

xxxx

When read together,these provisions are understood to mean that any vote cast in favor of a candidate, whose
disqualification has already been declared final regardless of the ground therefor, shall be considered stray. The
Comelec misconstrued this provision by limiting it only to disqualification by conviction in a final judgment.

Obviously, the disqualification of a candidate is not only by conviction in a final judgment; the law lists other
grounds for disqualification. It escapes us why the Comelec insists that Section 211(24) of the OEC is strictly for
those convicted by a final judgment. Such an interpretation is clearly inconsistent with the other provisions of
the election code.21 (Emphasis supplied; italics not ours)

Private respondent thus suggests that regardless of the ground for disqualification, the votes cast for the
disqualified candidate should result in considering the votes cast for him as stray as explicitly mandated by
Section 211(24) in relation to Section 72 of the OEC.

We disagree.

xxxx

24. Any vote cast in favor of a candidate who has been disqualified by final judgment shall be considered as
stray and shall not be counted but it shall not invalidate the ballot.

Private respondent cites the case of Kare v. COMELEC20 where this Court, construing the above provisions,
stated:

Pearliegates

It bears to stress that Sections 211 (24) and 72 applies to all disqualification cases and not to petitions to
cancel or deny due course to a certificate of candidacy such as Sections 69 (nuisance candidates) and 78
(material representation shown to be false). Notably, such facts indicating that a certificate of candidacy has
been filed "to put the election process in mockery or disrepute, or to cause confusion among the voters by the
similarity of the names of the registered candidates, or other circumstances or acts which clearly demonstrate
that the candidate has no bona fide intention to run for the office for which the certificate of candidacy has
been filed and thus prevent a faithful determination of the true will of the electorate" are not among those
grounds enumerated in Section 68 (giving money or material consideration to influence or corrupt voters or
public officials performing electoral functions, election campaign overspending and soliciting, receiving or

214

Election Law Cases


making prohibited contributions) of the OEC or Section 4022 of Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code
of 1991).

This pertains to the finality of decisions or resolutions of the commission en banc or division, particularly on
special actions (disqualification cases).

In Fermin v. COMELEC,23 this Court distinguished a petition for disqualification under Section 68 and a petition
to cancel or deny due course to a certificate of candidacy (COC) under Section 78. Said proceedings are
governed by different rules and have distinct outcomes.

special action cases refer to the following:

(a) petition to deny due course to a certificate of candidacy;


At this point, we must stress that a "Section 78" petition ought not to be interchanged or confused with a
"Section 68" petition. They are different remedies, based on different grounds, and resulting in different
eventualities. Private respondents insistence, therefore, that the petition it filed before the COMELEC in SPA
No. 07-372 is in the nature of a disqualification case under Section 68, as it is in fact captioned a "Petition for
Disqualification," does not persuade the Court.

(b) petition to declare a candidate as a nuisance candidate;

(c) petition to disqualify a candidate; and


xxxx
(d) petition to postpone or suspend an election.
To emphasize, a petition for disqualification, on the one hand, can be premised on Section 12 or 68 of the OEC,
or Section 40 of the LGC. On the other hand, a petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC can only be
grounded on a statement of a material representation in the said certificate that is false. The petitions also
have different effects. While a person who is disqualified under Section 68 is merely prohibited to continue as a
candidate, the person whose certificate is cancelled or denied due course under Section 78 is not treated as a
candidate at all, as if he/she never filed a CoC. Thus, in Miranda v. Abaya, this Court made the distinction that a
candidate who is disqualified under Section 68 can validly be substituted under Section 77 of the OEC because
he/she remains a candidate until disqualified; but a person whose CoC has been denied due course or
cancelled under Section 78 cannot be substituted because he/she is never considered a candidate.24
(Additional emphasis supplied)

Considering the foregoing and in order to guide field officials on the finality of decisions or resolutions on
special action cases (disqualification cases) the Commission, RESOLVES, as it is hereby RESOLVED, as follows:

(1) the decision or resolution of the En Banc of the Commission on disqualification cases shall become final and
executory after five (5) days from its promulgation unless restrained by the Supreme Court;

xxx
Clearly, a petition to cancel or deny due course to a COC under Section 69 as in Section 78 cannot be treated in
the same manner as a petition to disqualify under Section 68 as what COMELEC did when it applied the rule
provided in Section 72 that the votes cast for a disqualified candidate be considered stray, to those registered
candidates whose COCs had been cancelled or denied due course. Strictly speaking, a cancelled certificate
cannot give rise to a valid candidacy, and much less to valid votes. Said votes cannot be counted in favor of
the candidate whose COC was cancelled as he/she is not treated as a candidate at all, as if he/she never filed a
COC. But should these votes cast for the candidate whose COC was cancelled or denied due course be
considered stray?

(4) the decision or resolution of the En Banc on nuisance candidates, particularly whether the nuisance
candidate has the same name as the bona fide candidate shall be immediately executory;

(5) the decision or resolution of a DIVISION on nuisance candidate, particularly where the nuisance candidate
has the same name as the bona fide candidate shall be immediately executory after the lapse of five (5) days
unless a motion for reconsideration is seasonably filed. In which case, the votes cast shall not be considered
stray but shall be counted and tallied for the bona fide candidate.

COMELEC Resolution No. 4116 issued in relation to the finality of resolutions or decisions in special action
cases, provides:
All resolutions, orders and rules inconsistent herewith are hereby modified or repealed. (Emphasis supplied)25

Pearliegates

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Election Law Cases

The foregoing rule regarding the votes cast for a nuisance candidate declared as such under a final judgment
was applied by this Court in Bautista v. COMELEC26 where the name of the nuisance candidate Edwin Bautista
(having the same surname with the bona fide candidate) still appeared on the ballots on election day because
while the COMELEC rendered its decision to cancel Edwin Bautistas COC on April 30, 1998, it denied his motion
for reconsideration only on May 13, 1998 or three days after the election. We said that the votes for candidates
for mayor separately tallied on orders of the COMELEC Chairman was for the purpose of later counting the
votes and hence are not really stray votes. These separate tallies actually made the will of the electorate
determinable despite the apparent confusion caused by a potential nuisance candidate.

But since the COMELEC decision declaring Edwin Bautista a nuisance candidate was not yet final on
electionday, this Court also considered those factual circumstances showing that the votes mistakenly deemed
as "stray votes" refer to only the legitimate candidate (petitioner Efren Bautista) and could not have been
intended for Edwin Bautista. We further noted that the voters had constructive as well as actual knowledge of
the action of the COMELEC delisting Edwin Bautista as a candidate for mayor.

A stray vote is invalidated because there is no way of determining the real intention of the voter. This is,
however, not the situation in the case at bar. Significantly, it has also been established that by virtue of
newspaper releases and other forms of notification, the voters were informed of the COMELECs decision to
declare Edwin Bautista a nuisance candidate.27

In the more recent case of Martinez III v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal,28 this Court likewise
applied the rule in COMELEC Resolution No. 4116 not to consider the votes cast for a nuisance candidate stray
but to count them in favor of the bona fide candidate notwithstanding that the decision to declare him as such
was issued only after the elections.

As illustrated in Bautista, the pendency of proceedings against a nuisance candidate on election day inevitably
exposes the bona fide candidate to the confusion over the similarity of names that affects the voters will and
frustrates the same. It may be that the factual scenario in Bautista is not exactly the same as in this case,
mainly because the Comelec resolution declaring Edwin Bautista a nuisance candidate was issued before and
not after the elections, with the electorate having been informed thereof through newspaper releases and other
forms of notification on the day of election. Undeniably, however, the adverse effect on the voters will was
similarly present in this case, if not worse, considering the substantial number of ballots with only "MARTINEZ"
or

"C. MARTINEZ" written on the line for Representative - over five thousand - which have been declared as stray
votes, the invalidated ballots being more than sufficient to overcome private respondents lead of only 453
votes after the recount.29

Pearliegates

Here, Aurelio was declared a nuisance candidate long before the May 10, 2010 elections. On the basis of
Resolution No. 4116, the votes cast for him should not have been considered stray but counted in favor of
petitioner. COMELECs changing of the rule on votes cast for nuisance candidates resulted in the invalidation of
significant number of votes and the loss of petitioner to private respondent by a slim margin. We observed in
Martinez:

Bautista upheld the basic rule that the primordial objective of election laws is to give effect to, rather than
frustrate, the will of the voter. The inclusion of nuisance candidates turns the electoral exercise into an uneven
playing field where the bona fide candidate is faced with the prospect of having a significant number of votes
cast for him invalidated as stray votes by the mere presence of another candidate with a similar surname. Any
delay on the part of the COMELEC increases the probability of votes lost in this manner. While political
campaigners try to minimize stray votes by advising the electorate to write the full name of their candidate on
the ballot, still, election woes brought by nuisance candidates persist.

The Court will not speculate on whether the new automated voting system to be implemented in the May 2010
elections will lessen the possibility of confusion over the names of candidates. What needs to be stressed at
this point is the apparent failure of the HRET to give weight to relevant circumstances that make the will of the
electorate determinable, following the precedent in Bautista. x x x30

COMELEC justified the issuance of Resolution No. 8844 to amend the former rule in Resolution No. 4116 by
enumerating those changes brought about by the new automated election system to the form of official ballots,
manner of voting and counting of votes. It said that the substantial distinctions between manual and
automated elections validly altered the rules on considering the votes cast for the disqualified or nuisance
candidates. As to the rulings in Bautista and Martinez III, COMELEC opines that these find no application in the
case at bar because the rules on appreciation of ballotsapply only to elections where the names of candidates
are handwritten in the ballots.

The Court is not persuaded.

In Martinez III, we took judicial notice of the reality that, especially in local elections, political rivals or operators
benefited from the usually belated decisions by COMELEC on petitions to cancel or deny due course to COCs of
potential nuisance candidates. In such instances, political campaigners try to minimize stray votes by advising
the electorate to write the full name of their candidate on the ballot, but still, election woes brought by
nuisance candidates persist.31

As far as COMELEC is concerned, the confusion caused by similarity of surnames of candidates for the same
position and putting the electoral process in mockery or disrepute, had already been rectified by the new voting
system where the voter simply shades the oval corresponding to the name of their chosen candidate. However,
as shown in this case, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8844 on May 1, 2010, nine days before the elections,

216

Election Law Cases


with sufficient time to delete the names of disqualified candidates not just from the Certified List of Candidates
but also from the Official Ballot. Indeed, what use will it serve if COMELEC orders the names of disqualified
candidates to be deleted from list of official candidates if the official ballots still carry their names?

Let a copy of this Decision be served personally upon the parties and the Commission on Elections.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 179695

We hold that the rule in Resolution No. 4116 considering the votes cast for a nuisance candidate declared as
such in a final judgment, particularly where such nuisance candidate has the same surname as that of the
legitimate candidate, notstray but counted in favor of the latter, remains a good law. As earlier discussed, a
petition to cancel or deny a COC under Section 69 of the OEC should be distinguished from a petition to
disqualify under Section 68. Hence, the legal effect of such cancellation of a COC of a nuisance candidate
cannot be equated with a candidate disqualified on grounds provided in the OEC and Local Government Code.

December 18, 2008

MIKE A. FERMIN, petitioner,


vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and UMBRA RAMIL BAYAM DILANGALEN, respondents.

Moreover, private respondent admits that the voters were properly informed of the cancellation of COC of
Aurelio because COMELEC published the same before election day. As we pronounced in Bautista, the voters
constructive knowledge of such cancelled candidacy made their will more determinable, as it is then more
logical to conclude that the votes cast for Aurelio could have been intended only for the legitimate candidate,
petitioner. The possibility of confusion in names of candidates if the names of nuisance candidates remained on
the ballots on election day, cannot be discounted or eliminated, even under the automated voting system
especially considering that voters who mistakenly shaded the oval beside the name of the nuisance candidate
instead of the bona fide candidate they intended to vote for could no longer ask for replacement ballots to
correct the same.1wphi1

G.R. No. 182369

December 18, 2008

MIKE A. FERMIN, petitioner,


vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and UMBRA RAMIL BAYAM DILANGALEN, respondents.

Finally, upholding the former rule in Resolution No. 4116 is more consistent with the rule well-ensconced in our
jurisprudence that laws and statutes governing election contests especially appreciation of ballots must be
liberally construed to the end that the will of the electorate in the choice of public officials may not be defeated
by technical infirmities.32 Indeed, as our electoral experience had demonstrated, such infirmities and delays in
the delisting of nuisance candidates from both the Certified List of Candidates and Official Ballots only made
possible the very evil sought to be prevented by the exclusion of nuisance candidates during elections.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GIVEN DUE COURSE and the writ prayed for, accordingly GRANTED.
COMELEC Resolution No. 8844 dated May 1, 2010 insofar as it orders that the votes cast for candidates listed
therein, who were declared nuisance candidates and whose certificates of candidacy have been either
cancelled or set aside, be considered stray, is hereby declared NULL and VOID. Consequently, the 532 votes
cast for Aurelio N. Del a Cruz during the elections of May 10, 2010 should have been counted in favor of
Casimira S. Dela Cruz and not considered stray votes, making her total garnered votes 6,921 as against the
6,428 votes of private respondent John Lloyd M. Pacete who was the declared winner.

Petitioner Casimira S. Dela Cruz is hereby DECLARED the duly elected Vice-Mayor of the Municipality of
Bugasong, Province of Antique in the May 10, 2010 elections.
This Decision is immediately executory.

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DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

These consolidated petitions provide a welcome avenue for the Court to dichotomize, once and for all, two
popular remedies to prevent a candidate from running for an elective position which are indiscriminately
interchanged by the Bench and the Bar, adding confusion to the already difficult state of our jurisprudence on
election laws.

For the Courts resolution are two petitions for certiorari under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court: (1) G.R. No. 179695, which assails the June 29, 2007 Resolution1 of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) 2nd Division in SPA No. 07-372, and the September 20, 2007 Resolution2 of the COMELEC En Banc
affirming the said division resolution; and (2) G.R. No. 182369, which challenges the February 14, 2008
Resolution3 of the COMELEC 1st Division in SPR No. 45-2007, the March 13, 2008 Order4 of the COMELEC En
Banc denying petitioners motion for reconsideration, and the March 26, 2008 Entry of Judgment5 issued by the
Electoral Contests and Adjudication Department (ECAD) of the Commission in the said case.

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The relevant facts and proceedings follow.

3. THE RESPONDENT perjured himself when he swore to the truth of his statement in his Certificate of
Candidacy of being a resident of the Municipality for the last 38 years, when in truth and in fact he simply
transferred his registration from the Municipality of Kabuntalan on 13 December 2006, wherein he stated that
he has relocated to that municipality a year and six months earlier, or no earlier than June 2005.

After the creation of Shariff Kabunsuan,6 the Regional Assembly of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
(ARMM), on November 22, 2006, passed Autonomy Act No. 2057 creating the Municipality of Northern
Kabuntalan in Shariff Kabunsuan. This new municipality was constituted by separating Barangays Balong,
Damatog, Gayonga, Guiawa, Indatuan, Kapinpilan, P. Labio, Libungan, Montay, Sabaken and Tumaguinting from
the Municipality of Kabuntalan.8

4. THE RESPONDENT perjured himself when he swore to the truth of his statement in his Certificate of
Candidacy of being a resident of the Municipality for the last 38 years, when in truth and in fact he has stayed
for at least 33 years in Barangay Payan, Municipality [of] Kabunt[a]lan.

Mike A. Fermin, the petitioner in both cases, was a registered voter of Barangay Payan, Kabuntalan. On
December 13, 2006, claiming that he had been a resident of Barangay Indatuan for 1 year and 6 months,
petitioner applied with the COMELEC for the transfer of his registration record to the said barangay.9 In the
meantime, the creation of North Kabuntalan was ratified in a plebiscite on December 30, 2006,10 formally
making Barangay Indatuan a component of Northern Kabuntalan.

Thereafter, on January 8, 2007, the COMELEC approved petitioner's application for the transfer of his voting
record and registration as a voter to Precinct 21A of Barangay Indatuan, Northern Kabuntalan.11 On March 29,
2007, Fermin filed his Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) for mayor of Northern Kabuntalan in the May 14, 2007
National and Local Elections.12

On April 20, 2007, private respondent Umbra Ramil Bayam Dilangalen, another mayoralty candidate, filed a
Petition13 for Disqualification [the Dilangalen petition] against Fermin, docketed as SPA (PES) No. A07-003 [redocketed as SPA No. 07-372 before the COMELEC] with the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor of Shariff
Kabunsuan. The petition alleged that the petitioner did not possess the period of residency required for
candidacy and that he perjured himself in his CoC and in his application for transfer of voting record. The
pertinent portions of the petition follow:

5. THE RESPONDENT perjured himself when he swore to the truth of his statement in his Application for
Transfer that he is a resident of Barangay Indatuan on 13 December 2006, wherein he stated that he has
relocated to that municipality a year and six months earlier, or on or about June 2005, when in truth and in fact
he has never resided much less domiciled himself in Indatuan or anywhere else in the Municipality of Northern
Kabuntalan earlier than 14 May 2006.

6. THE RESPONDENT perjured himself when he swore to the truth of his statement in his Certificate of
Candidacy of being a resident of the Municipality for the last 38 years, when in truth and in fact he has never
resided in the Municipality, but was simply visiting the area whenever election is [f]ast approaching.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed that, [in consideration] of the Respondent not
possessing the residence required for candidacy, and having perjured himself in a number of times, the
Commission disqualify the Respondent.14

Elections were held without any decision being rendered by the COMELEC in the said case. After the counting
and canvassing of votes, Dilangalen emerged as the victor with 1,849 votes over Fermins 1,640.15 The latter
subsequently filed an election protest (Election Case No. 2007-022) with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
13 of Cotabato City.16

1. THE PETITIONER is of legal age, a registered voter, resident and incumbent Municipal Mayor of the
Municipality of Northern Kabuntalan, holding office at Barangay Paulino Labio in the Municipality of Northern
Kabuntalan where he may be served summons and other legal processes.

G.R. No. 179695

2. THE PETITIONER is a candidate for election as Mayor in the same Municipality of Northern Kabuntalan, being
a resident of and domiciled in the Municipality since birth. The Respondent is also a candidate for the same
office, Mayor in the same Municipality of Northern Kabuntalan. He is, however, not a resident of the
Municipality.

On June 29, 2007, the COMELEC 2nd Division, in SPA No. 07-372, disqualified Fermin for not being a resident of
Northern Kabuntalan.17 It ruled that, based on his declaration that he is a resident of Barangay Payan as of
April 27, 2006 in his oath of office before Datu Andal Ampatuan, Fermin could not have been a resident of
Barangay Indatuan for at least one year.18

The COMELEC En Banc, on September 20, 2007, affirmed the Division's ruling.19

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Election Law Cases

Thus, petitioner instituted G.R. No. 179695 before this Court raising the following issues:

Private respondent likewise posits that petitioner failed to comply with the one-year residency requirement for
him to be able to run for an elective office in Northern Kabuntalan. Petitioner applied for the transfer of his
voting record on December 13, 2006, and this was approved only on January 8, 2007.25

A.

G.R. No. 182369

WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITION TO DISQUALIFY PETITIONER FROM SEEKING THE MAYORALTY POST OF THE
MUNICIPALITY OF NORTHERN KABUNTALAN SHOULD BE DISMISSED FOR HAVING BEEN FILED OUT OF TIME.

During the pendency of G.R. No. 179695 with the Court, Dilangalen filed, on September 27, 2007, with the RTC
of Cotabato a motion to dismiss Election Case No. 07-022 on the ground that Fermin had no legal standing to
file the said protest, the COMELEC En Banc having already affirmed his disqualification as a candidate; and this
Court, in the abovementioned case, did not issue an order restraining the implementation of the assailed
COMELEC resolutions.

B.

WHETHER OR NOT THE ONE (1) YEAR RESIDENCY REQUIREMENT AS PROVIDED BY ART. 56, PAR. NO. 3, RULE
XIII, RULES AND REGULATIONS IMPLEMENTING THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF THE AUTONOMOUS REGION
IN MUSLIM MINDANAO IS APPLICABLE TO PETITIONER, WHO TRANSFERRED HIS VOTER'S REGISTRATION
RECORD DUE TO CHANGE OF RESIDENCE FROM BARANGAY PAYAN TO BARANGAY INDATUAN IN THE SAME
MUNICIPALITY OF KABUNTALAN.20

Petitioner contends that the Dilangalen petition is a petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC under
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC).21 Following Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6646, the same must be
filed within 5 days from the last day for the filing of CoC, which, in this case, is March 30, 2007, and considering
that the said petition was filed by Dilangalen only on April 20, 2007, the same was filed out of time. The
COMELEC should have then dismissed SPA No. 07-372 outright.22

Petitioner further argues that he has been a resident of Barangay Indatuan long before the creation of Northern
Kabuntalan. This change of residence prompted him to apply for the transfer of his voters registration record
from Barangay Payan to Barangay Indatuan. Moreover, the one year residency requirement under the law is not
applicable to candidates for elective office in a newly created municipality, because the length of residency of
all its inhabitants is reckoned from the effective date of its creation.23

The RTC, however, denied this motion on September 28, 2007. On motion for reconsideration, the trial court
remained steadfast in its stand that the election protest was separate and distinct from the COMELEC
proceedings, and that, unless restrained by the proper authority, it would continue hearing the protest.26

Assailing the RTCs denial of his motions, Dilangalen filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition27 docketed as
SPR No. 45-2007 with the COMELEC. On February 14, 2008, the COMELEC 1st Division set aside the aforesaid
orders of the trial court for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion, prohibited the said court from
acting on and proceeding with the protest, and ordered it to dismiss the same.28 The COMELEC En Banc, on
March 13, 2008, denied petitioners motion for the reconsideration of the divisions ruling on account of
Fermins failure to pay the required fees. It further directed the issuance of an entry of judgment in the said
case.29 On March 26, 2008, the ECAD recorded the finality of the ruling in SPR No. 45-2007 in the Book of
Entries of Judgments.30

These developments prompted Fermin to file another certiorari petition before this Court, docketed as G.R. No.
182369. In this petition, Fermin raises the following issues for our resolution:

A.
In his comment, private respondent counters that the petition it filed is one for disqualification under Section
68 of the OEC which may be filed at any time after the last day for filing of the CoC but not later than the
candidates proclamation should he win in the elections. As he filed the petition on April 20, 2007, long before
the proclamation of the eventual winning candidate, the same was filed on time.24

Whether or not public respondent has departed from the accepted and usual course of its rules of procedure, as
to call for an exercise of the power of supervision by the Honorable Court.

B.

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Election Law Cases


Whether or not public respondent in taking cognizance of the certiorari and prohibition not in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction, acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or in (sic) excess [of jurisdiction].

C.

Whether or not public respondent, in ordering Judge Ibrahim to dismiss the election protest case, acted without
or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in (sic) excess of jurisdiction.

Whether or not public respondent has jurisdiction to divest the Court of Judge Ibrahim of its jurisdiction on the
election protest case.31

The Court, on April 29, 2008, initially dismissed the said petition.32 Fermin subsequently filed in succession his
motions for reconsideration and for the consolidation of G.R. Nos. 179695 & 182369. Considering that the two
petitions were interrelated, the Court resolved to consolidate them.

The Issues
D.
The primordial issues in these consolidated cases may be encapsulated, as follows:
Whether or not public respondent, in not uniformly observing its process in the service of its resolution and/or
order, had denied to petitioner the equal protection of the law.

E.

(1) Whether or not the Dilangalen petition is one under Section 68 or Section 78 of the OEC;

(2) Whether or not it was filed on time;

Whether or not the petition for certiorari and prohibition is dismissible in view of the pendency of another
action and whereby the result of the first action is determinative of the second action in any event and
regardless of which party is successful.

(3) Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abuse its discretion when it declared petitioner as not a resident of
the locality for at least one year prior to the May 14, 2007 elections; and

F.

(4) Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abuse its discretion when it ordered the dismissal of Election Case No.
07-022 on the ground that Fermin had no legal standing to file the protest.

Whether or not there is forum shopping.

G.

Our Ruling

I.

Whether or not the public respondent, acting not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, has authority to issue TRO
and/or Preliminary Injunction as ancillary remedy of the original action for certiorari and prohibition.

Pivotal in the ascertainment of the timeliness of the Dilangalen petition is its proper characterization.

H.

As aforesaid, petitioner, on the one hand, argues that the Dilangalen petition was filed pursuant to Section 78
of the OEC; while private respondent counters that the same is based on Section 68 of the Code.

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Election Law Cases

After studying the said petition in detail, the Court finds that the same is in the nature of a petition to deny due
course to or cancel a CoC under Section 7833 of the OEC. The petition contains the essential allegations of a
"Section 78" petition, namely: (1) the candidate made a representation in his certificate; (2) the representation
pertains to a material matter which would affect the substantive rights of the candidate (the right to run for the
election for which he filed his certificate); and (3) the candidate made the false representation with the
intention to deceive the electorate as to his qualification for public office or deliberately attempted to mislead,
misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render him ineligible.34 It likewise appropriately raises a
question on a candidates eligibility for public office, in this case, his possession of the one-year residency
requirement under the law.

k, v, and cc, subparagraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected,
from holding the office. Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall
not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as a
permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided
for in the election laws.

Likewise, the other provisions of law referring to "disqualification" do not include the lack of the one-year
residency qualification as a ground therefor, thus:

Sections 12 of the OEC


Lest it be misunderstood, the denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC is not based on the lack of
qualifications but on a finding that the candidate made a material representation that is false, which may relate
to the qualifications required of the public office he/she is running for. It is noted that the candidate states in
his/her CoC that he/she is eligible for the office he/she seeks. Section 78 of the OEC, therefore, is to be read in
relation to the constitutional35 and statutory36 provisions on qualifications or eligibility for public office. If the
candidate subsequently states a material representation in the CoC that is false, the COMELEC, following the
law, is empowered to deny due course to or cancel such certificate.37 Indeed, the Court has already likened a
proceeding under Section 78 to a quo warranto proceeding under Section 25338 of the OEC since they both
deal with the eligibility or qualification of a candidate,39 with the distinction mainly in the fact that a "Section
78" petition is filed before proclamation, while a petition for quo warranto is filed after proclamation of the
wining candidate.

At this point, we must stress that a "Section 78" petition ought not to be interchanged or confused with a
"Section 68" petition. They are different remedies, based on different grounds, and resulting in different
eventualities. Private respondents insistence, therefore, that the petition it filed before the COMELEC in SPA
No. 07-372 is in the nature of a disqualification case under Section 68, as it is in fact captioned a "Petition for
Disqualification," does not persuade the Court.

SEC. 12. Disqualifications.Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or incompetent,
or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion, or for any offense for which he
has been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall
be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted
amnesty.

The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed upon the declaration by
competent authority that said insanity or incompetence had been removed or after the expiration of a period of
five years from his service or sentence, unless within the same period he again becomes disqualified.

Section 40 of the Local Government Code (LGC)40

SECTION 40. DisqualificationsThe following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local
position:
The ground raised in the Dilangalen petition is that Fermin allegedly lacked one of the qualifications to be
elected as mayor of Northern Kabuntalan, i.e., he had not established residence in the said locality for at least
one year immediately preceding the election. Failure to meet the one-year residency requirement for the public
office is not a ground for the "disqualification" of a candidate under Section 68. The provision only refers to the
commission of prohibited acts and the possession of a permanent resident status in a foreign country as
grounds for disqualification, thus:

(a) Those sentence by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by
one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence;

(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;


SEC. 68. Disqualifications.Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party is declared by final
decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having (a) given money or other
material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral
functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign an
amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited
under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e,

Pearliegates

(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the Republic;

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(d) Those with dual citizenship;

C. PETITION TO DISQUALIFY A CANDIDATE PURSUANT TO SEC. 68 OF THE OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE AND
PETITION TO DISQUALIFY FOR LACK OF QUALIFICATIONS OR POSSESSING SOME GROUNDS FOR
DISQUALIFICATION

(e) Fugitive from justice in criminal or nonpolitical cases here or abroad;

(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to reside abroad and continue
to avail of the same right after the effectivity of this Code; and

(g) The insane or feeble-minded.

Considering that the Dilangalen petition does not state any of these grounds for disqualification, it cannot be
categorized as a "Section 68" petition.

To emphasize, a petition for disqualification, on the one hand, can be premised on Section 12 or 68 of the OEC,
or Section 40 of the LGC. On the other hand, a petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC can only be
grounded on a statement of a material representation in the said certificate that is false. The petitions also
have different effects. While a person who is disqualified under Section 68 is merely prohibited to continue as a
candidate, the person whose certificate is cancelled or denied due course under Section 78 is not treated as a
candidate at all, as if he/she never filed a CoC. Thus, in Miranda v. Abaya,41 this Court made the distinction
that a candidate who is disqualified under Section 68 can validly be substituted under Section 77 of the OEC
because he/she remains a candidate until disqualified; but a person whose CoC has been denied due course or
cancelled under Section 78 cannot be substituted because he/she is never considered a candidate.42

1) A verified petition to disqualify a candidate pursuant to Sec. 68 of the OEC and the verified petition to
disqualify a candidate for lack of qualifications or possessing some grounds for disqualification may be filed on
any day after the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy but not later than the date of proclamation.

xxxx

3) The petition to disqualify a candidate for lack of qualification or possessing some grounds for disqualification,
shall be filed in ten (10) legible copies with the concerned office mentioned in Sec. 3 hereof, personally or
through a duly authorized representative by any person of voting age, or duly registered political party,
organization or coalition of political parties on the grounds that any candidate does not possess all the
qualifications of a candidate as provided for by the constitution or by existing law, or who possesses some
grounds for disqualification,

3.a. Disqualification under existing election laws:

1. For not being a citizen of the Philippines;

2. For being a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country;


In support of his claim that he actually filed a "petition for disqualification" and not a "petition to deny due
course to or cancel a CoC," Dilangalen takes refuge in Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure,43
specifically Section 144 thereof, to the extent that it states, "[a]ny candidate who does not possess all the
qualifications of a candidate as provided for by the Constitution or by existing law x x x may be disqualified
from continuing as a candidate," and COMELEC Resolution No. 780045 (Rules Delegating to COMELEC Field
Officials the Authority to Hear and Receive Evidence in Disqualification Cases Filed in Connection with the May
14, 2007 National and Local Elections), which states in Section 5(C)(1) and (3)(a)(4) that:

Sec. 5. Procedure in filing petitions.For purposes of the preceding section, the following procedure shall be
observed:

3. For lack of the required age;

4. For lack of residence;

5. For not being a registered voter;

6. For not being able to read and write;

xxxx

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7. In case of a party-list nominee, for not being a bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks
to represent for at least ninety (90) days immediately preceding the day of the election. [Emphasis supplied.]

We disagree. A COMELEC rule or resolution cannot supplant or vary the legislative enactments that distinguish
the grounds for disqualification from those of ineligibility, and the appropriate proceedings to raise the said
grounds. In other words, Rule 25 and COMELEC Resolution No. 7800 cannot supersede the dissimilar
requirements of the law for the filing of a petition for disqualification under Section 68, and a petition for the
denial of due course to or cancellation of CoC under Section 78 of the OEC.46 As aptly observed by the eminent
constitutionalist, Supreme Court Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, in his separate opinion in Romualdez-Marcos v.
Commission on Elections:47

Apparently realizing the lack of an authorized proceeding for declaring the ineligibility of candidates, the
COMELEC amended its rules on February 15, 1993 so as to provide in Rule 25, 1 the following:

Indeed, provisions for disqualifications on the ground that the candidate is guilty of prohibited election
practices or offenses, like other pre-proclamation remedies, are aimed at the detestable practice of "grabbing
the proclamation and prolonging the election protest," through the use of "manufactured" election returns or
resort to other trickery for the purpose of altering the results of the election. This rationale does not apply to
cases for determining a candidates qualifications for office before the election. To the contrary, it is the
candidate against whom a proceeding for disqualification is brought who could be prejudiced because he could
be prevented from assuming office even though in the end he prevails.48

Furthermore, the procedure laid down in the said Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure cannot be used in
"Section 78" proceedings, precisely because a different rule, Rule 23,49 specifically governs petitions to deny
due course to or cancel CoCs.

II.
Grounds for disqualification. Any candidate who does not possess all the qualifications of a candidate as
provided for by the Constitution or by existing law or who commits any act declared by law to be grounds for
disqualification may be disqualified from continuing as a candidate.

The lack of provision for declaring the ineligibility of candidates, however, cannot be supplied by a mere rule.
Such an act is equivalent to the creation of a cause of action which is a substantive matter which the COMELEC,
in the exercise of its rule-making power under Art. IX, A, 6 of the Constitution, cannot do. It is noteworthy that
the Constitution withholds from the COMELEC even the power to decide cases involving the right to vote, which
essentially involves an inquiry into qualifications based on age, residence and citizenship of voters. [Art. IX, C,
2(3)]

The assimilation in Rule 25 of the COMELEC rules of grounds for ineligibility into grounds for disqualification is
contrary to the evident intention of the law. For not only in their grounds but also in their consequences are
proceedings for "disqualification" different from those for a declaration of "ineligibility." "Disqualification"
proceedings, as already stated, are based on grounds specified in 12 and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code
and in 40 of the Local Government Code and are for the purpose of barring an individual from becoming a
candidate or from continuing as a candidate for public office. In a word, their purpose is to eliminate a
candidate from the race either from the start or during its progress. "Ineligibility," on the other hand, refers to
the lack of the qualifications prescribed in the Constitution or the statutes for holding public office and the
purpose of the proceedings for declaration of ineligibility is to remove the incumbent from office.

Consequently, that an individual possesses the qualifications for a public office does not imply that he is not
disqualified from becoming a candidate or continuing as a candidate for a public office and vice-versa. We have
this sort of dichotomy in our Naturalization Law. (C.A. No. 473) That an alien has the qualifications prescribed in
2 of the law does not imply that he does not suffer from any of [the] disqualifications provided in 4.

Pearliegates

Having thus determined that the Dilangalen petition is one under Section 78 of the OEC, the Court now
declares that the same has to comply with the 25-day statutory period for its filing. Aznar v. Commission on
Elections50 and Loong v. Commission on Elections51 give ascendancy to the express mandate of the law that
"the petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy." Construed in relation to reglementary periods and the principles of prescription, the
dismissal of "Section 78" petitions filed beyond the 25-day period must come as a matter of course.

We find it necessary to point out that Sections 5 and 752 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6646,53 contrary to the
erroneous arguments of both parties, did not in any way amend the period for filing "Section 78" petitions.
While Section 7 of the said law makes reference to Section 5 on the procedure in the conduct of cases for the
denial of due course to the CoCs of nuisance candidates54 (retired Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., in his
dissenting opinion in Aquino v. Commission on Elections55 explains that "the procedure hereinabove provided
mentioned in Section 7 cannot be construed to refer to Section 6 which does not provide for a procedure but for
the effects of disqualification cases, [but] can only refer to the procedure provided in Section 5 of the said Act
on nuisance candidates x x x."), the same cannot be taken to mean that the 25-day period for filing "Section
78" petitions under the OEC is changed to 5 days counted from the last day for the filing of CoCs. The clear
language of Section 78 certainly cannot be amended or modified by the mere reference in a subsequent
statute to the use of a procedure specifically intended for another type of action. Cardinal is the rule in
statutory construction that repeals by implication are disfavored and will not be so declared by the Court unless
the intent of the legislators is manifest.56 In addition, it is noteworthy that Loong,57 which upheld the 25-day
period for filing "Section 78" petitions, was decided long after the enactment of R.A. 6646. In this regard, we
therefore find as contrary to the unequivocal mandate of the law, Rule 23, Section 2 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure which states:

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Sec. 2. Period to File Petition.The petition must be filed within five (5) days following the last day for the filing
of certificates of candidacy.

2007 elections.61 Petitioner merely admitted that he was a resident of another locality as of April 27, 2006,
which was more than a year before the elections. It is not inconsistent with his subsequent claim that he
complied with the residency requirement for the elective office, as petitioner could have transferred to
Barangay Indatuan after April 27, 2006, on or before May 14, 2006.

As the law stands, the petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC "may be filed at any time not later than
twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy."

Accordingly, it is necessary to determine when Fermin filed his CoC in order to ascertain whether the
Dilangalen petition filed on April 20, 2007 was well within the restrictive 25-day period. If it was not, then the
COMELEC should have, as discussed above, dismissed the petition outright.

The record in these cases reveals that Fermin filed his CoC for mayor of Northern Kabuntalan for the May 14,
2007 National and Local Elections on March 29, 2007.58 It is clear therefore that the petition to deny due
course to or cancel Fermins CoC was filed by Dilangalen well within the 25-day reglementary period. The
COMELEC therefore did not abuse its discretion, much more gravely, when it did not dismiss the petition
outright.

III.

However, the Court finds the COMELEC to have gravely abused its discretion when it precipitately declared that
Fermin was not a resident of Northern Kabuntalan for at least one year prior to the said elections.

In its assailed June 29, 2007 Resolution, 59 the COMELEC ruled as follows:

In the petitioners memorandum, an authenticated copy of the respondents oath of office subscribed and
sworn to before Datu Andal Ampatuan, Governor Maguindanao Province, it was stated that respondents
residence is at Barangay Payan, Maguindanao (sic) as of April 27, 2006. Clearly the respondent is not a resident
of Northern Kabuntalan earlier than 15 May 2006 as his very own oath of office would reveal that he is really a
resident of Barangay Payan, Kabuntalan less than 365 days immediately preceding the May 14, 2007 elections.
He is a resident of a barangay not a component of the local government unit in which he seeks to be elected as
of May 15, 2006 and is therefore not qualified or eligible to seek election as mayor in the said municipality.60

Neither does this evidence support the allegation that petitioner failed to comply with the residency
requirement for the transfer of his voting record from Barangay Payan to Barangay Indatuan. Given that a voter
is required to reside in the place wherein he proposes to vote only for six months immediately preceding the
election,62 petitioners application for transfer on December 13, 2006 does not contradict his earlier admission
that he was a resident of Barangay Payan as of April 27, 2006. Be that as it may, the issue involved in the
Dilangalen petition is whether or not petitioner made a material representation that is false in his CoC, and not
in his application for the transfer of his registration and voting record.

The foregoing considered, the Court finds that the Dilangalen petition does not make out a prima facie case. Its
dismissal is therefore warranted. We emphasize that the mere filing of a petition and the convenient allegation
therein that a candidate does not reside in the locality where he seeks to be elected is insufficient to effect the
cancellation of his CoC. Convincing evidence must substantiate every allegation.63 A litigating party is said to
have a prima facie case when the evidence in his favor is sufficiently strong for his opponent to be called on to
answer it. A prima facie case, then, is one which is established by sufficient evidence and can be overthrown
only by rebutting evidence adduced on the other side.64

IV.

In light of the foregoing disquisition, the COMELECs order for the dismissal of Fermins election protest is
tainted with grave abuse of discretion, considering that the same is premised on Fermins alleged lack of legal
standing to file the protest, which, in turn, is based on Fermins alleged lack of residency qualification. With our
disposition herein that the Dilangalen petition should be dismissed, a disquisition that Fermin has no standing
as a candidate would be reckless and improper.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions for certiorari are GRANTED. The assailed issuances of the
COMELEC are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.
Obviously, the COMELEC relied on a single piece of evidence to support its finding that petitioner was not a
resident of Barangay Indatuan, Northern Kabuntalan, i.e., the oath of office subscribed and sworn to before
Governor Datu Andal Ampatuan, in which petitioner indicated that he was a resident of Barangay Payan,
Kabuntalan as of April 27, 2006. However, this single piece of evidence does not necessarily support a finding
that petitioner was not a resident of Northern Kabuntalan as of May 14, 2006, or one year prior to the May 14,

Pearliegates

G.R. No. 191938

July 2, 2010

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ABRAHAM KAHLIL B. MITRA, Petitioner,

Municipality of Aborlan and Puerto Princesa City. He was elected Representative as a domiciliary of Puerto
Princesa City, and represented the legislative district for three (3) terms immediately before the elections of
2010.7

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ANTONIO V. GONZALES, and ORLANDO R. BALBON, JR., Respondents.

The minimum requirement under our Constitution1 and election laws2 for the candidates residency in the
political unit they seek to represent has never been intended to be an empty formalistic condition; it carries
with it a very specific purpose: to prevent "stranger[s] or newcomer[s] unacquainted with the conditions and
needs of a community" from seeking elective offices in that community.3

The requirement is rooted in the recognition that officials of districts or localities should not only be acquainted
with the metes and bounds of their constituencies; more importantly, they should know their constituencies
and the unique circumstances of their constituents their needs, difficulties, aspirations, potentials for growth
and development, and all matters vital to their common welfare. Familiarity, or the opportunity to be familiar,
with these circumstances can only come with residency in the constituency to be represented.

The purpose of the residency requirement is "best met by individuals who have either had actual residence in
the area for a given period or who have been domiciled in the same area either by origin or by choice."4 At the
same time, the constituents themselves can best know and evaluate the candidates qualifications and fitness
for office if these candidates have lived among them.5

Read and understood in this manner, residency can readily be appreciated as a requirement that goes into the
heart of our democratic system; it directly supports the purpose of representation electing those who can
best serve the community because of their knowledge and sensitivity to its needs. It likewise adds meaning
and substance to the voters freedom of choice in the electoral exercise that characterizes every democracy.

In the present case, the respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) canceled the certificate of candidacy
(COC) of petitioner Abraham Kahlil B. Mitra for allegedly misrepresenting that he is a resident of the
Municipality of Aborlan, Province of Palawan where he ran for the position of Governor. Mitra came to this Court
to seek the reversal of the cancellation.6

The Antecedents

When his COC for the position of Governor of Palawan was declared cancelled, Mitra was the incumbent
Representative of the Second District of Palawan. This district then included, among other territories, the

Pearliegates

On March 26, 2007 (or before the end of Mitras second term as Representative), Puerto Princesa City was
reclassified as a "highly urbanized city" and thus ceased to be a component city of the Province of Palawan. The
direct legal consequence of this new status was the ineligibility of Puerto Princesa City residents from voting for
candidates for elective provincial officials.8

On March 20, 2009, with the intention of running for the position of Governor, Mitra applied for the transfer of
his Voters Registration Record from Precinct No. 03720 of Brgy. Sta. Monica, Puerto Princesa City, to Sitio
Maligaya, Brgy. Isaub, Municipality of Aborlan, Province of Palawan. He subsequently filed his COC for the
position of Governor of Palawan as a resident of Aborlan.9

Soon thereafter, respondents Antonio V. Gonzales and Orlando R. Balbon, Jr. (the respondents) filed a petition to
deny due course or to cancel Mitras COC.10 They essentially argued that Mitra remains a resident of Puerto
Princesa City who has not yet established residence in Aborlan, and is therefore not qualified to run for
Governor of Palawan. Mitra insisted in his Answer that he has successfully abandoned Puerto Princesa City as
his domicile of origin, and has established a new domicile in Aborlan since 2008.11

The Parties Claims and Evidence

The respondents petition before the COMELEC claimed that Mitras COC should be cancelled under the
following factual premises: (a) Mitra bought, in June 2009, a parcel of land in Aborlan where he began to
construct a house, but up to the time of the filing of the petition to deny due course or to cancel Mitras COC,
the house had yet to be completed; (b) in the document of sale, Puerto Princesa City was stated as Mitras
residence (attached as Annex "J" of the Respondents Petition before the COMELEC);12 (c) Mitras Puerto
Princesa City residence was similarly stated in his application for a building permit (attached as Annex "K" of
the Respondents Petition before the COMELEC);13 and (d) Mitras community tax certificate states that his
residence was Puerto Princesa City (attached as Annex "M" of the Respondents Petition before the
COMELEC).14 The respondents presented several affidavits attesting to the non-completion of the construction
of the house,15 and asserted that without a fully constructed house, Mitra could not claim residence in Aborlan.

Mitra denied the respondents allegations in his Answer. He claimed that the respondents misled the COMELEC
by presenting photographs of his unfinished house on the land he purchased from a certain Rexter Temple. He
claimed, on the contrary, that his residence is located inside the premises of the Maligaya Feedmill and Farm
(Maligaya Feedmill) which the owner, Carme Caspe, leased to him; and that he purchased a farm and presently
has an experimental pineapple plantation and a cock farm. The transfer of his residence, he claimed, began in
2008.16

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He submitted the following: (a) the Sinumpaang Salaysay of Ricardo Temple; Florame T. Gabrillo, the Punong
Barangay of Isaub, Aborlan; Marissa U. Zumarraga, Councilor of Aborlan; Virginia J. Agpao and Elsa M. Dalisay,
both Sangguniang Barangay members of Isaub, Aborlan, attesting that Mitra resides in their locality;17 (b)
photographs of the residential portion of the Maligaya Feedmill18 where he claims to reside, and of his Aborlan
experimental pineapple plantation, farm, farmhouse and cock farm;19 (c) the lease contract over the Maligaya
Feedmill;20 (d) the community tax certificate he claims he himself secured, stating that Aborlan is his
residence;21 and (e) an updated identification card issued by the House of Representatives stating that Aborlan
is his residence.22

To refute Mitras claimed residence in Aborlan specifically, that he resides at the Maligaya Feedmill property
the respondents additionally submitted: (a) the affidavits of the 14 Punong Barangays of Aborlan and of six
residents of Aborlan, all stating that Mitra is not a resident of Aborlan and has never been seen in that
municipality; (b) a Certification from the Barangay Captain of Sta. Monica, Puerto Princesa City stating that
Mitra was a resident of that barangay as of November 16, 2009; (c) the affidavit of Commodore Nicanor
Hernandez attesting that Mitra continues to reside in Puerto Princesa City; and (d) 24 affidavits of former
employees, workers, Aborlan residents and a customer of the Maligaya Feedmill attesting that they have never
seen Mitra during the time he claimed to have lived there and that the area where Mitra supposedly lives is, in
fact, the office of the feedmill and is unlivable due to noise and pollution.23

The Ruling of the COMELECs First Division24

The Law. The First Division defined the governing law with the statement that residence means domicile under
the Courts consistent rulings since 1928 in Nuval v. Guray.25 Domicile imports not only the intent to reside in a
fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of this intention.26

To acquire a new domicile a domicile by choice the following must concur: (1) residence or bodily presence
in a new locality; (2) an intention to remain there; and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile. In other
words, there must be an animus non revertendi with respect to the old domicile, and an animus manendi at the
domicile of choice. The intent to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time
and the acts of the person must be consistent with this intent.27

The First Divisions Evaluation of the Parties Evidence. Based on its consideration of the submitted evidence
(including various affidavits submitted by both parties and the photographs of the room that Mitra claims to be
his residence) and citing jurisprudence, the First Division granted the respondents petition to cancel Mitras
COC.

Pearliegates

To the First Division, Mitras submitted pictures are telling; they show a small, sparsely furnished room that is
evidently unlived in, located at the second floor of a structure that appears to be a factory or a warehouse; the
residence appears hastily set-up, cold, and utterly devoid of any indication of Mitras personality such as old
family photographs and memorabilia collected through the years. What the supposed residence lacks, in the
First Divisions perception, are the loving attention and details inherent in every home to make it ones
residence; perhaps, at most, this small room could have served as Mitras resting area whenever he visited the
locality, but nothing more than this.28

These observations coupled with the statements from former employees and customers of the Maligaya
Feedmill that the claimed residence is located in an unsavory location (for its noise and pollution), and that it
had been in fact Maligaya Feedmills office just a few months back militated against Mitras claim. These
pieces of information made it clear, to the First Division, that this room is not the home that a residence is
supposed to be.29

A persons domicile of origin is not easily lost, the First Division further said. The fact that Mitra registered as a
voter in Aborlan, has a cock farm, a farm, a rest house and an experimental pineapple plantation in Maligaya
Feedmill, was occasionally seen staying in Aborlan, and held meetings with Aborlan constituents does not
necessarily establish Mitras status as an Aborlan resident, or prove his abandonment of his domicile of origin in
Puerto Princesa City. Mere absence from ones residence or domicile of origin to pursue studies, engage in
business, or practice ones vocation is not sufficient to constitute abandonment or loss of domicile. Registration
or voting in a place other than ones domicile does not eliminate an individuals animus revertendi to his
domicile of origin; the natural desire and longing of every person to return to the place of birth and his strong
feeling of attachment to this place can only be shown to have been overcome by a positive proof of
abandonment of this place for another.30

Also, the First Division said that Mitras witnesses sworn statements appear to have been prepared by the
same person, as they use similar wordings, allegations, and contents; thus, putting into question the credibility
of the statements. Furthermore, the lease contract over the Maligaya Feedmill between Mitra and Carme Caspe
is effective only up to February 28, 2010, thus casting doubt on Mitras claim of residency in Aborlan.31

The COMELEC En Banc Ruling

The COMELEC en banc in a divided decision32 subsequently denied Mitras motion to reconsider the First
Division ruling under the following outlined reasons.

First, registration as a voter of Aborlan is not sufficient evidence that Mitra has successfully abandoned his
domicile of origin.33

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Second, mere intent cannot supplant the express requirement of the law; the "physical presence" required to
establish domicile connotes actual, factual and bona fide residence in a given locality. The COMELEC en banc
agreed with the First Divisions evidentiary findings on this point.34

The Petition

Mitra supports his petition with the following ARGUMENTS:


Third, the First Divisions Resolution was based on a careful and judicious examination and consideration of all
evidence submitted by the parties. The summary nature of the proceedings is not necessarily offensive to a
partys right to due process.35

Fourth, Fernandez v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal36 is not on all fours with the present case
Fernandez stemmed from a quo warranto case while the present case involves a petition to deny due course or
cancel the COC. Likewise, Fernandez successfully proved that his transfer to Sta. Rosa City, Laguna several
years prior to his candidacy was prompted by valid reasons, i.e., existence of his business in the area and the
enrolment of his children at Sta. Rosa schools, thereby erasing doubts as to the bona fide nature of his transfer.
In the present case, the COMELEC en banc found that Mitra admitted that his transfer to Aborlan in 2008 was
prompted by his plans to run for governor in the 2010 national and local elections. The COMELEC en banc also
noted that Fernandez involved an individual who had earned an overwhelming mandate from the electorate.
The COMELEC en bancs ruling on Mitras case, on the other hand, came before the 2010 elections; thus, the
people had not then voted.37

In his Dissent,38 Commissioner Sarmiento points out that the following acts of Mitra, taken collectively,
indubitably prove a change of domicile from Puerto Princesa to Aborlan:

(a) in January 2008, [Mitra] started a pineapple growing project in a rented farmland near Maligaya Feedmill
and Farm located in Barangay Isaub, Aborlan;

(b) in February 2008, [Mitra] leased the residential portion of the said Maligaya Feedmill;

(c) in March 2008, after the said residential portion has been refurbished and renovated, [Mitra] started to
occupy and reside in the said premises;

(d) in 2009, [Mitra] purchased his own farmland in the same barangay but continued the lease involving the
Maligaya Feedmill, the contract of which was even renewed until February 2010; and

6.1 x x x COMELECs GRAVE ABUSE is most patent as IT forgets, wittingly or unwittingly that the solitary
GROUND to deny due course to a COC is the DELIBERATE false material representation to DECEIVE, and not the
issue of the candidates eligibility which should be resolved in an appropriate QUO WARRANTO proceedings
post election.40

6.2 Deny Due Course Petitions under Section 78 of the OEC, being SUMMARILY decided and resolved, the same
must be exercised most sparingly, with utmost care and extreme caution; and construed most strictly against
the proponent/s, and liberally in favor of the candidate sought to be eliminated. When exercised otherwise and
with apparent biased in favor of the proponents, as in this instance, GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION necessarily
sets in.41

6.3 The mandate to be extremely cautious and careful in the SUMMARY exercise of the awesome power to
simplistically cancel [ones] candidacy x x x is further made manifest by the availability of a QUO WARRANTO
proceeding appropriately prosecuted post election.42

6.4 Absent any formal HEARINGS and Presentation of Evidence; Lacking the actual inspection and verification;
and without actual confrontation of affiants/alleged witnesses ALL the "conclusions" of COMELEC on the
RESIDENCE issue, were indeed predicted (sic) on sheer SPECULATION[.]43

6.5 A grievous procedural flaw, FATAL in character. THE BURDEN OF PROOF MUST ALWAYS BE PLACED ON THE
SHOULDERS OF THE PROPONENT/s. Not so in the present controversy, where COMELECs assailed decision/s
were devoted exclusively to the alleged weakness of MITRAs submissions and COMELECs speculative
conclusions, rather than on the strength of proponents unverified and unconfirmed submissions and
unconfronted sworn statements of supposed affiants[.]44

The petition also asks for ancillary injunctive relief. We granted the application for injunctive relief by issuing a
status quo ante order, allowing Mitra to be voted upon in the May 10, 2010 elections.45

The respondents Comment46 states the following counter-arguments:


(e) [Mitra] caused the construction of a house in the purchased lot which has been recently completed.39

Pearliegates

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a. Procedural Arguments:

II. THE INSTANT PETITION FAILED TO ATTACH CERTIFIED TRUE COPIES OF THE MATERIAL PORTIONS OF THE
RECORDS REFERRED TO THEREIN IN GROSS CONTRAVENTION OF SECTION 5 OF RULE 64 OF THE RULES OF
COURT. CONSEQUENTLY, IT MUST BE DISMISSED OUTRIGHT.

