TING VS.

VELEZ-TING
FACTS:
Petitioner Benjamin Ting (Benjamin) and respondent Carmen
Velez-Ting (Carmen) first met in 1972 while they were classmates in
medical school. They fell in love, and they were wed on July 26, 1975 in
Cebu City when respondent was already pregnant with their first child.
In September 1975, Benjamin passed the medical board
examinations and thereafter proceeded to take a residency program to
become a surgeon but shifted to anesthesiology. In 1980, he began
working for Velez Hospital, owned by Carmens family, as member of its
active staff, while Carmen worked as the hospitals Treasurer.
The couple begot six (6) children, namely Dennis; James Louis;
Agnes Irene; Charles Laurence; Myles Vincent and Marie Corinne.
After being married for more than 18 years to petitioner and while
their youngest child was only two years old, Carmen filed a verified
petition before the RTC of Cebu City praying for the declaration of nullity
of their marriage. She claimed that Benjamin suffered from psychological
incapacity even at the time of the celebration of their marriage, which,
however, only became manifest thereafter.
In her complaint, Carmen stated that prior to their marriage, she
was already aware that Benjamin used to drink and gamble occasionally
with his friends. But after they were married, petitioner continued to drink
regularly.
Carmen also complained that petitioner deliberately refused to
give financial support to their family and would even get angry at her
whenever she asked for money for their children. He rarely stayed home
and even neglected his obligation to his children.
Benjamin only stopped going to the casinos in 1986 after he was
banned therefrom for having caused trouble.
In his answer, Benjamin denied being psychologically
incapacitated. He maintained that he is a respectable person, as his peers
would confirm. He said that he is an active member of social and athletic
clubs and would drink and gamble only for social reasons and for leisure.
As for his alleged failure to support his family financially, Benjamin
claimed that it was Carmen herself who would collect his professional fees
from Velez Hospital.
During the trial, Carmens testimony regarding Benjamins
drinking and gambling habits and violent behavior was corroborated by
Susana Wasawas, who served as nanny to the spouses children.
Carmen also presented as witness Dr. Pureza Trinidad-Oate, a
psychiatrist. Instead of the usual personal interview, however, Dr. Oates

evaluation of Benjamin was limited to the transcript of stenographic notes

taken during Benjamins deposition because the latter had already gone
to work as an anesthesiologist in a hospital in South Africa. After reading
the transcript of stenographic notes, Dr. Oate concluded that Benjamins
compulsive drinking, compulsive gambling and physical abuse of
respondent are clear indications that petitioner suffers from a personality
disorder.
To refute Dr. Oates opinion, petitioner presented Dr. Renato D.
Obra, a psychiatrist and a consultant at the Department of Psychiatry in
Don Vicente Sotto Memorial Medical Center, as his expert witness. Dr.
Obra evaluated Benjamins psychological behavior based on the transcript
of stenographic notes, as well as the psychiatric evaluation report
prepared by Dr. A.J.L. Pentz, a psychiatrist from the University of Pretoria
in South Africa, and his (Dr. Obras) interview with Benjamins brothers.
Contrary to Dr. Oates findings, Dr. Obra observed that there is nothing
wrong with petitioners personality, considering the latters good
relationship with his fellow doctors and his good track record as
anesthesiologist.
Lower court rendered its Decision declaring the marriage between
petitioner and respondent null and void. The RTC gave credence to Dr.
Oates findings and the admissions made by Benjamin in the course of
his deposition, and found him to be psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential obligations of marriage.
CA: reversed. It faulted the trial courts finding, stating that no
proof was adduced to support the conclusion that Benjamin was
psychologically incapacitated at the time he married Carmen since Dr.
Oates conclusion was based only on theories and not on established
fact.
Because of this, Carmen filed a motion for reconsideration,
arguing that the Molina guidelines should not be applied to this case since
the Molina decision was promulgated only more than five years after she
had filed her petition with the RTC. Initially, the CA denied the motion for
reconsideration for having been filed beyond the prescribed period.
Respondent thereafter filed a manifestation explaining compliance with
the prescriptive period but the same was likewise denied for lack of merit.
Undaunted, respondent filed a petition for certiorari with this Court. Court
granted the petition and directed the CA to resolve Carmens motion for
reconsideration.
CA issued an Amended Decision reversing its first ruling and
sustaining the trial courts decision.
A motion for reconsideration was filed, this time by Benjamin, but
the same was denied by the CA. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:

I.

