SEC.

12 CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION

HO WAI PANG v. PEOPLE

FACTS:
Infraction of the rights of an accused during
custodial investigation or the so-called
Miranda Rights render inadmissible only the
extrajudicial confession or admission made
during such investigation.
13 Hongkong Nationals arrived at NAIA as
tourists. At the arrival area, the group
leader Wong Kwok Kwa (Sonny Wong)
presented baggage declaration form to
Gilda Cinco, Customs Examiner. Cinco
examined the baggages of all 13.
However, while the second bag was
examined, she noticed chocolate boxes
which are of the same size as the ones
found o the first baggage. Suspicious, she
took out 4 and opened one of them.What
she saw inside was a white crystalline
substance
contained
in
a
white
transparent plastic.
Cinco then called
attention of Duty Collector and Customs
Appraiser who advised her to call the
NARCOM.
The tourists were placed in Intensive
Counting Unit (ICU). The result of such
substance yielded positive for shabu.
The 13 tourists were brought to the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for further
questioning. The confiscated stuff were
turned over to the Forensic Chemist who
weighed and examined them. Findings show
that its total weight is 31.1126 kilograms and
that the representative samples were positive
for shabu. Out of the 13 tourists, the NBI
found evidence for violation of R.A. No. 6425
only as against petitioner and his five coaccused.
HELD:
Petition lacks merit.
Sec. 12 Art III of the Consti PROHIBITS as
evidence only confessions and admissions
of the accused as against himself.
CONTENTION:
he was not assisted by a
competent and independent lawyer during
the custodial investigation. He claimed that
he was not duly informed of his rights to

remain silent and to have competent counsel

of his choice.
SC:
Section 12 of Article III of the Constitution, we
must not, however, lose sight of the fact that
what
said
constitutional
provision
prohibits
as
evidence
are
only
confessions and admissions of the
accused as against himself.
In Aquino v. Paiste, the Court categorically
ruled that the infractions of the so-called
MIRANDA RIGHTS render inadmissible
only the extrajudicial confession or
admission
made
during
custodial
investigation. The admissibility of other
evidence, provided they are relevant to the
issue and [are] not otherwise excluded by law
or rules, [are] not affected even if obtained or
taken in the course of custodial investigation.
In the case at bench, the petitioner did
NOT make any confession or admission
during
the
custodial
investigation.
Moreover, no statement was taken from
petitioner
during
his
detention
and
subsequently used in evidence against him
NOTE: As the Court held in People v.
Buluran, [a]ny allegation of violation of rights
during custodial investigation is relevant and
material only to cases in which an
extrajudicial admission or confession
extracted from the accused becomes
the basis of their conviction.
Petitioners conviction in the present case was
on the strength of his having been
caught in flagrante
delicto
transporting
shabu into the country and not on the basis
of any confession or admission.
Petitioner was
confrontation.

not

denied

rights

to

ANOTHER
CONTENTION:
Alleged
violation of the right of confrontation.
In refutation, the OSG countered that
petitioner was given the opportunity to
confront his accusers and/or the witnesses of
the prosecution when his counsel crossexamined them
Accdg to the SC,
As borne out by the
records, petitioner did not register any
objection to the presentation of the
prosecutions evidence particularly on the

testimony of Cinco despite the absence of an

interpreter.
CONSPIRACY
ESTABLISHED.
RULING:
denied.

Guilty

OF
of

ACCUSED
RA

6425.

WAS
Petition

GAMBOA v CRUZ
FACTS:
On 19 July 1979, at about 7:00 o'clock in
the morning, he was arrested for
vagrancy, without a warrant of arrest, by
Patrolman Arturo Palencia. Thereafter,
petitioner was brought to Precinct 2,
Manila, where he was booked for vagrancy
and then detained therein together with
several others.
During the lineup of five (5) detainees,
including petitioner, complainant Erlinda
B. Bernal pointed to petitioner and said,
"that one is a companion." After the
Identification, the other detainees were
brought back to their cell but petitioner
was ordered to stay on. While the
complainant was being interrogated by
the police investigator, petitioner was told
to sit down in front of her.
Then an info for robbery was filed against
the petitioner.
On 13 August 1980, petitioner filed said
Motion predicated on the ground that the
conduct of the line-up, without notice
to, and in the absence of, his counsel
violated his constitutional rights to
counsel and to due process.

full enjoyment of the rights guaranteed by

the Constitution.
The right to counsel attaches upon the
start of an investigation, i.e. when the
investigating
officer
starts
to
ask
questions to elicit information and/or
confessions or admissions from the
respondent/accused. At such point or
stage, the person being interrogated must
be assisted by counsel to avoid the
pernicious practice of extorting false
or coerced admissions or confessions
from
the
lips
of
the
person
undergoing interrogation, for the
commission of an offense.
NOTE: Police line-up was no part of
the
custodial
inquest,
hence,
petitioner was NOT entitled at such
stage, to counsel.
Powell case: It has been firmly established
that a person's Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendment right to counsel attaches only
at or after the time that adversary judicial
proceedings have been initiated against
him.
HOWEVER, in our Consti: , the right to
counsel attaches at the start of
investigation against a respondent and,
therefore, even before adversary judicial
proceedings against the accused have
begun.
On due process there was no violation
RULING: PETITION DENIED.

HELD:
The Court found no merit in the contention
of petitioner. The rights to counsel and to
due process of law are indeed two (2) of
the fundamental rights guaranteed by the
Constitution, whether it be the 1973 or
1987 Constitution. In a democratic society,
like ours, every person is entitled to the

PEOPLE v. MACAM
FACTS:
Appeal from the decision of the RTC
finding Danilo and Ernesto Roque guilty
BRD of the crime of Robbery w/ Homicide.

Upon being arraigned, all the accused

pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.
However, after the prosecution had
presented evidence, assisted by their
clients, changed plea of not guilty to
guilty.
Upon
their
arrest,
the
appellants
contended that they were brought by the
security guards and then and there they
were mauled.

victims that may lead to a mistaken

identification. Appellants were handcuffed
and had contusions on their faces.
They were etopped (after an invalid
arrest) when they have not moved for
quashing of the info.
RULING: AFFIRMED.

HELD:

PEOPLE v. JUDGE AYSON

It appears that the security guards at the

factory of the father of accused Eduardo
Macam detained appellants. They were
later brought to the Quezon City Police
Headquarters for investigation. Since they
refused to admit their participation in the
commission of the crime, appellants were
then brought to the Quezon City General
Hospital and were made to line-up
together with several policemen in civilian
clothes. Salvacion Enrera, Benito Macam
and Nilo Alcantara, who were confined at
the hospital for injuries sustained during
the robbery, were asked to pinpoint the
perpetrators. At that time, appellants were
handcuffed and bore contusions on their
faces caused by the blows inflicted on
them by the police investigators.

FACTS:

We held that the right to counsel attaches

upon the start of an investigation, i.e.,
when the investigating officer starts to ask
questions to elicit information, confessions
or admissions from the accused (Gamboa
v. Cruz)
NOTE: After the start of the custodial
investigation, any identification of an
uncounseled accused made in a police
line-up is INADMISSIBLE. This is
particularly true in the case at bench
where the police officers first talked
to
the
victims
before
the
confrontation
was
held.
The
circumstances were such as to impart
improper suggestions on the minds of the

Controversy at bar is the equation by the

respondent Judge of the right of an
individual not to "be compelled to be a
witness against himself" accorded by
Section 20 (1973 Consti) Article III of the
Constitution, with the right of any
person "under
investigation
for
the
commission of an offense . . . to remain
silent and to counsel, and to be
informed of such right," granted by the
same provision.
Private respondent Felipe Ramos was a
ticket freight clerk of the Philippine Airlines
(PAL), assigned at its Baguio City station.
It having allegedly come to light that he
was involved in irregularities in the
sales of plane tickets, the PAL mgt
notified him of an investigation to be
conducted into the matter of February 9,
1986. That investigation was scheduled in
accordance with PAL's Code of Conduct
and
Discipline,
and
the
Collective
Bargaining Agreement signed by it with
the
Philippine
Airlines
Employees'
Association (PALEA) to which Ramos
pertained.
HANDWRITTEN.
Before
investigation,
Ramos gave to his superior notes alleging
that he would like to settle irregularities
charged v. him in the amount P76,000 s.t
conditions imposed by PAL.(Dated Feb. 8,
1986)

INVESTIGATION. Ramos' answers were to

the effect inter alia that he had not indeed
made disclosure of the tickets mentioned
in the Audit Team's findings, that the
proceeds had been "misused" by him, that
although he had planned on paying back
the money, he had been prevented from
doing so, "perhaps (by) shame," that he
was still willing to settle his obligation, and
proferred a "compromise x x to pay on
staggered basis, (and) the amount
would be known in the next investigation;"
But it would seem that no compromise
agreement was reached much less
consummated. (Dated Feb 9, 1986)
An info was filed against him for estafa.
Private prosecutors made a written offer of
evidence included "the (above mentioned)
statement of accused Felipe J. Ramos
taken on February 9, 1986 at PAL Baguio
City Ticket Office," as well as his
"handwritten admission x x given on
February 8, 1986."
DEFENSE: In Exhibit A (his confession w
audit team), the objection was that "said
document, which appears to be a
confession, was taken without the
accused being represented by a
lawyer." Exhibit K (handwritten letter)
was objected to "for the same reasons
interposed under Exhibits 'A' and 'J.'
INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCES PER JUDGE.
The respondent judge admitted all the
exhibits "as part of the testimony of the
witnesses who testified in connection
therewith and for whatever they are
worth," except Exhibits A and K, which
it rejected. EXHIBIT A: His Honor declared
Exhibit A "inadmissible in evidence, it
appearing that it is the statement of
accused Felipe Ramos taken on February
9, 1986 at PAL Baguio City Ticket Office, in
an investigation conducted by the Branch
Manager x x since it does not appear
that the accused was reminded of
this constitutional rights to remain

silent and to have counsel. He also

declared inadmissible "EXHIBIT K:
HELD:
Provision in question:
SEC. 20. No person shall be compelled to
be a witness against himself Any person
under investigation for the commission of
an offense shall have the right to remain
silent and to counsel, and to be informed
of such right. No force, violence, threat,
intimidation, or any other means which
vitiates the free will shall be used against
him. Any confession obtained in violation
of this section shall be inadmissible in
evidence.
NOTE: 2 rights under this section:
1) the right against self-incrimination
i.e., the right of a person not to be
compelled to be a witness against himself
set out in the first sentence, which is a
verbatim reproduction of Section 18,
Article III of the 1935 Constitution, and is
similar to that accorded by the Fifth
Amendment
of
the
American
Constitution, and
2) the rights of a person in custodial
interrogation, i.e., the rights of every
suspect "under investigation for the
commission of an offense."
The 1987 Constitution indicates much
more
clearly
the
individuality
and
disparateness of these rights. The right
against self- incrimination, "No person
shall be compelled to be a witness against
himself," is now embodied in Section 17,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The
lights
of
a
person
in
custodial
interrogation, which have been made
more explicit, are now contained in
Section 12 of the same Article III)
RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION.

