Probability

609-006-1

Sept
07

March 08

Supply Risk Management at

Unilever

Upper limit

Managing Spend at Risk

Annual Spend 08

01/2009-5563
This case was written by INSEAD Professors Paul Kleindorfer and Enver Ycesan, in cooperation with the Supply
Management Lead Team of Unilever Corporation. The issues raised here are purely for educational purposes and
are not intended to illustrate either effective or ineffective management of an administrative situation
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609-006-1

The Supply Management Leadership Team (SMLT) at Unilever brought together the heads
of key procurement areas such as oils and fats, plastics, cocoa, and milk powder at Unilever.
The SMLT was preparing for a special meeting in Zurich in a month to discuss possible
changes to its risk management tactics and strategy. The mood among team members was
unusually somber. In the past few months, commodity prices had defied all the laws of
gravity by jumping to historically high levels. Uwe Schulte, Vice President of Global Supply
Management, had asked his team to come up with innovative approaches to commodity
procurement that would provide a better understanding, and perhaps some mitigation, of
Unilevers exposure to the increased volatility of market prices. The presentations of the risk
management proposals by the plastics team was the top agenda item for the meeting, but it
was understood that every one of Unilevers major commodity purchases would be subject to
a similar review over the next few months. Given the developments of the past few months,
the focus was on understanding and managing the risk of large swings in procurement
expenditures. How to do this without sacrificing buying performance and a dependable
physical supply to Unilevers manufacturing facilities would be the centerpiece of the SMLT
meeting and discussion.

Unilever
Unilever was a global giant in food and personal care products. Operating in 150 countries
with 206,000 employees, its turnover was 39.7 billion euros in 2005. Figure 1 shows the
distribution of its activities across different categories and different regions.

Beverages
8%
Ice Cr eam and

Asia/Africa
26%

Home Care
18%

Fr ozen Food

Spr eads

16%

11%

Europe
41%

Savor y &
Dr essings

Per sonal Car e

21%

26%

Americas
33%

Figure 1: Distribution of Unilevers Activities Around the World

Unilever had global brands such as Lipton, Knorr, Lux and Omo that were top brands in their
categories, as well as locally strong brands such as Hellmanns, Birds Eye, Carte dOr and
Axe. Twelve of these brands achieved annual sales volumes of more than 1 billion euros
each.

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In a press release1, Patrick Cescau, Unilevers CEO, laid out an ambitious agenda:
We now need to drive harder to build a winning portfolio by extending our
leadership positions and our presence in high growth spaces. At the same time,
we are improving our consumer marketing and customer development to deliver
outstanding execution. Bringing all this together as One Unilever will ensure
that we capitalize on both our local roots and global scale. This strategy will
enable us to grow ahead of our markets with sustainable margin improvement. I
am confident that this will lead to sustainable underlying sales growth of 3-5%
and an operating margin in excess of 15% by 2010.

SMLT
Unilever was organized upon three pillars: categories, regions, and functions. The Supply
Management (SM) organization, which was responsible for global procurement, was part of
the Supply Chain Management function. SCMs mission was to build one supply network
from shelf to supplier, which leveraged Unilevers scale and delivered competitive solutions
to customers and consumers. The organizational structure is depicted in Figure 2. SMLT
consisted of the heads of the regions and of key spend categories such as chemicals, food
ingredients, and packaging.

