DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT BETWEEN PRINT & BROADCAST

MEDIA
TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND BROADCAST ATTORNEYS OF THE
PHILIPPINES, INC. and GMA NETWORK, INC., petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
[G.R. No. 132922. April 21, 1998]
FACTS:
Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of
the Philippines, Inc. (TELEBAP) is an organization of lawyers of radio and
television broadcasting companies. They are suing as citizens, taxpayers
and registered voters. It was declared to be without legal standing to
sue in this case as, among other reasons, it was not able to show that it
was to suffer from actual or threatened injury as a result of the subject
law. Other petitioner, GMA Network, Inc., appears to have the requisite
standing to bring this constitutional challenge. Petitioner operates radio
and television broadcast stations in the Philippines affected by the
enforcement of Sec. 92 of B.P Blg. 881 requiring radio and television
broadcast companies to provide free air time to the COMELEC for the
use of candidates for campaign and other political purposes. Petitioners
challenge the validity of Sec. 92 on the ground (1) that it takes property
without due process of law and without just compensation; (2) that it
denies radio and television broadcast companies the equal protection of
the laws; and (3) that it is in excess of the power given to the COMELEC
to supervise or regulate the operation of media of communication or
information during the period of election. Petitioner claims that it
suffered losses running to several million pesos in providing COMELEC
Time in connection with the 1992 presidential election and 1995
senatorial election and that it stands to suffer even more should it be
required to do so again this year. Petitioners claim that the primary
source of revenue of the radio and television stations is the sale of air
time to advertisers and to require these stations to provide free air time

is to authorize unjust taking of private property. According to petitioners,

in 1992 it lost P22,498,560.00 in providing free air time for one hour
each day and, in this years elections, it stands to lost P58,980,850.00 in
view of COMELECs requirement that it provide at least 30 minutes of
prime time daily for COMELEC Time.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 denies radio and television
broadcast companies the equal protection of the laws.
(2) Whether or not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 constitutes taking of
property without due process of law and without just compensation.
RULING:
Petitioners argument is without merit. All broadcasting,
whether radio or by television stations, is licensed by the government.
Airwave frequencies have to be allocated as there are more individuals
who want to broadcast that there are frequencies to assign. Radio and
television broadcasting companies, which are given franchises, do not
own the airwaves and frequencies through which they transmit
broadcast signals and images. They are merely given the temporary
privilege to use them. Thus, such exercise of the privilege may
reasonably be burdened with the performance by the grantee of some
form of public service. In granting the privilege to operate broadcast
stations and supervising radio and television stations, the state spends
considerable public funds in licensing and supervising them.
The argument that the subject law singles out radio and television
stations to provide free air time as against newspapers and magazines
which require payment of just compensation for the print space they
may provide is likewise without merit. Regulation of the broadcast
industry requires spending of public funds which it does not do in the
case of print media. To require the broadcast industry to provide free air
time for COMELEC is a fair exchange for what the industry gets.
As radio and television broadcast stations do not own the airwaves, no
private property is taken by the requirement that they provide air time
to the COMELEC. The use of property bears a social function and is

subject to the states duty to intervene for the common good. Broadcast
media can find their just and highest reward in the fact that whatever
altruistic service they may render in connection with the holding of
elections is for that common good.
For the foregoing reasons, the petition is dismissed.

RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION (SEC. 8, ART. III)

SSS Employee Asso. v CA 175 SCRA 686 (July 28, 1989)
Facts: The petitioners went on strike after the SSS failed to act
upon the unions demands concerning the implementation of
their CBA. SSS filed before the court action for damages with
prayer for writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners for
staging an illegal strike. The court issued a temporary restraining
order pending the resolution of the application for preliminary
injunction while petitioners filed a motion to dismiss alleging the
courts lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Petitioners
contend that the court made reversible error in taking
cognizance on the subject matter since the jurisdiction lies on the
DOLE or the National Labor Relations Commission as the case
involves a labor dispute. The SSS contends on one hand that the
petitioners are covered by the Civil Service laws, rules and
regulation thus have no right to strike. They are not covered by
the NLRC or DOLE therefore the court may enjoin the petitioners
from striking.

Issue:
1.
Whether or not SSS employers have the right to strike
2.
Whether or not the CA erred in taking jurisdiction over the
subject matter.

Held: The Constitutional provisions enshrined on Human Rights

and Social Justice provides guarantee among workers with the
right to organize and conduct peaceful concerted activities such
as strikes. On one hand, Section 14 of E.O No. 180 provides that
the Civil Service law and rules governing concerted activities
and strikes in the government service shall be observed, subject
to any legislation that may be enacted by Congress referring to
Memorandum Circular No. 6, s. 1987 of the Civil Service
Commission which states that prior to the enactment by
Congress of applicable laws concerning strike by government
employees enjoins under pain of administrative sanctions, all
government officers and employees from staging strikes,
demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs and other forms of mass
action which will result in temporary stoppage or disruption of
public service. Therefore in the absence of any legislation
allowing govt. employees to strike they are prohibited from doing
so.
In Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 the employees in the civil service
are denominated as government employees and that the SSS
is one such government-controlled corporation with an original
charter, having been created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees
are part of the civil service and are covered by the Civil Service
Commissions memorandum prohibiting strikes.
Neither the DOLE nor the NLRC has jurisdiction over the
subject matter but instead it is the Public Sector LaborManagement Council which is not granted by law authority to
issue writ of injunction in labor disputes within its jurisdiction

thus the resort of SSS before the general court for the issuance of
a writ of injunction to enjoin the strike is appropriate.