Whether the CA violated the rule on stare

decisis when it refused to follow the guidelines set
forth under the Santos and Molina cases;

HELD:
The principle of stare decisis enjoins adherence by lower courts to
doctrinal rules established by this Court in its final decisions. It is based
on the principle that once a question of law has been examined and
decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further argument.
Basically, it is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issues,
necessary for two simple reasons: economy and stability.
Associate Justice (now Chief Justice) Reynato S. Punos discussion
on the historical development of this legal principle in his dissenting
opinion in Lambino v. Commission on Elections is enlightening:
The latin phrase stare decisis et non quieta
movere means stand by the thing and do not disturb the
calm. As the rule evolved, early limits to its application
were recognized: (1) it would not be followed if it were
plainly unreasonable; (2) where courts of equal
authority developed conflicting decisions; and, (3) the
binding force of the decision was the actual principle or
principles necessary for the decision; not the words or
reasoning used to reach the decision.
It is also instructive to distinguish the two kinds of
horizontal stare decisis constitutional stare decisis and
statutory stare decisis. Constitutional stare decisis
involves judicial interpretations of the Constitution while
statutory stare decisis involves interpretations of
statutes. Stare decisis is not . . . a universal and
inexorable command. The rule of stare decisis is not
inflexible. Whether it shall be followed or departed from, is
a question entirely within the discretion of the court, which
is again called upon to consider a question once decided.
In general, courts follow the stare decisis rule for
an ensemble of reasons, viz.: (1) it legitimizes judicial
institutions; (2) it promotes judicial economy; and, (3) it
allows for predictability. Contrariwise, courts refuse to be
bound by the stare decisis rule where (1) its application
perpetuates illegitimate and unconstitutional holdings; (2)
it cannot accommodate changing social and political
understandings; (3) it leaves the power to overturn bad
constitutional law solely in the hands of Congress; and, (4)
activist judges can dictate the policy for future courts
while judges that respect stare decisis are stuck agreeing
with them.

The leading case in deciding whether a court

should follow the stare decisis rule in constitutional
litigations is Planned Parenthood v. Casey. It established a
4-pronged test. The court should
(1) determine whether the rule has proved to be
intolerable simply in defying practical workability;
(2) consider whether the rule is subject to a kind
of reliance that would lend a special hardship to the
consequences of overruling and add inequity to the cost of
repudiation;
(3) determine whether related principles of law
have so far developed as to have the old rule no more
than a remnant of an abandoned doctrine; and,
(4) find out whether facts have so changed or
come to be seen differently, as to have robbed the old rule
of significant application or justification.
To be forthright, respondents argument that the doctrinal
guidelines prescribed in Santos and Molina should not be applied
retroactively for being contrary to the principle of stare decisis is no
longer new. It is only when a prior ruling of this Court is overruled, and a
different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be applied
prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine and
have acted in good faith, in accordance therewith under the familiar rule
of lex prospicit, non respicit.

Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the petition for relief on the grounds
that the petition was filed out of time; that it failed to indicate a good and
substantial defense; that it failed to show the fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable negligence relied upon as basis for the petition; and that it was
not filed in the same court and in the same cause as required by Section 3
of Rule 38. Private respondent filed an opposition to said motion to
dismiss.
Lower court dismissed the petition for relief for lack of jurisdiction to hear
and determine the same.
Private respondent filed a notice of appeal from the order of dismissal to
the Intermediate Appellate Court.
SERVICE SPECIALISTS, INCORPORATED vs.
THE SHERIFF OF MANILA, DEPUTY SHERIFF ENRIQUITO A. VIOLETA
and ROY DIAZ
FACTS:
This is a petition for mandamus to compel respondents Sheriff and Deputy
Sheriff of Manila to proceed with the sale at public auction of the
properties of private respondent which had been levied upon on execution
of a final and executory judgment , pending appeal from an order
dismissing a petition for relief from said judgment.
Petitioner filed with the RTC Manila an action for replevin and damages
against private respondent. After private respondent had filed his answer,
a pre-trial conference was set by the lower court of which the counsels
were duly notified and commissioned to secure the presence of the parties
they represented. Both private respondent and his counsel failed to
appear at the pre-trial and, as prayed for by counsel for petitioner, private
respondent was declared as in default.
Lower court rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendant Roy Diaz.
After said decision had become final, the lower court granted the motion
for execution filed by petitioner.
Private respondent filed a petition for relief from judgment and
subsequently assigned to Branch XII of the Regional Trial Court of Manila.

