PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,

Plaintiff-Appellee ,
Vs.
LOL-LO AND SARAW,
Defendants-Appellants.
FACTS: This case is a tale of twentieth century piracy in the south
seas,attending rape and murder.
On or about June 30, 1920, two boats left of Dutch possession. In one of the
boats was one individual, a Dutch subject, and in the other boat eleven men,
women, and children, likewise subjects of Holland.The second boat arrived
between the Islands of Buang and Bukid in the Dutch East Indies. There the
boat was surrounded by six vintas manned by twenty-four Moros all armed.
The Moros first asked for food, but once on the Dutch boat, took for
themselves all of the cargo, attacked some of the men, and brutally violated
two of the women by methods too horrible to described. All of the persons on
the Dutch boat, with the exception of the two young women, were again
placed on it and holes were made in it, with the idea that it would submerge,
although as a matter of fact, these people, after eleven days of hardship and
privation, were succored. Taking the two women with them, and repeatedly
violating them, the Moros finally arrived at Maruro, a Dutch possession. Two
of the Moro marauders were Lol-lo, who also raped one of the women, and
Saraw. At Maruro, the two women were able to escape.
After Lol-lo and Saraw later returned to their home in South Ubian, TawiTawi, Sulu, Philippine Islands, they were arrested and were charged in the
CFI with the crime of piracy. The counsel of record interposed a demurrer on
the grounds that the offense charged was not within the jurisdiction of the
CFI, nor of any court of the Philippine Islands, and that the facts did not
constitute a public offense, under the laws in force in the Philippine Islands.
The demurrer was overruled by the trial judge, a trial was had, and a
judgment was rendered finding the two defendants guilty and sentencing each
of them to life imprisonment (cadena perpetua), to return together with
Kinawalang and Maulanis, defendants in another case, to the offended
parties, the thirty-nine sacks of copras which had been robbed, or to
indemnify them in the amount of 942 rupees, and to pay a one-half part of
the costs.
ISSUE: Whether or not the elements of piracy exists?
HELD: The SC decided that in the present case, the facts were proven and not
disputed and all of the elements of the crime of piracy were present. Piracy is

robbery or forcible depredation on the high seas, without lawful authority and
done animo furandi, and in the spirit and intention of universal hostility.
Piracy is a crime not against any particular state but against all mankind
which can be punished in the competent tribunal of any country where the
offender may be found or into which he may be carried. The jurisdiction of
piracy, unlike all other crimes, has no territorial limits. As it is against all so
may it be punished by all. Therefore it does not matter that the crime was
committed within the jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a foreign state, "for those
limits, though neutral to war, are not neutral to crimes." (U. S. vs. Furlong
[1820], 5 Wheat., 184).
Milo vs. Salanga
By: Krissy Tullo
On Arbitrary Detention, Article 124 of the RPC
G.R. No. L-37007
July 20, 1987
FACTS
An information for Arbitrary Detention was filed against herein private
respondent (accused Barrio Captain Tuvera, Sr.) and some other private
persons for maltreating petitioner Valdez by hitting him with butts of
their guns and fist blows. Immediately thereafter, without legal grounds
and with deliberate intent to deprive the latter of his constitutional
liberty, accused respondent and two members of the police force of
Mangsat conspired and helped one another in lodging and locking
petitioner inside the municipal jail of Manaoag, Pangasinan for about
eleven (11) hours.
Accused-respondent then filed a motion to quash the information on
the ground that the facts charged do not constitute the elements of said
crime and that the proofs adduced at the investigation are not
sufficient to support the filing of the information. Petitioner Asst.
Provincial Fiscal Milo filed an opposition thereto. Consequently,
averring that accused-respondent was not a public officer who can be
charged with Arbitrary Detention, respondent Judge Salanga granted
the motion to quash in an order. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE

Whether or not accused-respondent, being a Barrio Captain, can be

liable for the crime of Arbitrary Detention.
HELD
Yes. The public officers liable for Arbitrary Detention must be vested
with authority to detain or order the detention of persons accused of a
crime. One need not be a police officer to be chargeable with Arbitrary
Detention. It is accepted that other public officers like judges and
mayors, who act with abuse of their functions, may be guilty of this
crime. A perusal of the powers and function vested in mayors would
show that they are similar to those of a barrio captain except that in
the case of the latter, his territorial jurisdiction is smaller. Having the
same duty of maintaining peace and order, both must be and are given
the authority to detain or order detention. Noteworthy is the fact that
even private respondent Tuvera himself admitted that with the aid of
his rural police, he as a barrio captain, could have led the arrest of
petitioner Valdez.
Astorga VS People
ARBITRARY
DETENTION
(ART.No.
124)
ASTORGA
vs. 1, 1997,
PEOPLE
(G.R.
154130)
Facts: OnSamar
September
a team was
sent to and
the island
of
Daram,
Western
towith
conduct
intelligence
gathering
forest
protection
operations
in
line
the
governments
campaign
against
illegal
logging.
Uponboats.
investigation
of thealtercation
group, Mayor
Astorga
found Astorga
to be thecalled
ownerfor
of
two
A heated
ensued
andwas
Mayor
reinforcements.
Ten to
armed
men
arrived
in the
scene.
The had
offended
parties
were then
brought
Mayor
Astorgas
house
where
they
dinner
and
drinks
and
left to
at leave
2:30am.
SPO1
Capoquian
were
allowed
to go down
from
the
house,
but
not
the
barangay.
On
the
other
hand,
SPO3
Cinco
and
the
rest just sat in the house until 2:00 a.m. when the team was finally allowed to
leave.1awphi1.nt
Issue:
Whether
Mayor is guilty
Astorga
is guilty
of arbitrary
detention.
Held:
Yes.
Mayor
Astorga
oforarbitrary
Arbitrary
is
committed
by any
public officerelements
employeedetention.
who, without
legal Detention
grounds,
detains
the
are:
1.
That aThat
the person.The
offender
is
a detains
publicof officer
orcrimeemployee.
2.
he
a
person.
3.
That
the
detention
is
without
legal
grounds.
In the the
casewitnesses
at bar, the
restraint
resulting from
fear
is allowed
evident. by
Inspite
of their
pleas,
and
the
complainants
were
not
petitioner
to
go
home.reinforcements,
This refusal was all
quickly
followed
by the call forrifles,
and arrival
of almost
a dozen
armed
with
military-issue
proceeded
to
encircle
the
team, weapons
pointed
at the
complainants
andwho
the witnesses.
Given
such
circumstances,
we
give
credence
to
SPO1
Capoquians
statement
that it was
not armed
safe men,
to refuse
Mayor
Astorgas
orders.
It was
not just
the
presence
of the
but proves
also
thethat
evident
effect
these
gunmen
had
on
the
actions
the members,
team which
fearthey
wasfelt
indeed
instilled
in the
minds
of theofteam
to the
extent
that
compelled
to stay
in
Brgy.
Lucob-Lucob.
The
intent
prevent
the
departure
of the complainants
and witnesses
against
their
will to
is thus
clear.
In thethe
case
of People
Cortez,it[35]iswe
that, inthat
establishing
the intent
to
deprive
victim
of hisv.liberty,
notheld
necessary
the offended
party
be
keptrescue,
withinthe
an offended
enclosure
to restrict
her
freedom
of locomotion.
At theto
time
of her
party
in said
case
was She
found
outside talking
the
owner
of
the
house
where
she
had
been
taken.
explained
that
she
did
not
attempt
to
leave
the
premises
for
fear
that
the
kidnappers
would
make
good not
theirbaseless
threats as
to kill
her
should she
do so.
We she
ruled
thereinand
thatthey
her had
fear
was
the
kidnappers
knew
where
resided
earlier
announced
that
their
intention
in
looking
for
her
cousin
was
to
kill
him on sight.
Thus,
we concluded
that of
fear has
been known to
render
people
[36] to
immobile
and threats,
that
appeals
to the fears
individual,
by threats
kill or similar
are equivalent
to thean
use
of actual such
force as
or violence.
The prevailing
jurisprudence
on kidnapping
and illegal
detention
is that
the curtailment
of the
victims
liberty
need
not
involve
any
restraint
upon
thesuch
victims
If the
acts
andsufficient
actuations
of physical
the accused
can
produce
fear the
inperson.
the
mind
of the
victim
tohis
paralyze
the latter,
to
the
extent
that
victim
is
compelled
to
limit
own the
actions
and
movements
in
accordance
with
the
wishes
of
the
accused,
then
victim
is,
for all intents and purposes, detained against his will.