Victoriano v Elizalde Rope Workers Union 59 SCRA 54

(1974)
Facts: Plaintiff is a member of the Elizalde Rope Workers Union
who later resigned from his affiliation to the said union by reason
of the prohibition of his religion for its members to become
affiliated with any labor organization. The union has subsisting
closed shop agreement in their collective bargaining agreement
with their employer that all permanent employees of the
company must be a member of the union and later
was amended by Republic Act No. 3350 with the provision stating
"but such agreement shall not cover members of any religious
sects which prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor
organization".. By his resignation, the union wrote a letter to the
company to separate the plaintiff from the service after which he
was informed by the company that unless he makes a
satisfactory
arrangement
with
the
union
he
will
be dismissed from the service. The union contends that RA 3350
impairs obligation of contract stipulated in their CBA and
discriminatorily favors religious sects in providing exemption to
be affiliated with any labor unions.
Issue: WON RA 3350 impairs the right to form association.
Held: The court held that what the Constitution and the
Industrial Peace Act recognize and guarantee is the "right" to
form or join associations which involves two broad notions,
namely: first, liberty or freedom, i.e., the absence of legal
restraint, whereby an employee may act for himself without
being prevented by law; and second, power, whereby an
employee may join or refrain from joining an association.

Therefore the right to join a union includes the right to abstain

from joining any union. The exceptions provided by the assailed
Republic Act is that members of said religious sects cannot be
compelled or coerced to join labor unions even when said unions
have closed shop agreements with the employers; that in spite of
any closed shop agreement, members of said religious sects
cannot be refused employment or dismissed from their jobs on
the sole ground that they are not members of the collective
bargaining union. Thus this exception does not infringe upon the
constitutional provision on freedom of association but instead
reinforces it.
Villar v. Inciong
FACTS:
AEU under FUR attempted to have a certification election
but due to the opposition of AEU-PAFLU, the petition was denied
by the Med-Arbiter.
AEU-PAFLU then called a special meeting among members
and it was there decided that an investigation of certain people
would be held pursuant to the constitution and by-laws of the
Federation, of all of the petitioners and one Felipe Manlapao, for
"continuously maligning, libelling and slandering not only the
incumbent officers but even the union itself and the federation;"
spreading 'false propaganda' that the union officers were 'merely
appointees of the management', and for causing divisiveness in
the union.
A Trial Committee was then formed to investigate the
local union's charges against the petitioners for acts of disloyalty.
AEU-PAFLU and the Company concluded a new CBA which,
besides
granting
additional benefits to
the workers,
also
reincorporated the same provisions of the existing CBA, including
the union security clause reading, to wit:

All members of the UNION as of the signing of

this Agreement shall remain members thereof in good standing.
Therefore, any members who shall resign, be expelled, or shall in
any manner cease to be a member of the UNION, shall be
dismissed from his employment upon written request of the
UNION to the Company.

The petitioners were summoned to appear before the

PAFLU Trial Committee for the aforestated investigation of the
charges filed against them but they did not attend and instead
requested for a "Bill of Particulars" of the charges which had been
formalized by the AEU-PAFLU officers; they contend that their
actions were merely exercise of the right to freedom of
association.
Not recognizing PAFLU's jurisdiction over their case,
petitioners again refused to participate in the investigation
rescheduled and conducted. Instead, they merely appeared to
file their Answer to the charges and moved for a dismissal.
Based on the findings and recommendations of the PAFLU
trial committee, the PAFLU President found the petitioners guilty
of the charges against them and it was requested that they be
terminated in conformity with the security clause in the CBA.
Meanwhile, they were placed under preventive suspension and
denied access to the workplace.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Minister acted with grave abuse of discretion
when he affirmed the decision of the RO4-Officer-in-Charge
allowing the preventive suspension and subsequent dismissal of

petitioners by reason of the exercise of their right to freedom of

association.

HELD:
It is true that disaffiliation from a labor union is not open
to legal objection. It is implicit in the freedom of association
ordained by the Constitution. However, a closed shop is a valid
form of union security, and such provision in a CBA is not a
restriction of the right of freedom of association guaranteed by
the Constitution.
Here, the Company and the AEU-PAFLU entered into a CBA
with a union security clause and the stipulation for closed-shop is
clear and unequivocal and it leaves no room for doubt that the
employer is bound, under the collective bargaining agreement, to
dismiss
the
employees,
herein
petitioners,
for
nonunion membership.
Petitioners became non-union members upon their
expulsion from the general membership of the AEU-PAFLU
pursuant to the Decision of the PAFLU national president.
PAFLU had the authority to investigate petitioners on the
charges filed by their co-employees in the local union and after
finding them guilty as charged, to expel them from the roll
of membership under the constitution of the PAFLU to which the
local union was affiliated.
According to the OIC: dtripped of non-essentials, the basic
and fundamental issue in this case tapers down to the
determination of WHETHER OR NOT PAFLU HAD THE AUTHORITY
TO INVESTIGATE OPPOSITORS AND, THEREAFTER, EXPEL THEM

FROM
THE
ROLL
AMIGOEMPLOYEES UNION-PAFLU.