Writ of execution was issued pursuant to the order of execution issued by

the lower court.
Respondent deputy sheriff issued a notice of levy and sale of the
properties of private respondent levied on, but on the date of the auction
sale, said respondent sheriff refused to proceed with the auction because
of the protest of private respondent based on his appeal from the order
dismissing his petition for relief.
ISSUE: WON petition for mandamus should be granted.
HELD: YES.
Although private respondent correctly states that "after the decision in
Civil Case No. 85-29444 had already become final and executory, and
appeal was no longer available and feasible under the ordinary course of
law, petition for relief from judgment is the most available
remedy," he did not comply with the provision of Section 2 of Rule 38
which reads:
Petition to Court of First Instance for relief from judgment
or other proceeding thereof.-When a judgment or order is
entered, or any other proceeding is taken, against a party
in a Court of First In- stance through fraud, accident,
mistake, or excusable negligence, he may file a petition in
such court and in the same cause praying that the
judgment, order or proceeding be set aside.
In the case of Braca vs. Tan, this Court held:

It is clear from the foregoing provisions of Rule 38 that the

petition for relief from a judgment of the Court of First
Instance must be filed in the same court that rendered the
judgment and in the same cause wherein the judgment
was rendered; and that if the court finds the allegations of
the petition to be true, it shall set aside the judgment and
try the principal case upon its merits as if a timely motion
for new trial had been granted therein.
In the case at bar, private respondent filed his petition for relief also with
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, but he did not file it in the same case;
he filed it in another case, No. 85- 34098. Branch XII of the lower court to
which Civil Case No. 85-34098 was assigned could not take cognizance of
the petition for relief, because it was not the same branch of the court
which rendered the judgment from which relief was sought. It was Branch
L of the lower court which could properly take cognizance of said petition
and which, if it found the allegations thereof to be true, could order the
judgment complained of to be set aside and proceed to hear and
determine the case as if a timely motion for new trial had been granted
(Sections 6 and 7 of Rule 38).
The judge who rendered the judgment is not a party in a petition for relief
from said judgment. A petition for relief from judgment is not like a
petition for certiorari wherein the judge is made a party respondent
because he is alleged to have acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction
or with grave abuse of discretion. In a petition for relief from judgment,
the petitioner claims that due to extrinsic fraud, accident, mistake, or
excusable negligence, he has been unjustly deprived of a hearing or has
been prevented from taking an appeal.
In order to stay execution, it was necessary for private respondent to
obtain a writ of preliminary injunction in accordance with Section 5 of Rule
38.
As this Court held in the case of Asian Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. vs.
Relucio:
The necessity of securing a writ of preliminary injunction
to suspend or stay the execution of the judgment sought
to be set aside under Rule 38, stems from the fact that
such judgment had already become final and executory
otherwise the remedy would be a motion for new trial
under Rule 37 of the Rules. There is no question then, that
unless restrained such judgment could be executed as it

would then be the ministerial duty of the court to issue the

writ of execution.
While it is true that in ordinary cases, by the perfection of
an appeal, under section 9 of Rule 41 of the Rules, the trial
court loses jurisdiction over its judgment, and cannot
order its execution, the judgment adverted to refers to
one which has not attained finality because of the timely
appeal therefrom. Such is not applicable to an appeal from
an order dismissing or denying a petition for relief from
judgment, under Rule 38, because the judgment from
which relief is sought is already final and executory. And
the only way by which the execution of said judgment
could be suspended, is that prescribed in section 5 of Rule
38.
The purpose of the rule is to enable the appellate court to 'determine not
only the existence of any of the grounds relied upon whether it be fraud,
accident, mistake or excusable negligence, but also and primarily the
merit of the petitioner's cause of action or defense, as the case may be. If
the appellate court finds that one of the grounds exists and, what is of
decisive importance, that the petitioner has a good cause of action or
defense, it will reverse the denial or dismissal, set aside the judgment in
the main case and remand the case to the lower court for a new trial in
accordance with Section 7 of Rule 38.
On the other hand, if the petition for relief is against an order disallowing
an appeal for having been filed out of time and the petition is denied or
dismissed, in the appeal from the denial or dismissal the appellate court
must also be apprised of the merit of the case of the party who assails
such denial or dismissal. If the appellate court finds a justifiable ground
and a meritorious case, it will reverse the denial or dismissal and allow the
appeal from the decision in the main case.
Petitioner in its Reply urges this Court to make a finding that the petition
for relief from judgment was filed out of time as this would render the
discussion on the merits of the petition moot and academic.
Court required private respondent to file a Rejoinder to petitioner's Reply,
particularly specifying the date on which his counsel received a copy of
the decision dated August 9, 1985. Unfortunately, private respondent did
not file a Rejoinder.

