Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Case 1
In Re: Query of Mr. Roger Prioreschi
A.M. No. 09-6-9-SC
August 19, 2009
Facts:
In his letter dated May 22, 2009 addressed to the Chief Justice, Mr.
Roger C. Prioreschi, administrator of the Good Shepherd
Foundation, Inc., questioned OCA Circular No. 42-2005 and Rule
141 of the Rules of Court of the Philippines that reserve the
privilege of exemption from docket and filing fees to indigent
persons. He questioned why the rules excluded foundations or
associations that work with and for the most Indigent persons, as
in the case of the Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc. which had been
reaching out since 1985 to the poorest among the poor, the
newly born and abandoned babies, children who never saw the
smile of their mother, old people who cannot afford a few pesos to
pay for common prescriptions, broken families who returned to a
normal life, whom the Philippine Government and the Filipino
society could not reach to or had rejected or abandoned.
To answer the query of Mr. Prioreschi, the Supreme Court held that
it could not grant to foundations like the Good Shepherd
Foundation, Inc. the same exemption from payment of legal fees
granted to indigent litigants even if the foundations are working
for indigent and underprivileged people. The basis for the
exemption from legal and filing fees is the free access clause,
embodied in Sec. 11, Art. III of the 1987 Constitution, which
provides that free access to the courts and quasi judicial bodies
and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any person
by reason of poverty.
Held:
In implementation of the right of free access under the
Constitution, the Supreme Court promulgated rules, specifically,
Sec. 21, Rule 3, Rules of Court, and Sec. 19, Rule 141, Rules of
Court.
The Court held that the clear intent and precise language of the
aforequoted provisions of the Rules of Court indicated that only a
natural party litigant may be regarded as an indigent litigant. The
Gamboa v Cruz
G.R. No. L-56291
June 27, 1988
Facts: Petitioner was arrested for vagrancy without a warrant.
During a line-up of 5 detainees including petitioner, he was
identified by a complainant to be a companion in a robbery,
thereafter he was charged. Petitioner filed a Motion to Acquit on
the ground that the conduct of the line-up, without notice and in
the absence of his counsel violated his constitutional rights to
counsel and to due process. The court denied said motion. Hearing
was set, hence the petition.
Issue: Whether or Not petitioners right to counsel and due
process violated.
Held: No. The police line-up was not part of the custodial inquest;
hence, petitioner was not yet entitled, at such stage, to counsel.
He had not been held yet to answer for a criminal offense. The
moment there is a move or even an urge of said investigators to
elicit admissions or confessions or even plain information which
may appear innocent or innocuous at the time, from said suspect,
he should then and there be assisted by counsel, unless he waives
the right, but the waiver shall be made in writing and in the
presence of counsel.
On the right to due process, petitioner was not, in any way,
deprived of this substantive and constitutional right, as he was
duly represented by a counsel. He was accorded all the
opportunities to be heard and to present evidence to substantiate
his defense; only that he chose not to, and instead opted to file a
Motion to Acquit after the prosecution had rested its case. What
due process abhors is the absolute lack of opportunity to be heard.
Case 4
People v Macam
G.R. Nos. 91011-12
November 24, 1994
Facts: Accused was charged and prosecuted for robbery with
homicide as guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Defense assails the
court decision contending the constitutional rights of the accused
were violated for subjecting them to a police line up at the hospital
silent and to have counsel. Further, it did not appear that private
respondent waived his rights thereto.
The private prosecutors are here now alleging that the
judge committed a grave abuse of discretion by not allowing the
evidence.
Issue:
Whether or not private respondents rights to a proper
custodial investigation were violated?
Held:
his
Re.: Extrajudicial
Admissible
Confessions
to
Mayor
and
Media
Facts:
Pablito Andan alias "Bobby" was accused of the crime of rape with
homicide. The offense was committed on February 19,1994 in
Baliuag, Bulacan; the victim being Marianne Guevarra, 22 and a
2nd year student at the Fatima School of Nursing. On said day,
victim left her home for her school dormitory in Valenzuela. While
on her way, appellant invited her to his house. He used the pretext
that the blood pressure of his wife's grandmother should be taken.
Marianne agreed to do so as the old woman was her distant
relative. She did not know that nobody was inside the house.
Appellant then punched her in the abdomen, brought her to the
kitchen and raped her. By night time, Marianne, who was still
unconscious, was dragged by appellant to their backyard that was
adjacent to a vacant lot. Appellant was to transfer Marianne to the
vacant lot when she moved, prompting appellant to hit her head
with a piece of concrete block. No longer moving, he dragged her
to the lot and abandoned her. At 11am her body was discovered.
The autopsy revealed that she died of "traumatic injuries.
