BUKLOD NG KAWANING EIIB

FACTS:
petitioners seek the nullification of Executive
Order No. 191 and Executive Order No. 223 on
the ground that they were issued by the Office of
the President with grave abuse of discretion and in
violation of their constitutional right to security of
tenure.
The facts are undisputed:
Former President Corazon C. Aquino, issued
Executive Order No. 127 establishing the Economic
Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB) as part
of the structural organization of the Ministry of
Finance.
(a) Receive, gather and evaluate intelligence
reports and information and evidence on the
nature, modes and extent of illegal activities
affecting the national economy, such as, but
not limited to, economic sabotage, smuggling,
tax evasion, and dollar-salting, investigate the
same and aid in the prosecution of cases;
(b) Coordinate with external agencies in
monitoring the financial and economic
activities of persons or entities, whether
domestic or foreign, which may adversely
affect national financial interest with the goal
of regulating, controlling or preventing said
activities;
(c) Provide all intelligence units of operating
Bureaus or Offices under the Ministry with the
general framework and guidelines in the
conduct of intelligence and investigating
works;
(d) Supervise, monitor and coordinate all the
intelligence and investigation operations of the
operating Bureaus and Offices under the
Ministry;
(e) Investigate, hear and file, upon clearance
by the Minister, anti-graft and corruption cases
against personnel of the Ministry and its
constituents units;
(f) Perform such other appropriate functions as
may be assigned by the Minister or his
deputies.

the Economic Intelligence and Investigation

Bureau. Motivated by the fact that the designated
functions of the EIIB are also being performed by
the other existing agencies of the government and
that there is a need to constantly monitor the
overlapping of functions among these agencies,
former President Estrada ordered the deactivation
of EIIB and the transfer of its functions to the
Bureau of Customs and the National Bureau of
Investigation.
Meanwhile, President Estrada issued Executive
Order No. 196 creating the Presidential AntiSmuggling Task Force Aduana.
President Estrada issued Executive Order No. 223
providing that all EIIB personnel occupying positions
specified therein shall be deemed separated from
the service.
ISSUE:
WON there is a usurpation of the power of Congress
to decide whether or not to abolish the EIIB. a)
Does the President have the authority to reorganize
the executive department? and, b) How should the
reorganization be carried out?
HELD:
To deactivate means to render inactive or
ineffective or to break up by discharging or
reassigning personnel, while to abolish means to
do away with, to annul, abrogate or destroy
completely. In essence, abolition denotes an
intention to do away with the office wholly and
permanently. Thus, while in abolition, the office
ceases to exist, the same is not true in deactivation
where the office continues to exist, albeit remaining
dormant or inoperative.
Be that as it may,
deactivation and abolition are both reorganization
measures.
The general rule has always been that the power to
abolish a public office is lodged with the legislature.
This proceeds from the legal precept that the power
to create includes the power to destroy.
Presidents power of control may justify him to
inactivate the functions of a particular office, or
certain laws may grant him the broad authority to
carry out reorganization measures.

In a desire to achieve harmony of efforts and to

prevent possible conflicts among agencies in the
course of their anti-smuggling operations, President
Aquino issued Memorandum Order No. 225,
providing, among others, that the EIIB shall be the
agency of primary responsibility for anti-smuggling
operations in all land areas and inland waters and
waterways outside the areas of sole jurisdiction of
the Bureau of Customs.

What law then gives him the power to

reorganize?
It is Presidential Decree No.
1772 which amended Presidential Decree No.
1416.
These decrees expressly grant the
President of the Philippines the continuing
authority
to
reorganize
the
national
government, which includes the power to
group, consolidate bureaus and agencies, to
abolish offices, to transfer functions, to
create and classify functions, services and
activities and to standardize salaries and
materials.