III. THE INSTANT PETITION RAISES MERE ERRORS OF JUDGMENT, WHICH ARE OUTSIDE THIS HONORABLE
COURTS CERTIORARI JURISDICTION.

b. Arguments on the Merits

I. XXX

B. THE COMELEC CORRECTLY RULED THAT PETITIONERS MERE INTENT TO TRANSFER RESIDENCE TO ABORLAN,
PALAWAN, ABSENT ACTUAL, FACTUAL, AND BONA FIDE RESIDENCE THEREIN DOES NOT SUFFICE TO PROVE HIS
TRANSFER OF RESIDENCE FROM PUERTO PRINCESA, PALAWAN TO ABORLAN, PALAWAN.

C. THE COMELEC THOROUGHLY EVALUATED THE EVIDENCE, AND CORRECTLY ARRIVED AT THE ASSAILED
DECISION ONLY AFTER MUCH DELIBERATION AND CAREFUL ASSESSMENT OF THE EVIDENCE, ALBEIT THROUGH
SUMMARY PROCEEDINGS PARTICIPATED IN ACTIVELY BY PETITIONER. THE COMELEC CORRECTLY DID NOT GIVE
CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF PETITIONERS WITNESSES FOR BEING INCREDIBLE AND CONTRARY TO THE
PHYSICAL EVIDENCE, ESPECIALLY PERTAINING TO HIS ALLEGED RESIDENCE AT THE FEEDMILL PROPERTY.

D. THE COMELEC CORRECTLY RULED THAT PETITIONER HAS NOT TRANSFERRED HIS RESIDENCE FROM PUERTO
PRINCESA, PALAWAN TO ABORLAN, PALAWAN.

E. THE ALLEGED LEASE OF THE RESIDENTIAL PORTION OF THE FEEDMILL PROPERTY IS A SHAM.

B. THE LAW, IN IMPOSING A RESIDENCY REQUIREMENT, MANDATES NOT ONLY FAMILIARITY WITH THE NEEDS
AND CONDITIONS OF THE LOCALITY, BUT ALSO ACTUAL PHYSICAL, PERSONAL AND PERMANENT RESIDENCE
THEREIN. PETITIONERS SUPPOSED FAMILIARITY WITH THE "NEEDS, DIFFICULTIES, ASPIRATIONS, POTENTIALS
(SIC) FOR GROWTH AND ALL MATTERS VITAL TO THE WELFARE OF HIS CONSTITUENCY WHICH CONSTITUTES
ONE/THIRD OF THE WHOLE PROVINCE OF PALAWAN" AS A THREE-TERM CONGRESSMAN ABSENT SUCH
RESIDENCE DOES NOT SUFFICE TO MEET THE RESIDENCY REQUIREMENT OF THE LAW.

VI. GIVEN HIS STATURE AS A MEMBER OF THE PROMINENT MITRA CLAN OF PALAWAN, AND AS A 3-TERM
CONGRESSMAN, IT IS HIGHLY INCREDIBLE THAT A SMALL ROOM IN A FEEDMILL HAS SERVED AS HIS RESIDENCE
SINCE 2008.

VII. THE COMELEC CORRECTLY RULED THAT PETITIONER MAY NOT INVOKE THE CASE OF FERNANDEZ V. HRET
AS PETITIONER IS NOT SIMILARLY SITUATED AS DAN FERNANDEZ.
IV. FINDINGS OF FACTS OF ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES SUCH AS THE COMELEC, ARE ACCORDED GREAT RESPECT,
IF NOT FINALITY BY THE COURTS, ESPECIALLY IF SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. BECAUSE THE
FINDINGS OF FACTS OF THE COMELEC IN THE INSTANT CASE ARE OVERWHELMINGLY SUPPORTED BY
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, THIS HONORABLE COURT MAY NOT REVERSE SUCH FINDINGS.

VIII. THE MATERIAL STATEMENT IN PETITIONERS COC RESPECTING HIS RESIDENCE HAS BEEN SHOWN TO BE
FALSE. BY MAKING SUCH FALSE STATEMENT, PETITIONER DELIBERATELY TRIED TO MISLEAD AND TO MISINFORM
THE ELECTORATE AS TO HIS ACTUAL RESIDENCE. HENCE, HIS COC WAS CORRECTLY DENIED DUE COURSE AND
CANCELED.

V. THE COMELEC DID NOT COMMIT ANY GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE ASSAILED RESOLUTION DATED 04 MAY 2010.
In the recently concluded elections of May 10, 2010, Mitra obtained the most number of votes for Governor and
was accordingly proclaimed winner of the Palawan gubernatorial contest.47
A. THE COMELEC CORRECTLY RULED THAT PETITIONERS REGISTRATION AS A VOTER IN ABORLAN, PALAWAN IS
NOT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE THAT HE HAS SUCCESSFULLY ABANDONED HIS DOMICILE OF ORIGIN AT PUERTO
PRINCESA CITY, PALAWAN.

Pearliegates

We required the respondents and the COMELEC to comment on the petition.48 They complied on May 6,
201049 and June 2, 2010, respectively.50 On May 17, 2010, the petitioner filed a "Supplemental Petition."51

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On May 26, 2010, the respondents filed a "Supplemental Comment (with Omnibus Motion to Annul
Proclamation and for Early Resolution)" to the petitioners "Supplemental Petition."52 We deemed the case
ready for resolution on the basis of these submissions.

Closely related with the limited focus of the present petition is the condition, under Section 5, Rule 64 of the
Rules of Court, that findings of fact of the COMELEC, supported by substantial evidence, shall be final and nonreviewable. Substantial evidence is that degree of evidence that a reasonable mind might accept to support a
conclusion.57

The Courts Ruling

We find the petition meritorious.

The Limited Review in Certiorari Petitions under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court

A preliminary matter before us is the respondents jurisdictional objection based on the issues raised in the
present petition. The respondents assert that the questions Mitra brought to us are beyond our certiorari
jurisdiction. Specifically, the respondents contend that Mitras petition merely seeks to correct errors of the
COMELEC in appreciating the parties evidence a question we cannot entertain under our limited certiorari
jurisdiction.

Mitra brought his case before us pursuant to Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.53 Our review,
therefore, is based on a very limited ground the jurisdictional issue of whether the COMELEC acted without or
in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Whether the COMELEC, by law, has jurisdiction over a case or matter brought to it is resolved by considering
the black-letter provisions of the Constitution and pertinent election laws, and we see no disputed issue on this
point. Other than the respondents procedural objections which we will fully discuss below, the present case
rests on the allegation of grave abuse of discretion an issue that generally is not as simple to resolve.

As a concept, "grave abuse of discretion" defies exact definition; generally, it refers to "capricious or whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction"; the abuse of discretion must be patent and gross
as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at
all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion and hostility.54 Mere abuse of discretion is not enough; it must be grave.55 We have held, too, that the
use of wrong or irrelevant considerations in deciding an issue is sufficient to taint a decision-makers action
with grave abuse of discretion.56

In light of our limited authority to review findings of fact, we do not ordinarily review in a certiorari case the
COMELECs appreciation and evaluation of evidence. Any misstep by the COMELEC in this regard generally
involves an error of judgment, not of jurisdiction.

In exceptional cases, however, when the COMELECs action on the appreciation and evaluation of evidence
oversteps the limits of its discretion to the point of being grossly unreasonable, the Court is not only obliged,
but has the constitutional duty to intervene.58 When grave abuse of discretion is present, resulting errors
arising from the grave abuse mutate from error of judgment to one of jurisdiction.59

Our reading of the petition shows that it is sufficient in form with respect to the requisite allegation of
jurisdictional error. Mitra clearly alleged the COMELEC acts that were supposedly tainted with grave abuse of
discretion. Thus, we do not agree with the respondents contention that the petition on its face raises mere
errors of judgment that are outside our certiorari jurisdiction. Whether the allegations of "grave abuse" are duly
supported and substantiated is another matter and is the subject of the discussions below.

Nature of the Case under Review:

COC Denial/Cancellation Proceedings

The present petition arose from a petition to deny due course or to cancel Mitras COC. This is the context of
and take-off point for our review. From this perspective, the nature and requisites of the COC cancellation
proceedings are primary considerations in resolving the present petition.60

Section 74, in relation to Section 78, of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) governs the cancellation of, and grant
or denial of due course to, COCs. The combined application of these sections requires that the candidates
stated facts in the COC be true, under pain of the COCs denial or cancellation if any false representation of a
material fact is made. To quote these provisions:

SEC. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. The certificate of candidacy shall state that the person filing it
is announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and that he is eligible for said office; if for Member of
the Batasang Pambansa, the province, including its component cities, highly urbanized city or district or sector

Pearliegates

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which he seeks to represent; the political party to which he belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence; his
post office address for all election purposes; his profession or occupation; that he will support and defend the
Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; that he will obey the laws,
legal orders, and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent resident
or immigrant to a foreign country; that the obligation imposed by his oath is assumed voluntarily, without
mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in the certificate of candidacy are true to
the best of his knowledge.

xxxx

SEC. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. A verified petition seeking to deny
due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that
any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be
filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and
shall be decided, after due notice and hearing not later than fifteen days before the election.

The false representation that these provisions mention must necessarily pertain to a material fact. The critical
material facts are those that refer to a candidates qualifications for elective office, such as his or her
citizenship and residence. The candidates status as a registered voter in the political unit where he or she is a
candidate similarly falls under this classification as it is a requirement that, by law (the Local Government
Code), must be reflected in the COC. The reason for this is obvious: the candidate, if he or she wins, will work
for and represent the political unit where he or she ran as a candidate.61

Under the evidentiary situation of the case, there is clearly no basis for the conclusion that Mitra deliberately
attempted to mislead the Palawan electorate.

From the start, Mitra never hid his intention to transfer his residence from Puerto Princesa City to Aborlan to
comply with the residence requirement of a candidate for an elective provincial office. Republic Act No. 7160,
otherwise known as the Local Government Code, does not abhor this intended transfer of residence, as its
Section 39 merely requires an elective local official to be a resident of the local government unit where he
intends to run for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election. In other words, the law
itself recognizes implicitly that there can be a change of domicile or residence, but imposes only the condition
that residence at the new place should at least be for a year. Of course, as a continuing requirement or
qualification, the elected official must remain a resident there for the rest of his term.

Mitras domicile of origin is undisputedly Puerto Princesa City. For him to qualify as Governor in light of the
relatively recent change of status of Puerto Princesa City from a component city to a highly urbanized city
whose residents can no longer vote for provincial officials he had to abandon his domicile of origin and
acquire a new one within the local government unit where he intended to run; this would be his domicile of
choice. To acquire a domicile of choice, jurisprudence, which the COMELEC correctly invoked, requires the
following:

(1) residence or bodily presence in a new locality;

(2) an intention to remain there; and


The false representation under Section 78 must likewise be a "deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide
a fact that would otherwise render a candidate ineligible." Given the purpose of the requirement, it must be
made with the intention to deceive the electorate as to the would-be candidates qualifications for public
office.62 Thus, the misrepresentation that Section 78 addresses cannot be the result of a mere innocuous
mistake, and cannot exist in a situation where the intent to deceive is patently absent, or where no deception
on the electorate results. The deliberate character of the misrepresentation necessarily follows from a
consideration of the consequences of any material falsity: a candidate who falsifies a material fact cannot run;
if he runs and is elected, he cannot serve; in both cases, he can be prosecuted for violation of the election laws.

Based on these standards, we find that Mitra did not commit any deliberate material misrepresentation in his
COC. The COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in its appreciation of the evidence, leading it to conclude that
Mitra is not a resident of Aborlan, Palawan. The COMELEC, too, failed to critically consider whether Mitra
deliberately attempted to mislead, misinform or hide a fact that would otherwise render him ineligible for the
position of Governor of Palawan.

(3) an intention to abandon the old domicile.63

The contentious issues in Mitras case relate to his bodily presence, or the lack of it, in Aborlan, and the
declaration he made on this point. The respondents anchor their cause of action on the alleged falsity of Mitras
statement that he is a resident of Aborlan. To support this contention, the respondents claim that the
construction of the supposed Mitra residence or house, other than the leased premises in Maligaya Feedmill,
has yet to be completed, leaving Mitra with no habitable place in Aborlan. When Mitra successfully refuted this
original claim, the respondents presented sworn statements of Aborlan residents contradicting Mitras claimed
physical residence at the Maligaya Feedmill building in Aborlan. They likewise point out, by sworn statements,
that this alleged residence could not be considered a house that Mitra could properly consider his residence, on
the view that the feedmill place is beneath what Mitra a three-term congressman and a member of the Mitra
political clan of Palawan would occupy.

Mitra, on the other hand, presented sworn statements of various persons (including the seller of the land he
purchased, the lessor of the Maligaya Feedmill, and the Punong Barangay of the site of his residence) attesting

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to his physical residence in Aborlan; photographs of the residential portion of Maligaya Feedmill where he
resides, and of his experimental pineapple plantation, farm, farmhouse and cock farm; the lease contract over
the Maligaya Feedmill; and the deed of sale of the lot where he has started constructing his house. He clarified,
too, that he does not claim residence in Aborlan at the house then under construction; his actual residence is
the mezzanine portion of the Maligaya Feedmill building.

Faced with the seemingly directly contradictory evidence, the COMELEC apparently grossly misread its import
and, because it used wrong considerations, was led into its faulty conclusion.

The seeming contradictions arose from the sworn statements of some Aborlan residents attesting that they
never saw Mitra in Aborlan; these are controverted by similar sworn statements by other Aborlan residents that
Mitra physically resides in Aborlan. The number of witnesses and their conflicting claims for and against Mitras
residency appear to have sidetracked the COMELEC. Substantial evidence, however, is not a simple question of
number; reason demands that the focus be on what these differing statements say.

For example, the sworn statements that Mitra has never been seen in Aborlan border on the unbelievable and
loudly speak of their inherent weakness as evidence.

Mitra has established business interests in Aborlan, a fact which the respondents have never disputed. He was
then the incumbent three-term Representative who, as early as 2008, already entertained thoughts of running
for Governor in 2010. It is not disputed, too, that Mitra has started the construction of a house on a lot he
bought from Rexter Temple; the site is very near the Maligaya Feedmill that he leased from its owner, Carme
Caspe.

While Mitra might not have stayed in Aborlan nor in Palawan for most of 2008 and 2009 because his office and
activities as a Representative were in Manila, it is hardly credible that he would not be seen in Aborlan. In this
regard, the sworn statement of the Punong Barangay of Isaub, Aborlan should carry a lot more weight than the
statements of punong barangay officials elsewhere since it is the business of a punong barangay to know who
the residents are in his own barangay. The COMELEC apparently missed all these because it was fixated on the
perceived coldness and impersonality of Mitras dwelling.

The parties submitted documentary evidence likewise requires careful consideration for the correct appraisal
of its evidentiary value. On the one hand, the document of sale of the Temple property, the building permit for
the house under construction, and the community tax certificate used in these transactions all stated that
Mitras residence was Puerto Princesa City. On the other hand, Mitra introduced a notarized contract of lease
supported by the sworn explanation of the lessor (Carme Caspe) showing that he indeed leased Maligaya
Feedmill. He submitted, too, a residence certificate showing Aborlan as his residence, and an identification card
of the House of Representatives showing Aborlan as his residence.

Pearliegates

We cannot give full evidentiary weight to the contract of sale as evidence relating to Mitras residence for two
reasons. First, it is a unilateral contract executed by the seller (Rexter Temple); thus, his statement and belief
as to Mitras personal circumstances cannot be taken as conclusive against the latter. Second, the sale involved
several vendees, including Mitras brother (Ramon B. Mitra) and one Peter Winston T. Gonzales; his co-vendees
still live in Puerto Princesa City; hence, they were all loosely and collectively described to have their residence
in Puerto Princesa City.64 Parenthetically, the document simply stated: "I, REXTER TEMPLE, of legal age,
Filipino, single and resident of Isaub, Aborlan, Palawan, hereby by these presents, x x x do hereby SELL,
TRANSFER and CONVEY unto the said Vendees, ABRAHAM KAHLIL B. MITRA, single; RAMON B. MITRA, married to
Mary Ann Mitra; PETER WINSTON T. GONZALES, married to Florecita R. Gonzales, all of legal ages and residents
[of] Rancho Sta. Monica, Brgy. Sta. Monica, Puerto Princesa City, their heirs and assigns."65 Thus, the contract
contained a mere general statement that loosely described the vendees as Puerto Princesa City residents. This
general statement solely came from the vendor.

The building permit, on the other hand, was filed by Mitras representative, an architect named John Quillope,
who apparently likewise filled the form. That Mitra only signed the building permit form is readily discernible
from an examination of the face of the form; even the statement on his community tax certificate bearing a
Puerto Princesa City residence does not appear in his handwriting.66 Significantly, Mitras secretary Lilia
Camora attested that it was she who secured the community tax certificate for Mitra in February 2009 without
the latters knowledge.67 Annex "M" of the respondents Petition before the COMELEC indeed shows that the
community tax certificate did not bear the signature of Mitra.68 Mitra secured his own certificate in Aborlan on
March 18, 2009. This community tax certificate carries his own signature.69 Parenthetically, per Carme Caspes
statement, Mitra leased the feedmill residence in February 2008 and started moving in his belongings in March
2008, confirming the veracity of his Aborlan presence at the time he secured his community tax certificate.70
In these lights, the February 3, 2009 community tax certificate, if at all, carries very little evidentiary value.

The respondents expectedly attacked the validity of the lease contract; they contended in their Memorandum
that the feedmill was situated in a forest land that cannot be leased, and that the contract, while notarized,
was not registered with the required notarial office of the court.71

The validity of the lease contract, however, is not the issue before us; what concerns us is the question of
whether Mitra did indeed enter into an agreement for the lease, or strictly for the use, of the Maligaya Feedmill
as his residence (while his house, on the lot he bought, was under construction) and whether he indeed resided
there. The notarys compliance with the notarial law likewise assumes no materiality as it is a defect not
imputable to Mitra; what is important is the parties affirmation before a notary public of the contracts
genuineness and due execution.

A sworn statement that has no counterpart in the respondents evidence in so far as it provides details
(particularly when read with the statement of Ricardo Temple)72 is Carme Caspes statement73 on how Mitras
transfer of residence took place. Read together, these statements attest that the transfer of residence was
accomplished, not in one single move but, through an incremental process that started in early 2008 and was

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in place by March 2009, although the house Mitra intended to be his permanent home was not yet then
completed.74

In considering the residency issue, the COMELEC practically focused solely on its consideration of Mitras
residence at Maligaya Feedmill, on the basis of mere photographs of the premises. In the COMELECs view
(expressly voiced out by the Division and fully concurred in by the En Banc), the Maligaya Feedmill building
could not have been Mitras residence because it is cold and utterly devoid of any indication of Mitras
personality and that it lacks loving attention and details inherent in every home to make it ones residence.75
This was the main reason that the COMELEC relied upon for its conclusion.

Such assessment, in our view, based on the interior design and furnishings of a dwelling as shown by and
examined only through photographs, is far from reasonable; the COMELEC thereby determined the fitness of a
dwelling as a persons residence based solely on very personal and subjective assessment standards when the
law is replete with standards that can be used. Where a dwelling qualifies as a residence i.e., the dwelling
where a person permanently intends to return to and to remain76 his or her capacity or inclination to
decorate the place, or the lack of it, is immaterial.

in his favor cannot go below the level of an equipoise, i.e., when weighed, Mitras evidence of transfer and
residence in Aborlan cannot be overcome by the respondents evidence that he remained a Puerto Princesa
City resident. Under the situation prevailing when Mitra filed his COC, we cannot conclude that Mitra committed
any misrepresentation, much less a deliberate one, about his residence.

The character of Mitras representation before the COMELEC is an aspect of the case that the COMELEC
completely failed to consider as it focused mainly on the character of Mitras feedmill residence. For this
reason, the COMELEC was led into error one that goes beyond an ordinary error of judgment. By failing to
take into account whether there had been a deliberate misrepresentation in Mitras COC, the COMELEC
committed the grave abuse of simply assuming that an error in the COC was necessarily a deliberate falsity in
a material representation. In this case, it doubly erred because there was no falsity; as the carefully considered
evidence shows, Mitra did indeed transfer his residence within the period required by Section 74 of the OEC.

The respondents significantly ask us in this case to adopt the same faulty approach of using subjective norms,
as they now argue that given his stature as a member of the prominent Mitra clan of Palawan, and as a three
term congressman, it is highly incredible that a small room in a feed mill has served as his residence since
2008.77

Examined further, the COMELECs reasoning is not only intensely subjective but also flimsy, to the point of
grave abuse of discretion when compared with the surrounding indicators showing the Mitra has indeed been
physically present in Aborlan for the required period with every intent to settle there. Specifically, it was lost on
the COMELEC majority (but not on the Dissent) that Mitra made definite, although incremental transfer moves,
as shown by the undisputed business interests he has established in Aborlan in 2008; by the lease of a dwelling
where he established his base; by the purchase of a lot for his permanent home; by his transfer of registration
as a voter in March 2009; and by the construction of a house all viewed against the backdrop of a bachelor
Representative who spent most of his working hours in Manila, who had a whole congressional district to take
care of, and who was establishing at the same time his significant presence in the whole Province of Palawan.

We reject this suggested approach outright for the same reason we condemned the COMELECs use of
subjective non-legal standards. Mitras feed mill dwelling cannot be considered in isolation and separately from
the circumstances of his transfer of residence, specifically, his expressed intent to transfer to a residence
outside of Puerto Princesa City to make him eligible to run for a provincial position; his preparatory moves
starting in early 2008; his initial transfer through a leased dwelling; the purchase of a lot for his permanent
home; and the construction of a house in this lot that, parenthetically, is adjacent to the premises he leased
pending the completion of his house. These incremental moves do not offend reason at all, in the way that the
COMELECs highly subjective non-legal standards do.

From these perspectives, we cannot but conclude that the COMELECs approach i.e., the application of
subjective non-legal standards and the gross misappreciation of the evidence is tainted with grave abuse of
discretion, as the COMELEC used wrong considerations and grossly misread the evidence in arriving at its
conclusion. In using subjective standards, the COMELEC committed an act not otherwise within the
contemplation of law on an evidentiary point that served as a major basis for its conclusion in the case.

Thus, we can only conclude, in the context of the cancellation proceeding before us, that the respondents have
not presented a convincing case sufficient to overcome Mitras evidence of effective transfer to and residence
in Aborlan and the validity of his representation on this point in his COC, while the COMELEC could not even
present any legally acceptable basis to conclude that Mitras statement in his COC regarding his residence was
a misrepresentation.

With this analysis and conclusion in mind, we come to the critical question of whether Mitra deliberately
misrepresented that his residence is in Aborlan to deceive and mislead the people of the Province of Palawan.

Mitra has significant relationship with, and intimate knowledge of, the constituency he wishes to serve.

We do not believe that he committed any deliberate misrepresentation given what he knew of his transfer, as
shown by the moves he had made to carry it out. From the evidentiary perspective, we hold that the evidence
confirming residence in Aborlan decidedly tilts in Mitras favor; even assuming the worst for Mitra, the evidence

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Citing jurisprudence, we began this ponencia with a discussion of the purpose of the residency requirement
under the law. By law, this residency can be anywhere within the Province of Palawan, except for Puerto
Princesa City because of its reclassification as a highly urbanized city. Thus, residency in Aborlan is completely
consistent with the purpose of the law, as Mitra thereby declared and proved his required physical presence in
the Province of Palawan.

We also consider that even before his transfer of residence, he already had intimate knowledge of the Province
of Palawan, particularly of the whole 2nd legislative district that he represented for three terms. For that
matter, even the respondents themselves impliedly acknowledged that the Mitras, as a family, have been
identified with elective public service and politics in the Province of Palawan.78 This means to us that Mitra
grew up in the politics of Palawan.

We can reasonably conclude from all these that Mitra is not oblivious to the needs, difficulties, aspirations,
potential for growth and development, and all matters vital to the common welfare of the constituency he
intends to serve. Mitra who is no stranger to Palawan has merely been compelled after serving three terms as
representative of the congressional district that includes Puerto Princesa City and Aborlan by legal
developments to transfer his residence to Aborlan to qualify as a Province of Palawan voter. To put it differently,
were it not for the reclassification of Puerto Princesa City from a component city to a highly urbanized city,
Mitra would not have encountered any legal obstacle to his intended gubernatorial bid based on his knowledge
of and sensitivity to the needs of the Palawan electorate.

This case, incidentally, is not the first that we have encountered where a former elective official had to transfer
residence in order to continue his public service in another political unit that he could not legally access, as a
candidate, without a change of residence.

In Torayno, Sr. v. COMELEC,79 former Governor Vicente Y. Emano re-occupied a house he owned and had leased
out in Cagayan de Oro City to qualify as a candidate for the post of Mayor of that city (like Puerto Princesa City,
a highly urbanized city whose residents cannot vote for and be voted upon as elective provincial officials). We
said in that case that

In other words, the actual, physical and personal presence of herein private respondent in Cagayan de Oro City
is substantial enough to show his intention to fulfill the duties of mayor and for the voters to evaluate his
qualifications for the mayorship. Petitioners' very legalistic, academic and technical approach to the residence
requirement does not satisfy this simple, practical and common-sense rationale for the residence requirement.

In Asistio v. Hon. Trinidad Pe-Aguirre,80 we also had occasion to rule on the residency and right to vote of
former Congressman Luis A. Asistio who had been a congressman for Caloocan in 1992, 1995, 1998 and 2004,
and, in the words of the Decision, "is known to be among the prominent political families in Caloocan City."81
We recognized Asistios position that a mistake had been committed in his residency statement, and concluded

Pearliegates

that the mistake is not "proof that Asistio has abandoned his domicile in Caloocan City, or that he has
established residence outside of Caloocan City." By this recognition, we confirmed that Asistio has not
committed any deliberate misrepresentation in his COC.

These cases are to be distinguished from the case of Velasco v. COMELEC82 where the COMELEC cancelled the
COC of Velasco, a mayoralty candidate, on the basis of his undisputed knowledge, at the time he filed his COC,
that his inclusion and registration as a voter had been denied. His failure to register as a voter was a material
fact that he had clearly withheld from the COMELEC; he knew of the denial of his application to register and yet
concealed his non-voter status when he filed his COC. Thus, we affirmed the COMELECs action in cancelling his
COC.

If there is any similarity at all in Velasco and the present case, that similarity is in the recognition in both cases
of the rule of law. In Velasco, we recognized based on the law that a basic defect existed prior to his
candidacy, leading to his disqualification and the vice-mayor-elects assumption to the office. In the present
case, we recognize the validity of Mitras COC, again on the basis of substantive and procedural law, and no
occasion arises for the vice-governor-elect to assume the gubernatorial post.

Mitra has been proclaimed winner in the electoral contest and has therefore the mandate of the electorate to
serve

We have applied in past cases the principle that the manifest will of the people as expressed through the ballot
must be given fullest effect; in case of doubt, political laws must be interpreted to give life and spirit to the
popular mandate.83 Thus, we have held that while provisions relating to certificates of candidacy are in
mandatory terms, it is an established rule of interpretation as regards election laws, that mandatory provisions,
requiring certain steps before elections, will be construed as directory after the elections, to give effect to the
will of the people.84

Quite recently, however, we warned against a blanket and unqualified reading and application of this ruling, as
it may carry dangerous significance to the rule of law and the integrity of our elections. For one, such
blanket/unqualified reading may provide a way around the law that effectively negates election requirements
aimed at providing the electorate with the basic information for an informed choice about a candidates
eligibility and fitness for office.85 Short of adopting a clear cut standard, we thus made the following
clarification:

We distinguish our ruling in this case from others that we have made in the past by the clarification that COC
defects beyond matters of form and that involve material misrepresentations cannot avail of the benefit of our
ruling that COC mandatory requirements before elections are considered merely directory after the people shall
have spoken. A mandatory and material election law requirement involves more than the will of the people in
any given locality. Where a material COC misrepresentation under oath is made, thereby violating both our

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election and criminal laws, we are faced as well with an assault on the will of the people of the Philippines as
expressed in our laws. In a choice between provisions on material qualifications of elected officials, on the one
hand, and the will of the electorate in any given locality, on the other, we believe and so hold that we cannot
choose the electorate will.861avvphi1

Earlier, Frivaldo v. COMELEC87 provided the following test:

[T]his Court has repeatedly stressed the importance of giving effect to the sovereign will in order to ensure the
survival of our democracy. In any action involving the possibility of a reversal of the popular electoral choice,
this Court must exert utmost effort to resolve the issues in a manner that would give effect to the will of the
majority, for it is merely sound public policy to cause elective offices to be filled by those who are the choice of
the majority. To successfully challenge a winning candidate's qualifications, the petitioner must clearly
demonstrate that the ineligibility is so patently antagonistic to constitutional and legal principles that
overriding such ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the apparent will of the people would ultimately create
greater prejudice to the very democratic institutions and juristic traditions that our Constitution and laws so
zealously protect and promote. [Emphasis supplied.]

With the conclusion that Mitra did not commit any material misrepresentation in his COC, we see no reason in
this case to appeal to the primacy of the electorates will. We cannot deny, however, that the people of
Palawan have spoken in an election where residency qualification had been squarely raised and their voice has
erased any doubt about their verdict on Mitras qualifications.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we GRANT the petition and ANNUL the assailed COMELEC Resolutions in
Antonio V. Gonzales and Orlando R. Balbon, Jr. v. Abraham Kahlil B. Mitra (SPA No. 09-038 [C]). We DENY the
respondents petition to cancel Abraham Kahlil Mitras Certificate of Candidacy. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 134015 July 19, 1999

JUAN DOMINO, petitioner,


vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, NARCISO Ra. GRAFILO, JR., EDDY B. JAVA, JUAN P. BAYONITO, JR., ROSARIO
SAMSON and DIONISIO P. LIM, SR., respondent, LUCILLE CHIONGBIAN-SOLON, intervenor.

DAVIDE, JR., CJ.:

Challenged in this case for certiorari with a prayer for preliminary injunction are the Resolution of 6 May 1998 1
of the Second Division of the Commission on Elections (hereafter COMELEC), declaring petitioner Juan Domino
(hereafter DOMINO) disqualified as candidate for representative of the Lone Legislative District of the Province
of Sarangani in the 11 May 1998 elections, and the Decision of 29 May 1998 2 of the COMELEC en banc
denying DOMINO's motion for reconsideration.

The antecedents are not disputed.1wphi1.nt

On 25 March 1998, DOMINO filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative of the Lone
Legislative District of the Province of Sarangani indicating in item nine (9) of his certificate that he had resided
in the constituency where he seeks to be elected for one (1) year and two (2) months immediately preceding
the election. 3

On 30 March 1998, private respondents Narciso Ra. Grafilo, Jr., Eddy B. Java, Juan P. Bayonito, Jr., Rosario
Samson and Dionisio P. Lim, Sr., fied with the COMELEC a Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate
of Candidacy, which was docketed as SPA No. 98-022 and assigned to the Second Division of the COMELEC.
Private respondents alleged that DOMINO, contrary to his declaration in the certificate of candidacy, is not a
resident, much less a registered voter, of the province of Sarangani where he seeks election. To substantiate
their allegations, private respondents presented the following evidence:

1.
Annex "A" the Certificate of Candidacy of respondent for the position of Congressman of the Lone
District of the Province of Sarangani filed with the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor of Sarangani on
March 25, 1998, where in item 4 thereof he wrote his date of birth as December 5, 1953; in item 9, he claims
he have resided in the constituency where he seeks election for one (1) year and two (2) months; and, in item
10, that he is registered voter of Precinct No. 14A-1, Barangay Poblacion, Alabel, Sarangani;

2.
Annex "B" Voter's Registration Record with SN 31326504 dated June 22, 1997 indicating
respondent's registration at Precinct No. 4400-A, Old Balara, Quezon City;

3.

Annex "C" Respondent's Community Tax Certificate No. 11132214C dated January 15, 1997;

4.
Annex "D" Certified true copy of the letter of Herson D. Dema-ala, Deputy Provincial & Municipal
Treasurer of Alabel, Sarangani, dated February 26, 1998, addressed to Mr. Conrado G. Butil, which reads:

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In connection with your letter of even date, we are furnishing you herewith certified xerox copy of the triplicate
copy of COMMUNITY TAX CERTIFICATE NO. 11132214C in the name of Juan Domino.

Furthermore, Community Tax Certificate No. 11132212C of the same stub was issued to Carlito Engcong on
September 5, 1997, while Certificate No. 11132213C was also issued to Mr. Juan Domino but was cancelled and
serial no. 11132215C was issued in the name of Marianita Letigio on September 8, 1997.

5.
Annex "E" The triplicate copy of the Community Tax Certificate No. 11132214C in the name of Juan
Domino dated September 5, 1997;

6.
Annex "F" Copy of the letter of Provincial Treasurer Lourdes P. Riego dated March 2, 1998 addressed
to Mr. Herson D. Dema-ala, Deputy Provincial Treasurer and Municipal Treasurer of Alabel, Sarangani, which
states:

For easy reference, kindly turn-over to the undersigned for safekeeping, the stub of Community Tax Certificate
containing Nos. 11132201C-11132250C issued to you on June 13, 1997 and paid under Official Receipt No.
7854744.

Upon request of Congressman James L. Chiongbian.

7.
Annex "G" Certificate of Candidacy of respondent for the position of Congressman in the 3rd District
of Quezon City for the 1995 elections filed with the Office of the Regional Election Director, National Capital
Region, on March 17, 1995, where, in item 4 thereof, he wrote his birth date as December 22, 1953; in item 8
thereof his "residence in the constituency where I seek to be elected immediately preceding the election" as 3
years and 5 months; and, in item 9, that he is a registered voter of Precinct No. 182, Barangay Balara, Quezon
City;

9.
Annex "I" Copy of the SWORN APPLICATION FOR OF CANCELLATION OF THE VOTER'S [TRANSFER OF]
PREVIOUS REGISTRATION of respondent subscribed and sworn to on 22 October 1997 before Election Officer
Mantil Allim at Alabel, Sarangani. 4

For his defense, DOMINO maintains that he had complied with the one-year residence requirement and that he
has been residing in Sarangani since January 1997. In support of the said contention, DOMINO presented before
the COMELEC the following exhibits, to wit:

1.
Annex "1" Copy of the Contract of Lease between Nora Dacaldacal as Lessor and Administrator of
the properties of deceased spouses Maximo and Remedios Dacaldacal and respondent as Lessee executed on
January 15, 1997, subscribed and sworn to before Notary Public Johnny P. Landero;

2.
Annex "2" Copy of the Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate with Absolute Deed of sale executed by
and between the heirs of deceased spouses Maximo and Remedios Dacaldacal, namely: Maria Lourdes, Jupiter
and Beberlie and the respondent on November 4, 1997, subscribed and sworn to before Notary Public Jose A.
Alegario;

3.
Annex "3" True Carbon Xerox copy of the Decision dated January 19, 1998, of the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Metro Manila, Branch 35, Quezon City, in Election Case NO. 725 captioned as "In the Matter of the
Petition for the Exclusion from the List of voters of Precinct No. 4400-A Brgy. Old Balara, Quezon City, Spouses
Juan and Zorayda Domino, Petitioners, -versus- Elmer M. Kayanan, Election Officer, Quezon City, District III, and
the Board of Election Inspectors of Precinct No. 4400-A, Old Balara, Quezon City, Respondents." The dispositive
portion of which reads:

1.
Declaring the registration of petitioners as voters of Precinct No. 4400-A, Barangay Old Balara, in
District III Quezon City as completely erroneous as petitioners were no longer residents of Quezon City but of
Alabel, Sarangani where they have been residing since December 1996;

2.
Declaring this erroneous registration of petitioners in Quezon City as done in good faith due to an
honest mistake caused by circumstances beyond their control and without any fault of petitioners;
8.
Annex "H" a copy of the APPLICATION FOR TRANSFER OF REGISTRATION RECORDS DUE TO CHANGE
OF RESIDENCE of respondent dated August 30, 1997 addressed to and received by Election Officer Mantil Alim,
Alabel, Sarangani, on September 22, 1997, stating among others, that "[T]he undersigned's previous residence
is at 24 Bonifacio Street, Ayala Heights, Quezon City, III District, Quezon City; wherein he is a registered voter"
and "that for business and residence purposes, the undersigned has transferred and conducts his business and
reside at Barangay Poblacion, Alabel, Province of Sarangani prior to this application;"

3.
Approving the transfer of registration of voters of petitioners from Precint No. 4400-A of Barangay Old
Balara, Quezon City to Precinct No. 14A1 of Barangay Poblacion of Alabel, Sarangani; and

4.
Ordering the respondents to immediately transfer and forward all the election/voter's registration
records of the petitioners in Quezon City to the Election Officer, the Election Registration Board and other

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Comelec Offices of Alabel, Sarangani where the petitioners are obviously qualified to excercise their respective
rights of suffrage.

11.
Annexes "8-a", "8-b", "8-c" and "8-d" Copies of the uniform affidavits of witness Myrna Dalaguit,
Hilario Fuentes, Coraminda Lomibao and Elena V. Piodos subscribed and sworn to before Notary Public Bonifacio
F. Doria, Jr., on April 18, 1998, embodying their alleged personal knowledge of respondent's residency in Alabel,
Sarangani;

4.
Annex "4" Copy of the Application for Transfer of Registration Records due to Change of Residence
addressed to Mantil Alim, COMELEC Registrar, Alabel, Sarangani, dated August 30, 1997.

5.
Annex "5" Certified True Copy of the Notice of Approval of Application, the roster of applications for
registration approved by the Election Registration Board on October 20, 1997, showing the spouses Juan and
Zorayda Bailon Domino listed as numbers 111 and 112 both under Precinct No. 14A1, the last two names in the
slate indicated as transferees without VRR numbers and their application dated August 30, 1997 and
September 30, 1997, respectively.

6.

12.
Annex "8-e" A certification dated April 20, 1998, subscribed and sworn to before Notary Public
Bonifacio, containing a listing of the names of fifty-five (55) residents of Alabel, Sarangani, declaring and
certifying under oath that they personally know the respondent as a permanent resident of Alabel, Sarangani
since January 1997 up to present;

13.
Annexes "9", "9-a" and "9-b" Copies of Individual Income Tax Return for the year 1997, BIR form
2316 and W-2, respectively, of respondent; and,

Annex "6" same as Annex "5"

7.
Annex "6-a" Copy of the Sworn Application for Cancellation of Voter's Previous Registration (Annex
"I", Petition);

8.
Annex "7" Copy of claim card in the name of respondent showing his VRR No. 31326504 dated
October 20, 1997 as a registered voter of Precinct No. 14A1, Barangay Poblacion, Alabel, Sarangani;

14.
Annex "10" The affidavit of respondent reciting the chronology of events and circumstances leading
to his relocation to the Municipality of Alabel, Sarangani, appending Annexes "A", "B", "C", "D", "D-1", "E", "F",
"G" with sub-markings "G-1" and "G-2" and "H" his CTC No. 111`32214C dated September 5, 1997, which are
the same as Annexes "1", "2", "4", "5", "6-a", "3", "7", "9" with sub-markings "9-a" and "9-b" except Annex "H".
5

On 6 May 1998, the COMELEC 2nd Division promulgated a resolution declaring DOMINO disqualified as
candidate for the position of representative of the lone district of Sarangani for lack of the one-year residence
requirement and likewise ordered the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy, on the basis of the following
findings:

9.
Annex "7-a" Certification dated April 16, 1998, issued by Atty. Elmer M. Kayanan, Election Officer IV,
District III, Quezon City, which reads:

This is to certify that the spouses JUAN and ZORAYDA DOMINO are no longer registered voters of District III,
Quezon City. Their registration records (VRR) were transferred and are now in the possession of the Election
Officer of Alabel, Sarangani.

What militates against respondent's claim that he has met the residency requirement for the position sought is
his own Voter's Registration Record No. 31326504 dated June 22, 1997 [Annex "B", Petition] and his address
indicated as 24 Bonifacio St., Ayala Heights, Old Balara, Quezon City. This evidence, standing alone, negates all
his protestations that he established residence at Barangay Poblacion, Alabel, Sarangani, as early as January
1997. It is highly improbable, nay incredible, for respondent who previously ran for the same position in the 3rd
Legislative District of Quezon City during the elections of 1995 to unwittingly forget the residency requirement
for the office sought.

This certification is being issued upon the request of Mr. JUAN DOMINO.

10.
Annex "8" Affidavit of Nora Dacaldacal and Maria Lourdes Dacaldacal stating the circumstances and
incidents detailing their alleged acquaintance with respondent.

Pearliegates

Counting, therefore, from the day after June 22, 1997 when respondent registered at Precinct No. 4400-A, up to
and until the day of the elections on May 11, 1998, respondent clearly lacks the one (1) year residency
requirement provided for candidates for Member of the House of Representatives under Section 6, Article VI of
the Constitution.

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All told, petitioner's evidence conspire to attest to respondent's lack of residence in the constituency where he
seeks election and while it may be conceded that he is a registered voter as contemplated under Section 12 of
R.A. 8189, he lacks the qualification to run for the position of Congressman for the Lone District of the Province
of Sarangani. 6

On 11 May 1998, the day of the election, the COMELEC issued Supplemental Omnibus Resolution No. 3046,
ordering that the votes cast for DOMINO be counted but to suspend the proclamation if winning, considering
that the Resolution disqualifying him as candidate had not yet become final and executory. 7

The result of the election, per Statement of Votes certified by the Chairman of the Provincial Board of
Canvassers, 8 shows that DOMINO garnered the highest number of votes over his opponents for the position of
Congressman of the Province of Sarangani.

On 15 May 1998, DOMINO filed a motion for reconsideration of the Resolution dated 6 May 1998, which was
denied by the COMELEC en banc in its decision dated 29 May 1998. Hence, the present Petition for Certiorari
with prayer for Preliminary Mandatory Injunction alleging, in the main, that the COMELEC committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction when it ruled that he did not meet the one-year
residence requirement.

On 14 July 1998, acting on DOMINO's Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order, the Court directed
the parties to maintain the status quo prevailing at the time of the filing of the instant petition. 9

On 15 September 1998, Lucille L. Chiongbian-Solon, (hereafter INTERVENOR), the candidate receiving the
second highest number of votes, was allowed by the Court to Intervene. 10 INTERVENOR in her Motion for
Leave to Intervene and in her Comment in Intervention 11 is asking the Court to uphold the disqualification of
petitioner Juan Domino and to proclaim her as the duly elected representative of Sarangani in the 11 May 1998
elections.

Before us DOMINO raised the following issues for resolution, to wit:

a.
Whether or not the judgment of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City declaring petitioner as
resident of Sarangani and not of Quezon City is final, conclusive and binding upon the whole world, including
the Commission on Elections.

c.
Whether or not respondent COMELEC has jurisdiction over the petition a quo for the disqualification of
petitioner. 12

The first issue.

The contention of DOMINO that the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City in the exclusion
proceedings declaring him a resident of the Province of Sarangani and not of Quezon City is final and
conclusive upon the COMELEC cannot be sustained.

The COMELEC has jurisdiction as provided in Sec. 78, Art. IX of the Omnibus Election Code, over a petition to
deny due course to or cancel certificate of candidacy. In the exercise of the said jurisdiction, it is within the
competence of the COMELEC to determine whether false representation as to material facts was made in the
certificate of candidacy, that will include, among others, the residence of the candidate.

The determination of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City in the exclusion proceedings as to the right of
DOMINO to be included or excluded from the list of voters in the precinct within its territorial jurisdicton, does
not preclude the COMELEC, in the determination of DOMINO's qualification as a candidate, to pass upon the
issue of compliance with the residency requirement.

The proceedings for the exclusion or inclusion of voters in the list of voters are summary in character. Thus, the
factual findings of the trial court and its resultant conclusions in the exclusion proceedings on matters other
than the right to vote in the precinct within its territorial jurisdiction are not conclusive upon the COMELEC.
Although the court in inclusion or exclusion proceedings may pass upon any question necessary to decide the
issue raised including the questions of citizenship and residence of the challenged voter, the authority to order
the inclusion in or exclusion from the list of voters necessarily caries with it the power to inquire into and settle
all matters essential to the exercise of said authority. However, except for the right to remain in the list of
voters or for being excluded therefrom for the particular election in relation to which the proceedings had been
held, a decision in an exclusion or inclusion proceeding, even if final and unappealable, does not acquire the
nature of res judicata. 13 In this sense, it does not operate as a bar to any future action that a party may take
concerning the subject passed upon in the proceeding. 14 Thus, a decision in an exclusion proceeding would
neither be conclusive on the voter's political status, nor bar subsequent proceedings on his right to be
registered as a voter in any other election. 15

Thus, in Tan Cohon v. Election Registrar 16 we ruled that:


b.
Whether or not petitioner herein has resided in the subject congressional district for at least one (1)
year immediately preceding the May 11, 1998 elections; and

Pearliegates

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Election Law Cases


. . . It is made clear that even as it is here held that the order of the City Court in question has become final,
the same does not constitute res adjudicata as to any of the matters therein contained. It is ridiculous to
suppose that such an important and intricate matter of citizenship may be passed upon and determined with
finality in such a summary and peremptory proceeding as that of inclusion and exclusion of persons in the
registry list of voters. Even if the City Court had granted appellant's petition for inclusion in the permanent list
of voters on the allegation that she is a Filipino citizen qualified to vote, her alleged Filipino citizenship would
still have been left open to question.

Moreover, the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City in its 18 January decision exceeded its jurisdiction when it
declared DOMINO a resident of the Province of Sarangani, approved and ordered the transfer of his voter's
registration from Precinct No. 4400-A of Barangay Old Balara, Quezon City to precinct 14A1 of Barangay
Poblacion, Alabel, Sarangani. It is not within the competence of the trial court, in an exclusion proceedings, to
declare the challenged voter a resident of another municipality. The jurisdiction of the lower court over
exclusion cases is limited only to determining the right of voter to remain in the list of voters or to declare that
the challenged voter is not qualified to vote in the precint in which he is registered, specifying the ground of the
voter's disqualification. The trial court has no power to order the change or transfer of registration from one
place of residence to another for it is the function of the election Registration Board as provided under Section
12 of R.A. No. 8189. 17 The only effect of the decision of the lower court excluding the challenged voter from
the list of voters, is for the Election Registration Board, upon receipt of the final decision, to remove the voter's
registration record from the corresponding book of voters, enter the order of exclusion therein, and thereafter
place the record in the inactive file. 18

Finally, the application of the rule on res judicata is unavailing. Identity of parties, subject matter and cause of
action are indispensable requirements for the application of said doctrine. Neither herein Private Respondents
nor INTERVENOR, is a party in the exclusion proceedings. The Petition for Exclusion was filed by DOMINDO
himself and his wife, praying that he and his wife be excluded from the Voter's List on the ground of erroneous
registration while the Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy was filed by private
respondents against DOMINO for alleged false representation in his certificate of candidacy. For the decision to
be a basis for the dismissal by reason of res judicata, it is essential that there must be between the first and
the second action identity of parties, identity of subject matter and identity of causes of action. 19 In the
present case, the aforesaid essential requisites are not present. In the case of Nuval v. Guray, et al., 20 the
Supreme Court in resolving a similar issue ruled that:

The question to be solved under the first assignment of error is whether or not the judgment rendered in the
case of the petition for the exclusion of Norberto Guray's name from the election list of Luna, is res judicata, so
as to prevent the institution and prosecution of an action in quo warranto, which is now before us.

The procedure prescribed by section 437 of the Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3387, is of a
summary character and the judgment rendered therein is not appealable except when the petition is tried
before the justice of the peace of the capital or the circuit judge, in which case it may be appealed to the judge
of first instance, with whom said two lower judges have concurrent jurisdiction.

Pearliegates

The petition for exclusion was presented by Gregorio Nuval in his dual capacity as qualified voter of the
municipality of Luna, and as a duly registered candidate for the office of president of said municipality, against
Norberto Guray as a registered voter in the election list of said municipality. The present proceeding of quo
warranto was interposed by Gregorio Nuval in his capacity as a registered candidate voted for the office of
municipal president of Luna, against Norberto Guray, as an elected candidate for the same office. Therefore,
there is no identity of parties in the two cases, since it is not enough that there be an identity of persons, but
there must be an identity of capacities in which said persons litigate. (Art. 1259 of the Civil Code; Bowler vs.
Estate of Alvarez, 23 Phil., 561; 34 Corpus Juris, p. 756, par. 1165)

In said case of the petition for the exclusion, the object of the litigation, or the litigious matter was the
exclusion of Norberto Guray as a voter from the election list of the municipality of Luna, while in the present
que warranto proceeding, the object of the litigation, or the litigious matter is his exclusion or expulsion from
the office to which he has been elected. Neither does there exist, then, any identity in the object of the
litigation, or the litigious matter.

In said case of the petition for exclusion, the cause of action was that Norberto Guray had not the six months'
legal residence in the municipality of Luna to be a qualified voter thereof, while in the present proceeding of
quo warranto, the cause of action is that Norberto Guray has not the one year's legal residence required for
eligibility to the office of municipal president of Luna. Neither does there exist therefore, identity of causes of
action.

In order that res judicata may exist the following are necessary: (a) identity of parties; (b) identity of things;
and (c) identity of issues (Aquino v. Director of Lands, 39 Phil. 850). And as in the case of the petition for
excluision and in the present quo warranto proceeding, as there is no identity of parties, or of things or litigious
matter, or of issues or causes of action, there is no res judicata.

The Second Issue.

Was DOMINO a resident of the Province of Sarangani for at least one year immediately preceding the 11 May
1998 election as stated in his certificate of candidacy?

We hold in the negative.

It is doctrinally settled that the term "residence," as used in the law prescribing the qualifications for suffrage
and for elective office, means the same thing as "domicile," which imports not only an intention to reside in a
fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. 21
"Domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, whenever absent for business, pleasure, or some
other reasons, one intends to return. 22 "Domicile" is a question of intention and circumstances. In the

238

Election Law Cases


consideration of circumstances, three rules must be borne in mind, namely: (1) that a man must have a
residence or domicile somewhere; (2) when once established it remains until a new one is acquired; and (3) a
man can have but one residence or domicile at a time. 23

Records show that petitioner's domicile of origin was Candon, Ilocos


Sur 24 and that sometime in 1991, he acquired a new domicile of choice at 24 Bonifacio St. Ayala Heights, Old
Balara, Quezon City, as shown by his certificate of candidacy for the position of representative of the 3rd
District of Quezon City in the May 1995 election. Petitioner is now claiming that he had effectively abandoned
his "residence" in Quezon City and has established a new "domicile" of choice at the Province of Sarangani.

A person's "domicile" once established is considered to continue and will not be deemed lost until a new one is
established. 25 To successfully effect a change of domicile one must demonstrate an actual removal or an
actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a
new one and definite acts which correspond with the
purpose. 26 In other words, there must basically be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The
purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of
residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual. 27

It is the contention of petitioner that his actual physical presence in Alabel, Sarangani since December 1996
was sufficiently established by the lease of a house and lot located therein in January 1997 and by the
affidavits and certifications under oath of the residents of that place that they have seen petitioner and his
family residing in their locality.