OF MEMBERSHIP OF

THE

Recognized and salutary is the principle that when a labor

union affiliates with a mother union, it becomes bound by the
laws and regulations of the parent organization.

consequences of their separation from the union under the

security clause of the CBA.

Brandenburg v. Ohio

When a labor union affiliates with a parent organization or

mother union, or accepts a charter from a superior body, it
becomes subject to the laws of the superior body under whose
authority the local union functions. The constitution, by-laws and
rules of the parent body, together with the charter it issues
pursuant thereto to the subordinate union, constitute an
enforceable contract between the parent body and the
subordinate union, and between the members of the subordinate
union inter se.

Brief Fact Summary. An Ohio law prohibited the teaching or

advocacy of the doctrines of criminal syndicalism. The
Defendant, Brandenburg (Defendant), a leader in the Ku Klux
Klan, made a speech promoting the taking of vengeful actions
against government and was therefore convicted under the Ohio
Law.

'Due process' simply means that the parties were given

the opportunity to be heard. In the instant case, ample and
unmistakable evidence exists to show that the oppositors were
afforded the opportunity to present their evidence, but they
themselves disdained or spurned the said opportunity given to
them.

Facts. The Ohio Criminal Syndicalism Act (the Act) made it

illegal to advocate crime, sabotage, violence or . . . terrorism as
a means of accomplishing industrial or political reform. It also
prohibited assembling with any society, group, or assemblage or
persons formed to teach or advocate the doctrines of criminal
syndicalism. The Defendant, a leader in the Ku Klux Klan, made a
speech promoting the taking of revenge against the government
if it did not stop suppressing the white race and was therefore
convicted under the Act.

Inherent in every labor union, or any organization, is the

right of self-preservation. When members of a labor union,
therefore, sow the seeds of dissension and strife within the union;
when they seek the disintegration and destruction of the very
union to which they belong, they thereby forfeit their rights to
remain as members of the union which they seek to destroy.
We, therefore, hold and rule that petitioners, although
entitled to disaffiliate from their union and form a new
organization of their own, must, however, suffer the

Synopsis of Rule of Law. Speech can be prohibited if it is

directed at inciting or producing imminent lawless action and it
is likely to incite or produce such action.

Issue. Did the Statute, prohibiting public speech that advocated

certain violent activities, violate the Defendants right to free
speech under the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United
States Constitution (Constitution)?
Held. Yes.
(Per Curiam) The Act properly made it illegal to advocate or teach

doctrines of violence, but did not address the issue of whether

such advocacy or teaching would actually incite imminent
lawlessness. The mere abstract teaching of the need or propriety
to resort to violence is not the same as preparing a group for
violent action. Because the statute failed to provide for the
second part of the test it was overly broad and thus in violation
of
the
First
Amendment
of
the
Constitution.

Facts: This case, decided before the right to information was

included in the Bill of Rights of the Philippine Constitution,
involved a request by the editor of the Manila Post, a morning
daily, for the Register of Deeds of Manila to furnish him a list of
real estates sold to aliens and registered with said Register of
Deeds, but which request was denied.
Issue:

Concurrence.

Justice Hugo (J. Black) I agree with Justice William Douglas (J.
Douglas) in his concurring opinion of this case that the clear and
present danger doctrine should have no place in our
interpretation of the First Amendment of the Constitution.
J. Douglas argues that the how the clear and present danger
test has been applied in the past is disconcerting. First, the
threats to which it was applied were often loud but puny. Second,
the test was so perverted as to make trial of those teachers of
Marxism all out political trials, which had the effect of eroding
substantial parts of the First Amendment of the Constitution.

Discussion. In order for incitement to violence speech to be

constitutionally barred, Brandenburg sets a new standard. The
language must (1) expressly advocate violence; (2) advocate
immediate violence and (3) relate to violence likely to occur.

ACCESS TO INFORMATION
Subido v. Ozaeta

What is the extent of the discretion of the Register of Deeds (RD)

to regulate the accessibility of records relating to registered lands
in its office.

Held:
What the law expects and requires from the RD is the exercise of
an unbiased and impartial judgment by which all persons
resorting to the office, under the legal authority and conducting
themselves with the motives, reasons and objects of the person
seeking access to the records. Except when it is clear that the
purpose of the inspection is unlawful, it is not the duty of the
registration officers to concern themselves with the motives,
purposes, and objects of the person seeking to inspect the
records. It is not their prerogative to see that the information
which the records contain is not flaunted before the public gaze.

Baldoza v. Dimaano
Facts: In a verified letter-complaint dated September 9, 1975,
the Municipal Secretary of Taal, Batangas, charges Municipal
Judge Rodolfo B. Dimaano, of the same municipality, with abuse
of authority in refusing to allow employees of the Municipal
Mayor to examine the criminal docket records of the Municipal
Court to secure data in connection with their contemplated report
on the peace and order conditions of the said municipality.

