Polirev Set 1 Final

Page 1 of 30
CASE 1:
for said staffing modification. Among the positions collapsed were: one Attorney III,
four Attorney IV, one Chemist III, three Special Investigator I, one Clerk III, and one
Commission on Human Rights Employees' Association (CHREA) vs.
Accounting Clerk II. The CHR forwarded said staffing modification and upgrading
Commission on Human Rights
scheme to the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) with a request for its
[GR 155336, 25 November 2004]
approval, but the then DBM secretary Benjamin Diokno denied the request. In light
Second Division, Chico-Nazario (J): 4 concur
of the DBMs disapproval of the proposed personnel modification scheme, the Civil
Facts: On 14 February 1998, Congress passed Republic Act 8522, otherwise known
Service Commission (CSC)-National Capital Region Office, through a memorandum
as the General Appropriations Act of 1998. It provided for Special Provisions
dated 29 March 1999, recommended to the CSC-Central Office that the subject
Applicable to All Constitutional Offices Enjoying Fiscal Autonomy. The last portion of
appointments be rejected owing to the DBMs disapproval of the plantilla
Article XXXIII covers the appropriations of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR).
reclassification. Meanwhile, the officers of the Commission on Human Rights
These special provisions tackles Organizational Structure and the Use of Savings. On
Employees Association (CHREA), in representation of the rank and file employees of
the strength of these special provisions, the CHR, through its then Chairperson
the CHR, requested the CSC-Central Office to affirm the recommendation of the CSC-
Aurora P. Navarette-Recia and Commissioners Nasser A. Marohomsalic, Mercedes V.
Regional Office. CHREA stood its ground in saying that the DBM is the only agency
Contreras, Vicente P. Sibulo, and Jorge R. Coquia, promulgated Resolution A98-047 n
with appropriate authority mandated by law to evaluate and approve matters of
04 September 1998, adopting an upgrading and reclassification scheme among
reclassification and upgrading, as well as creation of positions. The CSC-Central
selected positions in the Commission. Annexed to said resolution is the proposed
Office denied CHREAs request in a Resolution dated 16 December 1999, and
creation of ten additional plantilla positions, namely: one Director IV position, with
reversed the recommendation of the CSC-Regional Office that the upgrading scheme
Salary Grade 28 for the Caraga Regional Office, four Security Officer II with Salary
be censured. CHREA filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CSC-Central Office
Grade 15, and five Process Servers, with Salary Grade 5 under the Office of the
denied the same on 9 June 2000. Given the cacophony of judgments between the
Commissioners. On 19 October 1998, CHR issued Resolution No. A98-055 providing
DBM and the CSC, CHREA elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals. The Court of
for the upgrading or raising of salary grades of certain positions in the Commission.
Appeals affirmed the pronouncement of the CSC-Central Office and upheld the
It, likewise, provided for the creation and upgrading of other positions. To support
validity of the upgrading, retitling, and reclassification scheme in the CHR on the
the implementation of such scheme, the CHR, in the same resolution, authorized the
justification that such action is within the ambit of CHRs fiscal autonomy. The
augmentation of a commensurate amount generated from savings under Personnel
CHREA filed the petition for review.
Services. By virtue of Resolution A98-062 dated 17 November 1998, the CHR

collapsed the vacant positions in the body to provide additional source of funding
Issue:
(1)Whether or not CHREA is a proper party to bring the suit in Court.
ABUBAKARBALICASCABRERACATBAGANCOSICODIZONGERO
NILLAILAGANJOAQUINJOSOLLUCAYLUCAY
MANGUNAY MERISMORALMUNOZNITURAORIOSTEPASTORESSICCUANTOLENTINOUYVILLASIN
Page 2 of 30
(2)Whether or not CHR is a constitutional Commission and as such enjoys
fiscal autonomy.
Held: (1) It has been held in a multitude of cases that a proper party is one who has
sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining an injury as a result of the act
complained of. Here, CHREA, which consists of rank and file employees of CHR,
protests that the upgrading and collapsing of positions benefited only a select few in
the upper level positions in the Commission resulting to the demoralization of the
rank and file employees. This sufficiently meets the injury test. Indeed, the CHRs
upgrading scheme, if found to be valid, potentially entails eating up the
Commissions savings or that portion of its budgetary pie otherwise allocated for
Personnel Services, from which the benefits of the employees, including those in the
rank and file, are derived. Further, the personality of the CHREA to file this case was
recognized by the CSC when it took cognizance of the CHREAs request to affirm the
recommendation of the CSC-National Capital Region Office. CHREAs personality to
bring the suit was a non-issue in the Court of Appeals when it passed upon the
merits of this case. Thus, neither should our hands be tied by this technical concern.
Indeed, it is settled jurisprudence that an issue that was neither raised in the
complaint nor in the court below cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, as to
do so would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice, and due process.
(2) The Court of Appeals incorrectly relied on the pronouncement of the CSC-Central
Office that the CHR is a constitutional commission, and as such enjoys fiscal
autonomy.20
Palpably, the Court of Appeals' Decision was based on the mistaken premise that the
CHR belongs to the species of constitutional commissions. But, Article IX of the
Constitution states in no uncertain terms that only the CSC, the Commission on
Elections, and the Commission on Audit shall be tagged as Constitutional
Commissions with the appurtenant right to fiscal autonomy. Along the same vein,
the Administrative Code, in Chapter 5, Sections 24 and 26 of Book II on Distribution
of Powers of Government, the constitutional commissions shall include only the Civil
Service Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit,
which are granted independence and fiscal autonomy. In contrast, Chapter 5,
Section 29 thereof, is silent on the grant of similar powers to the other bodies
including the CHR. From the 1987 Constitution and the Administrative Code, it is
abundantly clear that the CHR is not among the class of Constitutional Commissions.
As expressed in the oft-repeated maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the
express mention of one person, thing, act or consequence excludes all others.
Stated otherwise, expressium facit cessare tacitum what is expressed puts an end
to what is implied.
CASE 2:
JELBERT B. GALICTO
vs.
H.E. PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III, in his capacity as
President of the Republic of the Philippines; ATTY. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.,
in his capacity as Executive Secretary; and FLORENCIO B. ABAD, in his
capacity as Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management,
G.R. No. 193978, February 28, 2012
EN BANC
FACTS:
Petitioner is a Filipino citizen and an employee of the Philippine Health
Insurance Corporation (PhilHealth). He is currently holding the position of Court
Attorney IV and is assigned at the PhilHealth Regional Office CARAGA.
Respondent Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III is the President of the Republic of
the Philippines (Pres. Aquino).
Based on findings that officials and governing boards of various [GOCCs]
and [GFIs] x x x have been granting themselves unwarranted allowances, bonuses,
incentives, stock options, and other benefits [as well as other] irregular and abusive
practices, the Senate issued Senate Resolution No. 17 urging the President to order
the immediate suspension of the unusually large and apparently excessive
allowances, bonuses, incentives and other perks of members of the governing
boards of [GOCCs] and [GFIs].
Heeding the call of Congress, Pres. Aquino, on September 8, 2010, issued
EO 7, entitled Directing the Rationalization of the Compensation and Position
Classification System in the [GOCCs] and [GFIs], and for Other Purposes. He issued
EO 7 and has the duty of implementing it. EO 7 provided for the guiding principles
and framework to establish a fixed compensation and position classification system
for GOCCs and GFIs.
Page 3 of 30
EO 7 was published on September 10, 2010. It took effect on September
25, 2010 and precluded the Board of Directors, Trustees and/or Officers of GOCCs
from granting and releasing bonuses and allowances to members of the board of
directors, and from increasing salary rates of and granting new or additional benefits
and allowances to their employees.
Respondent Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr. is the incumbent Executive Secretary
and, as the alter ego of Pres. Aquino, is tasked with the implementation of EO
7. Respondent Florencio B. Abad is the incumbent Secretary of the Department of
Budget and Management (DBM) charged with the implementation of EO 7.
The petitioner contends that as an employee of PhilHealth , he stands to
be prejudiced by EO 7 , which suspends or imposes a moratorium on the grants of
salary increases or new or increased benefits to officers and employees of GOCCS
and curtails the prerogative of those officers who are to fix and determine his
compensation. The petitioner also claims that he has standing as a member of the
bar in good standing as a member of the bar in good standing who has an interest in
ensuring that laws and orders of the Philippine government are legally and validly
issued and implemented.
The respondents meanwhile argue that the petitioner is not a real party-ininterest since future increases in salaries and other benefits are merely contingent
events or expectancies. The petitioner, too, is not asserting a public right for which
he is entitled to seek judicial protection.
They claim that the President exercises control over the governing boards
of the GOCCs and GFIs; thus, he can fix their compensation packages. In addition,
EO 7 was issued in accordance with law for the purpose of controlling the grant of
excessive salaries, allowances, incentives and other benefits to GOCC and GFI
employees.
Meanwhile, on June 6, 2011, Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A.) No.
10149, otherwise known as the GOCC Governance Act of 2011. Section 11 of RA
10149 expressly authorizes the President to fix the compensation framework of
GOCCs and GFIs.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Petitioner lacks locus standi.
Whether or not Petition has been mooted by supervening events.
(Enactment of RA10149)
Locus standi or legal standing has been defined as a personal and

substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain
direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged.
Thus, as a general rule, a party is allowed to raise a constitutional
question when (1) he can show that he will personally suffer some actual or
threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the
injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be
redressed by a favorable action.
Jurisprudence defines interest as "material interest, an interest in issue and
to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question
involved, or a mere incidental interest. By real interest is meant a present
substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy or a future,
contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest."
In the present case, we are not convinced that the petitioner has
demonstrated that he has a personal stake or material interest in the outcome of the
case because his interest, if any, is speculative and based on a mere expectancy. In
this case, the curtailment of future increases in his salaries and other benefits
cannot but be characterized as contingent events or expectancies. To be sure, he
has no vested rights to salary increases and, therefore, the absence of such right
deprives the petitioner of legal standing to assail EO 7.
On Issue # 2: Moot and Academic --- THE PETITION HAS BEEN MOOTED BY
SUPERVENING EVENTS.
With the enactment of the GOCC Governance Act of 2011, the President is
now authorized to fix the compensation framework of GOCCs and GFIs.
The new law amended R.A. No. 7875 and other laws that enabled certain
GOCCs and GFIs to fix their own compensation frameworks; the law now authorizes
the President to fix the compensation and position classification system for all
GOCCs and GFIs, as well as other entities covered by the law. This means that, the
President can now reissue an EO containing these same provisions without any legal
constraints.
HELD:
We resolve to DISMISS the petition for its patent formal and procedural
infirmities, and for having been mooted by subsequent events.
On Issue #1 Locus Standi: --- GALICTO HAS NO LOCUS STANDI.
A moot case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by

virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical
use or value. [A]n action is considered moot when it no longer presents a
Page 4 of 30
justiciable controversy because the issues involved have become academic or
dead[,] or when the matter in dispute has already been resolved and hence, one is
not entitled to judicial intervention unless the issue is likely to be raised again
between the parties x x x. Simply stated, there is nothing for the x x x court to
resolve as [its] determination x x x has been overtaken by subsequent events.
On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that respondent GSIS has disregarded

the tender of the matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be
hastened by respondent GSIS and consummated with Renong Berhad, petitioner
came
This is the present situation here. Congress, thru R.A. No. 10149, has
expressly empowered the President to establish the compensation systems of
GOCCs and GFIs. For the Court to still rule upon the supposed unconstitutionality of
EO 7 will merely be an academic exercise. Any further discussion of the
constitutionality of EO 7 serves no useful purpose since such issue is moot in its
face in light of the enactment of R.A. No. 10149. In the words of the eminent
constitutional law expert, Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J., the Court normally [will not]
entertain a petition touching on an issue that has become moot because x x x
there would [be] no longer x x x a flesh and blood case for the Court to resolve.
In
the
to
main,
this
Court
petitioner
invokes
on
Sec.
prohibition
10,
second
and
par.,
Art.
mandamus.
XII,
of
the
1987Constitution and submits that the Manila Hotel has been identified with the
Filipino nation and has practically become a historical monument which reflects the
vibrancy of Philippine heritage and culture. It is a proud legacy of an earlier
generation of Filipinos who believed in the nobility and sacredness of independence
and its power and capacity to release the full potential of the Filipino people. To all
intents and purposes, it has become a part of the national patrimony. 6 Petitioner
also argues that since 51% of the shares of the MHC carries with it the ownership of
the business of the hotel which is owned by respondent GSIS, a government-owned
and controlled corporation, the hotel business of respondent GSIS being a part of the
CASE 3:
tourism
Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS
industry
is
unquestionably
part
of
the national
economy.
Issue: Whether or Not the sale of Manila Hotel to Renong Berhad is violative of the
Constitutional provision of Filipino First policy and is therefore null and void.
Facts: The controversy arose when respondent Government Service

InsuranceSystem (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of
the Philippine Government under Proclamation No. 50 dated 8 December 1986,
decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding
shares of respondent Manila Hotel Corporation. In a close bidding held on 18
Held: The Manila Hotel or, for that matter, 51% of the MHC, is not just any
commodity to be sold to the highest bidder solely for the sake of privatization. The
Manila Hotel has played and continues to play a significant role as an authentic
repository of twentieth century Philippine history and culture. This is the plain and
September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince
Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or
15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with
ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at
P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.
simple meaning of the Filipino First Policy provision of the Philippine Constitution.
And this Court, heeding the clarion call of the Constitution and accepting the duty of
being the elderly watchman of the nation, will continue to respect and protect the
sanctity of the Constitution. It was thus ordered that GSIS accepts the matching bid
of petitioner MANILA PRINCE HOTEL CORPORATION to purchase the subject 51% of
Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as the winning bidder/strategic partner
the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation at P44.00 per share and thereafter to
and the execution of the necessary contracts, matched the bid price of P44.00 per
execute the necessary clearances and to do such other acts and deeds as may be
share
necessary for purpose.
tendered
by
Renong
Berhad.
Page 5 of 30
The Supreme Court directed the GSIS and other respondents to cease and desist
from selling the 51% shares of the MHC to the Malaysian firm Renong Berhad, and
instead to accept the matching bid of the petitioner Manila Prince Hotel.
According to Justice Bellosillo, ponente of the case at bar, Section 10, second
paragraph, Article 11 of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory provision, a positive
command which is complete in itself and needs no further guidelines or
implementing laws to enforce it. The Court En Banc emphasized that qualified
Filipinos shall be preferred over foreigners, as mandated by the provision in
question.
The Manila Hotel had long been a landmark, therefore, making the 51% of the equity
of said hotel to fall within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it emprises the
majority and controlling stock. The Court also reiterated how much of national pride
will vanish if the nations cultural heritage will fall on the hands of foreigners.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Puno said that the provision in question should be
interpreted as pro-Filipino and, at the same time, not anti-alien in itself because it
does not prohibit the State from granting rights, privileges and concessions to
foreigners in the absence of qualified Filipinos. He also argued that the petitioner is
estopped from assailing the winning bid of Renong Berhad because the former knew
the rules of the bidding and that the foreigners are qualified, too.
Corporation (PGMC) for the installation, establishment and the operation of online
lottery and telecommunication systems required and/or authorized under the said
contract.
Petitioners questioned the legality and validity of the Contract of Lease in
the light of Section 1 of RA 1169, as amended by BP 42 which prohibits the PCSO
from holding and conducting lotteries in collaboration, association or joint venture
with any person, association, company or entity, whether domestic or foreign.
Petitioners further contend that PGMC is a 75% foreign or controlled corporation and
therefore cannot be granted a franchise to establish a telecommunications network
pursuant to Article XII of the Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner have legal standing to file the petition at
bench.
HELD: YES. In line with the liberal policy of the court on loans stand; ordinary
taxpayers, members of congress, and even association of planters and non profit
civic organizations were allowed to initiate and prosecute actions before the court to
question the constitutionality or validity of laws, acts, decisions, rulings or orders of
various government agencies or instrumentalities. The petition at bench is of
transcendental importance to the public; the issues raised are of paramount public
interest and of category even higher than those involved in other case.
CASE 5:
Re: COA Opinion on the Computation of the Appraised Value of the
Properties Purchased by the Retired Chief/Associate Justices of the
Supreme Court.
FACTS: Atty. Eden T. Candelaria, Deputy Clerk of Court and Chief Administrative
Officer, Office of Administrative Services, to the Office of the Chief Justice submitted
2 memoranda asking the Court to determine the proper formula to be used in
computing the appraisal value that a retired Chief Justice and several Associate
Justices of the Supreme Court have to pay to acquire the government properties
they used during their tenure.
CASE 4:
This issue has its roots in the June 8, 2010 Opinion issued by the Legal Services
Sector, Office of the General Counsel of the Commission on Audit (COA), which found
that an underpayment amounting to P221,021.50 resulted when five (5) retired
Supreme Court justices purchased from the Supreme Court the personal properties
assigned to them during their incumbency in the Court.
Kilosbayan v Guingona Jr.

