Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 2013

Vol. 39, No. 7, 1067
1085, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2013.778022

European Union and Commonwealth

Free Movement: A HistoricalComparative Perspective
Tendayi Bloom and Katherine Tonkiss

Between 1948 and 1962, approximately 600 million Commonwealth citizens had the
right to enter the UK. This number decreased throughout the 1960s and 1970s, as a series
of Acts of Parliament altered the rights and definitions of Commonwealth citizens. To
date, the European Union has extended the right to over 500 million citizens and
residents of member-states to enter the UK. This new trend has been met with
perceptions of threat to national cultural and economic resources. Reactions to
Commonwealth immigration were similarly negative. This paper examines parallels
between EU immigration today and Commonwealth immigration of the past. It argues
that the fears expressed, both in the literature of the 1960s and 1970s and in
contemporary society, reflect a fear of persons who are seen as other but who must, by
law, be defined as fellow-citizens and afforded the attendant rights. We argue that
theorists of free and freer movement must acknowledge these local concerns in order to
strengthen their theory and enable a more liberal treatment of immigration policy in the
UK and beyond.
Keywords: Commonwealth; European Union; Free Movement; Nationalism; United
Kingdom
Introduction
Todays EU free-movement regime gives 500 million persons the right to enter and
reside in the UK without a visa. From 1949, an estimated 600 million subjects of the
modern Commonwealth theoretically had this right. Examining Britains experiences
Tendayi Bloom is Research Fellow at the United Nations University Institute in Barcelona. Correspondence to:
Dr T. Bloom, United Nations University Institute, Sant Paul Historic Site, C/Sant Antoni Maria Claret 167,
08025 Barcelona, Spain. E-mail: bloom@unu.edu. Katherine Tonkiss is Research Fellow in the School of
Government and Society at the University of Birmingham. Correspondence to: Dr K. Tonkiss, INLOGOV,
School of Government and Society, Muirhead Tower, University of Birmingham, Edgbaston, Birmingham B15
2TT, UK. E-mail: k.e.tonkiss@bham.ac.uk.
# 2013 Taylor & Francis

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T. Bloom & K. Tonkiss

towards the end of Commonwealth free movement in the 1960s provides useful
lessons for responding to EU immigration today. Further, an examination of the
similarities and contrasts between these case studies provides useful insights for the
debate around free and freer movement more generally.
This paper first presents the two contexts, highlighting similarities between them,
before critically comparing them and analysing important differences. Finally, it
explores the ramifications of this discussion through two analytical lenses: ethnicity
(including language as ethnic demarcator) and social class. We argue that, in order to
develop a positive response to freer migration in the EU and to produce morenuanced free-movement theories more generally, it is essential to engage with these
local-context concerns, and the way in which exclusionary difference is constructed,
both as a result of and as a contributing factor to the way in which immigration is
experienced on a local level.

Contexts
The Modern Commonwealth
Much literature compares the current rise of right-wing politics in Britain with that
of the 1970s (e.g. Ford and Goodwin 2010; Husbands 1994), but ignores the lead-up
that occurred in the 1960s, which has important parallels with the EU situation today.
This is because todays limited discretionary control over EU immigration (Ford and
Goodwin 2010: 20) was arguably a crucial driver of the events of the 1960s, also
influencing attitudes in the 1970s towards those who had arrived in earlier decades.
In the late 1940s and early 1950s, at the formation of the Modern Commonwealth,
Britain was trying to rebuild after the Second World War, and to replace its depleted
workforce. The insufficient acknowledgement of local discontent at actual and
potential immigration came to a head in the 1960s, with the passage of the 1968
Commonwealth Immigrants Act (for a fuller discussion of the development of law in
this area see, for example, Clayton 2006; Dale 1983).
In the 1960s, independence movements in Eastern and Central Africa were
relocating nationhood and belonging ethnically, as Africanised. For example, the
1963 Kenyan constitution made citizenship require a person to have a parent born in
Kenya, and allowed discrimination even against citizens who did not belong.1 This
echoed a distinction made in British Empire territories, mainly in the West Indies,
between those who belonged to a particular territory (by birth, ancestry,
naturalisation or office) and other imperial subjects, and would be reflected in
the UKs patrial definition, introduced in 1971 (Clayton 2006: 313; Plender 1971:
305, 313).
The presence in East African countries, and elsewhere, of persons with heritage
from the region of India/Pakistan, descended from those relocated there during the
period of the British Empire, complicated these ethnicised notions of citizenship and
belonging, since those individuals were largely East African by experience and

Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies

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residence, British by passport and subjecthood, and Indian or Pakistani by ancestry.