Dimaano, in answer to the complaint, stated that there has never

been an intention to refuse access to official court records; that
although court records are among public documents open to
inspection not only by the parties directly involved but also by
other persons who have legitimate interest to such inspection,
yet the same is always subject to reasonable regulation as to
who, when, where and how they may be inspected. He further
asserted that a court has unquestionably the power to prevent an
improper use or inspection of its records and the furnishing of
copies therefrom may be refused where the person requesting is
not motivated by a serious and legitimate interest but acts out of
whim or fancy or mere curiosity or to gratify private spite or to
promote public scandal. The case was thereupon referred to
Judge Francisco Mat. Riodique for investigation and report. At the
preliminary hearing on 16 October 1975, Taal Mayor Corazon A.
Caiza filed a motion to dismiss the complaint to preserve
harmony and cooperation among officers in the same
municipality. This motion was denied by the Investigating Judge,
but after formal investigation, he recommended the exoneration
of Dimaano.
Issue: Whether the rules and conditions imposed by Judge
Dimaano on the inspection of the docket books infringe upon the
right of individuals to information.
Held: Judge Dimaano did not act arbitrarily in the premise. As
found by the Investigating Judge, Dimaano allowed the
complainant to open and view the docket books of Dimaano
under certain conditions and under his command and
supervision. It has not been shown that the rules and conditions
imposed by Dimaano were unreasonable. The access to public
records is predicated on the right of the people to acquire
information on matters of public concern. Undoubtedly in a
democracy, the public has a legitimate interest in matters of
social and political significance. The New Constitution expressly

recognizes that the people are entitled to information on matters

of public concern and thus are expressly granted access to
official records, as well as documents of official acts, or
transactions, or decisions, subject to such limitations imposed by
law. The incorporation of this right in the Constitution is a
recognition of the fundamental role of free exchange of
information in a democracy. There can be no realistic perception
by the public of the nation's problems, nor a meaningful
democratic decision-making if they are denied access to
information of general interest. Information is needed to enable
the members of society to cope with the exigencies of the times.
As has been aptly observed: "Maintaining the flow of such
information depends on protection for both its acquisition and its
dissemination since, if either process is interrupted, the flow
inevitably ceases." However, restrictions on access to certain
records may be imposed by law. Thus, access restrictions
imposed to control civil insurrection have been permitted upon a
showing of immediate and impending danger that renders
ordinary means of control inadequate to maintain order.

Legazpi v. CSC
Facts: Valentin L. Legaspi made a request for information on the
civil service eligibilities of certain persons employed as
sanitarians in the Health Department of Cebu City. These
government employees, Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas,
had allegedly represented themselves as civil service eligibles
who passed the civil service examinations for sanitarians. The
Civil Service Commission denied Legaspi's request. Legaspi filed
a special civil action for mandamus before the Supreme Court,
claiming that he has no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy to acquire the information.

Issue: Whether the information sought by Legaspi is within the

ambit of the constitutional guarantee.
Held: The right to information does not open every door to any
and all information. Under the Constitution, access to official
records, papers, etc., are "subject to limitations as may be
provided by law." The law may therefore exempt certain types of
information from public scrutiny, such as those affecting national
security. It follows that, in every case, the availability of access to
a particular public record must be circumscribed by the nature of
the information sought, i.e., (a) being of public concern or one
that involves public interest, and, (b) not being exempted by law
from the operation of the constitutional guarantee. The threshold
question is, therefore, whether or not the information sought is of
public interest or public concern. Herein, the information sought
by Legaspi is the truth of the claim of certain government
employees that they are civil service eligibles for the positions to
which they were appointed. The Constitution expressly declares
as a State policy that: "Appointments in the civil service shall be
made only according to merit and fitness to be determined, as
far as practicable, and except as to positions which are policy
determining, primarily confidential or highly technical, by
competitive examination." Public office being a public trust, it is
the legitimate concern of citizens to ensure that government
positions requiring civil service eligibility are occupied only by
persons who are eligibles. Public officers are at all times
accountable to the people even as to their eligibilities for their
respective positions. On the other hand, on whether the
information sought is among the species exempted by law from
the operation of the constitutional guarantee, the Civil Service
Commission has failed to cite any provision in the Civil Service
Law which would limit Legaspi's right to know who are, and who
are not, civil service eligibles. The Court take judicial notice of the
fact that the names of those who pass the civil service
examinations, as in bar examinations and licensure examinations

for various professions, are released to the public. Hence, there is

nothing secret about one's civil service eligibility, if actually
possessed. Legaspi's request is, therefore, neither unusual nor
unreasonable. And when, as in this case, the government
employees concerned claim to be civil service eligibles, the
public, through any citizen, has a right to verify their professed
eligibilities from the Civil Service Commission. The civil service
eligibility of a sanitarian being of public concern, and in the
absence of express limitations under the law upon access to the
register of civil service eligibles for said position, the duty of the
Commission to confirm or deny the civil service eligibility of any
person occupying the position becomes imperative.