Globally responsible
for SM on behalf of UL
SCLT

UEx Sponsor
John Rice

SCLT Sponsor
Greg Polcer

HPC
Category

FOODS
Category

FINANCE
Function

SMLT
CHEMNET
Henk Sijbring
VP Chemicals Network/
HPC Category Contact

R
e
g
I
o
n
s

PACKNET

INGNET

Uwe G Schulte

Jan-Jelle vd Meer

VP Packaging Network
VP Global SM

Dir Ingredients
Network Foods

NPI
Peter Pick
VP NPI

David Beauchamp/
Guenther Buck (O&F)

EUROPE
Marco Gonalves

AMERICAS
Umesh Shah

ASIA

6
global
teams

7 global
teams

6
global
teams

3
global
CoPs

Krish Maharaj

AMET

Figure 2: The Supply Management Organization

3 August 2006

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SM had several guiding principles. With respect to the supply base, it strived to achieve
competitive costs, be the innovation partner of choice and a professional business partner.
With respect to the downstream supply chain, SM aimed at delivering superior customer
service. Under Uwe Schultes leadership, the SMLT also considered efficient risk
management part of its mandate, and the new initiative on managing market risk for major
commodity groups was a central aspect of this element of SMLTs responsibilities.

Commodity Characteristics
SM purchased a wide range of commodities, including food ingredients (such as sugar,
powdered milk, cocoa, wheat, and various oils and fats); chemical products (such as lab,
caustic soda, and alcohol sulphates); packaging materials (such as plastics, aluminum, and
corrugated cardboard); as well as energy (such as electricity and natural gas). The total
annual spend under SMs responsibility was several billion euros but the profit consequences
of a dependable supply at predictable prices clearly went well beyond the direct impact of its
annual spend. Indeed, the sharp rise (Figure 3) and increased volatility (Figure 4) in
commodity prices had drawn a lot of attention to SMs activities and further heightened the
pressure to improve profitability following a few disappointing quarters for all the major
companies in the food industry and the resulting stock market reactions. In the context of this
dual pressure, SMLT decided to evaluate alternative risk mitigation strategies for its sizeable
commodity procurement business.

600
400

2006

2005

2004

2003

2002

2001

-200

2000

0
1999

mn

200

-400
-600
-800
Figure 3: Year-on-Year Change in Commodity Procurement (constant volumes)

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80%

Tallow
Dairy EU

60%

Dairy NA
Alkoxylated

40%

Resins
LAB/LAS
O&F

20%

0%
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
-20%

-40%

Figure 4: Increased Volatility in Commodity Prices

Risk Management Options

As a pilot project, SMLT decided to begin with plastics to understand what benefits risk
management innovations could provide. As with most major commodities, parallel financial
markets were well developed for plastic resins and the recent price volatility had created
heightened awareness of the need to limit exposure. Table 1 summarizes some recent market
movements in key spend items for selected commodities under SMs responsibility.

Cluster
Natural Gas EU
Dairy ingredients EU
Cocoa
Dairy NA
PAS/AE/LES
Plastics
LAB/LAS
Oils & Fats

Maximum
historic
annual price
volatility
30%
25%
30%
30%
25%
25%
60%
25%

Parallel Financial
market?
Limited OTC
No
LME, OTC
CME, limited
No
LME (limited) + OTC
OTC
CBOT + OTC

Tools available
Swaps
Futures + Options
Futures+Options
Futures + Swaps
Swaps
Futures

Table 1: Market Characteristics of Selected Commodities

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Plastics
Plastics for containers come in many sizes and grades, but the underlying chemical
components remain the same, with the basic chemicals (referred to as resins) being highdensity polyethylene (HDPE), polypropylene (PP) and polyethylene terephthalate (PET).
While SM did not purchase these resins directly, its suppliers of plastic containers did, and
they passed on the cost of these resins to SM via the price of the plastic containers it
purchased. SM was a major consumer of plastic bottles and lids to package Unilevers
products, spending around 400 million euros on plastics in 2006. Price volatility peaked at
25% within the year.
In spite of a complex supply chain, as depicted in Figure 5, plastics were highly
commoditized. As a key commodity, the global over-the-counter plastics trade was quite
transparent with well developed parallel financial markets since the price of both PP and
HDPE was highly correlated with the price of their raw materials, namely crude oil and
natural gas. This suggested that hedging instruments for plastics spend could be either
directly in HDPE, PP or PET, or through positions in the underlying raw materials of crude
oil and natural gas.
SM purchased bottles and lids from dedicated suppliers in each of its major sales regions.
Bottle blowers closely followed crude oil prices and resulting resin prices before adding their
own margins on the product. Due to product volumes, shipping was also quite expensive.
SMs strategy for this category was to achieve price stability. Unfortunately, market
forecasts were far from accurate. This, in turn, triggered SMs interest in pursuing parallel
risk management opportunities, both as a possible source of risk hedging as well as to
improve the quality of the information underlying SMs decisions regarding sourcing and
contracting for plastics.