While this may be so, actual and physical is not in itself sufficient to show that from said date he had
transferred his residence in that place. To establish a new domicile of choice, personal presence in the place
must be coupled with conduct indicative of that intention. While "residence" simply requires bodily presence in
a given place, "domicile" requires not only such bodily presence in that place but also a declared and probable
intent to make it one's fixed and permanent place of abode, one's home. 28

from his permanent residence, no matter how long, without the intention to abandon it does not result in loss
or change of
domicile. 30 Thus the date of the contract of lease of a house and lot located in the province of Sarangani, i.e.,
15 January 1997, cannot be used, in the absence of other circumstances, as the reckoning period of the oneyear residence requirement.

Further, Domino's lack of intention to abandon his residence in Quezon City is further strengthened by his act of
registering as voter in one of the precincts in Quezon City. While voting is not conclusive of residence, it does
give rise to a strong presumption of residence especially in this case where DOMINO registered in his former
barangay. Exercising the right of election franchise is a deliberate public assertion of the fact of residence, and
is said to have decided preponderance in a doubtful case upon the place the elector claims as, or believes to
be, his residence. 31 The fact that a party continously voted in a particular locality is a strong factor in assisting
to determine the status of his domicile. 32

His claim that his registration in Quezon City was erroneous and was caused by events over which he had no
control cannot be sustained. The general registration of voters for purposes of the May 1998 elections was
scheduled for two (2) consecutive weekends, viz.: June 14, 15, 21, and 22. 33

While, Domino's intention to establish residence in Sarangani can be gleaned from the fact that be bought the
house he was renting on November 4, 1997, that he sought cancellation of his previous registration in Qezon
City on 22 October 1997, 34 and that he applied for transfer of registration from Quezon City to Sarangani by
reason of change of residence on 30 August 1997, 35 DOMINO still falls short of the one year residency
requirement under the Constitution.

In showing compliance with the residency requirement, both intent and actual presence in the district one
intends to represent must satisfy the length of time prescribed by the fundamental law. 36 Domino's failure to
do so rendered him ineligible and his election to office null and void. 37

The Third Issue.


As a general rule, the principal elements of domicile, physical presence in the locality involved and intention to
adopt it as a domicile, must concur in order to establish a new domicile. No change of domicile will result if
either of these elements is absent. Intention to acquire a domicile without actual residence in the locality does
not result in acquisition of domicile, nor does the fact of physical presence without intention. 29

DOMINO's contention that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction in the present petition is bereft of merit.

The lease contract entered into sometime in January 1997, does not adequately support a change of domicile.
The lease contract may be indicative of DOMINO's intention to reside in Sarangani but it does not engender the
kind of permanency required to prove abandonment of one's original domicile. The mere absence of individual

As previously mentioned, the COMELEC, under Sec. 78, Art. IX of the Omnibus Election Code, has jurisdiction
over a petition to deny due course to or cancel certificate of candidacy. Such jurisdiction continues even after
election, if for any reason no final judgment of disqualification is rendered before the election, and the
candidate facing disqualification is voted for and receives the highest number of votes 38 and provided further
that the winning candidate has not been proclaimed or has taken his oath of office. 39

Pearliegates

239

Election Law Cases

It has been repeatedly held in a number of cases, that the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal's sole
and exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of
Congress as provided under Section 17 of Article VI of the Constitution begins only after a candidate has
become a member of the House of Representatives. 40

The fact of obtaining the highest number of votes in an election does not automatically vest the position in the
winning candidate. 41 A candidate must be proclaimed and must have taken his oath of office before he can be
considered a member of the House of Representatives.

In the instant case, DOMINO was not proclaimed as Congressman-elect of the Lone Congressional District of the
Province of Sarangani by reason of a Supplemental Omnibus Resolution issued by the COMELEC on the day of
the election ordering the suspension of DOMINO's proclamation should he obtain the winning number of votes.
This resolution was issued by the COMELEC in view of the non-finality of its 6 May 1998 resolution disqualifying
DOMINO as candidate for the position.

Cosidering that DOMINO has not been proclaimed as Congressman-elect in the Lone Congressional District of
the Province of Sarangani he cannot be deemed a member of the House of Representatives. Hence, it is the
COMELEC and not the Electoral Tribunal which has jurisdiction over the issue of his ineligibility as a candidate.
42

Issue raised by INTERVENOR.

After finding that DOMINO is disqualified as candidate for the position of representative of the province of
Sarangani, may INTERVENOR, as the candidate who received the next highest number of votes, be proclaimed
as the winning candidate?

It is now settled doctrine that the candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes may not be
proclaimed winner in case the winning candidate is disqualified. 43 In every election, the people's choice is the
paramount consideration and their expressed will must, at all times, be given effect. When the majority speaks
and elects into office a candidate by giving the highest number of votes cast in the election for that office, no
one can be declared elected in his place. 44

It would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a
candidate who has not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner and imposed as the
representative of a constituency, the majority of which have positively declared through their ballots that they
do not choose him. 45 To simplistically assume that the second placer would have received the other votes

Pearliegates

would be to substitute our judgment for the mind of the voters. He could not be considered the first among
qualified candidates because in a field which excludes the qualified candidate, the conditions would have
substantially changed. 46

Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have received the highest number of
votes cast in the election for that office, and it is fundamental idea in all republican forms of government that
no one can be declared elected and no measure can be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or
plurality of the legal votes cast in the election. 47

The effect of a decision declaring a person ineligible to hold an office is only that the election fails entirely, that
the wreath of victory cannot be transferred 48 from the disqualified winner to the repudiated loser because the
law then as now only authorizes a declaration of election in favor of the person who has obtained a plurality of
votes 49 and does not entitle the candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected.
In such case, the electors have failed to make a choice and the election is a nullity. 50 To allow the defeated
and repudiated candidate to take over the elective position despite his rejection by the electorate is to
disenfranchise the electorate without any fault on their part and to undermine the importance and meaning of
democracy and the people's right to elect officials of their choice. 51

INTERVENOR's plea that the votes cast in favor of DOMINO be considered stray votes cannot be sustained.
INTERVENOR's reliance on the opinion made in the Labo, Jr. case 52 to wit: if the electorate, fully aware in fact
and in law of a candidate's disqualification so as to bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety, would
nevertheless cast their votes in favor of the ineligible candidate, the electorate may be said to have waived the
validity and efficacy of their votes by notoriously misapplying their franchise or throwing away their votes, in
which case, the eligible candidate obtaining the next higher number of votes may be deemed elected, is
misplaced.

Contrary to the claim of INTERVENOR, petitioner was not notoriously known by the public as an ineligible
candidate. Although the resolution declaring him ineligible as candidate was rendered before the election,
however, the same is not yet final and executory. In fact, it was no less than the COMELEC in its Supplemental
Omnibus Resolution No. 3046 that allowed DOMINO to be voted for the office and ordered that the votes cast
for him be counted as the Resolution declaring him ineligible has not yet attained finality. Thus the votes cast
for DOMINO are presumed to have been cast in the sincere belief that he was a qualified candidate, without
any intention to misapply their franchise. Thus, said votes can not be treated as stray, void, or meaningless. 53

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The resolution dated 6 May 1998 of the COMELEC 2nd Division
and the decision dated 29 May 1998 of the COMELEC En Banc, are hereby AFFIRMED.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 135886

August 16, 1999

240

Election Law Cases

VICTORINO SALCEDO II, petitioner,


vs.

On August 12, 1998, the Comelec's Second Division ruled, by a vote of 2 to 1,8 that since there is an existing
valid marriage between Neptali Salcedo and Agnes Celiz, the subsequent marriage of the former with private
respondent is null and void. Consequently, the use by private respondent of the surname "Salcedo" constitutes
material misrepresentation and is a ground for the cancellation of her certificate of candidacy. The pertinent
portion of the Resolution reads as follows

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ERMELITA CACAO SALCEDO, respondents.

GONZAGA-REYES, J.:

This is a petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Court of the en banc Resolution of the
Commission on Elections (Comelec) dated October 6, 1998, which reversed the earlier Resolution issued by its
Second Division on August 12, 1998.

From the pleadings and the annexes, the following uncontroverted facts have been established

On February 18, 1968, Neptali P. Salcedo married Agnes Celiz, which marriage is evidenced by a certified true
copy of the marriage contract issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Ajuy, Iloilo.1 Without his first marriage
having been dissolved, Neptali P. Salcedo married private respondent Ermelita Cacao in a civil ceremony held
on September 21, 1986.2 Two days later, on September 23, 1986, Ermelita Cacao contracted another marriage
with a certain Jesus Aguirre, as shown by a marriage certificate filed with the Office of the Civil Registrar.3

Petitioner Victorino Salcedo II and private respondent Ermelita Cacao Salcedo both ran for the position of mayor
of the municipality of Sara, Iloilo in the May 11, 1998 elections, both of them having filed their respective
certificates of candidacy on March 27, 1998.4 However, on April 17, 1998, petitioner filed with the Comelec a
petition5 seeking the cancellation of private respondent's certificate of candidacy on the ground that she had
made a false representation therein by stating that her surname was "Salcedo." Petitioner contended that
private respondent had no right to use said surname because she was not legally married to Neptali Salcedo.
On May 13, 1998, private respondent was proclaimed as the duly elected mayor of Sara, Iloilo.6

In her answer, private respondent claimed that she had no information or knowledge at the time she married
Neptali Salcedo that he was in fact already married; that, upon learning of his existing marriage, she
encouraged her husband to take steps to annul his marriage with Agnes Celiz because the latter had
abandoned their marital home since 1972 and has not been heard from since that time; that on February 16,
1998, Neptali Salcedo filed a petition for declaration of presumptive death before Branch 66 of the Regional
Trial Court of Barotac Viejo, Iloilo, which was granted by the court in its April 8, 1998 decision; that Neptali
Salcedo and Jesus Aguirre are one and the same person; and that since 1986 up to the present she has been
using the surname "Salcedo" in all her personal, commercial and public transactions.7

Pearliegates

The only issue to be resolved is whether or not the use by respondent of the surname "Salcedo" in her
certificate of candidacy constitutes material misrepresentation under Section 78 in relation to Section 74 of the
Omnibus Election Code.

Sec. 78 of the of the (sic) Omnibus Election Code reads:

A verified petition seeking to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any
person exclusively on the ground that any material misrepresentation contained therein as required under
Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of
the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than
fifteen days before the election.

A candidate's name or surname contained in the certificate of candidacy is required under Section 74 of the
Omnibus Election Code and is a material misrepresentation.

Gleaned from the records, respondent admitted that she married Neptali Salcedo on September 21, 1986 in a
civil ceremony held in Sara, Iloilo and that she married Jesus Aguirre on September 23, 1986. For the petitioner,
this admission is supported by a marriage contract (attached as Annex "C" of the Petition) and a certificate of
marriage (attached as Annex "D" of the petition) where the contracting parties are "Jesus Aguirre" and
"Ermelita Cacao". On the other hand, respondent tries to create the impression that "Neptali Salcedo" and
"Jesus Aguirre" are one and the same persons. This Commission, however, holds the view that regardless of
whether Neptali Salcedo and Jesus Aguirre are the same persons, the fact remains irrefutable is that at the time
respondent contracted marriage with Neptali Salcedo, the latter has a valid existing marriage with Agnes Celiz
and this was sufficiently established by a marriage contract executed on February 18, 1968 and attached to the
petition as Annex "E". Respondent cannot seek refuge in her bare assumption that since Agnes Celiz was
declared as presumptively dead by the Regional Trial Court of Barotac Viejo, Iloilo, she was free to marry
Neptali Salcedo. In point of fact and law, there was considerably NO pronouncement to the effect that the
marriage of Neptali Salcedo and Agnes Celiz was annulled by the court and that Salcedo became free to marry
respondent.

From all indications, it is to be fairly assumed that since there is an existing valid marriage between Neptali
Salcedo and Agnes Celiz, the subsequent marriage of the former with the respondent is null and void.

241

Election Law Cases


Consequently, the use by the respondent of the surname "Salcedo" constitutes material misrepresentation and
is a ground for the cancellation of her certificate of candidacy.1wphi1.nt

WHEREFORE, this Commission (SECOND DIVISION) RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to CANCEL the
Certificate of Candidacy of respondent for the position of Municipal Mayor of Sara, Iloilo in the May 11, 1998
elections.9

However, in its en banc Resolution dated October 6, 1998, the Comelec overturned its previous resolution,
ruling that private respondent's certificate of candidacy did not contain any material misrepresentation. It
disposed of the case in this manner

The record shows that respondent Ermelita C. Salcedo married Neptali Salcedo on September 21, 1986. Under
Article 370 of the Civil Code, the respondent may use her husband's surname. Hence, there is no material
misrepresentation nor usurpation of another's name.

At any rate, its has been said that the "filing of a certificate of candidacy is a technicality that should be
enforced before the election, but can be disregarded after the electorate has made the choosing" (Collado vs.
Alonzo, 15 SCRA 526). This rule is in consonance with the policy announced in many decisions that "the rules
and regulations, for the conduct of elections, are mandatory before the elections, but when it is sought to
enforce them after the elections, they are held to be directory only" (Lambonao vs. Tero, 15 SCRA 716).

Furthermore, the municipal board of canvassers proclaimed the respondent last May 13, 1998, as the duly elect
mayor of the municipality of Sara, Province of Iloilo. Any defect in the respondent's certificate of candidacy
should give way to the will of the electorate.

WHEREFORE, the COMMISSION resolves to GRANT the instant Motion for Reconsideration. We REVERSE the
resolution (Second Division) promulgated on August 12, 1998, cancelling the certificate of candidacy of the
respondent Ermelita C. Salcedo. The proclamation of Ermelita C. Salcedo, as mayor of Sara, Iloilo, remains
valid, there being no legal ground to set it aside.10

Contrary to petitioner's contention, we are of the opinion that the main issue in this case is not whether or not
private respondent is entitled to use a specific surname in her certificate of candidacy,11 but whether the use
of such surname constitutes a material misrepresentation under section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code (the
"Code") so as to justify the cancellation of her certificate of candidacy. We hold that it does not.

Every person aspiring to hold any elective public office must file a sworn certificate of candidacy.12 One of the
things which should be stated therein is that the candidate is eligible for the office.13

In case there is a material misrepresentation in the certificate of candidacy, the Comelec is authorized to deny
due course to or cancel such certificate upon the filing of a petition by any person pursuant to section 78 of the
Code which states that

A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any
person exclusively on the ground that any material misrepresentation contained therein as required under
Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of
the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than
fifteen days before the election.

If the petition is filed within the statutory period and the candidate is subsequently declared by final judgment
to be disqualified before the election, he shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted.
If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is
voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or the Comelec shall continue
with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any
intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate
whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.14 The fifteen-day period in section 78 for deciding the petition is
merely directory.15

As stated in the law, in order to justify the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy under section 78, it is
essential that the false representation mentioned therein pertain to a material matter for the sanction imposed
by this provision would affect the substantive rights of a candidate the right to run for the elective post for
which he filed the certificate of candidacy. Although the law does not specify what would be considered as a
"material representation," the Court has interpreted this phrase in a line of decisions applying section 78 of the
Code.

This last resolution of the Comelec prompted petitioner to repair to this Court by way of a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65, claiming that public respondent's ruling was issued in grave abuse of its discretion.
In Abella vs. Larrazabal, supra, a petition was filed with the Comelec seeking the disqualification of private
respondent Larrazabal for alleged false statements in her certificate of candidacy regarding residence. The
Court held that the challenge made against private respondent's claimed residence was properly classified as a
proceeding under section 78, despite the fact that it was filed only on the very day of the election.16

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(2) After election, pursuant to Section 253 thereof, viz.:
Meanwhile, in Labo vs. Commission on Elections,17 the disqualification proceeding filed by respondent
pursuant to section 78 of the Code sought to cancel the certificate of candidacy filed by petitioner Ramon Labo,
who ran for mayor of Baguio City in the last May 11, 1992 elections, based on the ground that Labo made a
false representation when he stated therein that he is natural-born citizen of the Philippines. The Court,
speaking through Justice Abdulwahid A. Bidin, held that Labo, having failed to submit any evidence to prove his
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, is not a Filipino citizen and respondent Comelec did not commit any
grave abuse of discretion in cancelling his certificate of candidacy. The Court went on to say that the
possession of citizenship, being an indispensable requirement for holding public office, may not be dispensed
with by the fact of having won the elections for it "strikes at the very core of petitioner Labo's qualification to
assume the contested office."

A similar issue was dealt with in the Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections cases18 wherein Frivaldo's
qualification for public office was questioned in a petition filed by petitioner Paul R. Lee, praying that Frivaldo
be disqualified from seeking or holding any public office or position and that his certificate of candidacy be
cancelled by reason of his not yet being a citizen of the Philippines. The Court held that Frivaldo had reacquired
Philippine citizenship by virtue of his repatriation under P.D. 725 and was qualified to hold the position of
governor of Sorsogon.

The Court has likened a proceeding under section 78 to a quo warranto proceeding under section 253 since
they both deal with the qualifications of a candidate. In the case of Aznar vs. Commission on Elections,19
wherein a petition was filed asking the Comelec to disqualify private respondent Emilio Osmena on the ground
that he does not possess the requisite Filipino citizenship, the Court said

There are two instances where a petition questioning the qualifications of a registered candidate to run for the
office for which his certificate of candidacy was filed can be raised under the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg.
881), to wit:

(1) Before election, pursuant to Section 78 thereof which provides that:

Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy. A verified petition seeking to
deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground
that any material misrepresentation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition
may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of
candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.

and

Pearliegates

Sec. 253. Petition for quo warranto. Any voter contesting the election of any Member of the Batasang
Pambansa20, regional, provincial, or city officer on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of
the Philippines shall file a sworn petition for quo warranto with the Commission within ten days after the
proclamation of the results of the election.

(emphasis supplied)

The only difference between the two proceedings is that, under section 78, the qualifications for elective office
are misrepresented in the certificate of candidacy and the proceedings must be initiated before the elections,
whereas a petition for quo warranto under section 253 may be brought on the basis of two grounds (1)
ineligibility or (2) disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines, and must be initiated within ten days after the
proclamation of the election results. Under section 253, a candidate is ineligible if he is disqualified to be
elected to office,21 and he is disqualified if he lacks any of the qualifications for elective office.

In still another case, where the petition to disqualify petitioner was based upon an alleged false representation
in the certificate of candidacy as to the candidate's age, the Court once again drew a parallel between a
petition for quo warranto and a petition to cancel a certificate of candidacy when it stated that ". . . if a person
qualified to file a petition to disqualify a certain candidate fails to file the petition within the 25-day period
prescribed by Section 78 of the Code for whatever reasons, the elections laws do not leave him completely
helpless as he has another chance to raise the disqualification of the candidate by filing a petition for quo
warranto within ten (10) days from the proclamation of the results of the election, as provided under Section
253 of the Code."22

Therefore, it may be concluded that the material misrepresentation contemplated by section 78 of the Code
refer to qualifications for elective office. This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that the consequences
imposed upon a candidate guilty of having made a false representation in his certificate of candidacy are grave
to prevent the candidate from running or, if elected, from serving, or to prosecute him for violation of the
election laws.23 It could not have been the intention of the law to deprive a person of such a basic and
substantive political right to be voted for a public office upon just any innocuous mistake.

Petitioner has made no allegations concerning private respondent's qualifications to run for the office of mayor.
Aside from his contention that she made a misrepresentation in the use of the surname "Salcedo," petitioner
does not claim that private respondent lacks the requisite residency, age, citizenship or any other legal
qualification necessary to run for a local elective office as provided for in the Local Government Code.24 Thus,
petitioner has failed to discharge the burden of proving that the misrepresentation allegedly made by private
respondent in her certificate of candidacy pertains to a material matter.

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Aside from the requirement of materiality, a false representation under section 78 must consist of a "deliberate
attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible."25 In other
words, it must be made with an intention to deceive the electorate as to one's qualifications for public office.
The use of a surname, when not intended to mislead or deceive the public as to one's identity, is not within the
scope of the provision.

There is absolutely no showing that the inhabitants of Sara, Iloilo were deceived by the use of such surname by
private respondent. Petitioner does not allege that the electorate did not know who they were voting for when
they cast their ballots in favor of "Ermelita Cacao Salcedo" or that they were fooled into voting for someone
else by the use of such name. It may safely be assumed that the electorate knew who private respondent was,
not only by name, but also by face and may have even been personally acquainted with her since she has been
residing in the municipality of Sara, Iloilo since at least 1986.26 Bolstering this assumption is the fact that she
has been living with Neptali Salcedo, the mayor of Sara for three consecutive terms, since 1970 and the latter
has held her out to the public as his wife.27

Also arguing against petitioner's claim that private respondent intended to deceive the electorate is the fact
that private respondent started using the surname "Salcedo" since 1986, several years before the elections. In
her application for registration of her rice and corn milling business filed with the Department of Trade and
Industry in 1993, private respondent used the name "Ermelita Cacao Salcedo."28 From 1987 to 1997, she also
used the surname "Salcedo" in the income tax returns filed by herself and by Neptali Salcedo.29 The evidence
presented by private respondent on this point, which has remained uncontested by petitioner, belie the latter's
claims that private respondent merely adopted the surname "Salcedo" for purposes of improving her chances
of winning in the local elections by riding on the popularity of her husband.

Thus, we hold that private respondent did not commit any material misrepresentation by the use of the
surname "Salcedo" in her certificate of candidacy.

Resolution of the reasoning contained in the dissenting opinion of Commissioner Desamito; nor is the en banc
Resolution rendered infirm by the mere change of position adopted by Chairman Pardo and Guiani of the
Second Division. Precisely, the purpose of a motion for reconsideration is allow the adjudicator a second
opportunity to review the case and to grapple with the issues therein, deciding anew a question previously
raised.30 There is no legal proscription imposed upon the deciding body against adopting a position contrary to
one previously taken.

Finally, the fact that the decision was promulgated on the day Chairman Pardo, the ponente of the en banc
Resolution, took his oath of office as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court does not give ground to question
the Comelec decision for then Chairman Pardo enjoys the presumption of regularity in the performance of his
official duties, a presumption which petitioner has failed to rebut. At any rate, the date of promulgation is not
necessarily the date of signing.

In upholding the validity of private respondent's certificate of candidacy, we reiterate that "[t]he sanctity of the
people's will must be observed at all times if our nascent democracy is to be preserved. In any challenge
having the effect of reversing a democratic voice, expressed through the ballot, this Court should be ever so
vigilant in finding solutions which would give effect to the will of the majority, for sound public policy dictates
that all elective offices are filled by those who have received the highest number of votes cast in an election.
When a challenge to a winning candidate's qualifications however becomes inevitable, the ineligibility ought to
be so noxious to the Constitution that giving effect to the apparent will of the people would ultimately do harm
to our democratic institutions."31 Since there appears to be no dispute as to private respondent's qualifications
to hold the office of municipal mayor, the will of the electorate must prevail.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby AFFIRMS the en banc Resolution of the Commission on Elections dated October
6, 1998 denying the petition to cancel private respondent's certificate of candidacy. No pronouncement as to
costs.

SO ORDERED.
Having disposed of the major issues, we will now proceed to tackle the secondary issues raised in the petition.
Petitioner claims that the following circumstances constitute grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Comelec: (1) the October 6, 1998 en banc Resolution of the Comelec, sustaining the validity of private
respondent's certificate of candidacy, merely duplicated the dissenting opinion of Commissioner Desamito of
the Second Division in the August 12, 1998 Resolution; (2) Chairman Pardo, the ponente of the en banc
Resolution, and Commissioner Guiani; both members of the Second Division who ruled in favor of petitioner in
the August 12, 1998 Resolution, reversed their positions in the en banc resolution; and (3) the en banc
Resolution was promulgated on the very same day that Chairman Pardo took his oath of office as Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court.

Petitioner does not indicate what legal provision or equitable principle the Comelec transgressed by the
commission of these acts. We find nothing legally assailable with the Comelec's adoption in its en banc

Pearliegates

G.R. No. 195229

October 9, 2012

EFREN RACEL ARA TEA, Petitioner,


vs.
COMMISSiON ON ELECTIONS and ESTELA D. ANTlPOLO, Respondents.

DECISION

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CARPIO, J.:

SO ORDERED.8

The Case

Lonzanidas motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc remained pending during the May 2010
elections. Lonzanida and Efren Racel Aratea (Aratea) garnered the highest number of votes and were
respectively proclaimed Mayor and Vice-Mayor.

This is a special civil action for certiorari1 seeking to review and nullify the Resolution2 dated 2 February 2011
and the Order3 dated 12 January 2011 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En Banc in Dra. Sigrid S.
Rodolfo v. Romeo D. Lonzanida, docketed as SPA No. 09-158 (DC). The petition asserts that the COMELEC
issued the Resolution and Order with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

The Facts

Romeo D. Lonzanida (Lonzanida) and Estela D. Antipolo (Antipolo) were candidates for Mayor of San Antonio,
Zambales in the May 2010 National and Local Elections. Lonzanida filed his certificate of candidacy on 1
December 2009.4 On 8 December 2009, Dra. Sigrid S. Rodolfo (Rodolfo) filed a petition under Section 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code to disqualify Lonzanida and to deny due course or to cancel Lonzanidas certificate of
candidacy on the ground that Lonzanida was elected, and had served, as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales for
four (4) consecutive terms immediately prior to the term for the May 2010 elections. Rodolfo asserted that
Lonzanida made a false material representation in his certificate of candidacy when Lonzanida certified under
oath that he was eligible for the office he sought election. Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution5 and
Section 43(b) of the Local Government Code6 both prohibit a local elective official from being elected and
serving for more than three consecutive terms for the same position.

The COMELEC Second Division rendered a Resolution7 on 18 February 2010 cancelling Lonzanidas certificate
of candidacy. Pertinent portions of the 18 February 2010 Resolution read:

Respondent Lonzanida never denied having held the office of mayor of San Antonio, Zambales for more than
nine consecutive years. Instead he raised arguments to forestall or dismiss the petition on the grounds other
than the main issue itself. We find such arguments as wanting. Respondent Lonzanida, for holding the office of
mayor for more than three consecutive terms, went against the three-term limit rule; therefore, he could not be
allowed to run anew in the 2010 elections. It is time to infuse new blood in the political arena of San Antonio.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Certificate of Candidacy of
Respondent Romeo D. Lonzanida for the position of mayor in the municipality of San Antonio, Zambales is
hereby CANCELLED. His name is hereby ordered STRICKEN OFF the list of Official Candidates for the position of
Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales in May 10, 2010 elections.

Pearliegates

Aratea took his oath of office as Acting Mayor before Regional Trial Court (RTC) Judge Raymond C. Viray of
Branch 75, Olongapo City on 5 July 2010.9 On the same date, Aratea wrote the Department of Interior and
Local Government (DILG) and requested for an opinion on whether, as Vice-Mayor, he was legally required to
assume the Office of the Mayor in view of Lonzanidas disqualification. DILG Legal Opinion No. 117, S. 201010
stated that Lonzanida was disqualified to hold office by reason of his criminal conviction. As a consequence of
Lonzanidas disqualification, the Office of the Mayor was deemed permanently vacant. Thus, Aratea should
assume the Office of the Mayor in an acting capacity without prejudice to the COMELECs resolution of
Lonzanidas motion for reconsideration. In another letter dated 6 August 2010, Aratea requested the DILG to
allow him to take the oath of office as Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales. In his response dated 24 August 2010,
then Secretary Jesse M. Robredo allowed Aratea to take an oath of office as "the permanent Municipal Mayor of
San Antonio, Zambales without prejudice however to the outcome of the cases pending before the
[COMELEC]."11

On 11 August 2010, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Resolution12 disqualifying Lonzanida from running for
Mayor in the May 2010 elections. The COMELEC En Bancs resolution was based on two grounds: first,
Lonzanida had been elected and had served as Mayor for more than three consecutive terms without
interruption; and second, Lonzanida had been convicted by final judgment of ten (10) counts of falsification
under the Revised Penal Code. Lonzanida was sentenced for each count of falsification to imprisonment of four
(4) years and one (1) day of prisin correccional as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prisin
mayor as maximum. The judgment of conviction became final on 23 October 2009 in the Decision of this Court
in Lonzanida v. People,13 before Lonzanida filed his certificate of candidacy on 1 December 2009. Pertinent
portions of the 11 August 2010 Resolution read:

Prescinding from the foregoing premises, Lonzanida, for having served as Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales for
more than three (3) consecutive terms and for having been convicted by a final judgment of a crime punishable
by more than one (1) year of imprisonment, is clearly disqualified to run for the same position in the May 2010
Elections.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.14

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On 25 August 2010, Antipolo filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Attached Petition-inIntervention.15 She claimed her right to be proclaimed as Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales because Lonzanida
ceased to be a candidate when the COMELEC Second Division, through its 18 February 2010 Resolution,
ordered the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy and the striking out of his name from the list of official
candidates for the position of Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales in the May 2010 elections.

In his Comment filed on 26 January 2011, Aratea asserted that Antipolo, as the candidate who received the
second highest number of votes, could not be proclaimed as the winning candidate. Since Lonzanidas
disqualification was not yet final during election day, the votes cast in his favor could not be declared stray.
Lonzanidas subsequent disqualification resulted in a permanent vacancy in the Office of Mayor, and Aratea, as
the duly-elected Vice-Mayor, was mandated by Section 4416 of the Local Government Code to succeed as
Mayor.

SO ORDERED.17

In its Resolution dated 2 February 2011, the COMELEC En Banc no longer considered Lonzanidas qualification
as an issue: "It is beyond cavil that Lonzanida is not eligible to hold and discharge the functions of the Office of
the Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales. The sole issue to be resolved at this juncture is how to fill the vacancy
resulting from Lonzanidas disqualification."18 The Resolution further stated:

The COMELECs Rulings

We cannot sustain the submission of Oppositor Aratea that Intervenor Antipolo could never be proclaimed as
the duly elected Mayor of Antipolo [sic] for being a second placer in the elections. The teachings in the cases of
Codilla vs. De Venecia and Nazareno and Domino vs. COMELEC, et al., while they remain sound jurisprudence
find no application in the case at bar. What sets this case apart from the cited jurisprudence is that the
notoriety of Lonzanidas disqualification and ineligibility to hold public office is established both in fact and in
law on election day itself. Hence, Lonzanidas name, as already ordered by the Commission on February 18,
2010 should have been stricken off from the list of official candidates for Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales.

The COMELEC En Banc issued an Order dated 12 January 2011, stating:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Commission hereby:

Acting on the "Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Attached Petition-in-Intervention" filed by Estela D.
Antipolo (Antipolo) and pursuant to the power of this Commission to suspend its Rules or any portion thereof in
the interest of justice, this Commission hereby RESOLVES to:

1. Declares NULL and VOID the proclamation of respondent ROMEO D. LONZANIDA;

2. GRANTS the Petition for Intervention of Estela D. Antipolo;


1. GRANT the aforesaid Motion;
3. Orders the immediate CONSTITUTION of a Special Municipal Board of Canvassers to PROCLAIM Intervenor
Estela D. Antipolo as the duly elected Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales;
2. ADMIT the Petition-in-Intervention filed by Antipolo;

3. REQUIRE the Respondent, ROMEO DUMLAO LONZANIDA, as well as EFREN RACEL ARATEA, proclaimed ViceMayor of San Antonio, Zambales, to file their respective Comments on the Petition-in- Intervention within a nonextendible period of five (5) days from receipt thereof;

4. Orders Vice-Mayor Efren Racel Aratea to cease and desist from discharging the functions of the Office of the
Mayor, and to cause a peaceful turn-over of the said office to Antipolo upon her proclamation; and

5. Orders the Office of the Executive Director as well as the Regional Election Director of Region III to cause the
implementation of this Resolution and disseminate it to the Department of Interior and Local Government.
4. SET the above-mentioned Petition-in-Intervention for hearing on January 26, 2011 at 10:00 a.m. COMELEC
Session Hall, 8th Floor, Palacio del Gobernador, Intramuros, Manila.
SO ORDERED.19
WHEREFORE, furnish copies hereof the parties for their information and compliance.
Aratea filed the present petition on 9 February 2011.

Pearliegates

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Qualifications and Disqualifications
The Issues

The manner of filling up the permanent vacancy in the Office of the Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales is
dependent upon the determination of Lonzanidas removal. Whether Lonzanida was disqualified under Section
68 of the Omnibus Election Code, or made a false material representation under Section 78 of the same Code
that resulted in his certificate of candidacy being void ab initio, is determinative of whether Aratea or Antipolo
is the rightful occupant to the Office of the Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales.

The dissenting opinions reverse the COMELECs 2 February 2011 Resolution and 12 January 2011 Order. They
hold that Aratea, the duly elected Vice-Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales, should be declared Mayor pursuant to
the Local Government Codes rule on succession.

Section 65 of the Omnibus Election Code points to the Local Government Code for the qualifications of elective
local officials. Paragraphs (a) and (c) of Section 39 and Section 40 of the Local Government Code provide in
pertinent part:

Sec. 39. Qualifications. (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in
the barangay, municipality, city or province x x x; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately
preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.

xxxx

The dissenting opinions make three grave errors: first, they ignore prevailing jurisprudence that a false
representation in the certificate of candidacy as to eligibility in the number of terms elected and served is a
material fact that is a ground for a petition to cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section 78; second, they
ignore that a false representation as to eligibility to run for public office due to the fact that the candidate
suffers from perpetual special disqualification is a material fact that is a ground for a petition to cancel a
certificate of candidacy under Section 78; and third, they resort to a strained statutory construction to conclude
that the violation of the three-term limit rule cannot be a ground for cancellation of a certificate of candidacy
under Section 78, even when it is clear and plain that violation of the three-term limit rule is an ineligibility
affecting the qualification of a candidate to elective office.

(c) Candidates for the position of mayor or vice-mayor of independent component cities, component cities, or
municipalities must be at least twenty-one (21) years of age on election day.

The dissenting opinions tread on dangerous ground when they assert that a candidates eligibility to the office
he seeks election must be strictly construed to refer only to the details, i.e., age, citizenship, or residency,
among others, which the law requires him to state in his COC, and which he must swear under oath to possess.
The dissenting opinions choose to view a false certification of a candidates eligibility on the three-term limit
rule not as a ground for false material representation under Section 78 but as a ground for disqualification
under Section 68 of the same Code. This is clearly contrary to well-established jurisprudence.

(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by
one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence;

The Courts Ruling

We hold that Antipolo, the alleged "second placer," should be proclaimed Mayor because Lonzanidas certificate
of candidacy was void ab initio. In short, Lonzanida was never a candidate at all. All votes for Lonzanida were
stray votes. Thus, Antipolo, the only qualified candidate, actually garnered the highest number of votes for the
position of Mayor.

Pearliegates

xxxx

Sec. 40. Disqualifications. - The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position:

(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;

(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the Republic;

(d) Those with dual citizenship;

(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad;

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Election Law Cases


(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to reside abroad and continue
to avail of the same right after the effectivity of this Code; and

rule, or conviction by final judgment of the crime of falsification under the Revised Penal Code, as one of the
grounds or offenses covered under Section 68. In Codilla, Sr. v. de Venecia,21 this Court ruled:

(g) The insane or feeble-minded. (Emphasis supplied)

[T]he jurisdiction of the COMELEC to disqualify candidates is limited to those enumerated in Section 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code. All other election offenses are beyond the ambit of COMELEC jurisdiction. They are
criminal and not administrative in nature. x x x

Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code provides:

Sec. 12. Disqualification. Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or incompetent,
or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any offense for which he
was sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be
disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted
amnesty.

The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed upon the declaration by
competent authority that said insanity or incompetence had been removed or after the expiration of a period of
five years from his service of sentence, unless within the same period he again becomes disqualified.
(Emphasis supplied)

The grounds for disqualification for a petition under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code are specifically
enumerated:

Sec. 68. Disqualifications. Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party is declared by
final decision by a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having (a) given money or other
material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral
functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign an
amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited
under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; (e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k,
v, and cc, subparagraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from
holding the office. Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be
qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent
resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the
election laws. (Emphasis supplied)

A petition for disqualification under Section 68 clearly refers to "the commission of prohibited acts and
possession of a permanent resident status in a foreign country."20 All the offenses mentioned in Section 68
refer to election offenses under the Omnibus Election Code, not to violations of other penal laws. There is
absolutely nothing in the language of Section 68 that would justify including violation of the three-term limit

Pearliegates

Clearly, the violation by Lonzanida of the three-term limit rule, or his conviction by final judgment of the crime
of falsification under the Revised Penal Code, does not constitute a ground for a petition under Section 68.

False Material Representation

Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code states that a certificate of candidacy may be denied or cancelled
when there is false material representation of the contents of the certificate of candidacy:

Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. A verified petition seeking to deny
due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by the person exclusively on the ground that any
material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be
filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and
shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election. (Emphasis
supplied)

Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code details the contents of the certificate of candidacy:

Sec. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. The certificate of candidacy shall state that the person filing it is
announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and that he is eligible for said office; if for Member of the
Batasang Pambansa, the province, including its component cities, highly urbanized city or district or sector
which he seeks to represent; the political party to which he belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence; his
post office address for all election purposes; his profession or occupation; that he will support and defend the
Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; that he will obey the laws,
legal orders, and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent resident
or immigrant to a foreign country; that the obligation imposed by his oath is assumed voluntarily, without
mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in the certificate of candidacy are true to
the best of his knowledge.

x x x x (Emphasis supplied)

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A candidate for mayor in the 2010 local elections was thus required to provide 12 items of information in the
certificate of candidacy:22 name; nickname or stage name; gender; age; place of birth; political party that
nominated the candidate; civil status; residence/address; profession or occupation; post office address for
election purposes; locality of which the candidate is a registered voter; and period of residence in the
Philippines before 10 May 2010. The candidate also certifies four statements: a statement that the candidate is
a natural born or naturalized Filipino citizen; a statement that the candidate is not a permanent resident of, or
immigrant to, a foreign country; a statement that the candidate is eligible for the office he seeks election; and
a statement of the candidates allegiance to the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines.23 The
certificate of candidacy should also be under oath, and filed within the period prescribed by law.

The conviction of Lonzanida by final judgment, with the penalty of prisin mayor, disqualifies him perpetually
from holding any public office, or from being elected to any public office. This perpetual disqualification took
effect upon the finality of the judgment of conviction, before Lonzanida filed his certificate of candidacy. The
pertinent provisions of the Revised Penal Code are as follows:

Art. 27. Reclusion perpetua. x x x

Prisin mayor and temporary disqualification. The duration of the penalties of prisin mayor and temporary
disqualification shall be from six years and one day to twelve years, except when the penalty of disqualification
is imposed as an accessory penalty, in which case, it shall be that of the principal penalty.

In case of temporary disqualification, such disqualification as is comprised in paragraphs 2 and 3 of this article
shall last during the term of the sentence.

4. The loss of all rights to retirement pay or other pension for any office formerly held.

Art. 31. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary special disqualification. The penalties of perpetual
or temporary special disqualification for public office, profession or calling shall produce the following effects:

1. The deprivation of the office, employment, profession or calling affected.

2. The disqualification for holding similar offices or employments either perpetually or during the term of the
sentence, according to the extent of such disqualification.

Art. 32. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary special disqualification for the exercise of the right of
suffrage. The perpetual or temporary special disqualification for the exercise of the right of suffrage shall
deprive the offender perpetually or during the term of the sentence, according to the nature of said penalty, of
the right to vote in any popular election for any public office or to be elected to such office. Moreover, the
offender shall not be permitted to hold any public office during the period of his disqualification.

xxxx

Art. 30. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification. The penalties of
perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification for public office shall produce the following effects:

1. The deprivation of the public offices and employments which the offender may have held, even if conferred
by popular election.

2. The deprivation of the right to vote in any election for any popular elective office or to be elected to such
office.

3. The disqualification for the offices or public employments and for the exercise of any of the rights
mentioned.

Pearliegates

Art. 42. Prisin mayor Its accessory penalties. The penalty of prision mayor shall carry with it that of
temporary absolute disqualification and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage
which the offender shall suffer although pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been
expressly remitted in the pardon. (Emphasis supplied)

The penalty of prisin mayor automatically carries with it, by operation of law,24 the accessory penalties of
temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special disqualification. Under Article 30 of the Revised Penal
Code, temporary absolute disqualification produces the effect of "deprivation of the right to vote in any election
for any popular elective office or to be elected to such office. The duration of temporary absolute
disqualification is the same as that of the principal penalty of prisin mayor. On the other hand, under Article
32 of the Revised Penal Code, perpetual special disqualification means that "the offender shall not be permitted
to hold any public office during the period of his disqualification, which is perpetually. Both temporary absolute
disqualification and perpetual special disqualification constitute ineligibilities to hold elective public office. A
person suffering from these ineligibilities is ineligible to run for elective public office, and commits a false
material representation if he states in his certificate of candidacy that he is eligible to so run.

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In Lacuna v. Abes (Lacuna),25 the Court, speaking through Justice J.B.L. Reyes, explained the import of the
accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification:

On the first defense of respondent-appellee Abes, it must be remembered that appellees conviction of a crime
penalized with prision mayor which carried the accessory penalties of temporary absolute disqualification and
perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage (Article 42, Revised Penal Code); and Section 99 of
the Revised Election Code disqualifies a person from voting if he had been sentenced by final judgment to
suffer one year or more of imprisonment.

The accessory penalty of temporary absolute disqualification disqualifies the convict for public office and for
the right to vote, such disqualification to last only during the term of the sentence (Article 27, paragraph 3, &
Article 30, Revised Penal Code) that, in the case of Abes, would have expired on 13 October 1961.

But this does not hold true with respect to the other accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification for
the exercise of the right of suffrage. This accessory penalty deprives the convict of the right to vote or to be
elected to or hold public office perpetually, as distinguished from temporary special disqualification, which lasts
during the term of the sentence. Article 32, Revised Penal Code, provides:

Art. 32. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary special disqualification for the exercise of the right of
suffrage. The perpetual or temporary special disqualification for the exercise of the right of suffrage shall
deprive the offender perpetually or during the term of the sentence, according to the nature of said penalty, of
the right to vote in any popular election for any public office or to be elected to such office. Moreover, the
offender shall not be permitted to hold any public office during the period of disqualification.

The word "perpetually" and the phrase "during the term of the sentence" should be applied distributively to
their respective antecedents; thus, the word "perpetually" refers to the perpetual kind of special
disqualification, while the phrase "during the term of the sentence" refers to the temporary special
disqualification. The duration between the perpetual and the temporary (both special) are necessarily different
because the provision, instead of merging their durations into one period, states that such duration is
"according to the nature of said penalty" which means according to whether the penalty is the perpetual or
the temporary special disqualification. (Emphasis supplied)

states that "the offender shall not be permitted to hold any public office during the period of his [perpetual
special] disqualification." Once the judgment of conviction becomes final, it is immediately executory. Any
public office that the convict may be holding at the time of his conviction becomes vacant upon finality of the
judgment, and the convict becomes ineligible to run for any elective public office perpetually. In the case of
Lonzanida, he became ineligible perpetually to hold, or to run for, any elective public office from the time the
judgment of conviction against him became final. The judgment of conviction was promulgated on 20 July 2009
and became final on 23 October 2009, before Lonzanida filed his certificate of candidacy on 1 December 2009 .
26

Perpetual special disqualification is a ground for a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code
because this accessory penalty is an ineligibility, which means that the convict is not eligible to run for public
office, contrary to the statement that Section 74 requires him to state under oath in his certificate of candidacy.
As this Court held in Fermin v. Commission on Elections,27 the false material representation may refer to
"qualifications or eligibility. One who suffers from perpetual special disqualification is ineligible to run for public
office. If a person suffering from perpetual special disqualification files a certificate of candidacy stating under
oath that "he is eligible to run for (public) office," as expressly required under Section 74, then he clearly makes
a false material representation that is a ground for a petition under Section 78. As this Court explained in
Fermin:

Lest it be misunderstood, the denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC is not based on the lack of
qualifications but on a finding that the candidate made a material representation that is false, which may relate
to the qualifications required of the public office he/she is running for. It is noted that the candidate states in
his/her CoC that he/she is eligible for the office he/she seeks. Section 78 of the OEC, therefore, is to be read in
relation to the constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications or eligibility for public office. If the
candidate subsequently states a material representation in the CoC that is false, the COMELEC, following the
law, is empowered to deny due course to or cancel such certificate. Indeed, the Court has already likened a
proceeding under Section 78 to a quo warranto proceeding under Section 253 of the OEC since they both deal
with the eligibility or qualification of a candidate, with the distinction mainly in the fact that a "Section 78"
petition is filed before proclamation, while a petition for quo warranto is filed after proclamation of the winning
candidate.28 (Emphasis supplied)

Latasa, Rivera and Ong:

The Three-Term Limit Rule as a Ground for Ineligibility


Clearly, Lacuna instructs that the accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification "deprives the convict
of the right to vote or to be elected to or hold public office perpetually.

The accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification takes effect immediately once the judgment of
conviction becomes final. The effectivity of this accessory penalty does not depend on the duration of the
principal penalty, or on whether the convict serves his jail sentence or not. The last sentence of Article 32

Pearliegates

Section 74 requires the candidate to certify that he is eligible for the public office he seeks election. Thus,
Section 74 states that "the certificate of candidacy shall state that the person filing x x x is eligible for said
office. The three-term limit rule, enacted to prevent the establishment of political dynasties and to enhance
the electorates freedom of choice,29 is found both in the Constitution30 and the law.31 After being elected
and serving for three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate reelection for the
same office in the next regular election32 because he is ineligible. One who has an ineligibility to run for

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Election Law Cases


elective public office is not "eligible for [the] office." As used in Section 74, the word "eligible"33 means having
the right to run for elective public office, that is, having all the qualifications and none of the ineligibilities to
run for the public office.

In Latasa v. Commission on Elections,34 petitioner Arsenio Latasa was elected mayor of the Municipality of
Digos, Davao del Sur in 1992, 1995, and 1998. The Municipality of Digos was converted into the City of Digos
during Latasas third term. Latasa filed his certificate of candidacy for city mayor for the 2001 elections. Romeo
Sunga, Latasas opponent, filed before the COMELEC a "petition to deny due course, cancel certificate of
candidacy and/or disqualification" under Section 78 on the ground that Latasa falsely represented in his
certificate of candidacy that he is eligible to run as mayor of Digos City. Latasa argued that he did not make
any false representation. In his certificate of candidacy, Latasa inserted a footnote after the phrase "I am
eligible" and indicated "*Having served three (3) term[s] as municipal mayor and now running for the first time
as city mayor." The COMELEC First Division cancelled Latasas certificate of candidacy for violation of the threeterm limit rule but not for false material representation. This Court affirmed the COMELEC En Bancs denial of
Latasas motion for reconsideration.

We cancelled Marino Morales certificate of candidacy in Rivera III v. Commission on Elections (Rivera).35 We
held that Morales exceeded the maximum three-term limit, having been elected and served as Mayor of
Mabalacat for four consecutive terms (1995 to 1998, 1998 to 2001, 2001 to 2004, and 2004 to 2007). We
declared him ineligible as a candidate for the same position for the 2007 to 2010 term. Although we did not
explicitly rule that Morales violation of the three-term limit rule constituted false material representation, we
nonetheless granted the petition to cancel Morales certificate of candidacy under Section 78. We also affirmed
the cancellation of Francis Ongs certificate of candidacy in Ong v. Alegre,36 where the "petition to disqualify,
deny due course and cancel" Ongs certificate of candidacy under Section 78 was predicated on the violation of
the three-term limit rule.

Loong, Fermin and Munder:

When Possession of a Disqualifying Condition


is Not a Ground for a Petition for Disqualification

It is obvious from a reading of the laws and jurisprudence that there is an overlap in the grounds for eligibility
and ineligibility vis--vis qualifications and disqualifications. For example, a candidate may represent that he is
a resident of a particular Philippine locality37 when he is actually a permanent resident of another country.38 In
cases of such overlap, the petitioner should not be constrained in his choice of remedy when the Omnibus
Election Code explicitly makes available multiple remedies.39 Section 78 allows the filing of a petition to deny
due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy before the election, while Section 253 allows the filing of a
petition for quo warranto after the election. Despite the overlap of the grounds, one should not confuse a
petition for disqualification using grounds enumerated in Section 68 with a petition to deny due course or to
cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section 78.

Pearliegates

The distinction between a petition under Section 68 and a petition under Section 78 was discussed in Loong v.
Commission on Elections40 with respect to the applicable prescriptive period. Respondent Nur Hussein
Ututalum filed a petition under Section 78 to disqualify petitioner Benjamin Loong for the office of Regional
Vice-Governor of the Autonomous Government of Muslim Mindanao for false representation as to his age. The
petition was filed 16 days after the election, and clearly beyond the prescribed 25 day period from the last day
of filing certificates of candidacy. This Court ruled that Ututalums petition was one based on false
representation under Section 78, and not for disqualification under Section 68. Hence, the 25-day prescriptive
period provided in Section 78 should be strictly applied. We recognized the possible gap in the law:

It is true that the discovery of false representation as to material facts required to be stated in a certificate of
candidacy, under Section 74 of the Code, may be made only after the lapse of the 25-day period prescribed by
Section 78 of the Code, through no fault of the person who discovers such misrepresentations and who would
want the disqualification of the candidate committing the misrepresentations. It would seem, therefore, that
there could indeed be a gap between the time of the discovery of the misrepresentation, (when the discovery is
made after the 25-day period under Sec. 78 of the Code has lapsed) and the time when the proclamation of the
results of the election is made. During this so-called "gap" the would-be petitioner (who would seek the
disqualification of the candidate) is left with nothing to do except to wait for the proclamation of the results, so
that he could avail of a remedy against the misrepresenting candidate, that is, by filing a petition for quo
warranto against him. Respondent Commission sees this "gap" in what it calls a procedural gap which,
according to it, is unnecessary and should be remedied.

At the same time, it can not be denied that it is the purpose and intent of the legislative branch of the
government to fix a definite time within which petitions of protests related to eligibility of candidates for
elective offices must be filed, as seen in Sections 78 and 253 of the Code. Respondent Commission may have
seen the need to remedy this so-called procedural gap", but it is not for it to prescribe what the law does not
provide, its function not being legislative. The question of whether the time to file these petitions or protests is
too short or ineffective is one for the Legislature to decide and remedy.41

In Fermin v. Commission on Elections,42 the issue of a candidates possession of the required one-year
residency requirement was raised in a petition for disqualification under Section 68 instead of a petition to deny
due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section 78. Despite the question of the one-year
residency being a proper ground under Section 78, Dilangalen, the petitioner before the COMELEC in Fermin,
relied on Section 5(C)(1) and 5(C)(3)(a)(4) of COMELEC Resolution No. 780043 and filed the petition under
Section 68. In Fermin, we ruled that "a COMELEC rule or resolution cannot supplant or vary legislative
enactments that distinguish the grounds for disqualification from those of ineligibility, and the appropriate
proceedings to raise the said grounds."44 A petition for disqualification can only be premised on a ground
specified in Section 12 or 68 of the Omnibus Election Code or Section 40 of the Local Government Code. Thus,
a petition questioning a candidates possession of the required one-year residency requirement, as
distinguished from permanent residency or immigrant status in a foreign country, should be filed under Section
78, and a petition under Section 68 is the wrong remedy.

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Election Law Cases


In Munder v. Commission on Elections,45 petitioner Alfais Munder filed a certificate of candidacy for Mayor of
Bubong, Lanao del Sur on 26 November 2009. Respondent Atty. Tago Sarip filed a petition for Munders
disqualification on 13 April 2010. Sarip claimed that Munder misrepresented that he was a registered voter of
Bubong, Lanao del Sur, and that he was eligible to register as a voter in 2003 even though he was not yet 18
years of age at the time of the voters registration. Moreover, Munders certificate of candidacy was not
accomplished in full as he failed to indicate his precinct and did not affix his thumb-mark. The COMELEC
Second Division dismissed Sarips petition and declared that his grounds are not grounds for disqualification
under Section 68 but for denial or cancellation of Munders certificate of candidacy under Section 78. Sarips
petition was filed out of time as he had only 25 days after the filing of Munders certificate of candidacy, or until
21 December 2009, within which to file his petition.

candidates eligibility, and thus qualification for the office. Election to and service of the same local elective
position for three consecutive terms renders a candidate ineligible from running for the same position in the
succeeding elections. Lonzanida misrepresented his eligibility because he knew full well that he had been
elected, and had served, as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales for more than three consecutive terms yet he still
certified that he was eligible to run for mayor for the next succeeding term. Thus, Lonzanidas representation
that he was eligible for the office that he sought election constitutes false material representation as to his
qualification or eligibility for the office.

