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Tecson vs.

COMELEC , GR 16134 , March 3, 2004


FACTS:

Facts:

Petitioners questioned the jurisdiction of the COMELEC in taking cognizance of


and deciding the citizenship issue affecting Fernando Poe Jr. They asserted that
under Section 4(7) , Article VII of the 1987 Constituition, only the Supreme Court
had original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue of the case.

Petitioner questions the qualification of private respondent RosalindYbasco


Lopez to run for governor of Davao Oriental on citizenship grounds. Respondent
was born in 1934 in Australia to a Filipino father and an Australian mother. In
1998, she applied for an Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR) and Immigrant
Certificate of Residence (ICR) and was issued an Australian passport.

ISSUE:

Issue:

As the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) , does the Supreme Court have
jurisdiction
over
the
qualifications
of
presidential
candidates?

WON respondent is a Filipino; and if she is, WON she renounced her citizenship
by applying for ACR and ICR and being issued an Australian passport.

RULING:

Ruling:

No. An examination of the phraseology in Rule 12, 13, and Rule 14 of the
"Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal," promulgated by the Supreme
Court on April 1992 categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the "President" or
"Vice-President", of the Philippines, and not of "candidates" for President or
Vice-President. A quo warranto proceeding is generally defined as being an
action against a person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or
exercises a public office. In such context, the election contest can only
contemplate a post-election scenario. In Rule 14, only a registered candidate
who would have received either the second or third highest number of votes
could file an election protest. This rule again presupposes a post-election
scenario.
It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, defined by
Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, would not include cases
directly brought before it, questioning the qualifications of a candidate for the
presidency or vice-presidency before the elections are held.

Respondent is a Filipino. In 1934, the controlling laws of the Philippines were


the Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Act of August 29,
1916 (Jones Law). Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of the Philippines
who were Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899 and resided therein, including their
children, are considered Philippine citizens. Respondent's father was therefore
a Filipino, and consequently, her.
Respondent did not lose her citizenship. Renunciation of citizenship must be
express. Applying for ACR, ICR, and Australian passport are not enough to
renounce citizenship. They are merely acts of assertion of her Australian
citizenship before she effectively renounced the same.
"Dual citizenship" in the LGC, Sec 40, means "dual allegiance"

Valles v. COMELEC

G.R. No. L-24252

January 30, 1967

IN RE petition to declare ZITA NGO to possess all


qualifications and none of the disqualifications for
naturalization under Commonwealth Act 473 for the
purpose of cancelling her alien registry with the
BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION.
ZITA NGO BURCA, petitioner and appellee,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor and appellant.
SANCHEZ, J.:
On petition to declare Zita Ngo also known as Zita Ngo Burca "as
possessing all qualifications and none of the qualifications for naturalization
under Commonwealth Act 473 for the purpose of cancelling her Alien Registry
with the Bureau of Immigration". 1 She avers that she is of legal age, married to
Florencio Burca, a Filipino citizen, and a resident of Real St., Ormoc City; that
before her marriage, she was a Chinese citizen, subject of Nationalist China,
with ACR No. A-148054; that she was born on March 30, 1933 in Gigaquit,
Surigao, and holder of Native Born Certificate of Residence No. 46333. After
making a number of other allegations and setting forth certain denials, she
manifests that "she has all the qualifications required under Section 2 and none
of the disqualifications required under Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 473"
aforesaid.
Notice of hearing was sent to the Solicitor General and duly published.
The Solicitor General opposed and moved to dismiss the petition on two main
grounds, viz: (1) that "there is no proceeding established by law, or the rules for
the judicial declaration of the citizenship of an individual"; and (2) that as an
application for Philippine citizenship, "the petition is fatally defective for failure to
contain or mention the essential allegations required under Section 7 of the
Naturalization Law", such as, among others, petitioner's former places of
residence, and the absence of the affidavits of at least two supporting
witnesses.
Trial was held on December 18, 1964. Sole witness was petitioner. With the
documentary evidence admitted, the case was submitted for decision.