"Marianne's gruesome death drew public attention and prompted
Baliuag Mayor Cornelio Trinidad to form an investigation team. The
investigation pointed to the appellant. Appellant's nearby house
was searched but he was not there. On February 24, a police team
led by Mayor Trinidad traced appellant in his parents' house. They
took him and brought him to the police headquarters where he
was interrogated. Initially, he denied any knowledge of Marianne's
death. However, when the police confronted him with evidence,
appellant relented but implicated two of his neighbors, and that he
was merely a lookout. The police likewise brought Larin and Dizon
there. The following day a physical examination conducted on the
suspects revealed that appellant has multiple scratches on the
neck, chest and back. By that time, people and media
representatives were already at the police headquarters awaiting
the results of the investigation. Mayor Trinidad arrived. Upon
seeing the mayor, appellant approached him and whispered that
they talk privately. The mayor led him to the office of the Chief of
Police and there, he broke down and said "Mayor, patawarin mo
ako! I will tell you the truth. I am the one who killed Marianne."
The mayor opened the door of the room to let the public and
media representatives witness the confession. Since no lawyer was
available he ordered the proceedings photographed and
videotaped. In the presence of the mayor, the police,
Held:
Under these circumstances, it cannot be successfully claimed that
appellant's confession before the mayor is inadmissible. It is true
that a municipal mayor has "operational supervision and control"
over the local police and may arguably be deemed a law
enforcement officer for purposes of applying Section 12 (1) and (3)
of Article III of the Constitution. However, appellant's confession to
the mayor was not made in response to any interrogation by the
latter. In fact, the mayor did not question appellant at all. No police
authority ordered appellant to talk to the mayor. It was appellant
himself who spontaneously, freely and voluntarily sought the
mayor for a private meeting. The mayor did not know that
appellant was going to confess his guilt to him. When appellant
talked with the mayor as a confidant and not as a law enforcement
officer, his uncounseled confession to him did not violate his
constitutional rights. Thus, it has been held that the constitutional
procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a
spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the
authorities, but given in an ordinary manner whereby appellant
orally admitted having committed the crime. What the
Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of incriminating
facts or confessions. The rights under Section 12 are guaranteed
Case 9
Navallo v Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 97214
July 18, 1994
Case 11
People vs Alicando
GR No. 117487
December 12, 1995
Facts:
Arnel Alicando was charged of the crime of rape with homicide for
raping a 4 year old girl named, Khazie Mae Penecilla. The records
show that appellant was arrested and interrogated by PO3 Danilo
Tan. The accused verbally confessed his guilt without the
assistance of counsel. The trial court convicted Alicando with the
crimes and charged sentencing him death penalty thus; the case is
submitted to the Supreme Court for automatic review.
Issue:
Whether or not admission of guilt made without the presence of
counsel is valid
Held:
The evidence gathered by PO3 Danilo Tan as a result of the
custodial investigation is inadmissible because appellant verbally
confessed without the benefit of counsel.
As provided in Section 12(1) and (3) Article 3 of the Constitution
any person under investigation for a commission of an offense
have the right to xxx have competent and independent counsel
xxx; any confession or admission obtained in violation of this
and preceding section shall be inadmissible against him
We are equally committed to the ideal that the process of
detection, apprehension, conviction, and incarceration of criminals
should be accomplished with fairness and without impinging on
the dignity of the individual.
HELD:
No, a judge cannot grant a petition for bail without a trial.
Since the determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt of
the accused is strong is a matter of judicial discretion, the judge is
mandated to conduct a hearing even in cases where the
prosecution chooses to just file a comment or leave the application
of bail to the discretion of the court.
Case 12
BASCO vs RAPATALO
A.M. No. RTJ-96-1335.
March 5, 1997
FACTS:
Petitioner Inocencio Basco filed a complaint against respondent
Judge Leo H. Rapatalo of RTC, Branch 32 of Agoo, La Union for
gross ignorance or willful disregard of established rule of law for
granting bail to an accused in a murder case without receiving
evidence and conducting a hearing.
Basco is the father of the victim of a murder by three men. There
were three accused men; one of them is Roger Morente. Roger
Morente filed for a petition for bail. A hearing for the petition was
set for several times but did not push through.
After allegedly seeing Morente in Rosario, La Union, the petitioner
learned that the respondent Judge granted the Morentes petition
for bail even though the petition was not heard at all.
The Judge alleged that he granted the petition based on the
prosecutors option not to oppose the petition as well as the
latters recommendation setting the bail bond in the amount of
P80,000.00. Respondent said that when the prosecution chose not
to oppose the petition for bail, he had the discretion on whether to
approve it or not. The respondent approved the petition for bail
based on his presumption that the prosecutor was more familiar
with the case and more knowledgeable on what he was doing
since the latter conducted the preliminary investigation. The
respondent further added that when he approved the petition, he
presumed that the private prosecutor was not around at the time
the public prosecutor recommended bail. Eventually, Morentes
bail bond was cancelled. A warrant of arrest was issued on account
of Bascos motion for consideration. Morente is then confined in
the La Union Provincial Jail.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a Judge can grant a petition for bail without a
hearing for such.
1.
2.
3.
4.
Ruling:
1. We agree with the respondent court that bail cannot be denied
to the private respondent for he is charged with the crime of
rebellion as defined in Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code to
which is attached the penalty of prision mayor and a fine not
exceeding P20,000.00. 30 It is, therefore, a bailable offense under
Section 13 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution which provides
thus: Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong,
shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be
released on recognizance as may be prescribed by law. The right
to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be
required. Therefore, before conviction bail is either a matter of
right or of discretion. It is a matter of right when the offense
charged is punishable by any penalty lower than reclusion
perpetua. 31 To that extent the right is absolute.
for habeas corpus on the ground that they were being detained in
Camp Crame without charges. The petition was referred to RTC.