Legal Duty of COMELEC


to Enforce Perpetual Special Disqualification

The COMELEC En Banc, however, disqualified Munder. In reversing the COMELEC Second Division, the COMELEC
En Banc did not rule on the propriety of Sarips remedy but focused on the question of whether Munder was a
registered voter of Bubong, Lanao del Sur. This Court reinstated the COMELEC Second Divisions resolution. This
Court ruled that the ground raised in the petition, lack of registration as voter in the locality where he was
running as a candidate, is inappropriate for a petition for disqualification. We further declared that with our
ruling in Fermin, we had already rejected the claim that lack of substantive qualifications of a candidate is a
ground for a petition for disqualification under Section 68. The only substantive qualification the absence of
which is a ground for a petition under Section 68 is the candidates permanent residency or immigrant status in
a foreign country.

The dissenting opinions place the violation of the three-term limit rule as a disqualification under Section 68 as
the violation allegedly is "a status, circumstance or condition which bars him from running for public office
despite the possession of all the qualifications under Section 39 of the [Local Government Code]." In so holding
the dissenting opinions write in the law what is not found in the law. Section 68 is explicit as to the proper
grounds for disqualification under said Section. The grounds for filing a petition for disqualification under
Section 68 are specifically enumerated in said Section. However, contrary to the specific enumeration in
Section 68 and contrary to prevailing jurisprudence, the dissenting opinions add to the enumerated grounds
the violation of the three-term limit rule and falsification under the Revised Penal Code, which are obviously not
found in the enumeration in Section 68.

Even without a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, the COMELEC is under a legal duty to
cancel the certificate of candidacy of anyone suffering from perpetual special disqualification to run for public
office by virtue of a final judgment of conviction. The final judgment of conviction is judicial notice to the
COMELEC of the disqualification of the convict from running for public office. The law itself bars the convict
from running for public office, and the disqualification is part of the final judgment of conviction. The final
judgment of the court is addressed not only to the Executive branch, but also to other government agencies
tasked to implement the final judgment under the law.

Whether or not the COMELEC is expressly mentioned in the judgment to implement the disqualification, it is
assumed that the portion of the final judgment on disqualification to run for elective public office is addressed
to the COMELEC because under the Constitution the COMELEC is duty bound to "enforce and administer all
laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election."46 The disqualification of a convict to run for
elective public office under the Revised Penal Code, as affirmed by final judgment of a competent court, is part
of the enforcement and administration of "all the laws" relating to the conduct of elections.

Effect of a Void Certificate of Candidacy


The dissenting opinions equate Lonzanidas possession of a disqualifying condition (violation of the three-term
limit rule) with the grounds for disqualification under Section 68. Section 68 is explicit as to the proper grounds
for disqualification: the commission of specific prohibited acts under the Omnibus Election Code and possession
of a permanent residency or immigrant status in a foreign country. Any other false representation regarding a
material fact should be filed under Section 78, specifically under the candidates certification of his eligibility. In
rejecting a violation of the three-term limit as a condition for eligibility, the dissenting opinions resort to judicial
legislation, ignoring the verba legis doctrine and well-established jurisprudence on this very issue.

In a certificate of candidacy, the candidate is asked to certify under oath his eligibility, and thus qualification, to
the office he seeks election. Even though the certificate of candidacy does not specifically ask the candidate for
the number of terms elected and served in an elective position, such fact is material in determining a

Pearliegates

A cancelled certificate of candidacy void ab initio cannot give rise to a valid candidacy, and much less to valid
votes.47 We quote from the COMELECs 2 February 2011 Resolution with approval:

As early as February 18, 2010, the Commission speaking through the Second Division had already ordered the
cancellation of Lonzanidas certificate of candidacy, and had stricken off his name in the list of official
candidates for the mayoralty post of San Antonio, Zambales. Thereafter, the Commission En Banc in its
resolution dated August 11, 2010 unanimously affirmed the resolution disqualifying Lonzanida. Our findings
were likewise sustained by the Supreme Court no less. The disqualification of Lonzanida is not simply anchored
on one ground. On the contrary, it was emphasized in our En Banc resolution that Lonzanidas disqualification is
two-pronged: first, he violated the constitutional fiat on the three-term limit; and second, as early as December

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Election Law Cases


1, 2009, he is known to have been convicted by final judgment for ten (10) counts of Falsification under Article
171 of the Revised Penal Code. In other words, on election day, respondent Lonzanidas disqualification is
notoriously known in fact and in law. Ergo, since respondent Lonzanida was never a candidate for the position
of Mayor [of] San Antonio, Zambales, the votes cast for him should be considered stray votes. Consequently,
Intervenor Antipolo, who remains as the sole qualified candidate for the mayoralty post and obtained the
highest number of votes, should now be proclaimed as the duly elected Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales.48
(Boldfacing and underscoring in the original; italicization supplied)

Lonzanida's certificate of candidacy was cancelled because he was ineligible or not qualified to run for
Mayor.1wphi1 Whether his certificate of candidacy is cancelled before or after the elections is immaterial
because the cancellation on such ground means he was never a candidate from the very beginning, his
certificate of candidacy being void ab initio. There was only one qualified candidate for Mayor in the May 201 0
elections - Anti polo, who therefore received the highest number of votes.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The Resolution dated 2 February 2011 and the Order dated 12 January
2011 of the COMELEC En Bane in SPA No. 09-158 (DC) are AFFIRMED. The COMELEC En Bane is DIRECTED to
constitute a Special Municipal Board of Canvassers to proclaim Estela D. Antipolo as the duly elected Mayor of
San Antonio, Zambales. Petitioner Efren Racel Aratea is ORDERED to cease and desist from discharging the
functions of the Office of the Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 192289

January 8, 2013

(a) Minute Resolution No. 09-09462 (December 22, 2009 Resolution), dated December 22, 2009, disqualifying
the petitioner herein, Kamarudin K. Ibrahim (Ibrahim), from the 2010 Vice-Mayoralty race in Datu Unsay,
Maguindanao for supposedly not being a registered voter of the said municipality; and

(b) Resolution3 (May 6, 2010 Resolution) issued on May 6, 2010, relative to SPA Case No. 10-002 (MP) LOCAL,
denying Ibrahims opposition4 to Resolution No. 09-0946.

Antecedent Facts

On December 1, 2009, Ibrahim filed his certificate of candidacy to run as Vice-Mayor of Datu-Unsay in the May
10, 2010 elections. Thereafter, respondent Rolan G. Buagas (Buagas), then Acting Election Officer in the said
municipality, forwarded to the COMELECs Law Department (Law Department) the names of 20 candidates who
were not registered voters therein. The list5 included Ibrahims name, along with those of two candidates for
mayor, one for vice-mayor and 16 for councilor.

In a Memorandum6 dated December 10, 2009, the Law Department brought to the attention of the COMELEC
en banc the names of 56 candidates running for various posts in Maguindanao and Davao del Sur who were not
registered voters of the municipalities where they sought to be elected. The Law Department recommended
the retention of the said names in the Certified List of Candidates, but for the COMELEC to motu propio institute
actions against them for disqualification and for violation of election laws. Thereafter, the COMELEC en banc
issued the herein assailed December 22, 2009 Resolution approving, but with modification, the Law

KAMARUDIN K. IBRAHIM, Petitioner,


Departments recommendation in the following wise:

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ROLAN G. BUAGAS, Respondents.

DECISION

REYES, J.:

1. to disqualify the foregoing candidates for not being registered voters of the respective municipalities where
they seek to be elected without prejudice to their filing of an opposition within two (2) days from publication
hereof; and

2. to file election offense cases against said candidates for violation of Sec. 74 in relation to Sec. 262 of the
Omnibus Election Code.7 (Italics ours)

Before us is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order1 filed under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court assailing the following
resolutions of the public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC):

Pearliegates

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Election Law Cases


On January 8, 2010, Ibrahim and 50 other candidates filed a Petition/Opposition8 to assail the Resolution dated
December 22, 2009. In the Petition/Opposition, which was docketed as SPA 10-002 (MP) LOCAL, it was stressed
that some of those affected by the Resolution dated December 22, 2009 had participated as candidates in the
2004 and 2007 elections. If indeed they were not registered voters, they should have been disqualified then.
Further, it was emphasized that the candidates who filed the Petition/Opposition were permanent residents and
were domiciled at the place where they sought to be elected.

The COMELEC en banc denied the Petition/Opposition through the herein assailed Resolution dated May 6,
2010. The COMELEC declared that the Resolution dated December 22, 2009 was anchored on the certification,
which was issued by Buagas and Acting Provincial Election Supervisor of Maguindanao, Estelita B. Orbase,
stating that Ibrahim, among other candidates, were not registered voters of Datu Unsay, Maguindanao. The
certification was issued in the performance of official duty, hence, the presumption of regularity attached to it
in the absence of contrary evidence. Ibrahim and company failed to adduce evidence proving their allegations
of registration and residence.

In the May 10, 2010 elections, during which time the Resolution dated May 6, 2010 had not yet attained
finality, Ibrahim obtained 446 votes, the highest number cast for the Vice-Mayoralty race in Datu Unsay.9
However, the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBOC), which was then chaired by Buagas, suspended Ibrahims
proclamation on the basis of Section 5, Rule 2510 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.11

Issue

Whether or not the COMELEC en banc acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it issued the Resolutions dated December 22, 2009 and May 6, 2010.

Arguments in Support of the Instant Petition

Ibrahim posits that the MBOC is a ministerial body created merely "to take the returns as made from the
different voting precincts, add them up and declare the result."12 As long as the returns are on their face
genuine and are signed by the proper officers, sans indications of being spurious and forged, they cannot be
rejected on the ground of alleged questions on the qualifications of voters and the existence of electoral frauds
and irregularities. Further, since Ibrahim received the highest number of votes for Vice-Mayor, all possible
doubts should be resolved in favor of his eligibility, lest the will of the electorate, which should be the
paramount consideration, be defeated.13

the cancellation of a certificate of candidacy. The OSG emphasizes that similarly, Ibrahim was disqualified as a
candidate without prior notice and hearing and he was given the chance to file an opposition only after the
issuance of the Resolution dated December 22, 2009.

Further citing Bautista v. Comelec,16 the OSG argues that jurisdiction over petitions to cancel a certificate of
candidacy pertains to the COMELEC sitting in division and not to the COMELEC en banc. The COMELEC en banc
can only take cognizance of petitions to cancel a certificate of candidacy when the required number of votes for
a division to reach a decision, ruling, order or resolution is not obtained, or when motions for reconsideration
are filed to assail the said issuances of a division.

The OSG likewise refers to Section 4(B)(3)17 of Resolution No. 869618 to stress that generally, the COMELEC
cannot motu propio file petitions for disqualification against candidates. Section 519 of the same resolution,
however, provides the only exception to the foregoing, to wit, that certificates of candidacy of those running for
the positions of President, Vice-President, Senator and Party-List maybe denied due course and canceled motu
propio by the COMELEC based on grounds enumerated therein. While there was a Petition for Disqualification20
filed by Bai Reshal S. Ampatuan against Ibrahim and company, it was not the basis for the COMELEC en bancs
issuance of the Resolutions dated December 22, 2009 and May 6, 2010. Instead, the certification issued by
Buagas was the basis for the subsequent actions of the Law Department and the COMELEC en banc leading to
the issuance of the herein assailed resolutions.

The OSG also invokes Section 1621 of COMELEC Resolution No. 867822 to assert that the MBOC had no
authority to order the suspension of Ibrahims proclamation. Upon motion, the suspension of a winning
candidates proclamation can be ordered during the pendency of a disqualification case before the COMELEC.
However, only the COMELEC, as a tribunal, has the authority to issue orders relative to cases pending before it.
The MBOC cannot substitute its own judgment for that of the COMELECs. The MBOC can suspend a winning
candidates proclamation only when an actual issue within the Boards jurisdiction arises in the course of
conducting a canvass. The aforementioned issues include the commission of violent and terrorist acts or the
occurrence of a calamity at the canvassing site. Absent any determination of irregularity in the election returns,
as well as an order enjoining the canvassing and proclamation of the winner, it is a mandatory and ministerial
duty of the MBOC concerned to count the votes based on such returns and declare the result.23

It is also the OSGs position that Section 5, Rule 2524 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure was irregularly
worded for using the word "shall" when Section 625 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6646,26 which the rules seek to
implement, merely employed the word "may". The use of the word "may" indicates that the suspension of a
proclamation is merely directory and permissive in nature and operates to confer discretion.27

The COMELECs Contentions


In its Manifestation and Motion in Lieu of Comment,14 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) proposes for the
instant Petition to be granted. The OSG points out that in Cipriano v. Commission on Elections,15 this court
nullified, for lack of proper proceedings before their issuance, the resolutions issued by the COMELEC relative to

Pearliegates

254

Election Law Cases


In the Compliance28 filed with the court, the COMELEC assails as improper Ibrahims immediate resort to the
instant Petition for Certiorari under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court. Despite the issuance of the herein assailed
resolutions, Ibrahims name was not stricken off from the certified list of candidates during the May 10, 2010
elections and the votes cast for him were counted. Hence, no actual prejudice was caused upon him as the
COMELEC did not even direct the MBOC to suspend his proclamation. It was the MBOCs ruling which resulted
to the suspension of his proclamation. Such being the case, Ibrahim should have instead filed a preproclamation controversy before the COMELEC anchored on the supposed illegality of the MBOCs proceedings.
Section 241 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (BP 881), otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code (OEC),
defines pre-proclamation controversies as referring to any questions "pertaining to or affecting the proceedings
of the board of canvassers which may be raised by any candidate or by any registered political party or
coalition of political parties before the board or directly with the Commission, or any matter raised xxx in
relation to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of the election returns." Had
Ibrahim instituted instead a pre-proclamation controversy, the COMELEC could have corrected the MBOCs
ruling, if indeed, it was erroneous.

dated December 22, 2009 and May 6, 2010 is improper. Ibrahim should have instead filed before the COMELEC
a pre-proclamation controversy to allow the latter to correct the MBOCs ruling if it was indeed erroneous.

The COMELEC further argues that Ibrahim was not denied due process as he and the other candidates referred
to in the Resolutions dated December 22, 2009 and May 6, 2010 were given the opportunity to file their
opposition. Ibrahim did file his Petition/Opposition and sought reliefs from the COMELEC en banc. Now, he
should not be allowed to repudiate the proceedings merely because the result was adverse to him. Moreover,
the OSGs invocation of the doctrines enunciated in Bautista v. Comelec29 is misplaced because in the said
case, there was a total absence of notice and hearing.

A pre-proclamation controversy is defined in Section 241 of the OEC as referring to "any question pertaining to
or affecting the proceedings of the board of canvassers which may be raised by any candidate or by any
registered political party or coalition of parties before the board or directly with the Commission, or any matter
raised under Sections 233,31 234,32 23533 and 23634 in relation to the preparation, transmission, receipt,
custody and appreciation of the election returns." Section 243 of the OEC restrictively enumerates as follows
the issues which can be raised in a pre-proclamation controversy:

The COMELEC emphasizes that Ibrahim was undeniably not a registered voter in Datu Unsay when he ran as
Vice-Mayor in the May 10, 2010 elections. He cannot possess any mandate to serve as an elected official as by
his act and willful misrepresentations, he had deceived the electorate.

(a) Illegal composition or proceedings of the board of canvassers;

Our Ruling

We grant the instant Petition.

Before resolving the merits of the petition, the court shall first dispose of the procedural issue raised by the
COMELEC.

Ibrahim properly resorted to the instant Petition filed under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court to assail the
Resolutions dated December 22, 2009 and May 6, 2010 of the COMELEC en banc.

The COMELEC seeks the dismissal of the instant Petition on the basis of a technical ground, to wit, that
Ibrahims resort to a petition for certiorari filed under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court to challenge the Resolutions

Pearliegates

The claim fails to persuade.

Section 7, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution in part substantially provides that any decision, order or ruling of
any of the Constitutional Commissions may be brought for review to the Supreme Court on certiorari within 30
days from receipt of a copy thereof. The orders, ruling and decisions rendered or issued by the COMELEC en
banc must be final and made in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial power.30 Further, Section 1,
Rule 64 of the Rules of Court states that it shall govern the review of final judgments and orders or resolutions
of the COMELEC and the Commission on Audit.

(b) The canvassed election returns are incomplete, contain material defects, appear to be tampered with or
falsified, or contain discrepancies in the same returns or in other authentic copies thereof as mentioned in
Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 of this Code;

(c) The election returns were prepared under duress, threats, coercion, or intimidation, or they are obviously
manufactured or not authentic; and

(d) When substitute or fraudulent returns in controverted polling places were canvassed, the results of which
materially affected the standing of the aggrieved candidate or candidates.

The illegality of the proceedings of the board of canvassers is the first issue which may be raised in a preproclamation controversy. To illustrate, the proceedings are to be considered as illegal when the board is
constituted not in accordance with law, or is composed of members not enumerated therein, or when business
is transacted sans a quorum.

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In the case at bar, the now assailed Resolutions dated December 22, 2009 and May 6, 2010 were issued with
finality by the COMELEC en banc. Under the Constitution and the Rules of Court, the said resolutions can be
reviewed by way of filing before us a petition for certiorari. Besides, the issues raised do not at all relate to
alleged irregularities in the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of the election returns
or to the composition and proceedings of the board of canvassers. What the instant Petition challenges is the
authority of the MBOC to suspend Ibrahims proclamation and of the COMELEC en banc to issue the assailed
resolutions. The crux of the instant Petition does not qualify as one which can be raised as a pre-proclamation
controversy.

The COMELEC en banc is devoid of authority to disqualify Ibrahim as a candidate for the position of Vice-Mayor
of Datu Unsay.

Section 3(C), Article IX of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:

Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of
procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All such
election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions
shall be decided by the Commission en banc. (Italics ours)

Further, the circumstances obtaining in Bautista v. Comelec35 cited by the OSG in its Manifestation are similar
to those attendant to the instant Petition. In Bautista, the election officer reported to the Law Department that
Bautista was ineligible to run as a candidate by reason of his being an unregistered voter. The Law Department
recommended to the COMELEC en banc to deny due course or cancel Bautistas certificate of candidacy. The
COMELEC en banc adopted the recommendation and consequently issued a resolution. In the said case, this
Court discussed the COMELEC en bancs jurisdiction over petitions for disqualification, for denial of due course,
or cancellation of certificates of candidacy in the following wise:

In Garvida v. Sales, Jr., the Court held that it is the COMELEC sitting in division and not the COMELEC en banc
which has jurisdiction over petitions to cancel a certificate of candidacy. The Court held:

The Omnibus Election Code, in Section 78, Article IX, governs the procedure to deny due course to or cancel a
certificate of candidacy, viz:

may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of filing of the certificate of candidacy
and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before election."

In relation thereto, Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides that a petition to deny due course to or
cancel a certificate of candidacy for an elective office may be filed with the Law Department of the COMELEC
on the ground that the candidate has made a false material representation in his certificate. The petition may
be heard and evidence received by any official designated by the COMELEC after which the case shall be
decided by the COMELEC itself.

Under the same Rules of Procedure, jurisdiction over a petition to cancel a certificate of candidacy lies with the
COMELEC sitting in Division, not en banc. Cases before a Division may only be entertained by the COMELEC en
banc when the required number of votes to reach a decision, resolution, order or ruling is not obtained in the
Division. Moreover, only motions to reconsider decisions, resolutions, orders or rulings of the COMELEC in
Division are resolved by the COMELEC en banc.

xxxx

Under Section 3, Rule 23 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure, a petition for the denial or cancellation of a
certificate of candidacy must be heard summarily after due notice. It is thus clear that cancellation proceedings
involve the exercise of the quasi-judicial functions of the COMELEC which the COMELEC in division should first
decide. More so in this case where the cancellation proceedings originated not from a petition but from a report
of the election officer regarding the lack of qualification of the candidate in the barangay election. The
COMELEC en banc cannot short cut the proceedings by acting on the case without a prior action by a division
because it denies due process to the candidate.36 (Citation omitted and italics ours)

In the case at bar, the COMELEC en banc, through the herein assailed resolutions, ordered Ibrahims
disqualification even when no complaint or petition was filed against him yet. Let it be stressed that if filed
before the conduct of the elections, a petition to deny due course or cancel a certificate of candidacy under
Section 78 of the OEC is the appropriate petition which should have been instituted against Ibrahim considering
that his allegedly being an unregistered voter of Datu Unsay disqualified him from running as Vice-Mayor. His
supposed misrepresentation as an eligible candidate was an act falling within the purview of Section 78 of the
OEC. Moreover, even if we were to assume that a proper petition had been filed, the COMELEC en banc still
acted with grave abuse of discretion when it took cognizance of a matter, which by both constitutional
prescription and jurisprudential declaration, instead aptly pertains to one of its divisions.

Ibrahim is not estopped from challenging the COMELEC en bancs jurisdiction to issue the assailed resolutions.
"Sec.78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy.1wphi1 A verified petition seeking
to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground
that any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition

Pearliegates

In Republic v. Bantigue Point Development Corporation,37 we stated:

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Mastura v. COMELEC41 is emphatic that:
The rule is settled that lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by the Constitution or the law. It cannot be
acquired through a waiver or enlarged by the omission of the parties or conferred by the acquiescence of the
court. Consequently, questions of jurisdiction may be cognizable even if raised for the first time on appeal.

The ruling of the Court of Appeals that "a party may be estopped from raising such jurisdictional question if he
has actively taken part in the very proceeding which he questions, belatedly objecting to the courts jurisdiction
in the event that the judgment or order subsequently rendered is adverse to him" is based on the doctrine of
estoppel by laches. We are aware of that doctrine first enunciated by this Court in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy. In
Tijam, the party-litigant actively participated in the proceedings before the lower court and filed pleadings
therein. Only 15 years thereafter, and after receiving an adverse Decision on the merits from the appellate
court, did the party-litigant question the lower courts jurisdiction. Considering the unique facts in that case, we
held that estoppel by laches had already precluded the party-litigant from raising the question of lack of
jurisdiction on appeal. In Figueroa v. People, we cautioned that Tijam must be construed as an exception to the
general rule and applied only in the most exceptional cases whose factual milieu is similar to that in the latter
case.38 (Citations omitted and italics ours)

As enunciated above, estoppel by laches can only be invoked in exceptional cases with factual circumstances
similar to those in Tijam.39 In the case now before us, the assailed resolutions were issued on December 22,
2009 and May 6, 2010. The instant Petition, which now raises, among others, the issue of the COMELEC en
bancs jurisdiction, was filed on June 3, 2010. With the prompt filing of the instant Petition, Ibrahim can hardly
be considered as guilty of laches.

Ibrahim was not denied due process.

Interminably, we have declared that deprivation of due process cannot be successfully invoked where a party
was given the chance to be heard on his motion for reconsideration.40

In the case before us, Ibrahim was afforded the chance to file an opposition to the assailed resolutions.
Nonetheless, even if due process was substantially observed, the assailed resolutions remain null and void for
want of authority on the part of the COMELEC en banc to take cognizance of a matter which should have
instead been referred to one of its divisions.

(T)he board of canvassers is a ministerial body. It is enjoined by law to canvass all votes on election returns
submitted to it in due form. It has been said, and properly, that its powers are limited generally to the
mechanical or mathematical function of ascertaining and declaring the apparent result of the election by
adding or compiling the votes cast for each candidate as shown on the face of the returns before them, and
then declaring or certifying the result so ascertained. x x x.42 (Italics ours)

The simple purpose and duty of the canvassing board is to ascertain and declare the apparent result of the
voting while all other questions are to be tried before the court or other tribunal for contesting elections or in
quo warranto proceedings.43

In the case at bar, the MBOC motu propio suspended Ibrahims proclamation when the issue of the latters
eligibility is a matter which the board has no authority to resolve. Further, under Section 644 of R.A. 6646, the
COMELEC and not the MBOC has the authority to order the suspension of a winning candidatess proclamation.
Such suspension can only be ordered upon the motion of a complainant or intervenor relative to a case for
disqualification, or a petition to deny due course or cancel a certificate of candidacy pending before the
COMELEC, and only when the evidence of the winning candidates guilt is strong. Besides, the COMELEC en
banc itself could not have properly ordered Ibrahims disqualification because in taking cognizance of the
matter, it had already exceeded its jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is GRANTED. The December 22, 2009 and May
6, 2010 Resolutions issued by the COMELEC en banc is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Consequently, the
suspension by the MBOC of Ibrahims proclamation on the basis of the herein assailed resolutions is likewise
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. In the absence of a judgment, order or resolution relative to another action or
petition finally disqualifying Ibrahim, denying due course or cancelling his certificate of candidacy, the MBOC of
Datu Unsay is directed to convene within ten (10) days from receipt hereof and to proclaim Ibrahim as the dulyelected Vice-Mayor of the said municipality.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 150605

December 10, 2002

EUFROCINO M. CODILLA, SR., petitioner,


The MBOC has no authority to suspend Ibrahims proclamation especially since the herein assailed resolutions,
upon which the suspension was anchored, were issued by the COMELEC en banc outside the ambit of its
jurisdiction.

vs.
HON. JOSE DE VENECIA, ROBERTO P. NAZARENO, in their official capacities as Speaker
and Secretary-General of the House of Representatives, respectively,

Pearliegates

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and MA. VICTORIA L. LOCSIN, respondents.

DECISION

PUNO, J.:

In a democracy, the first self-evident principle is that he who has been rejected by the people cannot represent
the people. Respondent Ma. Victoria L. Locsin lost to petitioner Eufrocino M. Codilla, Sr. by 17,903 votes in the
May 14, 2001 elections as Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte. The most sophisticated legal
alchemy cannot justify her insistence that she should continue governing the people of Leyte against their will.
The enforcement of the sovereign will of the people is not subject to the discretion of any official of the land.

This is a Petition for Mandamus and Quo Warranto directed against respondents Speaker Jose De Venecia and
Secretary-General Roberto P. Nazareno of the House of Representatives to compel them to implement the
decision of the Commission on Elections en banc by (a) administering the oath of office to petitioner as the
duly-elected Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte, and (b) registering the name of the
petitioner in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives, and against respondent Ma. Victoria L. Locsin
for usurping, intruding into, and unlawfully holding and exercising the said public office on the basis of a void
proclamation.

The facts are uncontroverted. Petitioner and respondent Locsin were candidates for the position of
Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte during the May 14, 2001 elections. At that time, petitioner
was the Mayor of Ormoc City while respondent Locsin was the sitting Representative of the 4th legislative
district of Leyte. On May 8, 2001, one Josephine de la Cruz, a registered voter of Kananga, Leyte, filed directly
with the COMELEC main office a Petition for Disqualification1 against the petitioner for indirectly soliciting votes
from the registered voters of Kananga and Matag-ob, Leyte, in violation of Section 68 (a) of the Omnibus
Election Code. It was alleged that the petitioner used the equipments and vehicles owned by the City
Government of Ormoc to extract, haul and distribute gravel and sand to the residents of Kananga and Matagob, Leyte, for the purpose of inducing, influencing or corrupting them to vote for him. Attached to the petition
are the (a) Affidavits of Basilio Bates,2 Danilo D. Maglasang,3 Cesar A. Laurente;4 (b) Joint Affidavit of Agripino
C. Alferez and Rogelio T. Salvera;5 (c) Extract Records from the Police Blotter executed by Police
Superintendent Elson G. Pecho;6 and (d) Photographs showing government dump trucks, haulers and surfacers
and portions of public roads allegedly filled-in and surfaced through the intercession of the respondent.7 The
case was docketed as SPA No. 01-208 and assigned to the COMELEC's Second Division.

On May 10, 2001, the COMELEC Second Division issued an Order delegating the hearing and reception of
evidence on the disqualification case to the Office of the Regional Director of Region VIII.8 On May 11, 2001,
the COMELEC Second Division sent a telegram informing the petitioner that a disqualification case was filed
against him and that the petition was remanded to the Regional Election Director for investigation.9

Pearliegates

At the time of the elections on May 14, 2001, the Regional Election Director had yet to hear the disqualification
case. Consequently, petitioner was included in the list of candidates for district representative and was voted
for. The initial results showed that petitioner was the winning candidate.

On May 16, 2001, before the counting could be finished, respondent Locsin joined as intervenor in SPA No. 128
and filed a "Most Urgent Motion to Suspend Proclamation of Respondent [herein petitioner]" with the COMELEC
Second Division.10 Respondent Locsin alleged that "the evidence on record against respondent is very strong
and unless rebutted remains." She urged the Commission to set the hearing of the disqualification case and
prayed for the suspension of the proclamation of the respondent "so as not to render the present
disqualification case moot and academic." A copy of the Motion was allegedly served on petitioner by
registered mail but no registry receipt was attached thereto.11

On May 18, 2001, respondent Locsin filed a "Second Most Urgent Motion to Suspend Proclamation of
Respondent" stating "there is clear and convincing evidence showing that the respondent is undoubtedly guilty
of the charges against him and this remains unrebutted by the respondent." A copy of the Motion was sent to
the petitioner and the corresponding registry receipt was attached to the pleading.12 The records, however, do
not show the date the petitioner received the motion.

On the same day, May 18, 2001, the COMELEC Second Division issued an Ex-Parte Order13 directing the
Provincial Board of Canvassers of Leyte to suspend the proclamation of petitioner in case he obtains the
highest number of votes by reason of "the seriousness of the allegations in the petition for disqualification."14
It also directed the Regional Election Director to speed up the reception of evidence and to forward
immediately the complete records together with its recommendation to the Office of the Clerk of the
Commission.15 As a result, petitioner was not proclaimed as winner even though the final election results
showed that he garnered 71,350 votes as against respondent Locsin's 53,447 votes.16

At the time that the COMELEC Second Division issued its Order suspending his proclamation, the petitioner has
yet to be summoned to answer the petition for disqualification. Neither has said petition been set for hearing. It
was only on May 24, 2001 that petitioner was able to file an Answer to the petition for his disqualification with
the Regional Election Director, alleging that: (a) he has not received the summons together with the copy of the
petition; (b) he became aware of the matter only by virtue of the telegram sent by the COMELEC Second
Division informing him that a petition was filed against him and that the Regional Election Director was directed
to investigate and receive evidence therewith; and (c) he obtained a copy of the petition from the COMELEC
Regional Office No. 8 at his own instance.17 Petitioner further alleged that the maintenance, repair and
rehabilitation of barangay roads in the municipalities of Matag-ob and Kananga were undertaken without his
authority, participation or directive as City Mayor of Ormoc. He attached in his Answer the following: (a)
Affidavit of Alex B. Borinaga;18 (b) Copy of the Excerpt from the Minutes of the Regular Session of Barangay
Monterico;19 (c) Affidavit of Wilfredo A. Fiel;20 (d) Supplemental Affidavit of Wilfredo A. Fiel;21 and (e) Affidavit
of Arnel Y. Padayao.22

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On May 25, 2001, petitioner filed a Motion to Lift Order of Suspension,23 alleging that (a) he did not receive a
copy of the Motion to Suspend his Proclamation and hence, was denied the right to rebut and refute the
allegations in the Motion; (b) that he did not receive a copy of the summons on the petition for disqualification
and after personally obtaining a copy of the petition, filed the requisite answer only on May 24, 2001; and (c)
that he received the telegraph Order of the COMELEC Second Division suspending his proclamation only on May
22, 2001. He attached documentary evidence in support of his Motion to Lift the Suspension of his
proclamation, and requested the setting of a hearing on his Motion.24

On May 30, 2001, an oral argument was conducted on the petitioner's Motion and the parties were ordered to
submit their respective memoranda.25 On June 4, 2001, petitioner submitted his Memorandum26 in support of
his Motion assailing the suspension of his proclamation on the grounds that: (a) he was not afforded due
process; (b) the order has no legal and factual basis; and (c) evidence of his guilt is patently inexistent for the
purpose of suspending his proclamation. He prayed that his proclamation as winning congressional candidate
be expediently made, even while the disqualification case against him continue upon due notice and hearing.
He attached the following additional evidence in his Memorandum: (a) Copy of certification issued by PNP
Senior Inspector Benjamin T. Gorre;27 (b) Certification issued by Elena S. Aviles, City Budget Officer;28 (c) Copy
of certification issued by Wilfredo A. Fiel, City Engineer of Ormoc;29 (d) Joint Affidavit of Antonio Patenio and
Pepito Restituto;30 and (e) Affidavits of Demetrio Brion,31 Igmedio Rita32 and Gerardo Monteza.33 Respondent
Locsin's memorandum also contained additional affidavits of his witnesses.34

Petitioner's Motion to Lift the Order of Suspension, however, was not resolved. Instead, on June 14, 2001, the
COMELEC Second Division promulgated its Resolution35 in SPA No. 01-208 which found the petitioner guilty of
indirect solicitation of votes and ordered his disqualification. It directed the "immediate proclamation of the
candidate who garnered the highest number of votes xxx." A copy of said Resolution was sent by fax to the
counsel of petitioner in Cebu City in the afternoon of the following day.36

By virtue of the said Resolution, the votes cast for petitioner, totaling 71,350, were declared stray even before
said Resolution could gain finality. On June 15, 2001, respondent Locsin was proclaimed as the duly elected
Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte by the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Leyte. It issued a
Certificate of Canvass of Votes and Proclamation of the Winning Candidates for Member of the House of
Representatives stating that "MA. VICTORIA LARRAZABAL LOCSIN obtained a total of FIFTY THREE THOUSAND
FOUR HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN (53,447) votes representing the highest number of votes legally cast in the
legislative district for said office."37 Respondent Locsin took her oath of office on June 18, 2001 and assumed
office on June 30, 2001.

On June 20, 2001, petitioner seasonably filed with the COMELEC en banc a Motion for Reconsideration38 from
the June 14, 2001 Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division which ordered his disqualification, as well as an
Addendum to the Motion for Reconsideration.39 Petitioner alleged in his Motion for Reconsideration that the
COMELEC Second Division erred: (1) in disqualifying petitioner on the basis solely of the dubious declaration of
the witnesses for respondent Locsin; (2) in adopting in toto the allegations of the witnesses for respondent
Locsin; and (3) in promulgating the resolution in violation of its own rules of procedure and in directing therein
the immediate proclamation of the second highest 'vote getter.' Respondent Locsin and her co-petitioner in SPA
No. 01-208 filed a joint Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration.40

On June 21, 2001, petitioner filed with the COMELEC en banc a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Proclamation,41 docketed as SPC No. 01-324, assailing the validity of the proclamation of respondent Locsin
who garnered only the second highest number of votes. Respondent Locsin filed her Answer alleging that: (1)
the Commission lost jurisdiction to hear and decide the case because of the proclamation of Locsin and that
any question on the "election, returns, and qualification" of Locsin can only be taken cognizance of by the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET); (2) the case should be filed and heard in the first instance
by a Division of the Commission and not directly by the Commission en banc; and (3) the proclamation of
Locsin was valid because she received the highest number of valid votes cast, the votes of Codilla being stray.

On June 28, 2001, petitioner filed an Urgent Manifestation42 stating that he was deprived of a fair hearing on
the disqualification case because while the documentary evidence adduced in his Memorandum was in support
of his Motion for the lifting of the suspension of his proclamation, the COMELEC Second Division instead ruled
on the main disqualification case. In consonance with his prayer that a full-dress hearing be conducted on the
disqualification case, he submitted Affidavits of additional witnesses43 which he claims would refute and
substantially belie the allegations of petitioner's/intervenor's witnesses. A Reply,44 Rejoinder45 and SurRejoinder46 were respectively filed by the parties. Consequently, the motion for reconsideration in SPA No. 01208 and the petition for declaration of nullity in SPC No. 01-324 were submitted for resolution.

From the records, it appears that initially, a "Resolution" penned by Commissioner Rufino S.B. Javier, dated July
24, 2001, was submitted to the Office of the Chairman, dismissing the petition for declaration of nullity for lack
of jurisdiction and denying the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Codilla.47 Commissioners
Florentino A. Tuason, Jr. and Resurreccion Z. Borra submitted their respective dissenting opinions48 to the Javier
resolution. It bears emphasis that Commissioner Tuason, Jr. was the ponente of the Resolution of the COMELEC
Second Division which ordered the disqualification of petitioner but after considering the additional evidence
presented by the latter, he concluded that the totality of the evidence was clearly in petitioner's favor. Equally
worth mentioning is the fact that Commissioner Ralph C. Lantion, who was the Presiding Commissioner of the
Second Division, also dissented and voted to grant Codilla's motion for reconsideration on the ground that
"[T]he people of Leyte have spoken and I respect the electorate's will. x x x." 49

On August 29, 2001, then COMELEC Chairman Alfredo L. Benipayo issued a "Vote and Opinion and Summary of
Votes" reversing the resolution of the Second Division and declaring the proclamation of respondent Locsin as
null and void. The dispositive portion reads:

Pearliegates

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"JUDGMENT

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, I concur with Commissioner Resurreccion Z. Borra,
Commissioner Florentino A. Tuason, Jr. and Commissioner Ralph C. Lantion, in SPA No. 01-208, to GRANT the
motion for reconsideration and to REVERSE the resolution of the Commission (Second Division) promulgated on
June 1, 2001, disqualifying Codilla; and subsequently, in SPC No. 01-324, to GRANT the petition of Eufrocino M.
Codilla, Sr., and declare as null and void the proclamation of losing candidate Locsin.

(f) to order intervenor-oppositor Locsin, upon the finality of this resolution, to vacate the office of
Representative of the House of Representatives representing the Fourth legislative district of Leyte and, for this
purpose, to inform the House of Representatives through the Honorable Speaker of this resolution for its
attention and guidance; and

2. On the petition for Declaration of Nullity of proclamation of respondent Ma. Victoria L. Locsin (SPC No. 01324), I vote:

Accordingly:

1. On the Motion for Reconsideration of the disqualification resolution against Codilla, promulgated by the
Commission (Second Division) on June 14, 2001 (SPA No. 01-208), I vote:

(a) to GRANT the Motion for Reconsideration of respondent-movant Eufrocino M. Codilla, Sr., and to REVERSE
the Resolution of the Commission (Second Division) promulgated on June 14, 2001, for insufficiency of
evidence;

(b) to lift the order of suspension of proclamation of petitioner Codilla, issued by the Commission (Second
Division) on May 18, 2001, having been issued without hearing and without any finding that the evidence of
guilt of petitioner Codilla is strong and, thus, null and void;

(c) to nullify the order contained in the Resolution of the Commission (Second Division) promulgated on June
14, 2001, for "(t)he immediate proclamation of the candidate who garnered the highest number of votes, to the
exclusion of respondent" and the concurrent order for "the Provincial Board of Canvasser (sic) of Leyte to
immediately reconvene and thereafter proclaim forthwith the candidate who obtained the highest number of
votes counting out the Respondent" the same being violative of election laws, established jurisprudence, and
resolutions of the Commission;

(d) to nullify the ruling contained in the Resolution of the Commission (Second Division) promulgated o June 14,
2001, that the votes of respondent Codilla are "considered stray and invalid" said ruling being issued on the
basis of an inapplicable decision, and contrary to established jurisprudence;

(e) to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Leyte, upon the finality of this resolution, to reconvene and
proclaim petitioner Codilla as the winning candidate for Representative of the Fourth Legislative district of
Leyte to comply with its ministerial duty to proclaim the candidate who garnered the highest number of votes
in the elections for that position; and

Pearliegates

(a) to GRANT the petition of Eufrocino M. Codilla, Sr., and declare as null and void the proclamation of losing
candidate Locsin, the proclamation being violative of election laws, established jurisprudence, and resolutions
of the Commission on Elections;

(b) to lift the order of suspension of proclamation of petitioner Codilla, issued by the Commission (Second
Division) on May 18, 2001, in SPA No. 01-208, having been issued without hearing and without any finding that
the evidence of guilt of petitioner Codilla is strong and, thus, null and void;

(c) to nullify the order contained in the Resolution of the Commission (Second Division) promulgated on June
14, 2001, in SPA No. 01-208, for "(t)he immediate proclamation of the candidate who garnered the highest
number of votes, to the exclusion of respondent" and the concurrent order for "the provincial Board of
Canvasser (sic) of Leyte to immediately reconvene and thereafter proclaim forthwith the candidate who
obtained the highest number of votes counting out the Respondent" the same being violative of election laws,
established jurisprudence, and resolutions of the Commission;

(d) to nullify the ruling contained in the Resolution of the Commission (Second Division) promulgated on June
14, 2001, in SPA No. 01-208, that the votes of respondent Codilla are "considered stray and invalid" said ruling
being issued on the basis of an inapplicable decision, and contrary to established jurisprudence;

(e) to order the provincial Board of Canvassers of Leyte, upon the finality of this resolution, to reconvene and
proclaim petitioner Codilla as the winning candidate for Representative of the Fourth legislative district of Leyte
he (sic) having garnered the highest number of votes in the elections for the position; and

(f) to order respondent Locsin, upon the finality of this resolution, to vacate the office of Representative of the
House of Representatives representing the Fourth Legislative district of Leyte and, for this purpose, to inform
the House of Representatives through the Honorable Speaker of this resolution for its attention and guidance.

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Summary of Votes

Considering the FOUR (4) VOTES of the Chairman and Commissioners Resurreccion Z. Borra, Florentino A.
Tuason, Jr., and Ralph C. Lantion, to grant the Motion for Reconsideration of Codilla and reverse the
disqualification Resolution of the Commission (Second Division) in SPA No. 01-208, promulgated on June 14,
2001, and as an inevitable consequence, in voting to grant the petition for declaration of nullity of the
proclamation of Ma. Victoria L. Locsin in SPC No. 01-324, the verdict/opinion of the Chairman and the three (3)
Commissioners taken together now stands, as it is, the MAJORITY DECISION of the Commission En Banc in both
cases; and the "Resolution" submitted by three (3) Commissioners, namely, Commissioner Rufino S.B. Javier,
Commissioner Luzviminda G. Tancangco, and Commissioner Mehol K. Sadain, is considered, as it is, the
MINORITY DECISION of the Commission En Banc in both cases.

The MAJORTIY DECISION was arrived at after proper consultation with those who joined the majority. The
Chairman and the three (3) Commissioners comprising the majority decided that no one will be assigned to
write a Majority Decision. Instead, each one will write his own separate opinion. Commissioners Borra, Tuason,
Jr. and the undersigned Chairman submitted separate opinions. Commissioner Lantion wrote an explanation on
his vote."50

The aforequoted judgment was adopted in a "Vote of Adoption" signed by Commissioners Ralph C. Lantion,
Resurreccion Z. Borra and Florentino A. Tuason, Jr.51

Respondent Locsin did not appeal from this decision annulling her proclamation. Instead, she filed a "Comment
and Manifestation"52 with the COMELEC en banc questioning the procedure and the manner by which the
decision was issued. In addition, respondent Locsin requested and was issued an opinion by House of
Representatives Executive Director and Chief Legal Counsel Leonardo B. Palicte III declaring that the COMELEC
has no jurisdiction to nullify the proclamation of respondent Locsin after she had taken her oath and assumed
office since it is the HRET which is the sole judge of election, returns and qualifications of Members of the
House.53 Relying on this opinion, respondent Locsin submitted a written privileged speech to the House during
its regular session on September 4, 2001, where she declared that she will not only disregard but will openly
defy and disobey the COMELEC en banc resolution ordering her to vacate her position.54

On September 6, 2001, the COMELEC en banc issued an Order55 constituting the members of the Provincial
Board of Canvassers of Leyte to implement the aforesaid decision. It likewise ordered the Board to reconvene
and "proclaim the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes in the district, as the duly-elected
Representative of the Fourth Legislative district of Leyte, and accordingly issue a Certificate of Canvass and
Proclamation of Winning Candidate for Member of the House of Representatives x x x, based on the
city/municipal certificates of canvass submitted beforehand to the previous Provincial Board of Canvassers of
Leyte x x x."

On September 12, 2001, petitioner Codilla was proclaimed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers as the dulyelected Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte, having obtained a total of 71,350 votes
representing the highest number of votes cast in the district.56 On the same day, petitioner took his oath of
office before Executive Judge Fortunito L. Madrona of the Regional Trial Court of Ormoc City.57

On September 14, 2001, petitioner wrote the House of Representatives, thru respondent Speaker De Venecia,
informing the House of the August 29, 2001 COMELEC en banc resolution annulling the proclamation of
respondent Locsin, and proclaiming him as the duly-elected Representative of the 4th legislative district of
Leyte.58 Petitioner also served notice that "I am assuming the duties and responsibilities as Representative of
the fourth legislative district of Leyte to which position I have been lawfully elected and proclaimed. On behalf
of my constituents, I therefore expect that all rights and privileges intended for the position of Representative
of the fourth legislative district of Leyte be accorded to me, including all physical facilities and staff support."
On the basis of this letter, a Memorandum59 dated October 8, 2001 was issued by Legal Affairs Deputy
Secretary-General Gaudencio A. Mendoza, Jr., for Speaker De Venecia, stating that "there is no legal obstacle to
complying with the duly promulgated and now final and executory COMELEC Decision of August 29, 2001 x
x x."

These notwithstanding, and despite receipt by the House of Representatives of a copy of the COMELEC en banc
resolution on September 20, 2001,60 no action was taken by the House on the letter-appeal of petitioner.
Hence, petitioner sought the assistance of his party, LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP, which sent a letter61 addressed to
respondent Speaker De Venecia, dated October 25, 2001, and signed by Party President Teofisto T. Guingona,
Jr., Secretary-General Heherson T. Alvarez, and Region VIII Party Chairman Sergio Antonio F. Apostol, requesting
the House of Representatives to act decisively on the matter in order that petitioner "can avail of whatever
remedy is available should their action remain unfavorable or otherwise undecisive."

In response, Speaker De Venecia sent a letter62 dated October 30, 2001, stating that:

"We recognize the finality of the COMELEC decision and we are inclined to sustain it. However, Rep. Locsin has
officially notified the HOUSE in her privilege speech, inserted in the HOUSE Journal dated September 4, 2001,
that she shall 'openly defy and disobey' the COMELEC ruling. This ultimately means that implementing the
decision would result in the spectacle of having two (2) legislators occupying the same congressional seat, a
legal situation, the only consideration, that effectively deters the HOUSE's liberty to take action.

In this light, the accepted wisdom is that the implementation of the COMELEC decision is a matter that can be
best, and with finality, adjudicated by the Supreme Court, which, hopefully, shall act on it most expeditiously."
(emphases supplied)

Hence, the present petition for mandamus and quo warranto.

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Petitioner submits that by virtue of the resolution of the COMELEC en banc which has become final and
executory for failure of respondent Locsin to appeal therefrom, it has become the ministerial duty: (1) of the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, as its Administrative Head and Presiding Officer, to implement the
said resolution of the COMELEC en banc by installing him as the duly-elected Representative of the 4th
legislative district of Leyte; and (2) of the Secretary-General, as official custodian of the records of the House,
to formally register his name in the Roll of Members of the House and delete the name of respondent Locsin
therefrom. Petitioner further contends that respondent Locsin has been usurping and unlawfully holding the
public office of Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte considering that her premature
proclamation has been declared null and void by the COMELEC en banc. He alleges that the action or inaction
of public respondents has deprived him of his lawful right to assume the office of Representative of the 4th
legislative district of Leyte.

In his Comment,63 public respondent Speaker De Venecia alleged that mandamus will not lie to compel the
implementation of the COMELEC decision which is not merely a ministerial duty but one which requires the
exercise of discretion by the Speaker of the House considering that: (1) it affects the membership of the House;
and (2) there is nothing in the Rules of the House of Representatives which imposes a duty on the House
Speaker to implement a COMELEC decision that unseats an incumbent House member.

In his Comment,64 public respondent Secretary-General Nazareno alleged that in reading the name of
respondent Locsin during the roll call, and in allowing her to take her oath before the Speaker-elect and sit as
Member of the House during the Joint Session of Congress, he was merely performing official acts in
compliance with the opinions65 rendered by House of Representatives Chief Counsel and Executive Director
Leonardo C. Palicte III stating that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to declare the proclamation of respondent
Locsin as null and void since it is the HRET which is the sole judge of all election, returns and qualifications of
Members of the House. He also contends that the determination of who will sit as Member of the House of
Representatives is not a ministerial function and cannot, thus, be compelled by mandamus.

Respondent Locsin, in her Comment,66 alleged that the Supreme Court has no original jurisdiction over an
action for quo warranto involving a member of the House of Representatives for under Section 17, Article VI of
the Constitution it is the HRET which is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of Members of the House of Representatives. She likewise asserts that this Court cannot issue the
writ of mandamus against a co-equal legislative department without grossly violating the principle of
separation of powers. She contends that the act of recognizing who should be seated as a bona fide member of
the House of Representatives is not a ministerial function but a legislative prerogative, the performance of
which cannot be compelled by mandamus. Moreover, the prayer for a writ of mandamus cannot be directed
against the Speaker and Secretary-General because they do not have the authority to enforce and implement
the resolution of the COMELEC.

Additionally, respondent Locsin urges that the resolution of the COMELEC en banc is null and void for lack of
jurisdiction. First, it should have dismissed the case pending before it after her proclamation and after she had
taken her oath of office. Jurisdiction then was vested in the HRET to unseat and remove a Member of the House

Pearliegates

of Representatives. Second, the petition for declaration of nullity is clearly a pre-proclamation controversy and
the COMELEC en banc has no original jurisdiction to hear and decide a pre-proclamation controversy. It must
first be heard by a COMELEC Division. Third, the questioned decision is actually a "hodge-podge" decision
because of the peculiar manner in which the COMELEC disposed of the case.

Finally, respondent Locsin asserts that the matter of her qualification and eligibility has been categorically
affirmed by the HRET when it dismissed the quo warranto case filed against her, docketed as HRET Case No.
01-043, entitled "Paciano Travero vs. Ma. Victoria Locsin," on the ground that "the allegations stated therein are
not proper grounds for a petition for quo warranto against a Member of the House of Representatives under
section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code and Rule 17 of the HRET Rules, and that the petition was filed
late."67

In his Reply,68 petitioner asserts that the remedy of respondent Locsin from the COMELEC decision was to file a
petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court, not to seek an opinion from the Chief Legal Counsel of the House
of Representatives; that the HRET has no jurisdiction over a petition for declaration of nullity of proclamation
which is based not on ineligibility or disloyalty, but by reason that the candidate proclaimed as winner did not
obtain the highest number of votes; that the petition for annulment of proclamation is a pre-proclamation
controversy and, hence, falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the COMELEC pursuant to section 242 of B.P.
Blg. 88169 and section 3, Article IX (C) of the Constitution; that respondent Speaker De Venecia himself
recognizes the finality of the COMELEC decision but has decided to refer the matter to the Supreme Court for
adjudication; that the enforcement and implementation of a final decision of the COMELEC involves a
ministerial act and does not encroach on the legislative power of Congress; and that the power to determine
who will sit as Member of the House does not involve an exercise of legislative power but is vested in the
sovereign will of the electorate.

The core issues in this case are: (a) whether the proclamation of respondent Locsin by the COMELEC Second
Division is valid; (b) whether said proclamation divested the COMELEC en banc of jurisdiction to review its
validity; and (c) assuming the invalidity of said proclamation, whether it is the ministerial duty of the public
respondents to recognize petitioner Codilla, Sr. as the legally elected Representative of the 4th legislative
district of Leyte vice respondent Locsin.

Whether the proclamation of respondent Locsin is valid.

After carefully reviewing the records of this case, we find that the proclamation of respondent Locsin is null and
void for the following reasons:

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First. The petitioner was denied due process during the entire proceedings leading to the proclamation of
respondent Locsin.

COMELEC Resolution Nos. 340270 sets the procedure for disqualification cases pursuant to section 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code, viz:

"C. PETITION TO DISQUALIFY A CANDIDATE PURSUANT TO SEC. 68 OF THE OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE AND
PETITION TO DISQUALIFY FOR LACK OF QUALIFICATIONS OR POSSESSING SAME GROUNDS FOR
DISQUALIFICATION

(1) The verified petition to disqualify a candidate pursuant to Sec. 68 of the Omnibus Election Code and the
verified petition to disqualify a candidate for lack of qualifications or possessing same grounds for
disqualification, may be filed any day after the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy but not later than
the date of proclamation.