The failure of private respondent to comply with the resolution requiring

him to specify particularly the date on which his counsel received a copy
of the decision supports petitioner's contention that the petition for relief
was filed way beyond the reglementary period of sixty days after the
petitioner learns of the judgment (Section 3 of Rule 38), inasmuch as said
period begins to run from the date the petitioner's lawyer is notified of the
decision.
The levy on execution was made within the reglementary period of sixty
days after its receipt by respondent Deputy Sheriff Section 11 of Rule 39),
as shown by the Notice of Levy and Sale. Consequently, the sale on
execution may properly proceed. It is the ministerial duty of the lower
court to order the execution of its final and executory judgment and it is
the legal duty of respondent sheriffs to enforce the order of execution.
*Servicewide Specialists Inc. v. Sheriff of Manila 145 SCRA 139 (1986)
-

Petition for relief should be filed in the same case and in the same
branch of the court which rendered the judgrnent from which relief
was sought.
*Unless a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued, execution
of the judgment shall proceed even if the order denying the
petition for relief is pending on appeal.
o Said writ may be sought either in the trial or appellate
courts.
The judge who rendered the judgment is not a party in a petition
for relief from said judgment.
o It is not like a petition for certiorari wherein the judge is
made a party respondent because he is alleged to have
acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion.
In a petition for relief from judgment, the petitioner claims that
due to extrinsic fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence,
he has been unjustly deprived of a hearing or has been prevented
from taking an appeal.
To stay execution of a final and executory judgment, a writ of
preliminary injunction must be obtained.
*A judgment or order denying relief is final and appealable.
*An order granting relief is interlocutory.
If the petition for relief is against an order disallowing an appeal
for having been filed out of time and the petition is denied or
dismissed, in the appeal from the denial or dismissal the appellate
court must also be apprised of the merit of the case of the party
who assails such denial or dismissal.
o If the appellate court finds a justifiable ground and a
meritorious case, it will reverse the denial or dismissal and
allow the appeal from the decision in the main case.

ASIAVEST MERCHANT BANKERS

APPEALS
and
PHILIPPINE
CORPORATION

(M) BERHAD
NATIONAL

vs. COURT OF
CONSTRUCTION

FACTS:
The petitioner Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad is a corporation
organized under the laws of Malaysia while private respondent Philippine
National Construction Corporation is a corporation duly incorporated and
existing under Philippine laws.
It appears that petitioner initiated a suit for collection against private
respondent.
Petitioner sought to recover the indemnity of the performance bond it had
put up in favor of private respondent to guarantee the completion of the
Felda Project and the non-payment of the loan it extended to AsiavestCDCP Sdn. Bhd.
High Court of Malaya (Commercial Division) rendered judgment in favor of
the petitioner and against the private respondent which is also designated
therein as the 2nd Defendant.
The 2nd Defendant having entered appearance herein and the Court
having ordered that judgment as hereinafter provided be entered for the
Plaintiffs against the 2nd Defendant.
High Court of Malaya issued an Order directing the private respondent to
pay petitioner interest on the sums covered by the said Judgment.
Following unsuccessful attempts to secure payment from private
respondent under the judgment, petitioner initiated the complaint before

Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila, to enforce the judgment of the
High Court of Malaya.
Private respondent sought the dismissal of the case via a Motion to
Dismiss contending that the alleged judgment of the High Court of Malaya
should be denied recognition or enforcement since on its face, it is tainted
with want of jurisdiction, want of notice to private respondent, collusion
and/or fraud, and there is a clear mistake of law or fact. Dismissal was,
however, denied by the trial court considering that the grounds relied
upon are not the proper grounds in a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of
the Revised Rules of Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Malaysian Court judgment should be enforced
against PNCC in the Philippines.
HELD:
In this jurisdiction, a valid judgment rendered by a foreign tribunal may be
recognized insofar as the immediate parties and the underlying cause of
action are concerned so long as it is convincingly shown that there has
been an opportunity for a full and fair hearing before a court of competent
jurisdiction; that the trial upon regular proceedings has been conducted.
A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country
from which it comes, until a contrary showing, on the basis of a
presumption of regularity of proceedings and the giving of due notice in
the foreign forum. Under Section 50(b), Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of
Court, which was the governing law at the time the instant case was
decided by the trial court and respondent appellate court, a judgment,
against a person, of a tribunal of a foreign country having jurisdiction to
pronounce the same is presumptive evidence of a right as between the
parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title. The
judgment may, however, be assailed by evidence of want of jurisdiction,
want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
In addition, under Section 3(n), Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court, a
court, whether in the Philippines or elsewhere, enjoys the presumption
that it was acting in the lawful exercise of its jurisdiction. Hence, once the
authenticity of the foreign judgment is proved, the party attacking a
foreign judgment, is tasked with the burden of overcoming its presumptive
validity.
In the instant case, petitioner sufficiently established the existence of the
money judgment of the High Court of Malaya by the evidence it offered.
In addition to testimonial evidence, petitioner offered documentary
evidences.