Accorded to every person who gives

evidence, whether voluntarily or under
compulsion of subpoena, in any civil,
criminal,
or
administrative
proceeding. The right is NOT to "be
compelled to be a witness against
himself.
It prescribes an "option of refusal to
answer incriminating questions and
not
a
prohibition
of
inquiry."
However, the right can be claimed only
when the specific question, incriminatory
in character, is actually put to the witness.
It cannot be claimed at any other time. It
does not give a witness the right to
disregard a subpoena, to decline to
appear before the court at the time
appointed, or to refuse to testify
altogether. The witness receiving a
subpoena must obey it, appear as
required, take the stand, be sworn and
answer questions.
That first sentence of Section 20, Article IV
of the 1973 Constitution does not impose
on the judge, or other officer presiding
over a trial, hearing or investigation, any
affirmative obligation to advise a
witness of his right against selfincrimination. It is a right that a witness
knows or should know (ignoratia legis non
excusat). Furthermore, in the very nature
of things, neither the judge nor the
witness can be expected to know in
advance the character or effect of a
question to be put to the latter.
This right is NOT self- executing or
automatically operational. It must be
claimed. WHY? If not claimed by or in
behalf of the witness, the protection does
not come into play. It follows that the right
may be waived, expressly, or impliedly, as
by a failure to claim it at the appropriate
time
RIGHTS
IN
INTERROGATION

CUSTODIAL

For
"under
investigation
for
the
commission
of
an
offense,"
i.e.,
"suspects" under investigation by
police authorities (specific); and this is
what makes these rights different from
self-incrimination which, as aforestated,
indiscriminately applies to any person
testifying in any proceeding, civil, criminal,
or administrative. This provision is
avowedly derived from the decision of the
U.S. Supreme Court in Miranda v.
Arizona, 19 a decision described as an
"earthquake in the world of law
enforcement.
Section 20 states that whenever any
person is "under investigation for the
commission of an offense"-1) he shall have the right to remain
silent and to counsel, and to be informed
of such right,
2)
nor
force,
violence,
threat,
intimidation, or any other means
which vitiates the free will shall be
used against him; and
3) any confession obtained in violation
of (these rights shall be inadmissible
in evidence)
In Miranda, CJ Warren summarized the
procedural safeguards laid down for a
person in police custody, "in-custody
interrogation" being regarded as the
commencement
of
an
adversary
proceeding against the suspect.
WARNINGS. Prior to any questioning that
he has: (a) the right to remain silent,(b)
that anything he says can be used against
him in a court of law, (c) that he has the
right to the presence of an attorney, and
that if he cannot afford an attorney one
will be appointed for him prior to any
questioning if he so desires. Opportunities
during interrogation.. After such warnings
have been given, such opportunity
afforded him, the individual may

knowingly and intelligently waive

these rights and agree to answer or
make a statement.
OBJECTIVE: to prohibit "incommunicado
interrogation of individuals in a policedominated atmosphere, resulting in selfincriminating
statement
without
full
warnings of constitutional rights."
NOTE: The rights above specified, to
repeat,
exist
only
in
"custodial
interrogations,"
or
"in-custody
interrogation of accused persons.
CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION - questioning
initiated by law enforcement officers after
a person has been taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom of
action in any significant way.
Not every statement made to the
police by a person involved in some
crime is within the scope of the
constitutional protection. If not made
"under custodial interrogation," or "under
investigation for the commission of an
offense," the statement is not protected.
Example: where a person went to a police
precinct
and
before
any
sort
of
investigation could be initiated, declared
that he was giving himself up for the
killing of an old woman because she was
threatening to kill him by barang, or
witchcraft, this Court ruled that such a
statement was admissible, compliance
with the constitutional procedure on
custodial interrogation not being exigible
under the circumstances.
RIGHTS OF DEFENDANT IN CRIMINAL
CASE
As regards giving of testimony
Defendant ON TRIAL or UNDR PRELIM
INVESITGATION is not under custodial
interrogation. His interrogation by the
police, if any there had been would
already have been ended at the time of

the filing of the criminal case in court (or

the public prosecutors' office). Hence, if
one has pending case in court there is
no occasion to speak of his right while
under "custodial interrogation" for the
obvious reason that he is no longer
under "custodial interrogation."BUT
NOTE: The accused in court under
preliminary investigation before the public
prosecutor possesses the right against
self- incrimination set out in the first
sentence of Section 20 Article IV of the
1973 Constitution, i.e., the right to refuse
to answer a specific incriminatory question
at the time that it is put to him.
Under the Rules of Court, in all criminal
prosecutions the defendant is entitled
among others- 1) to be exempt from
being a witness against himself, and
2) to testify as witness in his own
behalf; BUT if he offers himself as a
witness he may be cross-examined as any
other witness; however, his neglect or
refusal to be a witness shall not in any
manner prejudice or be used against him.
OTHER RIGHTS. Meaning- he cannot testify
or produce evidence in which he is the
accused (nor compelled thru subpoena)
He can refuse to take the witness
stand,
be
sworn,
answer
any
question. And,
as
the
law
categorically states, "his neglect or
refusal to be a witness shall not in
any manner prejudice or be used
against him.
IF AGREED TO BE CROSS-EXAMINED: He
may not on cross-examination refuse
to answer any question on the ground
that the answer that he will give, or the
evidence he will produce, would have a
tendency to incriminate him for the crime
with which he is charged.
IF INCRIMINATORY QUESTION FOR SOME
OTHER CRIME, distinct from that of which
he is accused, he may decline to
answer that specific question, on the

strength of the right against selfincrimination granted by the first sentence

of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973
Constitution (now Section 17 of the 1987
Constitution).
RIGHTS, TO WIT:
1.BEFORE CASE IS FILED: OR WITH THE
PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, FOR PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION), but after having been
taken into custody or otherwise deprived
of his liberty in some significant way, and
on being interrogated by the police: the
continuing right to remain silent and
to counsel, and to be informed thereof,
not to be subjected to force, violence,
threat, intimidation or any other
means which vitiates the free will;
and to have evidence obtained in violation
of these rights rejected; and
2. AFTER THE CASE IS FILED: a) to refuse
to be a witness; b) not to have any
prejudice whatsoever result to him by
such refusal; c) to testify in his own behalf,
subject to cross-examination by the
prosecution; d) WHILE TESTIFYING, to
refuse to answer a specific question which
tends to incriminate him for some crime
other than that for which he is then
prosecuted.
IN THE CASE AT BAR: respondent Judge
has misapprehended the nature and
import of the disparate rights set
forth in Section 20, Article IV of the
1973 Constitution. He has taken them
as applying to the same juridical situation,
equating one with the other. In so
doing, he has grossly erred.
His Orders were thus rendered with grave
abuse of discretion. They should be as
they are hereby, annulled and set aside.
Felipe Ramos was NOT in any sense under
custodial interrogation, prior to and during
the administrative inquiry into the

discovered irregularities in ticket sales in

which he appeared to have had a hand.
It is clear from the undisputed facts of this
case that Felipe Ramos was not in any
sense under custodial interrogation, as the
term should be properly understood, prior
to and during the administrative inquiry
into the discovered irregularities in ticket
sales in which he appeared to have had a
hand.
CONSTI rights did not come to play
Ramos
had
VOLUNTARILY
answered
questions posed to him on the first day of
the administrative investigation, February
9, 1986 and agreed that the proceedings
should be recorded,. They may not be
excluded on the ground that the so-called
"Miranda rights" had not been accorded to
Ramos.
MIRANDA RIGHTS. which, to repeat, are
relevant
only
in
custodial
investigations.
RULING: PETITION GRANTED.

PEOPLE v. PINLAC
FACTS:
Automatic review: accused Ronilo Pinlac y
Libao was charged in two (2) separate
information for Robbery.
Long before April 1984, two Japanese
nationals were neighbors in San Lorenzo
Village, Makati, Metro Manila.
Mr. Koji Sato, 27 years old, married and
a mechanical engineer by profession
rented a house in the said plush
subdivision. He was living alone in said
house, although he had a housemaid by
the name of Irene Jandayan, who started

working for him in 1981, and a cook by the

name of Delia Marcelino. The latter was
employed for almost a year; although
went for maternity leave since she was
due to deliver a child with her husband,
Pinlac, who had frequently visited her in
Sato's place.
A low concrete fence separated the house
rented by Sato from that rented by Mr.
Saeki Osamu, 35 years old. The latter,
whose wife, Hiroko Saeki, was in the same
address but who returned to Japan
sometime after his untimely demise, was a
staff member of the Japan International
Cooperation Agency in the Philippines.
Returning home at around 11:30 in the
evening of the same day, Sato noticed
that the front door was already unlocked.
Upon returning to his room upstairs he
discovered that his Walkman transistor
which was placed beside his bed was
already missing. He searched for it
upstairs, downstairs and around the
house. It was only after entering
Jandayan's room that he found his
transistor together with his two wrist
watches (he was then wearing one),
cigarette lighter and eyeglass case.
Another watch, an Alba Seiko, which he
bought in Japan for 7,000 yen (the
approximate equivalent of P300.00), a
gold necklace, cash money were all lost.
Sato thereafter went to the Makati Police
Station to report the robbery. He
requested some policemen to repair to his
residence to investigate. It was when the
police investigators had already reached
his residence that he learned about the
death of Osamu.
Osamu's maid, Evelyn Salomea, was
investigated. She revealed that she saw
Pinlac enter the house of Sato at seven
o'clock in the evening, although she did
not see him leave thereafter; and that
Jandayan has knowledge of the address of
Marcelino
Her two statements were introduced in
evidence. Subsequently, the policemen
went to Marcelino's residence in Taguig
and, finding Pinlac thereat, invited him
to the police station. Detective Samson

(who also took the witness stand) opined

that the killer made his entry by removing
the panels of jalousies at the rear of the
house.
ALLEGATION: During the investigation at
the Police Headquarters in Makati, Metro
Manila, he was tortured and forced to
admit the crimes charged
ISSUE: Is the extrajudicial confession of
accused violative of Consti?
HELD:
No direct evidence or testimony of any
eyewitness was presented Identifying the
accused as the perpetrator of the crime
charged.
The only evidence furnished by the police
authorities were merely circumstantial
evidence regarding the fingerprints of the
accused found in the window stabs of the
maid's quarters and in the kitchen cabinet
in the house of Mr. Sato. His defense: But
this was satisfactorily explained by the
accused that aside from being a
frequent visitor in the house of Mr.
Sato where his wife works as a cook
wherein at those times he could have
unknowingly left his fingerprints, but
most especially during the time when he
was arrested and ordered to re-enact.
In the process he held some of these
window slabs, walls, furniture, etc., in
accordance with the order of the arresting
officer.