G.R. No. 11375; May 5, 1994
Facts: Pursuant to Sec. 1 of its charter, the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office
(PCSO) decided to establish an online lottery system for the purpose of increasing its
revenue base and diversifying its sources of funds. The office of the president
approved Contract of Lease with, respondent Philippine gaming Management
The COA attributed this underpayment to the use by the Property Division of the
Supreme Court of the wrong formula in computing the appraisal value of the
purchased vehicles. According to the COA, the Property Division erroneously
appraised the subject motor vehicles by applying Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy
Page 6 of 30
Group (CFAG) Joint Resolution No. 35 dated April 23, 1997 and its guidelines, in
compliance with the Resolution of the Court En Banc dated March 23, 2004 in A.M.
No. 03-12-01,3 when it should have applied the formula found in COA Memorandum
No. 98-569-A4 dated August 5, 1998.
Atty. Candelaria recommended that the Court advise the COA to respect the inhouse computation based on the CFAG formula claiming that he Constitution itself
grants the Judiciary fiscal autonomy in the handling of its budget and resources.
ISSUE: whether or not COA must respect the fiscal autonomy and judicial
independence of the Supreme Court?
HELD: The court found Atty. Candelarias recommendation to be well-taken. It is true
that COAs authority to conduct post-audit examinations on constitutional bodies
granted fiscal autonomy is provided under Section 2(1), Article IX-D of the 1987
Constitution, which states:
Section 2. (1) The Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority, and duty to
examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of,
and expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or
pertaining to, the Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or
instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations with
original charters, and on a post-audit basis: (a) constitutional bodies, commissions
and offices that have been granted fiscal autonomy under this Constitution. But this
authority, however, must be read not only in light of the Courts fiscal autonomy, but
also in relation with the constitutional provisions on judicial independence and the
existing jurisprudence and Court rulings on these matters.
However court emphasized and discussed the Separation of Powers among the 3
branches of the government and Judicial Independence of the Supreme Court.
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government.
It obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution.
Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its
jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the
fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution
intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The
Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure
coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government. And the
judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the
other departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to
declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.
The concept of the independence of the three branches of government, on the other
hand, extends from the notion that the powers of government must be divided to
avoid concentration of these powers in any one branch. Under the Judiciarys unique
circumstances, independence encompasses the idea that individual judges can
freely exercise their mandate to resolve justiciable disputes, while the judicial
branch, as a whole, should work in the discharge of its constitutional functions free
of restraints and influence from the other branches, save only for those imposed by
the Constitution itself. Thus, judicial independence can be "broken down into two
distinct concepts: decisional independence and institutional independence."
Decisional independence "refers to a judges ability to render decisions free from
political or popular influence based solely on the individual facts and applicable
law. On the other hand, institutional independence "describes the separation of
the judicial branch from the executive and legislative branches of
government. Simply put, institutional independence refers to the "collective
independence of the judiciary as a body.
Individual judicial independence which focuses on each particular judge and seeks to
insure his or her ability to decide cases with autonomy within the constraints of the
law. A judge has this kind of independence when he can do his job without having to
hear or at least without having to take it seriously if he does hear criticisms of his
personal morality and fitness for judicial office. The second concept is institutional
judicial independence. It focuses on the independence of the judiciary as a branch of
government and protects judges as a class.
According to the court a truly independent judiciary is possible only when both
concepts of independence are preserved - wherein public confidence in the
competence and integrity of the judiciary is maintained, and the public accepts the
legitimacy of judicial authority. Our Constitution provides a number of safeguards to
ensure that judicial independence is protected and maintained. All of these
constitutional provisions were put in place to strengthen judicial independence, not
only by clearly stating the Courts powers, but also by providing express limits on
the power of the two other branches of government to interfere with the Courts
affairs.
Court added that Fiscal Autonomy is one of the most important aspects of judicial
independence is the constitutional grant of fiscal autonomy. Just as the Executive
may not prevent a judge from discharging his or her judicial duty and just as the
Legislature may not enact laws removing all jurisdiction from courts, the courts may
not be obstructed from their freedom to use or dispose of their funds for purposes
germane to judicial functions. While, as a general proposition, the authority of
legislatures to control the purse in the first instance is unquestioned, any form of
interference by the Legislative or the Executive on the Judiciarys fiscal autonomy
amounts to an improper check on a co-equal branch of government.
When it comes to scope and extent of fiscal autonomy, the fiscal autonomy enjoyed
by the Judiciary, the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Audit, the
Commission on Elections, and the Office of the Ombudsman contemplates a
guarantee of full flexibility to allocate and utilize their resources with the wisdom
and dispatch that their needs require. It recognizes the power and authority to levy,
assess and collect fees, fix rates of compensation not exceeding the highest rates
authorized by law for compensation and pay plans of the government and allocate
and disburse such sums as may be provided by law or prescribed by them in the
course of the discharge of their functions.
Page 7 of 30
The imposition of restrictions and constraints on the manner the independent
constitutional offices allocate and utilize the funds appropriated for their operations
is anathema to fiscal autonomy and violative not only of the express mandate of the
Constitution but especially as regards the Supreme Court, of the independence and
separation of powers upon which the entire fabric of our constitutional system is
based. In the interest of comity and cooperation, the Supreme Court, Constitutional
Commissions, and the Ombudsman have so far limited their objections to constant
reminders.
Citizens Assemblies ("barangays") to resolve, among other things, the issues of

martial
law,
the national assembly, its
replacement, the
powers
of such
replacement, the period of its existence, the length of the period for tile exercise by
the President of his present powers.
Twenty days after or on September 22, 1976, the President issued another related
By way of a long standing tradition, partly based on the intention to reward long and
faithful service, the sale to the retired Justices of specifically designated properties
that they used during their incumbency has been recognized both as a privilege and
a benefit. This has become an established practice within the Judiciary that even the
COA has previously recognized. The En Banc Resolution also deems the grant of the
privilege as a form of additional retirement benefit that the Court can grant its
officials and employees in the exercise of its power of administrative supervision.
Under this administrative authority, the Court has the power to administer the
Judiciarys internal affairs, and this includes the authority to handle and manage the
retirement applications and entitlements of its personnel as provided by law and by
its own grants.
decree, Presidential Decree No. 1031, amending the previous Presidential Decree
The court ruled that the use of the formula provided in CFAG Joint Resolution No. 35
is a part of the Courts exercise of its discretionary authority to determine the
manner the granted retirement privileges and benefits can be availed of. Any kind of
interference on how these retirement privileges and benefits are exercised and
availed of, not only violates the fiscal autonomy and independence of the Judiciary,
but also encroaches upon the constitutional duty and privilege of the Chief Justice
and the Supreme Court En Banc to manage the Judiciarys own affairs. Therefore the
in-house computation of the appraisal value made by the Property Division, Office of
`Administrative Services, of the properties purchased by the retired Chief Justice and
Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, based on CFAG Joint Resolution No. 35
dated April 23, 1997, as directed under the Court Resolution dated March 23, 2004
in A.M. No. 03-12-01, is CONFIRMED to be legal and valid. Court reasoned that Full
autonomy, among others, contemplates the guarantee of full flexibility in the
allocation and utilization of the Judiciarys resources, based on its own determination
of what it needs. The Court thus has the recognized authority to allocate and
disburse such sums as may be provided or required by law in the course of the
discharge of its functions. To allow the COA to substitute the Courts policy in the
disposal of its property would be tantamount to an encroachment into this judicial
prerogative.
No. 1033, stating the questions to be submitted to the people in the referendum-
No. 991, by declaring the provisions of presidential Decree No. 229 providing for the
manner of voting and canvassing of votes in "barangays" applicable to the national
referendum-plebiscite of October 16, 1976. Quite relevantly, Presidential Decree No.
1031 repealed Section 4, of Presidential Decree No. 991, the full text of which is
quoted in the footnote below.
On the same date of September 22, 1976, the President issued Presidential Decree
plebiscite on October 16, 1976. The Decree recites in its "whereas" clauses that the
people's continued opposition to the convening of the National Assembly evinces
their desire to have such body abolished and replaced thru a constitutional
amendment, providing for a legislative body, which will be submitted directly to the
people in the referendum-plebiscite of October 16.
The questions ask, to wit:
(1) Do you want martial law to be continued?
(2) Whether or not you want martial law to be continued, do you approve the
following amendments to the Constitution? For the purpose of the second question,
the referendum shall have the effect of a plebiscite within the contemplation of
CASE 6:
Section 2 of Article XVI of the Constitution.

Sanidad vs. Comelec
On September 27, 1976, PABLO C. SANIDAD and PABLITO V. SANIDAD, commenced
FACTS: On September 2, 1976, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential

Decree No. 991 calling for a national referendum on October 16, 1976 for the
Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the Commission on Elections

from holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to declare
Page 8 of 30
without force and effect Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they
interim Assembly vis-a-vis his assumption of that body's legislative functions? The
propose amendments to the Constitution, as well as Presidential Decree No. 1031,
answer is yes. If the President has been legitimately discharging the legislative
insofar as it directs the Commission on Elections to supervise, control, hold, and
functions of the interim Assembly, there is no reason why he cannot validly
conduct the Referendum-Plebiscite scheduled on October 16, 1976.
discharge the function of that Assembly to propose amendments to the Constitution,

which is but adjunct, although peculiar, to its gross legislative power. This, of course,
Petitioners contend that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to
is not to say that the President has converted his office into a constituent assembly
the incumbent President to exercise the constituent power to propose amendments
of that nature normally constituted by the legislature. Rather, with the interim
to the new Constitution. As a consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16
National Assembly not convened and only the Presidency and the Supreme Court in
has no constitutional or legal basis.
operation, the urges of absolute necessity render it imperative upon the President to
act as agent for and in behalf of the people to propose amendments to the
ISSUES:
Constitution.
1. Whether or not the president has the authority to propose amendments to the
Issue 2 - Is the submission to the people of the proposed amendments
Constitution?
within
the
time
frame
allowed
therefor
sufficient
and
proper
submission?
2. Is the submission to the people of the proposed amendments within the time
frame allowed therefor a sufficient and proper submission?
It is worthy to note that Article XVI of the Constitution makes no provision as to the
specific date when the plebiscite shall be held, but simply states that it "shall be
HELD:
held not later than three months after the approval of such amendment or revision."
Issue 1 Whether or not the president has the authority to propose

amendments to the Constitution?
As earlier pointed out, the power to legislate is constitutionally consigned to the
interim National Assembly during the transition period. However, the initial
convening of that Assembly is a matter fully addressed to the judgment of the
incumbent President. And, in the exercise of that judgment, the President opted to
defer convening of that body in utter recognition of the people's preference.
CASE 7:
LAWYERS AGAINST MONOPOLY AND POVERTY (LAMP), et al. vs. THE SECRETARY OF
BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, et al.
Likewise, in the period of transition, the power to propose amendments to the
G.R. No. 164987
Constitution lies in the interim National Assembly upon special call by the President.
MENDOZA, J.: EN BANC
April 24, 2012
Again, harking to the dictates of the sovereign will, the President decided not to call
the interim National Assembly. Would it then be within the bounds of the
Constitution and of law for the President to assume that constituent power of the
FACTS: The GAA of 2004 contains the following provision subject of this petition:
PRIORITY DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE FUND
Page 9 of 30
For fund requirements of priority development programs and projects, as indicated
hereunder P 8,327,000,000.00
indulged in favor of the constitutionality and the burden of proof is on the party
alleging that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution.
Xxxxx
To justify the nullification of the law or its implementation, there must be a clear and
unequivocal, not a doubtful, breach of the Constitution. In case of doubt in the
sufficiency of proof establishing unconstitutionality, the Court must sustain
legislation because "to invalidate [a law] based on x x x baseless supposition is an
affront to the wisdom not only of the legislature that passed it but also of the
executive which approved it." This presumption of constitutionality can be overcome
only by the clearest showing that there was indeed an infraction of the Constitution,
and only when such a conclusion is reached by the required majority may the Court
pronounce, in the discharge of the duty it cannot escape, that the challenged act
must be struck down.
Special Provision
1
Use and Release of the Fund. The amount herein appropriated shall be
used to fund priority programs and projects or to fund the required
counterpart for foreign-assisted programs and projects: PROVIDED, That
such amount shall be released directly to the implementing agency or
Local Government Unit concerned: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That the
allocations authorized herein may be realigned to any expense class, if
deemed necessary: PROVIDED FURTHERMORE, That a maximum of ten
percent (10%) of the authorized allocations by district may be used for
procurement of rice and other basic commodities which shall be purchased
from the National Food Authority.
According to LAMP, the above provision is silent and, therefore, prohibits an

automatic or direct allocation of lump sums to individual senators and congressmen
for the funding of projects. It does not empower individual Members of Congress to
propose, select and identify programs and projects to be funded out of PDAF. For
LAMP, this situation runs afoul against the principle of separation of powers because
in receiving and, thereafter, spending funds for their chosen projects, the Members
of Congress in effect intrude into an executive function. In other words, they cannot
directly spend the funds, the appropriation for which was made by them. Verily, the
power of appropriation granted to Congress as a collegial body, "does not include
the power of the Members thereof to individually propose, select and identify which
projects are to be actually implemented and funded - a function which essentially
and exclusively pertains to the Executive Department." By allowing the Members of
Congress to receive direct allotment from the fund, to propose and identify projects
to be funded and to perform the actual spending of the fund, the implementation of
the PDAF provision becomes legally infirm and constitutionally repugnant.
The petition is miserably wanting in this regard.
**Under the Constitution, the power of appropriation is vested in the Legislature,

subject to the requirement that appropriation bills originate exclusively in the House
of Representatives with the option of the Senate to propose or concur with
amendments. While the budgetary process commences from the proposal submitted
by the President to Congress, it is the latter which concludes the exercise by crafting
an appropriation act it may deem beneficial to the nation, based on its own
judgment, wisdom and purposes. Like any other piece of legislation, the
appropriation act may then be susceptible to objection from the branch tasked to
implement it, by way of a Presidential veto. Thereafter, budget execution comes
under the domain of the Executive branch, which deals with the operational aspects
of the cycle including the allocation and release of funds earmarked for various
projects. Simply put, from the regulation of fund releases, the implementation of
payment schedules and up to the actual spending of the funds specified in the law,
the Executive takes the wheel.
CASE 8:
ISSUE: whether or not the implementation of Priority Development Assistance Fund

