Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Europe Program
Vol. 2, No. 1
February 2015
Policy Challenge: The Alternative
for Germany (AfD) is a rightwing populist party that should
not be underestimated. It has
nationwide appeal, including
to middle class voters with
higher income and education
levels. Its program goes beyond
opposing the euro to being
for the nation, against the
political establishment. It has
right-extremist elements but is
supported by up to 30 percent of
voters. Its reorganization around
a dominant leader will likely
prevent it from self-destructing
as others like it have before.
Policy Recommendations:
Moderate parties can best
reclaim voters from the AfD
by campaigning as guardians
of the German interest with
tighter asylum law and a hard
line on Euro-area issues. This
can strengthen the nationalist
tone in domestic debates in the
short term, and have negative
consequences for asylum
seekers in Germany and the
eurozone. This is the dilemma
moderate parties face with
right-wing populists. In the
run-up to the 2017 national
elections, however, these may
be unavoidable trade-offs to
counter the AfDs rise, which is
necessary for Germany to be the
motor of European integration.
1744 R Street NW
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A Textbook Right-Wing
Populist Party
In the last two years, the Alternative
for Germany (AfD) has erupted on
the political scene. Founded in 2012,
it has had a remarkable increase in
voter support in recent months. It
attracted a little less than 5 percent
of the votes in the state elections in
Hesse and in the federal election in
September 2013, i.e. just below the
threshold for parliamentary representation. In the May 2014 European
Parliament elections, the AfD won 7.1
percent and it now polls at between
6 and 8 percent nationally. It had its
greatest successes to date in the elections in the eastern states of Brandenburg, Saxony, and Thuringia in the
autumn of 2014. With 9.7 percent in
Saxony, 10.6 percent in Thuringia, and
12.2 percent in Brandenburg the AfD
outperformed the Greens (Bndnis
90/Die Grnen) and the Liberals
(FDP) by far, and took fourth place
behind the Conservatives (CDU/
CSU), the Social Democrats (SPD),
and the Left (Die Linke). While the
6.1 percent it gathered in the election
for the city assembly in Hamburg
on February 15 may look like a less
impressive result, it is actually a mile-
Europe Program
Policy Brief
party in Germany.2 The head of the
partys regional chapter in Saxony,
Frauke Petry, wants to establish the
AfD as a conservative political force in
the democratic spectrum where the
CDU/CSU once stood.3 This stands in
contrast to the informal party leader,
Bernd Lucke, who sees the AfD as a
modern peoples party, which cannot
be placed according to a left-right
scheme.4
4 Thringer-Allgemeine (March 24, 2014). AfD-Chef Lucke in Erfurt: Wir stehen nicht
rechts von der CSU. http://www.thueringer-allgemeine.de/web/zgt/politik/detail/-/
specific/AfD-Chef-Lucke-in-Erfurt-Wir-stehen-nicht-rechts-von-der-CSU-990041678.
5 Stern (June 4, 2014). Wer die AfD whlt. http://www.stern.de/politik/deutschland/
forsa-analyse-wer-die-afd-waehlt-2115316.html
6 Decker, O., J. Kiess, and E. Brhler (2014). Die stabilisierte Mitte. Rechtsextreme Einstellung in Deutschland 2014. http://www.uni-leipzig.de/~kredo/Mitte_Leipzig_Internet.
pdf. Universitt Leipzig.
7 Welt (June 4, 2014). op cit.
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Policy Brief
This pattern nearly perfectly
resembles that of electoral
support for right-wing
populist parties across
Europe, which mainly
bring together supporters
of center-right and social
democratic parties, as well
as protest voters. It confirms
that right-wing populist
parties unite voters with a
conservative value-set and
those keen on stating their
general political dissatisfaction.8
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Policy Brief
state support, and heterosexual German couples should be
encouraged to have more children.