Valmonte v. Belmonte
Facts: Ricardo Valmonte wrote Feliciano Belmonte Jr. on 4 June
1986, requesting to be "furnished with the list of names of the
opposition members of (the) Batasang Pambansa who were able
to secure a clean loan of P2 million each on guaranty (sic) of Mrs.
Imelda Marcos" and also to "be furnished with the certified true
copies of the documents evidencing their loan. Expenses in
connection herewith shall be borne by" Valmonte, et. al. Due to
serious legal implications, President & General Manager Feliciano
Belmonte, Jr. referred the letter to the Deputy General Counsel of
the GSIS, Meynardo A. Tiro. Tiro replied that it is his opinion "that
a confidential relationship exists between the GSIS and all those
who borrow from it, whoever they may be; that the GSIS has a
duty to its customers to preserve this confidentiality; and that it
would not be proper for the GSIS to breach this confidentiality
unless so ordered by the courts." On 20 June 1986, apparently
not having yet received the reply of the Government Service and
Insurance System (GSIS) Deputy General Counsel, Valmonte
wrote Belmonte another letter, saying that for failure to receive a

reply "(W)e are now considering ourselves free to do whatever

action necessary within the premises to pursue our desired
objective in pursuance of public interest." On 26 June 1986,
Ricardo Valmonte, Oswaldo Carbonell, Doy Del Castillo, Rolando
Bartolome, Leo Obligar, Jun Gutierrez, Reynaldo Bagatsing, Jun
"Ninoy" Alba, Percy Lapid, Rommel Corro, and Rolando Fadul filed
a special civil action for mandamus with preliminary injunction
invoke their right to information and pray that Belmonte be
directed: (a) to furnish Valmonte, et. al. the list of the
names of the Batasang Pambansa members belonging to
the UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were able to secure clean
loans immediately before the February 7 election thru the
intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda
Marcos; and/or (b) to furnish petitioners with certified
true copies of the documents evidencing their respective
loans; and/or (c) to allow petitioners access to the public
records for the subject information.
Issue: Whether Valmonte, et. al. may access GSIS records
pertaining to behest loans secured by Imelda Marcos in favor of
certain members of the opposition in the Batasang Pambansa.

Held: The pertinent provision under the 1987 Constitution is Art.

111, Sec. 7 states that "The right of the people to information on
matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official
records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research
data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the
citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law."
An informed citizenry with access to the diverse currents in
political, moral and artistic thought and data relative to them,
and the free exchange of ideas and discussion of issues thereon,
is vital to the democratic government envisioned under our
Constitution. The cornerstone of this republican system of
government is delegation of power by the people to the State. In
this system, governmental agencies and
institutions operate within the limits of the authority conferred by
the people. Denied access to information on the inner workings
of government, the citizenry can become prey to the whims and
caprices of those to whom the power had been delegated. The
postulate of public office as a public trust, institutionalized in the
Constitution (in Art. XI, Sec. 1) to protect the people from abuse
of governmental power, would certainly be mere empty words if
access to such information of public concern is denied, except
under limitations prescribed by implementing legislation adopted
pursuant to the Constitution. The right to information is an
essential premise of a meaningful right to speech and
expression. But this is not to say that the right to information is
merely an adjunct of and therefore restricted in application by
the exercise of the freedoms of speech and of the press. Far from
it. The right to information goes hand-in-hand with the
constitutional policies of full public disclosure and honesty in the
public service. It is meant to enhance the widening role of the
citizenry in governmental decision-making as well in checking
abuse in government. Yet, like all the constitutional guarantees,
the right to information is not absolute. As stated in Legaspi, The

people's right to information is limited to "matters of public

concern", and is further "subject to such limitations as may be
provided by law." Similarly, the State's policy of full disclosure is
limited to "transactions involving public interest", and is "subject
to reasonable conditions prescribed by law." Hence, before
mandamus may issue, it must be clear that the information
sought is of "public interest" or "public concern", and is not
exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional
guarantee. Herein, the information sought by Valmonte, et. al. is
the truth of reports that certain Members of the Batasang
Pambansa belonging to the opposition were able to secure
"clean" loans from the GSIS immediately before the 7 February
1986 election through the intercession of the former First Lady,
Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos. In sum, the public nature of the loanable
funds of the GSIS and the public office held by the alleged
borrowers make the information sought clearly a matter of public
interest and concern. However, a second requisite must be met
before the right to information may be enforced through
mandamus proceedings, viz., that the information sought must
not be among those excluded by law. On this matter, Belmonte
has failed to cite any law granting the GSIS the privilege of
confidentiality as regards the documents subject of the petition.
His position is apparently based merely on considerations of
policy. The judiciary does not settle policy issues. The Court can
only declare what the law is, and not what the law should be.
Under our system of government, policy issues are within the
domain of the political branches of the government, and of the
people themselves as the repository of all State power. Although
it may be true that when the information requested from the
government intrudes into the privacy of a citizen, a potential
conflict between the rights to information and to privacy may
arise. Such competing interests of these rights need not be
resolved in the present case. The right to privacy belongs to the
individual in his private capacity, and not to public and
governmental agencies like the GSIS. Moreover, the right cannot

be invoked by juridical entities like the GSIS. Thus, neither can

the GSIS through its General Manager, Belmonte, invoke the right
to privacy of its borrowers. The right is purely personal in nature,
and hence may be invoked only by the person whose privacy is
claimed to be violated. It may be observed, however, the
concerned borrowers themselves may not succeed if they choose
to invoke their right to privacy, considering the public offices they
were holding at the time the loans were alleged to have been
granted. It cannot be denied that because of the interest they
generate and their newsworthiness, public figures, most
especially those holding responsible positions in government,
enjoy a more limited right to privacy as compared to ordinary
individuals, their actions being subject to closer public scrutiny. In
fine, Valmonte, et. al. are entitled to access to the documents
evidencing loans granted by the GSIS, subject to reasonable
regulations that the latter may promulgate relating to the
manner and hours of examination, to the end that damage to or
loss of the records may be avoided, that undue interference with
the duties of the custodian of the records may be prevented and
that the right of other persons entitled to inspect the records
may be insured.
Chavez v. PCGG
FACTS: Petitioner asks this Court to define the nature and the
extent of the peoples constitutional right to information on
matters of public concern. Petitioner, invoking his constitutional
right to information and the correlative duty of the state to
disclose publicly all its transactions involving the national
interest, demands that respondents make public any and all
negotiations and agreements pertaining to PCGGs task of
recovering the Marcoses ill-gotten wealth.