(PDAF) as provided for in Republic Act (R.A.) 9206 or the General Appropriations Act
for 2004 (GAA of 2004) by the Members of Congress is unconstitutional and illegal.
RULING: NO. In determining whether or not a statute is unconstitutional, the Court

does not lose sight of the presumption of validity accorded to statutory acts of
Congress. In Farias v. The Executive Secretary, the Court held that:
Every statute is presumed valid. The presumption is that the legislature intended to
enact a valid, sensible and just law and one, which operates no further than may be
necessary to effectuate the specific purpose of the law. Every presumption should be
Santiago v. COMELEC
270 SCRA 106
March 19, 1997
Facts: Private respondent Delfin filed with the COMELEC a Petition to amend the
constitution, to lift term limits of Elective officials, by Peoples amendments to the
constitution granted under Section 2, Art. XVII of the 1987 Constitution. R.A. 6735
and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300. The proposed amendments consist of the
Page 10 of 30
submission of this proposition to the peopleDo you approve the lifting of the term
limits of all elective officials, amending for the purpose section 4 and 7 of Art. VI,
Section 4 of Art. VII, and section 8 of Art. X of the Philippine Constitution?
2. Whether R.A. 6735 is a sufficient statutory implementation of the said

constitutional provision?
3. Whether the COMELEC resolution is valid?
The COMELEC issued an order directing the publication of the petition and
the notice of hearing and thereafter set the case for hearing. At the hearing, Senator
Raul Roco, The IBP, Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon (DIK), Public Interest
Law Center, and Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LABAN) appeared as intervenorsoppositors. Senator Roco moved to dismiss the Delfin Petition on the ground that it is
not the initiatory party cognizable by the COMELEC.
Petitioners filed a special civil action directing respondents COMELEC and
Delfins Petition to directly propose amendments to the constitution through the
system of initiative under sec. 2 of Art. XVII of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioners
raise the following arguments;
1
The Constitutional provision on peoples initiative to amend the constitution

can only be implemented by law to be passed by congress. No such law has
been passed.
R.A. 6735 failed to provide subtitle initiative on the Constitution, unlike in
the other modes of initiative. It only provides for the effectivity of the law
after the publication in print media indicating that the Act covers only laws
and not constitutional amendments because the latter takes effect only
upon ratification and not after publication.
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, adopted on January 16, 1991 to govern the
conduct of initiative on the constitution and initiative and referendum on
national and local laws, is ultra vires insofar as initiative or amendments to
the Constitution are concerned since the COMELEC has no power to provide
rules and regulation for the exercise of the right of initiative to amend the
Constitution. Only the Congress is authorized by the Constitution to pass
the implementing law.
The peoples initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, to the
revision thereof. Extending or lifting of the term limits constitutes a revision
and is therefore outside the power of the peoples initiative.
Finally, Congress has not yet appropriated funds for peoples initiative,
neither the COMELEC nor any other department, agency or office of the
government has realigned funds for the purpose.
The Supreme Court gave due course to this petition and granted the
Motions for Intervention filed by Petitioners-Intervenors DIK, MABINI, IBP,
LABAN, and Senator Roco.
ISSUE: 1. Whether Sec. 2, Art. XVII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing

provision?
4.Whether the lifting of the term limits of elective national and local officials
as proposed would constitute a revision, or an amendment to the Constitution?
HELD: NO. Although the mode of amendment which bypasses congressional action,
in the last analysis, it is still dependent on congressional action. While the
Constitution has recognized or granted that right, the people cannot exercise it if the
Congress for whatever reason, does not provide for its implementation.
1
NO. R.A. 6735 is insufficient and incomplete to fully comply with the
power and duty of the Congress to enact the statutory implementation
of sec. 2, Art. XVII of the Constitution. Although said Act intended to
include the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it
is deemed inadequate to cover that system and accordingly provide for
a local initiative required for proposing the Constitutional changes.
NO. the COMELEC Resolution insofar as it prescribes rules and
regulations on the conduct of initiative on amendments to the
constitution is void, as expressed in the Latin maxim Potestas
delegate non delagari potest. In every case of permissible delegation,
it must be shown that the delegation itself is valid.
The resolution of this issue is held to be unnecessary, if not academic,
as the proposal to lift the term limits of elective local and nationals is
an amendment to the Constitution and not a revision. Thus, the
petition was granted, and the COMELEC is permanently enjoined from
taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to the
Constitution until a sufficiently law shall have been validly enacted to
provide for the implementation of the system.
CASE 9:
Jovito Salonga vs. Hon. Ernani Pao etc.
G.R. No. L-59524
February 18, 1985
Gutierrez, Jr., J.:
FACTS:
Page 11 of 30
A rash of bombings occurred in the Metro Manila area in the months of August,
September and October of 1980. One Victor Burns Lovely Jr., a Philippine-born
American citizen from Los Angeles, California, almost killed himself and injured his
younger brother, Romeo, as a result of the explosion of a small bomb inside his room
in Manila. Police and military authorities found in Lovelys possession several
pictures taken sometime in May 1980, at the birthday party of former Congressman
Raul Daza held in the latters residence in Los Angeles. Petitioner Jovito Salonga and
his wife were among those whose likenesses appeared in those pictures, which also
includes, Lovely.
As a result of the serious injuries he suffered, Lovely was brought to AFP Medical
Center (V. Luna Hospital) where he was placed in the custody and detention of Col.
Roman Madella, under the over-all direction of General Fabian Ver, head of the NISA.
Shortly afterwards, Mr. Victor Burns Lovely and his two brothers, Romeo and Baltazar
were charged with subversion, illegal possession of explosives and damage to
property.
September, 1980 when bombs once again exploded in Metro Manila causing injuries
to a number of persons and properties. On same month, the Presidents anniversary
television radio conference was broadcast. The younger brother of Victor Burns
Lovely, Romeo was presented during the conference. In his interview, Romeo stated
that he had driver his elder brother, Victor to Jovito Salongas residence in Greenhills
on two occasions. The first time was on August 20, 1980 and the second time was in
the afternoon of August 31, 1980.
The next day, newspapers came out with almost identical headlines stating that
petitioner had been linked to the various bombings in Metro Manila.
On the night of October 4, 1980, more bombs were reported to have exploded at
three big hotels in Metro Manila, name Philippine Plaza, Century Park Sheraton and
Manila Peninsula. The bombs injured nine people. Another bomb has exploded on
October 19, 1980, minutes after the President had finished delivering his speech at
the PICC. Within the next 24-hours, arrest, search and seizure orders (ASSOs) were
issued against persons who are apparently implicated by Victor Lovely in the series
of bombings in Metro Manila. One of them was herein petitioner, Jovito Salonga.
Victor Lovely offered himself to be a state witness.
On October 21, 1980, elements of the military went to the hospital room of the
petitioner at the Manila Medical Center, where he was confined due to his recurrent
and chronic ailment of bronchial asthma and placed him under arrest. The arresting
officer showed the petitioner the ASSO form which however did not specify the
charge or charges against him.
On November 2, 1980, the petitioner was transferred against his objections from his
hospital arrest to an isolation room without windows in an army prison camp at Fort
Bonifacio, Makati. Subsequently, on November 27, 1980, the petitioner was released
for humanitarian reasons from military custody and placed under house arrest in
the custody of Mrs. Lydia Salonga still without the benefit of any investigation or
charges.
On December 10, 1980, the Judge Advocate General sent the petitioner a Notice of
Preliminary Investigation stating the date and time of his investigation. The
petitioner states that up to the time martial law was lifted on January 17, 1981, and
despiae assurance to the contrary, he has not received any copies of the charges
against him nor any copies of the so-called supporting evidence. On February 9,
1981, the records of the case were turned over by Judge Advocate Generals Office
to the Ministry of Justice.
On February 24, 1981, the respondent City Fiscal filed a complaint accusing
petitioner, among others of having violated RA No. 1700, as amended by PD 885 and
BP Blg 31, in relation to Article 142 of the RPC.
On March 6, 1981, the petitioner was allowed to leave the country to attend a series
of church conference and undergo comprehensive medical examinations of the
heart, stomach, liver, eye and ear including a possible removal of his left eye to save
his right eye.
Petitioner Jovito Salonga almost died as one of the principal victims of the dastardly
bombing of a Liberal Party rally at Plaza Miranda on August 20, 1971. Since the, he
has suffered serious disabilities.
Page 12 of 30
On October, 15, 1981, the counsel for petitoner filed a motion to dismiss the
charged against petitioner for failure of the prosecution to establish a prima facie
case against him. However, the respondent judge denied the motion.
On January 4, 1982, the respondent judge issued a resolution ordering the filing of
an information for violation of the Revised Anti-Subversion Act, as amended, against
40 people, including herein petitioner. It is the contention of the petitioner that the
prosecution to justify the filing of information against him has established no prima
facie case. He states that to sanction his further prosecution despite the lack of
evidence against him would be to admit that no rule of law exists in the Philippines.
The respondent call to adherence to the consistent rule that the denial of a motion
to quash or to dismiss, being interlocutory in character, cannot be questioned by
certiorari.
ISSUE:
Were the evidences against the petitioner uncontradicted and if they were
unexplained or uncontradicted, would they, standing alone, sufficiently over the
presumption of innocence and warrant his conviction?
HELD:
The Court finds the evidence offered by the prosecution utterly insufficient to
establish a prima facie case against the petitioner.
The records reveal that in finding a case against the petitioner, the respondent
judge relied only on the testimonies of Col. Balbino Diego and Victor Lovely.
Ambassador Armando Fernandez, when called upon to testify on subversive
organizations in the United States nowhere mentioned the petitioner as an
organizer, officer or member of the Movement for Free Philippines (MFP), or any of
the organizations mentioned in the complaint. Col. Diego, on the other hand, when
asked what evidence he was able to gather against the petitioner depended only on
the statement of Lovely "that it was the residence of ex-Senator Salonga where they
met together with Renato Taada, one of the brains of the bombing conspiracy ...
and the fact that Sen. Salonga has been meeting with several subversive personnel
based in the U.S.A. was also revealed to me by Victor Burns Lovely; 11 and on the
group pictures taken at former Congressman Raul Daza's birthday party. In
concluding that a conspiracy exists to overthrow by violent means the government
of the Philippines in the United States, his only bases were "documentary as well as
physical and sworn statements that were referred to me or taken by me personally,"
which of course negate personal knowledge on his part.
Such testimony, being based on affidavits of other persons and purely hearsay, can
hardly qualify as prima facie evidence of subversion. It should not have been given
credence by the court in the first place.
In the issue presented by the prosecution for the procedural issue, infinitely more
important than conventional adherence to general rules of criminal procedure is
respect for the citizen's right to be free not only from arbitrary arrest and
punishment but also from unwarranted and vexatious prosecution. The integrity of a
democratic society is corrupted if a person is carelessly included in the trial of
around forty persons when on the very face of the record no evidence linking him to
the alleged conspiracy exists. Ex-Senator Jovito Salonga, himself a victim of the still
unresolved and heinous Plaza Miranda bombings, was arrested at the Manila Medical
Center while hospitalized for bronchial asthma. When arrested, he was not informed
of the nature of the charges against him. Neither was counsel allowed to talk to him
until this Court intervened through the issuance of an order directing that his
lawyers be permitted to visit him. Only after four months of detention was the
petitioner informed for the first time of the nature of the charges against him.
Furthermore, the respondent judge wanted to put things in proper perspective by

limiting the petitioner's alleged "participation" in the bombing mission only to the
fact that petitioner's house was used as a "contact point" between Lovely and
Taada, which was all that Lovely really stated in his testimony.
However, in the questioned resolution dated December 2, 1981, the respondent
judge suddenly included the "activities" of petitioner in the United States as his
basis for denying the motion to dismiss:
Page 13 of 30
On the activities of Salonga in the United States, the witness,
Lovely, in one of his statements declared: 'To the best of my
recollection he mentioned of some kind of violent struggle in the
Philippines being most likely should reforms be not instituted by
President Marcos immediately.
It is therefore clear that the prosecution's evidence has
established facts and circumstances sufficient for a finding that
excludes a Motion to Dismiss by respondent Salonga. The
Movement for Free Philippines is undoubtedly a force born on
foreign soil it appears to rely on the resources of foreign entities,
and is being (sic) on gaining ascendancy in the Philippines with the
use of force and for that purpose it has linked itself with even
communist organizations to achieve its end. It appears to rely on
aliens for its supporters and financiers.
The jump from the "contact point" theory to the conclusion of involvement in
subversive activities in the United States is not only inexplicable but without
foundation.
The "contact point" theory or what the petitioner calls the guilt by visit or guilt by
association" theory is too tenuous a basis to conclude that Senator Salonga was a
leader or mastermind of the bombing incidents. To indict a person simply because
some plotters, masquerading as visitors, have somehow met in his house or office
would be to establish a dangerous precedent. The right of citizens to be secure
against abuse of governmental processes in criminal prosecutions would be
seriously undermined.
dismiss the refutations and arguments of the petitioner, the prosecution evidence is
still inadequate to establish a prima facie finding.
The prosecution has not come up with even a single iota of evidence which could
positively link the petitioner to any proscribed activities of the Movement for Free
Philippines or any subversive organization mentioned in the complaint. Lovely had
already testified that during the party of former Congressman Raul Daza which was
alleged to have been attended by a number of members of the MFP, no political
action was taken but only political discussion. Furthermore, the alleged opinion of
the petitioner about the likelihood of a violent struggle here in the Philippines if
reforms are not instituted, assuming that he really stated the same, is nothing but a
legitimate exercise of freedom of thought and expression. No man deserves
punishment for his thoughts.
We have adopted the concept that freedom of expression is a "preferred" right and,
therefore, stands on a higher level than substantive economic or other liberties. The
primacy, the high estate accorded freedom of expression is a fundamental postulate
of our constitutional system. (Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, 29 SCRA 835).
As explained by Justice Cardozo in Palko v. Connecticut (302 U.S. 319) this must be
so because the lessons of history, both political and legal, illustrate that freedom of
thought and speech is the indispensable condition of nearly every other form of
freedom. Protection is especially mandated for political discussions. This Court is
particularly concerned when allegations are made that restraints have been imposed
upon mere criticisms of government and public officials. Political discussion is
essential to the ascertainment of political truth. It cannot be the basis of criminal
indictments.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for having become moot and academic.
The presence of Lovely in a group picture taken at Mr. Raul Daza's birthday party in
Los Angeles where Senator Salonga was a guest is not proof of conspiracy. As stated
by the petitioner, in his many years in the turbulent world of politics, he has posed
with all kinds of people in various groups and various places and could not possibly
vouch for their conduct. Commenting on the matter, newspaper columnist Teodoro
Valencia stated that Filipinos love to pose with important visitors and the picture
proves nothing.
It is likewise probable that a national figure and former politician of Senator
Salonga's stature can expect guests and visitors of all kinds to be visiting his home
or office. If a rebel or subversive happens to pose with the petitioner for a group
picture at a birthday party abroad, or even visit him with others in his home, the
petitioner does not thereby become a rebel or subversive, much less a leader of a
subversive group. More credible and stronger evidence is necessary for an
indictment. Nonetheless, even if we discount the flaws in Lovely's testimony and
CASE 10:
Taada vs. Angara, 272 SCRA 18
FACTS
On April 15, 1994, Rizalino Navarro, then Secretary of The Department of Trade and
Industry, representing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, signed in
Marrakesh, Morocco, the Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Negotiations, agreeing on behalf of the RP, to submit the WTO
Agreement for the consideration of their respective competent authorities. On
December 14, 1994, the Philippine Senate adopted Resolution No. 97, concurring in
the ratification by the President of the Philippines of the Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization.
ISSUES
Page 14 of 30
1
While sovereignty has traditionally been deemed absolute and all-encompassing

on the domestic level, it is however subject to restrictions and limitations
voluntarily agreed to by the Philippines, expressly or impliedly, as a member of
the family of nations.
Do the provisions of the WTO Agreement and its 3 annexes contravene