The judgment appealed from, dated December 18, 1964, reads:


WHEREFORE, decision is hereby rendered dismissing the opposition,
and declaring that ZITA NGO BURCA petitioner, has all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications to become a Filipino
Citizen and that she being married to a Filipino Citizen, is hereby
declared a citizen of the Philippines, after taking the necessary oath of
allegiance, as soon as this decision becomes final and executory.
The controlling facts are not controverted. Petitioner Zita Ngo was born in
Gigaquit, Surigao (now Surigao del Norte), on March 30, 1933. Her father was
Ngo Tay Suy and her mother was Dee See alias Lee Co, now both deceased
and citizens of Nationalist Republic of China. She holds Native Born Certificate
of Residence 46333 and Alien Certificate of Registration A-148054. She married
Florencio Burca a native-born Filipino, on May 14, 1961.
1. By constitutional and legal precepts, an alien woman who marries a Filipino
citizen, does not by the mere fact of marriage - automatically become a
Filipino citizen.
Thus, by Article IV of the Constitution, citizenship is limited to:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the
adoption of this Constitution.
(2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before
the adoption of this Constitution, had been elected to public office in
the Philippine Islands.
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon
reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
And, on the specific legal status of an alien woman married to a citizen of the
Philippines, Congress in paragraph 1, Section 15 of the Revised
Naturalization Law legislated the following:

Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the


Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be
deemed a citizen of the Philippines.
Jurisprudence has since stabilized the import of the constitutional and statutory
precepts just quoted with a uniform pronouncement that an alien wife of a
Filipino citizen may not acquire the status of a citizen of the Philippines unless
there is proof that she herself may be lawfully naturalized. 2 Which means that, in
line with the national policy of selective admission to Philippine citizenship, the
wife must possess the qualifications under Section 2, and must not be laboring
under any of the disqualifications enumerated in Section 4, of the Revised
Naturalization Law.3
This Court, in Ly Giok Ha, et al. vs. Galang, et al., L-21332, March 18,1966,
explains the reasons for the rule in this wise:
Reflection will reveal why this must be so. The qualifications prescribed
under section 2 of the Naturalization Act, and the disqualifications
enumerated in its section 4, are not mutually exclusive; and if all that
were to be required is that the wife of a Filipino be not disqualified
under section 4, the result might well be that citizenship would be
conferred upon persons in violation of the policy of the statute. For
example, section 4 disqualifies only
(c) Polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy;
(d) Persons convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude', so that a
blackmailer, or a maintainer of gambling or bawdy houses, not
previously convicted by a competent court, would not be thereby
disqualified; still, it is certain that the law did not intend such a person
to be admitted as a citizen in view of the requirement of section 2 that
an applicant for citizenship 'must be of good moral character'.
Similarly the citizen's wife might be a convinced believer in racial
supremacy, in government by certain selected classes, in the right to
vote exclusively by certain "herrenvolk", and thus disbelieve in the
principles underlying the Philippine Constitution; yet she would not be
disqualified under section 4, as long as she is not "opposed to
organized government", nor affiliated to groups "upholding or teaching
doctrines opposing all organized governments", nor "defending or
teaching the necessity or of violence, personal assault or assassination
for the success or predominance of their ideas'. Et sic de caeteris".

Indeed, the political privilege of citizenship should not to any alien woman on
the sole basis of her marriage to a Filipino "irrespective of moral character,
ideological beliefs, and identification with Filipino ideals, customs and
traditions".4
The rule heretofore adverted to is to be observed whether the husband be a
natural born Filipino,5 a naturalized Filipino,6 or a Filipino by election.
2. We next go to the mechanics of implementation of the constitutional and legal
provisions, as applied to an alien woman married to a Filipino. We part from the
premise that such an alien woman does not, by the fact of marriage, acquire
Philippine citizenship. The statute heretofore quoted (Sec. 15, Revised
Naturalization Law), we repeat, recites that she "shall be deemed a citizen of
the Philippines" if she "might herself be lawfully naturalized".
How then shall she be "deemed" a citizen of the Philippines? An examination of
the Revised Naturalization Law is quite revealing. For instance, minor children
of persons naturalized under the law who were born in the Philippines "shall be
considered citizens thereof". Similarly, a foreign-born minor child, if dwelling in
the Philippines at the time of the naturalization of the parents, "shall
automatically become a Filipino citizen".7 No conditions are exacted; citizenship
of said minor children is conferred by the law itself, without further proceedings
and as a matter of course. An alien wife of a Filipino does not fit into either of
the categories just mentioned. Legal action has to be taken to make her a
citizen.
There is no law or rule which authorizes a declaration of Filipino
citizenship.8 Citizenship is not an appropriate subject for declaratory judgment
proceedings.9 And in one case, we held that citizenship of an alien woman
married to a Filipino must be determined in an "appropriate proceeding". 10
Speculations arise as to the import of the term "appropriate proceeding". The
record of this case disclose that, in some quarters, opinion is advanced that the
determination of whether an alien woman married to a Filipino shall be deemed
a Filipino citizen, may be made by the Commissioner of
Immigration. 11 Conceivably, absence of clear legal direction on the matter could
have given rise to divergence of views. We should aim at drying up sources of
doubt. Parties interested should not be enmeshed in jurisdictional
entanglements. Public policy and sound practice, therefore, suggest that a
clear-cut ruling be made on this subject.
If an alien woman married to a Filipino does not become ipso facto a citizen,
then she must have to file a "petition for citizenship" in order that she may

