A.M. NO.

02-2-07-SC
A.M. NO. 02-2-07-SC
Effective May 01, 2002
EN BANC RESOLUTION
RE: PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO SECTION 5, RULE 110 OF THE REVISED RULES OF
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Acting on the Memorandum dated 2 February 2002 of Court Administrator
Prosbitero J. Velasco, Jr. submitting for this Court's consideration and approval the
proposed amendment to Sec. 5, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the Court Resolved to APPROVE the amendment to Sec. 5, Rule 110 so as
to read as follows:
"Section 5. Who must prosecute criminal action. - All criminal actions either
commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction
and control of a public prosecutor. In case of heavy work schedule of the public
prosecutor or in the event of lack of public prosecutors, the private prosecutor may
be authorized in writing by the Chief of the Prosecution Office or the Regional State
Prosecutor to prosecute the case subject to the approval of the court. Once so
authorized to prosecute the criminal action, the private prosecutor shall continue to
prosecute the case up to end of the trial even in the absence of a public prosecutor,
unless the authority is revoked or otherwise withdrawn. x x x ."
This amendment to Rule 110 shall take effect on the first day of May 2002 following
its publication in two newspapers of general circulation on or before 30 April 2002.
April 10, 2002.
HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.
Chief Justice
Associate Justices:
JOSUE N. BELLOSILLO
JOSE A.R. MELO
REYNATO S. PUNO
JOSE C. VITUG
SANTIAGO M. KAPUNAN
VICENTE V. MENDOZA
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
SABINO E. DE LEON, JR.
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
ANTONIO T. CARPIO

The Office of the Mayor of Las Pinas refused to issue permit to petitioners to hold
rally a rally in front of the Justice Hall of Las Pinas on the ground that it was
prohibited under Supreme Court En Banc Resolution dated July 7,1998 in A.M. No.
98-7-02-SC, entitled, "Re: Guidelines on the Conduct of Demonstrations, Pickets,
Rallies and Other Similar Gatherings in the Vicinity of the Supreme Court and All
Other Courts." Petitioners thus initiated the instant proceedings. They submit that
the Supreme Court gravely abused its discretion and/or acted without or in excess
of jurisdiction in promulgating those guidelines.
Held: We shall first dwell on the critical argument made by petitioners that the
rules constitute an abridgment of the people's aggregate rights of free speech, free
expression, peaceful assembly and petitioning government for redress of grievances
citing Sec. 4, Article III of the 1987 Constitution that "no law shall be passed
abridging" them.
It is true that the safeguarding of the people's freedom of expression to the end that
individuals may speak as they think on matters vital to them and that falsehoods
may be exposed through the processes of education and discussion, is essential to
free government. But freedom of speech and expression despite its indispensability
has its limitations. It has never been understood as the absolute right to speak
whenever, however, and wherever one pleases, for the manner, place, and time of
public discussion can be constitutionally controlled. [T]he better policy is not liberty
untamed but liberty regulated by law where every freedom is exercised in
accordance with law and with due regard for the rights of others.
Conventional wisdom tells us that the realities of life in a complex society preclude
an absolutist interpretation of freedom of expression where it does not involve pure
speech but speech plus physical actions like picketing. There are other significant
societal values that must be accommodated and when they clash, they must all be
weighed with the promotion of the general welfare of the people as the ultimate
objective. In balancing these values, this Court has accorded freedom of expression
a preferred position in light of its more comparative importance. Hence, our rulings
now musty in years hold that only the narrowest time, place and manner
regulations that are specifically tailored to serve an important governmental
interest may justify the application of the balancing of interests test in derogation of
the people's right of free speech and expression. Where said regulations do not aim
particularly at the evils within the allowable areas of state control but, on the
contrary, sweep within their ambit other activities as to operate as an overhanging
threat to free discussion, or where upon their face they are so vague, indefinite, or
inexact as to permit punishment of the fair use of the right of free speech, such
regulations are void.
Prescinding from this premise, the Court reiterates that judicial independence and
the fair and orderly administration of justice constitute paramount governmental
interests that can justify the regulation of the public's right of free speech and
peaceful assembly in the vicinity of courthouses. In the case of In Re: Emil P. Jurado,
the Court pronounced in no uncertain terms that:
"x x x freedom of expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to and
accommodated with the requirements of equally important public interests. One of

these fundamental public interests is the maintenance of the integrity and orderly
functioning of the administration of justice. There is no antinomy between free
expression and the integrity of the system of administering justice. For the
protection and maintenance of freedom of expression itself can be secured only
within the context of a functioning and orderly system of dispensing justice, within
the context, in other words, of viable independent institutions for delivery of justice
which are accepted by the general community. x x x" (In Re: Emil P. Jurado, 243
SCRA 299, 323-324 [1995])
It is sadly observed that judicial independence and the orderly administration of
justice have been threatened not only by contemptuous acts inside, but also by
irascible demonstrations outside, the courthouses. They wittingly or unwittingly,
spoil the ideal of sober, non-partisan proceedings before a cold and neutral judge.
Even in the United States, a prohibition against picketing and demonstrating in or
near courthouses, has been ruled as valid and constitutional notwithstanding its
limiting effect on the exercise by the public of their liberties. X x x
The administration of justice must not only be fair but must also appear to be fair
and it is the duty of this Court to eliminate everything that will diminish if not
destroy this judicial desideratum. To be sure, there will be grievances against our
justice system for there can be no perfect system of justice but these grievances
must be ventilated through appropriate petitions, motions or other pleadings. Such
a mode is in keeping with the respect due to the courts as vessels of justice and is
necessary if judges are to dispose their business in a fair fashion. It is the
traditional conviction of every civilized society that courts must be insulated from
every extraneous influence in their decisions. The facts of a case should be
determined upon evidence produced in court, and should be uninfluenced by bias,
prejudice or sympathies. (In Re: Petition to Annul En Banc Resolution A.M. 98-7-02SC - Ricardo C. Valmonte and Union of Lawyers and Advocates for Transparency in
Government [ULAT], G.R. No. 134621, Sept. 29, 1998)

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In Re: Petition to Annul En Banc Resolution A.M. 98-7-02-SC Ricardo C. Valmonte
and Union of Lawyers and Advocates for Transparency in Government [ULAT], G.R.
No. 134621, Sept. 29, 1998
B.P. Blg. 880 did not establish streets and sidewalks, among other places, as public
fora. A close look at the law will reveal that it in fact prescribes reasonable time,
place, and manner regulations. Thus, it requires a written permit for the holding of
public assemblies in public places subject, even, to the right of the mayor to modify
the place and time of the public assembly, to impose a rerouting of the parade or
street march, to limit the volume of loud speakers or sound system and to prescribe
other appropriate restrictions on the conduct of the public assembly.

To insulate the judiciary from mob pressure, friendly or otherwise, and isolate it from
public hysteria, this Court merely moved away the situs of mass actions within a
200-meter radius from every courthouse. In fine, B.P. Blg. 880 imposes general
restrictions to the time, place and manner of conducting concerted actions. On the
other hand, the resolution of this Court regulating demonstrations adds specific
restrictions as they involve judicial independence and the orderly administration of
justice. There is thus no discrepancy between the two sets of regulatory measures.
Simply put, B.P. Blg. 880 and the assailed resolution complement each other.