Section 19, Article II and Sections 10 and 12, Article XII, of the
Philippine Constitution?
Petitioners' argue that the "national treatment" and "parity provisions" of the
WTO Agreement "place nationals and products of member countries on the
same footing as Filipinos and local products," in contravention of the "Filipino
First" policy of the Constitution.
By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by generally accepted

principles of international law, which are considered to be automatically part of
our own laws. One of the oldest and most fundamental rules in international law
is pactasuntservanda international agreements must be performed in good
faith. . "A treaty engagement is not a mere moral obligation but creates a
legally binding obligation on the parties . . . A state which has contracted valid
international obligations is bound to make in its legislations such modifications
as may be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the obligations undertaken."
By its very title, Article II of the Constitution is a "declaration of principles and

state policies." These principles in Article II are not intended to be self-executing
principles ready for enforcement through the courts. They are used by the
judiciary as aids or as guides in the exercise of its power of judicial review, and
by the legislature in its enactment of laws. As held in the leading case of
Kilosbayan, Incorporated vs. Morato, the principles and state policies
enumerated in Article II and some sections of Article XII are not "self-executing
provisions, the disregard of which can give rise to a cause of action in the
courts.
By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the absoluteness of

sovereignty. By their voluntary act, nations may surrender some aspects of their
state power in exchange for greater benefits granted by or derived from a
convention or pact.
The sovereignty of a state therefore cannot in fact and in reality be considered
absolute. Certain restrictions enter into the picture: (1) limitations imposed by
the very nature of membership in the family of nations and (2) limitations
imposed by treaty stipulations.
Economic Nationalism Should Be Read with Other Constitutional Mandates to

Attain Balanced Development of Economy
On the other hand, Secs. 10 and 12 of Article XII, apart from merely laying down
general principles relating to the national economy and patrimony, should be
read and understood in relation to the other sections in said article, especially
Secs. 1 and 13 thereof.
While the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods,
services, labor and enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for
business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of equality and
reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises only against foreign
competition and trade practices that are unfair. In other words, the Constitution
did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy. It did not shut out foreign
investments, goods and services in the development of the Philippine economy.
While the Constitution does not encourage the unlimited entry of foreign goods,
services and investments into the country, it does not prohibit them either. In
fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning
only on foreign competition that is unfair.
Constitution Does Not Rule Out Foreign Competition
Furthermore, the constitutional policy of a "self-reliant and independent national
economy" does not necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods
and services. It contemplates neither "economic seclusion" nor "mendicancy in
the international community."
2
Do the Provisions of said agreement and its annexes limit, restrict or

impair the exercise of legislative power by the Congress?
Do said provisions unduly impair or interfere with the exercise of

judicial power by the SC in promulgating rules on evidence?
Petitioners aver that paragraph 1, Article 34 of the General Provisions and Basic
Principles of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPS) 49 intrudes on the power of the Supreme Court to promulgate
rules concerning pleading, practice and procedures.
The requirement of Article 34 to provide a disputable presumption applies only
if (1) the product obtained by the patented process in NEW or (2) there is a
substantial likelihood that the identical product was made by the process and
the process owner has not been able through reasonable effort to determine the
process used. Where either of these two provisos does not obtain, members
shall be free to determine the appropriate method of implementing the
provisions of TRIPS within their own internal systems and processes.
By and large, the arguments adduced in connection with our disposition of the
third issue derogation of legislative power will apply to this fourth issue
also. Suffice it to say that the reciprocity clause more than justifies such
intrusion, if any actually exists. Besides, Article 34 does not contain an
unreasonable burden, consistent as it is with due process and the concept of
adversarial dispute settlement inherent in our judicial system.
So too, since the Philippine is a signatory to most international conventions on
patents, trademarks and copyrights, the adjustment in legislation and rules of
procedure will not be substantial.
Page 15 of 30
4
Was the concurrence of the Senate in the WTO Agreement and its
annexes sufficient, and/or valid, considering that it did not include the
final act, ministerial declarations and decisions, and the understanding
on commitments in financial services?
(The WTO Agreement ratified by the President of the Philippines is composed of
the Agreement Proper and "the associated legal instruments included in
Annexes one (1), two (2) and three (3) of that Agreement which are integral
parts thereof." The Final Act signed by Secretary Navarro embodies not only the
WTO Agreement (and its integral annexes aforementioned) but also (1) the
Ministerial Declarations and Decisions and (2) the Understanding on
Commitments in Financial Services.)
Petitioners allege that the Senate concurrence in the WTO Agreement and its
annexes but not in the other documents referred to in the Final Act, namely
the Ministerial Declaration and Decisions and the Understanding on
Commitments in Financial Services is defective and insufficient and thus
constitutes abuse of discretion.
"A final act, sometimes called protocol de cloture, is an instrument which
records the winding up of the proceedings of a diplomatic conference and
usually includes a reproduction of the texts of treaties, conventions,
recommendations and other acts agreed upon and signed by the
plenipotentiaries attending the conference." It is not the treaty itself. It is rather
a summary of the proceedings of a protracted conference which may have
taken place over several years.
The assailed Senate Resolution No. 97 expressed concurrence in exactly what
the Final Act required from its signatories, namely, concurrence of the Senate in
the WTO Agreement.
ISSUE: Whether or not the President violated the Constitution when she issued
Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4
HELD: No.The petitions do not cite a specific instance where the President has
attempted to or has exercised powers beyond her powers as Chief Executive or as
Commander-in-Chief. The President, in declaring a state of rebellion and in calling
out the armed forces, was merely exercising a wedding of her Chief Executive and
Commander-in-Chief powers. These are purely executive powers, vested on the
President by Sections 1 and 18, Article VII.
Section 18, Article VII does not expressly prohibit the President from declaring a
state of rebellion. Note that the Constitution vests the President not only
with Commander-in-Chief powers but, first and foremost, with Executive powers.
The Commander-in-Chief powers are broad enough as it is and become more so
when taken together with the provision on executive power and the presidential oath
of office. Thus, the plenitude of the powers of the presidency equips the occupant
with the means to address exigencies or threats which undermine the very existence
of government or the integrity of the State.
Thus, the President's authority to declare a state of rebellion springs in the main
from her powers as chief executive and, at the same time, draws strength from her
Commander-in-Chief powers. Indeed, as the Solicitor General accurately points out,
statutory authority for such a declaration may be found in Section 4, Chapter 2
(Ordinance Power), Book III (Office of the President) of the Revised Administrative
Code of 1987
CASE 11
SANLAKAS v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
G.R No. 159085
CASE 12:
FACTS: In the wake of the Oakwood occupation on July 27, 2003, the President
issued Proclamation No. 427, declaring a state of rebellion and General Order No. 4,
directing the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police to
suppress rebellion. The Oakwood occupation ended on the evening of the same day
but the President did not lift the State of Rebellion. She only did on August 1,
2003through Proclamation No. 435. Several petitioners questioned Proclamation No.
427 on the ground that such act of the President was an unwarranted, illegal, and
abusive exercise of a martial law power. The petitioners include Sanlakas and
PartidoManggagawa, Social Justice Society, Rep.Sulpico and Sen. Pimentel.The
Solicitor General argues that the petitions have been rendered moot by the lifting of
the declaration.
DETAILED DIGEST: (Sorry ang haba kasi ng case sobra, pero may maikling version
ako sa dulo. J.)
PROF. RANDOLF S. DAVID et. al. vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO et. al.
G.R. 171396
May 3, 2006
Page 16 of 30
FACTS:
1. On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the Edsa
People Power I, Pres. Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency
as accorded in the Philippine Constitution which states that: "The Pres.. . . whenever
it becomes necessary, . . . may call out (the) armed forces to prevent or
suppress. . .rebellion. . .," and in my capacity as their Commander-in-Chief as
provided in Sec. 17, Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of
National Emergency. Accordingly, by virtue of the powers vested to her under the
Constitution as Pres. of the Republic of the Philippines, and Commander-in-Chief of
the Republic of the Philippines, and pursuant to Proclamation No. 1017 dated
February 24, 2006, she hereby call upon the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP)
and the Philippine National Police (PNP), to prevent and suppress acts of
terrorism and lawless violence in the country; PGMA (through the SolGen)
cited that the proximate cause behind the declaration was the circumstances and
intercepted information that there are conspiracy among some military officers
(Magdalo Group), leftist insurgents of the New Peoples Army (NPA), and some
members of the political opposition in a plot to unseat and/or assassinate Pres.
Arroyo. They considered the aim to oust or assassinate the Pres. and takeover the reigns of government as a clear and present danger.
2. On March 3, 2006, exactly one week after and after all these petitions had been
filed, the Pres. lifted PP 1017 by issuing Proclamation No. 1021.
3. Thereafter, 7 petitions were filed challenging the constitutionality the said PP and
G.O. Petitioners cited the events that followed after the issuance of PP 1017 and
G.O. No. 5:
a
The Office of the Pres. announced the cancellation of all programs and
activities related to the 20th anniversary celebration of Edsa People Power
I; and revoked the permits to hold rallies. As such, Members of Kilusang
Mayo Uno (KMU) and National Federation of Labor Unions-Kilusang Mayo
Uno (NAFLU-KMU while staging a rally near the EDSA site were violently
dispersed by huge clusters of anti-riot police, citing PP 1017 as the ground
for the dispersal of their assemblies.
Police also arrested without warrant petitioner Randolf S. David, a professor
at the University of the Philippines and newspaper columnist, and other
known lefties and political oppositions such as Crispin Beltran (Anakpawis),
Satur Ocampo (BayanMuna) Retired Gen. Monatano (Phil Constabulary)
Teddy Casio, etc.
Operatives of the CIDG of the PNP, on the basis of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5,
raided the Daily Tribune, pro-opposition paper, Malaya and its sister
publication, the tabloid Abante. The raiding team confiscated news stories
by reporters, documents, pictures, and mock-ups of the Saturday issue.
According to them, the raid is meant to show a strong presence, to tell
media outlets not to connive or do anything that would help the rebels in
bringing down this government."
Petition
Ground for filing:
G.R. No. 171396

Filed by Randolf S. David
(1) it encroaches on the emergency powers of Con

subterfuge to avoid the constitutional requiremen
of martial law; and (3) it violates the constitutiona
freedom of the press, of speech and of assembly.
(1) challenged the CIDGs act of raiding the Daily T
clear case of "censorship" or "prior restraint." (2)
that the term "emergency" refers only to tsunami,
and similar occurrences,
(1) Usurpation of legislative powers, (2) Violation o
expression (3) the act was a declaration of martial
gravely abused her discretion in calling out the arm
clear and verifiable factual basis.
G.R. No. 171409

Filed by Ninez Cacho-Olivares
and Tribune Publishing Co.
G.R. No. 171485
Filed by Francis Joseph G. Escudero, and
twenty one (21) other Congressmen
G.R. No. 171483
Filed by KMU and NAFLU-KMU G.R. No.
171400
Filed by Alternative Law Groups, Inc.
(ALGI)
G.R. No. 171489
Filed by Jose Cadiz et al.
(1) PGMA exercised the power to enact laws and d

issuance was without factual basis; and (3) they v
expression and the right of the people to peaceab
redress their grievances.
(1) PP 1017 is an "arbitrary (2) unlawful exercise b

Martial Law powers. (3) arguendo it is not really a
Martial Law, it amounts to an exercise by the Pres
powers without congressional approval.
G.R. No. 171424
(1) Violative of the freedom of expression, includin
Filed by Loren B. Legarda
such as freedom of the press and the right to acce
matters of public concern
4. SolGen on his Consolidated Comment countered that:
a
b
c
d
The petitions should be dismissed for being moot as there was no actual
case since the act was already lifted by PP 1021;
Petitioners in GR Nos. 171485 (Escudero et al.) 171483 (KMU et al.),
171400 (ALGI), 171489 (Cadiz et al.) and 171424 (Legarda) have legal
standing;
PP 1017 has constitutional and legal basis;
PP 1017 does not violate the peoples right to free expression and redress
of grievances.
ISSUES:
1. PROCEDURAL:
a
b
WON the issuance of PP 1021 renders the petitions moot and academic.
WON petitioners in GR Nos. 171485 (Escudero et al.) 171483 (KMU et al.),
171400 (ALGI), 171489 (Cadiz et al.) and 171424 (Legarda) have legal
standing;
2. SUBSTANTIVE:
Page 17 of 30
a
b
WON the declaration and issuance of PP 1017 have factual bases.