acquire the status of a Filipino citizen. Authority for this view is Section 7 of the
Revised Naturalization Law in which the plain language is: "Any person
desiring to acquire Philippine citizenship,shall file with the competent court" a
petition for the purpose. And this, because such alien woman is not a citizen,
and she desires to acquire it. The proper forum, Section 8 of the same law
points out, is the Court of First Instance of the province where the petitioner has
resided "at least one year immediately preceding the filing of the petition".
It is quite plain that the determination of whether said alien wife should be given
the status of a citizen should fall within the area allocated to competent courts.
That this is so, is exemplified by the fact that this Court has taken jurisdiction in
one such case originating from the court of first instance, where an alien woman
had directly sought naturalization in her favor. 12
And, as nothing in the Revised Naturalization Law empowers any other office,
agency, board or official, to determine such question, we are persuaded to say
that resolution thereof rests exclusively with the competent courts.
We accordingly rule that: (1) An alien woman married to a Filipino who desires
to be a citizen of this country must apply therefor by filing a petition for
citizenship reciting that she possesses all the qualifications set forth in Section
2, and none of the disqualifications under Section 4, both of the Revised
Naturalization Law; (2) Said petition must be filed in the Court of First Instance
where petitioner has resided at least one year immediately preceding the filing
of the petition; and (3) Any action by any other office, agency, board or official,
administrative or otherwise other than the judgment of a competent court of
justice certifying or declaring that an alien wife of the Filipino citizen is also a
Filipino citizen, is hereby declared null and void.
3. We treat the present petition as one for naturalization. Or, in the words of law,
a "petition for citizenship". This is as it should be. Because a reading of the
petition will reveal at once that efforts were made to set forth therein, and to
prove afterwards, compliance with Sections 2 and 4 of the Revised
Naturalization Law. The trial court itself apparently considered the petition as
one for naturalization, and, in fact, declared petition "a citizen of the
Philippines".
We go to the merits of the petition.
We note that the petition avers that petitioner was born in Gigaquit, Surigao that
her former residence was Surigao, Surigao, and that presently she is residing at
Regal St., Ormoc City. In court, however, she testified that she alsoresided in
Junquera St., Cebu, where she took up a course in home economics, for one

year. Section 7 of the Naturalization Law requires that a petition for


naturalization should state petitioner's "present and former places of residence".
Residence encompasses all places where petitioner actually and physically
resided. 13 Cebu, where she studied for one year, perforce comes within the
term residence. The reason for exacting recital in the petition of present and
former places of residence is that "information regarding petitioner and objection
to his application are apt to be provided by people in his actual, physical
surrounding". 14 And the State is deprived of full opportunity to make inquiries as
to petitioner's fitness to become a citizen, if all the places of residence do not
appear in the petition. So it is, that failure to allege a former place of residence
is fatal. 15
Viewed from another direction, we find one other flaw in petitioner's petition.
Said petition is not supported by the affidavit of at least two credible persons,
"stating that they are citizens of the Philippines and personally know the
petitioner to be a resident of the Philippines for the period of time required by
this Act and a person of good repute and morally irreproachable, and that said
petitioner has in their opinion all the qualifications necessary to become a
citizen of the Philippines and is not in any way disqualified under the provisions
of this Act". Petitioner likewise failed to "set forth the names and post-office
addresses of such witnesses as the petitioner may desire to introduce at the
hearing of the case". 16
The necessity for the affidavit of two witnesses cannot be overlooked. It is
important to know who those witnesses are. The State should not be denied the
opportunity to check on their background to ascertain whether they are of good
standing in the community, whose word may be taken on its face value, and
who could serve as "good warranty of the worthiness of the petitioner". These
witnesses should indeed prove in court that they are reliable insurers of the
character of petitioner. Short of this, the petition must fail. 17
Here, the case was submitted solely on the testimony of the petitioner. No other
witnesses were presented. This does not meet with the legal requirement.
Upon the view we take of his case, the judgment appealed from is hereby
reversed and the petition dismissed, without costs. So ordered
.