In People vs. Galit: the Court reiterated

correct procedure for police officer to
follow when making arrest and in
conducting a custodial investigation.
1. Inform reason of arrest

2. Be informed of his constil rights to

remain silent and to counsel
3. That any statement he might make
could be used against him
4. The person arrested shall have the
right to communicate with his
lawyer, a relative, or anyone he
chooses by the most expedient
means by telephone if possible
or by letter or messenger.
5. The right to counsel may be
waived but the waiver shall not be
valid unless made with the
assistance
of
counsel.
Any
statement obtained in violation of
the procedure herein laid down,
whether exculpatory or inculpatory
in whole or in part shall be
INADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE.
TO BE INFORMED OF RIGHT TOR REMAIN
SILENT AND TO COUNSEL. Transmission
of a meaningful information rather than
just the ceremonial and perfunctory
recitation of an abstract constitutional
principle.
NOTE: . Police officer is not only dutybound to tell the person the rights to
which the latter is entitled; he must also
explain their effects in practical
terms. Short of this, there is a denial of
the right, as it cannot truly be said that
the person has been "informed" of his
rights.
VERBAL ADMISSION may be held
INADMISSIBLE if appraisal of right is not
fully explained.
The Court found that the evidence for the
prosecution failed to prove compliance
with
these
constitutional rights.
Furthermore, the accused was not
assisted by counsel and his alleged
waiver
was
made
without
the
assistance of counsel. The record of the
case is also REPLETE with evidence which

was not satisfactorily rebutted by the

prosecution, that the accused was
maltreated and tortured for seven (7)
solid hours before he signed the prepared
extra-judicial confession.
RULING: NOT PROVED BRD

PEOPLE v. BOLANOS
FACTS:
Accused-appellant Ramon Bolanos was
convicted by murder.
The
evidence
for
the
prosecution
consisted of the testimonies of Pat.
Marcelo J. Fidelino and Francisco Dayao
of the Integrated National Police (INP),
Balagtas, Bulacan, Calixto Guinsaya, and
Dr. Benito Caballero, Medico-Legal Officer
of Bocaue, Bulacan and documentary
exhibits.
The testimonial evidence were after the
fact narration of events based on the
report regarding the death of the victim,
Oscar
Pagdalian
which
was
communicated to the Police Station where
the two (2) policemen who responded to
the
incident
are
assigned
and
subsequently became witnesses for the
prosecution.
Alcantara ad Dayao testified that they
proceeded to the scene of the crime of the
Marble Supply, Batangas, Bulacan and
upon arrival they saw the deceased Oscar
Pagdalian lying on an improvised bed full
of blood w/ stab wounds. Deceased was
with two (2) companions, on the previous
night, one of whom was the accused who
had a drinking spree with the deceased
and
another
companion
(Claudio
Magtibay) till the wee hours of the
following morning.
Pat Dayao testified that when they
apprehend the accused-appellant, they
found the firearm of the deceased on
the chair where the accused was
allegedly seated; that they boarded

Ramon Bolanos and Claudio Magtibay on

the police vehicle and brought them to the
police station.
EXTRAJUDICIAL ADMISSION. In the vehicle
where the suspect was riding, "Ramon
Bolanos accordingly admitted that he
killed the deceased Oscar Pagdalian
because he was abusive.
RTC:
Extrajudicial
admissible.

admission

was

Being
ALREADY
under
custodial
investigation while on board the
police patrol jeep on the way to the
Police Station where formal investigation
may have been conducted, appellant
should have been informed of his
Constitutional rights under Article III,
Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution
which explicitly provides RULING:
ACQUITTED.
PEOPLE v. ANDAN
FACTS:
PER CURIAM:
Accused-appellant
Pablito
Andan
y
Hernandez alias "Bobby" was accused of
the crime of rape with homicide.
On February 19, 1994 at about 4:00 P.M.,
in xxx, AAA, twenty years of age and a
second-year student at the xxx, left her
home for her school dormitory in xxx. She
was to prepare for her final examinations
on February 21, 1994. AAA wore a striped
blouse and faded denim pants and
brought with her two bags containing her
school uniforms, some personal effects
and more than P2,000.00 in cash.
AAA then walking when invited by the
accused in his house. AAA agreed to take
her blood pressure as the old woman
(accuseds wifes grandma) was her
distant relative.
Appellant then punched her in the
abdomen, brought her to the kitchen and
raped her.
Appellant dragged the
unconscious girl to an old toilet and left
her there until dark. Appellant stood on a

bench beside the pigpen and then lifted

and draped the girl's body over the fence
to transfer it to the vacant lot. When the
girl moved, he hit her head with a
piece of concrete block. He heard her
moan and hit her again on the face.
After silence reigned, he pulled her
body and dragged to shallow portion
of lot and abandoned.
AAA's gruesome death drew public
attention and prompted Mayor xxx of
xxx to form a crack team of police
officers to look for the criminal.
Initially, appellant denied any knowledge
of AAA's death. However, when the police
confronted him with the concrete block,
the victim's clothes and the bloodstains
found in the pigpen, appellant relented
and said that his neighbors, Gilbert Larin
and Reynaldo Dizon, killed AAA and that
he was merely a lookout.
By
this
time,
people
and
media
representatives were already gathered at
the police headquarters awaiting the
results of the investigation. Mayor xxx
arrived and upon seeing the mayor,
appellant
approached
him
and
whispered a request that they talk
privately. Appellant broke down and said
"Mayor, patawarin mo ako! I will tell you
the truth. I am the one who killed AAA."
The mayor opened the door of the
room to let the public and media
representatives
witness
the
confession
The mayor first asked for a lawyer to
assist appellant but since no lawyer was
available he ordered the proceedings
photographed and videotaped. In the
presence of the mayor, the police,
representatives
of
the
media
and
appellant's own wife and son, appellant
confessed his guilt.
His confession was captured on
videotape and covered by the media
nationwide.
On arraignment, however, he pleaded
NOT GUILTY.

HELD:
Plainly,
any
person
under
investigation for the commission of an
offense shall have the right (1) to remain
silent; (2) to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own
choice; and (3) to be informed of such
rights. These rights cannot be waived
except in writing and in the presence of
counsel. Any confession or admission
obtained in violation of this provision is
INADMISSIBLE
in
evidence
against
him. The exclusionary rule is premised
on the presumption that the defendant is
thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere and
runs
through
menacing
police
interrogation
procedures
where
the
potentiality for compulsion, physical and
psychological, is forcefully apparent.
INCOMMUNICADO
CHARACTER
OF
CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION: obscures
a later judicial determination of what
really transpired.
Rights under Sec. 12 are accorded to ANY
PERSON under investigation for the
commission
of
the
offense.
An
investigation begins when it is no
longer a general inquiry into an
unsolved crime but starts to focus on a
PARTICULAR PERSON as a suspect, i.e.,
when the police investigator starts
interrogating or exacting a confession
from the suspect in connection with an
alleged offense.
CONSTIL CONVENTION: Investigation
conducted by police authorities which will
include investigations conducted by
the municipal police, the PC and the
NBI and such other police agencies in
our government.
IN THE CASE AT BAR: When the police
arrested appellant, they were no longer
engaged in a general inquiry about
the death of AAA. Indeed, appellant was
already a prime suspect even before the
police found him at his parents' house.

NOTE: Appellant was already under

custodial investigation when he confessed
to the police
It is admitted that the police failed to
inform appellant of his constitutional
rights when he was investigated and
interrogated.

Confession
INADMISSIBLE and 2 BAGS RECOVERED
from appellants house. WHY? The victim's
bags were the FRUITS OF APPELLANT'S
UNCOUNSELLED CONFESSION to the
police. They are tainted evidence, hence
also inadmissible
The police detained appellant after his
initial confession. And that the following
day, Mayor visited appellant and then and
there appellant confessed alone.
HOW ABOUT CONFESSION MADE TO THE
MAYOR? it cannot be successfully claimed
that appellant's confession before the
mayor is inadmissible.
It
was
appellant
himself
who
spontaneously, freely and voluntarily
sought the mayor for a private
meeting. The mayor did not know that
appellant was going to confess his guilt to
him.
NOTE: When appellant talked with the
mayor as a confidant and not as a law
enforcement officer, his uncounselled
confession to him did not violate his
constitutional rights.
WHY? Ans. Constitutional procedures on
custodial investigation do NOT apply to
a
SPONTANEOUS
statement,
not
elicited through questioning by the
authorities, but given in an ordinary
manner whereby appellant orally admitted
having committed the crime. What Consti
bars is the compulsory disclosure of
incriminating facts or confessions. This is
to guarantee the slightest use of coercion
by the State as would lead the accused to
admit sth false.

Appellant's confessions to the media were

likewise
properly
admitted.
The
confessions were made in response to
questions by news reporters, not by the
police or any other investigating officer.
(Accdg to news interview, accused was a
cousin of the vicvtim; in the long loine of
interview w/ the news reporter, there was
a candid, free of undue influence) Here
(verbal confessions during the newsman
interview), The Bill of Rights does not
concern itself with the relation between a
private individual and another individual.

Navallo a letter demanding the restitution

of the missing amount. The latter
neither complied nor offered any
explanation for the shortage. The
official receipts and cashbook, together
with
some
other
records,
were
subsequently lost or damaged on account
of a typhoon that visited the province.

RULING: BRD

Accused-petitioner, invoking Section 7,

Rule 117, of the Revised Rules of Court,
pleads double jeopardy. We cannot agree.
Double jeopardy requires the existence of
the following requisites:

NAVALLO v. SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS:
The Provincial Auditor of Surigao del
Norte, Antonio Espino, made a preliminary
audit examination of cash and other
accounts of Ernesto Navallo (then
Collecting and Disbursing Officer of
Numancia National Vocational School).
Espino found Navallo to be short of
P16,483.62. Before departing, Espino
sealed the vault of Navallo.
Leopoldo A. Dulguime was directed by
Espino to complete the preliminary
examination and to conduct a final audit.
Dulguime broke the seal, opened the
vault, and made a new cash count.
Dulguime next examined the cashbook of
Navallo. After the audit, he had the
cashbook likewise deposited with the
same office.
The audit covered the period from July
1976 to January 1978 on the basis of
postings and record of collections certified
to by Navallo. Dulguime confirmed
Navallo's shortage of P16,483.62.
DEMAND FOR RESTITUTION. Dulguime
made a Report of Examination and wrote

Sandiganbayan:
Guilty
malversation of public funds

BRD

of

SC: No merit in the petition.

(1) The previous complaint or information

or other formal charge is sufficient in form
and substance to sustain a conviction;
(2) The court has jurisdiction to try the
case;
(3) The accused has been arraigned and
has pleaded to the charge; and
(4) The accused is convicted or acquitted
or the case is dismissed without his
express consent.
When all the above elements are
present, a second prosecution for
(a) the same offense, or (b) an
attempt to commit the said
offense, or (c) a frustration of the
said offense, or (d) any offense
which necessarily includes, or is
necessarily included in, the first
offense charged, can rightly be
barred.
In the case at bench, the RTC was
devoid
of
jurisdiction
when
it
conducted an arraignment of the
accused which by then had already been
conferred
on
the
Sandiganbayan.

Moreover, neither did the case there

terminate with conviction or acquittal nor
was it dismissed.
CONTENTION:
Deprived
constitutional rights

of

his

SC: A person under a normal audit

examination is not under custodial
investigation. An audit examiner himself
can hardly be deemed to be the law
enforcement officer contemplated in the
above rule. In any case, the allegation of
his having been "pressured" to sign the
Examination Report prepared by Dulguime
appears to be belied by his own testimony.

Additional prosecution evidence is to the

effect that in the early morning after the
incident, the Accused confessed orally to
Pat. Rodolfo Padilla, the operator of the
radio station on the Island, and voluntarily
surrendered the gun he had used in
shooting the victim.

RULING: AFFIRMED

ISSUE: Whether the Accused had orally

admitted his authorship of the crime
and surrendered the gun he had used in
shooting the victim, as the prosecution
claims, or, whether he had no involvement
whatsoever, the gun surrendered having
been found by a boy helper inside the bar
while cleaning the place the morning after
the incident, as the defense would have us
believe.

PEOPLE v. DY

HELD:

FACTS:

The Court erred in denying the accuedappellants motion for new trial.

Testimonial for the prosecution (given by

Wilson Tumaob):
At around 12:00 midnight while inside the
bar, he saw the accused Benny Dy shoot
a white person, (meaning a European) who
was hit on the right side of the neck. He
recognized the accused as the one who
shot the white person because of the light
coming from the petromax lamp which
was in front of him and he was just oneand-one-half
meters
from
the
accused and about the same distance
from the victim.
When he saw the accused shoot the
victim, he did not hear any conversation
between them. At that precise time, there
were many people of different nationalities
coming in and out of the bar. He did not
know anyone of them except the accused
Benny Dy. Neither did he know the helpers
in the bar, nor see anyone of these
customers to be residents of, or friends of
his from, barrio Balusbos, Malay, where he
resides.

The revolver, in turn, was Identified by Pat.