WON PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are unconstitutional.
o
Facial Challenge
o
Constitutional Basis
o
As Applied Challenge
*A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable

controversy by virtue of supervening events, 26 so that a declaration thereon would
be of no practical use or value. Generally, courts decline jurisdiction over such
case or dismiss it on ground of mootness.
HELD:
1. PROCEDURAL
B. LEGAL STANDING
A. MOOT and ACADEMIC

The Court holds that Pres. Arroyos issuance of PP 1021 did not render the
present petitions moot and academic. During the eight (8) days that PP 1017 was
operative, the police officers, according to petitioners, committed illegal acts in
implementing it.
The power of judicial review does not repose upon the courts a "selfstarting capacity." Courts may exercise such power only when the following
requisites are present:
a
b
c
d
there must be an actual case or controversy;

petitioners have to raise a question of constitutionality;
the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and
the decision of the constitutional question must be necessary to the
determination of the case itself.24
The respondent contended that since the act complained of was already
lifted by PP 1021, the first requisite is lacking, that there cease to be an actual case
or controversy and the case must be treated as moot and academic.
The "moot and academic" principle is not a magical formula that can
automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, even
moot and academic, if:
a
b
There is a grave violation of the Constitution;

The exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public
interest is involved;
c
When constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling
principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public;
d
The case is capable of repetition yet evading review.
All the foregoing exceptions are present here and justify this Courts assumption of
jurisdiction over the instant petitions.
* An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal right, an opposite
legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution. It is "definite and concrete, touching
the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interest;
The Court holds that all the petitioners herein have locus standi, the issue
being of transcendental importance.
Locus standi is defined as "a right of appearance in a court of justice on a
given question."37 In private suits, standing is governed by the "real-parties-in
interest. Accordingly, the "real-party-in interest" is "the party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of
the suit."
However, in many cases already decided by this Court, locus standi being a
mere procedural technicality, the requirement may be waived by the Court in the
exercise of its discretion. This was done in the 1949 Emergency Powers
Cases, Araneta v. Dinglasan,49 where the "transcendental importance" of the cases
prompted the Court to act liberally. Thus, the Court has adopted a rule that even
where the petitioners have failed to show direct injury, they have been allowed to
sue under the principle of "transcendental importance."
However, by way of summary, the following rules may be culled from the
cases decided by this Court. Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and legislators
may be accorded standing to sue, provided that the following requirements are met:
(1) the cases involve constitutional issues;
(2) for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public
funds or that the tax measure is unconstitutional;
(3) for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity
of the election law in question;
(4) for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues
raised are of transcendental importance which must be settled early; and
(5) for legislators, there must be a claim that the official action
complained of infringes upon their prerogatives as legislators.
Page 18 of 30
Thus eventhough, Cadiz et a.l (who have failed to allege any direct or
potential injury which the IBP as institution or its member may suffer), and Legarda
(no personality as taxpayer as there are no allegation of illegal disbursement of pub
funds) generally have no personality to file the petition, given the transcendental
importance of the issues involved, the Court may relax the standing requirements
and allow the suit to prosper despite the lack of direct injury to the parties seeking
judicial review. Hence, this Court holds that all the petitioners herein
have locus standi.
the assailed law may be valid. Here, petitioners did not even attempt to show
whether this situation exists.
Petitioners likewise seek a facial review of PP 1017 on the ground of
vagueness, which holds that "a law is facially invalid if men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application." However, llike
overbreadth, it is said that a litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it
is vague in all its possible applications. Again, petitioners did not even attempt to
show that PP 1017 is vague in all its application. They also failed to establish that
men of common intelligence cannot understand the meaning and application of PP
1017.
2. SUBSTANTIVE
A. FACTUAL BASES
Petitioners failed to show that Pres. Arroyos exercise of the calling-out
power, by issuing PP 1017, is totally bereft of factual basis.
Constitutional Basis:
The operative portion of PP 1017 may be divided into three (3) important provisions,
thus:
A reading of the SolGens Consolidated Comment and Memorandum shows

a detailed narration of the events leading to the issuance of PP 1017, with
supporting reports forming part of the records. Mentioned are the escape of the
Magdalo Group, their audacious threat of the Magdalo D-Day, the defections in the
military, particularly in the Philippine Marines, and the reproving statements from
the communist leaders. There was also the Minutes of the Intelligence Report and
Security Group of the Philippine Army showing the growing alliance between the NPA
and the military. Petitioners presented nothing to refute such events. Thus, absent
any contrary allegations, the Court is convinced that the Pres. was justified in issuing
PP 1017 calling for military aid.
i
First provision: Calling-out Power (Constitutional)
"by virtue of the power vested upon me by Section 18, Artilce VII do hereby
command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout
the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well any act of
insurrection or rebellion"
Judging the seriousness of the incidents, Pres. Arroyo was not expected to
simply fold her arms and do nothing to prevent or suppress what she believed was
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.
B. CONSTITUTIONALITY
Facial Challenge:
A facial review of PP 1017, using the overbreadth doctrine, is uncalled for.
Facial invalidation of laws is considered as "manifestly strong medicine," to
be used "sparingly and only as a last resort," and is "generally disfavored. A facial
challenge on the ground of overbreadth is the most difficult challenge to mount
successfully, since the challenger must establish that there can be no instance when
Held: Some of the petitioners vehemently maintain that PP 1017 is actually a

declaration of Martial Law. It is no so. What defines the character of PP 1017 are its
wordings. It is plain therein that what the President invoked was her calling-out
power.
ii
Second provision: Take Care" Power (Unconstitutional)
"and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations
promulgated by me personally or upon my direction;"
Held: The petitioners assail the clause "to enforce obedience to all the laws and to
all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my
direction." This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it
grants President Arroyo the authority to promulgate "decrees." Section 1, Article VI
Page 19 of 30
categorically states that legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the
Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives. To be
sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify
President Arroyos exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees.
iii
Third provision: Power to Take Over (Unconsitutional)
In times of national emergency, when the public interest so requires, the State
may, during the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it,
temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately-owned public utility or
business affected with public interest.
Held: Petitioners, particularly the members of the House of Representatives, claim

that President Arroyos inclusion of Section 17, Article XII in PP 1017 is an
encroachment on the legislatures emergency powers. A distinction must be drawn
between the Presidents authority to (1) declare "a state of national emergency"
and (2) to exercise emergency powers. To the first, no legitimate constitutional
objection can be raised. But to exercise of emergency powers, such as the taking
over of privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest, is a
different matter. This requires a delegation from Congress.
Thus, when Section 17 states that the "the State may, during the
emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or
direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with
public interest," it refers to Congress, not the President. Now, whether or not the
President may exercise such power is dependent on whether Congress may delegate
it to him pursuant to a law prescribing the reasonable terms thereof.
Held: Petitioner Cacho-Olivares, et al. (G.R. No. 171409) also contends that the term
"emergency" refers to "tsunami," "typhoon," "hurricane" and similar occurrences.
Court rule that this a limited view of "emergency. Emergency, as a generic term,
connotes the existence of conditions suddenly intensifying the degree of existing
danger to life or well-being beyond that which is accepted as normal. Emergencies,
as perceived by legislature or executive in the United Sates since 1933, have been
occasioned by a wide range of situations, classifiable under three (3) principal
heads: a)economic, b) natural disaster, and c) national security.
As applied Challenge
President Arroyo issued G.O. No. 5 to carry into effect the provisions of PP
1017. It mandates the AFP and the PNP to immediately carry out the "necessary and
appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and
lawless violence." Significantly, there is nothing in G.O. No. 5 authorizing the military
or police to commit acts beyond what are necessary and appropriate to suppress
and prevent lawless violence, the limitation of their authority in pursuing the Order.
Otherwise, such acts are considered illegal. The right of the petitioners against
unreasonable search and seizure; the right against warrantless arrest; and the
freedom of speech, of expression, of the press, should not be violated. During
emergency, governmental action may vary in breadth and intensity from normal
times, yet they should not be arbitrary as to unduly restrain our peoples liberty.
G.O. No. 5 is CONSTITUTIONAL since it provides a standard by which the
AFP and the PNP should implement PP 1017, i.e. whatever is "necessary and
appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of lawless
violence." Considering that "acts of terrorism" have not yet been defined and made
punishable by the Legislature, such portion of G.O. No. 5 is
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
The warrantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas; the dispersal
and warrantless arrest of the KMU and NAFLU-KMU members during their rallies, in
the absence of proof that these petitioners were committing acts constituting
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion and violating BP 880; the imposition of
standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press, as well as the
warrantless search of the Tribune offices and whimsical seizure of its articles for
publication and other materials, are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
DIGEST OF DIGEST: (Pang-gaya kong tamad J)

FACTS:
1. On February 24, 2006, PGMA issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national
emergency as there were circumstances and intercepted information that there are
conspiracy among some military officers (Magdalo Group), leftist insurgents of the
New Peoples Army (NPA), and some members of the political opposition in a plot to
unseat and/or assassinate Pres. Arroyo.
2. The 7 petitions were filed against constitutionality of PP 1017.
3. One week after and after all the 7 petitions had been filed, the Pres. issued PP
1021 that declaring that state national emergency had ceased and so PP 1017 lifted.
ISSUES:
1. WON the issuance of PP 1021 renders the petitions moot and academic.
2. WON petitioners have locus standi to file the case.
Page 20 of 30
3. WON the declaration and issuance of PP 1017 have factual bases.
fold her arms and do nothing to prevent or suppress what she believed was lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion.
4. WON PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 unconstitutional.
HELD:
1. The Court holds that Pres. Arroyos issuance of PP 1021 did not render the present
petitions moot and academic. The "moot and academic" principle is not a magical
formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case. Courts will
decide cases, even moot and academic, if:
a
b
There is a grave violation of the Constitution;

The exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public
interest is involved;
c
When constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling
principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public;
d
The case is capable of repetition yet evading review.
All the foregoing exceptions are present here and justify this Courts assumption of
jurisdiction over the instant petitions.
2. Eventhough, Cadiz et a.l (who have failed to allege any direct or potential injury
which the IBP as institution or its member may suffer), and Legarda (no personality
as taxpayer as there are no allegation of illegal disbursement of pub funds)
generally have no personality to file the petition, given the transcendental
importance of the issues involved, the Court may relax the standing requirements
and allow the suit to prosper despite the lack of direct injury to the parties seeking
judicial review
4. The Court rules that PP 1017 is CONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it constitutes a call by

President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless
violence. However, the provisions of PP 1017 commanding the AFP to enforce laws
not related to lawless violence, as well as decrees promulgated by the President, are
In addition, the provision in PP 1017 declaring national emergency under
Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution is CONSTITUTIONAL, but such declaration
does not authorize the President to take over privately-owned public utility or
business affected with public interest without prior legislation.
G.O. No. 5 is CONSTITUTIONAL since it provides a standard by which the
AFP and the PNP should implement PP 1017, i.e. whatever is "necessary and
appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of lawless
violence." Considering that "acts of terrorism" have not yet been defined and made
punishable by the Legislature, such portion of G.O. No. 5 is
The warrantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas; the dispersal
and warrantless arrest of the KMU and NAFLU-KMU members during their rallies, in
the absence of proof that these petitioners were committing acts constituting
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion and violating BP 880; the imposition of
standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press, as well as the
warrantless search of the Tribune offices and whimsical seizure of its articles for
publication and other materials, are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
CASE 13: #13 Fortun vs. Macapagal-Arroyo
3. Petitioners failed to show that Pres. Arroyos exercise of the calling-out power, by
issuing PP 1017, is totally bereft of factual basis. A reading of the SolGens
Consolidated Comment and Memorandum shows a detailed narration of the events
leading to the issuance of PP 1017, with supporting reports forming part of the
records. Mentioned are the escape of the Magdalo Group, their audacious threat of
the Magdalo D-Day, the defections in the military, particularly in the Philippine
Marines, and the reproving statements from the communist leaders. There was also
the Minutes of the Intelligence Report and Security Group of the Philippine Army
showing the growing alliance between the NPA and the military. Petitioners
presented nothing to refute such events. Thus, absent any contrary allegations, the
Court is convinced that the Pres. was justified in issuing PP 1017 calling for military
aid.Judging the seriousness of the incidents, Pres. Arroyo was not expected to simply
These cases concern the constitutionality of a presidential proclamation of

martial law and suspension of the privilege of habeas corpus in 2009 in a
province in Mindanao which were withdrawn after just eight days.
FACTS:On November 23, 2009 heavily armed men, believed led by the ruling
Ampatuan family, gunned down and buried under shoveled dirt 57 innocent civilians
on a highway in Maguindanao. In response to this carnage, on November 24
President Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation 1946, declaring a state of
emergency in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City to prevent and
suppress similar lawless violence in Central Mindanao.
Page 21 of 30
On December 4, 2009 President Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation 1959
declaring martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in
that province except for identified areas of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front.
Two days later or on December 6, 2009 President Arroyo submitted her report to
Congress in accordance with Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which
required her, within 48 hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, to submit to that body a report in
person or in writing of her action.
On December 9, 2009 Congress, in joint session, convened pursuant to Section 18,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution to review the validity of the President's action.
But, two days later or on December 12 before Congress could act, the President
issued Presidential Proclamation 1963, lifting martial law and restoring the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus in Maguindanao.
Petitioners Philip Sigfrid A. Fortun and the other petitioners in G.R. 190293, 190294,
190301, 190302, 190307, 190356, and 190380 brought the present actions to
challenge the constitutionality of President Arroyo's Proclamation 1959 affecting
Maguindanao. But, given the prompt lifting of that proclamation before Congress
could review it and before any serious question affecting the rights and liberties of
Maguindanao's inhabitants could arise, the Court deems any review of its
constitutionality the equivalent of beating a dead horse.
ISSUE: Whether the court may rule on the constitutionality of Proclamation 1959.
HELD: No, but it is not unavoidable for two reasons:
One. President Arroyo withdrew her proclamation of martial law and suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus before the joint houses of Congress could
fulfill their automatic duty to review and validate or invalidate the same. Section 18,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 18.The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the
Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces
to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or
rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty
days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or
any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of
martial law or the suspension of the privilege of writ of habeas corpus, the President
shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting
jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special
session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be
set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in
the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be
determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public
safety requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such
proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without any need
of a call.
It is evident that under the 1987 Constitution the President and the Congress act in
tandem in exercising the power to proclaim martial law or suspend the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus. They exercise the power, not only sequentially, but in a
sense jointly since, after the President has initiated the proclamation or the
suspension, only the Congress can maintain the same based on its own evaluation of
the situation on the ground, a power that the President does not have.
Here, President Arroyo withdrew Proclamation 1959 before the joint houses of
Congress, which had in fact convened, could act on the same. Consequently, the
petitions in these cases have become moot and the Court has nothing to
review. The lifting of martial law and restoration of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpusinMaguindanao was a supervening event that obliterated any
justiciable controversy.
Two.Notably, under Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, the Court has
only 30 days from the filing of an appropriate proceeding to review the sufficiency of
the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus. Thus
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen,
the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the extension thereof,
and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.
Justice Carpio of course points out that should the Court regard the powers of the
President and Congress respecting the proclamation of martial law or the suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus as sequential or joint, it would be
impossible for the Court to exercise its power of review within the 30 days given it.
But those 30 days, fixed by the Constitution, should be enough for the Court to fulfill
its duty without pre-empting congressional action. Section 18, Article VII, requires
the President to report his actions to Congress, in person or in writing, within 48
hours of such proclamation or suspension. In turn, the Congress is required to
convene without need of a call within 24 hours following the President's
proclamation or suspension. Clearly, the Constitution calls for quick action on the
part of the Congress. Whatever form that action takes, therefore, should give the
Court sufficient time to fulfill its own mandate to review the factual basis of the
proclamation or suspension within 30 days of its issuance.
Page 22 of 30
If the Congress procrastinates or altogether fails to fulfill its duty respecting the
proclamation or suspension within the short time expected of it, then the Court can
step in, hear the petitions challenging the President's action, and ascertain if it has a
factual basis. If the Court finds none, then it can annul the proclamation or the
suspension. But what if the 30 days given it by the Constitution proves inadequate?
Justice Carpio himself offers the answer in his dissent: that 30-day period does not
operate to divest this Court of its jurisdiction over the case. The settled rule is that
jurisdiction once acquired is not lost until the case has been terminated.
The third group, Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), et al, claim that on October 4, 2005,
a rally KMU co-sponsored was to be conducted at the Mendiola bridge but police
blocked them along C.M. Recto and Lepanto Streets and forcibly dispersed them,
causing injuries to several of their members. They further allege that on October 6,
2005, a multi-sectoral rally which KMU also co-sponsored was scheduled to proceed
along Espaa Avenue in front of the University of Santo Tomas and going towards
Mendiola bridge. Police officers blocked them along Morayta Street and prevented
them from proceeding further. They were then forcibly dispersed, causing injuries on
one of them. Three other rallyists were arrested.
The problem in this case is that the President aborted the proclamation of martial
law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Maguindanao
in just eight days. In a real sense, the proclamation and the suspension never took
off. The Congress itself adjourned without touching the matter, it having become
moot and academic.
All petitioners assail Batas Pambansa No. 880, some of them in toto and others only
Sections 4, 5, 6, 12, 13(a), and 14(a), as well as the policy of CPR. They seek to stop
violent dispersals of rallies under the "no permit, no rally" policy and the CPR policy
recently announced.
Of course, the Court has in exceptional cases passed upon issues that ordinarily
would have been regarded as moot. But the present cases do not present sufficient
basis for the exercise of the power of judicial review
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the consolidated petitions on the ground that
the same have become moot and academic.
CASE 14:
G.R. No. 169838
April 25, 2006
BAYAN vs Sec. Ermita