(2) The petition to disqualify a candidate pursuant to Sec. 68 of the Omnibus Election Code shall be filed in ten
(10) legible copies by any citizen of voting age, or duly registered political party, organization or coalition of
political parties against any candidate who in an action or protest in which he is a party is declared by final
decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of:

2.a having given money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public
officials performing electoral functions;

2.b having committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy;

xxxxxxxxx

(4) Upon payment of the filing fee of P1,000.00 and legal research fee of P20.00, the offices concerned shall
docket the petition and assign to it a docket number which must be consecutive, according to the order of
receipt and must bear the year and prefixed as SPA with the corresponding initial of the name of the office, i.e.
SPA (RED) No. C01-001; SPA (PES) No. C01-001;

(5) Within three (3) days from filing of the petitions, the offices concerned shall issue summons to the
respondent candidate together with a copy of the petition and its enclosures, if any;

(6) The respondent shall be given three (3) days from receipt of summons within which to file his verified
answer (not a motion to dismiss) to the petition in ten (10) legible copies, serving a copy thereof upon the
petitioner. Grounds for Motion to Dismiss may be raised as an affirmative defense;

(7) The proceeding shall be summary in nature. In lieu of the testimonies, the parties shall submit their
affidavits or counter-affidavits and other documentary evidences including their position paper;

(8) The hearing must be completed within ten (10) days from the date of the filing of the answer. The hearing
officer concerned shall submit to the Clerk of the Commission through the fastest means of communication, his
findings, reports and recommendations within five (5) days from the completion of the hearing and reception of
evidence together with the complete records of the case;

(9) Upon receipt of the records of the case of the findings, reports and recommendation of the hearing officer
concerned, the Clerk of the Commission shall immediately docket the case consecutively and calendar the
same for raffle to a division;

2.c having spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by the Omnibus Election Code;
(10) The division to whom the case is raffled, shall after consultation, assign the same to a member who shall
pen the decision, within five (5) days from the date of consultation."
2.d having solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104 of the
Omnibus Election Code;

2.e having violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, sub-paragraph 6 of
the Omnibus Election Code, shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from
holding the office.

Pearliegates

Resolution No. 3402 clearly requires the COMELEC, through the Regional Election Director, to issue summons to
the respondent candidate together with a copy of the petition and its enclosures, if any, within three (3) days
from the filing of the petition for disqualification. Undoubtedly, this is to afford the respondent candidate the
opportunity to answer the allegations in the petition and hear his side. To ensure compliance with this
requirement, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure requires the return of the summons together with the proof of
service to the Clerk of Court of the COMELEC when service has been completed, viz:

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Election Law Cases

"Rule 14. Summons

xxxxxxxxx

Section 5. Return.- When the service has been completed by personal service, the server shall give notice
thereof, by registered mail, to the protestant or his counsel and shall return the summons to the Clerk of Court
concerned who issued it, accompanied with the proof of service.

Section 6. Proof of Service.- Proof of service of summons shall be made in the manner provided for in the Rules
of Court in the Philippines."

Thereafter, hearings, to be completed within ten (10) days from the filing of the Answer, must be conducted.
The hearing officer is required to submit to the Clerk of the Commission his findings, reports and
recommendations within five (5) days from the completion of the hearing and reception of evidence together
with the complete records of the case.

(a) Petitioner was not notified of the petition for his disqualification through the service of summons nor of the
Motions to suspend his proclamation.

The records of the case do not show that summons was served on the petitioner. They do not contain a copy of
the summons allegedly served on the petitioner and its corresponding proof of service. Furthermore, private
respondent never rebutted petitioner's repeated assertion that he was not properly notified of the petition for
his disqualification because he never received summons.71 Petitioner claims that prior to receiving a
telegraphed Order from the COMELEC Second Division on May 22, 2001, directing the District Board of
Canvassers to suspend his proclamation, he was never summoned nor furnished a copy of the petition for his
disqualification. He was able to obtain a copy of the petition and the May 22 Order of the COMELEC Second
Division by personally going to the COMELEC Regional Office on May 23, 2001. Thus, he was able to file his
Answer to the disqualification case only on May 24, 2001.

More, the proclamation of the petitioner was suspended in gross violation of section 72 of the Omnibus Election
Code which provides:

"Sec. 72. Effects of disqualification cases and priority.- The Commission and the courts shall give priority to
cases of disqualification by reason of violation of this Act to the end that a final decision shall be rendered not
later than seven days before the election in which the disqualification is sought.

Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes
cast for him shall not be counted. Nevertheless, if for any reason, a candidate is not declared by final judgment
before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such
election, his violation of the provisions of the preceding sections shall not prevent his proclamation and
assumption to office." (emphases supplied)

In the instant case, petitioner has not been disqualified by final judgment when the elections were conducted
on May 14, 2001. The Regional Election Director has yet to conduct hearing on the petition for his
disqualification. After the elections, petitioner was voted in office by a wide margin of 17,903. On May 16, 2001,
however, respondent Locsin filed a Most Urgent Motion for the suspension of petitioner's proclamation. The
Most Urgent Motion contained a statement to the effect that a copy was served to the petitioner through
registered mail. The records reveal that no registry receipt was attached to prove such service.72 This violates
COMELEC Rules of Procedure requiring notice and service of the motion to all parties, viz:

"Section 4. Notice.- Notice of a motion shall be served by the movant to all parties concerned, at least three (3)
days before the hearing thereof, together with a copy of the motion. For good cause shown, the motion may be
heard on shorter notice, especially on matters which the Commission or the Division may dispose of on its own
motion.

The notice shall be directed to the parties concerned and shall state the time and place of the hearing of the
motion.

Section 5. Proof of Service.- No motion shall be acted upon by the Commission without proof of service of
notice thereof, except when the Commission or a Division is satisfied that the rights of the adverse party or
parties are not affected."

Respondent's Most Urgent Motion does not fall under the exceptions to notice and service of motions. First, the
suspension of proclamation of a winning candidate is not a matter which the COMELEC Second Division can
dispose of motu proprio. Section 6 of R.A. No. 664673 requires that the suspension must be "upon motion by
the complainant or any intervenor", viz:

"Section 6. Effect of Disqualification Case.- Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be
disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason, a
candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and

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Election Law Cases


receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission (COMELEC) shall continue with
the trial or hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor,
may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the
evidence of his guilt is strong." (emphases supplied)

Second, the right of an adverse party, in this case, the petitioner, is clearly affected. Given the lack of service
of the Most Urgent Motion to the petitioner, said Motion is a mere scrap of paper.74 It cannot be acted upon by
the COMELEC Second Division.

On May 18, 2001 at exactly 5:00 p.m.,75 respondent Locsin filed a Second Most Urgent Motion for the
suspension of petitioner's proclamation. Petitioner was served a copy of the Second Motion again by registered
mail. A registry receipt76 was attached evidencing service of the Second Most Urgent Motion to the petitioner
but it does not appear when the petitioner received a copy thereof. That same day, the COMELEC Second
Division issued an Order suspending the proclamation of petitioner. Clearly, the petitioner was not given any
opportunity to contest the allegations contained in the petition for disqualification. The Order was issued on the
very same day the Second Most Urgent Motion was filed. The petitioner could not have received the Second
Most Urgent Motion, let alone answer the same on time as he was served a copy thereof by registered mail.

Under section 6 of R.A. No. 6646, the COMELEC can suspend proclamation only when evidence of the winning
candidate's guilt is strong. In the case at bar, the COMELEC Second Division did not make any specific finding
that evidence of petitioner's guilt is strong. Its only basis in suspending the proclamation of the petitioner is the
"seriousness of the allegations" in the petition for disqualification. Pertinent portion of the Order reads:

"Without giving due course to the petition xxx the Commission (2nd Division), pursuant to Section 72 of the
Omnibus Election Code in relation to Section 6, Republic Act No. 6646 xxx and considering the serious
allegations in the petition, hereby directs the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Leyte to suspend the
proclamation of respondent, if winning, until further orders."77 (emphases supplied)

We hold that absent any finding that the evidence on the guilt of the petitioner is strong, the COMELEC Second
Division gravely abused its power when it suspended his proclamation.

Answer, and to submit his findings, reports, and recommendations within the five (5) days from completion of
the hearing and the reception of evidence.

Petitioner filed a Motion to Lift the Order of Suspension of his proclamation on May 25, 2001. Although an oral
argument on this Motion was held, and the parties were allowed to file their respective memoranda, the Motion
was not acted upon. Instead, the COMELEC Second Division issued a Resolution on the petition for
disqualification against the petitioner. It was based on the following evidence: (a) the affidavits attached to the
Petition for Disqualification; (b) the affidavits attached to the Answer; and (c) the respective memoranda of the
parties.

On this score, it bears emphasis that the hearing for Motion to Lift the Order of Suspension cannot be
substituted for the hearing in the disqualification case. Although intrinsically linked, it is not to be supposed
that the evidence of the parties in the main disqualification case are the same as those in the Motion to Lift the
Order of Suspension. The parties may have other evidence which they may deem proper to present only on the
hearing for the disqualification case. Also, there may be evidence which are unavailable during the hearing for
the Motion to Lift the Order of Suspension but which may be available during the hearing for the
disqualification case.

In the case at bar, petitioner asserts that he submitted his Memorandum merely to support his Motion to Lift
the Order of Suspension. It was not intended to answer and refute the disqualification case against him. This
submission was sustained by the COMELEC en banc. Hence, the members of the COMELEC en banc concluded,
upon consideration of the additional affidavits attached in his Urgent Manifestation, that the evidence to
disqualify the petitioner was insufficient. More specifically, the ponente of the challenged Resolution of the
COMELEC Second Division held:

"Indeed, I find from the records that the May 30, 2001 hearing of the COMELEC (Second Division) concerns only
the incident relating to the Motion to Lift Order of Suspension of Proclamation. It also appears that the order for
the submission of the parties' respective memoranda was in lieu of the parties' oral argument on the motion.
This would explain the fact that Codilla's Memorandum refers mainly to the validity of the issuance of the order
of suspension of proclamation. There is, however, no record of any hearing on the urgent motion for the
suspension of proclamation. Indeed, it was only upon the filing of the Urgent Manifestation by Codilla that the
Members of the Commission (Second Division) and other Members of the Commission en banc had the
opportunity to consider Codilla's affidavits. This time, Codilla was able to present his side, thus, completing the
presentation of evidentiary documents from both sides."78 (emphases supplied)

(b) The COMELEC Second Division did not give ample opportunity to the petitioner to adduce evidence in
support of his defense in the petition for his disqualification.

All throughout the proceeding, no hearing was conducted on the petition for disqualification in gross violation of
section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 which specifically enjoins the COMELEC to "continue with the trial or hearing of the
action, inquiry, or protest." This is also in violation of COMELEC Resolution No. 3402 requiring the Regional
Election Director to complete the hearing and reception of evidence within ten (10) days from the filing of the

Pearliegates

Indeed, careful reading of the petitioner's Memorandum shows that he confined his arguments in support of his
Motion to Lift the Order of Suspension. In said Memorandum, petitioner raised the following issues: (a) he was
utterly deprived of procedural due process, and consequently, the order suspending his proclamation is null
and void; (b) the said order of suspension of proclamation has no legal and factual basis; and (c) evidence of
guilt on his part is patently inexistent for the purpose of directing the suspension of his proclamation.79 He

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Election Law Cases


urged the COMELEC Second Division to conduct a full dress hearing on the main disqualification case should
the suspension be lifted.80

(c) the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division disqualifying the petitioner is not based on substantial
evidence.

The Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division cannot be considered to be based on substantial evidence. It
relied merely on affidavits of witnesses attached to the petition for disqualification. As stressed, the COMELEC
Second Division gave credence to the affidavits without hearing the affiants. In reversing said Resolution, the
COMELEC en banc correctly observed:

"Lacking evidence of Codilla, the Commission (Second Division) made its decisions based mainly on the
allegation of the petitioner and the supporting affidavits. With this lopsided evidence at hand, the result was
predictable. The Commission (Second Division) had no choice. Codilla was disqualified."81

Worse, the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division, even without the evidence coming from the petitioner,
failed to prove the gravamen of the offense for which he was charged.82

"[T]he respondent [herein petitioner], within the election period, took advantage of his current elective position
as City Mayor of Ormoc City by illegally and unlawfully using during the prohibited period, public equipments
and vehicles belonging to and owned by the City Government of Ormoc City in extracting, hauling and
distributing gravel and sand to the residents and voters of the Municipalities of Kananga and Matag-ob Leyte,
well within the territorial limits of the 4th Congressional District of Leyte, which acts were executed without
period, and clearly for the illicit purpose of unduly inducing or directly corrupting various voters of Kananga and
Matag-ob, within the 4th legislative district of Leyte, for the precise purpose of inducing and influencing the
voters/beneficiaries of Kananga and Matag-ob, Leyte to cast their votes for said respondent."83

The affidavits relied upon by the COMELEC Second Division failed to prove these allegations. For instance,
Cesar A. Laurente merely stated that he saw three (3) ten-wheeler dump trucks and a Hyundai Payloader with
the markings "Ormoc City Government" extracting and hauling sand and gravel from the riverbed adjacent to
the property owned by the Codilla family.84

Agripino C. Alferez and Rogelio T. Sulvera in their Joint Affidavit merely stated that they saw white trucks owned
by the City Government of Ormoc dumping gravel and sand on the road of Purok 6, San Vicente, Matag-ob,
Leyte. A payloader then scattered the sand and gravel unloaded by the white trucks.85

On the other hand, Danilo D. Maglasang, a temporary employee of the City Government of Ormoc assigned to
check and record the delivery of sand and gravel for the different barangays in Ormoc, stated as follows:

Petitioner allegedly violated section 68 (a) of the Omnibus Election Code which reads:

"Section 68. Disqualifications.- Any candidate who, in action or protest in which he is a party is declared by final
decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having (a) given money or other
material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing official functions,
xxx shall be disqualified from continuing as candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding office"

To be disqualified under the above-quoted provision, the following elements must be proved: (a) the candidate,
personally or through his instructions, must have given money or other material consideration; and (b) the act
of giving money or other material consideration must be for the purpose of influencing, inducing, or corrupting
the voters or public officials performing electoral functions.

In the case at bar, the petition for disqualification alleged that (a) petitioner ordered the extraction, hauling and
distribution of gravel and sand, and (b) his purpose was to induce and influence the voters of Kananga and
Matag-ob, Leyte to vote for him. Pertinent portion of the petition reads:

"3. That on April 20, 2001, I was ordered by Engr. Arnel Padayo, an employee of the City Engineering Office,
Ormoc City to go to Tagaytay, Kangga (sic), Leyte as that will be the source of the sand and gravel. I inquired
why we had to go to Kananga but Engr. Padayao said that it's not a problem as it was Mayor Eufrocino M.
Codilla, Sr. who ordered this and the property is owned by the family of Mayor Codilla. We were to deliver sand
and gravel to whoever requests from Mayor Codilla."86

Similarly, the Affidavit of Basilio Bates cannot prove the offense charged against the petitioner. He alleged that
on April 18, 2001, a white truck with the marking "City Government of Ormoc" came to his lot at Montebello,
Kananga, Leyte and unloaded mixed sand and that the driver of the truck told him to "vote for Codilla as a (sic)
congressman during election."87 His statement is hearsay. He has no personal knowledge of the supposed
order of the petitioner to distribute gravel and sand for the purpose of inducing the voters to vote for him. The
same could be said about the affidavits of Randy T. Merin,88 Alfredo C. De la Pea,89 Miguel P. Pandac,90
Paquito Bregeldo, Cristeta Alferez , Glicerio Rios,91 Romulo Alkuino, Sr.,92 Abner Casas,93 Rita Trangia,94 and
Judith Erispe95 attached to respondent Locsin's Memorandum on the Motion to Lift the Suspension of
Proclamation.

Also valueless are the affidavits of other witnesses96 of respondent Locsin, all similarly worded, which alleged
that the petitioner ordered the repair of the road in Purok 6, Barangay San Vicente, Matag-ob, Leyte and the

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flattening of the area where the cockfights were to be held. These allegations are extraneous to the charge in
the petition for disqualification. More importantly, these allegations do not constitute a ground to disqualify the
petitioner based on section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code.

To be sure, the petition for disqualification also ascribed other election offenses against the petitioner,
particularly section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code, viz:

"Section 261. Prohibited Acts.- The following shall be guilty of an election offense:

(a) Vote-buying and vote-selling.- (1) Any person who gives, offers or promises money or anything of value,
gives or promises any office or employment, franchise or grant, public or private, or make or offers to make an
expenditure, directly or indirectly, or cause an expenditure to be made to any person, association, corporation,
entity or community in order to induce anyone or the public in general, to vote for or against any candidate or
withhold his vote in the election, or to vote for or against any aspirant for the nomination or choice of a
candidate in a convention or similar selection process of a political party.

xxxxxxxxx

(o) Use of public funds, money deposited in trust, equipment, facilities owned or controlled by the government
for an election campaign.- Any person who uses under any guise whatsoever directly or indirectly, xxx (3) any
equipment, vehicle, facility, apparatus, or paraphernalia owned by the government or by its political
subdivisions, agencies including government-owned or controlled corporations, or by the Armed Forces of the
Philippines for any election campaign or for any partisan political activity x x x."

However, the jurisdiction of the COMELEC to disqualify candidates is limited to those enumerated in section 68
of the Omnibus Election Code. All other election offenses are beyond the ambit of COMELEC jurisdiction.97
They are criminal and not administrative in nature. Pursuant to sections 265 and 268 of the Omnibus Election
Code, the power of the COMELEC is confined to the conduct of preliminary investigation on the alleged election
offenses for the purpose of prosecuting the alleged offenders before the regular courts of justice, viz:

"Section 265. Prosecution.- The Commission shall, through its duly authorized legal officers, have the exclusive
power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under this Code, and to
prosecute the same. The Commission may avail of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the government:
Provided, however, That in the event that the Commission fails to act on any complaint within four months from
his filing, the complainant may file the complaint with the office of the fiscal or with the Ministry of Justice for
proper investigation and prosecution, if warranted.

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xxxxxxxxx

Section 268. Jurisdiction.- The regional trial court shall have the exclusive original jurisdiction to try and decide
any criminal action or proceeding for violation of this Code, except those relating to the offense of failure to
register or failure to vote which shall be under the jurisdictions of metropolitan or municipal trial courts. From
the decision of the courts, appeal will lie as in other criminal cases."

The COMELEC Second Division grievously erred when it decided the disqualification case based on section 261
(a) and (o), and not on section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code.

(d) Exclusion of the votes in favor of the petitioner and the proclamation of respondent Locsin was done with
undue haste.

The COMELEC Second Division ordered the exclusion of the votes cast in favor of the petitioner, and the
proclamation of the respondent Locsin, without affording the petitioner the opportunity to challenge the same.
In the morning of June 15, 2001, the Provincial Board of Canvassers convened, and on the strength of the said
Resolution excluding the votes received by the petitioner, certified that respondent Locsin received the highest
number of votes. On this basis, respondent Locsin was proclaimed.

Records reveal that the petitioner received notice of the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division only
through his counsel via a facsimile message in the afternoon of June 15, 200198 when everything was already
fait accompli. Undoubtedly, he was not able to contest the issuance of the Certificate of Canvass and the
proclamation of respondent Locsin. This is plain and simple denial of due process.

The essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard. When a party is deprived of that basic fairness, any
decision by any tribunal in prejudice of his rights is void.

Second. The votes cast in favor of the petitioner cannot be considered "stray" and respondent cannot be validly
proclaimed on that basis.

The Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division in SPA No. 01-208 contains two dispositions: (1) it ruled that
the petitioner was disqualified as a candidate for the position of Congressman of the Fourth District of Leyte;
and (2) it ordered the immediate proclamation of the candidate who garnered the highest number of votes, to
the exclusion of the respondent [herein petitioner].

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As previously stated, the disqualification of the petitioner is null and void for being violative of due process and
for want of substantial factual basis. Even assuming, however, that the petitioner was validly disqualified, it is
still improper for the COMELEC Second Division to order the immediate exclusion of votes cast for the petitioner
as stray, and on this basis, proclaim the respondent as having garnered the next highest number of votes.

(a) The order of disqualification is not yet final, hence, the votes cast in favor of the petitioner cannot be
considered "stray."

"This pertains to the finality of decisions or resolutions of the Commission en banc or division, particularly on
Special Actions (Disqualification Cases).

Special Action cases refer to the following:

(a) Petition to deny due course to a certificate of candidacy;


Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 and section 72 of the Omnibus Election Code require a final judgment before the
election for the votes of a disqualified candidate to be considered "stray." Hence, when a candidate has not yet
been disqualified by final judgment during the election day and was voted for, the votes cast in his favor
cannot be declared stray. To do so would amount to disenfranchising the electorate in whom sovereignty
resides.99 For in voting for a candidate who has not been disqualified by final judgment during the election
day, the people voted for him bona fide, without any intention to misapply their franchise, and in the honest
belief that the candidate was then qualified to be the person to whom they would entrust the exercise of the
powers of government.100

(b) Petition to declare a candidate as a nuisance candidate;

(c) Petition to disqualify a candidate; and

(d) Petition to postpone or suspend an election.


This principle applies with greater force in the case at bar considering that the petitioner has not been declared
by final judgment to be disqualified not only before but even after the elections. The Resolution of the
COMELEC Second Division disqualifying the petitioner did not attain finality, and hence, could not be executed,
because of the timely filing of a Motion for Reconsideration. Section 13, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure on Finality of Decisions and Resolutions reads:

"Sec. 13. Finality of Decisions or Resolutions.- (a) In ordinary actions, special proceedings, provisional remedies
and special reliefs, a decision or resolution of the Commission en banc shall become final and executory after
thirty (30) days from its promulgation.

(b) In Special Actions and Special Cases a decision or resolution of the Commission en banc shall become final
and executory after five (5) days in Special Actions and Special Cases and after fifteen (15) days in all other
proceedings, following their promulgation.

(c) Unless a motion for reconsideration is seasonably filed, a decision or resolution of a Division shall become
final and executory after the lapse of five (5) days in Special Actions and Special Cases and after fifteen (15)
days in all other actions or proceedings, following its promulgation." (emphasis supplied)

Considering the foregoing and in order to guide field officials on the finality of decisions or resolutions on
special action cases (disqualification cases) the Commission, RESOLVES, as it is hereby RESOLVED, as follows:

(1) the decision or resolution of the En Banc of the Commission on disqualification cases shall become final and
executory after five (5) days from its promulgation unless restrained by the Supreme Court;

(2) the decision or resolution of a Division on disqualification cases shall become final and executory after the
lapse of five (5) days unless a motion for reconsideration is seasonably filed;

(3) where the ground for disqualification case is by reason of non-residence, citizenship, violation of election
laws and other analogous cases and on the day of the election the resolution has not become final and
executory the BEI shall tally and count the votes for such disqualified candidate;

(4) the decision or resolution of the En Banc on nuisance candidates, particularly whether the nuisance
candidate has the same name as the bona fide candidate shall be immediately executory;
In this wise, COMELEC Resolution No. 4116,101 issued in relation to the finality of resolutions or decisions in
disqualification cases, provides:

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Election Law Cases


(5) the decision or resolution of a DIVISION on nuisance candidate, particularly where the nuisance candidate
has the same name as the bona fide candidate shall be immediately executory after the lapse of five (5) days
unless a motion for reconsideration is seasonably filed. In which case, the votes cast shall not be considered
stray but shall be counted and tallied for the bona fide candidate.

All resolutions, orders and rules inconsistent herewith are hereby modified or repealed."

Considering the timely filing of a Motion for Reconsideration, the COMELEC Second Division gravely abused its
discretion in ordering the immediate disqualification of the petitioner and ordering the exclusion of the votes
cast in his favor. Section 2, Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is very clear that a timely Motion for
Reconsideration shall suspend the execution or implementation of the resolution, viz:

Section 2. Period for filing Motion for Reconsideration.- A motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order, or
ruling of a Division shall be filed within five (5) days from the promulgation thereof. Such motion, if not pro
forma, suspends the execution or implementation of the decision, resolution, order or ruling." (emphases
supplied)

The effect of a decision declaring a person ineligible to hold an office is only that the election fails entirely, that
the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from the disqualified winner to the repudiated loser because the
law then as now only authorizes a declaration in favor of the person who has obtained a plurality of votes, and
does not entitle the candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. In such case,
the electors have failed to make a choice and the election is a nullity. To allow the defeated and repudiated
candidate to take over the elective position despite his rejection by the electorate is to disenfranchise the
electorate without any fault on their part and to undermine the importance and meaning of democracy and the
people's right to elect officials of their choice."105

Respondent Locsin proffers a distinction between a disqualification based on personal circumstances such as
age, residence or citizenship and disqualification based on election offenses. She contends that the election of
candidates later disqualified based on election offenses like those enumerated in section 68 of the Omnibus
Election Code should be invalidated because they violate the very essence of suffrage and as such, the votes
cast in his favor should not be considered.106

This contention is without merit. In the recent case of Trinidad v. COMELEC,107 this Court ruled that the effect
of a judgment disqualifying a candidate, after winning the election, based on personal circumstances or section
68 of the Omnibus Election Code is the same: the second placer could not take the place of the disqualified
winner.

(b) Respondent Locsin, as a mere second placer, cannot be proclaimed.


II
More brazen is the proclamation of respondent Locsin which violates the settled doctrine that the candidate
who obtains the second highest number of votes may not be proclaimed winner in case the winning candidate
is disqualified.102 In every election, the people's choice is the paramount consideration and their expressed
will must at all times be given effect. When the majority speaks and elects into office a candidate by giving him
the highest number of votes cast in the election for the office, no one can be declared elected in his place.103
In Domino v. COMELEC,104 this Court ruled, viz:

"It would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a
candidate who has not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed winner and imposed as
representative of a constituency, the majority of which have positively declared through their ballots that they
do not choose him. To simplistically assume that the second placer would have received that (sic) other votes
would be to substitute our judgment for the mind of the voters. He could not be considered the first among the
qualified candidates because in a field which excludes the qualified candidate, the conditions would have
substantially changed.

xxxxxxxxx

Pearliegates

Whether the proclamation of respondent Locsin divested the COMELEC en banc of jurisdiction to review its
validity.

Respondent Locsin submits that the COMELEC en banc has no jurisdiction to annul her proclamation. She
maintains that the COMELEC en banc was been divested of jurisdiction to review the validity of her
proclamation because she has become a member of the House of Representatives. Thus, she contends that the
proper forum to question her membership to the House of Representatives is the House of Representative
Electoral Tribunal (HRET).

We find no merit in these contentions.

First. The validity of the respondent's proclamation was a core issue in the Motion for Reconsideration
seasonably filed by the petitioner.

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In his timely Motion for Reconsideration with the COMELEC en banc, petitioner argued that the COMELEC
Second Division erred thus:

"(1) in disqualifying petitioner on the basis solely of the dubious declaration of the witnesses for respondent
Locsin;

Section 1. Grounds for Motion for Reconsideration.- A motion for reconsideration may be filed on the grounds
that the evidence is insufficient to justify the decision, order or ruling, or that the said decision, order or ruling
is contrary to law.

Section 2. Period for filing Motion for Reconsideration.- A motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order, or
ruling of a Division shall be filed within five (5) days from the promulgation thereof. Such motion, if not pro
forma, suspends the execution or implementation of the decision, resolution, order or ruling."

(2) in adopting in toto the allegations of the witnesses for respondent Locsin; and

(3) in promulgating the resolution in violation of its own rules of procedure and in directing therein the
immediate proclamation of the second highest 'vote getter.'" (emphases supplied)

In support of his third assignment of error, petitioner argued that "the Second Division's directive for the
immediate proclamation of the second highest vote-getter is premature considering that the Resolution has yet
to become final and executory."108 Clearly, the validity of respondent Locsin's proclamation was made a
central issue in the Motion for Reconsideration seasonably filed by the petitioner. Without doubt, the COMELEC
en banc has the jurisdiction to rule on the issue.

The fact that the Petition for Nullity of Proclamation was filed directly with the COMELEC en banc is of no
moment. Even without said Petition, the COMELEC en banc could still rule on the nullity of respondent's
proclamation because it was properly raised in the Motion for Reconsideration.

Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution empowers the COMELEC en banc to review, on motion for
reconsideration, decisions or resolutions decided by a division, viz:

"Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of
procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All such
election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decision shall
be decided by the Commission en banc."

Section 3. Form and Contents of Motion for Reconsideration.- The motion shall be verified and shall point out
specifically the findings or conclusions of the decision, resolution, order or ruling which are not supported by
the evidence or which are contrary to law, making express reference to the testimonial or documentary
evidence or to the provisions of law alleged to be contrary to such findings or resolutions.

Section 4. Effect of Motion for Reconsideration on Period to Appeal.- A motion to reconsider a decision,
resolution, order or ruling when not pro forma, suspends the running of the period to elevate the matter to the
Supreme Court.

Section 5. How Motion for Reconsideration Disposed Of.- Upon the filing of a motion to reconsider a decision,
resolution, order or ruling of a Division, the Clerk of Court concerned shall, within twenty-four (24) hours from
the filing thereof, notify the Presiding Commissioner. The latter shall within two (2) days thereafter certify the
case to the Commission en banc.

Section 6. Duty of the Clerk of Court of the Commission to set Motion for Hearing.- The Clerk of Court
concerned shall calendar the motion for reconsideration for the resolution of the Commission en banc within
ten (10) days from the certification thereof." (emphases supplied)

Since the petitioner seasonably filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of the Second Division
suspending his proclamation and disqualifying him, the COMELEC en banc was not divested of its jurisdiction to
review the validity of the said Order of the Second Division. The said Order of the Second Division was yet
unenforceable as it has not attained finality; the timely filing of the motion for reconsideration suspends its
execution. It cannot, thus, be used as the basis for the assumption in office of the respondent as the duly
elected Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte.

Pursuant to this Constitutional mandate, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides:

"Rule 19. Motions for Reconsideration.-

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Second. It is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) which has no jurisdiction in the instant
case.

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Respondent contends that having been proclaimed and having taken oath as representative of the 4th
legislative district of Leyte, any question relative to her election and eligibility should be brought before the
HRET pursuant to section 17 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.109

We reject respondent's contention.

(a) The issue on the validity of the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division has not yet been resolved by
the COMELEC en banc.

To stress again, at the time of the proclamation of respondent Locsin, the validity of the Resolution of the
COMELEC Second Division was seasonably challenged by the petitioner in his Motion for Reconsideration. The
issue was still within the exclusive jurisdiction of the COMELEC en banc to resolve. Hence, the HRET cannot
assume jurisdiction over the matter.

In Puzon vs. Cua,110 even the HRET ruled that the "doctrinal ruling that once a proclamation has been made
and a candidate-elect has assumed office, it is this Tribunal that has jurisdiction over an election contest
involving members of the House of Representatives, could not have been immediately applicable due to the
issue regarding the validity of the very COMELEC pronouncements themselves." This is because the HRET has
no jurisdiction to review resolutions or decisions of the COMELEC, whether issued by a division or en banc.

(b) The instant case does not involve the election and qualification of respondent Locsin.

Respondent Locsin maintains that the proper recourse of the petitioner is to file a petition for quo warranto with
the HRET.

A petition for quo warranto may be filed only on the grounds of ineligibility and disloyalty to the Republic of the
Philippines.111 In the case at bar, neither the eligibility of the respondent Locsin nor her loyalty to the Republic
of the Philippines is in question. There is no issue that she was qualified to run, and if she won, to assume
office.

A petition for quo warranto in the HRET is directed against one who has been duly elected and proclaimed for
having obtained the highest number of votes but whose eligibility is in question at the time of such
proclamation. It is evident that respondent Locsin cannot be the subject of quo warranto proceeding in the
HRET. She lost the elections to the petitioner by a wide margin. Her proclamation was a patent nullity. Her
premature assumption to office as Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte was void from the
beginning. It is the height of absurdity for the respondent, as a loser, to tell petitioner Codilla, Sr., the winner, to
unseat her via a quo warranto proceeding.

III

Whether it is the ministerial duty of the public respondents to

recognize petitioner Codilla, Sr. as the legally elected Representative

of the 4th legislative district of Leyte vice respondent Locsin.

Under Rule 65, section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, any person may file a verified petition for
mandamus "when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an
act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes
another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law."112 For a petition for mandamus to prosper,
it must be shown that the subject of the petition for mandamus is a ministerial act or duty, and not purely
discretionary on the part of the board, officer or person, and that the petitioner has a well-defined, clear and
certain right to warrant the grant thereof.

The distinction between a ministerial and discretionary act is well delineated. A purely ministerial act or duty is
one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the
mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or
impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide
how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial
only when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official discretion or judgment.113

In the case at bar, the administration of oath and the registration of the petitioner in the Roll of Members of the
House of Representatives representing the 4th legislative district of Leyte is no longer a matter of discretion on
the part of the public respondents. The facts are settled and beyond dispute: petitioner garnered 71,350 votes
as against respondent Locsin who only got 53, 447 votes in the May 14, 2001 elections. The COMELEC Second
Division initially ordered the proclamation of respondent Locsin; on Motion for Reconsideration the COMELEC en
banc set aside the order of its Second Division and ordered the proclamation of the petitioner. The Decision of

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the COMELEC en banc has not been challenged before this Court by respondent Locsin and said Decision has
become final and executory.

Petitioners Amado S. Bagatsing, Ernesto M. Maceda and Jaime Lopez and herein private respondent Jose L.
Atienza were candidates for the position of Mayor of Manila in the May 11, 1998 elections.

In sum, the issue of who is the rightful Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte has been finally
settled by the COMELEC en banc, the constitutional body with jurisdiction on the matter. The rule of law
demands that its Decision be obeyed by all officials of the land. There is no alternative to the rule of law except
the reign of chaos and confusion.

On May 18, 1998, seven (7) days after the elections, petitioners filed with the COMELEC a complaint for
disqualification against private respondent, docketed as SPA No. 98-319, on the ground that the latter allegedly
caused the disbursement of public funds in the amount of Three Million Three Hundred Seventy-Five Thousand
(P3,375,000.00) Pesos, more or less, within the prohibited forty-five-day period before the elections in violation
of Article 22, Section 261 (g) (2) 1 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code
of the Philippines. The alleged disbursement was intended to be distributed in the form of financial assistance
to the public school teachers of the City of Manila who manned the precinct polls in that city during the
elections.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Petition for Mandamus is granted. Public Speaker of the House of Representatives shall
administer the oath of petitioner EUFROCINO M. CODILLA, SR., as the duly-elected Representative of the 4th
legislative district of Leyte. Public respondent Secretary-General shall likewise register the name of the
petitioner in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives after he has taken his oath of office. This
decision shall be immediately executory.

On May 20, 1998, the COMELEC (First Division) * issued an order which dispositively reads as follows:

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 134047

December 8, 1999

PREMISES CONSIDERED, it appearing that the evidence presented consisting of disbursement voucher and the
general payroll evidencing payment to the teachers in the form of financial assistance dated May 5, 1998, in
violation of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, which provides:

AMADO S. BAGATSING, ERNESTO M. MACEDA, and JAIME LOPEZ, petitioners,


vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSE L. ATIENZA, respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.:

In this petition for certiorari petitioners seek to annul and set aside the Resolution dated June 4, 1998 of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) First Division directing the proclamation of private respondent as Mayor of
the City of Manila for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack, or excess, of
jurisdiction.

Sec. 68 Disqualifications. Any candidate who in an action or protest in which he is a party is declared by
final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having (a) given money or other
material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral
functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy, (c) spent in his election campaign an
amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited
under Section 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e) violated any Section 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v
and cc, sub-paragraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected from
holding the office. Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be
qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless said person has waived hi (sic) statues (sic) as
permanent resident or immigrant of foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for
in the election laws (Sec. 25, 1971 EC) (emphasis ours).

show a probable cause of commission of election offenses which are grounds for disqualification, and the
evidence in support of disqualification is strong, the City Board of Canvassers of Manila is hereby directed to
complete the canvassing of election returns of the City of Manila, but to suspend proclamation of respondent
Jose L. Atienza, Jr. should he obtain the winning number of votes for the position of City Mayor of Manila, until
such time when the petition for disqualification against him shall have been resolved.

The backdrop of the instant case reveals the following antecedent facts:
The Executive Director of this Commission is directed to cause the immediate implementation of this Order.

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SO ORDERED. 2

On May 21, 1998, private respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration and sought to set aside the aforequoted order directing his proclamation as mayor.

Considering therefore, that the petition for disqualification was filed after the election but before respondent's
proclamation, the Commission En Banc, conformably with Resolution No. 2050, hereby dismisses the same as a
disqualification case but refers Petitioners' charges of election offense against respondent to the Law
Department for appropriate action. 3

The decretal portion of the resolution reads:


On June 4, 1998, the COMELEC (First Division) * rendered a resolution ratiocinating thusly:

The Commission En Banc finds correct respondent's reliance on COMELEC Resolution No. 2050 for his cause.
The Resolution, promulgated by the Commission in order to formulate the rules governing the disposition of
cases of disqualification filed by virtue of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code in relation to Section 6 of
Republic Act 6646 otherwise known as the Electoral Reform Law of 1987, pertinently provides:

2.
Any complaint for disqualification based on Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, filed after the
elections against a candidate who has already been proclaimed as winner shall be dismissed as a
disqualification case. However, the complaint shall be referred for preliminary investigation to the Law
Department of the Commission.

Where a similar complaint is filed after the elections but before proclamation of the respondent candidate, the
complaint shall nevertheless, be dismissed as a or disqualification case. However, the complaint shall be
referred for preliminary investigation to the Law Department. If, before proclamation, the Law Department
makes a prima facie finding of guilt and the corresponding information had been filed with the appropriate trial
court, the complainant may file a petition for suspension of the proclamation of the respondent with the Court
before which the criminal case is pending and the said Court may order the suspension of the proclamation, if
the evidence of guilt is strong.

The applicability of COMELEC Resolution No. 2050 on cases of such nature as the one at bench, had been
upheld by the Supreme Court in Lozano vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. 94628, October 28, 1991, when it
declared:

Resolution No. 2050 specifically mandates a definite policy and procedure for disqualification cases. The
COMELEC Rules of Procedure speak of special actions, which include disqualification cases, in general. Hence,
as between a specific and a general rule, the former shall necessarily prevail.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Commission FIRST DIVISION hereby GRANTS the Motion to lift the
order of suspension of respondents proclamation. The Order of the First Division suspending respondent's
proclamation as City Mayor of Manila is SET ASIDE. The City Board of Canvassers of Manila is hereby DIRECTED
to CONVENE, COMPLETE the CANVASS and PROCLAIM the candidate obtaining the highest number of votes for
said position. Petitioners' complaints against respondent for violation of the Omnibus Election Code is hereby
referred to the Law Department for preliminary investigation.

SO ORDERED. 4

That same day at around eleven o'clock in the morning, petitioners filed a Motion to Suspend Immediate
Intended Proclamation of Respondent. In the afternoon of the same day, petitioners likewise filed a Motion for
Reconsideration and a Second Motion to Suspend Immediate Intended Proclamation of Respondent before
COMELEC en banc.

Meanwhile, the City Board of Canvassers of Manila reconvened at three o'clock in the afternoon of the same
day, June 4, 1998, and proclaimed private respondent as the duly elected Mayor of the City of Manila. 5

On June 25, 1999, without waiting for the resolution of their motion for reconsideration pending before the
COMELEC en banc, petitioners filed the instant petition to set aside the June 4, 1998 Resolution of the
COMELEC's First Division.

Records reveal, however, that said motion for reconsideration was denied for reconsideration pending before
the COMELEC en banc was denied in its Order of July 2, 1998 at the instance of herein petitioners themselves
for the reason that they had already filed a petition before this Court docketed as G.R. No. 134047. 6

The ground for the petition at bar, as therein promulgated, is as follows:


It is thus, a good law which could govern this case.

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6.1
Respondent acted whimsically, capriciously and arbitrarily when it dismissed outright the Petition for
Disqualification docketed SPA No. 98-319 against respondent Atienza on the basis of Comelec Resolution 2050
which had already been modified by this Honorable Court in the case of Sunga vs. Comelec (supra). Therefore
the dismissal by the Comelec must be struck down as having been issued in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. 7

The only issue for our consideration is whether or not the COMELEC First Division committed grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the Resolution dated June 4, 1998 dismissing the disqualification case against private
respondent and referring the same to its Law Department for preliminary investigation.

COMELEC Resolution No. 2050, adopted on November 3, 1988, reads:

WHEREAS, there remain pending before the Commission, a number of cases of disqualification filed by virtue of
the provisions of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code in relation to Section 6 of R.A. 6646, otherwise
known as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987;

WHEREAS, opinions of the members of the Commission on matters of procedure in dealing with cases of this
nature and the manner of disposing of the same have not been uniform;

In case such complaint was not resolved before the election, the Commission may motu proprio, or an (sic)
motion of any of the parties, refer the complaint to the law Department of the Commission as the instrument of
the latter in the exercise of its exclusive power to conduct a preliminary investigation of all cases involving
criminal infractions of the election laws. Such recourse may be availed of irrespective of whether the
respondent has been elected or has lost in the election.

2.
Any complaint for disqualification based on Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code in relation to
Section 6 of Rep. Act No. 6646 filed after the election against a candidate who has already been proclaimed as
winner shall be dismissed as a disqualification case. However, the complaint shall be referred for preliminary
investigation to the Law Department of the Commission.

Where a similar complaint is filed after election but before proclamation of the respondent candidate, the
complaint shall, nevertheless, be dismissed as a disqualification case. However, the complaint shall be referred
for preliminary investigation to the Law Department. If, before proclamation, the Law Department makes a
prima facie finding of guilt and the corresponding information has been filed with the appropriate trial court,
the complainant may file a petition for suspension of the proclamation of the respondent with the court before
which the criminal case is pending and the said court may order the suspension of the proclamation if the
evidence of guilt is strong.

WHEREAS, in order to avoid conflicts of opinion in the disposition or disqualification cases contemplated under
Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code in relation to Section 6 of Rep. Act 6646, there is a strongly felt need
to lay down a definite policy in the disposition of this specific class of disqualification cases;

3.
The Law Department shall terminate the preliminary investigation within thirty (30) days from receipt
of the referral and shall submit its study, report and recommendation to the Commission en banc within five (5)
days from the conclusion of the preliminary investigation. If it makes a prima facie finding of guilt, it shall
submit with such study the Information for filing with the appropriate court.

NOW, THEREFORE, on motion duly seconded, the Commission en banc:

The above-quoted resolution covers two (2) different aspects:

RESOLVED, as it hereby resolves, to formulate the following rules governing the disposition of cases of
disqualification filed by virtue of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code in relation to Section 6 of R.A. No.
6646, otherwise known as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987:

First, as contemplated in paragraph 1, a complaint for disqualification filed before the election must be inquired
into by the COMELEC for the purpose of determining whether the acts complained of have in fact been
committed. Where the inquiry results in finding before the election, the COMELEC shall order the candidate's
disqualification. In case the complaint was not resolved before the election, the COMELEC may motu propio or
on motion of any the parties, refer the said complaint to the Law Department of the COMELEC for preliminary
investigation.

1.
Any complaint for the disqualification of a duly registered candidate based upon any of the grounds
specifically enumerated under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, filed directly with the Commission
before an election in which the respondent is a candidate, shall be inquired into by the Commission for the
purpose of determining whether the acts complained of have in fact been committed. Where the inquiry by the
Commission results in a finding before election, that the respondent candidate did in fact commit the acts
complained, the Commission shall order the disqualification of the respondent candidate from continuing as
such candidate.

Pearliegates

Second, paragraph 2 refers to a complaint for disqualification filed after the election against a candidate who
has not yet been proclaimed or who has already been proclaimed as a winner. In both cases, the complaint
shall be dismissed as a disqualification case but shall referred to the Law Department of the COMELEC for
preliminary investigation. However, if before proclamation, the Law Department makes a prima facie finding of

274

Election Law Cases


guilt and the corresponding information has been filed with the appropriate trial court, the complainant may file
a petition for suspension of the proclamation of the respondent with the court before which the criminal case is
pending and the said court may order the suspension of the proclamation of the evidence of guilt is strong.

Petitioners contend that said resolution is no longer a good law since it has been nullified in toto by this Court
in Sunga v. COMELEC. 8

Contrary to petitioners' contention, the Court not nullify in toto COMELEC Resolution No. 2050 in the recent
case of Sunga v. COMELEC. There we held that:

. . . We discern nothing in COMELEC Resolution No. 2050 declaring, ordering or directing the dismissal of a
disqualification case filed before the election but which remained unresolved after the election. What the
Resolution mandates in such a case is for the Commission to refer the complaint to its Law Department for
investigation to determine whether the acts complained of have in fact been committed by the candidate
sought to be disqualified. The findings of the Law Department then become the basis for disqualifying the
erring candidate. This is totally different from the other two situations contemplated by Resolution No. 2050
i.e., a disqualification case filed after the election but before the proclamation of winners and that filed after the
election and the proclamation of winners, wherein it was specifically directed by the same Resolution to be
dismissed as a disqualification case.

Moreover, Resolution No. 2050 as interpreted in Silvestre v. Dauvit infringes on Sec. 6 of RA No. 6646, which
provides:

Sec. 6. Effects of Disqualification Case. Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be
disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate
is not declared by final judgment before and election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the
winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of
the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency
thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong
(emphasis supplied).

Clearly, the legislative intent is that the COMELEC should continue the trial and hearing of the disqualification
case to its conclusion, i.e., until judgment is rendered thereon. The word "shall" signifies that this requirement
of the law is mandatory, operating to impose a positive duty which must be enforced. The implication is that
the COMELEC is left with no discretion but to proceed with the disqualification case even after the election.
Thus, in providing for the outright dismissal of the disqualification case which remains unresolved after the
election, Silvestre v. Duavit in effect disallows what RA No. 6646 imperatively requires. . . . 9

What the Court found objectionable therein was the second paragraph of paragraph 1 of Resolution No. 2050
as said provision clearly infringes on Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 which mandates that should a disqualification
case be not resolved before an election, the COMELEC shall continue with the trial and hearing of the case. It
should not be referred to the Law Department as the resolution provides. The COMELEC's failure to distinguish
between a complaint for disqualification filed before an election and one filed after an election resulted in the
controversy. There, the COMELEC misapplied the rules pertaining to complaints filed after the election to a case
clearly filed prior to the May 8, 1995 elections. As we have already mentioned above, the rules on disposition
and resolution of cases filed before or after an election vary. 10 Consequently, the Sunga case cannot apply to
the instant case because here, the disqualification case was filed on May 18, 1998, seven (7) days after the
May 11, 1998 elections. Therefore, the provisions of paragraph 2 of Resolution No. 2050 must apply, in that,
the complaint shall be dismissed as a disqualification case, but referred to the Law Department of the
COMELEC for preliminary investigation. This is exactly what the COMELEC ruled in its assailed resolution of June
4, 1998, and rightly so.

Petitioners likewise fault the COMELEC for not ordering the suspension of respondent's proclamation as mayor
despite their timely-filed "Motion to Suspend Immediate Intended Proclamation of Respondent" and which
motion was reiterated in a second motion.

COMELEC did not err in not ordering the suspension of respondent's proclamation. The second paragraph of
paragraph 2 of Resolution No. 2050 provides that where a complaint is filed after the elections but before
proclamation, as in this case, the complaint must be dismissed as a disqualified case but shall be referred to
the Law Department for preliminary investigation. If before the proclamation, the Law Department makes a
prima facie finding of guilt and the corresponding information has been filed with the appropriate trial court,
the complainant may file a petition for suspension of the proclamation of respondent with the court before
which the criminal case is pending and that court may order the suspension of the proclamation if the evidence
of guilt is strong. 11 It appearing that none of the foregoing circumstances obtain herein as there is no prima
facie finding of guilt yet, a suspension of respondent's proclamation is not warranted. The mere pendency of a
disqualification case against a candidate, and a winning candidate at that, does not justify the suspension of
his proclamation after winning in the election. To hold otherwise would unduly encourage the filing of baseless
and malicious petitions for disqualification if only to effect the suspension of the proclamation of the winning
candidate, not only to his damage and prejudice but also to the defeat of the sovereign will of the electorate,
and for the undue benefit of undeserving third parties. 12

Before we end, a word of caution to herein petitioners and to future litigants and counsels predisposed to
invoke this Court's jurisdiction without waiting for the resolution of whatever pending motions and motions for
reconsideration they have before trial courts and tribunals exercising specialized jurisdiction: The Court will not
countenance the practice of taking any shortcuts of the established rules of pocedure pertaining to the
hierarchy of courts and remedies of last resort. When the petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari on
June 25, 1999, they knew pretty well that the motion for reconsideration they filed to assail the June 4, 1998
resolution of the First Division of the Commission was still pending with the COMELEC en banc. Notwithstanding
that knowledge, they went to this Court to seek another remedy which was not exactly available to them at
that time. This practice falls short of forum-shopping in the technical sense and will not be allowed.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.

Pearliegates

275

Election Law Cases


SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 125955

June 19, 1997

WILMER GREGO, petitioner,


vs.

Subsequently, Basco ran as a candidate for Councilor in the Second District of the City of Manila during the
January 18, 1988, local elections. He won and, accordingly, assumed office.

After his term, Basco sought re-election in the May 11, 1992 synchronized national elections. Again, he
succeeded in his bid and he was elected as one of the six (6) City Councilors. However, his victory this time did
not remain unchallenged. In the midst of his successful re-election, he found himself besieged by lawsuits of his
opponents in the polls who wanted to dislodge him from his position.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and HUMBERTO BASCO, respondents.


One such case was a petition for quo warranto 3 filed before the COMELEC by Cenon Ronquillo, another
candidate for councilor in the same district, who alleged Basco's ineligibility to be elected councilor on the
basis of the Tordesillas ruling. At about the same time, two more cases were also commenced by Honorio Lopez
II in the Office of the Ombudsman and in the Department of Interior and Local Government. 4 All these
challenges were, however, dismissed, thus, paving the way for Basco's continued stay in office.
ROMERO, J.:

The instant special civil action for certiorari and prohibition impugns the resolution of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) en banc in SPA No. 95-212 dated July 31, 1996, dismissing petitioner's motion for
reconsideration of an earlier resolution rendered by the COMELEC's First Division on October 6, 1995, which
also dismissed the petition for disqualification 1 filed by petitioner Wilmer Grego against private respondent
Humberto Basco.

The essential and undisputed factual antecedents of the case are as follows:

On October 31, 1981, Basco was removed from his position as Deputy Sheriff by no less than this Court upon a
finding of serious misconduct in an administrative complaint lodged by a certain Nena Tordesillas. The Court
held:

WHEREFORE, FINDING THE RESPONDENT DEPUTY SHERIFF HUMBERTO BASCO OF THE CITY COURT OF MANILA
GUILTY OF SERIOUS MISCONDUCT IN OFFICE FOR THE SECOND TIME, HE IS HEREBY DISMISSED FROM THE
SERVICE WITH FORFEITURE OF ALL RETIREMENT BENEFITS AND WITH PREJUDICE TO REINSTATEMENT TO ANY
POSITION IN THE NATIONAL OR LOCAL GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING ITS AGENCIES AND INSTRUMENTALITIES, OR
GOVERNMENT-OWNED OR CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS.

xxx

xxx

xxx 2

Pearliegates

Despite the odds previously encountered, Basco remained undaunted and ran again for councilor in the May 8,
1995, local elections seeking a third and final term. Once again, he beat the odds by emerging sixth in a battle
for six councilor seats. As in the past, however, his right to office was again contested. On May 13, 1995,
petitioner Grego, claiming to be a registered voter of Precinct No. 966, District II, City of Manila, filed with the
COMELEC a petition for disqualification, praying for Basco's disqualification, for the suspension of his
proclamation, and for the declaration of Romualdo S. Maranan as the sixth duly elected Councilor of Manila's
Second District.

On the same day, the Chairman of the Manila City Board of Canvassers (BOC) was duly furnished with a copy of
the petition. The other members of the BOC learned about this petition only two days later.

The COMELEC conducted a hearing of the case on May 14, 1995, where it ordered the parties to submit
simultaneously their respective memoranda.

Before the parties could comply with this directive, however, the Manila City BOC proclaimed Basco on May 17,
1995, as a duly elected councilor for the Second District of Manila, placing sixth among several candidates who
vied for the seats. 5 Basco immediately took his oath of office before the Honorable Ma. Ruby BithaoCamarista, Presiding Judge, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch I, Manila.

