November 25, 1940

G. R. No. 46786
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff and appellee,
vs.
OCTAVIO Marasigan, defendant and appellant.
D. Claro M. Recto and Messrs. Slim and Taada for appellant.
Mr. Ozaeta Attorney General and Assistant Attorney General Mr. Gianzon on behalf of the Government.
IMPERIAL, J .:
Octavio Marasigan The defendant was prosecuted in the District Court of the City of Baguio for the crime
of murder under the following allegations of the complaint that was presented against:
That on or about the 23d day of October, 1938, in the City of Baguio, Commonwealth of the Philippines,
and esta Within the jurisdiction of Court, the above named Octavio Accused Marasigan, Being there and
then a big armed with a double-bladed knife or balisong, a deadly weapon, did, with intent to kill, evident
premeditation and treachery, and taking advantage of His superior strength and while riding on a motor
vehicle while running was Taxi No. 1335 of the Royal Garage, then a and there willfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously assault, attack and stab knife Said many times With one Elisa Jereos, thereby inflicting upon
her a mortal; stabbed wound on the right chest, penetrating the third intercostal space and cutting the
bronchus and pulmonary Vessels; another mortal, penetrating wound on the xipoid, cutting the
diaphragm, liver and lesser omentum; a stabbed wound on the right shoulder; an incised wound on the
left forearm; a penetrating, stabbed wound on the left interscapular region; to nonpenetrating, stabbed
wound on the same region; to nonpenetrating, stabbed wound on the mid-dorsal line about the level of
the eleventh vertebra; Numerous and wounds on the fingers and hands, Which mortal wounds and other
injuries produced acute hemorrhage and Directly Caused the death of Said Elisa Jereos almist
instantaneously.
In the commission of the murder Described above, the aggravating Circumstances (1) That it wascommitted With treachery, (2) evidence premeditation and (3) abuse of superior strength and (4) by
taking advantage of a running motor vehicle, Were attendant .
The defendant waive his right to be informed of the complaint, but the Court noted in the record his
statement of not guilty. The defendant admitted during his testimony to the fact he had killed the
deceased, but I submit that this death was the result of mutual covenant that had held suicide. His
defense argues that the crime was committed is murder mitigated by extenuating circumstances will be
considered later. The defendant appealed the judgment hallo guilty of murder in the person of Elisa
Jereos and condemn him to perpetual seclusion, the ancillary law, to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased in the amount of P2,000, and to pay the costs.
The appellant was a business student at the Ateneo de Manila. The deceased was studying at the
University of Santo Tomas the pre-med. In June 1938 the appellant prendo of the deceased and that you
agree to the following month and since then sustuvieron relationships, a correspondence daily. Before
accepting the appellant and the deceased was holding an affair with the cadet Ramon Gelvezon and this
was regarded as one of the suitors of that. On the morning of October 20, 1938 the appellant, the
deceased and her friend Monserrat Montelibano went to Baguio City in Ilocos Express. Upon arrival, the
appellant was staying at the fourth No. 21 of Zigzag Hotel and the deceased and her friend in the room
No. 19. Both rooms were separated by another. At about 5 pm the same day the three were the
Teachers' Camp and beyond Gelvezon was presented by the deceased to Montserrat and the appellant.