Azcuna, J.
FACTS: The first petitioners, Bayan, et al., in G.R. No. 169838, allege that they are
citizens and taxpayers of the Philippines and that their rights as organizations and
individuals were violated when the rally they participated in on October 6, 2005 was
violently dispersed by policemen implementing Batas Pambansa (B.P.) No. 880.
The second group consists of 26 individual petitioners, Jess del Prado, et al., in
G.R. No. 169848, who allege that they were injured, arrested and detained when a
peaceful mass action they held on September 26, 2005 was preempted and violently
dispersed by the police. They further assert that on October 5, 2005, a group they
participated in marched to Malacaang to protest issuances of the Palace which,
they claim, put the country under an "undeclared" martial rule, and the protest was
likewise dispersed violently and many among them were arrested and suffered
injuries.
Petitioners Bayan, et al., contend that Batas Pambansa No. 880 is clearly a
violation of the Constitution and the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights and other human rights treaties of which the Philippines is a signatory.
They argue that B.P. No. 880 requires a permit before one can stage a public
assembly regardless of the presence or absence of a clear and present danger. It
also curtails the choice of venue and is thus repugnant to the freedom of expression
clause as the time and place of a public assembly form part of the message for
which the expression is sought. Furthermore, it is not content-neutral as it does not
apply to mass actions in support of the government. The words "lawful cause,"
"opinion," "protesting or influencing" suggest the exposition of some cause not
espoused by the government. Also, the phrase "maximum tolerance" shows that the
law applies to assemblies against the government because they are being tolerated.
As a content-based legislation, it cannot pass the strict scrutiny test.
Petitioners Jess del Prado, et al., in turn, argue that B.P. No. 880 is
unconstitutional as it is a curtailment of the right to peacefully assemble and
petition for redress of grievances because it puts a condition for the valid exercise of
that right. It also characterizes public assemblies without a permit as illegal and
penalizes them and allows their dispersal. Thus, its provisions are not mere
regulations but are actually prohibitions.
Finally, petitioners KMU, et al., argue that the Constitution sets no limits on the
right to assembly and therefore B.P. No. 880 cannot put the prior requirement of
securing a permit. And even assuming that the legislature can set limits to this right,
the limits provided are unreasonable: First, allowing the Mayor to deny the permit on
clear and convincing evidence of a clear and present danger is too comprehensive.
Second, the five-day requirement to apply for a permit is too long as certain events
require instant public assembly, otherwise interest on the issue would possibly
wane.
As to the CPR policy, they argue that it is preemptive, that the government takes
action even before the rallyists can perform their act, and that no law, ordinance or
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executive order supports the policy. Furthermore, it contravenes the maximum
tolerance policy of B.P. No. 880 and violates the Constitution as it causes a chilling
effect on the exercise by the people of the right to peaceably assemble.
Respondents argued that petitioners have no standing. BP 880 entails traffic rerouting to prevent grave public inconvenience and serious or undue interference in
the free flow of commerce and trade. It is content-neutral regulation of the time,
place and manner of holding public assemblies. According to Atienza RA. 7160 gives
the Mayor power to deny a permit independently of B.P. No. 880. and that the permit
is for the use of a public place and not for the exercise of rights; and that B.P. No.
880 is not a content-based regulation because it covers all rallies.
merely confuses our people and is used by some police agents to justify abuses. On
the other hand, B.P. No. 880 cannot be condemned as unconstitutional; it does not
curtail or unduly restrict freedoms; it merely regulates the use of public places as to
the time, place and manner of assemblies. Far from being insidious, "maximum
tolerance" is for the benefit of rallyists, not the government. The delegation to the
mayors of the power to issue rally "permits" is valid because it is subject to the
constitutionally-sound "clear and present danger" standard.
ISSUE: WON B.P. 880 is unconstitutional

HELD: B.P. No. 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that
simply regulates the time, place and manner of the assemblies. This was adverted
to in Osmea v. Comelec, where the Court referred to it as a "content-neutral"
regulation of the time, place, and manner of holding public assemblies.
CASE 15:
A fair and impartial reading of B.P. No. 880 thus readily shows that it refers
to all kinds of public assemblies that would use public places. The reference to
"lawful cause" does not make it content-based because assemblies really have to be
for lawful causes, otherwise they would not be "peaceable" and entitled to
protection. Neither are the words "opinion," "protesting" and "influencing" in the
definition of public assembly content based, since they can refer to any subject. The
words "petitioning the government for redress of grievances" come from the wording
of the Constitution, so its use cannot be avoided. Finally, maximum tolerance is for
the protection and benefit of all rallyists and is independent of the content of the
expressions in the rally.
FACTS: Petitioners H. Harry L. Roque, Jr., et al., suing as taxpayers and concerned
citizens, seek to nullify respondent Comelecs award of the 2010 Elections
Automation Project (automation project) to the joint venture of Total Information
Management Corporation (TIM) and Smartmatic International Corporation
(Smartmatic) and to permanently prohibit the Comelec, TIM and Smartmatic from
signing and/or implementing the corresponding contract-award.
Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on the ground of clear and present
danger to public order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or public
health.
At any rate, the Court rules that in view of the maximum tolerance mandated by B.P.
No. 880, it reiterates the basic policy of upholding the fundamental rights of our
people, especially freedom of expression and freedom of assembly. In several policy
addresses, Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban has repeatedly vowed to uphold the
liberty of our people and to nurture their prosperity. He said that "in cases involving
liberty, the scales of justice should weigh heavily against the government and in
favor of the poor, the oppressed, the marginalized, the dispossessed and the weak.
Indeed, laws and actions that restrict fundamental rights come to the courts with a
heavy presumption against their validity. These laws and actions are subjected to
heightened scrutiny."
For this reason, the so-called calibrated preemptive response policy has no place in
our legal firmament and must be struck down as a darkness that shrouds freedom. It
ROQUE, JR. vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 188456 September 10, 2009
VELASCO, JR., J.:
On December 22, 1997, Congress enacted RA 8436 authorizing the adoption of an

automated election system (AES) in the May 11, 1998 national and local elections
and onwards. The 1998, 2001, and 2004 national and local polls, however, came and
went and were conducted still using purely manual elections. On January 23, 2007,
the amendatory RA 9369 was passed authorizing anew the Comelec to use an AES.
The AES was not utilized in the May 10, 2007 elections, as funds were not
appropriated for that purpose by Congress and due to time constraints.
RA 9369 calls for the creation of the Comelec Advisory Council (CAC). CAC is to
recommend the most appropriate, applicable and cost-effective technology to be
applied to the AES. To be created by Comelec too is the Technical Evaluation
Committee (TEC) which is tasked to certify, through an established international
certification committee, not later than three months before the elections, by
categorically stating that the AES, inclusive of its hardware and software
components, is operating properly and accurately based on defined and
documented standards.
In August 2008, Comelec managed to automate the regional polls in the
Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), using direct recording electronics
(DRE) technology in the province of Maguindanao; and the optical mark
reader/recording (OMR) system, particularly the Central Count Optical Scan (CCOS),
in the rest of ARMM. What scores hailed as successful automated ARMM 2008
elections paved the way for Comelec, with some prodding from senators, to prepare
Page 24 of 30
for a nationwide computerized run for the 2010 national/local polls, with the many
lessons learned from the ARMM experience influencing the technology selection for
the 2010 automated elections.
Accordingly, in early March 2009, the Comelec released the Request for Proposal
(RFP), also known as Terms of Reference (TOR), for the nationwide automation of the
voting, counting, transmission, consolidation and canvassing of votes for the May
10, 2010 Synchronized National and Local Elections.
To address the possibility of systems failure, the RFP required interested bidders to
submit, among other things: a continuity plan and a back-up plan.
Under the two-envelope system designed under the RFP, each participating bidder
shall submit, as part of its bid, an Eligibility Envelope that should inter alia establish
the bidders eligibility to bid. On the other hand, the second envelope, or the Bid
Envelope itself, shall contain two envelopes that, in turn, shall contain the technical
proposal and the financial proposal, respectively.
Subsequently, the Comelec Special Bids and Awards Committee (SBAC), earlier
constituted purposely for the aforesaid project, caused the publication in different
newspapers of the Invitation to Apply for Eligibility and to Bid for the procurement of
goods and services to be used in the automation project. Meanwhile, Congress
enacted RA 9525 appropriating some PhP 11.3 billion as supplemental budget for
the May 10, 2010 automated national and local elections.
Under the RFP, among those eligible to participate in the bidding are manufacturers,
suppliers and/or distributors forming themselves into a joint venture. A joint venture
is defined as a group of two or more manufacturers, suppliers and/or distributors
that intend to be jointly and severally responsible or liable for a particular contract.
Among the submitted bids was that of the joint venture (JV) of TIM and Smartmatic,
the former incorporated under the Corporation Code of the Philippines. Smartmatic,
on the other hand, was organized under the laws of Barbados. For a stated amount,
said JV proposed to undertake the whole automation project, inclusive of the delivery
of 82,200 PCOS machines. Following the opening of the passing bidders Bid
Envelope and evaluating the technical and financial proposals therein contained, the
SBAC, declared the above-stated bid of the JV of TIM-Smartmatic as the single
complying calculated bid. As required by the RFP, the bid envelope contained an
outline of the joint ventures back-up and continuity or contingency plans, in case of
a systems breakdown or any such eventuality which shall result in the delay,
obstruction or nonperformance of the electoral process.
After declaring TIM-Smartmatic as the best complying bidder, the SBAC then
directed the joint venture to undertake post-qualification screening, and its PCOS
prototype machinesthe Smarmatic Auditable Electronic System (SAES) 1800to
undergo end-to-end testing to determine compliance with the pre-set criteria.
In its Memorandum of June 01, 2009: Systems Evaluation Consolidated Report and
Status Report on the Post-Qualification Evaluation Procedures, the SBAC Technical
Working Group (TWG) stated that it was undertaking a 4-day (May 27 to May 30,
2009) test evaluation of TIM and Smartmatics proposed PCOS project machines. Its
conclusion: "The demo systems presented PASSED all tests as required in the 26item criteria specified in the [RFP]" with 100% accuracy rating.31 The TWG also
validated the eligibility, and technical and financial qualifications of the TIMSmartmatic joint venture.
On June 9, 2009, Comelec issued Resolution No. (Res.) 860832 authorizing the SBAC
to issue, subject to well-defined conditions, the notice of award and notice to
proceed in favor of the winning joint venture.
TIM and Smartmatic, pursuant to the Joint Venture Agreement (JVA), caused the
incorporation of a joint venture corporation (JVC) that would enter into a contract
with the Comelec. On July 8, 2009, the Securities and Exchange Commission issued
a certificate of incorporation in favor of Smartmatic TIM Corporation. On July 10,
2009, Comelec and Smartmatic TIM Corporation, as provider, executed a contract
for the lease of goods and services under the contract for the contract amount of
PhP 7,191,484,739.48, payable as the "Goods and Services are delivered and/or
progress is made in accordance [with pre-set] Schedule of Payments." On the same
date, a Notice to Proceed was sent to, and received by, Smartmatic TIM Corporation.
Meanwhile, or on July 9, 2009, petitioners interposed the instant recourse which, for
all intents and purposes, impugns the validity and seeks to nullify the July 10, 2009
Comelec-Smartmatic-TIM Corporation automation contract adverted to. Among
others, petitioners pray that respondents be permanently enjoined from
implementing the automation project.
As a preliminary counterpoint, respondents question the legal standing or locus
standi of petitioners.
Petitioners depicted the covering automation contract as constituting an abdication
by the Comelec of its election-related mandate under the Constitution, which is to
enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections. Worse still,
according to the petitioners, the abdication, is in favor of a foreign corporation that
will be providing the hardware and software requirements. And when pressed
further, petitioners came out with the observation that, owing in part to the sheer
length of the ballot, the PCOS would not comply with Art. V, Sec. 2 of the
Constitution prescribing secrecy of voting and sanctity of the ballot.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not petitioners have the legal standing to sue.
2. Whether or not the automation constitutes a wholesale abdication of the
COMELEC's constitutional mandate for law enforcement.
3. Whether or not the mechanism of the PCOS machines would infringe the
constitutional right of the people to the secrecy of the ballot.
HELD:
1. YES. To have legal standing, one must, as a rule, establish having suffered some
actual or threatened injury as a result of the alleged illegal government conduct;
that the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and that the injury is likely
to be redressed by a favorable action. The prescription on standing, however, is a
matter of procedure. Hence, it may be relaxed, as the Court has often relaxed the
rule for non-traditional plaintiffs, like ordinary citizens and taxpayers, when the
Page 25 of 30
public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of importance, of overarching
significance to society, or of paramount public interest. Where the issues of public
importance are presented, there is no necessity to show that the suitor has
experienced or is in actual danger of suffering direct and personal injury as the
requisite injury is assumed.
x x x COMELEC, in the implementation of the automated project, will forge

partnerships with various entities in different fields to bring about the success of the
2010 automated elections.
2. NO. There is no abdication of Comelecs mandate and responsibility. The first

function of the Comelec under the Constitution86and the Omnibus Election Code
for that matterrelates to the enforcement and administration of all laws and
regulations relating to the conduct of elections to public office to ensure a free,
orderly and honest electoral exercise. And how did petitioners come to their
conclusion about their abdication theory? By acceding to Art. 3.3 of the automation
contract, Comelec relinquished, so petitioners claim, supervision and control of the
system to be used for the automated elections. To a more specific point, the loss of
control arose from the fact that Comelec would not be holding possession of what in
IT jargon are the public and private keys pair.
As regards the requirement of RA 9369 that IT-capable personnel shall be deputized