PP and HDPE Chains Overlap

Methane

Others: L(L)DPE/PVC/MEG/PET

95%

Natural
Gas

80%

Ethylene

Ethane

20%

HDPE

0.32t

Crude
oil
95%

0.16t

Naphtha (1t)

Propylene

PP

0.10t

Aromatics
Transport/
fuel

60%

PTA/DMT

Gasoline additives +
(polyester) fiber/PET
others

Reds show
competing
markets for
feedstock use

Various markets outside the resin market affect resin prices. Crude oil (energy and
transportation) is the most prominent affecting both PP and HDPE.

Figure 5: Overlapping HDPE, PP, and PET Supply Chains

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Figure 6 shows the structure and complexity of SMs plastics hedging problem. For a
specific region, the problem begins with aggregate end product demand for different bottles
and containers, as determined by Unilevers market forecast. These, in turn, imply ex ante
demand for different resins (HDPE, PP, PET) in the periods t = 1, , T (think of these as
quarters). The basic question confronting the SMLT in terms of hedging strategies was
whether to take positions (i.e., buy swaps and other derivative instruments from brokers or
directly on the London LIFFE or other exchanges) in crude oil (an indirect hedge) or in the
resins themselves. At this juncture SMLT was not interested in changing its physical
sourcing of plastics from its direct plastics manufacturers, but only in understanding the cost
and value of various hedging strategies.

Final Product
Demands

D1t

D2t

Dmt

Correlations

Correlations

Crude
Oil
Price

HDPEt

PETt

PPt

Market
Traded
Resins

Resin
Demands

Figure 6: Demand for Plastic Bottles

As an example, Table 2 summarizes demand and mean prices for three demand regions (NE,
SE and West) in the North American market for HDPE for the four quarters of 2006 (as
forecast at the beginning of 2006). The standard deviation of HDPE demand in each quarter
was expected to be about 10% and the standard deviation of the price was expected to be
about 25% of mean price, with strong correlation of prices across regional suppliers. During
2006, based on futures contracts trading on 1/1/06, the average price for Brent crude oil was
expected to be $65.32 per barrel (with a standard quarterly deviation of $6.17). For the same
period, the correlation between crude oil prices and that of resins was around 0.65.

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Quarter 1

Quarter 2

Quarter 3

Quarter 4

Demand-NE

15,557

16,159

14,532

16,858

Demand-SE

16,550

16,734

14,985

15,485

Demand-We

19,150

17,810

18,283

18,895

Price-NE

1,211

1,304

1,405

1,626

Price-SE

1,309

1,341

1,521

1,517

Price-We

1,119

1,260

1,378

1,578

Table 2: 2006 Demand Volumes (metric tons) & Prices ($/ton) Over 4 Quarters
The challenge for the SMLT was clear enough: Should they engage in risk hedging activity
for their plastics resins, possibly including taking positions in crude oil? The analysis
presented by the Plastics Team (see Exhibit 2) seemed to suggest that even a small portion of
about 1% of total spend on HDPE could lead to significant reductions in maximum
expenditures on HDPE in North America (and, by extension, to other plastics resins and other
regional markets).
But there were a number of central issues yet to consider. Was this financial approach to
hedging cash flows the right approach for the Unilever Supply Management group? Should
the same approach be extended to other resins and, if so, with what benefits? Should the
SMLT be the one to implement this approach or should it be done by Unilever Treasury?
What controls should be put in place to make sure that the hedging that was done was limited
to the specific purpose of improving SMs performance, and not for speculative purposes?
What benefits, if any, would information provided by this hedging strategy bring to
improving buying performance and contracting with respect to ULs plastics purchases?
As Uwe Schulte went through the materials for the coming SMLT meeting, he couldnt help
but think this was a whole new game as far as supply management was concerned.