BENGZON VS. HRET [357 SCRA 545; G. R. No. 142840;


7 May 2001]

Commonwealth Act No. 63, section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his
citizenship by, among other, "rendering service to or accepting commission in

Facts:
Respondent Teodoro Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was
born in San Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The
fundamental law then applicable was the 1935 Constitution. On November 5,
1985, however, respondent Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and
without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance
to the United States. As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under
Issue:
Whether or Not respondent Cruz is a natural born citizen of the
Philippines in view of the constitutional requirement that "no person shall
be a Member of the House of Representative unless he is a naturalborn
citizen.
Held:
Respondent is a natural born citizen of the Philippines. As distinguished
from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of
the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippine and
registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the
person concerned resides or last resided. This means that a naturalized
Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a
naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a
natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be
restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.

BAR MATER No. 914 October 1, 1999

RE: APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO THE


PHILIPPINE BAR,
vs.
VICENTE D. CHING, applicant.
RESOLUTION
KAPUNAN, J.:
Can a legitimate child born under the 1935 Constitution of a Filipino
mother and an alien father validly elect Philippine citizenship fourteen
(14) years after he has reached the age of majority? This is the question
sought to be resolved in the present case involving the application for
admission to the Philippine Bar of Vicente D. Ching.
The facts of this case are as follows:
Vicente D. Ching, the legitimate son of the spouses Tat Ching, a Chinese
citizen, and Prescila A. Dulay, a Filipino, was born in Francia West,
Tubao, La Union on 11 April 1964. Since his birth, Ching has resided in
the Philippines.
On 17 July 1998, Ching, after having completed a Bachelor of Laws
course at the St. Louis University in Baguio City, filed an application to
take the 1998 Bar Examinations. In a Resolution of this Court, dated 1
September 1998, he was allowed to take the Bar Examinations, subject
to the condition that he must submit to the Court proof of his Philippine
citizenship.
In compliance with the above resolution, Ching submitted on 18
November 1998, the following documents:
1. Certification, dated 9 June 1986, issued by the
Board of Accountancy of the Professional Regulations
Commission showing that Ching is a certified public
accountant;
2. Voter Certification, dated 14 June 1997, issued by
Elizabeth B. Cerezo, Election Officer of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in Tubao La
Union showing that Ching is a registered voter of the
said place; and
3. Certification, dated 12 October 1998, also issued by
Elizabeth B. Cerezo, showing that Ching was elected
as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Tubao, La
Union during the 12 May 1992 synchronized elections.
On 5 April 1999, the results of the 1998 Bar Examinations were released
and Ching was one of the successful Bar examinees. The oath-taking of
the successful Bar examinees was scheduled on 5 May 1999. However,
because of the questionable status of Ching's citizenship, he was not
allowed to take his oath. Pursuant to the resolution of this Court, dated

20 April 1999, he was required to submit further proof of his citizenship.


In the same resolution, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) was
required to file a comment on Ching's petition for admission to the bar
and on the documents evidencing his Philippine citizenship.
The OSG filed its comment on 8 July 1999, stating that Ching, being the
"legitimate child of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother born under the
1935 Constitution was a Chinese citizen and continued to be so, unless
upon reaching the age of majority he elected Philippine citizenship" 1 in
strict compliance with the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 625
entitled "An Act Providing for the Manner in which the Option to Elect
Philippine Citizenship shall be Declared by a Person Whose Mother is a
Filipino Citizen." The OSG adds that "(w)hat he acquired at best was
only an inchoate Philippine citizenship which he could perfect by election
upon reaching the age of majority." 2 In this regard, the OSG clarifies that
"two (2) conditions must concur in order that the election of Philippine
citizenship may be effective, namely: (a) the mother of the person
making the election must be a citizen of the Philippines; and (b) said
election must be made upon reaching the age of majority." 3 The OSG
then explains the meaning of the phrase "upon reaching the age of
majority:"
The clause "upon reaching the age of majority" has
been construed to mean a reasonable time after
reaching the age of majority which had been
interpreted by the Secretary of Justice to be three (3)
years (VELAYO, supra at p. 51 citing Op., Sec. of
Justice No. 70, s. 1940, Feb. 27, 1940). Said period
may be extended under certain circumstances, as
when a (sic) person concerned has always considered
himself a Filipino (ibid., citing Op. Nos. 355 and 422, s.
1955; 3, 12, 46, 86 and 97, s. 1953). But in Cuenco, it
was held that an election done after over seven (7)
years was not made within a reasonable time.
In conclusion, the OSG points out that Ching has not formally elected
Philippine citizenship and, if ever he does, it would already be beyond
the "reasonable time" allowed by present jurisprudence. However, due to
the peculiar circumstances surrounding Ching's case, the OSG
recommends the relaxation of the standing rule on the construction of
the phrase "reasonable period" and the allowance of Ching to elect
Philippine citizenship in accordance with C.A. No. 625 prior to taking his
oath as a member of the Philippine Bar.
On 27 July 1999, Ching filed a Manifestation, attaching therewith his
Affidavit of Election of Philippine Citizenship and his Oath of Allegiance,
both dated 15 July 1999. In his Manifestation, Ching states:
1. I have always considered myself as a Filipino;
2. I was registered as a Filipino and consistently