These so-called East African Asian populations fell victim to restrictions on trade,
professions and property, and emigrated steadily (Dummett and Nicol 1990; Shah
2000). In the late 1960s, this emigration suddenly increased and, in the first two
months of 1968, 12,800 persons from Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania entered the UK,
compared to 6,150 for the whole of 1965 (Lester 2003: 4). This was driven both by
worsening conditions in East Africa, and by fears that Britain would restrict entry
(e.g. Shah 2000: 80)*fears that would be soon realised.
In 1968, over the course of three days, the Commonwealth Immigrants Act was
passed. This was part of a series of legislation which increasingly complicated and
restricted immigration rights to the islands of the UK. The 1968 Act introduced the
idea that*irrespective of an immigrants citizenship status*if neither the person nor
her or his parent or grandparent were born, naturalised, adopted or registered as a
citizen, on the islands of the UK itself, s/he could be denied entry. Supported by
Conservative ministers like Enoch Powell, who criticised the Wilson government for
insufficient engagement with local concerns about immigration, the Act was also
supported by the Labour Home Secretary, Jim Callaghan, and all but two of the
Labour cabinet. Indeed, in a memorandum preceding the crucial meeting (quoted in
Lester 2003), Callaghan crucially uses the word belonging in the sense described here.
Just after the 1968 Act passed, Powell delivered his Rivers of Blood speech
expressing explicitly his racialised fears of the consequences of increased immigration,
and was ejected from the Conservative Party (Telegraph 2007). However, he and others
had already helped through an act that would deprive British subjects of core rights
and had brought into focus either the racial core of discontent at Commonwealth
immigration to Britain or, more likely, the racist sentiment that had been mobilised by
a lack of successful engagement in mainstream public debate on the issue.
Three themes arise in relation to this Act and to the context of its implementation
more generally. First, it suddenly rendered many persons effectively stateless. This
included those already in transit from East Africa towards their country of
citizenship, the UK. Second, it suddenly and abruptly altered complex migration
dynamics that had developed (Clayton 2006: 11). For example, Pakistani workers
had, for some time, been engaged in circular migration, spending some time working
in factories in Britain, benefiting from the higher wages available, and then returning
to Pakistan to set up families (Shaw 2000: 10). Those in Britain, ready to return,
suddenly discovered that they or their successors may be unable to re-enter in the
future (Shaw 2000: 30; Spencer 1997: 4). Similar circular and return migration
patterns have developed in the EU (Elrick 2008: 1506; Wallace 2002: 604
6).
A final theme is that of the political discourses which developed at the time and
which are reflected in todays political landscape. For Mazrui, writing in 1971, the
Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1968 was an attempt to contain growing racism in
the British population (1971: 27). Further, he argues that regionalism and racism
formed major challenges for the Commonwealth more generally*for example,
motivating British EEC membership which would take effect in 1973 (1971: 7, 23).

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T. Bloom & K. Tonkiss

Mazrui describes the EEC as representing a white grouping in contrast to the racially
diverse Commonwealth. However, focusing on the racial aspect of this misses other
aspects*crucially, Britains understanding of its role in these two organisations. For
example, Britain was losing its position as first among equals in the Commonwealth,
as an increasing number of Black-ruled African states were becoming members and
challenging Britains position with regard to the remaining white-ruled states in that
region. In the EEC, however, Britain could potentially take a role as a major player.
Perhaps, then, this is more easily seen as primarily about power politics, where race
was both secondary and in fact adopted as a post-decision popular explanation.
The National Front (NF) was formed in 1967, largely by Conservatives who felt
that a more right-wing approach would have won the 1965 general election. It grew
in stature, but came to be seen as militant. In 1982, the modern British National Party
(BNP) was founded out of divisions in the NF (e.g. Ford and Goodwin 2010).
Emerging from periods of changing migration conditions left unaddressed by
mainstream politics, these organisations represent a mainstreaming of extremist
parties and positions. However, as can be seen by the passage of the 1968 Act, this
period also featured the movement of extreme viewpoints into mainstream politics
(see also Husbands 1994: 565).

The European Union

Commonwealth and European Union migration to the UK are not mutually exclusive.
Migration from Eastern Europe to the UK arguably began in earnest with the 1946
postwar managed-migration scheme, which stopped as the UK Caribbean population
grew (McDowell 2009: 21). Meanwhile, despite the increasing relevance of Europe,
post-1990 migration to the UK has been largely of Commonwealth migrants moving
to join already-established communities (see Figure 1). EU migrants are, however,
gaining an increasing presence, particularly since the accession of the Eastern
European member-states in 2004 (A8) and 2007 (A2).2
Figure 1 compares immigration to the UK of both Commonwealth and EU citizens
(ONS 2011: Table 2.03). It makes the distinction between both different EU groups
(EU 15 and A8) and different Commonwealth groups (Old Commonwealth and
New Commonwealth) because the rates of immigration of these groups have been
quite different over this time period, as has the ethnic differentiation.
While Commonwealth immigration in the period under discussion was characterised by depleting mobility rights for Commonwealth citizens, the recent
experience in the EU context has been characterised by a growth in the recognition
of more substantial rights for EU citizens. Initially, freedom of movement in the EU
stemmed from a commitment to non-discrimination in labour rights for qualified
coal and steel workers to gain employment in alternative member-states of the
Economic Coal and Steel Community. This has gradually been extended, through a
series of reforms, into the granting of formal European citizenship to citizens of
member-states. Provisions were made for more extensive social rights for migrant

Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies

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Figure 1. Comparing immigration to the UK from Commonwealth and from EU

countries, 1991
2010.

workers regarding education, housing and non-workers rights (Baldoni 2003: 4
9).
European citizenship was formally created in 1992, further extending European
immigrants rights into areas of voting and access to domestic social security benefits
(Cabrera 2010: 182
4). The right to free movement is set out in Article 45 of the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (European Union 2010), the
commitments of which reflect those set out in the original Treaty of Rome 1957.
The provisions of European citizenship are set out in Part 2, the commitments of
which were agreed as part of the Maastricht Treaty 1992, in which the Schengen
Agreement of 1990 (allowing for the removal of many of the EUs border controls)
was also formally integrated (European Union 2010).
Despite the apparent equalisation of status for EU citizens in terms of migration,
there remain significant challenges surrounding the implementation of EU citizenship
and the free movement regime. These problems stem particularly from the relationship
between emerging trans-state citizenship and persistent national forms of citizenship. National identities are strong and prevalent in Europe and some studies suggest
that they may even be gaining further support as the integration project continues
(Auer 2010; Citrin and Sides 2004). Indeed, evidence shows that support for nationalist
and anti-EU parties, such as the BNP and UKIP in the UK, has grown particularly in
European elections (see Figure 2). In addition to these political expressions, incidents
signalling hostility towards European citizens residing in the UK have also been
reported*for example, in rural communities like those in the county of Herefordshire,
where large numbers of EU migrants have arrived for employment mainly within the
agricultural and hospitality sectors (Dawney 2007; Tonkiss 2011), as well as widespread
hostility towards the European Traveller populations (Chakraborti 2010).3

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T. Bloom & K. Tonkiss

Figure 2. Electoral success for far-right parties (NF and BNP) in Britain, 1970
2010.
Source: 1970
2001 data are drawn from Parliamentary notes (Yonwin 2004: 7); 2005 and
2010 data drawn from raw data (Electoral Commission 2010).

Such anti-migrant hostilities have become more visible since the accession of the
A8 and A2 member-states in 2004 and 2007 respectively. Indeed, in May 2004, the EU
population increased by 28 per cent to 500 million (McDowell 2009: 19). As can be
seen in Figure 1, following the accession of these new member-states, the migration of
EU citizens into the UK almost doubled to 130,000 in 2004, and peaked at 190,000 in
2008, before dropping back to 167,000 in 2009. Whilst it is worth noting that many of
these persons return to their country of national citizenship, or go to another
member-state without settling in the UK (Elrick 2008: 1506; Pollard et al. 2008:
17
21; Wallace 2002: 604
6), these figures nonetheless represent a significant increase
on the 50,000 accession-state nationals who were estimated to be living in the UK in
2003 (Pollard et al. 2008: 16).
The UK, driven largely by labour market shortages, gave more immediate, fuller
employment rights to A8 nationals than other Western European countries (Demireva
2011: 639; McDowell 2009: 20). Indeed, the UK was one of only three countries (with
Ireland and Sweden) to impose no restrictions on the migration of A8 nationals and
only small restrictions on subsequent migration from the A2 states. A2 nationals had
to obtain an accession worker card from the UK before migrating, unless they were
highly skilled, students or self-sufficient individuals (Migration Advisory Committee
2008: 49). Migrants filled gaps in the agricultural sector which, studies suggest, has
placed particular strain on rural communities, changing the nature of public service
provision in such areas and affecting the indigenous community (Commission for
Rural Communities 2007: 7). However, while this benefited the UK economy, it caused
some difficulties on a local level, the nature of which is discussed below.

Practical Analysis Arising from Contextual Comparisons

This section analyses the ramifications of the UK experience of Commonwealth
immigration, and the current system of EU citizenship that drives substantial

Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies

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unrestricted migration and explores the similarities and differences between them,
beginning with the former.
The free-movement regimes of the Commonwealth and the EU were both based on
shared systems of treaties and, arguably, also developed on an idealistic notion of
promoting liberal democratic values (see Bloom 2011; Kostakopoulou 2001: 116).
At the outset, each seemed to be in Britains interests, enabling its citizens and
businesses to take up opportunities abroad and bringing in much-needed labour.
As we have argued, this came to a head in both contexts when initial labour
shortages had been (or were perceived to have been) satisfied, economic conditions
for local populations were worsening, and Britains position as a first among equals
had been lost. Further, unaddressed local concerns at pressure on local labour
markets and services were fanned by a right-wing media, along with fears at the large
numbers of migrants who could theoretically move. Finally, this situation became one
of crisis when discontent at the large numbers of potential immigrants, alongside
insufficient response in terms of local services, were not addressed by mainstream
politicians from either the left or the right. In 1961, Rab Butler MP warned that the
600 million potential Commonwealth immigrants amounted to about one quarter of
the world population (Hansard 1961). The current potential EU immigration of
500 million is more akin to 7 per cent of todays world population. There is also a
perception of economic dependence, and that, in the early 1960s, Britain was
supporting poorer, mismanaged countries (Hartley and Hawkes 2011).
Key differences between these contexts are broadly summarised in Table 1;
understanding them is essential to the discussion in this paper.
We now focus on one key similarity between the two contexts: the insufficient
mainstream debate around genuine local concerns with the potential immigration.
Firstly, substantial support for political parties such as UKIP and the BNP reflects
Table 1. Differences between the context of the Commonwealth and of the EU, from the
perspective of migrants from those regions to the UK
Commonwealth in the 1960s
Status
Future
Construction of
past
Construction of
difference
Intersections

Commonwealth citizens were

constitutionally British subjects

EU today

EU citizens have no specific status in

Britain that they do not have in other
second countries
Commonwealth entry rights could be,
No realistic possibility of EU entry
and were, deconstructed
rights being removed in near future
Emerged out of British Empire; shared Emerged out of conflict; created
common law, parliamentary systems and shared history; EEC explicitly
reciprocal from beginning
other national cultures, but also
subjugation
Largely ethnic/racial; English spoken by Language is large factor; ethnic
most Commonwealth citizens
concerns often stem from this, but
ethnic differences also constructed
separately from language
Intersected with other, more powerful
Hegemonic for its member-states
groupings (OAS, OIC, EEC, etc.)

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T. Bloom & K. Tonkiss

concerns at the local level which, insufficiently addressed in the mainstream, are
driven to the margins. Already in 2003, the BNP claimed a membership of 3,500,
although that was only a sixth of the size of the NFs claimed membership in the
1970s (Renton 2003: 84). Figure 2 shows the rise in electoral success for those farright parties which emerged out of the dissatisfaction of the 1960s.
As can be seen, in 2010, the BNP had significant electoral success, securing 50
incumbent local councillors, two MEPs and one seat on the Greater London
Assembly (Ford and Goodwin 2010). David Camerons recent strong rhetoric
condoning an immigration cap, in contrast, seeks to address only concerns relating to
non-EU migration, and thus the concerns of entire communities that are only
affected by EU migration remain outside this attempted engagement.
A confusing rhetoric has often surrounded EU migration (Tonkiss 2013). Consider,
for example, three comments by current Conservative Prime Minister, David
Cameron, in one 2011 speech:4
Yes, our borders are open to people from other member-states in the EU. But
actually, this counts for a small proportion of overall net migration to the UK.
Since 2004 . . . more than one million people from those countries have come to live
and work in the UK*a huge number.
But this remains the fact: when it comes to immigration to our country, its the
numbers from outside the EU that really matter.

He both admits and denies that EU immigration is large and significant. He also
avoids this as a major issue in developing domestic policies to respond to
immigration. This probably reflects an appreciation that it is impossible to reduce
EU immigration and a desire, therefore, to detract from it. However, this prevents
proper discussion of what provisions to put in place to respond to new arrivals.
The fact that EU immigration cannot be controlled was also insufficiently
acknowledged, for example, in comments by Labour Prime Minister, Gordon Brown,
during a 2009 energy workers strike in the North of England, responding to
competition for employment from Italian workers. He declared a commitment to
British jobs for British workers,5 effectively ignoring the equal legal rights of EU
citizens to compete for the jobs in question. As in the Commonwealth context,
however, mainstream politics failed to engage immediately with local-level concerns
and later had to catch up, using the ways in which the far right had already begun to
frame the debate.
Secondly, in the Commonwealth context, a sudden loss of migration rights had
negative consequences*for individuals, for communities and for the host state.
Migration was not a simple phenomenon of persons leaving one country and
entering the UK forever. As discussed earlier, both the Commonwealth and the EU
have facilitated complex networks of circular and onward migrations. When the UK
suddenly closed down its free-entry rights, it destroyed complexly balanced migration

Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies

1075

networks. In the EU today, responses to complicated migration patterns have made

integration more challenging for those populations and for more-settled EU
migrants. This is because needs may be misjudged and a persistent distinction is
made between the needs and rights of the local community, and the more-limited
needs and rights of migrants*who are often considered as guests rather than as
citizens with equal rights.
Extensive interviews over the period from July 2010 to April 2011 in the county of
Herefordshire (in the west of England) have found that the needs of migrant
populations can become invisible in local areas and their citizenship and rights thus
undermined by a persistent sense of co-national loyalty (Tonkiss 2011). Failure to
recognise the complexity of migration patterns can, then, lead to an inadequate
response to local issues by central government.
This is not solved by merely distinguishing between permanent and nonpermanent immigration. In his 1968 Rivers of Blood speech, Powell explicitly
separates discussion of non-permanent immigration and of immigration for
settlement.6 The idea that it is possible to import units of labour without importing
persons, however, is highly contested. As has been argued here, migrants bring with
them justified demands for human and civil rights. They will set up communities,
want a family life, get sick and may want to stay after their initial contract has ended.
But they may also want the flexibility to live their lives in multiple sites. As has been
demonstrated, rash measures to alter current and future immigration dramatically
affects the context into which the continued migration takes place and may interfere
with complex systems, stranding people somewhere that they would rather not be, or
leading to pockets of disadvantage.
Analysis of Constructions of Difference
Despite evidence that Eastern European migration to the UK has been beneficial to
the country, without significant negative impact (e.g. Blanchflower et al. 2007; Gilpin
et al. 2006), new arrivals can find themselves blamed for more-fundamental systemic
problems at a local level, and the generalisation of these to a national level. We
analyse the rationale that is given for this, first under the lens of ethnicity, and then
under that of class. We argue that, while ethnicity is constructed around the
difficulties to be explained, class represents the system of disadvantage into which
migrants must be slotted.
Ethnicity
The use of ethnicity is central to the problematisation of the immigration contexts of
migration explored here. We argue that it is key in the reproduction of divisions
between who may and who may not belong, and who may thus claim access to rights.
Under such circumstances, individuals with concerns about the impact of migration
on their local area or national context may use ethnicity to define the problem and

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T. Bloom & K. Tonkiss

locate blame. This is seen in both the EU and Commonwealth contexts, though in
different ways.
In the Commonwealth context, emphasis was placed on the responsibility of the
immigrant to integrate or to assimilate into the local community. Powell summed up
this sentiment, commenting that to be integrated into a population means to
become for all practical purposes indistinguishable from its other members
(Telegraph 2007). Thus blame for the problems and challenges often associated
with immigration came to be framed in terms of ethnic similarity and difference,
though the perception of threat may really be driven by unaddressed underlying
economic and other concerns. We argue, then, that, if fears of local labour-market
saturation or local public-service provision were openly debated, this might avoid
their ethnicisation, with its focus upon assimilation failures.
Contemporary research with nationalist group members commonly finds them
citing Eastern European migrants as being culturally distinct from the indigenous
British population and reporting this as a reason to suppose that such migrants
present a threat to the cultural distinctiveness of the UK and local communities
(Tonkiss 2011). However, when asked for their views on Turkish accession, Turkey
becomes the perceived other, while Eastern Europeans became included in a different
layer of the collective European we (Tonkiss 2011; layers of created difference from
the perspective of the migrants is also found in McDowell 2009: 30). Understanding
the construction of ethnic difference and its relevance for immigration policies must
be part of the examination of local concerns expressed about immigration.

Language as an Ethnic Demarcator

Language skills are important in terms of migrants access to rights and services, and
local authorities rightfully emphasise the importance of educational provision in this
area for these reasons (Cook et al. 2011: 66
8). However, concerns surrounding
language are often framed in terms of blaming migrants for their language
difficulties. Exploring the attitudes of nationalist group members in England to
European free movement demonstrates how this is constructed. During interviews7
conducted by Tonkiss in 2010
11 as part of a wider study of perceptions of EU
migration to the UK, one respondent (a member of the BNP in Herefordshire)
offered the following comment:
You get these enclaves of foreigners in an area and they dont actually mix in, they
dont mix in the community, theyre not crossing the barrier. If you go back to the
West Indians from 40, 60 years ago, theyve all settled in, learnt English . . . Thats
the difference, making the effort to settle into the community. And if they dont
make the effort, then you get tensions (author interview, March 2011).

It is interesting to observe here both how the previous outsiders have become
insiders, and how this process is being retrospectively framed in terms of current
rhetoric. The immigrants from the West Indies almost all spoke English to begin with

Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies

1077

and, although they experienced discrimination on account of their accents, racialised

ethnicity was a significant factor (Channer 1995). This suggests that language may be
merely the latest reasoning given in a more timeless phenomenon of the construction
of difference. That is, it is one rationale currently given for perceived problems with
migration.
Coupled with many of the often unchallenged assumptions about migrants, this
language difficulty among EU migrants is seen as particularly problematic. Indeed,
one interviewee commented, But most of them who dont want to learn English, they
know one word*benefits (author interview with local community member,
Herefordshire, July 2010). It is this assumption of migrants unwillingness to
cooperate and contribute that drives the framing of integration in terms of blame of
the perceived outsider. Thus, while some researchers in rural areas suggest that white
incomers may assume some level of insider status because of their shared ethnicity
(Chakraborti 2010: 505), EU migrants in fact find themselves perceived as outsiders
on different grounds. Participants felt that xenophobia against other white groups
was not racist, perceiving there to be, nonetheless, undesirable forms of whiteness
(Chakraborti 2010: 512), suggesting this may be even harder to challenge.
As we have already noted, local racism in the 1960s was frowned upon by
mainstream politics but, unchallenged, contributed to the failure to address local
immigration concerns. It then became the dominant way to frame immigration
discussions. Paralleling this, in the contemporary context, popular racism against
Commonwealth immigrants is not socially acceptable, except in extreme circles.
However, racism against EU migrants*on the basis of their level of integration or
language ability*is socially acceptable, though frowned upon in mainstream politics.
This is changing, however. Gordon Browns accusations in 2010 of bigotry against a
local party member expressing concern at EU immigration will be discussed in due
course, but it is worth noting here David Camerons 2011 comment:8
[W]hen there have been significant numbers of new people arriving in
neighbourhoods, perhaps not able to speak the same language as those living
there, on occasions not really wanting or even willing to integrate, that has created a
kind of discomfort and disjointedness in some neighbourhoods . . . So, taking all
this into account, I believe controlling immigration and bringing it down is of vital
importance to the future of our country.

What is crucial here is that Camerons response to difficulties in the local context is to
reduce migration, rather than to recognise that there are also systemic problems of
disadvantage and inequality creating and re-creating the context into which the
migration is occurring.

Analysing Social Class and Competing Micro and Macro Concerns

Economic concerns arising from immigration are common in public discourse. The
view that migrants place a potential strain on available jobs and goods, as well as the

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T. Bloom & K. Tonkiss

idea that migrants use of benefits and public services is burdensome, is frequently
heard in informal conversation and the tabloid media (Dolan 2009; Groves 2011;
Harvey 2008) and is mirrored in the rhetoric of nationalist and mainstream
politicians alike (for example, see David Camerons recent speech*Guardian 2011;
and the manifesto of the British National Party 2010: 16
19).
In blindly positing economic threat as a reason to limit migration, such individuals
are asserting a belief that their co-citizens (or, more accurately, co-nationals) should
have primary access to such goods ahead of others*essentially, that shared
nationality represents an ethical community (Gibney 1999: 175; Miller 2000: 27).
This seems to suggest that a concern for economic threat may itself be symptomatic
of underlying fears of cultural threat, which is also fed by economic concerns.
Migration can seem to reduce cohesiveness of the in-group, firstly by diluting a
perceived homogeneity in dimensions seen as important (race, ethnicity, language),
and secondly through including individuals specifically defined as members of a
group classed negatively as different (e.g. the Arab other).
Although racism forms a barrier to the realisation of equal rights (e.g. Koopmans
2010: 4), it is often mediated, in Britain, through social class (McDowell 2009: 29).
This is no less the case in the contexts under discussion here. In 1950, sociologist
Thomas Marshall declared that equal citizenship status could be undermined by
inequalities of the social class system (Marshall 1992 [1950: 2]; discussed in relation
to migration in Bloom and Feldman 2011: 43). Marshall notes how class divisions
within society, denying some persons full political or social rights, thereby also
remove civil rights and undermine the concept of equal citizenship. Migrants moving
into this context may arrive without that deep sense of class difference which still
defines this country so strongly (Alibhai-Brown 2000: 27). They must also negotiate
the class system.
Some theorists argue that It is not exclusion from citizenship per se which results
in . . . [negative conditions for immigrants], but unequal social and economic spaces
(Bloom and Feldman 2011: 45). Discrimination in housing and the labour market, or
as a result of poor language skills, effectively acts as Marshallian social-class
stratification. Acknowledging that immigrants participate in the social-class system
helps not only to understand their disadvantage, and the structural barriers they may
experience, but also to recognise their social mobility, and the reactions this may
cause in local populations who must themselves negotiate the class system. It can also
help to explain former immigrants reactions to new waves of immigrants, once they
are themselves positioned.
Frustration at immobility between social classes has an impact upon local reactions
to the immigrant presence (observed by several commentators, e.g. Mann and Fenton
2009: 529). Indeed, studies have found that antipathy to immigrants is felt the most
strongly among non-mobile skilled working classes who feel unrepresented and
alienated by mainstream politics (Ford and Goodwin 2010: 12, Table 5; Lowles and
Painter 2011). Xenophobic parties seem to be successful in communities that have
long been ignored, for example, among white skilled working-class voters who feel

Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies

1079

politicians live on a different planet (Hazel Blears, former Secretary of State for
Communities and Local Government, quoted in Ford and Goodwin 2010: 1). This
represents a core contingent of the BNP membership today, and was observed to
form the bulk of NF members in the early 1970s (Ford and Goodwin 2010: 9, Table 2;
Hanna 1974: 51). Class-based immobility seems to translate to a wider frustration at
an inability to control or narrate external environments (Mann and Fenton 2009:
530). Housing and welfare policies can be seen to advantage new migrants at the
expense of white working-class Britons (Lowles and Painter 2011; Mann and Fenton
2009: 531). This concern needs to be engaged with to avoid reinforcing the
accompanying frustration and alienation. The upward mobility of locals, meanwhile,
seems to lead to indifference towards migration (Lowles and Painter 2011).
Class is a central concern in the rhetoric surrounding the problems associated with
heightened immigration and mainstream politics failure to engage with it. Consider
education. Currently, the BNP explicitly link their education policy to problems
wrought by immigration, putting a stop to what they call the scandalous and racist
neglect that has left working-class white boys at the bottom of the table for academic
achievement.9 Similarly, in 1963 the parents of white children at a state school in
Southall removed their children from school, expressing fears that the large
proportion of immigrant children in the school had led to a lowering of standards
and to a lack of conveying of English cultural values. The then Minister for Education
warned:
If possible, it is desirable on education grounds that no one school should have
more than about 30 per cent of immigrants.. . . I must regretfully tell the House that
one school must be regarded now as irretrievably an immigrant school. The
important thing to do is to prevent this happening elsewhere (Hansard 1963,
quoted in Swann 1985: 193).

This echoes the fear found in a National Front article from the 1970s that suggested
that British children were in danger of losing cultural birthright due to curriculum
changes (Hanna 1974: 50), and is representative of the concerning relationship we
have observed between mainstream and extreme politics.
Social class, then, is crucial to the debate between the local and the national
contexts and concerns. This played out recently. In 1998 (and elsewhere), Gordon
Brown has argued that:
My vision of Britain comes from celebrating diversity, in other words a multiethnic and multinational Britain . . . I understand Britishness as being outward
looking, open, internationalist with a commitment to democracy and tolerance
(quoted in Alibhai-Brown 2000: 29).

Such a vision can seem divorced from the real concerns of ordinary voters. In 2010, as
Prime Minister, Brown met one such Labour voter, Mrs Duffy, who explained that
she worked with vulnerable people in her local area, and expressed concern that those
people would find it difficult to access local services because of what she saw as a high

1080

T. Bloom & K. Tonkiss

level of EU immigration to her local area. Once he believed he was out of earshot,
Brown referred to Duffy as a bigot on the basis of these comments.10 This comment
seems to locate him in a class apart from these trivial local concerns, failing to
acknowledge that, given his social class, he is unlikely to experience the local issues
involved.
This is symbolic of our concern. The freer-movement ideals supported by Brown
need to engage with the local-level experiences in order to avoid, at best, impotence,
and at worst, destructiveness. Researchers have found two key factors in BNP
supporters: they are both very worried about immigration and hostile or alienated
from political establishment (e.g. Ford and Goodwin 2010; Mann and Fenton 2009).
As long as mainstream politics fails to engage with local concerns, both of these can
become inflamed.

Implications for Freer Movement Theorising More Generally

The national, macro-level theoretical position often avoids engagement with these
micro-level challenges of migration, and celebrated free-movement theorists falter
when acknowledging it (e.g. Carens 1987, 2000). When policy then apparently takes
on a less-restrictive stance without engaging with micro-level concerns, a disconnect
develops between individual views and those of policy-makers.
There have been numerous attempts to understand how ideal conclusions in
favour of free movement should be modified in the light of real-world constraints
(e.g. see Baubo ck 1994; Carens 1996; Gibney 1999); however, there are few
opportunities to study genuine free-movement regimes and the implications of
modifying them. Joseph Carens has emphasised the difficulties inherent in trying to
apply conclusions of ideal theorising to the real world (Carens 1996). However,
beyond noting that a realistic approach must take into account sovereign and
independent states, behavioural realities and political realities (Carens 1996: 158),
he does not discuss crucial internal changes that may need to be made to change
these realities. We have highlighted issues of class and inequality, as well as the use
of inflammatory rhetoric, which fill the gap left when these issues are not
addressed.
We agree with Matthew Gibney that a convincing ethical ideal must strive to
balance the competing claims of citizens and refugees (1999: 169, developed in
Gibney 2004); however, we argue that this reaches wider than just to the admission of
refugees. That is, it is necessary to recognise the special circumstances arising from
the admission of persons with already equal or similar citizenship rights to those of
the native population. This then moves beyond the justifications for entry, since entry
is already legally assured, and must focus on the development of optimum reception
conditions in order to minimise the problems we have discussed. This relies on an
honest appraisal of the existing structures of disadvantage and inequality in the host
state.

Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies

1081

Carens himself notes that What we assume about what is possible can have
a tremendous effect upon the questions we ask and the conclusions we reach
(Carens 1996: 169). In this paper, we argue that the root conditions into which
migration takes place are not themselves fixed, so that it is necessary to question what
Carens takes to be the real-world circumstances. Meanwhile, it is necessary to also
study particular free-movement regimes to understand how they affect the reception
of immigrants and how they can be changed.

Concluding Thoughts
It is, then, irresponsible to discuss and legislate freer movement without engaging
with the genuine concerns of local people. In the context of Commonwealth
immigration of the 1960s, this has had negative consequences that are still felt today.
First, it initiated and validated far-right groups as political parties, as the only ones
publicly willing to engage with popular concerns, tying them to national identity
and entitlement rather than to the economic concerns discussed above. Second, poor
reception and initial exclusion have contributed to entrenching some communities
into cycles of poverty that are difficult to break.
Contemporary EU immigration to the UK has similarities with Commonwealth
immigration of the 1960s. This paper has traced popular discontent at EU
immigration and, in the absence of mainstream debate about the local impact of
EU immigration, we have observed far-right parties turning this towards increasingly
xenophobic rhetoric, also moving mainstream politics in this direction. Meanwhile,
we have described anti-immigrant sentiment itself as a barrier to successful inclusion,
further perpetuating the discontent, as people do not pick up English-language skills
or are systematically excluded from service provision.
We argue that free movement is not problematic per se, but that the way central
government responds to it can, and does, problematise it in dangerous ways.
Regarding contemporary EU immigration to the UK, then, we advocate the direct
engagement of policy-makers with local community members to discuss the benefits
of increased migration and how to respond to the specific problems that arise as a
result of changing demographics. In the context of wider discussions of free and freer
movement, we argue that, for such ideals to be successful, it is necessary to engage
actively with how to make the local contexts in the host state more amenable to
increased immigration.
Acknowledgements
This paper is based on a presentation to the British International Studies Association
conference, Manchester, 27
29 May 2011. We would like to thank our co-panellists
and audience members on that occasion for their insightful comments. We thank also
the anonymous reviewers of JEMS and its editorial staff for helping us to strengthen
this paper.

1082

T. Bloom & K. Tonkiss

Notes
[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]
[6]

[7]

[8]

[9]
[10]

See: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1963/54. People had two years to register for

Kenyan citizenship if they did not meet this requirement. They also had two years to apply
for a UK and Colonies passport.
The A8 member-states (gaining EU accession in 2004) are the Czech Republic, Estonia,
Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. The A2 member-states (acceding
in 2007) are Bulgaria and Romania.
Most recently, the Schengen agreement has been put under threat by concerns raised by
France and Italy over the number of migrants fleeing North Africa, with the EU considering
the temporary reinstatement of border controls, given such concerns (Traynor 2011).
Good immigration, not mass immigration, 14 April 2011, The Conservative Party, http://
www.conservatives.com/News/Speeches/2011/04/David_Cameron_Good_immigration_
not_mass_immigration.aspx.
BBC News (2009) PM stands by British jobs vow, 30 January 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/
1/hi/uk_politics/7860593.stm.
This has nothing to do with the entry of Commonwealth citizens, any more than of aliens,
into this country, for the purposes of study or of improving their qualifications, like (for
instance) the Commonwealth doctors who, to the advantage of their own countries, have
enabled our hospital service to be expanded faster than would otherwise have been possible.
They are not, and have never been, immigrants.
A total of 54 open-ended, semi-structured interviews were conducted over the period
2010
11 in the English counties of Herefordshire and Lincolnshire, which have witnessed
large-scale migration since the accession of the A8 and A2 Eastern European memberstates in 2004 and 2007. The purpose of the research was to gain insights into perceptions of
difference about EU migrants in these case-study locations. Interviews were held with both
nationalist group members and members of local communities more generally. The
interviewees were initially selected through a purposive sampling technique (whereby
respondents are selected on the basis that they have specific relevance for the phenomenon
being researched) in order to identify individuals living in the appropriate geographical
areas and, where relevant, belonging to the relevant nationalist groups. Then a snowball
sampling technique was followed whereby interviewees were asked to identify further
individuals to contact for interview, and so on. Interviewees were questioned about their
views of EU migration in their local area, and these data were then analysed to gain insights
into the perceptions of sameness and difference at work in the two case-study locations. For
a full explanation of this research and a detailed exploration of the findings, see Tonkiss
(2013).
Good immigration, not mass immigration, 14 April 2011, The Conservative Party, http://
www.conservatives.com/News/Speeches/2011/04/David_Cameron_Good_immigration_
not_mass_immigration.aspx.
BNP Education Policy Building Blocks, available, for example, at http://www.bnp.org.uk/
policies/education.
Transcript of the discussion is available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/8649448.stm.

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