On the afternoon of 22 of the same month the three were again at the Teachers' Camp and beyond were
entertained by Gelvezon in a game of basketball. On the evening of the same day Gelvezon phoned the
deceased and after having discussed both this give the device the appellant. In this conversation with
rival Gelvezon said both were gallant and reciprocally offered to continue courting the deceased. Shortly
after the conversation on the phone the deceased was the Teachers' Camp, accompanied by Gelvezon,
where they remained until about 9pm. The appellant and Monserrat were looking for the deceased and
how they found out the building Shows (showhouse), led to the hotel and on the way the appellant's
recriminodiciendo if that was what was going to keep doing the prefer her dead before they lost. On the
morning of October 23 the same year the appellant and the deceased were together at the church and
heard mass. Leaving the church, at about 6, both embarked on a taxicab and the appellant instructed
the driver to drive them to Mines View Park. When the car was heading to go to that site and I ordered
the driver to turn and give him illevara the hotel, but the appellant again instructed the driver to go ahead

in the direction of the Mines View Park. As he stood in front of the Post Office the driver stop the car
because I heard the door had opened and saw that the deceased was the one who opened it, I wonder
which of the two passengers would obey. On that occasion the driver observed that the deceased was
pale and tried to jump out the door unless they lead her to the hotel. The driver llevos them to Zigzag
Hotel. Before arriving at the hotel, the deceased appellant accepted the invitation they were to walk at 5
in the afternoon. About 1:30 Nap same dis the deceased felt an attack of the heart and the doctor who
administered the treatment an injection and prescribed rest and not go outside. Shortly after the visit of
Gelvezon who remained in her room until 4 pm. During this time the deceased was lying in bed and the
appellant entered five times inside the rooms while Gelvezon was inside her. Before leaving the hotel,
Gelvezon, Appellant, the deceased and Montelibano went to the hall of the hotel and the deceased
Gelvezon and danced to the beat of a phonograph. When Gelvezon and Montelibano were to go to a tea
that was to hit the Teachers' Camp, the deceased meant his desire to accompany, to which the
appellant's told not to do such a thing and ought not to go. As soon as Gelvenzon and Montelibano it had
left the hotel, the appellant call a taxicab that came at once handled by the driver Nicomedes Abonejar.
The appellant embarked on the car followed by the deceased and instructed the driver to take them to
the Teachers' Camp. When they were over Leonard Wood Road, near the Teachers' Camp, Abonejar
heard that the deceased suddenly exclaimed full of fear and terror. Look in the mirror I had in front of him
and saw that appellant stabbed the deceased with double-edged knife that frame as Exhibit "AA." Stop
the car and set within the appellant smote saw the deceased in the chest with the knife and that stopped
the blows with his hands. Abonejar are felling the car and saw that the appellant was hurting with the
same weapon. Abonejar another taxicab stop passing and beg the driver who was driving that would
track the incident to the police. After a taro arrived on the scene a group of policemen led by Bugayong
and Floresca Sergeants. The police found the deceased dead and lying face up on the floor of the car,
head to the left door and the appellant sitting in the backseat, crouched over the body of the deceased.
Wounds that had the appellant and the deceased were bleeding profusely and in the car the doubleedged knife bloody well as also bag the deceased were found. The appellant and the corpse of the
deceased were taken to hospital in Baguio. The corpse of the deceased had two serious and fatal
injuries in the chest, once in the right shoulder, three in the back, one on his right forearm, several in the
fingers of both hands, plus a contusion on the left named and scratches forearm and right arm. The
appellant had two wounds inferred itself, which forced him to be hospitalized for long.
As already said, the appellant admitted having killed the deceased and the defense argues that the
crime was committed is to manslaughter and not murder. The court estimated the concurrence of the
fact that in his opinion alevosia qualify the crime converting it into murder. The third error signaling is
intended that the qualifying circumstance has not been tested and fifth pointing error is reiterated that
the offense is manslaughter. On the way the attack was executed by the appellant there is more
evidence that the statement given by Nicomedes Abonejar, the driver who was driving the taxi in which
developing crime. According to the witness the first time that I take warning that something extraordinary
was happening in the car was when I noticed that the door had been left open and saw the deceased
tried to jump out. Then he saw the appellant stabbed with double-edged knife to the deceased, and this
is defended with their hands. Stop the car and that was when he saw the deceased had fallen inert
inside the car and had received fatal injuries and the appellant, also wounded, he was bent toward the
body of the victim. All this happened in a very short time. If it is considered that the deceased with terror
try to jump the car and immediately after she was attacked and repeatedly wound times by the appellant,
it is undeniable that the attack was sudden and unexpected and the appellant's efectuo no risk of person
in view of that the deceased could not defend or offer any resistance given the very small automotive
where both were space. The fact that the deceased strike some blows with their hands can not change
the circumstances under which the attack was undertaken whenever he did instinctively and was not
suitable means to evade defense constituted armed aggression. The fact is made manifest perfidy
(Article 14, 16 of the Revised Penal Code) and the Court did not err in estimating it as qualifying the
crime of murder.