the appellant
knocking
or called
pushing
Rabepolice!"
down, Gregorio
then proceeded
maltreat
him.
At thisofmoment
Rabe
"police!
Glindo,
atomunicipal
policeman
Pitogo,
being
a patrol
duty
night
in said
barrio,
these
words
went
totothe
scene,
arriving
justthat
as the
offended
washearing
getting
up,
and
attempted
arrest
the
appellant,
saying
to
him: the
"Inparty
the
name
of and
the
United
States,
don't
move."
The
appellant,
on
seeing
policeman
hearing
this command,
said:
Don't
come
near, because
I will
take
your
The
policeman
continued
toward
the
appellant
andaccount
when
very
near
himlife."
the
appellant
struck
at
the
policeman
with
a
knife.
On
of
this
resistance
the policeman
not arrest
thecouncilman
appellant at
time,
so Demetrio
he went
immediately
to could
the house
ofmatter.
the
of that
thathim
barrio,
Pandenio,
and
reported
the
Pandenio
ordered
to
arrest
the
appellant.
He returned
obeycalled
this order,
being followed
by Pandenio.
They
found
the appellant
in atoplace
Mutingbayan.
The
attempted
to
take
of The
the appellant,
but
he ordered
resisted,
striking
at policeman
the
again
with
hishold
knife.
councilman
then
the
appellant
to policeman
submit anyone,"
himself,
and
on
receiving
this
order
the
appellant
said:
"I
do
not
recognize
and struck at the councilman with the knife.
The not
appellant
was not
arrested
that his
night
on account
of this resistance.
He
did
lay hands
to refuse
touchonwith
knife
either
or and
the
councilman,
butThe
heonpoliceman
did
to submit
himself
to the
the policeman
authorities,
resistedneither
arrest.
did
notsaid
see priest,
the appellant
knock
thecries
priest
down,
didfor
hehelp,
see him
kick
the
but
we heard
the
of
the
priest
calling
saying
"police!
police!"
and
when
he
arrived
on
the
scene
the priest
was getting
up and
freeing
from
the short
appellant.
When
the
policeman
heard
these
cries
for
help
he himself
was
only
a the
very
distance

some
6
or
8
brazas

away,
and
when
arrived
trouble
had
not
terminated,
although
no active
fighting
took ifplace
after his
arrival.
Under
these
facts and
circumstances
it was
the
duty
this police
officer
to stop
this
disturbance
by placing
the defendant
under
arrest.
Any
officer
in chargedany
with
the preservation
of the public
peace
may arrest,a
without
warrant,
person
who is committing,
or has
committed,
breach
ofathe
peace in his presence.
An
offense
is committed
in the
presence an
or arrest
withinwithout
the view
of an officer,
within
the sees
meaning
of the rule
authorizing
a warrant,
when
the
officer
the
offense,
although
distance,
or
hears the
disturbances
created
thereby
and
at onceattoa the
scene
thereof;
of the
offense is
continuing,
or has
notproceeds
been consummated,
at the
time
the arrest
is made.

Sayo vs. Chief of Police

Detainee (D) vs. Arresting Authorities (P)
GR L-2128, , May 12, 1948 (80 Phil. 859)

[T]

Summary: Two suspects of a robbery were arrested upon a complaint of

another person.
Rule of Law: Under the constitution, no person may be deprived of his liberty
except by warrant of arrest or commitment issued upon probable cause by a
judge after examination of the complainant and his witness.
Facts: Upon complaint of Bernardino Malinao, charging Melencio Sayo (D)
and Joaquin Mostero (D) with having committed the crime of robbery,
Benjamin Dumlao, a policeman of the City of Manila, arrested the Sayo (D)
and Mostero (D), and presented a complaint against them with the fiscal's
office of Manila. When the petition for habeas corpuswas heard, the Sayo (D)
and Mostero (D) were still detained or under arrest, and the city fiscal had not
yet released or filed charges against them with the proper courts justice.
Issues: Is the warrantless arrest valid?