declared myself as one in my school records and


other official documents;
3. I am practicing a profession (Certified Public
Accountant) reserved for Filipino citizens;
4. I participated in electoral process[es] since the time
I was eligible to vote;
5. I had served the people of Tubao, La Union as a
member of the Sangguniang Bayan from 1992 to
1995;
6. I elected Philippine citizenship on July 15, 1999 in
accordance with Commonwealth Act No. 625;
7. My election was expressed in a statement signed
and sworn to by me before a notary public;
8. I accompanied my election of Philippine citizenship
with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the
Government of the Philippines;
9. I filed my election of Philippine citizenship and my
oath of allegiance to (sic) the Civil Registrar of Tubao
La Union, and
10. I paid the amount of TEN PESOS (Ps. 10.00) as
filing fees.
Since Ching has already elected Philippine citizenship on 15 July 1999,
the question raised is whether he has elected Philippine citizenship
within a "reasonable time." In the affirmative, whether his citizenship by
election retroacted to the time he took the bar examination.
When Ching was born in 1964, the governing charter was the 1935
Constitution. Under Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution, the
citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and an alien
father followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the
age of majority, the child elected Philippine citizenship. 4 This right to
elect Philippine citizenship was recognized in the 1973 Constitution
when it provided that "(t)hose who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant
to the provisions of the Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five"
are citizens of the Philippines. 5 Likewise, this recognition by the 1973
Constitution was carried over to the 1987 Constitution which states that
"(t)hose born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority" are Philippine
citizens. 6 It should be noted, however, that the 1973 and 1987
Constitutional provisions on the election of Philippine citizenship should
not be understood as having a curative effect on any irregularity in the
acquisition of citizenship for those covered by the 1935 Constitution. 7 If
the citizenship of a person was subject to challenge under the old
charter, it remains subject to challenge under the new charter even if the
judicial challenge had not been commenced before the effectivity of the
new Constitution. 8

C.A. No. 625 which was enacted pursuant to Section 1(3), Article IV of
the 1935 Constitution, prescribes the procedure that should be followed
in order to make a valid election of Philippine citizenship. Under Section
1 thereof, legitimate children born of Filipino mothers may elect
Philippine citizenship by expressing such intention "in a statement to be
signed and sworn to by the party concerned before any officer
authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil
registry. The said party shall accompany the aforesaid statement with
the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the
Philippines."
However, the 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 did not prescribe a
time period within which the election of Philippine citizenship should be
made. The 1935 Charter only provides that the election should be made
"upon reaching the age of majority." The age of majority then
commenced upon reaching twenty-one (21) years. 9 In the opinions of
the Secretary of Justice on cases involving the validity of election of
Philippine citizenship, this dilemma was resolved by basing the time
period on the decisions of this Court prior to the effectivity of the 1935
Constitution. In these decisions, the proper period for electing Philippine
citizenship was, in turn, based on the pronouncements of the
Department of State of the United States Government to the effect that
the election should be made within a "reasonable time" after attaining
the age of majority. 10 The phrase "reasonable time" has been
interpreted to mean that the election should be made within three (3)
years
from
reaching
the
age
of
majority. 11 However, we held in Cuenco vs. Secretary of Justice, 12 that
the three (3) year period is not an inflexible rule. We said:
It is true that this clause has been construed to mean
a reasonable period after reaching the age of majority,
and that the Secretary of Justice has ruled that three
(3) years is the reasonable time to elect Philippine
citizenship under the constitutional provision adverted
to above, which period may be extended under certain
circumstances, as when the person concerned has
always considered himself a Filipino. 13
However, we cautioned in Cuenco that the extension of the option to
elect Philippine citizenship is not indefinite:
Regardless of the foregoing, petitioner was born on
February 16, 1923. He became of age on February
16, 1944. His election of citizenship was made on May
15, 1951, when he was over twenty-eight (28) years of
age, or over seven (7) years after he had reached the
age of majority. It is clear that said election has not
been made "upon reaching the age of majority." 14
In the present case, Ching, having been born on 11 April 1964, was