as a member of the BEI and that another IT-capable person shall assist the BOC,
public respondent COMELEC shall partner with DOST and other agencies and
instrumentalities of the government.
The Court is not convinced. There is to us nothing in Art 3.3 of the automation
contract, even if read separately from other stipulations and the provisions of the bid
documents and the Constitution itself, to support the simplistic conclusion of
abdication of control pressed on the Court. Insofar as pertinent, Art 3.3 reads:
3.3 The PROVIDER shall be liable for all its obligations under this Project and the
performance of portions thereof by other persons or entities not parties to this
Contract shall not relieve the PROVIDER of said obligations and concomitant
liabilities.
SMARTMATIC, as the joint venture partner with the greater track record in automated
elections, shall be in charge of the technical aspects of the counting and canvassing
software and hardware, including transmission configuration and system integration.
SMARTMATIC shall also be primarily responsible for preventing and troubleshooting
technical problems that may arise during the elections.
The proviso designating Smartmatic as the joint venture partner in charge of the
technical aspect of the counting and canvassing wares does not to us translate,
without more, to ceding control of the electoral process to Smartmatic. It bears to
stress that the aforesaid designation of Smartmatic was in fact an eligibility
requirement imposed, should the bidder be a joint venture.
Art. 6.7 of the automation contract, providing:
6.7 Subject to the provisions of the General Instructions to be issued by the
Commission En Banc, the entire processes of voting, counting, transmission,
consolidation and canvassing of votes shall be conducted by COMELECs personnel
and officials, and their performance, completion and final results according to
specifications and within the specified periods shall be the shared responsibility of
COMELEC and the PROVIDER. (Emphasis added.)
But not one to let an opportunity to score points pass by, petitioners rhetorically ask:
"Where does Public Respondent Comelec intend to get this large number of
professionals, many of whom are already gainfully employed abroad?" The Comelec,
citing Sec. 390 and Sec. 5 of RA 8436,91 as amended, aptly answered this poser in
the following wise:
Public respondent COMELEC will partner with Smartmatic TIM Corporation for the
training and hiring of the IT personnel as well as for the massive voter-education
campaign. There is in fact a budget allocation x x x for these undertakings. x x x
In their respective Memoranda, public and private respondents categorically rejected

outright allegations of abdication by the Comelec of its constitutional duty. The
petitioners, to stress, are strangers to the automation contract. Not one participated
in the bidding conference or the bidding proper or even perhaps examined the
bidding documents and, therefore, none really knows the real intention of the
parties. As case law tells us, the court has to ferret out the real intent of the parties.
What is fairly clear in this case, however, is that petitioners who are not even privy
to the bidding process foist upon the Court their own view on the stipulations of the
automation contract and present to the Court what they think are the parties true
intention.
The RFP/TOR used in the recent bidding for the AES to be used in the 2010 elections
specifically mandated the use of public key cryptography. However, it was left to the
discretion of the bidder to propose an acceptable manner of utilization for
approval/acceptance of the Comelec. Nowhere in the RFP/TOR was it indicated that
COMELEC would delegate to the winning bidder the full discretion, supervision and
control over the manner of PKI [Public Key Infrastructure] utilization.
The role of Smartmatic TIM Corporation is basically to supply the goods necessary
for the automation project, such as but not limited to the PCOS machines, PCs,
electronic transmission devices and related equipment, both hardware and software,
and the technical services pertaining to their operation. As lessees of the goods and
the back-up equipment, the corporation and its operators would provide assistance
with respect to the machines to be used by the Comelec which, at the end of the
day, will be conducting the election thru its personnel and whoever it deputizes.
And if only to emphasize a point, Comelecs contract is with Smartmatic TIM
Corporation of which Smartmatic is a 40% minority owner, per the JVA of TIM and
Smartmatic and the Articles of Incorporation of Smartmatic TIM Corporation.
Accordingly, any decision on the part or on behalf of Smartmatic will not be binding
on Comelec. As a necessary corollary, the board room voting arrangement that
Smartmatic and TIM may have agreed upon as joint venture partners, inclusive of
the veto vote that one may have power over the other, should really be the least
concern of the Comelec.
3. NO. Parenthetically, the contention that the PCOS would infringe on the secrecy
and sanctity of the ballot because, as petitioners would put it, the voter would be
Page 26 of 30
confronted with a "three feet" long ballot, does not commend itself for concurrence.
Surely, the Comelec can put up such infrastructure as to insure that the voter can
write his preference in relative privacy. And as demonstrated during the oral
arguments, the voter himself will personally feed the ballot into the machine. A
voter, if so minded to preserve the secrecy of his ballot, will always devise a way to
do so. By the same token, one with least regard for secrecy will likewise have a way
to make his vote known.
The Comelec is an independent constitutional body with a distinct and pivotal role in
our scheme of government. In the discharge of its awesome functions as overseer of
fair elections, administrator and lead implementor of laws relative to the conduct of
elections, it should not be stymied with restrictions that would perhaps be justified in
the case of an organization of lesser responsibility. It should be afforded ample
elbow room and enough wherewithal in devising means and initiatives that would
enable it to accomplish the great objective for which it was createdto promote
free, orderly, honest and peaceful elections. This is as it should be for, too often,
Comelec has to make decisions under difficult conditions to address unforeseen
events to preserve the integrity of the election and in the process the voice of the
people. Thus, in the past, the Court has steered away from interfering with the
Comelecs exercise of its power which, by law and by the nature of its office properly
pertain to it. Absent, therefore, a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion on
Comelecs part, as here, the Court should refrain from utilizing the corrective hand of
certiorari to review, let alone nullify, the acts of that body.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED.
CASE 16:
GONZALES III vs. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT (679 SCRA 614) 2012
FACTS:
These two petitions have been consolidated not because they stem from the same
factual milieu but because they raise a common thread of issues relating to the
President's exercise of the power to remove from office herein petitioners who claim
the protective cloak of independence of the constitutionally-created office to which
they belong - the Office of the Ombudsman.
The first case is a Petition for Certiorari (with application for issuance of temporary
restraining order or status quo order) which assails on jurisdictional grounds the
Decision rendered by the Office of the President, dismissing petitioner Emilio A.
Gonzales III, Deputy Ombudsman for the Military and Other Law Enforcement Offices
(MOLEO), upon a finding of guilt on the administrative charges of Gross Neglect of
Duty and Grave Misconduct constituting a Betrayal of Public Trust. The petition
primarily seeks to declare as unconstitutional Section 8(2) of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, which gives the President
the power to dismiss a Deputy Ombudsman of the Office of the Ombudsman.
The second case is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition (with application for
issuance of a temporary restraining order or status quo order) seeking to annul,
reverse and set aside the Order requiring petitioner Wendell Barreras-Sulit to submit
a written explanation with respect to alleged acts or omissions constituting
serious/grave offenses in relation to the Plea Bargaining Agreement (PLEBARA)
entered into with Major General Carlos F. Garcia; and the Notice of Preliminary
Investigation, both issued by the Office of the President, the administrative case
initiated against petitioner as a Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman.
The petition likewise seeks to declare as unconstitutional Section 8(2) of R.A. No.
6770 giving the President the power to dismiss a Special Prosecutor of the Office of
the Ombudsman.
On 23 August 2010, a dismissed police officer, former Manila Police District Police
Senior Inspector (Captain) Rolando Del Rosario Mendoza, hijacked a tourist bus, and
held hostage a group of twenty-one foreign tourists and four Filipino tour
assistants.Mendoza was a bemedaled police official who served the Philippine
National Police (PNP) for thirty years prior to his termination ordered by the Office of
the
Ombudsman. For the liberty of his hostages, Mendozas lone demand was his
reinstatement in service. Mendoza claimed he was illegally dismissed from the
police service.The 10-hour hostage drama ended with the murder of eight and the
injury of seven. Mendoza was shot dead by a sniper.In the aftermath of the hostagetaking incident, which ended in the tragic murder of eight HongKong Chinese
nationals, the injury of seven others and the death of P/S Insp. Rolando Mendoza, a
public outcry against the blundering of government officials prompted the creation
of the Incident Investigation and Review Committee (IIRC), chaired by Justice
Secretary Leila de Lima and vice-chaired by Interior and Local Government Secretary
Jesus Robredo. It was tasked to determine accountability for the incident through the
conduct of public hearings and executive sessions. However, petitioner, as well as
the Ombudsman herself, refused to participate in the IIRC proceedings on the
assertion that the Office of the Ombudsman is an independent constitutional
body.Sifting through testimonial and documentary evidence, the IIRC eventually
identified petitioner Gonzales to be among those in whom culpability must lie.
The IIRC made the following findings:
Deputy Ombudsman Gonzales committed serious and inexcusable negligence and
gross violation of their own rules of procedure by allowing Mendoza's motion for
reconsideration (with regard to his dismissal for having committed grave
misconduct) to languish for more than nine (9) months without any justification, in
violation of the Ombudsman prescribed rules to resolve motions for reconsideration
in administrative disciplinary cases within five (5) days from submission. The
inaction is gross, considering there is no opposition thereto. The prolonged inaction
precipitated the desperate resort to hostage-taking.
When the two Ombudsman officials received Mendoza's demand for the release of
the final order resolving his motion for reconsideration, they should have performed
their duty by resolving the reconsideration that same day since it was already
pending for nine months and the prescribed period for its resolution is only five
days. Or if they cannot resolve it that same day, then they should have acted
Page 27 of 30
decisively by issuing an order provisionally suspending the further enforcement of
the judgment of dismissal subject to revocation once the reconsideration is denied
and without prejudice to the arrest and prosecution of Mendoza for the hostagetaking. Had they done so, the crisis may have ended peacefully, without necessarily
compromising the integrity of the institution. After all, as relayed to the negotiators,
Mendoza did express willingness to take full responsibility for the hostage-taking if
his demand for release of the final decision or reinstatement was met.But instead of
acting decisively, the two Ombudsman officials merely offered to review a pending
motion for review of the case, thereby prolonging their inaction and aggravating the
situation. As expected, Mendoza - who previously berated Deputy Gonzales for
allegedly demanding Php150,000 in exchange for favorably resolving the motion for
reconsideration - rejected and branded as trash ("basura") the Ombudsman [sic]
letter promising review, triggering the collapse of the negotiations. To prevent the
situation from getting out of hand, the negotiators sought the alternative option of
securing before the PNP-NCRPO an order for Mendoza's provisional reinstatement
pending resolution of the motion for reconsideration. Unfortunately, it was already
too late. But had the Ombudsman officials performed their duty under the law and
acted decisively, the entire crisis may have ended differently.
In a completely separate incident much earlier in time, more particularly in
December of 2003, 28-year-old Juan Paolo Garcia and 23-year-old Ian Carl Garcia
were caught in the United States smuggling $100,000 from Manila by concealing the
cash in their luggage and making false statements to US Customs Officers. The
Garcia brothers pleaded guilty to bulk cash smuggling and agreed to forfeit the
amount in favor of the US Government in exchange for the dismissal of the rest of
the charges against them and for being sentenced to time served. Inevitably,
however, an investigation into the source of the smuggled currency conducted by
US Federal Agents and the Philippine Government unraveled a scandal of military
corruption and amassed wealth -- the boys' father, Retired Major General Carlos F.
Garcia, former Chief Procurement Officer of the Armed Forces, had accumulated
more than P 300 Million during his active military service. Plunder and Anti-Money
Laundering cases were eventually filed against Major General Garcia, his wife and
their two sons before the Sandiganbayan.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Office of the President has jurisdiction to exercise administrative
disciplinary power over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor who belong
to the constitutionally-created Office of the Ombudsman.
HELD:
(2) A Deputy or the Special Prosecutor, may be removed from office by the President
for any of the grounds provided for the removal of the Ombudsman, and after due
process.
It is a basic canon of statutory construction that in interpreting a statute, care should
be taken that every part thereof be given effect, on the theory that it was enacted
as an integrated measure and not as a hodge-podge of conflicting provisions. A
construction that would render a provision inoperative should be avoided; instead,
apparently inconsistent provisions should be reconciled whenever possible as parts
of a coordinated and harmonious whole. Otherwise stated, the law must not be read
in truncated parts. Every part thereof must be considered together with the other
parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment.
A harmonious construction of these two apparently conflicting provisions in R.A. No.
6770 leads to the inevitable conclusion that Congress had intended the Ombudsman
and the President to exercise concurrent disciplinary jurisdiction over petitioners as
Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, respectively.
By granting express statutory power to the President to remove a Deputy
Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, Congress merely filled an obvious gap
in the law.
Section 9, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution confers upon the President the power
to appoint the Ombudsman and his Deputies, viz:
Section 9. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall be appointed by the President
from a list of at least six nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council, and
from a list of three nominees for every vacancy thereafter. Such appointments shall
require no confirmation. All vacancies shall be filled within three months after they
occur.
While the removal of the Ombudsman himself is also expressly provided for in the
Constitution, which is by impeachment under Section 244 of the same Article, there
is, however, no constitutional provision similarly dealing with the removal from office
of a Deputy Ombudsman, or a Special Prosecutor, for that matter. By enacting
Section 8(2) of R.A. 6770, Congress simply filled a gap in the law without running
afoul of any provision in the Constitution or existing statutes. In fact, the
Constitution itself, under
Section 2, authorizes Congress to provide for the removal of all other public officers,
including the Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, who are not subject to
impeachment.
For case GR No. 196231:
According to R.A. 6670, Section 8(2), grants the President express power of removal
over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor. Thus:
Section 8.Removal; Filling of Vacancy.-
x xxx
The Power of the President to Remove a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special