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Policy Brief
In Germanys Interest: Recalibrating Relations
with Russia and the United States
The AfD calls for a general overhaul of Germanys role in
international affairs. This especially applies in relation to
the two countries of highest strategic importance for the
country: Russia and the United States. AfDs vice speaker,
Alexander Gauland, the partys expert on foreign policy,
has shown strong sympathy for Russias interference in
Ukraine. He has argued that it is merely reaching out for
territory that constitutes the core of modern Russia, and
that denying Russias influence in this area would be similar
to denying Germany claiming the cities of Aachen or
Cologne.20 The AfD rejects all forms of sanctions against
Russia and wants Germany and the EU to remain neutral
in the conflict between Ukraine and Russia.21 This call for
German and EU neutrality is not limited to the conflict
in Ukraine only: the AfD says it should be the guiding
principle for all disputes that any European country east of
Germany might have with Russia.22
Not only does the AfD take a far friendlier stance toward
Russia than most other parties, it is also far more skeptical toward the United States. For example, it rejects the
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Agreement (TTIP),
depicting it as a threat to Germanys consumer protection
and environmental standards, social welfare and cultural
policies, and constitutional process.23 While the partys
conservative wing around Lucke is less outspoken with
regard to U.S.-German relations, Gauland has stated that
the epoch of intense transatlantic cooperation ended in
1990.24
The AfD in the German Party Spectrum
The AfDs campaign program perfectly fits the winning
formula of other right-wing populist parties in Europe.25 It
is characterized by a lack of economic policies and a strong
20 http://www.alternativefuer.de/thesenpapier-aussenpolitik/
21 http://www.alternativefuer.de/thesenpapier-aussenpolitik/
22 http://www.alternativefuer.de/programm-hintergrund/fragen-und-antworten/aussenpolitik/
23 http://www.alternativefuer.de/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/Argument-9-Freihandelsabkommen.pdf
24 Welt (August 20, 2014). Tiefer Riss durchzieht die AfD in Russland-Frage. http://
www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article131432482/Tiefer-Riss-durchzieht-die-AfD-inRussland-Frage.html.
25 Ennser, L. (2010). The homogeneity of West European party families. The radical
right in comparative perspective. Party Politics 20: 286-296; Fieschi, C. (2013). Introduction. Populist Fantasies: European revolts in context, Counterpoint.
Europe Program
Policy Brief
Figure 3: The Political Positioning of the AfD and Other Right-Wing Populists
Source: Author
Organization and
Leadership Still in
the Making
In Germany and
across Europe, many
right-wing populist
parties that emerged
with narratives
similar to the AfDs
have self-destructed
in the past. This
has usually been
through a combination of their core
issues losing salience
or being co-opted,
internal differences,
or lack of organizational capacity.
This happened in
Germany before in
the short-lived electoral advances of Die
Republikaner, the
last right-wing populist party to gather substantial support,
which also polled steadily at 6-8 percent nationwide in
the early 1990s. But when all the major parties agreed to
change the constitution to tighten asylum law in 1992-93,
support for the party quickly fell. It has not attracted more
than 2 percent of voters since. This decline fuelled internal
frictions in the party, which in turn further drove voters
away.
For as long as its core issues make it popular to voters,
the AfD is not likely to self-destruct as a result of internal
divisions alone. Its leadership mainly consists of former
CDU politicians and national-conservative intellectuals.
26 Fieschi, C. (2013). Introduction. Populist Fantasies: European revolts in context,
Counterpoint.; Mudde, C. (2013). The 2012 Stein Rokkan Lecture. Three decades of
populist radical right parties in Western Europe: So what? European Journal of Political
Research 52(1): 1-19.; Rydgren, J. (2007). The Sociology of the Radical Right. Annual
Review of Sociology 33: 241-262.
Europe Program
Policy Brief
This provides the party with a mix of party-management
skills and intellectual rigor that is likely to prevent it from
collapsing.
This is not to say that there are no internal division within
the AfD. Until January 2015, it relied on three equal
spokespersons: Konrad Adam, Bernd Lucke, and Frauke
Petry. Lucke, a professor of economics from the University
of Hamburg, has effectively acted as informal party leader.
He was considered to be best suited to representing a party
critical of European monetary and fiscal policies. Infighting
over the organizational and programmatic development of
the party in 2013 and 2014 led Lucke to state that he would
step down from the leadership unless he was elected the
sole leader. Despite fierce resistance, he was able to settle
almost all organizational matters in his favor at the party
congress in early February 2015. The party will continue
with its three spokespersons until April 2015, when their
number will be reduced to two. From November, it will
have a single chairperson. There is hardly any doubt that
Lucke will be elected as sole party leader at that point,
which means that the party will face fierce internal debates
over its program in the months to come.
The liberal wing of the AfD lost influence, with its key
figures quitting the party over the last two years after losing
internal battles. They complained about the lack of liberal
positions within the party and the absence of internal
democracy. With a few exceptions, the infighting now takes
place between the conservatives around Lucke and the
national-conservatives around Adam, Petry, and Gauland.