In view of such proclamation, petitioner lost no time in filing an Urgent Motion seeking to annul what he
considered to be an illegal and hasty proclamation made on May 17, 1995, by the Manila City BOC. He
reiterated Basco's disqualification and prayed anew that candidate Romualdo S. Maranan be declared the
winner. As expected, Basco countered said motion by filing his Urgent Opposition to: Urgent Motion (with

276

Election Law Cases


Reservation to Submit Answer and/or Motion to Dismiss Against Instant Petition for Disqualification with
Temporary Restraining Order).

On June 5, 1995, Basco filed his Motion to Dismiss Serving As Answer pursuant to the reservation he made
earlier, summarizing his contentions and praying as follows:

Respondent thus now submits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief for the following reasons:

1.
The respondent cannot be disqualified on the ground of Section 40 paragraph b of the Local
Government Code because the Tordesillas decision is barred by laches, prescription, res judicata, lis pendens,
bar by prior judgment, law of the case and stare decisis;

2.
Section 4[0] par. B of the Local Government Code may not be validly applied to persons who were
dismissed prior to its effectivity. To do so would make it ex post facto, bill of attainder, and retroactive
legislation which impairs vested rights. It is also a class legislation and unconstitutional on the account.

After the parties' respective memoranda had been filed, the COMELEC's First Division resolved to dismiss the
petition for disqualification on October 6, 1995, ruling that "the administrative penalty imposed by the Supreme
Court on respondent Basco on October 31, 1981 was wiped away and condoned by the electorate which
elected him" and that on account of Basco's proclamation on May 17, 1995, as the sixth duly elected councilor
of the Second District of Manila, "the petition would no longer be viable." 6

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of said resolution was later denied by the COMELEC en banc in its
assailed resolution promulgated on July 31, 1996. 7 Hence, this petition.

Petitioner argues that Basco should be disqualified from running far any elective position since he had been
"removed from office as a result of an administrative case" pursuant to Section 40 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160,
otherwise known as the Local Government Code (the Code), which took effect on January 1, 1992. 8

Petitioner wants the Court to likewise resolve the following issues, namely:

1.
Whether or not Section 40 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160 applies retroactively to those removed from
office before it took effect on January 1, 1992;
3.
Respondent had already been proclaimed. And the petition being a preproclamation contest under the
Marquez v. Comelec Ruling, supra, it should be dismissed by virtue of said pronouncement.
2.
Whether or not private respondent's election in 1988, 1992 and in 1995 as City Councilor of Manila
wiped away and condoned the administrative penalty against him;
4.
Respondent's three-time election as candidate for councilor constitutes implied pardon by the people
of previous misconduct (Aguinaldo v. Comelec G.R. 105128; Rice v. State 161 SCRA 401; Montgomery v. Newell
40 SW 2d 4181; People v. Bashaw 130 P. 2nd 237, etc.).

5.
As petition to nullify certificate of candidacy, the instant case has prescribed; it was premature as an
election protest and it was not brought by a proper party in interest as such protest.:

3.
Whether or not private respondent's proclamation as sixth winning candidate on May 17, 1995, while
the disqualification case was still pending consideration by COMELEC, is void ab initio; and

4.
Whether or not Romualdo S. Maranan, who placed seventh among the candidates for City Councilor of
Manila, may be declared a winner pursuant to Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646.

PRAYER

WHEREFORE it is respectfully prayed that the instant case be dismissed on instant motion to dismiss the prayer
for restraining order denied (sic). If this Honorable Office is not minded to dismiss, it is respectfully prayed that
instant motion be considered as respondent's answer. All other reliefs and remedies just and proper in the
premises are likewise hereby prayed for.

Pearliegates

While we do not necessarily agree with the conclusions and reasons of the COMELEC in the assailed resolution,
nonetheless, we find no grave abuse of discretion on its part in dismissing the petition for disqualification. The
instant petition must, therefore, fail.

We shall discuss the issues raised by petitioner in seriatim.

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Election Law Cases


I.
Does Section 40 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160 apply retroactively to those removed from office before it
took effect on January 1, 1992?

xxx

xxx

xxx

(b)

Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case.

Section 40 (b) of the Local Government Code under which petitioner anchors Basco's alleged disqualification to
run as City Councilor states:
Republic Act 7160 took effect only on January 1, 1992.
Sec. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position:
The rule is:
xxx

xxx

xxx
xxx

(b)

xxx

xxx

xxx

Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;

xxx

xxx

In this regard, petitioner submits that although the Code took effect only on January 1, 1992, Section 40 (b)
must nonetheless be given retroactive effect and applied to Basco's dismissal from office which took place in
1981. It is stressed that the provision of the law as worded does not mention or even qualify the date of
removal from office of the candidate in order for disqualification thereunder to attach. Hence, petitioner
impresses upon the Court that as long as a candidate was once removed from office due to an administrative
case, regardless of whether it took place during or prior to the effectivity of the Code, the disqualification
applies. 9 To him, this interpretation is made more evident by the manner in which the provisions of Section 40
are couched. Since the past tense is used in enumerating the grounds for disqualification, petitioner strongly
contends that the provision must have also referred to removal from office occurring prior to the effectivity of
the Code. 10

We do not, however, subscribe to petitioner's view. Our refusal to give retroactive application to the provision of
Section 40 (b) is already a settled issue and there exist no compelling reasons for us to depart therefrom. Thus,
in Aguinaldo v. COMELEC, 11 reiterated in the more recent cases of Reyes v. COMELEC 12 and Salalima v.
Guingona, Jr., 13 we ruled, thus:

. . . Well-settled is the principle that while the Legislature has the power to pass retroactive laws which do not
impair the obligation of contracts, or affect injuriously vested rights, it is equally true that statutes are not to be
construed as intended to have a retroactive effect so as to affect pending proceedings, unless such intent is
expressly declared or clearly and necessarily implied from the language of the enactment. . . . (Jones v.
Summers, 105 Cal. App. 51, 286 Pac. 1093; U.S. v. Whyel 28 (2d) 30; Espiritu v. Cipriano, 55 SCRA 533 [1974],
cited in Nilo v. Court of Appeals, 128 SCRA 519 [1974]. See also Puzon v. Abellera, 169 SCRA 789 [1989]; AlAmanah Islamic Investment Bank of the Philippines v. Civil Service Commission, et al., G.R. No. 100599, April 8,
1992).

There is no provision in the statute which would clearly indicate that the same operates retroactively.

It, therefore, follows that [Section] 40 (b) of the Local Government Code is not applicable to the present case.
(Emphasis supplied).

That the provision of the Code in question does not qualify the date of a candidate's removal from office and
that it is couched in the past tense should not deter us from applying the law prospectively. The basic tenet in
legal hermeneutics that laws operate only prospectively and not retroactively provides the qualification sought
by petitioner. A statute, despite the generality in its language, must not be so construed as to overreach acts,
events or matters which transpired before its passage. Lex prospicit, non respicit. The law looks forward, not
backward. 14

The COMELEC applied Section 40 (b) of the Local Government Code (Republic Act 7160) which provides:

Sec. 40. The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local positions:

Pearliegates

II.
Did private respondent's election to office as City Councilor of Manila in the 1988, 1992 and 1995
elections wipe away and condone the administrative penalty against him, thus restoring his eligibility for public
office?

278

Election Law Cases

Petitioner maintains the negative. He quotes the earlier ruling of the Court in Frivaldo v. COMELEC 15 to the
effect that a candidate's disqualification cannot be erased by the electorate alone through the instrumentality
of the ballot. Thus:

Sec. 24. Personnel Actions.

xxx
. . . (T)he qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone. The will of the
people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly
believed, as in this case, that the candidate was qualified. . . .

At first glance, there seems to be a prima facie semblance of merit to petitioner's argument. However, the
issue of whether or not Basco's triple election to office cured his alleged ineligibility is actually beside the point
because the argument proceeds on the assumption that he was in the first place disqualified when he ran in
the three previous elections. This assumption, of course, is untenable considering that Basco was NOT subject
to any disqualification at all under Section 40 (b) of the Local Government Code which, as we said earlier,
applies only to those removed from office on or after January 1, 1992. In view of the irrelevance of the issue
posed by petitioner, there is no more reason for the Court to still dwell on the matter at length.

Anent Basco's alleged circumvention of the prohibition in Tordesillas against reinstatement to any position in
the national or local government, including its agencies and instrumentalities, as well as government-owned or
controlled corporations, we are of the view that petitioner's contention is baseless. Neither does petitioner's
argument that the term "any position" is broad enough to cover without distinction both appointive and local
positions merit any consideration.

xxx

xxx

(d)
Reinstatement. Any person who has been permanently APPOINTED to a position in the career
service and who has, through no delinquency or misconduct, been separated therefrom, may be reinstated to a
position in the same level for which he is qualified.

xxx

xxx

xxx

(Emphasis supplied).

The Rules on Personnel Actions and Policies issued by the Civil Service Commission on November 10, 1975, 17
provides a clearer definition. It reads:

RULE VI. OTHER PERSONNEL ACTIONS

Contrary to petitioner's assertion, the Tordesillas decision did not bar Basco from running for any elective
position. As can be gleaned from the decretal portion of the said decision, the Court couched the prohibition in
this wise:

Sec. 7. Reinstatement is the REAPPOINTMENT of a person who was previously separated from the service
through no delinquency or misconduct on his part from a position in the career service to which he was
permanently appointed, to a position for which he is qualified. (Emphasis supplied).

. . . AND WITH PREJUDICE TO REINSTATEMENT TO ANY POSITION IN THE NATIONAL OR LOCAL GOVERNMENT,
INCLUDING ITS AGENCIES AND INSTRUMENTALITIES, OR GOVERNMENT-OWNED OR CONTROLLED
CORPORATIONS.

In light of these definitions, there is, therefore, no basis for holding that Basco is likewise barred from running
for an elective position inasmuch as what is contemplated by the prohibition in Tordesillas is reinstatement to
an appointive position.

In this regard, particular attention is directed to the use of the term "reinstatement." Under the former Civil
Service Decree, 16 the law applicable at the time Basco, a public officer, was administratively dismissed from
office, the term "reinstatement" had a technical meaning, referring only to an appointive position. Thus:

III.
Is private respondent's proclamation as sixth winning candidate on May 17, 1995, while the
disqualification case was still pending consideration by COMELEC, void ab initio?

Art. VIII. PERSONNEL POLICIES AND STANDARDS.

Pearliegates

To support its position, petitioner argues that Basco violated the provisions of Section 20, paragraph (i) of
Republic Act No. 7166, Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646, as well as our ruling in the cases of Duremdes v.
COMELEC, 18 Benito v. COMELEC 19 and Aguam v. COMELEC. 20

279

Election Law Cases

Sec. 20. Procedure in Disposition of Contested Election Returns.

discretion. 21 What is merely made mandatory, according to the provision itself, is the continuation of the trial
and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest. Thus, in view of this discretion granted to the COMELEC, the
question of whether or not evidence of guilt is so strong as to warrant suspension of proclamation must be left
for its own determination and the Court cannot interfere therewith and substitute its own judgment unless such
discretion has been exercised whimsically and capriciously. 22 The COMELEC, as an administrative agency and
a specialized constitutional body charged with the enforcement and administration of all laws and regulations
relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall, 23 has more than enough
expertise in its field that its findings or conclusions are generally respected and even given finality. 24 The
COMELEC has not found any ground to suspend the proclamation and the records likewise fail to show any so
as to warrant a different conclusion from this Court. Hence, there is no ample justification to hold that the
COMELEC gravely abused its discretion.

xxx

It is to be noted that Section 5, Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure 25 states that:

We are not convinced. The provisions and cases cited are all misplaced and quoted out of context. For the sake
of clarity, let us tackle each one by one.

Section 20, paragraph (i) of Rep. Act 7166 reads:

xxx

xxx

(i)
The board of canvassers shall not proclaim any candidate as winner unless authorized by the
Commission after the latter has ruled on the objections brought to it on appeal by the losing party. Any
proclamation made in violation hereof shall be void ab initio, unless the contested returns will not adversely
affect the results of the election.

xxx

xxx

xxx

The inapplicability of the abovementioned provision to the present case is very much patent on its face
considering that the same refers only to a void proclamation in relation to contested returns and NOT to
contested qualifications of a candidate.

Next, petitioner cites Section 6 of Rep. Act 6646 which states:

Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be
disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason, a
candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and
receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial
and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may
during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the
evidence of his guilt is strong. (Emphasis supplied).

This provision, however, does not support petitioner's contention that the COMELEC, or more properly
speaking, the Manila City BOC, should have suspended the proclamation. The use of the word "may" indicates
that the suspension of a proclamation is merely directory and permissive in nature and operates to confer

Pearliegates

Sec. 5. Effect of petition if unresolved before completion of canvass. . . . (H)is proclamation shall be
suspended notwithstanding the fact that he received the winning number of votes in such election.

However, being merely an implementing rule, the same must not override, but instead remain consistent with
and in harmony with the law it seeks to apply and implement. Administrative rules and regulations are intended
to carry out, neither to supplant nor to modify, the law. 26 Thus, in Miners Association of the Philippines, Inc. v.
Factoran, Jr., 27 the Court ruled that:

We reiterate the principle that the power of administrative officials to promulgate rules and regulations in the
implementation of a statute is necessarily limited only to carrying into effect what is provided in the legislative
enactment. The principle was enunciated as early as 1908 in the case of United States v. Barrias. The scope of
the exercise of such rule-making power was clearly expressed in the case of United States v. Tupasi Molina,
decided in 1914, thus: "Of course, the regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular
department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and for the sole purpose of carrying into effect
its general provisions. By such regulations, of course, the law itself can not be extended. So long, however, as
the regulations relate solely to carrying into effect the provision of the law, they are valid.

Recently, the case of People v. Maceren gave a brief delineation of the scope of said power of administrative
officials:

Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony
with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions.
By such regulations, of course, the law itself cannot be extended (U.S. v. Tupasi Molina, supra). An
administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress (Santos v. Estenzo, 109 Phil. 419, 422; Teoxon vs.

280

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Members of the Board of Administrators, L-25619, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 585; Manuel vs. General Auditing
Office, L-28952, December 29, 1971, 42 SCRA 660; Deluao v. Casteel, L-21906, August 29, 1969, 29 SCRA 350).

The rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceeding to carry into effect
the law as it has been enacted. The power cannot be extended to amending or expanding the statutory
requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute. Rules that subvert the statute cannot be
sanctioned (University of Santo Tomas v. Board of Tax Appeals, 93 Phil. 376, 382, citing 12 C.J. 845-46. As to
invalid regulations, see Collector of Internal Revenue v. Villaflor, 69 Phil. 319; Wise & Co. v. Meer, 78 Phil. 655,
676; Del Mar v. Phil. Veterans Administration, L-27299, June 27, 1973, 51 SCRA 340, 349).

xxx

xxx

xxx

. . . The rule or regulations should be within the scope of the statutory authority granted by the legislature to
the administrative agency (Davis, Administrative Law, p. 194, 197, cited in Victorias Milling Co., Inc. v. Social
Security Commission, 114 Phil. 555, 558).

In case of discrepancy between the basic law and a rule or regulation issued to implement said law, the basic
law prevails because said rule or regulations cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law
(People v. Lim, 108 Phil. 1091).

Since Section 6 of Rep. Act 6646, the law which Section 5 of Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure seeks
to implement, employed the word "may," it is, therefore, improper and highly irregular for the COMELEC to
have used instead the word "shall" in its rules.

Moreover, there is no reason why the Manila City BOC should not have proclaimed Basco as the sixth winning
City Councilor. Absent any determination of irregularity in the election returns, as well as an order enjoining the
canvassing and proclamation of the winner, it is a mandatory and ministerial duty of the Board of Canvassers
concerned to count the votes based on such returns and declare the result. This has been the rule as early as in
the case of Dizon v. Provincial Board of Canvassers of Laguna 28 where we clarified the nature of the functions
of the Board of Canvassers, viz.:

The simple purpose and duty of the canvassing board is to ascertain and declare the apparent result of the
voting. All other questions are to be tried before the court or other tribunal for contesting elections or in quo
warranto proceedings. (9 R.C.L., p. 1110)

To the same effect is the following quotation:

Pearliegates

. . . Where there is no question as to the genuineness of the returns or that all the returns are before them, the
powers and duties of canvassers are limited to the mechanical or mathematical function of ascertaining and
declaring the apparent result of the election by adding or compiling the votes cast for each candidate as shown
on the face of the returns before them, and then declaring or certifying the result so ascertained. (20 C.J., 200201) [Emphasis supplied]

Finally, the cases of Duremdes, Benito and Aguam, supra, cited by petitioner are all irrelevant and inapplicable
to the factual circumstances at bar and serve no other purpose than to muddle the real issue. These three
cases do not in any manner refer to void proclamations resulting from the mere pendency of a disqualification
case.

In Duremdes, the proclamation was deemed void ab initio because the same was made contrary to the
provisions of the Omnibus Election Code regarding the suspension of proclamation in cases of contested
election returns.

In Benito, the proclamation of petitioner Benito was rendered ineffective due to the Board of Canvassers'
violation of its ministerial duty to proclaim the candidate receiving the highest number of votes and pave the
way to succession in office. In said case, the candidate receiving the highest number of votes for the mayoralty
position died but the Board of Canvassers, instead of proclaiming the deceased candidate winner, declared
Benito, a mere second-placer, the mayor.

Lastly, in Aguam, the nullification of the proclamation proceeded from the fact that it was based only on
advanced copies of election returns which, under the law then prevailing, could not have been a proper and
legal basis for proclamation.

With no precedent clearly in point, petitioner's arguments must, therefore, be rejected.

IV.

May Romualdo S. Maranan, a seventh placer, be legally declared a winning candidate?

Obviously, he may not be declared a winner. In the first place, Basco was a duly qualified candidate pursuant to
our disquisition above. Furthermore, he clearly received the winning number of votes which put him in sixth
place. Thus, petitioner's emphatic reference to Labo v. COMELEC, 29 where we laid down a possible exception
to the rule that a second placer may not be declared the winning candidate, finds no application in this case.
The exception is predicated on the concurrence of two assumptions, namely: (1) the one who obtained the
highest number of votes is disqualified; and (2) the electorate is fully aware in fact and in law of a candidate's
disqualification so as to bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety but would nonetheless cast their

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Election Law Cases


votes in favor of the ineligible candidate. Both assumptions, however, are absent in this case. Petitioner's
allegation that Basco was well-known to have been disqualified in the small community where he ran as a
candidate is purely speculative and conjectural, unsupported as it is by any convincing facts of record to show
notoriety of his alleged disqualification. 30

In sum, we see the dismissal of the petition for disqualification as not having been attended by grave abuse of
discretion. There is then no more legal impediment for private respondent's continuance in office as City
Councilor for the Second District of Manila.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The
assailed resolution of respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in SPA 95-212 dated July 31, 1996 is
hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

petitioner) Ferdinand B. Trinidad, then incumbent mayor, was a candidate for re-election in the same
municipality.

On 22 April 1995, Sunga filed with the COMELEC a letter-complaint for disqualification against Trinidad,
accusing him of using three (3) local government vehicles in his campaign, in violation of Section 261, par. (o),
Art. XXII, of BP Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code, as amended). On 7 May 1995, Sunga filed another lettercomplaint with the COMELEC charging Trinidad this time with violation of Sec. 261, par. (e) (referring to threats,
intimidation, terrorism or other forms of coercion) of the Omnibus Election Code, in addition to the earlier
violation imputed to him in the first letter-complaint. This was followed by an Amended Petition for
disqualification consolidating the charges in the two (2) letters-complaint, including vote buying, and providing
more specific details of the violations committed by Trinidad. The case was docketed as SPA No. 95-213.

In a Minute Resolution dated 25 May 1995, the COMELEC 2nd Division referred the complaint to its Law
Department for investigation. Hearings were held wherein Sunga adduced evidence to prove his accusations.
Trinidad, on the other hand, opted not to submit any evidence at all.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 135716

September 23, 1999


Meanwhile, the election results showed that Trinidad garnered the highest number of votes, while Sunga trailed
second.

FERDINAND TRINIDAD, petitioner,


vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and MANUEL C. SUNGA, respondents.

The instant Petition for Certiorari questions the June 22, 1998 Resolution 1 of the Commission on Elections
(hereinafter referred to as COMELEC) in SPA No. 95-213, disqualifying petitioner as a candidate for Mayor of
Iguig, Cagayan, in the May 8, 1995 elections. It also questions the October 13, 1998 COMELEC Resolution 2
which not only denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration, but also annulled his proclamation as elected
Mayor in the May 11, 1998 elections.

This case has been filed before this Court when the Petition for Disqualification of private respondent (SPA No.
95-213) was dismissed by the COMELEC. Acting on the Petition for Certiorari of private respondent, this court,
in Sunga v. Commission on Elections, 3 ordered the COMELEC to reinstate SPA No. 95-213 and act thereon.

The facts of the case, as found in Sunga v. Commission on Elections, supra, are as follows:

On 10 May 1995 Sunga moved for the suspension of the proclamation of Trinidad. However, notwithstanding
the motion, Trinidad was proclaimed the elected mayor, prompting Sunga to file another motion to suspend the
effects of the proclamation. Both motions were not acted upon by the COMELEC 2nd Division.

On 28 June 1995 the COMELEC Law Department submitted its Report to the COMELEC En Banc recommending
that Trinidad be charged in court for violation of the following penal provisions of the Omnibus Election Code:
(a) Sec. 261, par. (a), on vote buying; (b) Sec. 261, par. (e), on threats, intimidation, terrorism or other forms of
coercion; and, (c) Sec. 261, par. (o), on use of any equipment, vehicle owned by the government or any of its
political subdivisions. The Law Department likewise recommended to recall and revoke the proclamation of
Ferdinand D. Trinidad as the duly elected Mayor of Iguig, Cagayan; proclaim Manuel C. Sunga as the duly
elected Mayor, and, direct Sunga to take his oath and assume the duties and functions of the office.

The COMELEC En Banc approved the findings of the Law Department and directed the filing of the
corresponding informations in the Regional Trial Court against Trinidad. Accordingly, four (4) informations for
various election offenses were filed in the Regional Trial Court of Tuguegarao, Cagayan. The disqualification
case, on the other hand, was referred to the COMELEC 2nd Division for hearing.

Petitioner (herein private respondent) Manuel C. Sunga was one of the candidates for the position of Mayor in
the Municipality of Iguig, Province of Cagayan, in the May 8, 1995 elections. Private respondent (herein

Pearliegates

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Election Law Cases


On 2 May 1996 Sunga filed a Second Urgent Motion to Suspend the Effects and Annul the Proclamation with
Urgent Motion for Early Resolution of the Petition. But in its 17 May 1996 Resolution, the COMELEC 2nd Division
dismissed the petition for disqualification, . . . .

His motion for reconsideration having been denied by the COMELEC En Banc, Sunga filed the instant petition
contending that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petition for
disqualification . . . .

As we have mentioned, above, private respondent's Petition with this Court was granted and COMELEC was
ordered to reinstate SPA No. 95-213 and hear the same. 4

Finally, on June 22, 1998, the COMELEC 1st Division (former 2nd Division) promulgated the first questioned
Resolution disqualifying petitioner as a candidate in the May 8, 1995 elections. 5 Petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, 6 claiming denial of due process. Private respondent filed his Opposition to the Motion, 7 at
the same time moving for the cancellation of petitioner's proclamation as elected Mayor in the 1998 elections
and praying that he be proclaimed Mayor instead.

On October 13, 1998, the COMELEC En Banc denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration and also annulled
his proclamation as duly elected Mayor of Iguig, Cagayan in the May 11, 1998 elections. 8 Private respondent's
motion to be declared Mayor was, however, denied. Commissioner Teresita Dy-Liacco Flores rendered a
dissenting opinion insofar as the Resolution annulled the proclamation of petitioner as Mayor in the May 11,
1998 elections, which she found to be "bereft of any legal basis."

Petitioner alleges that the questioned Resolutions were promulgated without any hearing conducted and
without his evidence having been considered by the COMELEC, in violation of his right to due process. He also
contends that the portion of the October 13, 1998 Resolution annulling his proclamation as Mayor in the May
11, 1998 elections was rendered without prior notice and hearing and that he was once more effectively denied
due process. Petitioner also adopts the stand of Commissioner Dy-Liacco Flores that his disqualification, if any,
under SPA No. 95-213 cannot extend beyond the three-year term to which he was elected on May 8, 1995, in
relation to which the corresponding Petition for his disqualification was lodged.

In his Comment, 9 private respondent assails the arguments raised in the Petition and prays that he be
proclaimed as the elected Mayor in the 1998 elections. Petitioner filed a Reply 10 to private respondent's
Comment on February 24, 1999. Meanwhile, on February 25, 1999, the criminal cases filed against the
petitioner with the Regional Trial Court of Tuguegarao, Cagayan were dismissed. 11 On March 8, 1999, the
Solicitor General filed a Comment for the COMELEC, 12 reiterating the argument that the COMELEC is
empowered to disqualify petitioner from continuing to hold public office and at the same time, barring private
respondent's moves to be proclaimed elected in the 1998 elections. Respective Memoranda were filed by both
parties.

Pearliegates

The issues before us may be summarized as follows:

1.
Was petitioner deprived of due process in the proceedings before the COMELEC insofar as his
disqualification under the May 8, 1995 elections was concerned?

2.
Was petitioner deprived of due process in the proceedings before the COMELEC insofar as his
disqualification under the May 11, 1998 elections was concerned?

3.
May petitioner's proclamation as Mayor under the May 11, 1998 elections be cancelled on account of
the disqualification case filed against him during the May 8, 1995 elections?

4.
May private respondent, as the candidate receiving the second highest number of votes, be
proclaimed as Mayor in the event of petitioner's disqualification?

The Commission on Elections is the agency vested with exclusive jurisdiction over election contests involving
regional, provincial and city officials, as well as appellate jurisdiction over election contests involving elective
municipal and barangay officials. Unless the Commission is shown to have committed a grave abuse of
discretion, its decision and rulings will not be interfered with by this Court. 13

Guided by this doctrine, we find that no violation of due process has attached to the COMELEC's June 22, 1998
Resolution.

Petitioner complains that while the COMELEC reinstated SPA No. 95-213, it conducted no hearing and private
respondent no evidence. 14 Yet, this does not equate to a denial of due process. As explained in Paat v. Court of
Appeals 15

. . . . Due process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing, but simply an opportunity or right to be
heard (Pepsi Cola Distributors of the Phil. V. NLRC, G.R. No. 100686, August 15, 1995). One may be heard, not
solely by verbal presentation but also, and perhaps many times more creditably and predictable than oral
argument, through pleadings (Concerned Officials of MWSS v. Vasquez, G.R. No. 109113, January 25, 1995). In
administrative proceedings moreover, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied;
administrative process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense (Ibid.) Indeed,
deprivation of due process cannot be successfully invoked where a party was given a chance to be heard on his
motion for reconsideration (Rodriguez v. Project 6 Market Service Cooperative, G.R. No. 79968, August 23,

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Election Law Cases


1995), as in the instant case, when private respondents were undisputedly given the opportunity to present
their side when they filed a letter of reconsideration dated June 28, 1989 which was, however, denied in an
order of July 12, 1989 of Executive Director Baggayan. In Navarro III vs. Damasco (G.R. No. 101875, July 14,
1995), we ruled that:

The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings,
an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. A formal or trial type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential. The requirements
are satisfied when the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the
controversy at hand. What is frowned upon is the absolute lack of notice or hearing.

In the case at bar, petitioner was able to file an Answer with Counter Petition and Motion to Dismiss. 16 He was
also able to submit his counter-affidavit and sworn statements of forty-eight (48) witnesses. While he complains
that these were not considered by the Hearing Officer, he, himself, admits that the COMELEC did not rely on
the findings of the Hearing Officer but referred the case to its Second Division. Thus, by the time the Second
Division reviewed his case, petitioner's evidence were already in place. Moreover, petitioner was also given a
chance to explain his arguments further in the Motion for Reconsideration which he filed before the COMELEC.
Clearly, in the light of the ruling in Paat, no deprivation of due process was committed. Considering that
petitioner was afforded an opportunity to be heard, through his pleadings, there is really no denial of
procedural due process. 17

Being interrelated, we shall discuss the second and third issues together.

We note that petitioner's term as Mayor under the May 8, 1995 elections expired on June 30, 1998. 18 Thus,
when the first questioned Resolution was issued by COMELEC on June 22, 1998, petitioner was still serving his
term. However, by the time the Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner was filed on July 3, 1998, the case had
already become moot and academic as his term had already expired. So, too, the second questioned Resolution
which was issued on October 13, 1998, came at a time when the issue of the case had already been rendered
moot and academic by the expiration of petitioner's challenged term of office.

In Malaluan v. Commission on Elections, 19 this Court clearly pronounced that expiration of the challenged term
of office renders the corresponding petition moot and academic. Thus:

It is significant to note that the term of office of the local officials elected in the May, 1992 elections expired on
June 30, 1995. This petition, thus, has become moot and academic insofar as it concerns petitioner's right to
the mayoralty seat in his municipality (Amatong v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 71003, April 28, 1988, En Banc, Minute
Resolution; Artano v. Arcillas, G.R. No. 76823, April 26, 1988, En Banc, Minute Resolution) because expiration of
the term of office contested in the election protest has the effect of rendering the same moot and academic
(Atienza v. Commission on Elections, 239 SCRA 298; Abeja v. Tanada, 236 SCRA 60; Yorac v. Magalona, 3 SCRA
76).

When the appeal from a decision in an election case has already become moot, the case being an election
protest involving the office of the mayor the term of which had expired, the appeal is dismissible on that
ground, unless the rendering of a decision on the merits would be of practical value (Yorac v. Magalona, supra).
This rule we established in the case of Yorac v. Magalona which was dismissed because it had been mooted by
the expiration of the term of office of the Municipal Mayor of Saravia, Negros Occidental. . . . . (emphasis, ours)

With the complaint for disqualification of private respondent rendered moot and academic by the expiration of
petitioner's term of office therein contested, COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion in proceeding to
disqualify petitioner from his reelected term of office in its second questioned Resolution on the ground that "it
comes as a matter of course after his disqualification in SPA No. 95-213 promulgated after the 1998 election."
While it is true that the first questioned Resolution was issued eight (8) days before the term of petitioner as
Mayor expired, said Resolution had not yet attained finality and could not effectively be held to have removed
petitioner from his office. 20 Indeed, removal cannot extend beyond the term during which the alleged
misconduct was committed. If a public official is not removed before his term of office expires, he can no longer
be removed if he is thereafter reelected for another term. 21

In this regard, therefore, we agree with the dissenting opinion of Commissioner Teresita Dy-Liacco Flores in the
second questioned Resolution that petitioner's disqualification under SPA No. 95-213 cannot extend beyond the
term to which he was elected in 1995. 22

Yet another ground to reverse the COMELEC's annulment of petitioner's proclamation under the 1998 elections
is the undeniable fact that petitioner was not accorded due process insofar as this issue is concerned. To be
sure, this was not part of the first questioned Resolution which only touched on the matter raised in the
complaint the May 8, 1995 elections. Private respondent merely prayed for the annulment of petitioner's
proclamation as winner in the 1998 elections in his Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration. It was with
grave abuse of discretion, then, that the COMELEC went on to annul petitioner's proclamation as winner of the
1998 elections without any prior notice or hearing on the matter. 23

As per the Certificate of Canvass, 24 petitioner obtained 5,920 votes as against the 1,727 votes obtained by
private respondent and 15 votes garnered by the third mayoral candidate, Johnny R. Banatao. This gives
petitioner a high 77.26% of the votes cast. There is no doubt, therefore, that petitioner received his
municipality's clear mandate. This, despite the disqualification case filed against him by private respondent.

Pearliegates

284

Election Law Cases

This further lends support to our decision to bar his disqualification insofar as the May 11, 1998 elections is
concerned. Indeed, in election cases, it is fundamental that the people's will be at all times upheld. As
eloquently stressed in Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections 25

This Court has time and again liberally and equitably construed the electoral laws of our country to give fullest
effect to the manifest will of our people, for in case of doubt, political laws must be interpreted to give life and
spirit to the popular mandate freely expressed through the ballot. Otherwise stated, legal niceties and
technicalities cannot stand in the way of the sovereign will. Consistently, we have held:

. . . (L)aws governing election contests must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in the
choice of public officials may not be defeated by mere technical objections (Benito v. Commission on Elections,
235 SCRA 436, 442 [August 17, 1994]).

Finally, we see no error in the COMELEC's rejection of private respondent's move to be declared as Mayor on
account of petitioner's disqualification. To begin with, the issue had been rendered moot and academic by the
expiration of petitioner's challenged term of office. Second, even in law and jurisprudence, private respondent
cannot claim any right to the office. As held by the COMELEC, the succession to the office of the mayor shall be
in accordance with the provisions of the Local Government Code which, in turn, provides that the vice mayor
concerned shall become the mayor. 26 Also, in Nolasco v. Commission on Elections, 27 citing Reyes v.
Commission on Elections, 28 we already rejected, once and for all, the position that the candidate who obtains
the second highest number of votes may be proclaimed the winner in the event of disqualification or failure of
the candidate with the highest number of votes to hold office. This court ratiocinated thus

That the candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes may not be proclaimed winner in case the
winning candidate is disqualified is now settled (Frivaldo v. COMELEC, 174 SCRA 245 [1989]; Labo, Jr. v.
COMELEC, 176 SCRA 1 [1989]; Abella v. COMELEC, 201 SCRA 253 [1991]; Labo, Jr. v. COMELEC, 211 SCRA 297
[1992]; Benito v. COMELEC, 235 SCRA 436 [1994]). The doctrinal instability caused by see-sawing rulings
(Compare Topacio v. Paredes, 23 Phil. 238 [1912] with Ticson v. COMELEC, 103 SCRA 687 [1981]; Geronimo v.
Ramos, 136 SCRA 435 [1985] with Santos v. COMELEC, 137 SCRA 740 [1985]) has since been removed. In the
latest ruling (Aquino v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 120265, September 18, 1995) on the question, this Court said:

Private respondent claims that there are compelling reasons to depart from this doctrine. He argues that since
the disqualification case filed against the petitioner for the 1995 elections has been rendered moot and
academic, it is with the 1998 elections that its impact must be felt. He also claims that justice should be given
him as victim of petitioner's dilatory tactics.

We are not persuaded. On the other hand, the fact that despite the disqualification case filed against petitioner
relating to the 1995 elections, he still won the mandate of the people for the 1998 elections, leads us to believe
that the electorate truly chose petitioner and repudiated private respondent. To allow private respondent, a
defeated and repudiated candidate, to take over the mayoralty despite his rejection by the electorate is to
disenfranchise the electorate without any fault on their part and to undermine the importance and meaning of
democracy and the people's right to elect officials of their choice. 29

Therefore, the Resolution of the COMELEC dated October 13, 1998 which annulled petitioner's proclamation as
Mayor of Iguig, Cagayan in the May 11, 1998 elections should be set aside. On the other hand, the petition filed
before the COMELEC against petitioner for election offenses committed during the May 1995 elections should
be dismissed for being moot and academic, the term of office to which petitioner was elected having already
expired.

WHEREFORE, the petition is partly GRANTED. The Resolution of the COMELEC, dated October 13, 1998 is SET
ASIDE insofar as it annuls the proclamation of petitioner as winner in the May 11, 1998 elections. Insofar as the
May 8, 1995 elections is concerned, we find the issues related thereto rendered moot and academic by
expiration of the term of office challenged and, accordingly, DISMISS the petition lodged in connection
therewith. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 154198

January 20, 2003

PETRONILA S. RULLODA, petitioner,


To simplistically assume that the second placer would have received the other votes would be to substitute our
judgment for the mind of the voter. The second placer is just that, a second placer. He lost the elections. He
was repudiated by either a majority or plurality of voters. He could not be considered the first among qualified
candidates because in a field which excludes the disqualified candidate, the conditions would have
substantially changed. We are not prepared to extrapolate the results under the circumstances.

Pearliegates

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC), ELECTION OFFICER LUDIVICO L. ASUNCION OF SAN
JACINTO, PANGASINAN; BARANGAY BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF BRGY. STO. TOMAS, SAN JACINTO,
PANGASINAN, Board of Election Tellers of Prec. Nos. 30A/30A1, 31A, 31A1, and 32A1, and REMEGIO
PLACIDO, respondents.

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YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

In the barangay elections of July 15, 2002, Romeo N. Rulloda and Remegio L. Placido were the contending
candidates for Barangay Chairman of Sto. Tomas, San Jacinto, Pangasinan. On June 22, 2002, Romeo suffered a
heart attack and passed away at the Mandaluyong City Medical Center.1

2. To direct the Election Officer of Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija and San Jacinto, Pangasinan to delete the name of
ANDRES PEREZ MANALAYSAY, candidate for Barangay Chairman in Barangay La Fuente, Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija;
and the name of PETRONILA S. RULLODA, candidate for Barangay Captain in Barangay Sto. Tomas, San Jacinto,
Pangasinan.

Let the Law Department implement this resolution.


His widow, petitioner Petronila "Betty" Rulloda, wrote a letter to the Commission on Elections on June 25, 2002
seeking permission to run as candidate for Barangay Chairman of Sto. Tomas in lieu of her late husband.2
Petitioners request was supported by the Appeal-Petition containing several signatures of people purporting to
be members of the electorate of Barangay Sto. Tomas.3

On July 14, 2002, Election Officer Ludivico L. Asuncion issued a directive to the Chairman and Members of the
Barangay Board of Canvassers of Sto. Tomas as follows:

Just in case the names "BETTY" or "PETRONILA" or the surname "RULLODA" is written on the ballot, read the
same as it is written but add the words "NOT COUNTED" like "BETTY NOT COUNTED" or "RULLODA NOT
COUNTED."4

Based on the tally of petitioners watchers who were allowed to witness the canvass of votes during the July 15,
2002 elections, petitioner garnered 516 votes while respondent Remegio Placido received 290 votes.5 Despite
this, the Board of Canvassers proclaimed Placido as the Barangay Chairman of Sto. Tomas.6

After the elections, petitioner learned that the COMELEC, acting on the separate requests of Andres Perez
Manalaysay and Petronila Rulloda to be substituted as candidates for Barangay Chairman of Barangay La
Fuente, Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija and Barangay Sto. Tomas, San Jacinto, Pangasinan, respectively, issued
Resolution No. 5217 dated July 13, 2002 which states:

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to ADOPT the recommendation of
the Law Department as follows:

SO ORDERED.7

The above-quoted Resolution cited as authority the COMELECs Resolution No. 4801 dated May 23, 2002,
setting forth the guidelines on the filing of certificates of candidacy in connection with the July 15, 2002
synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan elections, more particularly Section 9 thereof which reads:

Sec. 9. Substitution of candidates. There shall be no substitution of candidates for barangay and sangguniang
kabataan officials.8

Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari, seeking to annul Section 9 of Resolution No. 4801 and
Resolution No. 5217, both of the COMELEC, insofar as they prohibited petitioner from running as substitute
candidate in lieu of her deceased husband; to nullify the proclamation of respondent; and to proclaim her as
the duly elected Barangay Chairman of Sto. Tomas, San Jacinto, Pangasinan.

Private respondent Remegio Placido filed his Comment, arguing that since the barangay election is nonpartisan, substitution of candidates is not allowed. Moreover, petitioner did not file any certificate of candidacy;
hence, there was only one candidate for Barangay Chairman of Sto. Tomas, namely, respondent Placido.9

Public respondent COMELEC also filed its Comment. It contends that its Resolution No. 4801 was issued not
pursuant to its quasi-judicial functions but as an incident of its inherent administrative functions over the
conduct of the barangay elections. Therefore, the same may not be the subject of review in a petition for
certiorari. Further, the COMELEC alleges that it did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying due course
to petitioners certificate of candidacy and in proclaiming respondent considering that he was the only
candidate for Barangay Chairman of Sto. Tomas.10

1. To deny due course the Certificates of Candidacy of ANDRES PEREZ MANALAYSAY and PETRONILA S.
RULLODA; and
We find merit in the petition.

Pearliegates

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At the outset, there is no dispute that petitioner garnered 516 votes while respondent got only 290 votes.
Respondents did not deny this in their respective Comments.

In our jurisdiction, an election means the choice or selection of candidates to public office by popular vote
through the use of the ballot, and the elected officials which are determined through the will of the electorate.
An election is the embodiment of the popular will, the expression of the sovereign power of the people. The
winner is the candidate who has obtained a majority or plurality of valid votes cast in the election. Sound policy
dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who receive the highest number of votes cast in the
election for that office. For, in all republican forms of government the basic idea is that no one can be declared
elected and no measure can be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal
votes cast in the election.11

Respondents base their argument that the substitution of candidates is not allowed in barangay elections on
Section 77 of the Omnibus Elections Code, which states:

Section 77. Candidates in case of death, disqualification or withdrawal of another. If after the last day of the
filing of certificates of candidacy, an official candidate of a registered or accredited political party dies,
withdraws or is disqualified for any cause, only a person belonging to, and certified by the same political party
may file a certificate of candidacy to replace the candidate who died, withdrew or was disqualified. The
substitute candidate nominated by the political party concerned may file his certificate of candidacy for the
office affected in accordance with the preceding sections not later than mid-day of the election. If the death,
withdrawal or disqualification should occur between the day before the election and mid-day of election day,
said certificate may be filed with any board of election inspectors in the political subdivision where he is a
candidate or, in the case of candidates to be voted by the entire electorate of the country, with the
Commission.

Private respondent likewise contends that the votes in petitioners favor can not be counted because she did
not file any certificate of candidacy. In other words, he was the only candidate for Barangay Chairman. His
claim is refuted by the Memorandum of the COMELEC Law Department as well as the assailed Resolution No.
5217, wherein it indubitably appears that petitioners letter-request to be allowed to run as Barangay Chairman
of Sto. Tomas in lieu of her late husband was treated as a certificate of candidacy.14

To reiterate, it was petitioner who obtained the plurality of votes in the contested election. Technicalities and
procedural niceties in election cases should not be made to stand in the way of the true will of the electorate.
Laws governing election contests must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in the choice
of public officials may not be defeated by mere technical objections.15

Election contests involve public interest, and technicalities and procedural barriers must yield if they constitute
an obstacle to the determination of the true will of the electorate in the choice of their elective officials. The
Court frowns upon any interpretation of the law that would hinder in any way not only the free and intelligent
casting of the votes in an election but also the correct ascertainment of the results.16

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution No. 5217 of the
Commission on Elections, insofar as it denied due course to petitioners certificate of candidacy, is declared
NULL and VOID. The proclamation of respondent Remegio L. Placido as Barangay Chairman of Sto. Tomas, San
Jacinto, Pangasinan is SET ASIDE, and the Board of Canvassers of the said Barangay is ORDERED to proclaim
petitioner as the duly elected Barangay Chairman thereof.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-54718

Private respondent argues that inasmuch as the barangay election is non-partisan, there can be no substitution
because there is no political party from which to designate the substitute. Such an interpretation, aside from
being non sequitur, ignores the purpose of election laws which is to give effect to, rather than frustrate, the will
of the voters.12 It is a solemn duty to uphold the clear and unmistakable mandate of the people. It is wellsettled that in case of doubt, political laws must be so construed as to give life and spirit to the popular
mandate freely expressed through the ballot.13

Contrary to respondents claim, the absence of a specific provision governing substitution of candidates in
barangay elections can not be inferred as a prohibition against said substitution. Such a restrictive construction
cannot be read into the law where the same is not written. Indeed, there is more reason to allow the
substitution of candidates where no political parties are involved than when political considerations or party
affiliations reign, a fact that must have been subsumed by law.

Pearliegates

December 4, 1985

CRISOLOGO VILLANUEVA Y PARDES, petitioner,


vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MUNICIPAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF DOLORES, QUEZON, VIVENCIO
G. LIRIO respondents.

TEEHANKEE, J.:
Upon consideration of petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the decision of May 3, 1983 1 (which dismissed
his petition to set aside respondent Comelec's resolutions of February 21, 1980 and July 31, 1980 denying his
petition for annulment of the proclamation of respondent Vivencio Lirio as the elected vice-mayor of Dolores,
Quezon and for his proclamation instead as such elected vice-mayor for having received the clear majority of
the votes cast), the comments of public and private respondents and petitioner's consolidated reply and

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manifestation and motion of June 25, 1985 (stating that respondent abandoned his claim to the office and
accepted and assumed on June 10, 1985, the position of municipal trial judge of Lucban and Sampaloc,
Quezon, as verified from the records of the Office of the Court Administrator), the Court Resolved to
RECONSIDER and SET ASIDE its aforesaid decision and to GRANT the petition at bar.

The undisputed facts show that one Narciso Mendoza, Jr. had filed on January 4, 1980, the last day for filing of
certificates of candidacy in the January 30, 1980 local elections, his sworn certificate of candidacy as
independent for the office of vice-mayor of the municipality of Dolores, Quezon. But later on the very same
day, Mendoza filed an unsworn letter in his own handwriting withdrawing his said certificate of candidacy "for
personal reasons." Later on January 25, 1980, petitioner Crisologo Villanueva, upon learning of his companion
Mendoza's withdrawal, filed his own sworn "Certificate of Candidacy in substitution" of Mendoza's for the said
office of vice mayor as a one-man independent ticket. ... The results showed petitioner to be the clear winner
over respondent with a margin of 452 votes (3,112 votes as against his opponent respondent Lirio's 2,660
votes). But the Municipal Board of Canvassers disregarded all votes cast in favor of petitioner as stray votes on
the basis of the Provincial Election Officer's erroneous opinion that since petitioner's name does not appear in
the Comelec's certified list of candidates for that municipality, it could be presumed that his candidacy was not
duly approved by the Comelec so that his votes could not be "legally counted. " ... The canvassers accordingly
proclaimed respondent Vivencio G. Lirio as the only unopposed candidate and as the duly elected vice mayor of
the municipality of Dolores.

Respondent Comelec issued its questioned resolution on February 21, 1980 denying the petition on two
grounds after citing the pertinent legal provisions, as follows:

The 1978 Election Code provides:

Upon a restudy of the case, the Court finds merit in the reconsideration prayed for, which would respect the will
of the electorate instead of defeating the same through the invocation of formal or technical defects. (De
Guzman vs. Board of Canvassers, 48 Phil. 211 [1925], citing Lino Luna vs. Rodriguez, 39 Phil. 208 (1918)
Badelles vs. Cabili 27 SCRA 121 [1969]; Yra vs. Abano 52 Phil. 380 [1928]; Canceran vs. Comelec, 107 Phil. 607
(1960) Corocoro vs. Bascara, 9 SCRA 522 [1963], Pungutan vs. Abubakar, 43 SCRA 11 [19721; and Lacson, Jr.
vs. Posadas 72 SCRA 170 [19761).

The Court holds that the Comelec's first ground for denying due course to petitioner's substitute certificate of
candidacy, i.e. that Mendoza's withdrawal of his certificate of candidacy was not "under oath," should be
rejected. It is not seriously contended by respondent nor by the Comelec that Mendoza's withdrawal was not an
actual fact and a reality, so much so that no votes were cast for him at all, In fact, Mendoza's name, even
though his candidacy was filed on the last day within the deadline, was not in the Comelec's certified list of
candidates. His unsworn withdrawal filed later on the same day had been accepted by the election registrar
without protest nor objection, On the other hand, since there was no time to include petitioner's name in the
Comelec list of registered candidates, because the election was only four days away, petitioner as substitute
candidate circularized formal notices of his candidacy to all chairmen and members of the citizens election
committees in compliance with the suggestion of the Comelec Law Manager, Atty. Zoilo Gomez.

The fact that Mendoza's withdrawal was not sworn is but a technicality which should not be used to frustrate
the people's will in favor of petitioner as the substitute candidate. In Guzman us, Board of Canvassers, 48 Phil.
211, clearly applicable, mutatis mutandis this Court held that "(T)he will of the people cannot be frustrated by a
technicality that the certificate of candidacy had not been properly sworn to, This legal provision is mandatory
and non-compliance therewith before the election would be fatal to the status of the candidate before the
electorate, but after the people have expressed their will, the result of the election cannot be defeated by the
fact that the candidate has not sworn to his certificate or candidacy." (See also Gundan vs. Court of First
Instance, 66 Phil. 125). As likewise ruled by this Court in Canceran vs. Comelec, 107 Phil. 607, the legal
requirement that a withdrawal be under oath will be held to be merely directory and Mendoza's failure to
observe the requirement should be "considered a harmless irregularity."

SEC. 27. ... No certificate of candidacy duly filed shall be considered withdraw ... unless the candidate files with
the office which received the certificate ... or with the Commission a sworn statement of withdrawal ...

SEC. 28. ... If, after last day for filing certificates of candidacy, a candidate with a certificate of candidacy duly
filed should ... withdraw ... any voter qualified for the office may file his certificate of candidacy for the office for
which ... the candidate who has withdrawn ... was a candidate on or before midday of election ...

Clearly, Petitioner Villanueva could not have substituted for Candidate Mendoza on the strength of Section 28
of the 1978 Election Code which he invokes, For one thing, Mendoza's withdrawal of his certificate is not under
oath, as required under Section 27 of the Code; hence it produces no legal effect. For another, said withdrawal
was made not after the last day (January 4, 1980) for filing certificates of candidacy, as contemplated under
Sec. 28 of the Code, but on that very same day. (Emphasis copies)

Pearliegates

As to the second ground, Mendoza's withdrawal of his certificate of candidacy right on the very same day that
he filed his certificate of candidacy on January 4, 1980 which was the very last day for filing of certificates of
candidacy shows that he was not serious about his certificate of candidacy. But this could not be done to would
be bonafide candidates, like petitioner who had not filed his candidacy in deference to Mendoza's candidacy
who was one of his " co-planners " with "some concerned citizens ... (who) held causes to put up a slate that
will run against the erstwhile unopposed KBL slate."

The Comelec's post-election act of denying petitioner's substitute candidacy certainly does not seem to be in
consonance with the substance and spirit of the law. Section 28 of the 1978 Election Code provides for such
substitute candidates in case of death. withdrawal or disqualification up to mid-day of the very day of the
elections. Mendoza's withdrawal was filed on the last hour of the last day for regular filing of candidacies on
January 4, 1980, which he had filed earlier that same day. For all intents and purposes, such withdrawal should
therefore be considered as having been made substantially and in truth after the last day, even going by the

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literal reading of the provision by the Comelec. Indeed, the statement of former Chief Justice Enrique M.
Fernando in his dissent that "the bona fides of petitioner Crisologo Villanueva y Paredes as a substitute
candidate cannot, (in his opinion), be successfully assailed. It follows that the votes cast in his favor must be
counted. Such being the case, there is more than sufficient justification for his proclamation as Vice Mayor...

ACCORDINGLY, the Court SETS ASIDE the questioned Resolutions of respondent Comelec and annuls the
proclamation of respondent Lirio as elected
vice-mayor of Dolores, Quezon and instead declares petitioner as the duly elected vice-mayor of said
municipality and entitled forthwith to assume said office, take the oath of office and discharge its functions.
This resolution is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 136351

July 28, 1999

JOEL G. MIRANDA, petitioner,

3.
DIRECT THE City board of Canvassers of Santiago City to RECONVENE, PREPARE a new certificate of
canvass & proclamation and PROCLAIM the winning candidate among those voted upon as the duly elected
mayor of Santiago City in the May 11, 1998 election; and

4.
DIRECT the Clerk of Court of the Commission to furnish copies of this Decision to the Office of the
President of the Philippines; the Department of Interior and Local Government; the Department of Finance, and
the Secretary of the Sangguniang Panglunsod of Santiago City.

SO ORDERED.

(pp. 90-91, Rollo.)

vs.
ANTONIO M. ABAYA and the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.

Before us is a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction questioning the resolution of the Comelec En Banc dated December 8, 1998 in SPA Case
No. 98-288 which disposed:

ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered to:

1.
AMEND and RECTIFY the dispositive portion of the Resolution of the Commission (First Division) in SPA
No. 98-019 promulgated on May 5, 1998, to read as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Commission (First Division) GRANTS the Petition. Respondent JOSE
"PEMPE" MIRANDA's certificate of candidacy for the position of mayor of Santiago City in the May 11, 1998
national and local elections is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE AND/OR CANCELLED.

SO ORDERED.