The court appreciate the premeditation known as an aggravating circumstance that compensated with
youth appellant that consider as a mitigating circumstance. In the second marking of error alleges that
the facts do not support the conclusion that attended premeditation known. In the commission of the
crime details abound in our opinion clearly demonstrate the presence of such aggravating. It will be
recalled that in one of the letters that the deceased Gelvezon give the appellant, this he read a passage
that woke intimate jealousy. According to the appellant himself, the conceived the idea of killing the
deceased on the night of October 22, 1938 when the alleged suicide pact had both agreed as a result of
serious trouble that he had received in connection with the conduct of the deceased. On the morning of
23 of the same month the appellant persisted in the idea of crime when boarding the deceased in a taxi
and I instruct the driver to drive them to Mines View Park. The deceased must have suspected in the
incident plan appellant when he resisted strongly to go to that place and I barely managed to give her
back to the hotel. Before making the crime the appellant wrote letters to his parents, brothers and sisters
and a priest and said goodbye to them all. Finally, in the last note he wrote in his own handwriting
custom he and the deceased were buried either in Black or Batangas and over his grave the following
epitaph be inscribed: "They love each other so much That They can not Afford to be separated. " All

these circumstances demonstrate conclusively that the offense was committed by the appellant with
premeditation (article 14, 13 of the Revised Penal Code). It should be appreciated the aggravating
circumstance of premeditation known when the offense has been thoughtfully pondered for the guilty;
when prepared in advance means you have believed on purpose to run, and when it has had time to
reason with cold take charge of their subsequent consequences (Judgments of the Supreme Court of
Spain from December 26, 1887 and 1. of September 1893; Eulalio EU against Cornejo, 28 Jur Fil,
476)...
It is intended that no premeditation known or perfidy that between the appellant and the deceased had
been entered into a suicide pact both. We believe that the Court was right to reject such a defense. Tests
have not shown such a suicide pact. But even if there had been, no serious justification would
undermine the crime or malice aforethought who have attended. The death of the deceased was not a
suicide because it was caused directly by the appellant and Article 253 of the Revised Penal Code
criminalizes the act of helping commit suicide.
It is held on the first error signaling is assessed appellant for mitigating 6th Article 13 of the Revised
Penal Code for having acted by stimuli such powerful outburst occurred naturally and blindness. We
believe that the mitigating been busy, because it appears that jealousy was the motive which led the
appellant to commit the crime. As stated in the case of United States v Vicente Santillan, 4 Phil. Rep.,
170, "resentment rivalry in love with a woman is powerful stimulus of jealousy, so suitable for producing
outburst and blindness."
We find unfounded claim of the defense contained in the fourth marking error to the effect that the
condition of the appellant while he was apprehended by the authorities is a similar circumstance and
analog voluntary presentation referred to in Article 13, paragraph 2, of Revised Penal Code. Voluntary
authorities presentation is considered by the Revised Penal Code as a circumstance that mitigates the
criminal act committed by the offender, his repentance foundation acknowledges that in this case may
not resemble the condition that the appellant was at the time his apprehension.
For the reasons expressed is later exposed equally untenable theory in the sixth and final error signaling
that the appellant is entitled to an indeterminate sentence pursuant to Act No. 4103, as has been
amended by Law No . 4225.
The court appreciation appellant youth as a mitigating circumstance that mitigated his criminal
responsibility and compensated with aggravated known premeditation. The Attorney General believes
that such mitigation has not busy, because when the offense consumption Appellant was 18 years old.