already thirty-five (35) years old when he complied with the requirements
of C.A. No. 625 on 15 June 1999, or over fourteen (14) years after he
had reached the age of majority. Based on the interpretation of the
phrase "upon reaching the age of majority," Ching's election was clearly
beyond, by any reasonable yardstick, the allowable period within which
to exercise the privilege. It should be stated, in this connection, that the
special circumstances invoked by Ching, i.e., his continuous and
uninterrupted stay in the Philippines and his being a certified public
accountant, a registered voter and a former elected public official,
cannot vest in him Philippine citizenship as the law specifically lays
down the requirements for acquisition of Philippine citizenship by
election.
Definitely, the so-called special circumstances cannot constitute what
Ching erroneously labels as informal election of citizenship. Ching
cannot find a refuge in the case of In re: Florencio Mallare, 15 the
pertinent portion of which reads:
And even assuming arguendo that Ana Mallare were
(sic) legally married to an alien, Esteban's exercise of
the right of suffrage when he came of age, constitutes
a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. It
has been established that Esteban Mallare was a
registered voter as of April 14, 1928, and that as early
as 1925 (when he was about 22 years old), Esteban
was already participating in the elections and
campaigning for certain candidate[s]. These acts are
sufficient to show his preference for Philippine
citizenship. 16
Ching's reliance on Mallare is misplaced. The facts and circumstances
obtaining therein are very different from those in the present case, thus,
negating its applicability. First, Esteban Mallare was born before the
effectivity of the 1935 Constitution and the enactment of C.A. No. 625.
Hence, the requirements and procedures prescribed under the 1935
Constitution and C.A. No. 625 for electing Philippine citizenship would
not be applicable to him. Second, the ruling in Mallare was an obiter
since, as correctly pointed out by the OSG, it was not necessary for
Esteban Mallare to elect Philippine citizenship because he was already a
Filipino, he being a natural child of a Filipino mother. In this regard, the
Court stated:
Esteban Mallare, natural child of Ana Mallare, a
Filipina, is therefore himself a Filipino, and no other
act would be necessary to confer on him all the rights
and privileges attached to Philippine citizenship (U.S.
vs. Ong Tianse, 29 Phil. 332; Santos Co vs.
Government of the Philippine Islands, 42 Phil. 543,
Serra vs. Republic, L-4223, May 12, 1952, Sy

Quimsuan vs. Republic, L-4693, Feb. 16, 1953;


Pitallano vs. Republic, L-5111, June 28, 1954). Neither
could any act be taken on the erroneous belief that he
is a non-filipino divest him of the citizenship privileges
to which he is rightfully entitled. 17
The ruling in Mallare was reiterated and further elaborated in Co
vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 18where we held:
We have jurisprudence that defines "election" as both
a formal and an informal process.
In the case of In re: Florencio Mallare (59 SCRA 45
[1974]), the Court held that the exercise of the right of
suffrage and the participation in election exercises
constitute a positive act of election of Philippine
citizenship. In the exact pronouncement of the Court,
we held:
Esteban's exercise of the right of
suffrage when he came of age
constitutes a positive act of
Philippine citizenship. (p. 52:
emphasis supplied)
The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of
suffrage. He has established his life here in the Philippines.
For those in the peculiar situation of the respondent
who cannot be excepted to have elected Philippine
citizenship as they were already citizens, we apply the
In Re Mallare rule.
xxx xxx xxx
The filing of sworn statement or formal declaration is a
requirement for those who still have to elect
citizenship. For those already Filipinos when the time
to elect came up, there are acts of deliberate choice
which cannot be less binding. Entering a profession
open only to Filipinos, serving in public office where
citizenship is a qualification, voting during election
time, running for public office, and other categorical
acts of similar nature are themselves formal
manifestations for these persons.
An election of Philippine citizenship presupposes that
the person electing is an alien. Or his status is
doubtful because he is a national of two countries.
There is no doubt in this case about Mr. Ong's being a
Filipino when he turned twenty-one (21).
We repeat that any election of Philippine citizenship on
the part of the private respondent would not only have
been superfluous but it would also have resulted in an