Eleven years after, President Joseph Estrada issued

Executive Order No. 191 entitled Deactivation of

authority of the President to effect organizational

changes in the department or agency under the

executive structure. Such a ruling further finds

support in Section 78 of Republic Act No. 8760.
Section 78 ends up with the mandate that the
actual streamlining and productivity improvement
in agency organization and operation shall be
effected pursuant to Circulars or Orders issued
for the purpose by the Office of the President.
Under Section 31, Book III of Executive Order No.
292 (otherwise known as the Administrative Code
of 1987), the President, subject to the policy
in the Executive Office and in order to achieve
simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have
the continuing authority to reorganize the
administrative structure of the Office of the
President. For this purpose, he may transfer the
functions of other Departments or Agencies to the
Office of the President.
The EIIB is a bureau
attached to the Department of Finance. It falls
under the Office of the President. Hence, it is
subject to the Presidents continuing authority to
reorganize.
In this jurisdiction, reorganizations have been
regarded as valid provided they are pursued in
good faith. Reorganization is carried out in good
faith if it is for the purpose of economy or to make
bureaucracy more efficient.
the idea is to encourage the utilization of
personnel, facilities and resources of the
already
existing
departments,
agencies,
bureaus, etc., instead of maintaining an
independent office with a whole set of
personnel and facilities. The EIIB had proven
itself burdensome for the government because it
maintained separate offices in every region
Task Force Aduana has the additional authority to
conduct investigation of cases involving ill-gotten
wealth. This was not expressly granted to the EIIB.

DOMINGO VS. ZAMORA GR NO. 142283

FACTS:
Former President Joseph E. Estrada issued Executive
Order No. 81 (EO 81 for brevity) entitled
Transferring the Sports Programs and Activities of
the Department of Education, Culture and Sports to
the Philippine Sports Commission and Defining the
Role of DECS in School-Based Sports.
Pursuant to EO 81, former DECS Secretary Andrew
B. Gonzales issued Memorandum No. 01592 on
January 10, 2000.
Memorandum No. 01592
temporarily reassigned, in the exigency of the
service, all remaining BPESS Staff to other divisions
or bureaus of the DECS effective March 15, 2000.
On January 21, 2000, Secretary Gonzales issued
Memorandum No. 01594 reassigning the BPESS
staff named in the Memorandum to various offices
within
the
DECS.
Dissatisfied
with
their
reassignment, petitioners filed the instant petition.

petitioners argue that EO 81 is void and

unconstitutional for being an undue legislation by
President Estrada.
During the pendency of the case, Republic Act No.
9155 (RA 9155 for brevity), otherwise known as
the Governance of Basic Education Act of 2001,
was enacted on August 11, 2001.
RA 9155
expressly abolished the BPESS and transferred the
functions, programs and activities of the DECS
relating to sports competition to the PSC.
The Issue
The issue to resolve is whether EO 81 and the DECS
Memoranda are valid.
The Courts Ruling
We dismiss this petition for being moot and
academic.
Since RA 9155 abolished the BPESS and transferred
the DECS functions relating to sports competition
to the PSC, petitioners now admit that it is no
longer plausible to raise any ultra vires assumption
by the PSC of the functions of the BPESS.
Moreover, since RA 9155 provides that BPESS
personnel not transferred to the PSC shall be
retained by the DECS, petitioners now accept that
the law explicitly protects and preserves their
right to security of tenure.
Since EO 81 is based on the Presidents continuing
authority under Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO 292,
EO 81 is a valid exercise of the Presidents
delegated power to reorganize the Office of the
President. The law grants the President this power
in recognition of the recurring need of every
President to reorganize his office to achieve
simplicity, economy and efficiency. The Office of
the President is the nerve center of the Executive
Branch. To remain effective and efficient, the Office
of the President must be capable of being shaped
and reshaped by the President in the manner he
deems fit to carry out his directives and policies.
After all, the Office of the President is the command
post of the President. This is the rationale behind
the Presidents continuing authority to reorganize
the administrative structure of the Office of the
President.
However, the Presidents power to reorganize the
Office of the President under Section 31 (2) and (3)
of EO 292 should be distinguished from his power to
reorganize the Office of the President Proper.
Under Section 31 (1) of EO 292, the President can
reorganize the Office of the President Proper by
abolishing, consolidating or merging units, or
by transferring functions from one unit to another.
In contrast, under Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO 292,
the Presidents power to reorganize offices outside
the Office of the President Proper but still within
the Office of the President is limited to merely
transferring functions or agencies from the Office
of the President to Departments or Agencies, and
vice versa.
This distinction is crucial as it affects the security of
tenure of employees. The abolition of an office in