US v samonte
About
8 o'clock
on theRabe
nightwere
of September
1908,
the of
appellant,
Isaac
Samonte,
andthe
Basilio
together
in6,the
house
one
Demetrio
Pandeio They
in
barrio
of Macalalong,
jurisdiction
of Pitogo,
Province
of
Tayabas.
both
left the
and
met
shortly
afterwards
street
(Verdades) in said
barrio.
On house
meeting
there
they
became
engaged in
in the
a quarrel,

Ruling: No. Under the constitution, no person may be deprived of his liberty
except by warrant of arrest or commitment issued upon probable cause by a
judge after examination of the complainant and his witness.

sprawled on a diversion road with fourteen stab wounds.

A peace officer has no power or authority to arrest a person without a
warrant upon complaint of the offended party or any other person, except in
those cases expressly authorized by law. What he or the complainant may do
in such case is to file a complaint with the city fiscal or directly with the
justice of the peace courts in municipalities and other political subdivisions.
A fortiori a police officer has no authority to arrest and detain a person
charged with an offense upon complaint of the offended party or other
persons even though, after investigation, he becomes convinced that the
accused is guilty of the offense charged.
Is
the cityoffiscal
manila
judicial Penal
authority
provisions
articleof125
of theaRevised
Codewithin the meaning of the
"judicial
as vested
used inwith
said judicial
article, power
mean the
courtsthe
of justices
or
judges
ofauthority",
said
courts
to order
temporary
detention
or
confinement
of a person
charged
with inferior
having
committed
public
offense,
that
"the Supreme
Court
and such
courts as amay
be
established
byis,
law"
,people
section
Article
of persons...against
our Constitution unreasonable
provides that seizure
"the right
of the
to 1be(3),
secure
in III,
their
shall
not
be
violated,
and
nocause,
warrant
[of arrest, detention
or confinement]
shall
issue
but
upon
probable
to
be
by the
afterhethe
examination
under
oath
or
affirmation
of
thedetermined
complaint
and
thejudge
witness
may
produce."
Under
this
constitutional
precept
no
person
may
be
deprived
of
his
liberty,
except
by
warrant
of
arrest
or
commitment
issued
upon
probable
cause
by
a
judge after to
examination
of the complainant
and
his
witness.officers
And themust
judicial
authority
whom
the
arrested
byjudge
a public
be
surrendered
can
not of
be
anyperson
other but
court
or
who aloneofis the
authorized
to issue pending
a warrant
commitment
or
provisional
detention
person
arrested
the
trial
of
the
case
against
the
latter.
Without
such
warrant
of
detention
ofConstitution.
the person arrested for than six hours would
be commitment,
illegal and in the
violation
of our
The
judicial
authority tomentioned
in fiscal
section
125
of the
RevisedorPenal
Code
can
be construed
include
the
of of
thearrest
City
oforManila
any other
city, not
because
they cannot
a surrendered
warrant
ofthe
commitment
temporary
confinement
aissue
person
to legalize
detention ofor
a
person arrested
without of
warrant.
The
only executive
authorized
by of
law
to make
a proper
preliminary
investigation
in
caseofficers
of the
temporary
absence
both
the justice
of
peace
the
auxiliary
justice
of
from
theinmunicipality,
town
or the
place,
areand
the
municipal
mayors
who
arepeace
empowered
such case to
issue
a warrant
of
arrest of the
caused.
Under
the
law, a complaint
charging
a person
withwith
the municipal
commission
of an
offense
cognizable
by the courts
of Manila
is notas
filed
court
or
the make
Court
of conduct
First Instance
of Manila,
because
above The
stated,
the latter
do
not
or
a
preliminary
investigation
proper.
complaint
must
be
made
or
filed
with
the
city
fiscal
of
Manila
who,
personally
or
through
one
of his assistants,
makes but
the investigation,
not
forproper
the purpose
of
ordering
the
arrest
of
the
accused,
of
filing
with
the
court
the
necessary
information
against
resultofofarrest
the investigation
so warrants,
and obtaining
fromthe
theaccused
court aif the
warrant
or commitment
of the
accused.
To
consider
the
city Code,
fiscal as the judicial
authority the
referred
to in article
125 of
the
Revised
Penal
to authorize
detention
of a by
person
arrested
without
warrant would
forbya abe
period
than that
permitted
law
without
any
process
court longer
of competent
jurisdiction.
The city
fiscal, may
not,
after issued
due investigation,
find
sufficient
ground
for after
filing
an
information
or
prosecuting
the
person
arrested
and
release
him,
the
latter
issued had
by a been
court illegally
or judge.detained for days or weeks without any process
Custodial investigation:
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. HERSON TAN y
VERZO, accused-appellant.
FACTS:
Tricycle driver Freddie Saavedra went to see his wife, Delfa, a to inform her
that he will drive Lito Amido and appellant Herson Tan to Barangay Maligaya.
It was the last time that Freddie was seen alive. His body was later found