absurdity. How can a Filipino citizen elect Philippine


citizenship? 19
The Court, like the OSG, is sympathetic with the plight of Ching.
However, even if we consider the special circumstances in the life of
Ching like his having lived in the Philippines all his life and his consistent
belief that he is a Filipino, controlling statutes and jurisprudence
constrain us to disagree with the recommendation of the OSG.
Consequently, we hold that Ching failed to validly elect Philippine
citizenship. The span of fourteen (14) years that lapsed from the time he
reached the age of majority until he finally expressed his intention to
elect Philippine citizenship is clearly way beyond the contemplation of
the requirement of electing "upon reaching the age of majority."
Moreover, Ching has offered no reason why he delayed his election of
Philippine citizenship. The prescribed procedure in electing Philippine
citizenship is certainly not a tedious and painstaking process. All that is
required of the elector is to execute an affidavit of election of Philippine
citizenship and, thereafter, file the same with the nearest civil registry.
Ching's unreasonable and unexplained delay in making his election
cannot be simply glossed over.
Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a commodity that can be
claimed when needed and suppressed when convenient. 20 One who is
privileged to elect Philippine citizenship has only an inchoate right to
such citizenship. As such, he should avail of the right with fervor,
enthusiasm and promptitude. Sadly, in this case, Ching slept on his
opportunity to elect Philippine citizenship and, as a result. this golden
privilege slipped away from his grasp.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court Resolves to DENY Vicente D.
Ching's application for admission to the Philippine Bar.

Djumantan vs. Domingo


Facts:
Bernard Banez, the husband of Marina Cabael, went to Indonesia as
a contract worker.
On April 3, 1974, he embraced and was converted to Islam. On May 17,
1974, he married petitioner in accordance with Islamic rites. He returned
to the Philippines in January 1979. On January 13, 1979, petitioner and
her two children with Banez, arrived in Manila as the "guests" of Banez.
The latter made it appear that he was just a friend of the family of
petitioner and was merely repaying the hospitability extended to him
during his stay in Indonesia. When petitioner and her two children

arrived at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport on January 13, 1979,


Banez, together with Marina Cabael, met them.As "guests," petitioner
and her two children lived in the house of Banez. Petitioner and her
children were admitted to the Philippines as temporary visitors under
Section 9(a) of the Immigration Act of 1940.

an "alien who enters the Philippines after the effective date of this Act by
means of false and misleading statements or without inspection and
admission by the immigration authorities at a designated port of entry or
at any place other than at a designated port of entry" is subject to
deportation.

In 1981, Marina Cabael discovered the true relationship of her husband


and petitioner. On March 25, 1982, the immigration status of petitioner
was changed from temporary visitor to that of permanent resident under
Section 13(a) of the same law. On April 14, 1982, petitioner was issued
an alien certificate of registration.

The deportation of an alien under said clause of Section 37(a) has a


prescriptive period and "shall not be effected ... unless the arrest in the
deportation proceedings is made within five years after the cause for
deportation arises". Tolling the prescriptive period from November 19,
1980, when Leonardo C. Banez informed the CID of the illegal entry of
petitioner into the country, more than five years had elapsed before the
issuance of the order of her deportation on September 27, 1990.

Not accepting the set-back, Banez' eldest son, Leonardo, filed a letter
complaint with the Ombudsman, who subsequently referred the letter to
the CID. On the basis of the said letter, petitioner was detained at the
CID detention cell.
The CID issued an order revoking the status of permanent resident
given to petitioner, the Board found the 2nd marriage irregular and not in
accordance with the laws of the Phils. There was thus no basis for giving
her the status of permanent residence, since she was an Indonesian
citizen and her marriage with a Filipino Citizen was not valid.
Thus this petition for certiorari
Issue:
whether or not the courts may review deportation proceedings
Held :
Yes. Section 1 of Article 8 says Judicial Power includes 1) settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable 2) determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any
branch
or
instrumentality
of
the
government.
We need not resolve the validity of petitioner's marriage to Banez, if
under the law the CID can validly deport petitioner as an "undesirable
alien" regardless of her marriage to a Filipino citizen. Generally, the right
of the President to expel or deport aliens whose presence is deemed
inimical to the public interest is as absolute and unqualified as the right
to
prohibit
and
prevent
their
entry
into
the
country.
However, under clause 1 of Section 37(a) of the Immigration Act of 1940

Mercado vs Manzano [307 SCRA 630]