Having thus proven, through the foregoing evidence, the existence and
authenticity of the foreign judgment, said foreign judgment enjoys
presumptive validity and the burden then fell upon the party who disputes
its validity, herein private respondent, to prove otherwise.
Needless to stress, the recognition to be accorded a foreign judgment is
not necessarily affected by the fact that the procedure in the courts of the
country in which such judgment was rendered differs from that of the
courts of the country in which the judgment is relied on. Ultimately,
matters of remedy and procedure such as those relating to the service of
summons or court process upon the defendant, the authority of counsel to
appear and represent a defendant and the formal requirements in a
decision are governed by the lex fori or the internal law of the forum, i.e.,
the law of Malaysia in this case.
In this case, it is the procedural law of Malaysia where the judgment was
rendered that determines the validity of the service of court process on
private respondent as well as other matters raised by it. As to what the
Malaysian procedural law is, remains a question of fact, not of law. It may
not be taken judicial notice of and must be pleaded and proved like any
other fact. Accordingly, the presumption of validity and regularity of
service of summons and the decision thereafter rendered by the High
Court of Malaya must stand.
On the matter of alleged lack of authority of the law firm of Allen and
Gledhill to represent private respondent, not only did the private
respondents witnesses admit that the said law firm of Allen and Gledhill
were its counsels in its transactions in Malaysia, but of greater significance
is the fact that petitioner offered in evidence relevant Malaysian
jurisprudence to the effect that (a) it is not necessary under Malaysian law
for counsel appearing before the Malaysian High Court to submit a special
power of attorney authorizing him to represent a client before said court,
(b) that counsel appearing before the Malaysian High Court has full
authority to compromise the suit, and (c) that counsel appearing before
the Malaysian High Court need not comply with certain pre-requisites as
required under Philippine law to appear and compromise judgments on
behalf of their clients before said court.
On the ground that collusion, fraud and clear mistake of fact and law
tainted the judgment of the High Court of Malaya, no clear evidence of the
same was adduced or shown. The facts which the trial court found
intriguing amounted to mere conjectures and specious observations.
Furthermore, even when the foreign judgment is based on the drafts
prepared by counsel for the successful party, such is not per se indicative
of collusion or fraud.
Fraud to hinder the enforcement within the
jurisdiction of a foreign judgment must be extrinsic, i.e., fraud based on
facts not controverted or resolved in the case where judgment is
rendered, or that which would go to the jurisdiction of the court or would
deprive the party against whom judgment is rendered a chance to defend
the action to which he has a meritorious defense. Intrinsic fraud is one

which goes to the very existence of the cause of action is deemed already
adjudged, and it, therefore, cannot militate against the recognition or
enforcement of the foreign judgment. Evidence is wanting on the alleged
extrinsic fraud. Hence, such unsubstantiated allegation cannot give rise to
liability therein.
Lastly, there is no merit to the argument that the foreign judgment is not
enforceable in view of the absence of any statement of facts and law upon
which the award in favor of the petitioner was based. As aforestated, the
lex fori or the internal law of the forum governs matters of remedy and
procedure. Considering that under the procedural rules of the High Court
of Malaya, a valid judgment may be rendered even without stating in the
judgment every fact and law upon which the judgment is based, then the
same must be accorded respect and the courts in this jurisdiction cannot
invalidate the judgment of the foreign court simply because our rules
provide otherwise.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals sustaining the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 168 denying the enforcement of the
Judgment dated September 13, 1985 of the High Court of Malaya in Kuala
Lumpur is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

Simplified ruling (from net):

Yes. PNCC failed to prove and substantiate its bare allegations of want of
jurisdiction, want of notice, collusion and/or fraud, and mistake of fact. On
the contrary, Asiavest was able to present evidence as to the validity of
the proceedings that took place in Malaysia. Asiavest presented the
certified and authenticated copies of the judgment and the order issued
by the Malaysian Court. It also presented correspondences between
Asiavests lawyers and PNCCs lawyers in and out of court which belied
PNCCs allegation that the Malaysian court never acquired jurisdiction
over it. PNCCs allegation of fraud is not sufficient too, further, it never
invoked the same in the Malaysian Court.
The Supreme Court notes, to assail a foreign judgment the party must
present evidence of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Otherwise, the judgment
enjoys the presumption of validity so long as it was duly certified and
authenticated. In this case, PNCC failed to present the required evidence.