Subsequently, Lt. Santos, Cpl. Numeriano Aguilar and Pat. Rolando Alandy
invited appellant in connection with the instant case and with respect to two
other robbery cases reported in Lucena City. During their conversation,
appellant allegedly gave an explicit account of what actually transpired in the
case at bar. He narrated that he and co-accused Amido were responsible for
the loss of the motorcycle and the consequent death of Saavedra. Moreover,
he averred that they sold the motorcycle to a certain Danny Teves of Barrio
Summit, Muntinlupa. With the help of appellant as a guide, the Lucena PNP
immediately dispatched a team to retrieve the same.
Tan and Amido were charged with the crime of highway robbery with murder
Lt. Carlos, on cross-examination, testified that when he invited appellant to
their headquarters, he had no warrant for his arrest. In the course thereof, he
informed the latter that he was a suspect, not only in the instant case, but
also in two other robbery cases allegedly committed in Lucena City. In the
belief that they were merely conversing inside the police station, he admitted
that he did not inform appellant of his constitutional rights to remain silent
and to the assistance of counsel; nor did he reduce the supposed confession
to writing.
In a decision dated April 21, 1994, the trial court convicted appellant.
ISSUE: Whether or not the confession of the appellant, given before a police
investigator upon invitation and without the benefit of counsel, is admissible
in evidence against him.
HELD: No.
It is well-settled that the Constitution abhors an uncounselled confession or
admission and whatever information is derived therefrom shall be regarded as
inadmissible in evidence against the confessant. R.A. No. 7438 reenforced the
constitutional mandate protecting the rights of persons under custodial
investigation, a pertinent provision of which reads:
As used in this Act, "custodial investigation" shall include the practice of
issuing an "invitation" to a person who is investigated in connection with an
offense he is suspected to have committed, without prejudice to the liability of
the "inviting" officer for any violation of law.
Custodial
involves
anyinto
questioning
by law
enforcement
authoritiesinvestigation
after a person
is taken
custody initiated
or otherwise
deprived
of his