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Appendix 1
Risk Mitigation Instruments and Supply Portfolios2

Call and Put Options

A call option gives the holder the right, but not the obligation, to buy the spot asset on or
a before a predetermined date (the maturity date) at a certain price (the strike price),
which is agreed today. Call options come in various flavors. For instance, in American
options, execution is allowed from a given execution/start date through any time up to
and including the expiration date. By contrast, a European option can only be exercised
on the maturity date itself. Figure 8 illustrates the potential payoff from a European call
option.
A put option is similarly defined as giving the holder the right, but not the obligation, to
sell the spot asset on or before the maturity date at the strike price.

Payoff/Profit
12
10
Probability of

Terminal Price
Pay

6
4
Stri

Pro

0
0

10

12

14
16
18
Terminal Price

20

Price of the Option

Figure 8: Payoff of a European Option

SWAPS
A swap is an agreement whereby a floating (market or spot) price is exchanged for a fixed
price over a specified period. A swap buyer pays the fixed leg and receives the floating leg.
A swap seller pays the floating leg and receives the fixed leg.
Swaps are financial
agreements but they essentially assure (for the contracted volume of the swap) that the swap
buyer will pay the exact price of the swap for the commodity in question. The effectiveness
of swaps is summarized in Figure 9.

For further details on available instruments and risk management strategies, see Aswath Damodaran,
Strategic Risk Taking, Wharton School Publishing, 2008.

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Suppose
there is
UL Spend

Floating Index

correlation

for Plastic

e.g., for

Resins

Crude Oil

This crude oil Swap gives

rise to basis risk as an
imperfect hedge against
plastic resin price
fluctuations

Crude Oil
Swap at Price
Ps

This Swap is a complete

hedge against crude oil
price fluctuations

Figure 9: Using Financial Swaps for Risk Hedging

The Supply Portfolio Problem

The central question to be addressed in supply portfolio management (for example for HDPE
for ULs North American market) is what mix of supply contracts, options contracts and
swaps will provide assured physical supply of needed inputs for its production, together with
appropriate financial hedges for the associated cash expenditures for these inputs. Physical
supplies can come either from pre-qualified sellers or directly from various spot markets. In
supply management for commodities, different grades and specifications for commodities
often require prior contracting and procurement relations with pre-qualified suppliers. These
alternative situations give rise to various forms of commodity risk management, as shown in
Table 3 below.

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Description of Context

Instruments used in Optimal

Portfolio

Examples

Cost and access differences

small and only standard
commodities are sourced

Bilateral contracting and

financial hedge instruments
are defined on a common
market and optimized jointly

Energy

Cost and access differences

are large and only standard
commodities are sourced

Bilateral contracting used for

most physical procurement,
with spot market used for
topping up supply, and for
financial hedge instruments

Logistics services (standard

air and maritime cargo)

Non-standard commodities are

sourced, but their prices are
highly correlated with those of
standard commodities

Bilateral contracting used for

all physical procurement, with
financial hedge instruments,
defined on correlated standard
products, used as an overlay
for hedging

Plastic resins and commodity

chemicals

Commodity metals

Fed-cattle (beef), hogs and

lamb markets

Table 3: Alternative Contexts for Commodity Risk Management of Supply

The standard problem of commodity sourcing and hedging for a large buyer like UL can be
stated as maximizing expected profits, subject to physical delivery constraints and some risk
constraints. The general structure of the Supply Portfolio Problem (SPP) is as follows:
Supply Portfolio Problem (SPP)

Maximize Expected Profits (where the decision choices are the amounts to contract for from
each available physical and financial contract)
Subject to:

Physical delivery constraints (to assure delivery of needed inputs)

Financial risk constraints (on maximum exposures or on allowable losses from financial
instruments used for hedging)

Constraints defining the instruments themselves (puts, calls, swaps, contract parameters
such as minimum take provisions and flexibility bands, etc.)