2.
ANNUL the election and proclamation of respondent JOEL G. MIRANDA as mayor of Santiago City in the
May 11, 1998 election and CANCEL the Certificate of Canvass and Proclamation (C.E. form 25) issued therefor;

Pearliegates

The aforementioned resolution dated December 8, 1998 reversed and set aside the earlier resolution of the
First Division of the Comelec dated May 16, 1998, dismissing private respondent's petition to declare the
substitution of Jose "Pempe" Miranda by petitioner as candidate for the City of Santiago's mayoralty post void.

Briefly, the pertinent factual backdrop is summarized as follows:

On March 24, 1998, Jose "Pempe" Miranda, then incumbent mayor of Santiago City, Isabela, filed his certificate
of candidacy for the same mayoralty post for the synchronized May 11, 1998 elections.

On March 27, 1998, private respondent Antonio M. Abaya filed a Petition to Deny Due Course to and/or Cancel
Certificate of Candidacy (pp. 26-33, Rollo), which was docketed as SPA No. 98-019. The petition was GRANTED
by the Comelec in its resolution dated May 5, 1998 (pp. 36-43, Rollo). The Comelec further ruled to DISQUALIFY
Jose "Pempe" Miranda.

On May 6, 1998, way beyond the deadline for filing a certificate of candidacy, petitioner Joel G. Miranda filed
his certificate of candidacy for the mayoralty post, supposedly as a substitute for his father, Jose "Pempe"
Miranda.

During the May 11, 1998 elections; petitioner and private respondent vied for the mayoralty seat, with
petitioner garnering 22,002 votes, 1,666 more votes than private respondent who got only 20,336 votes.

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Election Law Cases

On May 13, 1998, private respondent filed a Petition to Declare Null and Void Substitution with Prayer for
Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order, which was docketed as SPA No.
98-288. He prayed for the nullification of petitioner's certificate of candidacy for being void ab initio because
the certificate of candidacy of Jose "Pempe" Miranda, whom petitioner was supposed to substitute, had already
been cancelled and denied due course.

On May 16, 1998, Comelec's First Division dismissed SPA No. 98-288 motu proprio (pp. 57-61, Rollo). Private
respondent moved for reconsideration (pp. 62-72, Rollo). On December 8, 1998, the Comelec En Banc rendered
the assailed decision aforequoted, resolving to GRANT the motion for reconsideration, thus nullifying the
substitution by petitioner Joel G. Miranda of his father as candidate for the mayoralty post of Santiago City.

On December 9, 1998, petitioner sought this Court's intercession via a petition for certiorari, with prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. On December 11, 1998, the
Court resolved to issue a temporary restraining order and to require respondents to comment on the petition.
On December 14, 1998, private respondent filed his Comment (pp. 140-187 and 188-234, Rollo) and on
February 16, 1999, the Comelec, through its counsel, the Solicitor General, filed its Comment (pp. 254-265,
Rollo). The Court required petitioner to file a consolidated reply within 10 days from notice, but petitioner twice
asked for an extension of the period. Without granting the motions for extension of time to file consolidated
reply, the Court decided to resolve the controversy in favor of petitioner.

Tersely, the issues in the present case may be summarized as follows:

1.
Whether the annulment of petitioner's substitution and proclamation was issued without jurisdiction
and/or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction; and

2.
Whether the order of the Comelec directing the proclamation of the private respondent was issued
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

The Court finds neither lack of jurisdiction nor grave abuse of discretion attended the annulment of the
substitution and proclamation of petitioner.

On the matter of jurisdiction, there is no question that the case at hand is within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Comelec. As early as in Herrera vs. Barretto (25 Phil, 245 [1913]), this Court had occasion to
apply the following principles:

Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and determine a cause the right to act in a case. Since it is the power to
hear and determine, it does not depend either upon the regularity of the exercise of that power or upon the
rightfulness of the decision made. Jurisdiction should therefore be distinguished from the exercise of
jurisdiction. The authority to decide a cause at all, and not the decision rendered therein, is what makes up
jurisdiction. Where there is jurisdiction over the subject matter, as we have said before, the decision of all other
questions arising in the case is but an exercise of that jurisdiction.

(p. 251)

On the issue of soundness of the disposition in SPA No. 98-288, the Court finds that the Comelec's action
nullifying the substitution by and proclamation of petitioner for the mayoralty post of Santiago City, Isabela is
proper and legally sound.

Petitioner insists that the substitution at bar is allowed under Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code which
provides:

Sec. 77. Candidates in case of death, disqualification or withdrawal. If after the last day for the filing of
certificates of candidacy, an official candidate of a registered or accredited political party dies, withdraws or is
disqualified for any cause, only a person belonging to, and certified by, the same political party may file a
certificate of candidacy to replace the candidate who died, withdrew or was disqualified. The substitute
candidate nominated by the political party concerned may file his certificate of candidacy for the office affected
in accordance with the preceding sections not later than mid-day of the day of the election. If the death,
withdrawal or disqualification should occur between the day before the election and mid-day of election day,
said certificate may be filed with any board of election inspectors in the political subdivision where he is a
candidate, or, in the case of candidates to be voted for by the entire electorate of the country, with the
Commission.

Petitioner capitalizes on the fact that the Comelec ruled to disqualify Jose "Pempe" Miranda in the May 5, 1998
resolution and he heavily relies upon the above-quoted provision allowing substitution of a candidate who has
been disqualified for any cause.

While there is no dispute as to whether or not a nominee of a registered or accredited political party may
substitute for a candidate of the same party who had been disqualified for any cause, this does not include
those cases where the certificate of candidacy of the person to be substituted had been denied due course and
cancelled under Section 78 of the Code.

Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. While the law enumerated the occasions where a candidate may be
validly substituted, there is no mention of the case where a candidate is excluded not only by disqualification

Pearliegates

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Election Law Cases


but also by denial and cancellation of his certificate of candidacy. Under the foregoing rule, there can be no
valid substitution for the latter case, much in the same way that a nuisance candidate whose certificate of
candidacy is denied due course and/or cancelled may not be substituted. If the intent of the lawmakers were
otherwise, they could have so easily and conveniently included those persons whose certificates of candidacy
have been denied due course and/or cancelled under the provisions of Section 78 of the Code.

More importantly, under the express provisions of Section 77 of the Code, not just any person, but only "an
official candidate of a registered or accredited political party" may be substituted. In Bautista vs. Comelec (G.R.
No. 133840, November 13, 1998) this Court explicitly ruled that "a cancelled certificate does not give rise to a
valid candidacy" (p.13).

A person without a valid certificate of candidacy cannot be considered a candidate in much the same way as
any person who has not filed any certificate of candidacy at all can not, by any stretch of the imagination, be a
candidate at all.

The law clearly provides:

Sec. 73. Certificate of candidacy No person shall be eligible for any elective public office unless he files a
sworn certificate of candidacy within the period fixed herein.

It is at once evident that the importance of a valid certificate of candidacy rests at the very core of the electoral
process. It cannot be taken lightly, lest there be anarchy and chaos. Verily, this explains why the law provides
for grounds for the cancellation and denial of due course to certificates of candidacy.

After having considered the importance of a certificate of candidacy, it can be readily understood why in
Bautista we ruled that a person with a cancelled certificate is no candidate at all. Applying this principle to the
case at bar and considering that Section 77 of the Code is clear and unequivocal that only an official candidate
of a registered or accredited party may be substituted, there demonstrably cannot be any possible substitution
of a person whose certificate of candidacy has been cancelled and denied due course.

Also, under ejusdem generis rule, where a general word or phrase (such as "disqualification for any cause" in
this case) follows an enumeration of particular and specific words of the same class (such as the words "dies"
and "withdraws" in the instant case) or where the latter follow the former, the general word or phrase is to be
construed to include, or to be restricted to persons, things or cases akin to, resembling, or of the same kind or
class as those specifically mentioned (see: Vera vs. Cuevas, 90 SCRA 379 [1979]). A deceased candidate is
required to have duly filed a valid certificate of candidacy, otherwise his political party would not be allowed to
field a substitute candidate in his stead under Section 77 of the Code. In the case of withdrawal of candidacy,
the withdrawing candidate is required to have duly filed a valid certificate of candidacy in order to allow his
political party to field a substitute candidate in his stead. Most reasonable it is then, under the foregoing rule,
to hold that a valid certificate of candidacy is likewise an indispensable requisite in the case of a substitution of
a disqualified candidate under the provisions of Section 77 of the Code, just as it is in the two previous
instances.

By its express language, the foregoing provision of law is absolutely mandatory. It is but logical to say that any
person who attempts to run for an elective office but does not file a certificate of candidacy, is not a candidate
at all. No amount of votes would catapult him into office. In Gador vs. Comelec (95 SCRA 431 [1980]), the Court
held that a certificate of candidacy filed beyond the period fixed by law is void, and the person who filed it is
not, in law, a candidate. Much in the same manner as a person who filed no certificate of candidacy at all and a
person who filed it out of time, a person whose certificate of candidacy is cancelled or denied due course is no
candidate at all. No amount of votes should entitle him to the elective office aspired for.

Furthermore, interpretatio talis in ambiguis semper freinda est, ut euiatur inconveniens et absurdum, meaning,
where there is ambiguity, such interpretation as will avoid inconvenience and absurdity shall in all cases be
adopted. To include those disqualified candidates whose certificate of candidacy had likewise been denied due
course and/or cancelled among those who may be substituted under Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code,
leads to the absurdity where a substitute is allowed to take the place of somebody who had not been a
candidate in the first place a person who did not have a valid certificate of candidacy prior to substitution.
Nemo dat quod non habet. What right can a non-candidate pass on to his substitute? Clearly, there is none
because no one can give what he does not have.

The evident purposes of the law in requiring the filing of certificates of candidacy and in fixing the time limit
therefor are: (a) to enable the voters to know, at least sixty days before the regular election, the candidates
among whom they are to make the choice, and (b) to avoid confusion and inconvenience in the tabulation of
the votes cast. For if the law did not confine the choice or election by the voters to the duly registered
candidates, there might be as many persons voted for as there are voters, and votes might be cast even for
unknown or fictitious persons as a mark to identify the votes in favor of a candidate for another office in the
same election. (Monsale vs. Nice, 83 Phil. 758 [1949]).

Even on the most basic and fundamental principles, it is readily understood that the concept of a substitute
presupposes the existence of the person to be substituted, for how can a person take the place of somebody
who does not exist or who never was. The Court has no other choice but to rule that in all the instances
enumerated in Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code, the existence of a valid certificate of candidacy
seasonably filed is a requisite sine qua non.

All told, a disqualified candidate may only be substituted if he had a valid certificate of candidacy in the first
place because, if the disqualified candidate did not have a valid and seasonably filed certificate of candidacy,
he is and was not a candidate at all. If a person was not a candidate, he cannot be substituted under Section 77

Pearliegates

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of the Code. Besides, if we were to allow the so-called "substitute" to file a "new" and "original" certificate of
candidacy beyond the period for the filing thereof, it would be a crystalline case of unequal protection of the
law, an act abhorred by our Constitution.

From the foregoing discussion it is evident that the controversy at hand is not a simple case of hair-splitting. A
candidate may not be qualified to run for election but may have filed a valid certificate of candidacy. Another
candidate may likewise be not qualified and at the same time not have a valid certificate of candidacy, for
which reason, said certificate of candidacy is also cancelled and/or denied due course. Or, a third candidate
may be qualified but, his certificate of candidacy may be denied due course and/or cancelled. This is possible
because the grounds for disqualification (see: Omnibus Election Code, Section 68 Disqualifications) are
totally separate and distinct from the grounds for cancellation and/or denying due course to a certificate of
candidacy (Ibid., Section 69 nuisance candidates; and Section 78 material misrepresentation). Only the
candidate who had a valid certificate of candidacy may be substituted.

The question to settle next is whether or not aside from Joel "Pempe" Miranda being disqualified by the
Comelec in its May 5, 1998 resolution, his certificate of candidacy had likewise been denied due course and
cancelled.

(p,43, Rollo; Emphasis ours.)

From a plain reading of the dispositive portion of the Comelec resolution of May 5, 1998 in SPA No. 98-019, it is
sufficiently clear that the prayer specifically and particularly sought in the petition was GRANTED, there being
no qualification on the matter whatsoever. The disqualification was simply ruled over and above the granting of
the specific prayer for denial of due course and cancellation of the certificate of candidacy. It may be stressed
at this instance that the legal consequences of this May 5, 1998 resolution are independent of the issue of
whether or not the Comelec was correct in reviving SPA No. 98-019 by consolidating it with SPA No. 98-288 in
its December 8, 1998 resolution.

As regards the procedural matter in the present petition for certiorari, the following considerations are also in
point:

It may be relevantly stressed that the review powers of the Supreme Court over decisions of the Constitutional
Commissions, in general, and the Commission on Elections, in particular, were rather particularly defined and
"limited" by the 1987 Constitution, as they were also circumscribed in the 1973 Constitution, to a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 65. In Dario vs. Mison (176 SCRA 84 [1989]), the Court held:

The Court rules that it was.

Private respondent's petition in SPA No. 98-019 specifically prayed for the following:

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the Certificate of Candidacy filed by respondent for the position of
Mayor for the City of Santiago be not given due course and/or cancelled.

Other reliefs just and equitable in the premises are likewise prayed for.

(Rollo, p. 31; Emphasis ours.)

In resolving the petition filed by private respondent specifying a very particular relief, the Comelec ruled
favorably in the following manner:

. . . We affirm the teaching of Aratuc vs. Commission of Elections, 88 SCRA 251 [1979]) as regards recourse
to this Court with respect to rulings of the Civil Service Commission which is that judgments of the
Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court through certiorari alone, under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court.

In Aratuc, we declared:

It is at once evident from these constitutional and statutory modifications that there is a definite tendency to
enhance and invigorate the role of the Commission on Elections as the independent constitutional body
charged with the safeguarding of free, peaceful and honest elections. The framers of the new Constitution must
be presumed to have definite knowledge of what it means to make the decisions, orders and rulings of the
Commission "subject to review by the Supreme Court." And since instead of maintaining that provision intact, it
ordained that the Commission's actuations be instead "brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari", We cannot
insist that there was no intent to change the nature of the remedy, considering that the limited scope of
certiorari, compared to a review, is well known in remedial law.

xxx

xxx

xxx

SO ORDERED.

Pearliegates

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. . . It should also be noted that under the new Constitution, as under the 1973 Charter, "any decision, order, or
ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari," which, as Aratuc tells us,
"technically connotes something less than saying that the same "shall be subject to review by the Supreme
Court," which in turn suggests an appeal by review by petition for review under Rule 45. Therefore, our
jurisdiction over cases emanating from the Civil Service Commission is limited to complaints of lack or excess
of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction, complaints that justify
certiorari under Rule 65.

to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where
the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility (Intestate
Estate of Carmen de Luna vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 170 SCRA 246 [1989]; Litton Mills vs. Galleon
Traders, 163 SCRA 489 [1988]; Butuan Bay Export Co. vs. Court of Appeals, 97 SCRA 297 [1980]). An error of
judgment committed in the exercise of its legitimate jurisdiction is not the same as "grave abuse of discretion".
An abuse of discretion is not sufficient by itself to justify the issuance of a writ of certiorari. The abuse must be
grave and patent, and it must be shown that the discretion was exercised arbitrarily and despotically (Soriano
vs. Atienza, 171 SCRA 284 [1989]).

(pp. 111-112)

To emphasize this procedural point, then Commissioner, later to become a distinguished Member of this Court,
Mr. Justice Florenz Regalado responded to Commissioner Bernas' query during the deliberations of the 1987
Constitution thusly:

FR. BERNAS.
So, for purposes of the record, now, what is the intention of the Committee? What are the
grounds for certiorari?

MR. REGALADO. The Committee refers specifically to a technical term of review by certiorari would be relying
on the provision of Rule XLV [Should be LXV] of the Rules of Court that laid down the three grounds.

(I RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION, p. 539, as cited in Bernas, S.J, The 1987 Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, 1996 Edition, p. 903.)

Thus, we have to be guided by jurisprudence relating to review by certiorari under Rule 65. Generally, certiorari
lies where a court has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. "Without
jurisdiction" refers to an absolute want of jurisdiction; "excess of jurisdiction" refers to the case where the court
has jurisdiction, but it transcended the same or acted without any statutory authority; "grave abuse of
discretion" implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.

Even assuming for the sake of argument that the Comelec committed an error in the exercise of its jurisdiction
in the present case, such is not within the province of certiorari, as a remedial measure, to correct. The only
issue that may be taken cognizance of in the present case is whether or not the Comelec committed grave
abuse of discretion in rendering the assailed decision.

It is well-settled that an act of a court or tribunal may only be considered to have been done in grave abuse of
discretion when the same was performed in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment which is equivalent

Pearliegates

Petitioner posits that the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion when it annulled the substitution by
and proclamation of petitioner, who under Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code, was allowed to substitute
for disqualified the candidate Jose "Pempe" Miranda. Petitioner also contends that it was an act of grave abuse
of discretion for the Comelec to direct the proclamation of private respondent as the winning candidate in the
May 11, 1998 election.

Petitioner further faults the Comelec for amending the dispositive portion of its resolution in SPA No. 98-019,
which was not elevated to it on review, the same having already attained finality by then.

While it may be conceded that the Comelec stepped overboard and acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it
motu proprio took cognizance of SPA No. 98-019, the decision in which was by then already final, it does not
necessarily follow that the Comelec also committed grave abuse of discretion in resolving to grant private
respondent's motion for reconsideration by nullifying the substitution of petitioner Joel G. Miranda. Evidently,
what is under review before us in this certiorari proceedings is SPA No. 98-288, and not SPA No. 98-019.

The question to answer is: will the Comelec's act which may constitute an excess of jurisdiction in SPA No. 98019 be tantamount to an act of grave abuse of discretion in its judgment in the separate and distinct case of
SPA No. 98-288 as well? Clearly, non sequitur. SPA No. 98-288 should be judged on its own accord, and not
under the shadow of SPA No. 98-019.

Comelec committed no grave abuse of discretion, in resolving SPA No. 98-288 in favor of private respondent. As
earlier pointed out, the result in the dispositive portion of the December 8, 1998 resolution pertaining to the
issues involved in SPA No. 98-288 is correct insofar as it annulled the election and proclamation of Joel G.
Miranda. But even assuming for the sake of argument that it is not, still, this supposed error does not constitute
grave abuse of discretion which may be annulled and reversed in the present petition for certiorari.

As earlier elucidated too, the crux of the Comelec's disposition in SPA No. 98-288 is the fact that former
candidate Jose "Pempe" Miranda's certificate of candidacy was denied due course and cancelled. There is no
dispute that the complaint or petition filed by private respondent in SPA No. 98-019 is one to deny due course

293

Election Law Cases


and to cancel the certificate of candidacy of Jose "Pempe" Miranda (Rollo, pp. 26-31). There is likewise no
question that the said petition was GRANTED without any qualification whatsoever. It is rather clear, therefore,
that whether or not the Comelec granted any further relief in SPA No. 98-019 by disqualifying the candidate,
the fact remains that the said petition was granted and that the certificate of candidacy of Jose "Pempe"
Miranda was denied due course and cancelled. In fact, it was not even necessary for the Comelec to reiterate
this in its December 8, 1998 resolution. At best, the Comelec's motu proprio act of resurrecting SPA No. 98-019
should be treated as a mere surplusage. The fact that the certificate of candidacy of Joel "Pempe" Miranda was
denied due course and cancelled did not depend on the en banc resolution dated December 8, 1998 of the
Comelec. It stems from the fact that the May 5, 1998 resolution GRANTED private respondent's Petition to Deny
Due Course to and/or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy.

Verily, there is clear basis to find that there indeed was a blatant misrepresentation in the instant case and that
it was a valid ground for the granting of the petition in SPA No. 98-019. Also, there appears to be sound basis to
rule that a certificate of candidacy which has been denied due course on account of misrepresentation is, in
every legal contemplation, no certificate at all. Ergo, there is nothing to substitute. If this judgment, rendered in
the Comelec's rightful exercise of its jurisdiction in SPA No. 98-288 may, at all, be considered flawed, this
blemish would only constitute an error of judgment and definitely not grave abuse of discretion. And, of course,
errors of judgment may not be corrected by certiorari.

It may be noted that Commissioner Flores raised this supposed error in her dissenting opinion (pp. 93-99,
Rollo). However, her legal opinion failed to convince the majority of the collegiate body and was not adopted by
the Commission en banc. This Court in the present certiorari proceedings cannot substitute its judgment for
that of the Comelec without violating the Constitution and the Rules of Court on the matter. The Comelec's
decision is not subject to appeal to this Court. We may only strike out a Comelec decision if it was rendered
without jurisdiction, in excess thereof, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

The Court cannot accede to the reasoning that this Court should now acquiesce and submit to the sovereign
will of the electorate, as expressed by their votes. We should always be reminded that ours is a government of
laws not of men. If this Court should fold its arms and refuse to apply the law at every "clamor" of the majority
of the supposed constituency, where shall order and justice lie? Without the least intention to degrade, where
shall "people power" end, and where shall "law and justice" begin? Would the apparent results of the
canvassing of votes justify this Court in refusing to apply the law instead? The answers to the foregoing are
obvious. The Court cannot choose otherwise but to exercise its sacred duty to uphold the Constitution and the
laws of the Republic for and under which it exists. Besides, only history will discern whether Jose "Pempe"
Miranda's filing of a certificate of candidacy for a 4th term and the intended substitution by his son was a ploy
to perpetrate the Mirandas in power by way of a political dynasty disdained and abhorred by our Constitution
which declared:

Sec. 26. The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service, and prohibit political
dynasties as may be defined by law.

Pearliegates

(Article II, 1987 Constitution)

The invalidation of petitioner's supposed substitution of Jose "Pempe" Miranda brings about the disqualification
of petitioner in the mayoralty race. In this regard, what was said in Nolasco vs. Commission on Elections (275
SCRA 763 [1997]) may be recalled:

Our case law is now settled that in a mayoralty election, the candidate who obtained the second highest
number of votes, in this case Alarilla, cannot be proclaimed winner in case the winning candidate is
disqualified. Thus, we reiterated the rule in the fairly recent case of Reyes v. Comelec (254 SCRA 514 [1996]),
viz.:

xxx

xxx

xxx

We likewise find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Comelec in denying petitioner Julius O. Garcia's
petition to be proclaimed mayor in view of the disqualification of Renato U. Reyes.

That the candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes may not be proclaimed winner in case the
winning candidate is disqualified is now settled. The doctrinal instability caused by see-sawing rulings has since
been removed. In the latest ruling on the question, this Court said:

To simplistically assume that the second placer would have received the other votes would be to substitute our
judgment for the mind of the voter. The second placer is just that, a second placer. He lost the elections. He
was repudiated by either a majority or plurality of voters. He could not be considered the first among qualified
candidates because in a field which excludes the disqualified candidate, the conditions would have
substantially changed. We are not prepared to extrapolate the results under the circumstances.

Garcia's plea that the votes case for Reyes be invalidated is without merit. The votes cast for Reyes are
presumed to have been cast in the belief that Reyes was qualified and for that reason can be treated as stray,
void and meaningless. The subsequent finding that he is disqualified cannot retroact to the date of the
elections as to invalidate the votes cast for him.

Consequently, respondent Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion insofar as it failed to follow the above
doctrine, a descendant of our ruling in Labo v. Comelec (176 SCRA 1[1989]).

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Election Law Cases


(pp. 782-783)

elections. The law on succession should be enforced. Accordingly, the restraining order issued in this case is
forthwith LIFTED.

Thus, the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion insofar as it failed to follow the above-cited settled
ruling consistently applied by this Court since the case of Labo vs. Comelec (176 SCRA 1 [1989]), Aquino vs.
Comelec, 248 SCRA 400 [1995], Reyes vs. Comelec (254 SCRA 514 [1996]); and Nolasco vs. Comelec (275
SCRA 763 [1997]).

SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

Even as the Court cannot accede to the contention that, in view of the election results pointing to petitioner as
the electors' choice for the mayoralty post, we should now close our eyes to the pertinent provisions of the
Omnibus Election Code on the matter, nevertheless, the Court duly notes that the said election results point to
the fact that private respondent was not then the choice of the people of Santiago City, Isabela. This Court has
no authority under any law to impose upon and compel the people of Santiago City to accept private
respondent as their mayor. The law on succession under section 44 of Republic Act 7160, otherwise known as
the Local Government Code, would then apply. Said provision relevantly states:

Sec. 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice-Governor, Mayor, and Vice Mayor, (a) If a
permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or mayor, the vice-governor or vice-mayor concerned
shall become the governor or mayor. If a permanent vacancy occurs in the offices of the governor, vice
governor, mayor, or vice mayor, the highest ranking sanggunian member, or, in case of his permanent
disability, the second highest ranking sanggunian member, shall become governor, vice governor, mayor or
vice mayor, as the case may be. Subsequent vacancies in the said office shall be filled automatically by the
other sanggunian members according to their ranking as defined herein.

xxx

xxx

xxx

For purposes of this Chapter, a permanent vacancy arises when an elective local official fills a higher vacant
office, refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is removed from office, voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise
permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office.

For purposes of succession as provided in this Chapter, ranking in the sanggunian shall be determined on the
basis of the proportion of votes obtained by each winning candidate to the total number of registered voters in
each district in the immediately preceding local election.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby partly DENIED, insofar as the Comelec ruling to ANNUL the election and
proclamation of petitioner is being AFFIRMED. The petition is, however, hereby GRANTED so as to MODIFY the
resolution of the Comelec in SPA No. 98-288 by DELETING the portion directing the city board of canvassers to
reconvene and proclaim the winning candidate from among those voted upon during the May 11, 1998

Pearliegates

EN BANC

G.R. No. 135691

September 27, 1999

EMMANUEL SINACA, petitioner,


vs.
MIGUEL MULA and COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.

Before us is a special civil action for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition, with a prayer for preliminary
injunction and/or temporary restraining order assailing the Resolution of 6 October 1998, of respondent
Commission on Elections (hereafter COMELEC) in SPA No. 98-292, declaring as invalid the substitution of
mayoralty candidate Teodoro F. Sinaca, Jr. by herein petitioner Emmanuel D. Sinaca. 1

The records disclose that in the 11 May 1998 elections, the two opposing factions of the ruling party LAKASNUCD-UMPD (hereafter LAKAS) filled in separate candidates for the position of mayor of the Municipality of
Malimano, Surigao del Norte. One faction headed by Robert Z. Barbers (hereafter "BARBERS Wing") nominated
Grachil G. Canoy (hereafter CANOY), while the other group lead by Francisco T. MATUGAS (hereafter "MATUGAS
Wing") endorsed the candidacy of Teodoro F. Sinaca, Jr. (hereafter TEODORO).

Miguel H. Mula (hereafter MULA), a candidate for vice-mayor and belonging to the "BARBERS Wing," filed
before the COMELEC a petition for disqualification against TEODORO which was docketed as SPA 98-021. On 8
May 1998, the Second Division of the COMELEC issued a resolution disqualifying TEODORO as candidate for
mayor of the Municipality of Malimono, Surigao del Norte and ordering the cancellation of his certificate of
candidacy because of prior conviction of bigamy, a crime involving moral turpitude. 2

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On 10 May 1998, TEODORO filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid resolution. On even date, herein
petitioner Emmanuel D. Sinaca, (hereafter EMMANUEL), an independent candidate, withdrew his certificate of
candidacy for Sangguniang Bayan Member, joined and became a member of the LAKAS party and was
nominated by the LAKAS "MATUGAS Wing" as the substitute mayoralty candidate for the Municipality of
Malimono, Surigao del Norte. On the basis of said nomination, EMMANUEL filed his certificate of candidacy 3
attached thereto is his certificate of nomination as LAKAS mayoralty candidate signed by Governor Francisco T.
MATUGAS (hereafter MATUGAS), as party provincial chairman together with EMMANUEL's written acceptance of
the party's nomination. 4

On 11 May 1998, MULA filed through mail another petition for disqualification, this time against EMMANUEL,
which was received by the COMELEC on 14 May 1998 and was docketed as SPA No. 98-292. In his petition
MULA contended that the nomination of EMMANUEL as substitute candidate is illegal on the following grounds:

a)
The substitute, before he filed his Certificate of Candidacy as LAKAS candidate, was an independent
candidate. Being so, he cannot rightfully substitute the disqualified one;

c)
Gov. Matugas was duly authorized by LAKAS as its Provincial Chairman and official candidate for
Provincial Governor to nominate the party's local candidates; and

d)
The petition is already moot and academic because of the proclamation of EMMANUEL as mayor of the
Municipality of Malimono, Surigao del Norte. 6

On 28 May 1998, the COMELEC Second Division dismissed the petition for disqualification and upheld the
candidacy for mayor of EMMANUEL. 7 The pertinent part of the resolution reads:

It is therefore clear, that candidate for governor Matugas was clothed with the authority to nominate the
respondent as substitute candidate for the position of mayor of Malimono, Surigao del Norte, vice the
disqualified candidate, Apropos thereto, Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code states:

xxx
b)
The nomination of respondent substitute bears only the approval of Provincial Chairman Matugas and
without consultation and consent of the higher political hierarchy especially Mr. Robert Ace Barbers who has
also a say on nomination of candidates within his jurisdiction, as evidenced by an authority hereto attached as
Annex "E";

xxx

xxx

Considering that on May 10, 1998 the proper nomination was issued by the official of the party authorized
therefor, it stands to reason that the substitution was valid, respondent having accepted the nomination and
his certificate of candidacy dated May 10, 1998, correspondingly filed.

c)
Substitution generally takes place when by reason of a candidate's disqualification the party to which
he belongs loses such representation. In the instant case, the disqualification did not at all prejudice LAKAS
NUCD-UMDP because Mr. Garchil G. Canoy is still there representing the party after the disqualification. The
substitution is a redundancy and not necessary under the circumstances, more so that it was done with malice
and without the required consensus of the political hierarchy. 5

Respondent is correct in stating that the question of nomination is a party concern which is beyond the ambit of
the Commission. What matters is, the candidate has been certified as a party member and the nomination duly
issued in his favor.

In his answer, EMMANUEL moved for the dismissal of the petition for the following reasons:

Be that as it may, the petition is rendered moot and academic by the proclamation of respondent on May 12,
1998, as evidenced by the certificate of canvass and proclamation of winning candidates for municipal offices
with SN 16671298 and his oath of office dated May 13, 1998, which forms part of the record of this case.

a)
The petition does not state a cause of action as it is not based on any of the grounds for
disqualification as provided under Sec. 68 of the Omnibus Election Code and Sec. 40(A) of the Local
Government Code of 1991;

b)
The issue of who in LAKAS has the authority to nominate candidates for local officials, is an intra-party
matter hence beyond the jurisdiction of the Comelec;

Pearliegates

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission (Second Division) RESOLVES to DISMISS the instant petition
for lack of merit.

MULA filed a motion for reconsideration raising in the main that the signature alone of MATUGAS in the
nomination was not sufficient because the party's authority to nominate was given to both MATUGAS and
Senator Robert S. Barbers (hereafter BARBERS), in their joint capacity, and that the nomination of EMMANUEL is
void since he was an independent candidate prior to his nomination. 8

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On 6 October 1998, the COMELEC en banc issued a Resolution 9 which set aside the resolution dated 28 May
1998 of the Second Division and disqualified EMMANUEL, for the following reasons:

In the motion for reconsideration, petitioner argues that the signature only of Governor Matugas in the
nomination was not sufficient because the party's authority to nominate was given to both Governor Matugas
and Senator Robert Barbers, in their joint capacity.

We do not have to resolve this issue because the more important issue is whether respondent is disqualified as
a substitute candidate. He was an independent candidate for councilor at the time he filed his certificate of
candidacy for mayor as a substitute of a disqualified candidate. Thus, he did not belong to the same political
party as the substituted candidate.

We sustain petitioner's position. We declare that the substitution of disqualified mayoralty candidate Teodoro F.
Sinaca, Jr. by respondent Emmanuel D. Sinaca was not valid because the latter was an independent candidate
for councilor prior to his nomination as substitute candidate in place of the withdrawing candidate who was a
Lakas party member.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Commission en banc hereby resolves to SET ASIDE the Commission (Second Division)'s
resolution dated May 28, 1998. We declare Emmanuel D. Sinaca DISQUALIFIED to be a substitute candidate for
mayor of Malimono, Surigao del Norte, and ANNUL his proclamation as such being void ab initio. Upon finality
of this resolution, he is ordered to vacate the position of mayor of the municipality of Malimono, Surigao del
Norte, to which the vice-mayor elected in the May 11, 1998 elections shall succeed by operation of law.

Not satisfied therewith, EMMANUEL is now before us alleging that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the assailed Resolution. EMMANUEL principally contends that his nomination as a
substitute candidate was regular and valid hence, his proclamation as mayor of the Municipality of Malimono,
Surigao del Norte must be upheld.

If after the last day for the filing of certificates of candidacy, an official candidate of a registered or accredited
political party dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause, only a person belonging to, and certified by, the
same political party may file a certificate of candidacy to replace the candidate who died, withdrew or was
disqualified. The substitute candidate nominated by the political party concerned may file his certificate of
candidacy for the office affected in accordance with the preceding sections not later than mid-day of the day of
the election. If the death, withdrawal or disqualification should occur between the day before the election and
mid-day of election day, said certificate maybe filed with any board of election inspectors in the political
subdivision where he is a candidate, or, in the case of candidates to be voted for by the entire electorate of the
country, with the Commission.

Thus, under the said provision it is necessary, among others, that the substitute candidate must be of the same
political party as the original candidate and must be duly nominated as such by the political party.

In the instant case, there was substantial compliance with the above said requirements. EMMANUEL was
properly nominated as substitute candidate by the LAKAS party "MATUGAS wing" to which TEODORO, the
disqualified candidate, belongs, as evidenced by the Certificate of Nomination and Acceptance signed by
MATUGAS, the Party's provincial chairman. 10 That EMMANUEL is a bona fide member of the LAKAS party is
shown not only by the certificate of membership, 11 which is being controverted for having been presented as
new evidence for the first time before this court, but more importantly by his certificate of candidacy filed
before the COMELEC stating therein that he belongs to the LAKAS party. 12

A certificate of candidacy is in the nature of a formal manifestation to the whole world of the candidate's
political creed or lack of political creed. 13 It is a statement of a person seeking to run for a public office
certifying that he announces his candidacy for the office mentioned and that he is eligible for the office, the
name of the political party to which he belongs, if he belongs to any, and his post-office address for all election
purposes being as well stated. 14

The certificate of candidacy of EMMANUEL permitted the placing of his name before the electorate. It
constituted an authorized badge, which the voter could scrutinize before casting his ballot. Thus, with the
declaration of EMMANUEL in his certificate of candidacy that he is affiliated with the LAKAS party, he was
effectively voted by the electorate not as an independent candidate, but as a member of the LAKAS party. His
allegation in the certificate of candidacy as to political party to which he belongs is sufficient to make the
electorate conscious of the platform of the said political party. 15

In the assailed resolution, the COMELEC disqualified EMMANUEL solely on the basis that he was an independent
candidate prior to his nomination as a substitute candidate.

The rule on substitution of an official candidate of a registered or accredited political party who dies, withdraws
or is disqualified for any cause after the last day for the filing of certificates of candidacy is governed by Sec. 77
of the Omnibus Election Code which provides:

Pearliegates

The fact that EMMANUEL was an independent candidate prior to his nomination is immaterial. What is more
significant is that he had previously withdrawn his certificate of candidacy as independent candidate for
Sangguniang member before he filed his certificate of candidacy as a substitute for TEODORO at which time he
was, for all intents and purposes, already deemed a member of the LAKAS party "MATUGAS wing." As such,
EMMANUEL is obliged to pursue and carry out the party's ideology, political ideas and platforms of government.
As the official candidate of an organized political party, he is bound by the party's rule. He owes loyalty to the

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Election Law Cases


party, its tenet and its policies, its platforms and programs of government. To the electorate he represents the
party, its principles, ideals and objectives. 16

Even the fact that EMMANUEL only became a member of the LAKAS party after the disqualification of
TEODORO, will not affect the validity of the substitution. There is nothing in the Constitution or the statute
which requires as a condition precedent that a substitute candidate must have been a member of the party
concerned for a certain period of time before he can be nominated as such. Section 77 of the Omnibus Election
Code only mandates that a substitute candidate should be a person belonging to and certified by the same
political party as the candidate to be replaced. We cannot provide for an additional requirement or condition
not provided under the said provision without encroaching into the domain of the legislative department.

Secondly, there are only two official candidates for mayor of Malimono, Surigao del Norte, namely TEODORO
and CANOY, 20 both of whom are members of the LAKAS party but from different factions. TEODORO was
indorsed by the "MATUGAS wing" and CANOY by the "BARBERS Wing." The certificates of candidacy of these
candidates were never questioned despite the fact that they belong to the same political party and were
separately and independently endorsed by either BARBERS or MATUGAS. Therefore, if the absence of a joint
nomination is to be considered fatal to the validity of the certificate of candidacy of TEODORO or CANOY, then
there would in effect no candidates running for mayor in the Municipality of Malimono, Surigao del Norte.

Verily, it stands to reason that with the disqualification of TEODORO, who is a member of the LAKAS "MATUGAS
wing," the substitute must come from the same faction as the candidate to be substituted and since it was
MATUGAS who indorsed the nomination of TEODORO, then MATUGAS' nomination of EMMANUEL in substitution
of TEODORO is sufficient and in order.

As aptly observed by Commissioner Teresita Dy-Liacco Flores in her dissenting opinion, to wit:

. . . . With due respect to the majority opinion, I find that at the time the substitute candidate filed his
certificate of candidacy for mayor and at the time of his election as such, he was an independent candidate no
more. He was, at that time, a nominee of the LAKAS NUCD-UMDP Political Party. This fact is evidenced by the
Certificate of Nomination and Acceptance dated 10 May 1998 executed by the Provincial Chairman of the said
party of Surigao del Norte and by herein respondent. This certificate bonafide member of the said party. To rule
that respondent was still an independent candidate and not a member of the LAKAS NUCD-UMDP political party
at the time of filing his certificate of candidacy as a substitute candidate for mayor is to arrogate upon this
Commission what would have been the sole and exclusive prerogative of any political organization to
determine party membership and its nominees to elective positions. It is an accepted fact that, in this country,
politicians switch party affiliations more frequently than the ebb and flow of the tides. 17

The argument advanced by private respondent MULA that MATUGAS has no authority to nominate a candidate
without the concurrence of BARBERS is devoid or merit.

Firstly, MATUGAS, was designated by the LAKAS National Headquarters through its Deputy Secretary General
and National Secretariat Executive Director Reynaldo L. Maclang, as the party officer authorized to nominate,
sign, attest under oath, and issue Certificates of Nomination and Acceptance for the Party's official candidates
for the positions of Board Members, City Councilors, Municipal Mayors, Vice-mayors and councilors for the
Province of Surigao del Norte. 18

This authorization which was dated March 26, 1998 replaced and/or modified the former authorization given by
the party of both BARBERS and MATUGAS. 19 Both BARBERS and MATUGAS were given separate and distinct
authorizations when the mother of BARBERS ran for governor against MATUGAS.

Pearliegates

There is also no irregularity in the act of EMMANUEL in joining a political party. The right of individuals to form
an association as guaranteed by the fundamental law includes the freedom to associate or refrain from
association. 21 No man is compelled by law to become a member of a political party; or after having become
such, to remain a member. He may join such a party for whatever reason reasons seems good to him, and may
quit the party for any cause, good, bad, or indifferent, or without cause. 22 The decision of a candidate on
whether to run as an independent candidate or to join a political party, group or aggrupation is left entirely to
his discretion. 23

We also agree with the contention of EMMANUEL that the decision as to which member a party shall nominate
as its candidate is a party concern which is not cognizable by the courts.

A political party has the right to identify the people who constitute the association and to select a standard
bearer who best represents the party's ideologies and preference. 24 Political parties are generally free to
conduct their internal affairs free from judicial supervision; this common-law principle of judicial restraint,
rooted in the constitutionally protected right of free association, serves the public interest by allowing the
political processes to operate without undue interference. 25 Thus, the rule is that the determination of
disputes as to party nominations rests with the party, in the absence of statutes giving the court's jurisdiction.
26

Quintessentially, where there is no controlling statute or clear legal right involved, the court will not assume
jurisdiction to determine factional controversies within a political party, but will leave the matter for
determination by the proper tribunals of the party itself or by the electors at the polls. 27 Similarly, in the
absence of specific constitutional or legislative regulations defining how nominations are to be made, or
prohibiting nominations from being made in certain ways, political parties may handle party affairs, including
nominations, in such manner as party rules may establish. 28

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An election in which the voters have fully, fairly, and honestly expressed their will is not invalid even though an
improper method is followed in the nomination of candidates. 29 This is because in determining the effect of a
particular irregularity in a party nomination for office on the result of the general election, the pivotal issue is
whether the irregularity complained of has prevented a full, fair, and free expression of the public will. Thus, in
the absence of a statutory provision to the contrary, an election may not even be invalidated by the fact that
the nomination of the successful candidate was brought about by fraud, and not in the manner prescribed by
the statute, provided it appears that noncompliance with the law did not prevent a fair and free vote. 30

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 196804

October 9, 2012

MAYOR BARBARA RUBY C. TALAGA, Petitioner,


vs.

None of the situations adverted to above are obtaining in the case at bar as to warrant this Court's intervention
in ascertaining the propriety of EMMANUEL's nomination as a substitute candidate by the LAKAS "MATUGAS
wing."

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and RODERICK A. ALCALA, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

Finally, the issue as to the validity of EMMANUEL's nomination as substitute candidate has been rendered moot
and academic by his proclamation on May 12, 1998, by the Board of Canvassers of Malimono as the duly
elected municipal mayor and after he has assumed into office. The fact that the nomination of a substitute
lacks the signature of one of the authorized signatory is but a technicality which cannot be used to frustrate the
will of the electorate.

G.R. No. 197015

PHILIP M. CASTILLO, Petitioner,


It has been held that the provisions of the election law regarding certificates of candidacy, such as signing and
swearing on the same, as well as the information required to be stated therein, are considered mandatory prior
to the elections. Thereafter, they are regarded as merely directory. With respect to election laws, it is an
established rule of interpretation that mandatory provisions requiring certain steps before election will be
construed as directory after the elections, to give effect to the will of the electorate. Thus, even if the certificate
of candidacy was not duly signed or if it does not contain the required data, the proclamation of the candidate
as winner may not be nullified on such ground. The defects in the certificate should have been questioned
before the election; they may not be questioned after the election without invalidating the will of the
electorate, which should not be done. 30 In Guzman v. Board of Canvassers, 32 the Court held that the "will of
the people cannot be frustrated by a technicality that the certificate of candidacy had not been properly sworn
to. This legal provision is mandatory and non-compliance therewith before the election would be fatal to the
status of the candidate before the electorate, but after the people have expressed their will, the result of the
election cannot be defeated by the fact that the candidate has not sworn to his certificate of candidacy."

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, BARBARA RUBY TALAGA and RODERICK A. ALCALA, Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
In focus in these consolidated special civil actions are the disqualification of a substitute who was proclaimed
the winner of a mayoralty election; and the ascertainment of who should assume the office following the
substitutes disqualification.

The consolidated petitions for certiorari seek to annul and set aside the En Banc Resolution issued on May 20,
2011 in SPC No. 10-024 by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), the dispositive portion of which states:
Thus, were a candidate has received popular mandate, overwhelmingly and clearly expressed, all possible
doubts should be resolved in favor of the candidate's eligibility for to rule otherwise is to defeat the will of the
people. 33 Above and beyond all, the determination of the true will of the electorate should be paramount. It is
their voice, not ours or of anyone else, that must prevail. This, in essence, is the democracy we continue to
hold sacred. 34

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. REVERSING and SETTING ASIDE the January 11, 2011 Resolution of the Second Division;
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed resolution of 6 October 1998 of the COMELEC en banc is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another one rendered declaring EMMANUEL SINACA as having been duly
elected mayor of the Municipality of Malimono, Surigao del Norte.

Pearliegates

2. GRANTING the petition in intervention of Roderick A. Alcala;

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3. ANNULLING the election and proclamation of respondent Barbara C. Talaga as mayor of Lucena City and
CANCELLING the Certificate of Canvass and Proclamation issued therefor;

4. Ordering respondent Barbara Ruby Talaga to cease and desist from discharging the functions of the Office of
the Mayor;

5. In view of the permanent vacancy in the Office of the Mayor of Lucena City, the proclaimed Vice-Mayor is
ORDERED to succeed as Mayor as provided under Section 44 of the Local Government Code;

6. DIRECTING the Clerk of Court of the Commission to furnish copies of this Resolution to the Office of the
President of the Philippines, the Department of Interior and Local Government, the Department of Finance and
the Secretary of the Sangguniang Panglunsod of Lucena City.

Let the Department of Interior and Local Government and the Regional Election Director of Region IV of
COMELEC implement this resolution.

SO ORDERED.1

therein that Ramon, despite knowing that he had been elected and had served three consecutive terms as
Mayor of Lucena City, still filed his CoC for Mayor of Lucena City in the May 10, 2010 national and local
elections.

The pertinent portions of Castillos petition follow:

1. Petitioner is of legal age, Filipino, married, and a resident of Barangay Mayao Crossing, Lucena City but may
be served with summons and other processes of this Commission at the address of his counsel at 624 Aurora
Blvd., Lucena City 4301;

2. Respondent Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr. is likewise of legal age, married, and a resident of Barangay Ibabang Iyam,
Lucena City and with postal address at the Office of the City Mayor, City Hall, Lucena City, where he may be
served with summons and other processes of this Commission;

3. Petitioner, the incumbent city vice-mayor of Lucena having been elected during the 2007 local elections, is
running for city mayor of Lucena under the Liberal party this coming 10 May 2010 local elections and has filed
his certificate of candidacy for city mayor of Lucena;

4. Respondent was successively elected mayor of Lucena City in 2001, 2004, and 2007 local elections based on
the records of the Commission on Elections of Lucena City and had fully served the aforesaid three (3) terms
without any voluntary and involuntary interruption;

Antecedents

On November 26, 2009 and December 1, 2009, Ramon Talaga (Ramon) and Philip M. Castillo (Castillo)
respectively filed their certificates of candidacy (CoCs) for the position of Mayor of Lucena City to be contested
in the scheduled May 10, 2010 national and local elections.2

5. Except the preventive suspension imposed upon him from 13 October 2005 to 14 November 2005 and from
4 September 2009 to 30 October 2009 pursuant to Sandiganbayan 4th Division Resolution in Criminal Case No.
27738 dated 3 October 2005, the public service as city mayor of the respondent is continuous and
uninterrupted under the existing laws and jurisprudence;

Ramon, the official candidate of the Lakas-Kampi-CMD,3 declared in his CoC that he was eligible for the office
he was seeking to be elected to.

6. There is no law nor jurisprudence to justify the filing of the certificate of candidacy of the respondent, hence,
such act is outrightly unconstitutional, illegal, and highly immoral;

Four days later, or on December 5, 2009, Castillo filed with the COMELEC a petition denominated as In the
Matter of the Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy of Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr. as Mayor
for Having Already Served Three (3) Consecutive Terms as a City Mayor of Lucena, which was docketed as SPA
09-029 (DC).4 He alleged

7. Respondent, knowing well that he was elected for and had fully served three (3) consecutive terms as a city
mayor of Lucena, he still filed his Certificate of Candidacy for City Mayor of Lucena for this coming 10 May 2010
national and local elections;

Pearliegates

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8. Under the Constitution and existing Election Laws, New Local Government Code of the Philippines, and
jurisprudence the respondent is no longer entitled and is already disqualified to be a city mayor for the fourth
consecutive term;

9. The filing of the respondent for the position of city mayor is highly improper, unlawful and is potentially
injurious and prejudicial to taxpayers of the City of Lucena; and

10. It is most respectfully prayed by the petitioner that the respondent be declared disqualified and no longer
entitled to run in public office as city mayor of Lucena City based on the existing law and jurisprudence.5

The petition prayed for the following reliefs, to wit:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that the Certificate of Candidacy filed by the
respondent be denied due course to or cancel the same and that he be declared as a disqualified candidate
under the existing Election Laws and by the provisions of the New Local Government Code.6 (Emphasis
supplied.)

Ramon countered that that the Sandiganbayan had preventively suspended him from office during his second
and third terms; and that the three-term limit rule did not then apply to him pursuant to the prevailing
jurisprudence7 to the effect that an involuntary separation from office amounted to an interruption of
continuity of service for purposes of the application of the three-term limit rule.

interrupted when he was suspended by the Sandiganbayan Fourth Division. And the respondent actually
heeded the suspension order since he did not receive his salary during the period October 16-31 and November
1-15 by reason of his actual suspension from office. And this was further bolstered by the fact that the DILG
issued a

Memorandum directing him, among others, to reassume his position." (Emphasis supplied.)

5. Clearly, there was no misrepresentation on the part of respondent as would constitute a ground for the
denial of due course to and/or the cancellation of respondents certificate of candidacy at the time he filed the
same. Petitioners ground for the denial of due course to and/or the cancellation of respondents certificate of
candidacy thus has no basis, in fact and in law, as there is no ground to warrant such relief under the Omnibus
Election Code and/or its implementing laws.

6. Pursuant, however, to the new ruling of the Supreme Court in respect of the issue on the three (3)-term
limitation, respondent acknowledges that he is now DISQUALIFIED to run for the position of Mayor of Lucena
City having served three (3) (albeit interrupted) terms as Mayor of Lucena City prior to the filing of his
certificate of candidacy for the 2010 elections.

7. In view of the foregoing premises and new jurisprudence on the matter, respondent respectfully submits the
present case for decision declaring him as DISQUALIFIED to run for the position of Mayor of Lucena City.9

Notwithstanding his express recognition of his disqualification to run as Mayor of Lucena City in the May 10,
2010 national and local elections, Ramon did not withdraw his CoC.
In the meantime, on December 23, 2009, the Court promulgated the ruling in Aldovino, Jr. v. Commission on
Elections,8 holding that preventive suspension, being a mere temporary incapacity, was not a valid ground for
avoiding the effect of the three-term limit rule. Thus, on December 30, 2009, Ramon filed in the COMELEC a
Manifestation with Motion to Resolve, taking into account the intervening ruling in Aldovino. Relevant portions
of his Manifestation with Motion to Resolve are quoted herein, viz:

4. When respondent filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Mayor of Lucena City, the rule that
where the separation from office is caused by reasons beyond the control of the officer i.e. involuntary the
service of term is deemed interrupted has not yet been overturned by the new ruling of the Supreme Court. As
a matter of fact, the prevailing rule then of the Honorable Commission in [sic] respect of the three (3)-term
limitation was its decision in the case of Aldovino, et al. vs. Asilo where it stated:

Acting on Ramons Manifestation with Motion to Resolve, the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution on
April 19, 2010,10 disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr. is
hereby declared DISQUALIFIED to run for Mayor of Lucena City for the 10 May 2010 National and Local
Elections.

SO ORDERED.

"Thus, even if respondent was elected during the 2004 elections, which was supposedly his third and final term
as city councilor, the same cannot be treated as a complete service or full term in office since the same was

Pearliegates

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Initially, Ramon filed his Verified Motion for Reconsideration against the April 19, 2010 Resolution of the
COMELEC First Division.11 Later on, however, he filed at 9:00 a.m. of May 4, 2010 an Ex-parte Manifestation of
Withdrawal of the Pending Motion for Reconsideration.12 At 4:30 p.m. on the same date, Barbara Ruby filed her
own CoC for Mayor of Lucena City in substitution of Ramon, attaching thereto the Certificate of Nomination and
Acceptance (CONA) issued by Lakas-Kampi-CMD, the party that had nominated Ramon.13

On January 11, 2011, the COMELEC Second Division dismissed Castillos petition and Alcalas petition-inintervention,24 holding:

On May 5, 2010, the COMELEC En Banc, acting on Ramons Ex parte Manifestation of Withdrawal, declared the
COMELEC First Divisions Resolution dated April 19, 2010 final and executory.14

In the present case, Castillo was notified of Resolution 8917 on May 13, 2010 as it was the basis for the
proclamation of Ruby on that date. He, however, failed to file any action within the prescribed period either in
the Commission or the Supreme Court assailing the said resolution. Thus, the said resolution has become final
and executory. It cannot anymore be altered or reversed.