freedom of action
in operate
any significant
The rulesceases
on custodial
investigation
begin
as soon
asmanner.
the begins
investigation
to be a
general
inquiry
intotoan
unsolved
and
topolice
focuscarries
a particular
suspect,of
the
suspect
is that
taken
intocrime
custody,
and the
out a
process
interrogations
tends
itself
to eliciting
incriminating
statements
that
the
rule
begins
to
operate.
Furthermore,
not
only does officer,
the fundamental
law
impose,
asrights
a requisite
function
of
the
investigating
the
duty
to
explain
those
to
the
accused but also
that understanding
there must correspondingly
be
a meaningful
communication
to and
by the
accused.
mere
perfunctory
reading
by the constable
of thereof
such rights
to the
accusedAsuffice.
would
thus the Constitution
not
Under
and
existing
law
and
jurisprudence,
a
confession
to
be
admissible
satisfymade
the following
it must and
be
voluntary;
(2)counsel;
itmust
must
the requirements:
assistance
of (1)
competent
independent
(3) be
it must bewith
express;
and (4) it must
be in writing.
While thebe
Constitution
sanctions
waiver of theand
right to counsel, it in
must,
however,
"voluntary,
knowing the
and
the
presence
and
with
the intelligent,
assistance must ofbe made
counsel."
Any
statement obtained
in in
violation
of the
constitution,
whether
exculpatory
or
inculpatory,
in
whole
or
part,
shall
be
inadmissible
in
evidence.
Even
if
thecounsel,
confession
containsinadmissible
a grain of truth,
if it was made
without
the absence
assistance
of
becomes
in evidence,
regardless
of
the
of
coercion
oritshows
even
ifthat
it had
voluntarily
given.
Thequestioning
evidence
for
the
prosecution
whenbeen
appellant
was
invited
for
atThis
the
police
headquarters,
he
allegedly
admitted
his
participation
in
the
crime.
will
not
to particularly
convict him,the
however,
said crime.
The toconstitutional
rights
of suffice
appellant,
toofremain
silent
and
counsel,
impregnable
the moment
heright
is investigated
in same
connection
with are
an
offense
he is from
suspected
to have
committed,
even
ifwill
the
be
initiated
by
mere invitation.
"This
Court
values
liberty
and
always
insist
on the
observance
of
basic
constitutional
rights
as
a
condition
sine
qua
non against
the awesome investigative and prosecutory powers of government."
Sanchez v. Demetriou [GR Nos. 111771-77 November 9, 1993]
Post under case digests, Remedial Law at Tuesday, February 21, 2012 Posted
by Schizophrenic Mind
Facts: Information was filed against several people including the petitioner in
relation with the rape-slay of Mary Eileen Sarmenta and the killing of Allan
Gomez. Sanchez has brought the petition to challenge the order of the
respondent judge denying his motion to quash the information for rape with
homicide filed against him and six other persons on the ground he is being
charged with seven homicides arising from the death of only two persons. The
petitioner submits that the seven informations charging seven separate
homicides are absurd because the two victims in these cases could not have
died seven times.

that the girl was raped seven times, with each of the seven accused taking
turns in abusing her with the assistance of the other six. Afterwards, their
lust satisfied, all seven of them decided to kill and thus silence Sarmenta.
Every one of the seven accused is being charged separately for actually raping
Sarmenta and later killing her instead of merely assisting the petitioner in
raping and then slaying her. The separate informations filed against each of
them allege that each of the seven successive rapes is complexed by the
subsequent slaying of Sarmenta and aggravated by the killing of Allan Gomez
by her seven attackers. The separate rapes were committed in succession by
the seven accused, culminating in the slaying of Sarmenta.
The Arrest
Was petitioner Sanchez arrested on August 13, 1993?
"Arrest"
under
Section
Rule
113heofmay
the Rules
of Court
as the
taking
ofisa defined
person
into
custody
in 1,
order
that
bound
answer
the
commission
of an
offense.
Under
Section
of arrested
the be
same
Rule,toan
arrestfor
is
effected
by an
restraint
of
the
person
to2be
submission
to actual
the custody
of the
person
making
the arrest.or by his voluntary
Application
of actual of
force, manual
touching
of the
physical
restraint
or
a
formal
declaration
is
not,
required.
It isbody,
enough
there
be an
intent
parttoofsubmit,
onearrest
of the
parties
arrest
other
andthat
an intent
onthe
12
part
ofon
thethe
other
under
the to
belief
andthe
impression
that
submission
is
necessary.
The
was taken
to Camp
Lim, Canlubang,
Laguna, byhim
virtue
of a petitioner
letter-invitation
issued
by PNPVicente
Commander
Rex Piad requesting
to
appear
at the said camp
for investigation.
In Babst v. National Intelligence Board

13

this Court declared:

Issue: Whether or not the court acted properly on denying the petition of
Sanchez to quash on the grounds that he is being charged with seven
homicides arising from the death of only two persons.