ISSUE: Are the negotiations leading to a settlement on ill-gotten

wealth of the Marcoses within the scope of the constitutional
guarantee of access to information?
HELD: Yes. Considering the intent of the framers of the
Constitution, it is incumbent upon the PCGG and its officers, as
well as other government representatives, to disclose sufficient
public information on any proposed settlement they have
decided to take up with the ostensible owners and holders of illgotten wealth. Such information, though, must pertain to definite
propositions of the government, not necessarily to intra-agency
or inter-agency recommendations or communications during the
stage when common assertions are still in the process of being
formulated or are in the exploratory stage. There is a need, of
course, to observe the same restrictions on disclosure of
information in general -- such as on matters involving national
security, diplomatic or foreign relations, intelligence and other
classified information.
Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas
THE FACTS

As a consequence of the public release of copies of the Hello

Garci compact disc audiotapes involving a wiretapped mobile
phone conversation between then-President Gloria Arroyo and
Comelec Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano, respondent DOJ
Secretary Gonzales warned reporters that those who had copies
of the CD and those broadcasting or publishing its contents could
be held liable under the Anti-Wiretapping Act. He also stated that
persons possessing or airing said tapes were committing a
continuing offense, subject to arrest by anybody. Finally, he
stated that he had ordered the National Bureau of Investigation
to go after media organizations found to have caused the
spread, the playing and the printing of the contents of a tape.

Meanwhile, respondent NTC warned in a press release all radio

stations and TV network owners/operators that the conditions of
the authorization and permits issued to them by government like
the Provisional Authority and/or Certificate of Authority explicitly
provides that they shall not use their stations for the
broadcasting or telecasting of false information or willful
misrepresentation. The NTC stated that the continuous airing or
broadcast of the Hello Garci taped conversations by radio and
TV stations is a continuing violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law
and the conditions of the Provisional Authority and/or Certificate
of Authority. It warned that their broadcast/airing of such false
information and/or willful misrepresentation shall be a just cause
for the suspension, revocation and/or cancellation of the licenses
or authorizations issued to the said media establishments.

Subsequently, a dialogue was held between the NTC and

the Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster sa Pilipinas (KBP) which
resulted in the issuance of a Joint Press Statement which stated,

among others, that the supposed wiretapped tapes should be

treated with sensitivity and handled responsibly.

Petitioner Chavez filed a petition under Rule 65 against

respondents Secretary Gonzales and the NTC directly with the
Supreme Court.

II.

THE ISSUES

1. Will a purported violation of law such as the Anti-Wiretapping

Law justify straitjacketing the exercise of freedom of speech and
of the press?

2. Did the mere press statements of respondents DOJ Secretary

and the NTC constitute a form of content-based prior restraint
that has transgressed the Constitution?

III. THE RULING

[The Court voted 10-5 (CJ Puno, joined by JJ. Quisumbing, YnaresSantiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio
Morales, Azcuna, Reyes and Tinga in the majority, as against JJ.
Corona, Chico-Nazario, Nachura, Leonardo-De Castro and Velasco
in the minority) in granting the petition insofar as respondent
Secretary Gonzalezs press statement was concerned. Likewise,
it voted 10-5 (CJ Puno, joined by JJ. Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago,

Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio Morales,

Azcuna, Reyes and Velasco in the majority, as against JJ. Corona,
Chico-Nazario, Nachura, Leonardo-De Castro and Tinga in the
minority) in granting the same insofar as NTCs press statement
was concerned.]

1. NO, a purported violation of law such as the AntiWiretapping Law will NOT justify straitjacketing the
exercise of freedom of speech and of the press.

A governmental action that restricts freedom of speech or of the

press based on content is given the strictest scrutiny, with
the government having the burden of
overcoming
the
presumed unconstitutionality by the clear and present danger
rule. This
rule
applies
equally
to all kinds
of
media, including broadcast media.

Respondents, who have the burden to show that these acts do

not abridge freedom of speech and of the press, failed to hurdle
the clear and present danger test. [T]he great evil which
government wants to prevent is the airing of a tape recording in
alleged violation of the anti-wiretapping law. The records of the
case at bar however are confused and confusing, and
respondents evidence falls short of satisfying the clear and
present danger test. Firstly, the various statements of the Press
Secretary obfuscate the identity of the voices in the tape
recording. Secondly, the integrity of the taped conversation is
also suspect. The Press Secretary showed to the public two
versions, one supposed to be a complete version and the
other, an altered version. Thirdly, the evidence of the

respondents on the whos and the hows of the wiretapping act is

ambivalent, especially considering the tapes different versions.
The identity of the wire-tappers, the manner of its commission
and other related and relevant proofs are some of the invisibles
of this case. Fourthly, given all these unsettled facets of the
tape, it is even arguable whether its airing would violate the antiwiretapping law.