Padilla as the firearm surrendered by the
Accused. When Pat. Padilla stated that he
saw the fatal gun, its serial number and
name for the first he was clearly referring
to particulars which he did not concern
himself with at the time of surrender.
The ORAL CONFESSION made by the
accused to Pat. Padilla that he had shot a
tourist' and that the gun he had used in
shooting the victim was in his bar which
he wanted surrendered to the Chief of
Police is competent evidence against him.
RES GESTAE. It may in a sense be also
regarded as part of the res gestae. The
rule is that, any person, otherwise
competent as a witness, who heard
the confession, is competent to
testify as to the substance of what he
heard if he heard and understood all
of it. An oral confession need not be
repeated verbatim, but in such a case it
must be given in substance

What was told by the Accused to Pat,

Padilla was a SPONTANEOUS STATEMENT
not elicited through questioning, but given
an ordinary manner.
The gun surrendered was a clear and
direct evidence which caused death of the
tourist.
RULING. AFFIRMED

PEOPLE v. ALICANDO
FACTS:
On June 29, 1994, appellant was arraigned
with the assistance of Atty. Rogelio
Antiquiera of the PAO, Department of
Justice. Appellant pleaded guilty.
The prosecution evidence shows that in
the afternoon of June 12, 1994, Romeo
Penecilla, father of the four year old
victim Khazie Mae, was drinking liquor
with Ramil Rodriguez and Remus Gaddi in
his (Penecilla's) house at Barangay Rizal,
Zone 1, Pulo Bala, Iloilo. Appellant joined
them but every now and then would take
leave and return. Appellant was living in
his uncle's house some five (5) arm's
length from Penecilla's house. At about
4:30 p.m., Penecilla's group stopped
drinking and left.
Luisa Rebida testified that she was
shocked when she saw appellant was
naked, on top of the victim, his left hand
choking her neck. She retreated to her
house in fright. She gathered her children
together and informed her compadre,
Ricardo Lagrana, then in her house, about
what she saw. Lagrana was also overcome
with fear and hastily left.
Romeo Penecilla returned to his house at 8
o'clock in the evening. He did not find
Khazie Mae. He and his wife searched for
her until 1 o'clock in the morning. Their

effort was fruitless. Rebada was aware

that the Penecillas were looking for their
daughter but did not tell them what she
knew. Instead, Relada called out appellant
from her window and asked him the time
Khazie Mae left his house. Appellant
replied he was drunk and did not know.
Neighbor, Leopoldo Santiago, discovered
the lifeless body of Khazie Mae under his
house. Her parents were informed and so
was the police. Rebada suffered a change
of heart. She informed Romeo Penecilla
and his wife Julie Ann, that appellant
committed the crime. Forthwith, appellant
was arrested and interrogated by PO3
Danilo Tan. He verbally confessed his
guilt without the assistance of
counsel. On the basis of his uncounselled
verbal
confession
and
follow
up
interrogations, the police came to know
and recovered from appellant's house,
Khazie Mae's green slippers, a pair of gold
earrings, a buri mat, a stained pillow and a
stained T-shirt all of which were presented
as evidence for the prosecution.
HELD:
We find that the Decision of the trial court
sentencing the appellant to death is shot
full of errors, both substantive and
procedural. The conviction is on an
amalgam of inadmissible and incredible
evidence and supported by scoliotic logic.
LANGUAGE NOT KNOWN. In the case at
bar, the records do not reveal that the
Information against the appellant was read
in the language or dialect known to him.
The Information against the appellant
is written in the English language. It is
unbeknown whether the appellant knows
the English language. Neither is it known
what dialect is understood by the
appellant. Nor is there any showing that
the Information couched in English was
translated to the appellant in his own
dialect before his plea of guilt. The scanty
transcript during his arraignment,

The plea of guilt made by the appellant is

likewise null and void. The trial court
violated section 3 of Rule 116 when it
accepted the plea of guilt of the appellant.
The records reveal how the trial judge
inadequately discharged this duty of
conducting a "searching inquiry." In the
hearing of June 28, 1994
The questions of the trial court failed to
show the voluntariness of the plea of
guilt of the appellant nor did the
questions demonstrate appellant's full
comprehension of the consequences of his
plea. The records do not reveal any
information
about
the personality
profile of the appellant which can serve
as a trustworthy index of his capacity to
give a free and informed plea of guilt. The
age,
socio-economic
status,
and
educational background of the appellant
were not plumbed by the trial court. The
questions were framed in English yet there
is no inkling that appellant has a nodding
acquaintance of English. It will be noted
too that the trial court did not bother to
explain to the appellant the essential
elements of the crime of rape with
homicide.
Did not tell the appellant what are the
effects of mandatory death penalty.
Some prosecution evidence, offered
independently of the plea of guilt of the
appellant, were inadmissible, yet, were
considered by the trial court in convicting
the appellant.
INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE. These physical
evidences (pillow with blood stains and
shirt) are inadmissible evidence for they
were gathered by PO3 Danilo Tan of the
Iloilo City PNP as a result of custodial
interrogation
where appellant verbally confessed to the
crime without the benefit of counsel.
PO3
Tan
admitted
under
crossexamination,

UNCOUNSELLED
CONFESSION
INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE

In the case at bar, PO3 Tan did not even

have the simple sense to reduce the
all important confession of the
appellant in writing. Neither did he
present any writing showing that appellant
waived his right to silence and to have
competent and independent counsel
despite the blatant violation of appellant's
constitutional right, the trial court allowed
his uncounselled confession to flow into
the records and illicitly used it in
sentencing him to death.
NOTE: It is not only the uncounselled
confession that
is
condemned
as
inadmissible, but also evidence derived
therefrom
FRUIT OF THE POISONOUS TREE. We have
not only constitutionalized the Miranda
warnings in our jurisdiction. We have also
adopted the libertarian exclusionary
rule known as the "fruit of the
poisonous tree," a phrase minted by Mr.
Justice Felix Frankfurter in the celebrated
case
of Nardone
v. United
States.Accdg to this rule:
the primary source (the "tree")
is
shown
to
have
been
unlawfully
obtained,
any secondary or derivative
evidence (the " fruit " ) derived
from it is also inadmissible..
illegally seized evidence is obtained
as a direct result of the illegal act,
whereas the "fruit of the poisonous tree" is
the indirect result of the same illegal
act. The "fruit of the poisonous tree" is at
least once removed from the illegally
seized evidence, but it is equally
inadmissible.
PRINCIPLE: evidence illegally obtained by
the State should not be used to gain other
evidence because the originally illegally

obtained evidence taints

subsequently obtained.

all

evidence

No examination of the shirt

It must also be noted that it is not
unnatural
for
appellant
to
have
bloodstains on his shirt. He is a butcher by
occupation.
RULING: Decision in Criminal Case No.
43663, convicting accused Arnel Alicando
of the crime of Rape with Homicide and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of
death is annulled and set aside and the
case is remanded to the trial court for
further proceedings.

prosecutors option not to oppose the

petition
as
well
as
latters
recommendation setting the bailbond
in the amount of P80,000.00. He
averred that when the prosecution
chose not to oppose petition for bail,
he had the discretion on whether to
approve it or not.
Respondent Judge stated that in any case,
bailbond posted was cancelled and WoA
was issued and thus accused was confined
at the La Union Provincial Jail.
WHAT IS BAIL? It is the security required
by the court and given by the accused to
ensure that the accused appears before
the proper court at the scheduled time
and place to answer the charges brought
against him or her.

SEC. 13 RIGHT TO BAIL

BASCO v. RAPATALO
FACTS:
AN ADMIN MATTER:
Complainant Inocencio Basco charged
respondent Judge Leo M. Rapatalo w/
gross ignorance or wilful disregard of law
granting bail.
Complainant, father of victim, alleged that
info for murder was filed against Roger
Morente, one of the 3 accused. Accused
Morente filed a petition for bail. Hearings
were reset many times. In the meantime,
complainant allegedly saw the accused in
Rosario, La Union and later learned that
accused was OUT ON BAIL despite the
petition being unheard at all.
Upon
investigation,
complainant
discovered that bail had been granted and
was issued on a basis of MARGINAL NOTE
of the Asst. Prosecutor when another
hearing was scheduled. In his Comment,
respondent
Judge
alleged that
he
granted
the
petition
based
on

FUNCTION: In theory, bail is to ensure the

appearance of the defendant at the time
set for trial. And to prevent release of an
accused
who
might
otherwise
be
dangerous to society. WHY DETAIN
ACCUSED BEFORE CONVICTION? To assure
his presence at the trial.
EXCEPTION TO RIGHT TO BE BAILED
applied in DIRECT RATIO to the extent
of probability of evasion of the
prosecution. In other words, if the denial
of bail is authorized in CAPITAL OFFENSES
it is only in theory that the proof being
strong, the defendant would flee, if he has
an opportunity rather than to face
conviction.
NOTE: Bail is NOT a MATTER OF RIGHT
in cases where the person is charged
with: capital offenses punishable by
death,
rec.
perpetua
or
life
imprisonment. Art. 114, Sec. 7
prohibits admittance to jail on these
offenses REGARDLESS of stage.
When the grant of bail is discretionary,
the PROSECUTION has the burden of
showing that the evidence of guilt against

the accused is strong. However, the

DETERMINATION of whether or not
the evidence of guilt is strong, being a
matter of judicial discretion, remains with
the judge.it is obvious that a proper
exercise of judicial discretion requires that
the evidence of guilt be submitted to the
court, the petitioner having the right of
cross examination and to introduce
his own evidence in rebuttal."
The DISCRETION OF THE TRIAL COURT, "is
not absolute nor beyond control. It
must be sound, and exercised within
reasonable bounds. An uncontrolled or
uncontrollable discretion on the part of a
judge is a misnomer. It is a fallacy. Lord
Mansfield, speaking of the discretion to
be exercised in granting or denying bail
said: "But discretion when applied to a
court of justice, means sound discretion
guided by law. It must be governed
by rule, not by humour; it must not
be arbitrary, vague and fanciful; but
legal and regular.
BAIL; WHEN CAPITAL OFFENSES. a
hearing,
whether
summary
or
otherwise in the discretion of the
court, must actually be conducted to
determine
whether
or
not
the
evidence of guilt against the accused
is strong. "A SUMMARY HEARING means
such brief and speedy method of receiving
and considering the evidence of guilt as is
practicable and consistent PURPOSE: to
determine the weight of evidence for
the purposes of bail.
On such hearing, the court does not sit
to try the merits The course of inquiry
may be left to the discretion of the court
which may confine itself to receiving such
evidence as has reference to substantial
matters,
avoiding
unnecessary
thoroughness in the examination and
cross examination." If a party is denied the
opportunity to be heard, there would be
a violation of procedural due process.