Facts:
Under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code, those holding dual
citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective local position.
Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private respondent Eduardo B.
Manzano were candidates for vice mayor of the City of Makati.
The proclamation of private respondent was suspended in view of a
pending petition for disqualification. The Second Division of the
COMELEC issued a resolution, dated May 7, 1998, granting the petition
and ordered the cancellation of the COC of private respondent on the
ground that he is a dual citizen.
Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration. The motion
remained pending even until after the election held on May 11, 1998.
Pursuant to Omnibus Resolution No. 3044, of the COMELEC, the board

of canvassers tabulated the votes cast for vice mayor of Makati City but
suspended the proclamation of the winner.
Subsequently, petitioner sought to intervene in the case for
disqualification. Private respondent opposed contending that at the time
of the Elections, the resolution of the Second Division adopted on 7 May
1998 was not yet final so that, effectively, petitioner may not be declared
the winner even assuming that Manzano is disqualified to run for and
hold the elective office of Vice-Mayor of the City of Makati.
Issue:
WON petitioner who intervened prior proclamation will hold the elective
office of the Vice-Mayor when respondent is disqualified.
Held:
Yes. Private respondent argues that petitioner has neither legal interest
in the matter in litigation nor an interest to protect because he is a
defeated candidate for the vice-mayoralty post of Makati City who
cannot be proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati City even if the
private respondent be ultimately disqualified by final and executory
judgment.
The flaw in this argument is it assumes that, at the time petitioner sought
to intervene in the proceedings before the COMELEC, there had already
been a proclamation of the results of the election for the vice mayoralty
contest for Makati City, on the basis of which petitioner came out only
second to private respondent. The fact, however, is that there had been
no proclamation at that time. Certainly, petitioner had, and still has, an
interest in ousting private respondent from the race at the time he sought
to intervene. The rule in Labo v. COMELEC, reiterated in several cases,
only applies to cases in which the election of the respondent is
contested, and the question is whether one who placed second to the
disqualified candidate may be declared the winner. In the present case,
at the time petitioner filed a Motion for Leave to File Intervention on
May 20, 1998, there had been no proclamation of the winner, and
petitioners purpose was precisely to have private respondent
disqualified from running for an elective local position under par 40(d)
of R.A. No. 7160

LABO VS COMELEC
176 SCRA 1 Law on Public Officers Election Laws Citizenship of a
Public Officer Dual Citizenship Labo Doctrine
FACTS
In 1988, Ramon Labo, Jr. was elected as mayor of Baguio City. His rival,
Luis Lardizabal filed a petition for quo warranto against Labo as
Lardizabal asserts that Labo is an Australian citizen hence disqualified;
that he was naturalized as an Australian after he married an Australian.
Labo avers that his marriage with an Australian did not make him an
Australian; that at best he has dual citizenship, Australian and Filipino;
that even if he indeed became an Australian when he married an
Australian citizen, such citizenship was lost when his marriage with the
Australian was later declared void for being bigamous. Labo further
asserts that even if hes considered as an Australian, his lack of

citizenship is just a mere technicality which should not frustrate the will
of the electorate of Baguio who voted for him by a vast majority.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Labo can retain his public office.
2. Whether or not Lardizabal, who obtained the second highest vote in
the mayoralty race, can replace Labo in the event Labo is disqualified.

HELD:
1. No. Labo did not question the authenticity of evidence presented
against him. He was naturalized as an Australian in 1976. It was not his
marriage to an Australian that made him an Australian. It was his act of
subsequently swearing by taking an oath of allegiance to the
government of Australia. He did not dispute that he needed an Australian
passport to return to the Philippines in 1980; and that he was listed as
an immigrant here. It cannot be said also that he is a dual citizen. Dual
allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt
with by law. He lost his Filipino citizenship when he swore allegiance to
Australia. He cannot also claim that when he lost his Australian
citizenship, he became solely a Filipino. To restore his Filipino
citizenship, he must be naturalized or repatriated or be declared as a
Filipino through an act of Congress none of this happened.
Labo, being a foreigner, cannot serve public office. His claim that his

lack of citizenship should not overcome the will of the electorate is not
tenable. The people of Baguio could not have, even unanimously,
changed the requirements of the Local Government Code and the
Constitution simply by electing a foreigner (curiously, would Baguio have
voted for Labo had they known he is Australian). The electorate had no
power to permit a foreigner owing his total allegiance to the Queen of
Australia, or at least a stateless individual owing no allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines, to preside over them as mayor of their city.
Only citizens of the Philippines have that privilege over their countrymen.
2. Lardizabal on the other hand cannot assert, through the quo warranto
proceeding, that he should be declared the mayor by reason of Labos
disqualification because Lardizabal obtained the second highest number
of vote. It would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the
constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if acandidate who has not
acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner and
imposed as the representative of a constituency, the majority of which
have positively declared through their ballots that they do not choose
him. Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those
who have received the highest number of votes cast in the election for
that office, and it is a fundamental idea in all republican forms of
government that no one can be declared elected and no measure can
be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the
legal votes cast in the election.

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