Be
that as
it may, it issome
not idle
to note that
ordinarily,
an invitation
to attend
a
hearing
and
questions,
which
the person
invited may
heed
or
refuse atcircumstances,
his answer
pleasure, ishowever,
not
illegal
or
constitutionally
objectionable.
Under
certain
such
an invitation
can
easily
assume
a
different
appearance.
Thus,
where
the
invitation
comes
from
a
powerful
group
composed
predominantly
offrom
ranking
military
issued
at
a time when
the
country
has
justwrit
emerged
martial
ruleofficers
and entirely
when
the
suspension
of the
privilege
of interrogation
the
of habeas
has
not
been
lifted,beand
the
designated
site is corpus
a military
camp,
the same
easily
taken,not
as command
a strictly voluntary
invitation
which
it
purports
to. can
be,
but as
an
authoritative
which
one
can
only
defy
at
his
peril.
.
.
(Emphasis
supplied)

Held: The court ruled that where there are two or more offenders who commit
rape, the homicide committed on the occasion or by reason of each rape,
must be deemed as a constituent of the special complex crime of rape with
homicide. Therefore, there will be as many crimes of rape with homicide as
there are rapes committed. In effect, the presence of homicide qualifies the
crime of rape, thereby raising its penalty to the highest degree. Thus,
homicide committed on the occasion or by reason of rape, loses its character
as anindependent offense, but assumes a new character, and functions like a
qualifying circumstance. However,by fiction of law, it merged with rape to
constitute an constituent element of a special complex crime of rape with
homicide with a specific penalty which is in the highest degree. The petitioner
and his six co-accused are not charged with only one rape committed by him
in conspiracy with the other six. Each one of the seven accused is charged
with having himself raped Sarmenta instead of simply helping Sanchez in
committing only one rape. In other words, the allegation of the prosecution is

In
the
case
at bar, the
invitationwas
came
from
a high-ranking
military
official
and
theguise
investigation
of Sanchez
to be
made
at a military
camp.
in the
of a request,
it washeobviously
atocommand
or an
order Although
of cowed
arrest
that
the"invitation,"
petitioner
could
hardly
expected
defy. In
fact,
apparently
by
the
he
went
without
protest
(and
in
informal
clothes
and
slippers only) with the officers who had come to fetch him.
It may not investigation"
be amiss to observe
that under
7438,
requisites
of a
"custodial
are applicable
even R.A.
to a No.
person
notthe
formally
arrested
but merely "invited" for questioning.
It should
likewisestatus"
be noted
that
at Camp
Vicente
Lim, theand
petitioner
was
placed
"arrest
after
he Mary
was
pointed
to
by Centeno
Malabanan
as
the on
person
who first
raped
Eileen
Sarmenta.
Respondent
himself
acknowledged
during
13, 1993
hearing
that, on had
the Zuo
basis
of
the sworn
statements
of the
the August
two state
witnesses,
petitioner
been
"arrested."
We
with
petitioner
Ruleagree
113 of
the the
Rules
of Court.that his arrest did not come under Section 5,
It
is not allegedly
denied that
the arresting
officers
not
present
when
the
petitioner
participated
in the did
killing
ofwere
Allan
Gomez
andknowledge
the rapeslay of
Mary
Eileen was
Sarmenta.
Neither
they
have
any
personal
that
the
petitioner
responsible
therefor
because
the
basis ofas
the
arrest
was
the
sworn
statements
of
Centeno
and
Malabanan.
Moreover,
the
rape
and killing
of before
Sarmenta date
allegedly
took
place
on Junebe28-June
or
forty-six
days
of the
arrest,
it cannot
that29,
the1993,
offense
had "in fact
just beenthe
committed"
when
the petitioner
wassaid
arrested.
The
original the
warrantless
arrestCourt
of the petitioner
was doubtlessover
illegal.
Nevertheless,
Regional
Trial
acquired
the
person
of against
the petitioner
by the
virtue
of thelawfully
warrant
of arrestjurisdiction
itwith
issued
August
26,
1993
him to
and
other
in connection
theon
rape-slay
cases.
It was
belated,
be sure,
but accused
it was nonetheless
legal.