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This optimization problem is not solved once and for all but on a continuing basis. At the
same time, demand uncertainties are resolved, as well as spot prices and contract prices. To
the extent that contracts allow flexibility in execution (e.g., call or put options), these are
executed to optimize profits on the day by executing all options that are in the money or
needed for physical fulfillment. This problem on the day can sometimes be interesting, but
in theory it is straightforward and solved by some computer-based algorithm that picks the
best options on the day to execute for both physical coverage and financial return. The more
interesting problem, which requires both judgment and computer support, is the medium to
long-term, on-going Supply Portfolio Problem (SPP). Various forms of the SPP have been
developed for various types of markets, and the details of these differ considerably across
these markets. Except in very simple cases, the solution to the SPP must be accomplished
using Monte Carlo simulation (together with a simulation optimization engine). We illustrate
this below for the plastics problem for UL North America.

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Appendix 2
The Initial Risk Management Plan for Plastics
Jan-Jelle Van der Meer, responsible for procurement of food ingredients for the SMLT, had
taken a strong interest in the commodities risk management project and Uwe Schulte had
charged him to guide the initial effort on plastics. Van der Meer had a doctorate in chemical
engineering and over several months of preparatory work had overseen the development of
an analytic framework to guide the Plastics Team. The resulting framework entailed the
following analysis process:

Start with product and market structure and determine the pattern of procurement and
correlated markets that could provide risk management hedges.
Analyze historical data to obtain relevant random variables (demand, price, and
correlations) and the associated predicted Spend (total expenses for sourcing and
delivering the relevant quantities to production sites).
For a given pattern of procurement choices, which gives rise to the unhedged
probability distribution of Spend, analyze risk management overlays that could (at a
cost) reduce right tail spend-at-risk (SaR) exposure.
Determine the efficient frontier that trades off increased total Spend against
decreased right hand tail exposure or SaR.

As an example of this process, the Plastics Team presented their results for ULs North
American expenditures on HDPE. The team used 2006 market data throughout, but they
assumed they were at the beginning of 2006 and planning a procurement strategy for that
year. Alternative portfolios were evaluated in terms of the total expected spend on HDPE,
including the cost of any hedge instruments used. Also of interest were exceedance
probabilities for various upper limits (or targets) on total annual spend for HDPE-NA.
A simple simulation in Crystal Ball was constructed to evaluate various risk hedging
strategies for the NA HDPE spend. Below are the results for the fourth quarter of 2006,
based on the mean values of price and demand quantities at the beginning of 2006. Table 4
shows the assumptions underlying the simulation (all distributions were tested and found to
be well approximated by the log-normal distribution). Table 5 shows the results of using just
HDPE call options and Table 6 shows the results of using HDPE call options plus Brent
crude oil swaps in the indicated amounts. In each case, both the hedged and unhedged
(expected value of) Spend are shown. The unhedged value is simply in the cash outlay for
HDPE by UL in the market. The Hedged Spend is this cash outlay for procurement
adjusted by the cashflows (positive or negative) resulting from the hedge instruments
purchased. A number of other combinations of calls and swaps could also be considered, but
these two examples illustrate the general consequences of hedging in this case, which can be
summarized as follows.
Hedging costs money: The expected value of Spend will be greater than if one did not buy
hedging instruments because (on average) no financial broker or investor will take the other
side of these market instruments without some expectation of profit. Note, for example, in
Table 5 below, that the expected cost of the HDPE call options is $360,000. Of course, the
large standard deviation of the value of these call options also tells us that they are in the