We rule that not every violation of a law will justify

straitjacketing the exercise of freedom of speech and of
the press. Our laws are of different kindsand doubtless,
some of them provide norms of conduct which[,] even if
violated[,] have only an adverse effect on a persons private
comfort but does not endanger national security. There are laws
of great significance but their violation, by itself and without
more, cannot support suppression of free speech and free
press. In fine, violation of law is just a factor, a vital one to be
sure, which should be weighed in adjudging whether to restrain
freedom of speech and of the press. The totality of the
injurious effects of the violation to private and public interest
must be calibrated in light of the preferred status accorded by
the Constitution and by related international covenants
protecting freedom of speech and of the press. In calling for a
careful and calibrated measurement of the circumference of all
these factors to determine compliance with the clear and present
danger test, the Court should not be misinterpreted as
devaluing violations of law. By all means, violations of law
should be vigorously prosecuted by the State for they breed their
own evil consequence. But to repeat, the need to prevent
their violation cannot per se trump the exercise of free
speech and free press, a preferred right whose breach
can lead to greater evils. For this failure of the respondents
alone to offer proof to satisfy the clear and present danger test,

the Court has no option but to uphold the exercise of free speech
and free press. There is no showing that the feared violation of
the anti-wiretapping law clearly endangers the national
security of the State.

2. YES, the mere press statements of respondents

DOJ Secretary and the NTC constituted a form of contentbased prior restraint that has transgressed the
Constitution.

[I]t is not decisive that the press statements made by

respondents were not reduced in or followed up with
formal orders or circulars. It is sufficient that the press
statements were made by respondents while in the
exercise of their official functions. Undoubtedly, respondent
Gonzales made his statements as Secretary of Justice, while the
NTC issued its statement as the regulatory body of media. Any
act done, such as a speech uttered, for and on behalf of
the government in an official capacity is covered by the
rule on prior restraint. The concept of an act does not
limit itself to acts already converted to a formal order or
official circular. Otherwise, the non formalization of an
act into an official order or circular will result in the easy
circumvention of the prohibition on prior restraint. The
press statements at bar are acts that should be struck down as
they constitute impermissible forms of prior restraints on the
right to free speech and press.

Senate vs. Ermita

Facts: In 2005, scandals involving anomalous transactions

about the North Rail Project as well as the Garci tapes surfaced.
This prompted the Senate to conduct a public hearing to
investigate the said anomalies particularly the alleged
overpricing in the NRP. The investigating Senate committee
issued invitations to certain department heads and military
officials to speak before the committee as resource persons.
Ermita submitted that he and some of the department heads
cannot attend the said hearing due to pressing matters that need
immediate attention. AFP Chief of Staff Senga likewise sent a
similar letter. Drilon, the senate president, excepted the said
requests for they were sent belatedly and arrangements were
already made and scheduled. Subsequently, GMA issued EO 464
which took effect immediately.
EO 464 basically prohibited Department heads, Senior officials of
executive departments who in the judgment of the department
heads are covered by the executive privilege; Generals and flag
officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and such other
officers who in the judgment of the Chief of Staff are covered by
the executive privilege; Philippine National Police (PNP) officers
with rank of chief superintendent or higher and such other
officers who in the judgment of the Chief of the PNP are covered
by the executive privilege; Senior national security officials who
in the judgment of the National Security Adviser are covered by
the executive privilege; and Such other officers as may be
determined by the President, from appearing in such hearings
conducted by Congress without first securing the presidents
approval.
The department heads and the military officers who were invited
by the Senate committee then invoked EO 464 to except
themselves. Despite EO 464, the scheduled hearing proceeded
with only 2 military personnel attending. For defying President
Arroyos order barring military personnel from testifying before

legislative inquiries without her approval, Brig. Gen. Gudani and

Col. Balutan were relieved from their military posts and were
made to face court martial proceedings. EO 464s
constitutionality was assailed for it is alleged that it infringes on
the rights and duties of Congress to conduct investigation in aid
of legislation and conduct oversight functions in the
implementation of laws.
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 464 is constitutional.
HELD: The SC ruled that EO 464 is constitutional in part. To
determine the validity of the provisions of EO 464, the SC sought
to distinguish Section 21 from Section 22 of Art 6 of the 1987
Constitution. The Congress power of inquiry is expressly
recognized in Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution.
Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly
investing either House of Congress with power to make
investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may
exercise its legislative functions advisedly and effectively, such
power is so far incidental to the legislative function as to be
implied. In other words, the power of inquiry with process to
enforce it is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the
legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or
effectively in the absence of information respecting the
conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change;
and where the legislative body does not itself possess the
requisite information which is not infrequently true recourse
must be had to others who do possess it.
Section 22 on the other hand provides for the Question Hour. The
Question Hour is closely related with the legislative power, and it
is precisely as a complement to or a supplement of the
Legislative Inquiry. The appearance of the members of Cabinet
would be very, very essential not only in the application of check
and balance but also, in effect, in aid of legislation. Section 22

refers only to Question Hour, whereas, Section 21 would refer

specifically to inquiries in aid of legislation, under which anybody
for that matter, may be summoned and if he refuses, he can be
held in contempt of the House. A distinction was thus made
between inquiries in aid of legislation and the question hour.
While attendance was meant to be discretionary in the question
hour, it was compulsory in inquiries in aid of legislation. Sections
21 and 22, therefore, while closely related and complementary to
each other, should not be considered as pertaining to the same
power of Congress. One specifically relates to the power to
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim of which is to elicit
information that may be used for legislation, while the other
pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, the objective of
which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress oversight
function. Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the
appearance of executive officials under Section 21 and the lack
of it under Section 22 find their basis in the principle of
separation of powers.

of department heads in the question hour is discretionary on

their part. Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to appearances
of department heads in inquiries in aid of legislation. Congress is
not bound in such instances to respect the refusal of the
department head to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim
of privilege is subsequently made, either by the President herself
or by the Executive Secretary.