Finding after hearing that no formal charges had been filed against
the petitioners after more than a year after their arrest, the trial
court
ordered
their
release.
Issues:
(1) Whether or Not there was a denial of due process.
(2) Whether or not there was a violation of the accused right to
bail.
Held:
NO denial of due process. Petitioners were given several
opportunities to present their side at the pre-trial investigation.
Instead, they filed a verbal motion for reconsideration which they
were again asked to submit in writing. They had been expressly
warned in the subpoena that "failure to submit counter-affidavits
on the date specified shall be deemed a waiver of their right to
submit controverting evidence." Petitioners have a right to
peremptory
challenge.
The right to bail invoked by the private respondents has
traditionally not been recognized and is not available in the
military, as an exception to the general rule embodied in the Bill of
Rights. The right to a speedy trial is given more emphasis in the
military
where
the
right
to
bail
does
not
exist.
On the contention that they had not been charged after more than
one year from their arrest, there was substantial compliance with
the requirements of due process and the right to a speedy trial.
The AFP Special Investigating Committee was able to complete the
pre-charge investigation only after one year because hundreds of
officers and thousands of enlisted men were involved in the failed
coup.
Accordingly, in G.R. No. 93177, the petition is dismissed for lack of
merit. In G.R. No. 96948, the petition is granted, and the
respondents are directed to allow the petitioners to exercise the
right of peremptory challenge under article 18 of the articles of
war. In G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454, the petitions are also granted,
and the orders of the respondent courts for the release of the
private respondents are hereby reversed and set aside. No costs.
Case 16
Baylon v Judge Sison
A.M. No. 92-7-360-0
April 6, 1995
this motion.
Facts:
Respondent judge is accused for malfeasance in granting bail to
the accused charged with double murder. Prosecution was not
given notice of at least 3 days before the scheduled hearing for
bail in violation of Rule 15, section 4 of the Rules of Court and the
filing of petition for bail has only 2 non-working day interval from
the schedule of the hearing. Moreover the prosecution also assails
that they were not given the chance to present evidence that
strongly prove the guilt of the accused. Respondent judge justifies
not having committed grave abuse of discretion since the
prosecution did not interpose objection with his orders and the
lack of previous notice was cured with the filing of motion for
reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent judge exercised abuse in
discretion in the grant of bail to the accused.
HELD:
The Supreme Court held that there was abuse in the
discretion of the judge in granting bail to the accused considering
that the motion for bail was filed on a Saturday and the hearing
was immediately conducted on Monday thereby depriving the
prosecution to make an opposition thereto and violating the 3-day
notice rule embodied in Rule 15, Sec. 4 of Rules of Court. It is a
well-established rule of law that bail is not a matter of right and
requires a hearing where the accused is charged with an offense
which
is
punishable
by
death, reclusion
perpetua or
life
FACTS:
There was a torrens title submitted and accepted by
Manotoc Securities Inc., which was suspected to be fake. Six of its
clients filed separate criminal complaints against the petitioner
and Leveriza, President and V-President respectively. He was
charged with estafa and was allowed by the Court to post bail.
Petitioner filed before each trial court motion for permission to
leave the country stating his desire to go to U.S. relative to his
business transactions and opportunities. Such was opposed by the
prosecution and was also denied by the judges. He filed petition
for certiorari with CA seeking to annul the prior orders and the SEC
satisfied itself that she would comply with the conditions of her
matter of right, neither the courts that granted bail nor SEC, which
bail bond.
Case 18
Gov. of the US vs Judge Puruganan
GR no. 148571
Sept 24, 2002; Dec 17, 2002
ISSUE:
FACTS:
Rules of Court defines bail as the security required and given for
ISSUE:
HELD:
As suggested by the use of the word conviction, the
constitutional provision on bail, as well as Sec. 4 of Rule 114 of the
Rules of Court applies only when a person has been arrested and
detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply
to extradition proceedings, because extradition courts do not
render judgements of conviction or acquittal.
Case 19
Gov of Hong Kong vs Hon. Olalia
GR no. 153675
April 19, 2007
FACTS:
Case 20
Tatad v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. Nos. L-72335-39
March 21, 1998
Facts:
The complainant, Antonio de los Reyes, originally filed what
was
deprived
of
his
Ruling:
Yes. Due process and right to speedy disposition of trial
were violated. First, the complaint came to life, only after
petitioner Tatad had a falling out with President Marcos. Second,
departing from established procedures prescribed by law for
preliminary investigation, which require the submission of
affidavits and counter-affidavits by the complainant and the
respondent and their witnesses, the Tanodbayan referred the
complaint to the Presidential Security Command for finding
investigation and report. P.D. 911 prescribes a ten-day period for
the prosecutor to resolve a case under preliminary investigation by
him from its termination. Although, the period fixed by law was
merely directory, a delay of close to three years cannot be
deemed reasonable.