Article 13, paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal Code provides that a mitigating circumstance is
considered to be the less culpable than 18 or older than 70 years old. Not submitted any evidence on
the age that appellant had at the time that perpetrated the crime; however, when I declare the May 8,
1939 manifesto that was 19 years. In the preliminary investigation practiced on November 25, 1938 the
appellant himself manifesto that was 19 years. Accepting that this was his exact age, is that when I
committed the offense was 18 years and 11 months. The court took into account the appellant aprecir
age as a mitigating the fact that according to Article 320 of the Civil Code, as has been amended by Law
No. 1891, a person is not considered able to exercise their rights and bound but since he turns 21 and
becomes since adult, youth and held that appellant contributed greatly mode which did not make the
mature judgment of an adult. .. This question has been solved in the case of People v Macario It will be
Josefa, 52 Jur Fil, 213, where the Court said:

With respect to age that the accused had to commit the crime, 19 years and six months, it is true that for
the full exercise of their civil rights he was not then able to be less of age according to the Civil Code.
But please note that the degree of discernment is required of a person criminally accountable for their
actions, is not the same as that required for the full exercise of rights in the civil field. And within criminal
law, crime has its correlative degrees to the age of the individual. It is true that, as well as obvious, the
reason for such degrees of crime by age, based on less or greater discernment, it is difficult for the
Constitutional right to set limits on such degrees; however, it is not for us to resolve these legal issues.
Our function is to enforce the law, law constituted as this, and positive law in the criminal field, requires
full responsibility, as the defendant has already served 18 years of age. We are not authorized to
consider as a mitigating state 19 years and 6 months of age who had the defendant to commit the crime.
Nor can we consider under the circumstances eighth Article 9 of the Criminal Code, as the same entity
analogous to earlier in this article. More than equality or analogy in the state, so there is gradation, and
marked gradation by law. Consider this age of the accused as a mitigating circumstance equate to
amend the age limit set in the second circumstance, article 9 of the Code.
In the case of People v Macabangon, R. G. No. 44783, promulgated on October 26, 1936, the Court
seized of the same attenuating said:
We declare that the fact of having only 19 years old the defendant is not a mitigating accordance with
No. 2 of that article, can not be regarded as similar in nature according to the No. 10, then, the law
grants the benefit only to the lesser of 18 or older than 70 years. The cars do not provide any details
stating that the age of the accused for the better infuido for in the commission of the crime. There is no
evidence that even insinuate that because of his age did not have the maturity of judgment by an adult.
We conclude that the age of the appellant is not a mitigating circumstance that must be upheld in their
favor.
Summarizing the circumstances under which the crime was committed, the Attorney General contends
that have contributed to aggravating of premeditation known, which is embedded cunning (People v
Madrid, RG No. 41967), breach of trust and use of vehicle engine, without any mitigation that can offset
any aggravating mentioned. The breach of trust must be estimated in this case, because being the
boyfriend of the deceased appellant was exceeded the confidence that this will had deposited; and the
use of the motor vehicle is another aggravating factor that must be assessed because the crime was
committed in the taxi was called and used by the same appellant.
The offense committed by the appellant is to be murder qualified by the perfidy and is punishable under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code with reclusion temporal in its maximum degree to death; and
having attended in his commission the aggravating circumstances of premeditation known, breach of
trust and use of motor vehicle and must be compensated with one of these mitigating outburst and
stubbornness, to impose the penalty prescribed in its maximum degree to death. But, for lack of a
unanimous vote of the members of the Court, should be imposed the penalty next lower in degree to the
death penalty in this case is perpetual seclusion, under which provides the last paragraph of Article 133
of Revised Administrative Code, according to been amended by Article 2 of Law No. 3 of the
Commonwealth.
The contested judgment is confirmed, the costs of this instance against the appellant. So it is ordered.