Prosecutor is Implied from his Power to Appoint.
Page 28 of 30
Under the doctrine of implication, the power to appoint carries with it the power to
remove.48 As a general rule, therefore, all officers appointed by the President are
also removable by him.49 The exception to this is when the law expressly provides
otherwise - that is, when the power to remove is expressly vested in an office or
authority other than the appointing power. In some cases, the Constitution expressly
separates the power to remove from the President's power to appoint. Under Section
9, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, the Members of the Supreme Court and
judges of lower courts shall be appointed by the President. However, Members of the
Supreme Court may be removed after impeachment proceedings initiated by
Congress (Section 2, Article XI), while judges of lower courts may be removed only
by the Supreme Court by virtue of its administrative supervision over all its
personnel (Sections 6 and 11, Article VIII). The Chairpersons and Commissioners of
the Civil Service
Commission Section 1(2), Article IX(B), the Commission on Elections Section 1(2),
Article IX(C), and the Commission on Audit Section 1(2), Article IX(D) shall likewise
be appointed by the President, but they may be removed only by impeachment
(Section 2, Article XI). As priorly stated, the Ombudsman himself shall be appointed
by the President (Section 9, Article XI) but may also be removed only by
impeachment (Section 2, Article XI).
In giving the President the power to remove a Deputy Ombudsman and Special
Prosecutor, Congress simply laid down in express terms an authority that is already
implied from the President's constitutional authority to appoint the aforesaid officials
in the Office of the Ombudsman.The Office of the Ombudsman is charged with
monumental tasks that have been generally categorized into investigatory power,
prosecutorial power, public assistance, authority to inquire and obtain information
and the function to adopt, institute and implement preventive measures.50 In order
to ensure the effectiveness of his constitutional role, the Ombudsman was provided
with an over-all deputy as well as a deputy each for Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao.
However, well into the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, a provision
for the appointment of a separate deputy for the military establishment was
necessitated by Commissioner Ople's lament against the rise within the armed
forces of "fraternal associations outside the chain of command" which have become
the common soldiers' "informal grievance machinery" against injustice, corruption
and neglect in the uniformed service,51 thus:
indifference. The Ombudsman can designate a deputy to help the ordinary foot
soldier get through with his grievance to higher authorities. This deputy will, of
course work in close cooperation with the Minister of National Defense because of
the necessity to maintain the integrity of the chain of command. Ordinary soldiers,
when they know they can turn to a military Ombudsman for their complaints, may
not have to fall back on their own informal devices to obtain redress for their
grievances. The Ombudsman will help raise troop morale in accordance with a major
professed goal of the President and the military authorities themselves. x xx
The add-on now forms part of Section 5, Article XI which reads as follows:
Section 5. There is hereby created the independent Office of the Ombudsman,
composed of the Ombudsman to be known as Tanodbayan, one over-all Deputy and
at least one Deputy each for Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao. A separate deputy for
the military establishment shall likewise be appointed. (Emphasis supplied) The
integrity and effectiveness of the Deputy Ombudsman for the MOLEO as a military
watchdog looking into abuses and irregularities that affect the general morale and
professionalism in the military is certainly of primordial importance in relation to the
President's own role asCommander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. It would not be
incongruous for Congress, therefore, to grant the President concurrent disciplinary
authority over the Deputy Ombudsman for the military and other law enforcement
offices.
Granting the President the Power to Remove a Deputy Ombudsman does
not Diminish the Independence of the Office of the Ombudsman.
The claim that Section 8(2) of R.A. No. 6770 granting the President the power to
remove a Deputy Ombudsman from office totally frustrates, if not resultantly
negates the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman is tenuous. The
independence which the Office of the Ombudsman is vested with was intended to
free it from political considerations in pursuing its constitutional mandate to be a
protector of the people. What the Constitution secures for the Office of the
Ombudsman is, essentially, political
In our own Philippine Armed Forces, there has arisen in recent years a type of
fraternal association outside the chain of command proposing reformist objectives.
They constitute, in fact, an informal grievance machinery against injustices to the
rank and file soldiery and perceive graft in higher rank and neglect of the needs of
troops in combat zones. The Reform the Armed Forces Movement of RAM has kept
precincts for pushing logistics to the field, the implied accusation being that most of
the resources are used up in Manila instead of sent to soldiers in the field. The
Guardians, the El Diablo and other organizations dominated by enlisted men
function, more or less, as grievance collectors and as mutual aid societies.This
proposed amendment merely seeks to extend the office of the Ombudsman to the
military establishment, just as it champions the common people against
bureaucratic
Page 29 of 30
independence. This means nothing more than that "the terms of office, the salary,
the appointments and discipline of all persons under the office" are "reasonably
insulated from the whims of politicians."52 And so it was that Section 5, Article XI of
the 1987 Constitution had declared the creation of the independent Office of the
Ombudsman, composed of the Ombudsman and his Deputies, who are described as
"protectors of the people" and constitutionally mandated to act promptly on
complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or employees of the
Government Section 12, Article XI. Pertinent provisions under Article XI prescribes a
term of office of seven years without reappointment Section 11, prohibits a decrease
in salaries during the term of office Section 10, provides strict qualifications for the
office Section 8, grants fiscal autonomy Section 14 and ensures the exercise of
constitutional functions Section 12 and 13. The cloak of independence is meant to
build up the Office of the Ombudsman's institutional strength to effectively function
as official critic, mobilizer of government, constitutional watchdog53 and protector
of the people. It certainly cannot be made to extend to wrongdoings and permit the
unbridled acts of its officials to escape administrative discipline.
Being aware of the constitutional imperative of shielding the Office of the
Ombudsman from political influences and the discretionary acts of the executive,
Congress laid down two restrictions on the President's exercise of such power of
removal over a Deputy Ombudsman, namely: (1) that the removal of the Deputy
Ombudsman must be for any of the grounds provided for the removal of the
Ombudsman and (2) that there must be observance of due process. Reiterating the
grounds for impeachment laid down in Section 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution,
paragraph 1 of Section 8 of R.A. No. 6770 states that the Deputy Ombudsman may
be removed from office for the same grounds that the Ombudsman may be removed
through impeachment, namely, "culpable violation of the Constitution, treason,
bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust." Thus, it
cannot be rightly said that giving the President the power to remove a Deputy
Ombudsman, or a Special Prosecutor
for that matter, would diminish or compromise the constitutional independence of
the Office of the Ombudsman. It is, precisely, a measure of protection of the
independence of the Ombudsman'sDeputies and Special Prosecutor in the discharge
of their duties that their removal can only be had on grounds provided by law.
In Espinosa v. Office of the Ombudsman,54 the Court elucidated on the nature of the
Ombudsman's independence in this wise -The prosecution of offenses committed by
public officers is vested in the Office of the Ombudsman. To insulate the Office from
outside pressure and improper influence, the Constitution as well as RA 6770 has
endowed it with a wide latitude of investigatory and prosecutory powers virtually
free from legislative, executive or judicial intervention. This Court consistently
refrains from interfering with the exercise of its powers, and respects the initiative
and independence inherent in the Ombudsman who, 'beholden to no one, acts as
the champion of the people and the preserver of the integrity of public service.
However, the same discussion cannot be applied to the tragic hostage-taking
incident, which was the result of a confluence of several unfortunate events
including system failure of government response. It cannot be solely attributed then
to what petitioner Gonzales may have negligently failed to do for the quick, fair and
complete resolution of the case, or to his error of judgment in the disposition thereof.
Neither should petitioner's official acts in the resolution of P/S Insp. Mendoza's case
be judged based upon the resulting deaths at the Quirino Grandstand. The failure to
immediately act upon a party's requests for an early resolution of his case is not, by
itself, gross neglect of duty amounting to betrayal of public trust. Records show that
petitioner took considerably less time to act upon the draft resolution after the same
was submitted for his appropriate action compared to the length of time that said
draft remained pending and unacted upon in the Office of Ombudsman Merceditas
N. Gutierrez. He reviewed and denied P/S Insp. Mendoza's motion for reconsideration
within nine (9) calendar days reckoned from the time the draft resolution was
submitted to him on April 27, 2010 until he forwarded his recommendation to the
Office of Ombudsman Gutierrez on May 6, 2010 for the latter's final action.
Clearly, the release of any final order on the case was no longer in his hands.Even if
there was inordinate delay in the resolution of P/S Insp. Mendoza's motion and an
unexplained failure on petitioner's part to supervise his subordinates in its prompt
disposition, the same cannot be considered a vicious and malevolent act warranting
his removal for betrayal of public trust. More so because the neglect imputed
upon petitioner appears to be an isolated case.
Accordingly, the OP's pronouncement of administrative accountability against
petitioner and the imposition upon him of the corresponding penalty of dismissal
must be reversed and set aside, as the findings of neglect of duty or misconduct in
office do not amount to a betrayal of public trust. Hence, the President, while he
may be vested with authority, cannot order the removal of petitioner as Deputy
Ombudsman, there being no intentional wrongdoing of the grave and serious kind
amounting to a betrayal of public trust.This is not to say, however, that petitioner is
relieved of all liability for his acts showing less than diligent performance of official
duties. Although the administrative acts imputed to petitioner fall short of the
constitutional standard of betrayal of public trust, considering the OP's factual
findings of negligence and misconduct against petitioner, the Court deems it
appropriate to refer the case to the Office of the Ombudsman for further
investigation of the charges in OP Case No. 10-J-460 and the imposition of the
corresponding administrative sanctions, if any.
Inasmuch as there is as yet no existing ground justifying his removal from office,
petitioner is entitled to reinstatement to his former position as Deputy Ombudsman
and to the payment of backwages and benefits corresponding to the period of his
suspension.
For Case GR No. 196232:
The Office of the President is vested with statutory authority to proceed

administratively against petitioner Barreras-Sulit to determine the
existence of any of the grounds for her removal from office as provided for
under the Constitution and the Ombudsman Act.
Page 30 of 30
Petitioner Barreras-Sulit, on the other hand, has been resisting the President's
authority to remove her from office upon the averment that without the
Sandiganbayan's final approval and judgment on the basis of the PLEBARA, it would
be premature to charge her with acts and/or omissions "tantamount to culpable
violations of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust," which are grounds for
removal from office under Section 8, paragraph (2) of the Ombudsman Act of 1989;
and which also constitute a violation of Section 3, paragraph (e) of Republic Act No.
3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) - causing undue injury to the
Government or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence. With reference to the doctrine of prejudicial procedural antecedent,
petitioner Barreras-Sulit asserts that the propriety of taking and continuing to take
administrative disciplinary proceeding against her must depend on the final
disposition by the Sandiganbayan of the PLEBARA, explaining that if the
Sandiganbayan would uphold the PLEBARA, there would no longer be any cause of
complaint against her; if not, then the situation becomes ripe for the determination
of her failings.
The argument will not hold water. The incidents that have taken place subsequent to
the submission in court of the PLEBARA shows that the PLEBARA has been practically
approved, and that the only thing which remains to be done by the Sandiganbayan
is to promulgate a judgment imposing the proper sentence on the accused Major
General Garcia based on his new pleas to lesser offenses. On May 4, 2010, the
Sandiganbayan issued a resolution declaring that the change of plea under the
PLEBARA was warranted and that it complied with jurisprudential guidelines. The
Sandiganbayan, thereafter, directed the accused Major General Garcia to
immediately convey in favor of the State all the properties, both real and personal,
enumerated therein. On August 11, 2010, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution,
which, in order to put into effect the reversion of Major General Garcia's ill-gotten
properties, ordered the corresponding government agencies to cause the transfer of
ownership of said properties to the Republic of the Philippines. In the meantime, the
Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) informed the Sandiganbayan that an Order70
had been issued by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 21 on November 5,
2010 allowing the transfer of the accused's frozen accounts to the Republic of the
Philippines pursuant to the terms of the PLEBARA as approved by the
Sandiganbayan. Immediately after the OSP informed the Sandiganbayan that its May
4, 2010 Resolution had been substantially complied with, Major General Garcia
manifested71 to the Sandiganbayan on November 19, 2010 his readiness for
sentencing and for the withdrawal of the criminal information against his wife and
two sons.
The approval or disapproval of the PLEBARA by the Sandiganbayan is of no

consequence to an administrative finding of liability against petitioner Barreras-Sulit.
While the court's determination of the propriety of a plea bargain is on the basis of
the existing prosecution evidence on record, the disciplinary authority's
determination of the prosecutor's administrative liability is based on whether the
plea bargain is consistent with the conscientious consideration of the government's
best interest and the diligent and efficient performance by the prosecution of its
public duty to prosecute crimes against the State. Consequently, the disciplining
authority's finding of ineptitude, neglect or willfulness on the part of the prosecution,
more particularly petitioner Special Prosecutor Barreras-Sulit, in failing to pursue or
build a strong case for the government or, in this case, entering into an agreement
which the government finds "grossly disadvantageous," could result in
administrative liability, notwithstanding court approval of the plea bargaining
agreement entered into.
Notwithstanding this earlier ruling by the Sandiganbayan, the OSP, unexplainably,
chose to plea bargain with the accused Major General Garcia as if its evidence were
suddenly insufficient to secure a conviction. At this juncture, it is not amiss to
emphasize that the "standard of strong evidence of guilt which is sufficient to deny
bail to an accused is markedly higher than the standard of judicial probable cause
which is sufficient to initiate a criminal case."76 Hence, in light of the apparently
strong case against accused Major General Garcia, the disciplining authority would
be hard-pressed not to look into the whys and wherefores of the prosecution's
turnabout in the case.
The Court need not touch further upon the substantial matters that are the subject
of the pending administrative proceeding against petitioner Barreras-Sulit and are,
thus, better left to the complete and effective resolution of the administrative case
before the Office of the President.
WHEREFORE, in G.R. No. 196231, the decision of the Office of the President in OP
Case No. 10-J-460 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Emilio A. Gonzales III is
ordered REINSTATED with payment of backwages corresponding to the period of
suspension effective immediately, even as the Office of the Ombudsman is directed
to proceed with the investigation in connection with the above case against
petitioner. In G.R. No. 196232, We AFFIRM the continuation of OP-DC Case No. 11-B003 against Special Prosecutor Wendell Barreras-Sulit for alleged acts and omissions
tantamount to culpable violation of the Constitution and a betrayal of public trust, in
accordance with Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman Act of 1989.

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Page 1 of 30

Commission on Human Rights Employees' Association (CHREA) vs.

Commission on Human Rights

[GR 155336, 25 November 2004]

Second Division, Chico-Nazario (J): 4 concur

Service Commission (CSC)-National Capital Region Office, through a memorandum

as the General Appropriations Act of 1998. It provided for Special Provisions

appointments be rejected owing to the DBMs disapproval of the plantilla

reclassification. Meanwhile, the officers of the Commission on Human Rights

Employees Association (CHREA), in representation of the rank and file employees of

Aurora P. Navarette-Recia and Commissioners Nasser A. Marohomsalic, Mercedes V.

Contreras, Vicente P. Sibulo, and Jorge R. Coquia, promulgated Resolution A98-047 n

with appropriate authority mandated by law to evaluate and approve matters of

04 September 1998, adopting an upgrading and reclassification scheme among

reclassification and upgrading, as well as creation of positions. The CSC-Central

selected positions in the Commission. Annexed to said resolution is the proposed

Office denied CHREAs request in a Resolution dated 16 December 1999, and

Commissioners. On 19 October 1998, CHR issued Resolution No. A98-055 providing

augmentation of a commensurate amount generated from savings under Personnel

CHREA filed the petition for review.

Services. By virtue of Resolution A98-062 dated 17 November 1998, the CHR

(1)Whether or not CHREA is a proper party to bring the suit in Court.

Locus standi or legal standing has been defined as a personal and

A moot case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by

On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that respondent GSIS has disregarded

Facts: The controversy arose when respondent Government Service

Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as the winning bidder/strategic partner

necessary for purpose.

Kilosbayan v Guingona Jr.

Citizens Assemblies ("barangays") to resolve, among other things, the issues of

the national assembly, its

Section 2 of Article XVI of the Constitution.

FACTS: On September 2, 1976, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential

Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the Commission on Elections

propose amendments to the Constitution, as well as Presidential Decree No. 1031,

insofar as it directs the Commission on Elections to supervise, control, hold, and

functions of the interim Assembly, there is no reason why he cannot validly

conduct the Referendum-Plebiscite scheduled on October 16, 1976.

discharge the function of that Assembly to propose amendments to the Constitution,

the incumbent President to exercise the constituent power to propose amendments

to the new Constitution. As a consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16

has no constitutional or legal basis.

Issue 2 - Is the submission to the people of the proposed amendments

Issue 1 Whether or not the president has the authority to propose

Likewise, in the period of transition, the power to propose amendments to the

G.R. No. 164987

MENDOZA, J.: EN BANC

April 24, 2012

According to LAMP, the above provision is silent and, therefore, prohibits an

The petition is miserably wanting in this regard.

**Under the Constitution, the power of appropriation is vested in the Legislature,

ISSUE: whether or not the implementation of Priority Development Assistance Fund

RULING: NO. In determining whether or not a statute is unconstitutional, the Court

2. Whether R.A. 6735 is a sufficient statutory implementation of the said

The Constitutional provision on peoples initiative to amend the constitution

ISSUE: 1. Whether Sec. 2, Art. XVII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing

Furthermore, the respondent judge wanted to put things in proper perspective by

While sovereignty has traditionally been deemed absolute and all-encompassing

Do the provisions of the WTO Agreement and its 3 annexes contravene

By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by generally accepted

By its very title, Article II of the Constitution is a "declaration of principles and

By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the absoluteness of

Economic Nationalism Should Be Read with Other Constitutional Mandates to