Evencourt
on the
assumption
that nojurisdiction
warrant was
issued
at all, of
we findpetitioner.
that the
trial
acquired
the person
The
rulehe
is still
thatlawfully
if theto
accused
objects
to the over
jurisdiction
of that
the the
court over
person,
may
quash
the
information,
but
only
on
If,his
as
in
this case,
themove
accused
raises
other
grounds
in submitted
the
motion
to ground.
quash,to
he
is
14
deemed
to
have
waived
that
objection
and
to
have
his
person
the
jurisdiction of that court.
The CourtJudge
notes that
on August
13, a1993,
after of
thearrest
petitioner
was Antonio
unlawfully
arrested,
Lanzanas
issued
warrant
against
L.
15 Criminal
Sanchez
in
with
Cases
Nos. 93-124634
to 93-124637
for
violation
of connection
R.A
No. 6713.
issuance
the warrant
of arrest
for
the
rape-slay
cases,
this firstPending
warrantthe
served
as theofinitial
justification
for his
detention.
The Courtofalso
adverts to its uniform
ruling
that the
filing ofa charges,
and the
issuance
the
warrant
of arrest,
against
detained
willbecause
curecorresponding
the
of that
detention
or at least
deny person
him theinvalidly
right to
be released
ofdefect
such defect.
G.R. No. L-14639 March 25, 1919 ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL.,
petitioners, vs. JUSTO LUKBAN, ET AL., respondents.
Villacicencio Vs Lukban
Facts : One hundred and seventy women were isolated from society, and then
at night, without their consent and without any opportunity to consult with
friends or to defend their rights, were forcibly hustled on board steamers for
transportation to regions unknown. Despite the feeble attempt to prove that
the women left voluntarily and gladly, that such was not the case is shown by
the mere fact that the presence of the police and the constabulary was
deemed necessary and that these officers of the law chose the shades of night
to cloak their secret and stealthy acts. Indeed, this is a fact impossible to
refute and practically admitted by the respondents.
ISSUE : WON Mayor Lukban has the right to deport women with ill repute.
HELD : Law defines power. No official, no matter how high, is above the law.
Lukban committed a grave abuse of discretion by deporting the prostitutes to
a new domicile against their will. There is no law expressly authorizing his
action. On the contrary, there is a law punishing public officials, not
expressly authorized by law or regulation, who compels any person to change
his residence Furthermore, the prostitutes are still, as citizens of the
Philippines, entitled to the same rights, as stipulated in the Bill of Rights, as
every other citizen. Thei rchoice of profession should not be a cause for
discrimination. It may make some, like Lukban, quite uncomfortable but it
does not authorize anyone to compel said prostitutes to isolate themselves
from the rest of the human race. These women have been deprived of their
liberty by being exiled to Davao without even being given the opportunity to
collect their belongings or, worse, without even consenting to being
transported to Mindanao. For this, Lukban etal must be severely punished
FERDINAND E. MARCOS vs. HON. RAUL MANGLAPUS (177 SCRA 668) Case
Digest
Facts:

After Ferdinand Marcos was deposed from the presidency, he and his family
fled to Hawaii. Now in his deathbed, petitioners are asking the court to order
the respondents to issue their travel documents and enjoin the
implementation of the Presidents decision to bar their return to the
Philippines. Petitioners contend under the provision of the Bill of Rights that
the President is without power to impair their liberty of abode because only a
court may do so within the limits prescribed by law. Nor, according to the
petitioners, may the President impair their right to travel because no law has
authorized her to do so.
Issue:
Does the president have the power to bar the Marcoses from returning to the
Philippines?
Ruling:
The President has the obligation, under the Constitution to protect the
people, promote their welfare and advance national interest.
This case calls for the exercise of the Presidents power as protector of the
peace. The president is not only clothed with extraordinary powers in times of
emergency, but is also tasked with day-to-day problems of maintaining peace
and order and ensuring domestic tranquility in times when no foreign foe
appears on the horizon.
The documented history of the efforts of the Marcoses and their followers to
destabilize the country bolsters the conclusion that their return at this time
would only exacerbate and intensify the violence directed against the state
and instigate more chaos.
The State, acting through the Government, is not precluded from taking
preemptive actions against threats to its existence if, though still nascent they
are perceived as apt to become serious and direct protection of the people is
the essence of the duty of the government.
The Supreme Court held that the President did not act arbitrarily or with
grave abuse of discretion in determining the return of the petitioners at the
present time and under present circumstances poses a serious threat to
national interest and welfare prohibiting their return to the Philippines. The
petition is DISMISSED.