On election day on May 10, 2010, the name of Ramon remained printed on the ballots but the votes cast in his
favor were counted in favor of Barbara Ruby as his substitute candidate, resulting in Barbara Ruby being
ultimately credited with 44,099 votes as against Castillos 39,615 votes.15

xxxx

Castillo promptly filed a petition in the City Board of Canvassers (CBOC) seeking the suspension of Barbara
Rubys proclamation.16

It was only on May 13, 2010 when the COMELEC En Banc, upon the recommendation of its Law Department,17
gave due course to Barbara Rubys CoC and CONA through Resolution No. 8917, thereby including her in the
certified list of candidates.18 Consequently, the CBOC proclaimed Barbara Ruby as the newly-elected Mayor of
Lucena City.19

On May 20, 2010, Castillo filed a Petition for Annulment of Proclamation with the COMELEC,20 docketed as SPC
10-024. He alleged that Barbara Ruby could not substitute Ramon because his CoC had been cancelled and
denied due course; and Barbara Ruby could not be considered a candidate because the COMELEC En Banc had
approved her substitution three days after the elections; hence, the votes cast for Ramon should be considered
stray.

x x x. A close perusal of the petition filed by Castillo in SPA 10-029 (Dc) shows that it was actually for the
disqualification of Ramon for having served three consecutive terms, which is a ground for his disqualification
under the Constitution in relation to Section 4(b)3 of Resolution 8696. There was no mention therein that
Ramon has committed material representation that would be a ground for the cancellation or denial of due
course to the CoC of Ramon under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. The First Division, in fact, treated
the petition as one for disqualification as gleaned from the body of the resolution and its dispositive portion
quoted above. This treatment of the First Division of the petition as one for disqualification only is affirmed by
the fact that its members signed Resolution No. 8917 where it was clearly stated that the First Division only
disqualified Ramon.

Having been disqualified only, the doctrine laid down in Miranda v. Abaya is not applicable. Ramon was rightly
substituted by Ruby. As such, the votes for Ramon cannot be considered as stray votes but should be counted
in favor of Ruby since the substituted and the substitute carry the same surname Talaga, as provided in
Section 12 of Republic Act No. 9006.

xxxx
In her Comment on the Petition for Annulment of Proclamation,21 Barbara Ruby maintained the validity of her
substitution. She countered that the COMELEC En Banc did not deny due course to or cancel Ramons COC,
despite a declaration of his disqualification, because there was no finding that he had committed
misrepresentation, the ground for the denial of due course to or cancellation of his COC. She prayed that with
her valid substitution, Section 12 of Republic Act No. 900622 applied, based on which the votes cast for Ramon
were properly counted in her favor.

On July 26, 2010, Roderick Alcala (Alcala), the duly-elected Vice Mayor of Lucena City, sought to intervene,23
positing that he should assume the post of Mayor because Barbara Rubys substitution had been invalid and
Castillo had clearly lost the elections.

Pearliegates

Moreover, there is no provision in the Omnibus Election Code or any election laws for that matter which
requires that the substitution and the Certificate of Candidacy of the substitute should be approved and given
due course first by the Commission or the Law Department before it can be considered as effective. All that
Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code as implemented by Section 13 of Resolution No. 8678 requires is that
it should be filed with the proper office. The respondent is correct when she argued that in fact even the BEI
can receive a CoC of a substitute candidate in case the cause for the substitution happened between the day
before the election and mid-day of election day. Thus, even if the approval of the substitution was made after
the election, the substitution became effective on the date of the filing of the CoC with the Certificate of
Nomination and Acceptance.

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There being no irregularity in the substitution by Ruby of Ramon as candidate for mayor of Lucena City, the
counting of the votes of Ramon in favor of Ruby is proper. The proclamation, thus, of Ruby as mayor elect of
Lucena City is in order. Hence, we find no cogent reason to annul the proclamation of respondent Barbara Ruby
C. Talaga as the duly elected Mayor of the City of Lucena after the elections conducted on May 10, 2010.25

Acting on Castillo and Alcalas respective motions for reconsideration, the COMELEC En Banc issued the
assailed Resolution dated May 20, 2011 reversing the COMELEC Second Divisions ruling.26

The filing of a CoC within the period provided by law is a mandatory requirement for any person to be
considered a candidate in a national or local election. This is clear from Section 73 of the Omnibus Election
Code, to wit:

Section 73. Certificate of candidacy No person shall be eligible for any elective public office unless he files a
sworn certificate of candidacy within the period fixed herein.

Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code specifies the contents of a COC, viz:
Pointing out that: (a) Resolution No. 8917 did not attain finality for being issued without a hearing as a mere
incident of the COMELECs ministerial duty to receive the COCs of substitute candidates; (b) Resolution No.
8917 was based on the wrong facts; and (c) Ramons disqualification was resolved with finality only on May 5,
2010, the COMELEC En Banc concluded that Barbara Ruby could not have properly substituted Ramon but had
simply become an additional candidate who had filed her COC out of time; and held that Vice Mayor Alcala
should succeed to the position pursuant to Section 44 of the Local Government Code (LGC).27

Issues

The core issue involves the validity of the substitution by Barbara Ruby as candidate for the position of Mayor
of Lucena City in lieu of Ramon, her husband.

Ancillary to the core issue is the determination of who among the contending parties should assume the
contested elective position.

Ruling

The petitions lack merit.

1.

Existence of a valid CoC is a condition


sine qua non for a valid substitution

Pearliegates

Section 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy.The certificate of candidacy shall state that the person filing it
is announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and that he is eligible for said office; if for Member of
the Batasang Pambansa, the province, including its component cities, highly urbanized city or district or sector
which he seeks to represent; the political party to which he belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence; his
post office address for all election purposes; his profession or occupation; that he will support and defend the
Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; that he will obey the laws,
legal orders, and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent resident
or immigrant to a foreign country; that the obligation imposed by his oath is assumed voluntarily, without
mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in the certificate of candidacy are true to
the best of his knowledge. x x x

The evident purposes of the requirement for the filing of CoCs and in fixing the time limit for filing them are,
namely: (a) to enable the voters to know, at least 60 days prior to the regular election, the candidates from
among whom they are to make the choice; and (b) to avoid confusion and inconvenience in the tabulation of
the votes cast. If the law does not confine to the duly-registered candidates the choice by the voters, there may
be as many persons voted for as there are voters, and votes may be cast even for unknown or fictitious
persons as a mark to identify the votes in favor of a candidate for another office in the same election.28
Moreover, according to Sinaca v. Mula,29 the CoC is:

x x x in the nature of a formal manifestation to the whole world of the candidates political creed or lack of
political creed. It is a statement of a person seeking to run for a public office certifying that he announces his
candidacy for the office mentioned and that he is eligible for the office, the name of the political party to which
he belongs, if he belongs to any, and his post-office address for all election purposes being as well stated.

Accordingly, a persons declaration of his intention to run for public office and his affirmation that he possesses
the eligibility for the position he seeks to assume, followed by the timely filing of such declaration, constitute a
valid CoC that render the person making the declaration a valid or official candidate.

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There are two remedies available to prevent a candidate from running in an electoral race. One is through a
petition for disqualification and the other through a petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of
candidacy. The Court differentiated the two remedies in Fermin v. Commission on Elections,30 thuswise:

x x x A petition for disqualification, on the one hand, can be premised on Section 12 or 68 of the Omnibus
Election Code, or Section 40 of the Local Government Code. On the other hand, a petition to deny due course
to or cancel a CoC can only be grounded on a statement of a material representation in the said certificate that
is false. The petitions also have different effects. While a person who is disqualified under Section 68 is merely
prohibited to continue as a candidate, the person whose certificate is cancelled or denied due course under
Section 78 is not treated as a candidate at all, as if he/she never filed a CoC.31

Nonetheless, whether the ground for substitution is death, withdrawal or disqualification of a candidate, Section
77 of the Omnibus Election Code unequivocally states that only an official candidate of a registered or
accredited party may be substituted.

Considering that a cancelled CoC does not give rise to a valid candidacy,33 there can be no valid substitution
of the candidate under Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code. It should be clear, too, that a candidate who
does not file a valid CoC may not be validly substituted, because a person without a valid CoC is not considered
a candidate in much the same way as any person who has not filed a CoC is not at all a candidate.34

Inasmuch as the grounds for disqualification under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code (i.e., prohibited
acts of candidates, and the fact of a candidates permanent residency in another country when that fact affects
the residency requirement of a candidate) are separate and distinct from the grounds for the cancellation of or
denying due course to a COC (i.e., nuisance candidates under Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code; and
material misrepresentation under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code), the Court has recognized in
Miranda v. Abaya32 that the following circumstances may result from the granting of the petitions, to wit:

Likewise, a candidate who has not withdrawn his CoC in accordance with Section 73 of the Omnibus Election
Code may not be substituted. A withdrawal of candidacy can only give effect to a substitution if the substitute
candidate submits prior to the election a sworn CoC as required by Section 73 of the Omnibus Election Code.35

(1) A candidate may not be qualified to run for election but may have filed a valid CoC;

Declaration of Ramons disqualification

2.

rendered his CoC invalid; hence, he was not


(2) A candidate may not be qualified and at the same time may not have filed a valid CoC; and

a valid candidate to be properly substituted

(3) A candidate may be qualified but his CoC may be denied due course or cancelled.

In the light of the foregoing rules on the CoC, the Court concurs with the conclusion of the COMELEC En Banc
that the Castillo petition in SPA 09-029 (DC) was in the nature of a petition to deny due course to or cancel a
CoC under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code.

In the event that a candidate is disqualified to run for a public office, or dies, or withdraws his CoC before the
elections, Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code provides the option of substitution, to wit:
In describing the nature of a Section 78 petition, the Court said in Fermin v. Commission on Elections:36
Section 77. Candidates in case of death, disqualification or withdrawal. If after the last day for the filing of
certificates of candidacy, an official candidate of a registered or accredited political party dies, withdraws or is
disqualified for any cause, only a person belonging to, and certified by, the same political party may file a
certificate of candidacy to replace the candidate who died, withdrew or was disqualified. The substitute
candidate nominated by the political party concerned may file his certificate of candidacy for the office affected
in accordance with the preceding sections not later than mid-day of the day of the election. If the death,
withdrawal or disqualification should occur between the day before the election and mid-day of election day,
said certificate may be filed with any board of election inspectors in the political subdivision where he is a
candidate, or, in the case of candidates to be voted for by the entire electorate of the country, with the
Commission.

Pearliegates

Lest it be misunderstood, the denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC is not based on the lack of
qualifications but on a finding that the candidate made a material representation that is false, which may relate
to the qualifications required of the public office he/she is running for. It is noted that the candidate states in
his/her CoC that he/she is eligible for the office he/she seeks. Section 78 of the OEC, therefore, is to be read in
relation to the constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications or eligibility for public office. If the
candidate subsequently states a material representation in the CoC that is false, the COMELEC, following the
law, is empowered to deny due course to or cancel such certificate. Indeed, the Court has already likened a
proceeding under Section 78 to a quo warranto proceeding under Section 253 of the OEC since they both deal
with the eligibility or qualification of a candidate, with the distinction mainly in the fact that a "Section 78"

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petition is filed before proclamation, while a petition for quo warranto is filed after proclamation of the winning
candidate.

Castillos petition contained essential allegations pertaining to a Section 78 petition, namely: (a) Ramon made a
false representation in his CoC; (b) the false representation referred to a material matter that would affect the
substantive right of Ramon as candidate (that is, the right to run for the election for which he filed his
certificate); and (c) Ramon made the false representation with the intention to deceive the electorate as to his
qualification for public office or deliberately attempted to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact that would
otherwise render him ineligible.37 The petition expressly challenged Ramons eligibility for public office based
on the prohibition stated in the Constitution and the Local Government Code against any person serving three
consecutive terms, and specifically prayed that "the Certificate of Candidacy filed by the respondent Ramon be
denied due course to or cancel the same and that he be declared as a disqualified candidate."38

The denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC under Section 78 involves a finding not only that a
person lacks a qualification but also that he made a material representation that is false.39 A petition for the
denial of due course to or cancellation of CoC that is short of the requirements will not be granted. In Mitra v.
Commission on Elections,40 the Court stressed that there must also be a deliberate attempt to mislead, thus:

The false representation under Section 78 must likewise be a "deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide
a fact that would otherwise render a candidate ineligible." Given the purpose of the requirement, it must be
made with the intention to deceive the electorate as to the would-be candidates qualifications for public office.
Thus, the misrepresentation that Section 78 addresses cannot be the result of a mere innocuous mistake, and
cannot exist in a situation where the intent to deceive is patently absent, or where no deception on the
electorate results. The deliberate character of the misrepresentation necessarily follows from a consideration of
the consequences of any material falsity: a candidate who falsifies a material fact cannot run; if he runs and is
elected, he cannot serve; in both cases, he can be prosecuted for violation of the election laws.

It is underscored, however, that a Section 78 petition should not be interchanged or confused with a Section 68
petition. The remedies under the two sections are different, for they are based on different grounds, and can
result in different eventualities.41 A person who is disqualified under Section 68 is prohibited to continue as a
candidate, but a person whose CoC is cancelled or denied due course under Section 78 is not considered as a
candidate at all because his status is that of a person who has not filed a CoC.42 Miranda v. Abaya43 has
clarified that a candidate who is disqualified under Section 68 can be validly substituted pursuant to Section 77
because he remains a candidate until disqualified; but a person whose CoC has been denied due course or
cancelled under Section 78 cannot be substituted because he is not considered a candidate.1wphi1

To be sure, the cause of Ramons ineligibility (i.e., the three-term limit) is enforced both by the Constitution and
statutory law. Article X, Section 8 of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Pearliegates

Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by
law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of
his service for the full term for which he was elected.

Section 43 of the Local Government Code reiterates the constitutional three-term limit for all elective local
officials, to wit:

Section 43. Term of Office. (a) x x x

(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected. (Emphasis supplied.)

The objective of imposing the three-term limit rule was "to avoid the evil of a single person accumulating
excessive power over a particular territorial jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged stay in the same office." The
Court underscored this objective in Aldovino, Jr. v. Commission on Elections,44 stating:

x x x The framers of the Constitution specifically included an exception to the peoples freedom to choose those
who will govern them in order to avoid the evil of a single person accumulating excessive power over a
particular territorial jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged stay in the same office. To allow petitioner Latasa to
vie for the position of city mayor after having served for three consecutive terms as a municipal mayor would
obviously defeat the very intent of the framers when they wrote this exception. Should he be allowed another
three consecutive terms as mayor of the City of Digos, petitioner would then be possibly holding office as chief
executive over the same territorial jurisdiction and inhabitants for a total of eighteen consecutive years. This is
the very scenario sought to be avoided by the Constitution, if not abhorred by it.

To accord with the constitutional and statutory proscriptions, Ramon was absolutely precluded from asserting
an eligibility to run as Mayor of Lucena City for the fourth consecutive term. Resultantly, his CoC was invalid
and ineffectual ab initio for containing the incurable defect consisting in his false declaration of his eligibility to
run. The invalidity and inefficacy of his CoC made his situation even worse than that of a nuisance candidate
because the nuisance candidate may remain eligible despite cancellation of his CoC or despite the denial of
due course to the CoC pursuant to Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code.45

Ramon himself specifically admitted his ineligibility when he filed his Manifestation with Motion to Resolve on
December 30, 2009 in the COMELEC.46 That sufficed to render his CoC invalid, considering that for all intents
and purposes the COMELECs declaration of his disqualification had the effect of announcing that he was no
candidate at all.

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We stress that a non-candidate like Ramon had no right to pass on to his substitute. As Miranda v. Abaya aptly
put it:

Even on the most basic and fundamental principles, it is readily understood that the concept of a substitute
presupposes the existence of the person to be substituted, for how can a person take the place of somebody
who does not exist or who never was. The Court has no other choice but to rule that in all the instances
enumerated in Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code, the existence of a valid certificate of candidacy
seasonably filed is a requisite sine qua non.

All told, a disqualified candidate may only be substituted if he had a valid certificate of candidacy in the first
place because, if the disqualified candidate did not have a valid and seasonably filed certificate of candidacy,
he is and was not a candidate at all. If a person was not a candidate, he cannot be substituted under Section 77
of the Code. Besides, if we were to allow the so-called "substitute" to file a "new" and "original" certificate of
candidacy beyond the period for the filing thereof, it would be a crystalline case of unequal protection of the
law, an act abhorred by our Constitution.47 (Emphasis supplied)

The question to settle next is whether or not aside from Joel "Pempe" Miranda being disqualified by the
Comelec in its May 5, 1998 resolution, his certificate of candidacy had likewise been denied due course and
cancelled.

The Court rules that it was.

Private respondents petition in SPA No. 98-019 specifically prayed for the following:

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the Certificate of Candidacy filed by respondent for the position of
Mayor for the City of Santiago be not given due course and/or cancelled.

Other reliefs just and equitable in the premises are likewise prayed for.

(Rollo, p. 31; Emphasis ours.)


3.

Granting without any qualification of petition in

In resolving the petition filed by private respondent specifying a very particular relief, the Comelec ruled
favorably in the following manner:

SPA No. 09-029(DC) manifested COMELECs intention to


declare Ramon disqualified and to cancel his CoC

That the COMELEC made no express finding that Ramon committed any deliberate misrepresentation in his CoC
was of little consequence in the determination of whether his CoC should be deemed cancelled or not.

In Miranda v. Abaya,48 the specific relief that the petition prayed for was that the CoC "be not given due course
and/or cancelled." The COMELEC categorically granted "the petition" and then pronounced in apparent
contradiction that Joel Pempe Miranda was "disqualified." The

Court held that the COMELEC, by granting the petition without any qualification, disqualified Joel Pempe
Miranda and at the same time cancelled Jose Pempe Mirandas CoC. The Court explained:

Pearliegates

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Commission (FIRST DIVISION) GRANTS the Petition. Respondent JOSE
"Pempe" MIRANDA is hereby DISQUALIFIED from running for the position of mayor of Santiago City, Isabela, in
the May 11, 1998 national and local elections.

SO ORDERED.

(p.43, Rollo; Emphasis ours.)

From a plain reading of the dispositive portion of the Comelec resolution of May 5, 1998 in SPA No. 98-019, it is
sufficiently clear that the prayer specifically and particularly sought in the petition was GRANTED, there being
no qualification on the matter whatsoever. The disqualification was simply ruled over and above the granting of
the specific prayer for denial of due course and cancellation of the certificate of candidacy. x x x.49

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xxxx

x x x. There is no dispute that the complaint or petition filed by private respondent in SPA No. 98-019 is one to
deny due course and to cancel the certificate of candidacy of Jose "Pempe" Miranda (Rollo, pp. 26-31). There is
likewise no question that the said petition was GRANTED without any qualification whatsoever. It is rather clear,
therefore, that whether or not the Comelec granted any further relief in SPA No. 98-019 by disqualifying the
candidate, the fact remains that the said petition was granted and that the certificate of candidacy of Jose
"Pempe" Miranda was denied due course and cancelled. x x x.50

The crucial point of Miranda v. Abaya was that the COMELEC actually granted the particular relief of cancelling
or denying due course to the CoC prayed for in the petition by not subjecting that relief to any qualification.

Miranda v. Abaya applies herein. Although Castillos petition in SPA No. 09-029 (DC) specifically sought both the
disqualification of Ramon and the denial of due course to or cancellation of his CoC, the COMELEC categorically
stated in the Resolution dated April 19, 2010 that it was granting the petition. Despite the COMELEC making no
finding of material misrepresentation on the part of Ramon, its granting of Castillos petition without express
qualifications manifested that the COMELEC had cancelled Ramons CoC based on his apparent ineligibility. The
Resolution dated April 19, 2010 became final and executory because Castillo did not move for its
reconsideration, and because Ramon later withdrew his motion for reconsideration filed in relation to it.

4.

Elected Vice Mayor must succeed

x x x In Labo there was no final judgment of disqualification before the elections. The doctrine on the rejection
of the second placer was applied in Labo and a host of other cases because the judgment declaring the
candidates disqualification in Labo and the other cases had not become final before the elections. To repeat,
Labo and the other cases applying the doctrine on the rejection of the second placer have one common
essential condition the disqualification of the candidate had not become final before the elections. This
essential condition does not exist in the present case.

Thus, in Labo, Labos disqualification became final only on 14 May 1992, three days after the 11 May 1992
elections. On election day itself, Labo was still legally a candidate. In the present case, Cayat was disqualified
by final judgment 23 days before the 10 May 2004 elections. On election day, Cayat was no longer legally a
candidate for mayor. In short, Cayats candidacy for Mayor of Buguias, Benguet was legally non-existent in the
10 May 2004 elections.

The law expressly declares that a candidate disqualified by final judgment before an election cannot be voted
for, and votes cast for him shall not be counted. This is a mandatory provision of law. Section 6 of Republic Act
No. 6646, The Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, states:

Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be
disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be

counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified
and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall
continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any
intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate
whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong. (Emphasis added)

and assume the position of Mayor


due to a permanent vacancy in the office

On the issue of who should assume the office of Mayor of Lucena City, Castillo submits that the doctrine on the
rejection of the second-placer espoused in Labo, Jr. v. Commission on Elections51 should not apply to him
because Ramons disqualification became final prior to the elections.52 Instead, he cites Cayat v. Commission
on Elections,53 where the Court said:

Pearliegates

Section 6 of the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 covers two situations. The first is when the disqualification
becomes final before the elections, which is the situation covered in the first sentence of Section 6. The second
is when the disqualification becomes final after the elections, which is the situation covered in the second
sentence of Section 6.

The present case falls under the first situation. Section 6 of the Electoral Reforms Law governing the first
situation is categorical: a candidate disqualified by final judgment before an election cannot be voted for, and
votes cast for him shall not be counted. The Resolution disqualifying Cayat became final on 17 April 2004, way
before the 10 May 2004 elections. Therefore, all the 8,164 votes cast in Cayats favor are stray. Cayat was
never a candidate in the 10 May 2004 elections. Palilengs proclamation is proper because he was the sole and
only candidate, second to none.54

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Relying on the pronouncement in Cayat, Castillo asserts that he was entitled to assume the position of Mayor of
Lucena City for having obtained the highest number of votes among the remaining qualified candidates.

It would seem, then, that the date of the finality of the COMELEC resolution declaring Ramon disqualified is
decisive. According to Section 10, Rule 19 of the COMELECs Resolution No. 8804,55 a decision or resolution of
a Division becomes final and executory after the lapse of five days following its promulgation unless a motion
for reconsideration is seasonably filed. Under Section 8, Rule 20 of Resolution No. 8804, the decision of the
COMELEC En Banc becomes final and executory five days after its promulgation and receipt of notice by the
parties.

The COMELEC First Division declared Ramon disqualified through its Resolution dated April 19, 2010, the copy
of which Ramon received on the same date.56 Ramon filed a motion for reconsideration on April 21, 201057 in
accordance with Section 7 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8696,58 but withdrew the motion on May 4, 2010,59
ostensibly to allow his substitution by Barbara Ruby. On his part, Castillo did not file any motion for
reconsideration. Such circumstances indicated that there was no more pending matter that could have
effectively suspended the finality of the ruling in due course. Hence, the Resolution dated April 19, 2010 could
be said to have attained finality upon the lapse of five days from its promulgation and receipt of it by the
parties. This happened probably on April 24, 2010. Despite such finality, the COMELEC En Banc continued to
act on the withdrawal by Ramon of his motion for reconsideration through the May 5, 2010 Resolution declaring
the April 19, 2010 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division final and executory.

Yet, we cannot agree with Castillos assertion that with Ramons disqualification becoming final prior to the May
10, 2010 elections, the ruling in Cayat was applicable in his favor. Barbara Rubys filing of her CoC in
substitution of Ramon significantly differentiated this case from the factual circumstances obtaining in Cayat.
Rev. Fr. Nardo B. Cayat, the petitioner in Cayat, was disqualified on April 17, 2004, and his disqualification
became final before the May 10, 2004 elections. Considering that no substitution of Cayat was made, Thomas
R. Palileng, Sr., his rival, remained the only candidate for the mayoralty post in Buguias, Benguet. In contrast,
after Barbara Ruby substituted Ramon, the May 10, 2010 elections proceeded with her being regarded by the
electorate of Lucena City as a bona fide candidate. To the electorate, she became a contender for the same
position vied for by Castillo, such that she stood on the same footing as Castillo. Such standing as a candidate
negated Castillos claim of being the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes, and of being
consequently entitled to assume the office of Mayor.

The only time that a second placer is allowed to take the place of a disqualified winning candidate is when two
requisites concur, namely: (a) the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is disqualified; and (b)
the electorate was fully aware in fact and in law of that candidates disqualification as to bring such awareness
within the realm of notoriety but the electorate still cast the plurality of the votes in favor of the ineligible
candidate.64 Under this sole exception, the electorate may be said to have waived the validity and efficacy of
their votes by notoriously misapplying their franchise or throwing away their votes, in which case the eligible
candidate with the second highest number of votes may be deemed elected.65 But the exception did not apply
in favor of Castillo simply because the second element was absent. The electorate of Lucena City were not the
least aware of the fact of Barbara Rubys ineligibility as the substitute. In fact, the COMELEC En Banc issued the
Resolution finding her substitution invalid only on May 20, 2011, or a full year after the decisions.

On the other hand, the COMELEC En Banc properly disqualified Barbara Ruby from assuming the position of
Mayor of Lucena City. To begin with, there was no valid candidate for her to substitute due to Ramons
ineligibility. Also, Ramon did not voluntarily withdraw his CoC before the elections in accordance with Section
73 of the Omnibus Election Code. Lastly, she was not an additional candidate for the position of Mayor of
Lucena City because her filing of her CoC on May 4, 2010 was beyond the period fixed by law. Indeed, she was
not, in law and in fact, a candidate.66

A permanent vacancy in the office of Mayor of Lucena City thus resulted, and such vacancy should be filled
pursuant to the law on succession defined in Section 44 of the LGC, to wit:67

Section 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice-Governor, Mayor, and Vice-Mayor. If a
permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or mayor, the vice-governor or vice-mayor concerned
shall become the governor or mayor. x x x

WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petitions in these consolidated cases; AFFIRMS the Resolution issued on
May 20, 2011 by the COMELEC En Banc; and ORDERS the petitioners to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 202202

Indeed, Castillo could not assume the office for he was only a second placer.1wphi1 Labo, Jr. should be
applied. There, the Court emphasized that the candidate obtaining the second highest number of votes for the
contested office could not assume the office despite the disqualification of the first placer because the second
placer was "not the choice of the sovereign will."60 Surely, the Court explained, a minority or defeated
candidate could not be deemed elected to the office.61 There was to be no question that the second placer lost
in the election, was repudiated by the electorate, and could not assume the vacated position.62 No law
imposed upon and compelled the people of Lucena City to accept a loser to be their political leader or their
representative.63

Pearliegates

March 19, 2013

SILVERIO R. TAGOLINO, Petitioner,


vs.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL AND LUCY MARIE TORRES-GOMEZ,
Respondents.

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DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the March 22, 2012
Decision1 of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) in HRET Case No. 10-031 (QW) which
declared the validity of private respondent Lucy Marie Torres-Gomezs substitution as the Liberal Partys
replacement candidate for the position of Leyte Representative (Fourth Legislative District) in lieu of Richard
Gomez.

The Facts

On November 30, 2009, Richard Gomez (Richard) filed his certificate of candidacy2 (CoC) with the Commission
on Elections (COMELEC), seeking congressional office as Representative for the Fourth Legislative District of
Leyte under the ticket of the Liberal Party. Subsequently, on December 6, 2009, one of the opposing
candidates, Buenaventura Juntilla (Juntilla), filed a Verified Petition,3 alleging that Richard, who was actually a
resident of College Street, East Greenhills, San Juan City, Metro Manila, misrepresented in his CoC that he
resided in 910 Carlota Hills, Can-adieng, Ormoc City. In this regard, Juntilla asserted that Richard failed to meet
the one (1) year residency requirement under Section 6, Article VI4 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution
(Constitution) and thus should be declared disqualified/ineligible to run for the said office. In addition, Juntilla
prayed that Richards CoC be denied due course and/or cancelled.5

On February 17, 2010, the COMELEC First Division rendered a Resolution6 granting Juntillas petition without
any qualification. The dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVE, to GRANT the Petition to
Disqualify Candidate for Lack of Qualification filed by BUENAVENTURA O. JUNTILLA against RICHARD I. GOMEZ.
Accordingly, RICHARD I. GOMEZ is DISQUALIFIED as a candidate for the Office of Congressman, Fourth District
of Leyte, for lack of residency requirement.

SO ORDERED.

Aggrieved, Richard moved for reconsideration but the same was denied by the COMELEC En Banc through a
Resolution dated May 4, 2010.7 Thereafter, in a Manifestation of even date, Richard accepted the said
resolution with finality "in order to enable his substitute to facilitate the filing of the necessary documents for
substitution."8

Pearliegates

On May 5, 2010, Lucy Marie Torres-Gomez (private respondent) filed her CoC9 together with a Certificate of
Nomination and Acceptance10 from the Liberal Party endorsing her as the partys official substitute candidate
vice her husband, Richard, for the same congressional post. In response to various letter-requests submitted to
the COMELECs Law Department (Law Department), the COMELEC En Banc, in the exercise of its administrative
functions, issued Resolution No. 889011 on May 8, 2010, approving, among others, the recommendation of the
said department to allow the substitution of private respondent. The recommendation reads:

STUDY AND OBSERVATION

On the same date, this Department received an Opposition from Mr. Buenaventura O. Juntilla, thru his counsel,
opposing the candidacy of Ms. Lucy Marie Torres Gomez, as a substitute candidate for Mr. Richard I. Gomez.

The crux of the opposition stemmed from the issue that there should be no substitution because there is no
candidate to substitute for.

It must be stressed that the resolution of the First Division, this Commission, in SPA No. 09-059 speaks for
disqualification of candidate Richard I. Gomez and not of cancellation of his Certificate of Candidacy:

Wherefore, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to GRANT the Petition to
Disqualify Candidate for Lack of Qualification filed x x x against RICHARD I. GOMEZ. Accordingly, RICHARD I.
GOMEZ is DISQUALIFIED as a candidate for the Office of Congressman, Fourth District of Leyte, for lack of
residency requirement.

The said resolution was affirmed by the Commission En Banc on May 04, 2010.

The disqualification of a candidate does not automatically cancel ones certificate of candidacy, especially
when it is nominated by a political party. In effect, the political party is still allowed to substitute the candidate
whose candidacy was declared disqualified. After all, the right to substitute is a privilege given to a political
party to exercise and not dependent totally to a candidate.

Nonetheless, in case of doubt, the same must always be resolved to the qualification of a candidate to run in
the public office.

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The substitution complied with the requirements provided under Section 12 in relation to Section 13 of Comelec
Resolution No. 8678 dated October 6, 2009.

xxxx

In her Verified Answer,18 private respondent denied petitioners allegations and claimed that she validly
substituted her husband in the electoral process. She also averred that she personally known to the notary
public who notarized her CoC, one Atty. Edgardo Cordeno, and thus, she was not required to have presented
any competent proof of identity during the notarization of the said document. Lastly, she asserted that despite
her marriage to Richard and exercise of profession in Metro Manila, she continued to maintain her residency in
Ormoc City which was the place where she was born and raised.

In view of the foregoing, the Law Department RECOMMENDS the following:


During the preliminary conference, and as shown in the Preliminary Conference Order dated September 2,
2010, the parties agreed on the following issues for resolution:

xxxx

2. TO ALLOW CANDIDATE LUCY MARIE TORRES GOMEZ AS A SUBSTITUTE CANDIDATE FOR RICHARD GOMEZ:
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Whether or not the instant petition for quo warranto is meritorious;


Whether or not the substitution of respondent is valid;
Whether or not a petition for quo warranto can be used as a substitute for failure to file the necessary petition
for disqualification with the COMELEC;

xxxx

Whether or not respondents COC was duly subscribed; and


The following day, or on May 9, 2010, Juntilla filed an Extremely Urgent Motion for Reconsideration12 (May 9,
2010 Motion) of the above-mentioned COMELEC En Banc resolution

Whether or not respondent is ineligible for the position of Representative of the Fourth District of Leyte for lack
of residency requirement.19
Ruling of the HRET

Pending resolution of Juntillas May 9, 2010 Motion, the national and local elections were conducted as
scheduled on May 10, 2010. During the elections, Richards, whose name remained on the ballots, garnered
101, 250 votes while his opponents, namely, Eufrocino Codilla, Jr. and herein petitioner Silverio Tagolino,
obtained 76,549 and 493 votes, respectively.13 In view of the aforementioned substitution, Richards votes
were credited in favor of private respondent and as a result, she was proclaimed the duly-elected
Representative of the Fourth District of Leyte.

On May 11, 2010, Juntilla filed an Extremely Urgent Motion to resolve the pending May 9, 2010 Motion relative
to Resolution No. 8890.14 The said motion, however, remained unacted.

On May 24, 2010, petitioner filed a Petition15 for quo warranto before the HRET in order to oust private
respondent from her congressional seat, claiming that: (1) she failed to comply with the one (1) year residency
requirement under Section 6, Article VI of the Constitution considering that the transfer of her voter registration
from San Rafael Bulacan16 to the Fourth District of Leyte was only applied for on July 23, 2009; (2) she did not
validly substitute Richard as his CoC was void ab initio; and (3) private respondents CoC was void due to her
non-compliance with the prescribed notarial requirements i.e., she failed to present valid and competent proof
of her identity before the notarizing officer.17

Pearliegates

After due proceedings, the HRET issued the assailed March 22, 2012 Decision20 which dismissed the quo
warranto petition and declared that private respondent was a qualified candidate for the position of Leyte
Representative (Fourth Legislative District). It observed that the resolution denying Richards candidacy i.e., the
COMELEC First Divisions February 17, 2010 Resolution, spoke of disqualification and not of CoC cancellation.
Hence, it held that the substitution of private respondent in lieu of Richard was legal and valid.21 Also, it
upheld the validity of private respondents CoC due to petitioners failure to controvert her claim that she was
personally known to the notary public who notarized her CoC.22 Finally, the HRET ruled that while it had been
admitted that private respondent resides in Colgate Street, San Juan City and lived in San Rafael, Bulacan, the
fact was she continued to retain her domicile in Ormoc City given that her absence therefrom was only
temporary.

Hence, the instant petition.

Issues Before the Court

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The crux of the present controversy is whatever or not the HRET gravely abused its discretion in finding that
Richard was validly substituted by private respondent as candidate for Leyte Representative (Fourth Legislative
District) in view of the formers failure to meet the one (1) year residency requirement provided under Section
6, Article VI of the Constitution.

It is petitioners submission that the HRET gravely abused its discretion when it upheld the validity of private
respondents substitution despite contrary jurisprudence holding that substitution is impermissible where the
substituted candidates CoC was denied due course to and/or cancelled, as in the case of Richard. On the other
hand, respondents maintain that Richards CoC was not denied due course to and/or cancelled by the COMELEC
as he was only "disqualified" and therefore, was properly substituted by private respondent.

It must be stressed that one who is disqualified under Section 68 is still technically considered to have been a
candidate, albeit proscribed to continue as such only because of supervening infractions which do not,
however, deny his or her statutory eligibility. In other words, while the candidates compliance with the
eligibility requirements as prescribed by law, such as age, residency, and citizenship, is not in question, he or
she is, however, ordered to discontinue such candidacy as a form of penal sanction brought by the commission
of the above-mentioned election offenses.

On the other hand, a denial of due course to and/or cancellation of a CoC proceeding under Section 78 of the
OEC36 is premised on a persons misrepresentation of any of the material qualifications required for the
elective office aspired for. It is not enough that a person lacks the relevant qualification; he or she must have
also made a false representation of the same in the CoC.37 The nature of a Section 78 petition was discussed
in the case of Fermin v. COMELEC,38 where the Court illumined:

Ruling of the Court

The petition is meritorious.

A. Distinction between a petition for disqualification and a petition to deny due course to/cancel a certificate of
candidacy

The Omnibus Election Code23 (OEC) provides for certain remedies to assail a candidates bid for public office.
Among these which obtain particular significance to this case are: (1) a petition for disqualification under
Section 68; and (2) a petition to deny due course to and/or cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section 78.
The distinctions between the two are well-perceived.

Primarily, a disqualification case under Section 68 of the OEC is hinged on either: (a) a candidates possession
of a permanent resident status in a foreign country;24 or (b) his or her commission of certain acts of
disqualification. Anent the latter, the prohibited acts under Section 68 refer to election offenses under the OEC,
and not to violations of other penal laws.25 In particular, these are: (1) giving money or other material
consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral functions; (2)
committing acts of terrorism to enhance ones candidacy; (3) spending in ones election campaign an amount
in excess of that allowed by the OEC; (4) soliciting, receiving or making any contribution prohibited under
Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104 of the OEC; and (5) violating Sections 80,26 83,27 85,28 8629 and 261,
paragraphs d,30 e,31 k,32 v,33 and cc, sub-paragraph 634 of the OEC. Accordingly, the same provision
(Section 68) states that any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he or she is a party, is declared by
final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the COMELEC to have committed any of the foregoing
acts shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate for public office, or disallowed from holding the same,
if he or she had already been elected.35

Pearliegates

Let it be misunderstood, the denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC is not based on the lack of
qualifications but on a finding that the candidate made a material representation that is false, which may relate
to the qualifications required of the public office he/she is running for. It is noted that the candidates states in
his/her CoC that he/she is eligible for the office he/she seeks. Section 78 of the OEC, therefore, is to be read in
relation to the constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications or eligibility for public office. If the
candidate subsequently states a material representation in the CoC that is false, the COMELEC, following the
law, is empowered to deny due course to or cancel such certificate. Indeed, the Court has already likened a
proceeding under Section 78 to a quo warranto proceeding under Section 253 of the OEC since they both deal
with the eligibility or qualification of a candidate, with the distinction mainly in the fact that a "Section 78"
petition is filed before proclamation, while a petition for quo warranto is filed after proclamation of the winning
candidate. (Emphasis supplied)

Corollary thereto, it must be noted that the deliberateness of the misrepresentation, much less ones intent to
defraud, is of bare significance in a Section 78 petition as it is enough that the persons declaration of a
material qualification in the CoC be false. In this relation, jurisprudence holds that an express finding that the
person committed any deliberate misrepresentation is of little consequence in the determination of whether
ones CoC should be deemed cancelled or not.39 What remains material is that the petition essentially seeks to
deny due course to and/or cancel the CoC on the basis of ones ineligibility and that the same be granted
without any qualification.40

Pertinently, while a disqualified candidate under Section 68 is still considered to have been a candidate for all
intents and purposes, on the other hand, a person whose CoC had been denied due course to and/or cancelled
under Section 78 is deemed to have not been a candidate at all. The reason being is that a cancelled CoC is
considered void ab initio and thus, cannot give rise to a valid candidacy and necessarily, to valid votes.41 In
Talaga v. COMELEC42 (Talaga), the Court ruled that:

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x x x x While a person who is disqualified under Section 68 is merely prohibited to continue as a candidate, a
person who certificate is cancelled or denied due course under Section 78 is not treated as a candidate at all,
as if he/she never filed a CoC.

The foregoing variance gains utmost importance to the present case considering its implications on candidate
substitution.

B. Valid CoC as a condition sine qua non for candidate substitution

In this regard, the CoC is the document which formally accords upon a person the status of a candidate. In
other words, absent a valid CoC one is not considered a candidate under legal contemplation. As held in
Talaga:45

x x x a persons declaration of his intention to run for public office and his affirmation that he possesses the
eligibility for the position he seeks to assume, followed by the timely filing of such declaration, constitute a
valid CoC that render the person making the declaration a valid or official candidate. (Emphasis supplied)

Section 77 of the OEC provides that if an official candidate of a registered or accredited political party dies,
withdraws or is disqualified for any cause, a person belonging to and certified by the same political party may
file a CoC to replace the candidate who died, withdrew or was disqualified. It states that:

Considering that Section 77 requires that there be a candidate in order for substitution to take place, as well as
the precept that a person without a valid CoC is not considered as a candidate at all, it necessarily follows that
if a persons CoC had been denied due course to and/or cancelled, he or she cannot be validly substituted in
the electoral process. The existence of a valid CoC is therefore a condition sine qua non for a disqualified
candidate to be validly substituted.46

Sec. 77. Candidates in case of death, disqualification or withdrawal of another. - If after the last day for the
filing of certificates of candidacy, an official candidate of a registered or accredited political party dies,
withdraws or is disqualified for any cause, only a person belonging to, and certified by, the same political party
may file a certificate of candidacy to replace the candidate who died, withdrew or was disqualified. (Emphasis
supplied)

C. Divergent effects of disqualification and denial of due course to and/or cancellation of CoC cases vis--vis
candidate substitution

Evidently, Section 77 requires that there be an "official candidate" before candidate substitution proceeds.
Thus, whether the ground for substitution is death, withdrawal or disqualification of a candidate, the said
section unequivocally states that only an official candidate of a registered or accredited party may be
substituted.43

As defined under Section 79(a) of the OEC, the term "candidate" refers to any person aspiring for or seeking an
elective public office who has filed a certificate of candidacy by himself or through an accredited political party,
aggroupment, or coalition of parties. Clearly, the law requires that one must have validly filed a CoC in order to
be considered a candidate. The requirement of having a CoC obtains even greater importance if one considers
its nature. In particular, a CoC formalizes not only a persons public declaration to run for office but evidences
as well his or her statutory eligibility to be elected for the said post. In Sinaca v. Mula,44 the Court has
illumined:

A certificate of candidacy is in the nature of a formal manifestation to the whole world of the candidates
political creed or lack of political creed. It is a statement of a person seeking to run for a public office certifying
that he announces his candidacy for the office mentioned and the be is eligible for the office, the name of the
political party to which he belongs, if he belongs to any, and his post-office address for all election purposes
being as well stated. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied).

Pearliegates

Proceeding, from the foregoing discourse, it is evident that there lies a clear-cut distinction between a
disqualification case under Section 68 and denial of due course to and/or cancellation of COC case under
Section 78 vis--vis their respective effects on candidate substitution under Section 77.1wphi1

As explained in the case of Miranda v. Abaya47 (Miranda), a candidate who is disqualified under Section 68 can
be validly substituted pursuant to Section 77 because he remains a candidate until disqualified; but a person
whose CoC has been denied due course to and/or cancelled under Section 78 cannot be substituted because he
is not considered a candidate.48 Stated differently, since there would be no candidate to speak of under a
denial of due course to and/or cancellation of a CoC case, then there would be no candidate to be substituted;
the same does not obtain, however, in a disqualification case since there remains to be a candidate to be
substituted, although his or her candidacy is discontinued.

On this note, it is equally revelatory that Section 77 expressly enumerates the instances where substitution is
permissible, that is when an official candidate of a registered or accredited political party "dies, withdraws or is
disqualified for any cause." Noticeably, material misrepresentation cases are not included in the said section
and therefore, cannot be a valid basis to proceed with candidate substitution.

D. Application to the case at bar

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In this case, it is undisputed that Richard was disqualified to run in the May 10, 2010 elections due to his failure
to comply with the one year residency requirement.49 The confusion, however, stemmed from the use of the
word "disqualified" in the February 17, 2010 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division, which was adopted by
the COMELEC En Banc in granting the substitution of private respondent, and even further perpetuated by the
HRET in denying the quo warranto petition. In short, a finding that Richard was merely disqualified and not
that his CoC was denied due course to and/or cancelled would mean that he could have been validly
substitute by private respondent, thereby legitimizing her candidacy.

Yet the fact that the COMELEC First Divisions February 17, 2010 Resolution did not explicitly decree the denial
of due course to and/or cancellation of Richards CoC should not have obviated the COMELEC En Banc from
declaring the invalidity of private respondents substitution. It should be stressed that the clear and
unequivocal basis for Richards "disqualification" is his failure to comply with the residency requirement under
Section 6, Article VI of the Constitution which is a ground for the denial of due course to and/or cancellation a
CoC under Section 78 of the OEC, misrepresentation contemplated under a Section 78 petition refers to
statements affecting ones qualifications for elective office such as age, residence and citizenship or nonpossession of natural-born Filipino status.51 There is therefore no legal basis to support a finding of
disqualification within the ambit of election laws. Accordingly, given Richards non-compliance with the one
year residency requirement, it cannot be mistaken that the COMELEC First Divisions unqualified grant of
Juntillas "Verified Petition to Disqualify Candidate for Lack of Qualification"52 which prayed that the COMELEC
declare Richard "DISQUALIFIED and INELIGIBLE from seeking the office of Member of the House of
Representatives" and "x x x that his Certificate of Candidacy x x x be DENIED DUE COURSE and/or
CANCELLED"53 carried with it the denial of due course to and/or cancellation of Richards CoC pursuant to
Section 78.

Case law dictates that if a petition prays for the denial of due course to and/or cancellation of CoC and the
same is granted by the COMELEC without any qualification, the cancellation of the candidates CoC in in order.
This is precisely the crux of the Miranda ruling wherein the Court, in upholding the COMELEC En Bancs
nullification of the substitution in that case, decreed that the COMELEC Divisions unqualified grant of the
petition necessarily included the denial of due course to and/or cancellation of the candidates CoC,
notwithstanding the use of the term "disqualified" in the COMELEC Divisions resolution, as the foregoing was
prayed for in the said petition:

The question to settle next is whether or not aside from Joiel "Pempe" Miranda being disqualified by the
COMELEC in its May 5, 1998 resolution, his certificate of candidacy had likewise been denied due course and
cancelled.

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the Certificate of Candidacy filed by respondent for the position of
Mayor for the City of Snatiago be not given due course and/or cancelled.

Other reliefs just and equitable in the premises are likewise prayed for.

In resolving the petition filed by private respondent specifying a very particular relief, the COMELEC ruled
favorably in the following manner:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Commission (FIRST DIVISION) GRANTS the Petition. Respondent JOSE
"Pempe" MIRANDA is hereby DISQUALIFIED from running for the position of mayor of Santiago City, Isabela, in
the May 11, 1998 national and local elections.

SO ORDERED.

From a plain reading of the dispositive portion of the COMELEC resolution of May 5, 1998 in SPA No. 98-019, it is
sufficiently clear that the prayer specifically and particularly sought in the petition was GRANTED, there being
no qualification on the matter whatsoever. The disqualification was simply ruled over and above the granting of
the specific prayer for denial of due course and cancellation of the certificate of candidacy.

xxxx

There is no dispute that the complaint or petition filed by private respondent in SPA No. 98-019 is one to deny
due course and to cancel the certificate of candidacy of Jose "Pempe" Miranda. There is likewise no question
that the said petition was GRANTED without any qualification whatsoever. It is rather clear, therefore, that
whether or not the COMELEC granted any further relief in SPA No. 98-019 by disqualifying the candidate, the
fact remains that the said petition was granted and that the certificate of candidacy of Jose "Pempe" Miranda
was denied due course and cancelled. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The same rule was later discussed in the case of Talaga, viz:
The Court rules that it was.

Private respondents petition in SPA No. 98-019 specifically prayed for the following:

Pearliegates

3. Granting without any qualification or petition in SPA No. 09-029(DC) manifested COMELECs intention to
declare Ramon disqualified and to cancel his CoC

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petition without any qualification. By these undisputed and essential facts alone, the HRET should not have
adopted the COMELEC En Bancs erroneous finding that the COMELEC First Divisions February 17, 2010
Resolution "speaks only of "disqualification and not of cancellation of Richards CoC"36 and thereby, sanctioned
the substitution of private respondent.

xxxx

In Miranda v. Abaya, the specific relief that the petition prayed for was that the CoC "be not given due course
and/or cancelled". The COMELEC categorically granted "the petition" and then pronounced in apparent
contradiction that Joel Pempe Miranda was "disqualified." The Court held that the COMELEC, by granting the
petition without any qualification, disqualified Joel Pempe Miranda and at the same time cancelled Jose Pempe
Mirandas CoC.

Lest it be misunderstood, the HRET is not bound by previous COMELEC pronouncements relative to the
qualifications of the Members of the House. Being the sole judge57 of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of its respective members, the HRET cannot be tied down by COMELEC resolutions,
else its constitutional mandate58 be circumvented and rendered nugatory. Instructive on this point is the
Courts disquisition in Fernandez v. HRET,59 to wit:

xxxx

The crucial point of Miranda v. Abaya was that the COMELEC actually granted the particular relief of cancelling
or denying due course to the CoC prayed for in the petition by not subjecting that relief to any qualification.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

In view of the foregoing rulings, the COMELEC En Banc direly misconstrued the COMELEC First Divisions
February 17, 2010 Resolution when it adopted the Law Departments finding that Richard was only
"disqualified" and that his CoC was not denied due course to and/or cancelled, paving the way for the approval
of private respondents substitution. It overlooked the fact that the COMELEC First Divisions ruling
encompassed the cancellation of Richards CoC and in consequence, disallowed the substitution of private
respondent. It was therefore grave and serious error on the part of the COMELEC En Banc to have approved
private respondents substitution.

Consequently, in perpetuating the COMELEC En Bancs error as above-discussed, the HRET committed a grave
abuse of discretion, warranting the grant of the instant petition.

Fundamental is the rule that grave abuse of discretion arises when a lower court or tribunal patently violates
the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence.54 While it is well-recognized that the HRET has been
empowered by the Constitution to be the "sole judge" of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the members of the House, the Court maintains jurisdiction over it to check "whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on the part of the
latter.55 In other words, when the HRET utterly disregards the law and settled precedents on the matter before
it, it commits a grave abuse of discretion.

Private respondent concludes from the above that petitioner had no legal basis to claim that the HRET, when
reference to the qualification/s of Members of the House of Representatives is concerned, is "co-equal", to the
COMELEC respecting the matter of eligibility and qualification of a member of the House of Representatives.
The truth is the other way around, because the COMELEC is subservient to the HRET when the dispute or
contest at issue refers to the eligibility and/or qualification of a Member of the House of Representatives. A
petition for quo warranto is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the HRET as sole judge, and cannot be
considered forum shopping even if another body may have passed upon in administrative or quasi-judicial
proceedings the issue of the Members qualification while the Member was still a candidate. There is forumshopping only where two cases involve the same parties and the same cause of action. The two cases here are
distinct and dissimilar in their nature and character. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Notably, the phrase "election, returns, and qualifications" should be interpreted in its totality as referring to all
matters affecting the validity of the contestees title. More particularly, the term "qualifications" refers to
matters that could be raised in a quo warranto proceeding against the pro-claimed winner, such as his
disloyalty or ineligibility, or the inadequacy of his certificate of candidacy.60 As used in Section 74 of the OEC,
the word "eligible" means having the right to run for elective public office, that is, having all the qualifications
and none of the ineligibilities to run for the public office.61 In this relation, private respondents own
qualification to run for public office which was inextricably linked to her husbands own qualifications due to
her substitution was the proper subject of quo warranto proceedings falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the HRET and independent from any previous proceedings before the COMELEC, lest the jurisdiction divide
between the two be blurred.

Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that the HRETs independence is not without limitation. As earlier
mentioned, the Court retains certiorari jurisdiction over the HRET if only to check whether or not it has gravely
abused its discretion. In this regard, the Court does not endeavor to denigrate nor undermine the HRETs
independence; rather, it merely fulfills its duty to ensure that the Constitution and the laws are upheld through
the exercise of its power of judicial review.

Records clearly show that: (1) Richard was held ineligible as a congressional candidate for the Fourth District of
Leyte due to his failure to comply with the one year residency requirement; (2) Juntillas petition prayed for the
denial of due course to and/or cancellation of his CoC; and (3) the COMELEC First Division granted the foregoing

Pearliegates

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In fine, the Court observes that the HRET wantonly disregarded the law by deliberately adopting the COMELEC
En Bancs flawed findings regarding private respondents eligibility to run for public office which essentially
stemmed from her substitution. In this light, it cannot be gainsaid that the HRET gravely abused its discretion.

Owing to the lack of proper substitution in its case, private respondent was therefore not a bona fide candidate
for the position of Representative for the Fourth District of Leyte when she ran for office, which means that she
could not have been elected. Considering this pronouncement, there exists no cogent reason to further dwell
on the other issues respecting private respondents own qualification to office.

Pearliegates

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the March 22, 2012 Decision rendered by the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal in HRET Case No. 10-031 (QW) is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

315

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