HEARING MANDATORY. That it is

MANDATORY FOR THE JUDGE TO REQUIRE
A HEARING in a petition for bail is
emphasized in the following cases:
1. PEOPLE
v.
SOLA
(when
Prosecution has not given its
opportunity to prove guilt to
accused is strong, defendant can
post bail. )
2. PEOPLE v. NANO n this case. the
judge issued an order admitting the
accused in a kidnapping and
murder case to bail without any
hearing. We held: "The prosecution
must first be given an opportunity
to present evidence because by the
very
nature
of
deciding
applications for bail, it is on the
basis of such evidence that
judicial discretion is weighed
against in determining whether
the guilt of the accused is
strong."
3. PICO v. COMBONG, Jr. (In this
administrative
case,
the
respondent judge granted bail to
an accused charged with an
offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua, without notice and
hearing and even before the
accused had been arrested or
detained. The respondent judge
was ordered to pay a fine of
P20,000.00 and warned to
exercise
greater
care
and
diligence in the performance of
his duties.)
The aforecited cases are all to the effect
that when bail is discretionary, a
HEARING,
whether
summary
or
otherwise in the discretion of the
court, should first be conducted to
determine the existence of strong
evidence, or lack of it, against the accused
to enable the judge to make an intelligent
assessment of the evidence presented by
the parties.
NOTE: Mere ordering the Prosecution
to file a Comment on the accuseds
motion
to
fix
bail
is
NOT
SUBSTANTIAL compliance w/ reqt of
formal hearing.
A hearing is likewise required if the
prosecution refuses to adduce evidence in

opposition to the application to grant and

fix bail. "It is still mandatory for the court
to conduct a hearing or ask searching
questions from which it may infer the
strength of the evidence of guilt, or the
lack of it, against the accused.
AFTER HEARING. The court's order
granting or refusing bail must contain
a summary of the evidence for the
prosecution. On the basis thereof, the
judge should then formulate his own
conclusion as to whether the evidence so
presented is strong enough as to indicate
the guilt of the accused.
IN THE CASE AT BAR: respondent Judge
granted bail to the accused without first
conducting a hearing to prove that the
guilt of the accused is strong despite his
knowledge that the offense charged is a
capital offense in disregard of the
procedure laid down in Section 8, Rule
114 of the Rules of Court as amended by
Administrative Circular No. 12-94. (Due to
prosecutions declaration not to oppose
declaration)
Section 8 of RULE 114 was added to
address a situation where in case the
prosecution does not choose to present
evidence to oppose the application for
bail, the judge may feel duty-bound to
grant the bail application. In such a case,
the judge may well lose control of the
proceedings.
In a sense, this undermines the authority
of a judge since all that the prosecution
has to do to "force" the judge to grant the
bail application is to refrain from
presenting evidence opposing the same.
In effect, this situation makes Sections 6
and 7 of the 1940 Rules of Court on "Bail"
MEANINGLESS since whether or not the
evidence of guilt of a person charged with
a capital offense is strong cannot be
determined
if
the
PROSECUTION
CHOOSES NOT to present evidence or
oppose the bail application in a
hearing precisely to be conducted by
the trial judge for that purpose, as
called for in the two sections.
HEARING
MEANS
PRESENTATION
OF
EVIDENCE. And the filing of a comment or
a written opposition to the bail application
by the prosecution will not suffice.

DUTIES OF THE JUDGE IN APP FOR BAIL:

(1)
Notify the prosecutor of the
hearing of the application for bail or
require him to submit his recommendation
(Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court
as amended)
(2)
Conduct a hearing of the
application for bail regardless of
whether or not the prosecution refuses to
present evidence to show that the guilt of
the accused is strong for the purpose of
enabling the court to exercise its sound
discretion (Sections 7 and 8, supra);
(3)
Decide whether the evidence of
guilt of the accused is strong based on the
summary of evidence of the prosecution
(Baylon v. Sison, supra);
(4)
If the GUILT OF THE ACCUSED IS
NOT STRONG, discharge the accused
upon the approval of the bailbond.
(Section 19, supra). Otherwise, petition
should be denied.
RULING: REPRIMANDED W/ WARNING.
PEOPLE v. JUDGE DONATO
FACTS:
Instant petition for certiorari
and
prohibition and prayer to set aside the
order of respondent judge granting bail to
the accused Rodolfo Salas (alias Cdr.
Bilog).
Private respondent Rodolfo Salas, alias
"Commander Bilog", and his co-accused
were charged for the crime of rebellion
under Article 134, in relation to Article
135, of the RPC.
The Communist Party of the Philippines, its
military arm, the New People's Army, its
mass infiltration network, the National
Democratic
Front
with
its
other
subordinate organizations and fronts,
have, under the direction and control of
said organizations' leaders risen publicly
and taken arms throughout the country

against the Government of the Republic of

the Philippines for the purpose of
overthrowing the present Government, the
seat of which is in the City of Manila.
Instead of asking for a reconsideration of
said Order, private respondent filed on
9 May 1987 a petition for bail, herein
petitioner opposed in an Opposition
filed on 27 May 1987 on the ground
that since rebellion became a capital
offense under the provisions of P.D. Nos.
1996, 942 and 1834, which amended
Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code, by
imposing
the
penalty
of reclusion
perpetua to death on those who promote,
maintain, or head a rebellion the accused
is no longer entitled to bail as
evidence of his guilt is strong.
On 5 June 1987 the President issued
Executive Order No. 187 repealing, among
others, P.D. Nos. 1996, 942 and 1834 and
restoring to full force and effect
Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code as
it existed before the amendatory decrees.
Thus,
the
original
penalty
for
rebellion, prision mayor and a fine
not to exceed P20,000.00, was
restored.
his Order of 7 July 1987 respondent Judge,
taking into consideration Executive Order
No. 187, granted private respondent's
petition for bail, fixed the bail bond at
P30,000.00 and imposed upon private
respondent the additional condition
that he shall REPORT TO THE COURT once
every two (2) months within the first ten
(10) days of every period thereof. now
entitled to bail as a matter of right.
An order of the RTC increased bail form
30k to 50k
PETITIONERS CONTENTION: that private
respondent is estopped from invoking his
right to bail, having expressly waived it in
G.R. No. 76009 when he agreed to "remain
in legal custody and face trial before the
court having custody of his person. Also,
respondent Judge acted with grave abuse
of discretion when he did not allow
petitioner to present all the evidence it
may desire to support its prayer for the
denial of bail and when he declared that
the State has forfeited its right to do so

since during all the time that the petition

for bail was pending, it never manifested,
much less hinted, its intention to adduce
such evidence. And that even if release on
bail may be allowed, respondent judge, in
fixing the amount of bail at P50,000.00
ISSUE: Whether the right to bail may,
under certain circumstances, be denied to
a person who is charged with an otherwise
bailable offense, and whether such right
may be waived.
HELD:
The Court agree with the respondent court
that bail cannot be denied to the private
respondent for he is charged with the
crime of rebellion as defined in Article 134
of the Revised Penal Code to which is
attached the penalty of prision mayor and
a fine not exceeding P20,000.00. It is,
therefore, a bailable offense under
Section 13 of Article III of the 1987
Constitution.
NOTE: Therefore, before conviction bail is
either a MATTER OF RIGHT or of
DISCRETION.
BAIL A MATTER OF RIGHT. It is a matter
of right when the offense charged is
punishable
by
any
penalty
lower
than reclusion perpetua. To that extent
the right is absolute. No need for
prosecution to present evidence as to
denial of such right.
The 1987 Constitution strengthens further
the right to bail by explicitly providing
that it shall not be impaired even
when the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus is suspended. This
overturns the Court's ruling in GarciaPadilla vs. Enrile, et al., supra.
BAIL A MATTER OF DISCRETION. if the
offense charged is punishable by reclusion
perpetua. It shall be denied if the
evidence of guilt is strong.
LIMITATIONS
OF
COURTS
DISCRETION. The court's discretion is
limited to determining whether or not
evidence of guilt is strong. But once it is
determined that the evidence of guilt is

not strong, bail also becomes a matter

of right.
HEARING TO FIX BAIL. Erroneous for the
respondent court to fix the bond at
P30,000.00, then later at P50,000.00
without hearing the prosecution. The
guidelines for the fixing of the amount of
bail provided for in Section 10 (now sec. 9)
of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court are not
matters left entirely to the discretion of
the court.
We agree with Petitioner that private
respondent has, however, waived his
right to bail in G.R. No. 76009.
The petition for habeas corpus will be
withdrawn by petitioners and Josefina
Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion will be
immediately released but shall appear at
the trial of the criminal case for rebellion.
Petitioner Rodolfo Salas will remain
in legal custody and face trial before
the court having custody over his
person. simply meant that Rodolfo
Salas, herein respondent, will REMAIN IN
ACTUAL PHYSICAL CUSTODY OF THE
COURT, or in actual confinement or
detention, as distinguished from the
stipulation concerning petitioners.
Consequently, having agreed in G.R. No.
76009 to remain in legal custody, private
respondent had unequivocably waived
his right to bail. IS SUCH WAIVER VALID?
Art. 6 of the CC states: Rights may be
waived, unless the waiver is contrary to
law, public order, public policy, morals, or
good customs, or prejudicial to a third
person with a right recognized by law.
WAIVER: "a voluntary and intentional
relinquishment or abandonment of a
known existing legal right, advantage,
benefit, claim or privilege, which except
for such waiver the party would have
enjoyed.
DOCTRINE OF WAIVER. Extends to
rights and privileges of any character,
and, since the word "waiver" covers every
conceivable right. GR: that a person
may waive any matter which affects
his property, and any alienable right

or privilege of which he is the owner or

which belongs to him or to which he is
legally entitled, whether secured by
contract, conferred with statute or
guaranteed by constitution, provided
such rights and privileges rest in the
individual, are intended for his sole
benefit, do not infringe on the rights of
others, and further provided the waiver of
the right or privilege is not forbidden by
law, and does not contravene public
policy.
2 CLASSES OF RIGHTS (Commonwealth
vs. Petrillo): (a) those in which the state,
as well as the accused, is interested
(NOTE: cannot be waived); (b) those
which are personal to the accused, which
are in the nature of personal privileges
(can be waived).
This Court has recognized waivers of
constitutional rights such as, for
example,
the
right
against
unreasonable
searches
and
seizures; the right to counsel and to
remain silent; and the right to be
heard.
RIGHT TO BAIL CAN BE WAIVED. It is a
right which is PERSONAL to the accused
and whose waiver would not be contrary
to law, public order, public policy, morals,
or good customs, or prejudicial to a third
person with a right recognized by law.
The respondent Judge then clearly
acted with grave abuse of discretion
in granting bail to the private
respondent. (should not have allowed to
bail since such right is waived)
RULING: ORDERS OF JUDGE PEOPLE v.
SALAS, et al. NULLIFIED
.
PEOPLE v. FORTES
FACTS:
Agustin Fortes y Garra convicted for the
rape of a young of only 13, [a] sixth grade
pupil, bred in a barangay of rural
atmosphere, and the denial by the trial
court of his application for bail pending his

appeal from the judgment of conviction

are questioned in these consolidated
cases.
In 25 January 1989, found the accused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape
and sentenced him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and pay the
victim the sum of P20,000.00 to answer
for damages and costs.
Agripino Gine accompanied his 13-year old
daughter, Merelyn, to the police station
of the said municipality to report a rape
committed against the latter by the
accused at around 11:00 o'clock in the
morning of that day. Following this, the
accused was forthwith apprehended.
The bond for the latter's temporary liberty
was initially fixed at P30,000.00 but was
later reduced to P25,000.00 upon motion
of the accused. The latter then put up the
required bond; upon its approval, the court
ordered his release on 15 December 1983.
On 5 December 1984, the accused,
through his counsel de oficio, informed the
court that he was waiving his right
thereto.
HELD:
No merit. Crime is punishable by rec.
perpetua (hence a bail is a matter of
discretion; The court's discretion is limited
to determining whether or not evidence of
guilt is strong. But once it is determined
that the evidence of guilt is not strong,
bail also becomes a matter of right).
IMPLICATION: Accused who is charged
with a crime punishable by reclusion
perpetua, bail is neither a matter of
right on the part of the accused nor
of discretion on the part of the court.
Bail must not then be granted to the
accused during the pendency of his appeal
from the judgment of conviction. (NOTE:
Accused no longer entitled to bail as a
matter of right even if he APPEALS the
case to this Court since his conviction
clearly imports that the evidence of
his guilt of the offense charged is
strong.)

IN THE CASE AT BAR: the rape for which

the accused was indicted is punishable
by reclusion perpetua pursuant to Article
335 of the Revised Penal Code; he was
convicted therefor and subsequently
sentenced to serve that penalty. It is
thus evident that the trial court correctly
denied his application for bail during the
pendency of the appeal.
Moreover, the appellant has not shown
that the complainant and her father were
actuated by any ulterior motives which
could have induced them to falsely
implicate him in the commission of the
crime.
RULING:
denied

Increased

indemnity;

Appeal

B/GEN. COMENDADOR, et al. v. GEN.