good faith necessarily results in the employees

cessation in office, but in such event there is no
dismissal or separation because the office itself
ceases to exist. On the other hand, the transfer of
functions or agencies does not result in the
employees cessation in office because his office
continues to exist although in another department,
agency or office. In the instant case, the BPESS
employees who were not transferred to PSC were at
first temporarily, then later permanently reassigned
to other offices of the DECS, ensuring their
continued employment. At any rate, RA 9155 now
mandates that these employees shall be retained
by the Department.

Cario vs Human Rights, G.R. No. 96681 case

brief summary
December 2, 1991
Facts: Some 800 public school teachers, among them
members of MPSTA and ACT undertook "mass concerted
actions" after the protest rally without disrupting classes
as a last call for the government to negotiate the granting
of demands had elicited no response from the Secretary of
Education. The "mass actions" consisted in staying away
from their classes, converging at the Liwasang Bonifacio,
gathering in peaceable assembly. Secretary of Education
issued a return to work in 24 hours or face dismissal and a
memorandum directing the DECS officials and to initiate
dismissal proceedings against those who did not comply.
After failure to heed the order, the CHR complainant
(private respondents) were administratively charged and
preventively suspended for 90 days. The private
respondents moved "for suspension of the administrative
proceedings pending resolution by the Supreme Court of
their application for issuance of an injunctive
writ/temporary restraining order. The motion was denied.
The respondent staged a walkout. The case was
eventually decided ordering the dismissal of Esber and
suspension of others. The petition for certiorari in RTC was
dismissed. Petition for Certiorari to the Supreme Court was
also denied.
Respondent complainant filed a complaint on the
Commission of Human Rights alleging they were denied
due process and dismissed without due notice. The
Commission issued an order to Cario to appear and
enlighten the commission so that they can be accordingly
guided in its investigation and resolution of the matter.
Cario filed a petition to Supreme Court for certiorari and
prohibition whether the Commission has the jurisdiction to
try and decide on the issue regarding denial of due
process and whether or not grievances justify their mass
action or strike.
Issue: Does the Commission on have jurisdiction to
adjudicate, try and hear the issue?
Ruling: The Court declares the Commission on Human
Rights to have no such power. The most that may be
conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative
power is that it may investigate. But fact finding is not
adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial
function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial
agency or official. The Constitution clearly and

categorically grants to the Commission the power to

investigate all forms of human rights violations involving
civil and political rights. It does not however grant it the
power to resolve issues. The Commission on Human
Rights, having merely the power "to investigate," cannot
and should not "try and resolve on the merits" of the
matters involved. These are matters within the original
jurisdiction of the Secretary of Education and within the
appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission and
lastly, the Supreme Court.
The petition is granted and respondent Commission on
Human Rights and the Chairman and Members thereof are
prohibited "to hear and resolve the case on the merits."
The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to
have no such power; and that it was not meant by the
fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial
agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over
the functions of the latter.
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the
way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate. But
fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to
the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasijudicial agency or official. The function of receiving
evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a
controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To
be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and
making factual conclusions in a controversy must be
accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those
factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may
be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and
definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as
may be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the
Commission does not have.
The Constitution clearly and categorically grants to the
Commission the power to investigate all forms of human
rights violations involving civil and political rights. It may
exercise that power pursuant to such rules of procedure as
it may adopt and, in cases of violations of said rules, cite
for contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court.
But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine
causes) as courts of justice, or even quasi-judicial bodies
do. To investigate is not to adjudicate or adjudge.
In any event, the investigation by the Commission on
Human Rights would serve no useful purpose. If its
investigation should result in conclusions contrary to those
reached by Secretary Cario, it would have no power
anyway to reverse the Secretary's conclusions. The only
thing the Commission can do, if it concludes that
Secretary Cario was in error, is to refer the matter to the
appropriate Government agency or tribunal for assistance;
that would be the Civil Service Commission. It cannot
arrogate unto itself the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil
Service Commission.