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money some of the time (and given their structure, we know that this occurs when the price
of HDPE is high and therefore these options help to offset high HDPE prices).
Hedging cuts off the right hand tail of the spend distribution: Both the standard deviation and
the probability that (Spend + Hedging Costs) exceeds a given target threshold will decrease
as hedge instruments are purchased. This is, of course, the primary purpose of hedging.
Note, for example, in Table 5, that the HDPE call options reduce the probability of exceeding
the target spend figure of $100 million from 0.093 to 0.076. They also reduce the probability
of exceeding the target spend figure of $110 million from .013 to .006. There are further
reductions in the furthest extremes of the spend distribution since it is precisely for these
values that the HDPE call options are clearly in the money. (To see these reductions in the
extremes, check the distribution of Spend versus Hedged Spend in the Crystal Ball output.)
The effectiveness of swaps depends on their correlation with the underlying spend: For
example, the assumption of 0.65 correlation (not that high!) between crude oil and NA HDPE
prices means that crude oil swaps are not that good a hedge for HDPE price volatility in the
present case. Indeed it is clear that the crude oil swap hedge here is actually less effective
than the HDPE call options alone in reducing the right hand tail of the HDPE Spend
distribution (compare 0.76 vs. 0.78 in Tables 4-5 in reducing the exceedance probability for a
Target of $100 MM), primarily because these swap options are too expensive relative to their
risk hedging benefits (note that buying 50,000 swaps at the indicated swap price has an
expected cost of $220,000). Of course, if a more attractive swap price were available, then
such swaps could play a role in an efficient hedging strategyhere they clearly do not.

Mean

Std Deviation

UL Demand for NA HDPE Qtr 4

55,000.00

4,400.00

Crude Oil Price/Barrel Oct 1

$68.00

$6.00

HDPE Price ($/ton) Oct 1

$1,594.00

$106.00

Correlation of Crude with HDPE

0.65

HDPE Option Price/Ton Oct 1 Calls

$28.25

HDPE Execution Price/Ton Oct 1 Calls

$1,650.00

Crude Oil Futures/Swaps ($/Barrel)

$72.50

Table 4: Assumptions on 4th Quarter HDPE Spend Calculation for UL NA

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Mean

Std Dev

Unhedged Quarterly Spend ($ Million)

87.74

9.23

Hedged Quarterly Spend ($ Million)

88.10

8.24

Value of Crude Oil Swaps ($ Million)

0.00

0.00

Value of HDPE Call Options ($ Million)

-0.36

2.25

Prob{Unhedged Spend > $100 Million}

0.093

Prob{Hedged Spend > $100 Million}

0.076

Prob{Unhedged Spend > $110 Million}

0.013

Prob{Hedged Spend > $110 Million}

0.006

Table 5: UL HDPE NA 4th Quarter 2006 Spend (as predicted on 1/1/2006) Hedging
Strategy: 50,000 Call Options in HDPE CMAI NA Spot Underlying
(Prices per Table 4)

Mean

Std Dev

Unhedged Quarterly Spend ($ Million)

87.74

9.23

Hedged Quarterly Spend ($ Million)

88.32

8.25

Value of Crude Oil Swaps ($ Million)

-0.22

0.30

Value of HDPE Call Options ($ Million)

-0.36

2.25

Prob{Unhedged Spend > $100 Million}

0.093

Prob{Hedged Spend > $100 Million}

0.078

Prob{Unhedged Spend > $110 Million}

0.013

Prob{Hedged Spend > $110 Million}

0.006

Table 6: UL HDPE NA 4th Quarter 2006 Spend (as predicted on 1/1/2006) Hedging
Strategy: 50,000 Call Options in HDPE CMAI NA Spot Underlying and 50,000 Crude
Oil Swaps on NYFE (Prices per Table 4)

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