RENATO DE VILLA, et al.
FACTS:
Petitioners are officers of the Armed
Forces
of
the
Philippines
facing
prosecution
for
their
alleged
participation in the failed coup d'
etat that took place on December 1 to 9,
1989.
CHARGES: violation of Articles of War (AW)
67 (Mutiny), AW 96 (Conduct Unbecoming
an Officer and a Gentleman) and AW 94
(Various Crimes) in relation to Article 248
of the Revised Penal Code (Murder).
Before the charges were referred to GCM
No. 14, a Pre-Trial Investigation PTI
Panel had been constituted pursuant
to Office Order No. 16 dated January 14,
1990, TO INVESTIGATE THE PETITIONERS
IN G.R. NOS. 93177 AND 96948. The PTI
Panel issued a uniform subpoena dated
January 30, 1990, individually addressed
to the petitioners.
CONTENTION: There was no pre-trial
investigation of the charges as
mandated by Article of War 71 (No
charge will be referred to a general courtmartial for trial until after a thorough and
impartial investigation thereof shall have
been made.. )

In G.R. No. 95020, Ltc Jacinto Ligot

applied for bail on June 5, 1990, but the
application was denied by GCM No.14. .
After considering the petition and the
answer thereto filed by the president and
members of GCM No.14, Judge Maximiano
C. Asuncion issued an order granting
provisional liberty to Ligot.
RTC: bail - the assailed orders of General
Court- Martial No. 14 denying bail to
petitioner
and
intervenors
on
the
mistaken assumption that bail does not
apply to military men facing court-martial
proceedings on the ground that there is no
precedent, are hereby set aside and
declared null and void.
Private respondents in G.R. No. 97454 filed
with this Court a petition for habeas
corpus on the ground that they were
being detained
in Camp
Crame
without charges. Finding after hearing
that no formal charges had been filed
against the petitioners after more than a
year after their arrest, the trial court
ordered their release.
In G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948 were
given several opportunities to present
their side at the pre-trial investigation
The said petitioners cannot now claim
they have been denied due process
because the investigation was resolved
against them owing to their own failure to
submit their counter-affidavits.
There is SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE with
Article of War 71 by the PTI Panel.
Moreover, it is now settled that "even a
failure to conduct a pre-trial investigation
does not deprive a general court- martial
of jurisdiction.
PRE-TRIAL INVESTIGATION is that it is
directory, not mandatory, and in no
way affects the jurisdiction of a courtmartial. Pre-trial investigation is NOT an
indispensable pre-requisite to the exercise
of the Army General court martial
jurisdiction.
A trial before a general court-martial
convened
without
any
pretrial
investigation under article of war 71 would
of course be altogether irregular but the
court-martial
might
nevertheless

have
jurisdiction.
Absence
of
preliminary investigation does not go into
the jurisdiction of the court but merely to
the regularity of the proceedings.
Article of War GCM: The President of the
Philippines, the Chief of Staff of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, the Chief of
Constabulary and, when empowered by
the President, the commanding officer of a
major command or task force, the
commanding officer of a division, the
commanding officer of a military area, the
superintendent of the Military Academy,
the commanding officer of a separate
brigade or body of troops may appoint
general courts-martial.
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE. Article 18 of
Com. Act No. 408 (Articles of War), as
amended by Rep. Act No. 242, on June 12,
1948. Members of general or
special
courts-martial
MAY
BE
CHALLENGED by the accused or the
trial judge advocate for cause stated
to the court. The court shall determine
the relevancy and validity thereof, and
shall not receive a challenge to more than
one member at a time. Challenges by
the
trial
judge
advocate
shall
ordinarily be presented and decided
before those by the accused are
offered. Each side shall be entitled to the
peremptory challenge, but the law
member of the court shall not be
challenged except for cause.
History: Martelino v. Alejandro (there was
a complete dearth of officers learned in
military law, its aside from the fact that
the officer corps of the developing army
was numerically made equate for the
demands of the strictly military aspects of
the national defense program; Because of
these considerations it was then felt that
peremptory challenges should not in the
meanwhile be permitted and that only
challenges for cause, in any number,
would be allowed.)
On
September
27,1972,
President
Marcos issued General Order No. 8,
empowering the Chief of Staff of the
Armed Forces to create military
tribunals "to try and decide cases of
military personnel and such other cases as
may be referred to them.

On November 7,1972, he promulgated

P.D. No. 39 (Governing the Creation,
Composition, Jurisdiction, Procedure, and
other
matters
relevant
to
military
Tribunals). This decree disallowed the
peremptory challenge.

NOT VIOLATION OF EQUAL PROTETION.

The accused officers can complain if they
are denied bail and other members of the
military are not. But they cannot say they
have been discriminated against because
they are not allowed the same right that is
extended to civilians.

With the TERMINATION OF MARTIAL LAW

and the dissolution of the military
tribunals created thereunder, the reason
for the existence of P.D. No. 39 ceased
automatically. STATCON: that when the
reason of the law ceases, the law itself
ceases. Cessante ratione legis, cessat
ipsa lex. This principle is also expressed
in the maxim ratio legis est anima: the
reason of law is its soul.

RULING: G.R. No. 93177, the petition is

DISMISSED for lack of merit. In G.R. No.
96948, the petition is GRANTED, and the
respondents are DIRECTED to allow the
petitioners to exercise the right of
peremptory challenge under Article 18 of
the Articles of War. In G.R. Nos. 95020 and
97454, the petitions are also GRANTED,
and the orders of the respondent courts
for the release of the private respondents
are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

RIGHT TO BAIL IN MILITARY AN

EXCEPTION .We find that the right to bail
invoked by the private respondents in G.R.
Nos. 95020 has traditionally not been
recognized and is not available in the
military, as an exception to the general
rule embodied in the Bill of Rights. This
much was suggested in Arula, where we
observed that "the right to a speedy trial
is given more emphasis in the military
where the right to bail does not exist.

BAYLON v. J.UDGE SISON

RATIONALE: it is vital to note that

mutinous soldiers operate within the
framework of democratic system, are
allowed the fiduciary use of firearms by
the government for the discharge of their
duties and responsibilities and are paid
out of revenues collected from the people.
All other insurgent elements carry out
their activities outside of and against the
existing political system.
National security considerations should
also impress upon this Honorable Court
that release on bail of respondents
constitutes a damaging precedent.
But, the truly disquieting thought is
that they could freely resume their
heinous activity which could very well
result in the overthrow of duly
constituted authorities, including this
Honorable Court, and replace the same
with a system consonant with their own
concept of government and justice.

FACTS:
This present admin matter was initiated by
City Prosecutor Alicia A. Baylon charging
Judge Deodoro J. Sison, presiding judge of
RTC Dagupan w/ utter disregard of judicial
decorum by excessive display of interest
in handling a case assigned to and then
pending in his branch. This letter is sent to
Chief Prosecutor Fernando P. de Leon
Court for appropriate action.
People v. Manolo Salcedo, et al.
Prosecutor Office filed a case re double
murder against several accused and
thereafter raffled to respondent judge.
Accused then filed a petition for
reinvestigation w/c was granted by the SC.
However,
during
the
pendency
of
reinvestigation, accused filed a petition
for bail and requested that it be set for
hearing. However, this was opposed by
the prosecution on the bases of the
sworn
statements
of
several
eyewitnesses to the incident which
constitutes CLEAR and CONVINCING
EVIDENCE of the guilt of the accused;
and that the accused should wait for
the outcome of the reinvestigation.
Then a hearing was conducted purportedly
held by the RTC. And on the basis of the
joint counter-affidavit of the accused, and
allegedly w/o objection on the part of

prosecution, the court forthwith granted

bail for his provisional liberty in the
amount of P40k.
A motion for reconsideration of said order
was duly filed by the prosecution but the
same was denied by the respondent
judge. WHY? He granted the bail
ostensibly AFTER DUE HEARING AND
AFTER A CAREFUL AND DELIBERATE
CONSIDERATION OF THE PERTINENT
PAPERS OF BOTH PARTIES.
These orders (granting bail and the denial
of the reconsideration) became the
subject of a petition for certiorari. There
was another accused , Roberto Untalan
who was denied motion for respondent
judge to inhibit himself from the case
contending that such act of the judge had
invited
serious
doubt
re
impartial
disposition of this case.
CONTENTION of Private complainants:
alleged that respondent judge failed to
give notice of at least 3 days before
scheduled hearing; Asst. City Prosecutor
Rosito Castro who happened to be present
during said hearing was NOT authorized to
appear for and in behalf of the prosecution
or to comment on the proceeding of the
bail.
ANSWER OF JUDG RE CONTENTION: That
petitioner never asked for opportunity to
show that the evidence of guilt against the
accused was strong and that asst.
prosecutor raised no question and
instead left the matter in the sound
discretion of the court. (motion to
inhibit was said to be a forum shopping)
Respondent judge stands charged with the
familiar malfeasance of granting bail
in a non-bailable offense w/o notice
and hearing. He alleged that the lack of
previous notice was CURED by the filing of
the MR. (This admin matter was referred
to the Office of Court Admin but still
unresolved).

HELD:

LACK OF SUFFICIENT NOTICE. Since the

petition for bail was filed in the court on a
Saturday, and was craftily set for a
hearing on a Monday, prosecution, in
effect was given only one day, Sunday, to
prepare opposition thereto. This, the
respondent
judge,
condoned,
and
aggravated by the unusual and precipitate
haste w/ which the petition was granted.
The judge exacerbated his deisregard of
settled rule of procudere by justifying nonobservance of 3-day notice as under
Sec.4, Rule 15 of the RC on the theory:
petition of bail is an urgent motion and
may therefore be heard on shorter notice.
Given this, the judge should have
carefully scrutinized the validity of
the petition for bail and its veracity
(since it is not a matter of right when
offense is punishable by death, rec.
perpetua or life imprisonment.)
2 MAIN ARGUMENTS OF ACCUSED:
1. Grant of bail to the accused was of
the essence considering that the
accused had been detained since
Oct. 1991
2. Prosecution failed to interpose an
objection granting the bail and to
ask for an opportunity to prove the
strength of the evidence of guilt
against the accused.
FIRST ARGUMENT: REJECTED. First, the
accused were charged w/ double murder
and thus bail is not a matter of right.
Second, no bail was recommended in the
info w/c was filed on the bases of the
sworn statement. Third, reinvestigation
was at the instance of the accused
themselves, hence any delay is naturally
and logically attributable to them. Finally,
guileful setting of the hearing for petition
for bail casts doubt.
Code of Judicial Conduct: requires judges
toa
ct
w/
competence
integrity,
independence, and should so behave at all
times as to promote public confidence in
the integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary.
ERRONEOUS DECISION IN GOOD FAITH
(defense by judge) may be negated by the
circumstances on record.

NOTE: Bail in this case being a matter of

right, must be addressed to the sound
discretion of the court. IN THE CASE AT
BAR,
a
LUBRICIOUS
and
UNTRAMMELED exercise of discretion
was made.
BAIL as a MATTER OF DISCRETION:
Prosecution
must
be
accorded
an
opportunity to present evidence because
by their very nature, evidence need be
weighed.
As a matter of law, discretion of the court,
in cases involving capital offenses may be
exercised only after there has been a
hearing called to ascertain the weight of
the evidence against the accused.
SECOND ARGUMENT. Accdg to the him,
it is incumbent upon the prosecution to
seek permission from the RTC to prove
evidence of guilt and if it failed to do so,
respondent judge was left w/ no other
recourse but to grant the app for bail.
WELL-SETTLED: When an accused is
charged w/ serious offense punishable w/
rec.perpetua to death, such as murder,
BAIL MAY BE GRANTED ONLY AFTER
MOTION FOR THAT PURPOSE HAS BEEN
FILED AND A HEARING
THEREON
CONDUCTED
BY
THE
JUDGE
TO
DETERMINE W/N the EVIDENCE FOR
ACCUSED IS STRONG. (MUST BE GIVEN
REASONABLE TIME)
NOTE: In granting or refusing bail,
summary of the evidence offered by the
prosecution needed.
HEARING-MANDATORY. As such, there
must be searching and clarificatory
questions from which the court may infer
the strength of the evidence of guilt, or
lack of it, against the accused.
In Borinaga v. Tamin, etc., the Court
held that where the prosecutor refuses to
adduce evidence in opposition to the
application to grant and fix bail, the court
may
ask
the
prosecution
such
questions as would ascertain the
strength of the Peoples evidence.