Their substantial programmatic differences can be illustrated with the debate on how to deal with the Pegida
protests. Pegida, which stands for Patriotic Europeans
against the Islamization of the Occident, has organized
marches in different cities since October 2014. While 17
percent of the general public sympathizes with it, among
AfD supporters, that figure jumps to 70 percent.27 The
movement has been condemned as racist and xenophobic
by Chancellor Angela Merkel and almost all other leading
politicians and by Lucke, who here sides with the established parties and rejects any collaboration with Pegida.
However, Adam, Gauland, and Petry sympathize with the
27 Zeit (January 16, 2015). Pegida nur bei AfD-Whlern beliebt. http://www.zeit.de/
politik/deutschland/2015-01/pegida-afd-politbarometer
29 Husler, A. and R. Roeser (2014). Rechtspopulismus in Europa und die rechtspopulistische Lcke in Deutschland. Erfurt, Mobit e.V.
Europe Program
Policy Brief
In order to streamline the partys programmatic appeal
and its organizational structure, most right-wing populist parties also tend to be organized around one dominant leading figure. This authoritarian model serves two
purposes. First, the leader symbolizes the partys claim
to present clear-cut solutions to complex political problems. Second, having a strong leader who is not from
the extremist faction prevents the latter from gaining
momentum within the party.30 The AfDs internal turmoil
around the leadership of Bernd Lucke and the organizational revamp follow this well-known pattern.
A Consolidated Right-Wing Populist Party
to Reckon With
This analysis shows that the AfD is clearly a right-wing
populist party with solid voter potential. At least 30 percent
of voters see it as a credible political force for which they
have sympathies.31 Its ongoing organizational consolidation will most likely help it endure, and its right-extremist
element will not hamper its electoral advances. Its electoral
appeal based on nostalgic nationalism places the AfD
in the same category as successful right-wing populist
parties such as the Front National in France or the United
Kingdom Independence Party.
As it becomes a more prominent party, voters will almost
entirely base their voting decision on a comparison of the
AfDs program with that of other parties. This means that
their strategy of avoiding the AfDs program altogether will
lead to voters continuing to turn away from other parties.
Instead, as analyses of strategies to deal with right-wing
populists in other EU member states have shown, other
parties can reclaim a substantial number of voters that have
switched to the AfD by co-opting parts of its program and
also proposing policies to protect German culture. This
does not mean duplicating or adopting the AfDs ideas.
Instead, it entails staying with or reintroducing conservative positions on matters of immigration and European
30 Fieschi, C. (2013). Introduction. Populist Fantasies: European revolts in context,
Counterpoint.; Mudde, C. (2013). The 2012 Stein Rokkan Lecture. Three decades of
populist radical right parties in Western Europe: So what? European Journal of Political
Research 52(1): 1-19.; Rydgren, J. (2007). The Sociology of the Radical Right. Annual
Review of Sociology 33: 241-262.
31 Welt (June 4,2014). Jeder dritte Deutsche will die AfD im Bundestag http://www.
welt.de/politik/deutschland/article128706682/Jeder-dritte-Deutsche-will-die-AfD-imBundestag.html.
Europe Program
Policy Brief
In purely electoral terms, research shows, the most promising strategies for moderate parties to reclaim voters from
the AfD are tightening asylum law and taking a restrictive stance on further EU integration and a hard line on
euro-area matters, including the possibility of letting
countries exit the currency union. However, these strategies would strengthen the nationalist tone in the domestic
debates (in the short term at least), cause a policy shift that
reduces the prospects of asylum-seekers in Germany, and
make much needed further integration in the euro area
politically much more difficult. These difficult trade-offs
illustrate the dilemma moderate German parties face in
dealing with the AfD. Between now and the national elections in 2017, however, this may be an unavoidable price to
pay to counter the rise of the AfD, which is necessary for
Germany to be the motor of European integration in the
longer run.
About GMF
The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) strengthens
transatlantic cooperation on regional, national, and global challenges
and opportunities in the spirit of the Marshall Plan. GMF does this by
supporting individuals and institutions working in the transatlantic
sphere, by convening leaders and members of the policy and business
communities, by contributing research and analysis on transatlantic
topics, and by providing exchange opportunities to foster renewed
commitment to the transatlantic relationship. In addition, GMF supports a number of initiatives to strengthen democracies. Founded in
1972 as a non-partisan, non-profit organization through a gift from
Germany as a permanent memorial to Marshall Plan assistance, GMF
maintains a strong presence on both sides of the Atlantic. In addition
to its headquarters in Washington, DC, GMF has offices in Berlin,
Paris, Brussels, Belgrade, Ankara, Bucharest, and Warsaw. GMF also
has smaller representations in Bratislava, Turin, and Stockholm.