While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the

legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of Congress to legislate
by refusing to comply with its demands for information. When
Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for
department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid
claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that
they are department heads. Only one executive official may be
exempted from this power the President on whom executive
power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress except
through the power of impeachment. It is based on her being the
highest official of the executive branch, and the due respect
accorded to a co-equal branch of government which is
sanctioned by a long-standing custom. The requirement then to
secure presidential consent under Section 1, limited as it is only
to appearances in the question hour, is valid on its face. For
under Section 22, Article VI of the Constitution, the appearance

Neri v. Senate Committee

When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department

heads are implementing the statutes which it has issued, its right
to such information is not as imperative as that of the President
to whom, as Chief Executive, such department heads must give a
report of their performance as a matter of duty. In such
instances, Section 22, in keeping with the separation of powers,
states that Congress may only request their appearance.
Nonetheless, when the inquiry in which Congress requires their
appearance is in aid of legislation under Section 21, the
appearance is mandatory for the same reasons stated in Arnault.

FACTS: On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and

Communication (DOTC) entered into a contract with Zhong Xing
Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of
equipment and services for the National Broadband Network
(NBN) Project in the amount of U.S. $ 329,481,290
(approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to be financed
by
the
Peoples
Republic
of
China.
The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal.
In the September 18, 2007 hearing Jose de Venecia III testified
that several high executive officials and power brokers were
using their influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by
the
NEDA.
Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the
Senate Blue Ribbon. He appeared in one hearing wherein he was

interrogated for 11 hrs and during which he admitted that Abalos

of COMELEC tried to bribe him with P200M in exchange for his
approval of the NBN project. He further narrated that he informed
President Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she
instructed him not to accept the bribe.
However, when probed further on what they discussed about the
NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking executive
privilege. In particular, he refused to answer the questions on:
(a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project,
(b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and
(c) whether or not she directed him to approve.
He later refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita sent a
letter to the senate averring that the communications between
GMA and Neri are privileged and that the jurisprudence laid down
in Senate vs Ermita be applied. He was cited in contempt of
respondent committees and an order for his arrest and detention
until such time that he would appear and give his testimony.
ISSUE:
Are the communications elicited by the subject three (3)
questions covered by executive privilege?
HELD:
The communications are covered by executive privilege

The revocation of EO 464 (advised executive officials and

employees to follow and abide by the Constitution, existing laws
and jurisprudence, including, among others, the case of Senate v.
Ermita when they are invited to legislative inquiries in aid of
legislation.), does not in any way diminish the concept of
executive privilege. This is because this concept has
Constitutional underpinnings.
The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases
where the subject of inquiry relates to a power textually
committed by the Constitution to the President, such as the area
of military and foreign relations. Under our Constitution, the
President is the repository of the commander-in-chief, appointing,
pardoning, and diplomatic powers. Consistent with the doctrine
of separation of powers, the information relating to these powers
may
enjoy
greater
confidentiality
than
others.
Several jurisprudence cited provide the elements of presidential
communications privilege:
1) The protected communication must relate to a quintessential
and non-delegable presidential power.
2) The communication must be authored or solicited and
received by a close advisor of the President or the President
himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in
operational proximity with the President.
3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified
privilege that may be overcome by a showing of adequate need,
such that the information sought likely contains important
evidence and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere
by an appropriate investigating authority.
In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim
of executive privilege on the ground that the communications
elicited by the three (3) questions fall under conversation and

correspondence between the President and public officials

necessary in her executive and policy decision-making process
and, that the information sought to be disclosed might impair
our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the Peoples
Republic of China. Simply put, the bases are presidential
communications privilege and executive privilege on matters
relating to diplomacy or foreign relations.
Using the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the
communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered
by the presidential communications privilege. First, the
communications relate to a quintessential and non-delegable
power of the President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive
agreement with other countries. This authority of the President to
enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the
Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine
jurisprudence. Second, the communications are received by a
close advisor of the President. Under the operational proximity
test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a
member of President Arroyos cabinet. And third, there is no
adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the
limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the
information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.

Respondent Committees further contend that the grant of

petitioners claim of
executive
privilege
violates
the
constitutional provisions on the right of the people to information
on matters of public concern.50 We might have agreed with such
contention if petitioner did not appear before them at all. But
petitioner made himself available to them during the September
26 hearing, where he was questioned for eleven (11) hours. Not
only that, he expressly manifested his willingness to answer more
questions from the Senators, with the exception only of those
covered by his claim of executive privilege.
The right to public information, like any other right, is subject to
limitation. Section 7 of Article III provides: The right of the people
to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized.
Access to official records, and to documents, and papers
pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to
government research data used as basis for policy development,
shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may
be provided by law.