In Tucay v. Damagas, stated that

although there was no objection by
prosecutor, the respondent judge should
have nevertheless have set the petition
for bail for hearing and diligently
ascertained from the prosecution was not
really contesting the bail app.
AFTER CAREFUL PERUSAL OF RECORDS:
only the evidences presented by the
defense appear and prosecution was not
given the chance to cross-examine the
accused on their counter-affidavit.
RULING: JUDGE GUILTY OF GROSS
IGNORANCE OF LAW AND GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION; ORDERED TO PAY P 20K
W/ STERN WARNING.
MANOTOC v. CA
FACTS:
Petitioner Ricardo Manotoc, jr. is one of the
2 principal stockholders of Trans-Insular
Mgt.Inc. and Manotoc Securities, Inc., a
stock brokerage house. The mgt of the
latter was transferred into the hand of
professional men, he holds no officerposition in said business, but acts as of
forme corp.
Petitioner (came home from U.S) filed w/
his co-stockholders a petition w/ the SEC
for the appointment of a mgt committee
for both companies.
SEC requested the
then
Commissioner
of
Immigration,
Edmundo Reyes, not to clear petitioner for
the departure and a memorandum was
issued.
When a Torrens title submitted to and
accepted
by Manotoc securities was
suspected to be a facke, 6 f its clients filed
criminal complaints against petitioner and
one Raul Leveriza, Pres. and VP of said
company. Charges of estafa were filed but
admitted to bail for 105,000.00 w/ an
insurance company as surety.
Petitioner then filed a motion for
permission to leave the country stating his
desire to go to the US relative to his
business transactions and opportunities.
But such motion was denied.

CONTENTION: Having admitted to bail as a

matter of right, neither the courts w/c
granted him bail nor the SEC has no
jurisdiction over his liberty to prevent him
from exercising his right to travel.
ISSUE: Does a person facing a criminal
indictment and provisionally released on
bail have an unrestricted right to travel?
HELD:
Petitioners contention is untenable. A
court has the power to prohibit a person
admitted to bail form leaving the Phils.
This is a NECESSARY CONSEQUENCE of
the nature and function of a bail bond.
RULE 114, SEC. 1 of RC, defines BAIL
security reqd and given for the release of
a person who is in the custody of the law,
that he will appear before any court in w/c
his appearance may be reqd as stipulate
in the bail bond or recognizance.
This condition is a VALID RESTRICTION on
the petitioners right to travel. As per
People v. Uy Tuising: Not to prohibit the
said accused would otherwise make said
orders
and
processes
NUGATORY
inasmuch as the jurisdiction of the courts
from which they issues does NOT extend
that of the Phils (no more binding force)
ergo, he may be placed BEYOND the
reach of courts if allowed to leave.
EFFECT OF BAIL. To transfer the custody of
the accused from public officials
keepers of his own selection. Such custody
has been regarded merely as continuation
of the original imprisonment. Also, the
sureties become invested w./ full
authority over the person of the principal
and have the right to prevent the principal
from leaving the state.
If the sureties have the right to do so,
more so then has the court from whcich
sureties derive such right.
In Shepherd case, the accused was able
to show urgent necessity and the
conforme of her sureties satisfied the
court that she would comply w/ the
conditions of her bail bond.
FOR THE PETITIONER: There was no urgent
or compelling reason to be discerned to
justify the grant of judicial imprimatur. The

court cannot allow the accused to leave

the country w/o assent of his surety bec,
in accepting a bail bond, the govt
impliedly agrees that it will not take any
proceedings w the prinicipal that will
increase the risks of the sureties or affect
their remedies against it.
RIGHT TO TRAVEL IS NOT AN ABSOLUTE
RIGHT.
RULING: PETITION DISMISSED.

GOVT OF U.S v. JUDGE PURGANAN

FACTS:
In extradition proceedings, are prospective
extraditees entitled to notice and hearing
before warrants for their arrest can be
issued? Are they entitled to right to ail and
provisional liberty while such proceedings
are pending? NO. Explained in the decision
This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule
65 of the RC seeking to set aside Orders
by the RTC. First Order assailed is re set
hearing for issuance for the arrest of
Respondent Mark B. Jimenez. The second
one directed the issuance of a warrant and
at the same time granted bail to Jimenez.
(The latter is directed to surrender
passport and the likewise included in the
Hold-Departure List)
Essentially, the Petition prays for the lifting
of the Bail Order, cancellation of the bond,
and taking Jimenez to legal custody.
Antecedents
This petition is a sequel to Sec. of Justice
v. Ralph C. Lantion. Accdg to RP-US
extradition treaty, the U.S Govt, thru
diplomatic channels, sent to the Phil Govt
Note
dated
1999
requesting
the
extradition of Mark B. Jimenez, aka
Mario Batacan Crespo. Upon receipt of
the notes and docs, Sec. of foreign affairs
transmitted them to the secretary of
justice for appropriate action (Sec. 5, PD
1609, aka Extradition Law).

Jimenez was granted TRO w/c was assailed

by SOJ in a Petition before the Court. But
w/ a vote of 9-6 after justices changed
their votes - it reconsidered and reversed
its
earlier
Decision.
Held:
Private
respondent was bereft of the right to
notice
and
hearing
during
the
evaluation stage of the extradition
process.
Since there is no more legal obstacle, Govt
of US, represented by DOJ, field w/ RTC
Petiiton for Extradtiion. WHY? Alleged,
inter alia, that Jimenez was the subject of
an arrest warrant issued by US District
Court for the Southern District of Florida
re CONSPIRACY to defraud the US, TAX
EVASION,
WIRE
FRAUD,
FALSE
STATEMENTS,
ILLEGAL
CAMPAIGN
DISTRIBUTION.
Judge directed issuance of a WoA and
fixed bail for P1M and granted provisional
liberty. Hence, this petition.
CONTENTION: In case a warrant should
issue, he be allowed to post bail in the
amount of 100k
ISSUES:
1. W/N Jimenez is entitled to notice
and hearing before a warrant for
his arrest can be issued
2. W/N he is entitled to bail and
provisional
liberty
while
the
extradition proceedings ar are
pending.

HELD:
Petition is meritorious.
Contention of the SOJ: Assailed orders by
the judge is a patent nullity, absent factual
and legal basis therefor; need for relief is
extremely urgent for the accuseds ample
opportunity to escape.
5 POSTULATES of EXTRADITION:
NOTE: Cardinal rule in the interpretation
of a treaty or a law is to ASCERTAIN and
give effect to its INTENT.

1. Extradition is Major Instrument for

the Suppression of Crime
extradition
treaties
intended
to
SUPPRESS a crime by facilitating arrest
and custodial transfer of a fugitive from
one state to the other. (because flight of
criminals has become more frequent w/
advent of easier and faster means of intl
travel).
- extradition is a major effective
instrument of intl co-operation in the
suppression of crime.
It is the only
regular system that has been devised to
return fugitives to the jurisdiction of a
competent court in accordance w/
municipal and intl law. (PRACTICAL
EFFECT:
Reduction
of
criminals
seeking refuge abroad)
2. The requesting State will accord
due process to the accused.
extradition treaty presupposes both
have examined each others legal sys. and
judicial process. OUR REPS SIGNATURE IN
THE TREATY: signifies our confidence in
the capacity and the willingness of the
other state to protect the basic rights of
the person sought to be extradited.
(signifies our full faith that the accused
will be given ALL RELEVANT AND BASIC
RIGHTS in a criminal proceedings.
3. The proceedings are sui generis.
- as pointed out in SOJ v. Lantion,
extradition proceedings are NOT criminal
in nature. In criminal proceedings,
constitutional rights are at fore, in
extradition it is not.
NOTE: In criminal proceedings, it will call
into operation all the rights of the accused
in Bill of Rights. The process of
extradition does NOT involve the
determination
of
the
guilt
or
innocence of an accused.
EXTRADITION

CRIMINAL

Summary in nature

Full-blown trial

Rules

Proof BRD; fugitive

of

evidence

- Persons to be extradited are presumed to

be
flight
risks
(nothing
short
of
confinement can ensure that the accused
will not flee the jurisdiction of the
requested state in order to thwart
extradition to requesting state)

allow admission of
evidence under less
stringent standards

may be ordered
extradited
upon
showing of prima
facie evidence

Our
courts
may
adjudge
an
individual
extaditable but the
Pres. has the final
discretion
to
extradite him.

Executory
when
rendered final

- Indeed, extradition hearings would not

even begin, if only the accused were
willing to submit a trial in the requesting
country. Prior acts of respondent: left the
US right before the conclusion of his
indictment proceedings there. Having fled
once, there can now be an opportunity for
his fleeing the second time.

From the above, it is evident that

extradition court is NOT called upon to
ascertain the guilt or the innocence of the
person sought to be extradited. (Since it
will only cause needless duplication and
delay).
Extradition
is
merely
a
measure of intl judicial assistance
through w/c a person charged or
convicted of a crime is RESTORED to
jurisdiction w/the best claim to try
that person.

ISSUE #1: IS RESPONDENT ENTITLED

TO NOTICE AND HEARING BEFORE
ISSUANCE OF WoA? NO.

ERGO,
ULTIMATE
PURPOSE
OF
EXTRADITION
PROCEEDINGS
IN
COURT: TO DETERMINE W/N EXTRADITION
REQUEST COMPLIES W/ THE EXTRADITION
TREATY AND WHETHER PERSON SOUGHT
IS EXTRADITABLE.
4. Compliance shall be in good faith.
- Executive branch voluntarily entered into
such and our leg. Branch ratified it. Hence,
it
carries
presumption
that
its
implementation will serve the NATIONAL
INTEREST.
- Fulfilling our obligations promotes:
COMITY. Such failure would discourage
other states from entering treaties w/ us
particularly on extradition treaties wc
hinges on reciprocity.
- PACTA SUNT SERVANDA. This principle
requires that we deliver the accused to the
requesting
party
if
the
conditions
precedent
to
the
extradition
are
SATISFIED.
5. There is an underlying risk of flight

SEC. 6, PD 1069: The presiding judge

may issue a warrant for the immediate
arrest should he found reasons to best
serve ends of justice. After receipt of
warrant or failure to answer presiding
judge SHALL HEAR the case or set another
date for hearing. RTC Judge Purganans
acts cannot be sanctioned for immediately
setting a hearing re Woa.
1. On the basis of the Extradition Law
- the use of word immediate would be
rendered nugatory by setting a hearing for
the issuance of WoA. Hearing entails:
sending notices to the opposing parties,
etc. Thus, arrest subsequent to the
hearing can NO longer considered:
immediate.
The use of word, if it appears, the law
conveys that ACCURACY IS NOT AS
IMPORTANT AS SPEED at such early stage.
The trial court is NOT expected to make
an exhaustive determination to ferret
out the true and actual situation. THE
COURT IS EXPECTED MERELY TO GET A
GOOD IMPRESSION A PRIMA FACIE
FINDING SUFFICIENT TO MAKE SPEEDY
INITIAL DETERMINATION.
IN THE CASE AT BAR: The judge had
already gotten an impression based from
affidavits submitted that immediate arrest
would best serve the ends of justice
(probable cause did exist)

GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION. Since

prima facie existence of probable cause
for hearing the petiion for WoA was
already evident from the petition itself,
judge abused discretion when HE SET THE
MATTER FOR HEARING UPON MOTION OF
JIMENEZ.
NOTE: The word hearing is notably
absent in the provision in connection w/
immediate arrest (only present when there
are summons). Meaning to say, had the
holding of a hearing at that stage is
intended, the law could have easily so
provided. ALSO, at this point extradition
proceedings are SUMMARY in nature.
INTERPRETATION: If the meaning of
a
treaty
is
AMBIGUOUS
reasonable
meaning is to be preferred to the
unreasonable, the more reasonable to the
less reasonable.
As argued by petitioners, sending to
persons sought to be extradited a notice
of the request for their arrest and setting it
for hearing at some future date would give
them ample time to escape.
2. On the basis of the Consti
- NOTE: Even Sec. 2, Art. III, invoked by
Jimenez, does not require a hearing. To
determine probable cause for the issuance
of WoA, Consti requires only the
examination under oath or affirmation of
complainants and witnesses they may
produce. NO REQT TO NOTIFY AND
HEAR
THE
ACCUSED
BEFORE
ISSUANCE OF WoA
Otherwise, the prima facie procedure
would be converted into a full-blown trial
of the entire proceedings and make the
main case SUPERFLUOUS.
AS A MATTER OF FIRST IMPRESSION,
PROPER PROCEDURE:
1. Upon receipt of a petition for
extradition, judge must study them
and make, asap, a prima facie
finding w/n:
a. They are sufficient in form and
substance

b. They show compliance w/ the

treaty and law
c. The person is extraditable
2. At his discretion the judge may
require submission of further doc or
may personally examine affiants
and witnesses of the petitioner.
3. If in spite of study, no prima facie
finding is possible, petition may be
dismissed at the judges discretion.
4. If w/ prima facie finding judge
must immediately issue WoA.
PRIOR to the issuance thereof,
judge MUST NOT INFORM OR
NOTIFY POTENTIAL EXTRADITEE
lest his/her escape.
ISSUE#2: IS RESPONDENT ENTITLED
TO BAIL?
The only exception found in Sec. 13, Art. III
are those persons charged w/ offenses
punishable by rec. perpetua.
Extradition
different
Criminal Proceedings

from

Ordinary

-The above provisions only apply to Phil.

Criminal laws re bail. Not in extradition
proceedings. WHY? Extradition courts do
not render judgments of conviction or
acquittal.
-right
to
bail
flows
from
the
presumption of innocence in favor of
every accused; it follows that the constil
provision on bail will NOT APPLY to a case
like extradition, where presumption of
innocence not an issue.
right to bail shall not be impaired
even when the privilege of habeas
corpus is suspended. proves that
right to bail is available only in criminal
proceedings. NOTE: Habeas corpus only
for those judicially charged for rebellion or
offenses inherent in or directly connected
w/ invasion. HE SHOULD APPLY FOR
BAIL BEFORE THE COURTS TRYING
THE CRIMINAL CASES AGAINST HIM
NOT BEFORE EXTRADITION COURT.
-no violation of due process (respondent
will be given opportunity to be heard
subsequently once extradition court hears
the Petition for Extradition; and since he

fled from US, he cannot claim that hes

deprived of such right; due to flight risk
involved)

in nature
innocence)

(not

determine

guilt

or

3.Not flight risk?

EXCEPTIONS TO NO BAIL RULE
After the potential extraditee has been
arrested or placed under custody, bail may
be applied for and granted as a exception,
upon clear and convincing evidence,
showing: (1) that once granted bail, the
applicant will not be a flight risk or a
danger to the community; (2) that there
exist special, humanitarian and compelling
circumstances including, as a matter of
reciprocity, those cited by the highest
court in requesting state when it grants
provisional liberty in extradition cases.
(applicant bears the burden)
CONTENTION OF JIMENEZ:
1.Alleged disenfranchisement
-While his extradition was pending,
Jimenez was elected as a member of the
HOR. On that basis, he claims that his
detention will disenfranchise his Manila
district of 600k resident. NOT PERSUADED.
People
v.
Jalosjos:
ON
EQUAL
PROTECTION [t]he performance of
legitimate and even essential duties by
public officers has NEVER been an excuse
to free a person validly from prison.
Congress continues to function well
in the physical absence of one or few
of its mems. Never has the call of a
particular duty lifted a prisoner into a
different classification from those
others who are validly restrained
from law. Also, the functions and duties
of the office are NOT substantial
distinctions w/c will lift him from the class
of prisoners interrupted in their freedom
and restricted in liberty. LAWFUL ARREST
AD CONFINEMENT is germane to the
purposes of the law.
2.Anticipated delay
-respondent contends that because the
extradition proceedings are lengthy, it
would be unfair to confine him during the
pendency of the case. NOT CONVINCED.
extradition proceedings are SUMMARY

-he may flee as he hears the footsteps of

the requesting govt inching closer and
closer. That he has fled in the Phils cannot
be taken to mean that he will stand his
gorund and still within reach of our govt
NO NEED TO REMAND THE CASE TO
EXTRADTIION COURT (Jimenez was given
more than sufficient opportunity both by
the RTC and the Court. (The remand would
mean a repetition of this long, tedious
process )
EXTRADITION- essentially EXECUTIVE in
nature; COURTS merely for oversight
functions.
RULING: PETIITON GRANTED. BAIL BOND
CANCELLED. RTC DIRECTED TO CONDUCT
EXTRADITION PROCEEDINGS W/ ALL
DELIBERATE SPEED
GOVT OF HK v. HON OLALIA, JR.
FACTS:
This is an instant petition for certiorari
seeking to nullify 2 orders of the RTC
allowing Juan Antonio Munoz to post bail
and denying the motion to vacate oder
filed by Govt of HK Special admin region
(represented by DOJ). Alleging that judge
had used grave abuse of discretion a there
is no provision in the Consti granting bail
to a potential extradite.
On Jan. 30, 1995, the Republic of the Phils
and the then British Crown Colony of HK
signed an agreement for the Surrender of
Accused and convicted persons.
Private respondent Munoz was charged
before the HK w/ 3 counts of offense of
accepting an advantage as agent in
violation of Prevention of bribery
Ordinance. Also faces 7 counts of the
offense of CONSPIRACY to DFRAUD,
penalized by HK common law. WoA are
issued against him..

On Sep 13, 1999, DOJ received from the

HK DOJ a request for the provisional arrest
of private respondent. DOJ forwarded the
request to the NBI which in turn filed w/
RTC of Mla. 10 days atfter, said RTC issued
an order against respondent. NBI agents
then arrested and detained him.
CA: order of arrest is void.
Hence, DOJ filed a petition for review on
Certiorari. Court granted the petition.
Private respondent then filed in the same
case a petition for bail w/c was opposed
by petitioner.- The judge denied such
petition.
Private respondent filed an MR of the
Order denying app for bail. This was
granted by respondent judge. Bail is set at
P750 cash.
HELD:
Provision in bail applies does not apply to
extradition proceedings. It is available only
in criminal proceedings.
FOLLOWING TRENDS IN INTL LAW: (1)The
growing importance of the individual
person in public intl law who in the 2oth
century has gradually attained global
recognition; (2)Higher value now being
given to human rights in intl spheres; (3)
corresponding duty of countries to observe
these universal human rights in fulfilling
treaty obligations; and (4) duty of the
Court to balance the rights of the
individual under our fundamental law, oon
one hand, and the law on extradition, on
the other.
Modern trend in public intl law is the
PRIMACY place on the worth of
individual and sanctity of human
rights. Example would be, on Dec. 10,
1948, the UN General Assembly adopted
the UDHR iin which the right to life, liberty
and all the other fundamental rights of
ever person were proclaimed. While not
a treaty, the principle of such
Declaration are now recognized as
customarily binding upon mems of
intl community. (Sec. 2, Art. II- adopts
generally accepted principles of intl law)

Re-examination of
Purganan is in order:

Courts

ruling

in

1.Exercise of State power to deprive an

individual of his liberty is NOT necessarily
limited
to
criminal
proceedings.
Respondents
in
admin,
such
as
DEPORTATION AND QUARANTINE, have
likewise been detained.
2.To limit bail to criminal proceedings
would be to close our eyes to our
jurisprudential history. This Court has
admitted to bail persons WHO ARE NOT
INVOLVED IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS. In
fact, bail has been allowed in this
jurisdiction to persons in detention
during
the pendency of admin
proceedings, taking into cognizance
the obligation of the Phils.under intl
conventions to uphold human rights.
NOTE: In U.S v Go-Sioco, a Chinese
facing deportation was given bailed for the
Court said ,To refuse him bail is to treat
him as a person who has committed the
most serious crime known to law. The
Court in Mejoff case relied upon UDHR in
sustaining the detained right to bail.
Accdg to SC: Since UDHR applies to
deportation cases, there is no reason
why
it
cannot
be
invoked
in
extradition cases. BUT, the right to
apply for bail in this jurisdiction must be
viewed in the light of the various treaty
obligations of the Phils. Under these
treaties, presumption lies in favor of
human liberty,
WHAT IS EXTRADITION? Sec. 2 of PD
1069 removal of an accused from the
Phils. w/ the object of placing him at the
disposal of foreign authorities to enable
the requesting state or govt to hold him in
connection w/ any criminal investigation
directed against him or the execution of a
penalty imposed on him under the penal
or criminal law of the requesting state or
govt.
CHARACTERIZED as RIGHT OF A FOREIGN
POWER, created by treaty, to demand the
surrender of one accused or convicted of a
crime w/in its territorial jurisdiction, and
the correlative duty of the other to
surrender him. IT IS NOT A CRIMINAL

PROCEEDING
EVEN
IF
EXTRADITEE IS A CRIMINAL.

POTENTIAL

OBJECT: Prevent the escape of a person

accused or convicted of a crime and to
secure his return to the state from w/c he
fled, for the purpose of trial or
punishment.
CHARACTERISTICS:
a. It entails deprivation of liberty on the
part of the potential extraditee
b. The means employed to attain the
purpose of extradition is also the
machinery of criminal law. (shown by
Sec. 6 on immediate arrest and
temporary detention of the accused
NOTE: A potential extraditee may be
subjected to arrest, to a prolonged
restraint of liberty, and forced to transfer
to
the
demanding
state
ff.
the
proceedings.
IN THE CASE AT BAR: Private respondent
has been detained for 2 years w/o having
been convicted of any crime. Serious
deprivation of liberty w/c prompted the
extradition court to grant him bail.
While our extradition law does not
provide for the grant of bail to an
extradite, however, there is NO
provision prohibiting him/her from
filing a MOTION for BAIL, A RIGHT TO
DUE PROCESS under Consti.
BUT, applicable standard of due process
should not be the same as that in criminal
proceedings
(i.,e,
presumption
of
innocence
of
the
accused).
In
EXTRADITION
PROCEEDINGS

the

premise behind the issuance of WoA and

temporary detention is the POSSIBILITY OF
FLIGHT of the potential extraditee. Thus,
prospective extraditee thus bears the
onus probandi of showing that he/she
is not a flight risk and should be
granted bail.
While extradition is admin in character,
the standard of substantial evidence used
in admin cases CANNOT likewise apply
given the object of extradition law w/c is
to prevent the prospective extradite from
fleeing our jurisdiction.
NEW STANDARD FOR GRANTING BAIL:
Clear and Convincing evidence
(lower than BRD but higher than
preponderance of evidence).
In the case, there is no showing that
private respondent presented evidence to
show that he is not a flight risk.
RULING:
REMANDED
TO
RTC
TO
DETERMINE
WHETHER
PRIVATE
RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO BAIL ON
THE BASIS OF CLEAR AND CONVINCING
EVIDENCE. IF NOT, CANCEL BAIL BOND
AND
CONDUCT
EXTRADITION
PROCEEDINGS.