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Asst. City Prosecutor Abraham L. Ramos II reported the matter to the Solicitor General and
requested that a motion for clarification be filed with this Court to clarify the decision. The CA
then rendered a Resolution which states that they simply modified the appealed decision of the
court in one respect only - the increase of the indemnity to be paid by the appellant to the heirs of
the victims, and that they had affirmed the decision of the court with regard to the penalty of
imprisonment imposed in the said trial courts decision.
Respondent Judge then set the promulgation of the decision anew. The accused, however, filed a
Motion to Set Aside Promulgation on the grounds that the judgment in said case was already
promulgated and therefore there is nothing to promulgate anymore, and that to pursue with the
scheduled promulgation will violate his constitutional right against jeopardy. The respondent
Judge granted the aforestated motion. The Solicitor General then filed before the CA a petition
for certiorari and mandamus contending that the respondent Judge seriously erred and gravely
abused his discretion in refusing to execute the penalty of imprisonment in spite of the CAs
Decision and Resolution. He prays that the Order of the judge be nullified and the penalty of
imprisonment rendered against the accused be enforced.
ISSUE: Whether petitioners right against double jeopardy was violated
RULING: Petitioner contends that the promulgation by Judge Ramos of the Respondent Courts
decision by reading its dispositive portion has effectively terminated the criminal cases against
him. In other words, petitioner claims that the first jeopardy attached at that point.
The Court is not persuaded. As a rule, a criminal prosecution includes a civil action for the
recovery of indemnity. Hence, a decision in such case disposes of both the criminal as well as the
civil liabilities of an accused. Here, the trial court promulgated only the civil aspect of the case,
but not the criminal.
As earlier observed, the promulgation of the CA Decision was not complete. In fact and in truth,
the promulgation was not merely incomplete; it was also void. In excess of its jurisdiction, the
trial judge rendered a substantially incomplete promulgation. The Court emphasizes that grave
abuse of discretion rendered the aforementioned act of the trial court void. Since the criminal
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cases have not yet been terminated, the first jeopardy has not yet attached. Hence, double
jeopardy cannot prosper as a defense.
The constitutional proscription of double jeopardy is not violated by a Court of Appeals order
requiring the trial court to promulgate a decision sentencing the accused to imprisonment even if,
earlier, the same decision has been promulgated in regard only to the payment of the modified
civil indemnity arising from the same criminal act. Otherwise stated, the promulgation of only
one part of the decision, i.e., the liability for civil indemnity, is not a bar to the subsequent
promulgation of the other part, the imposition of the criminal accountability.
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dates of the hearings were transferred for valid grounds. Hence, the trial court set aside its initial
order and reinstated the cases against petitioner, which order the appellate court later sustained.
There was no unreasonable, vexatious and oppressive delay in the trial. Hence, there was no
violation of petitioner's right to speedy trial as there were no unjustified postponements which
had prolonged the trial for unreasonable lengths of time. There being no oppressive delay in the
proceedings, and no postponements unjustifiably sought, the Court concurs with the conclusion
reached by the CA that petitioner's right to speedy trial had not been infringed.
It follows that petitioner cannot invoke the constitutional right against double jeopardy when that
order was reconsidered seasonably. The trial court's initial order of dismissal was upon motion of
petitioner's counsel, hence made with the express consent of petitioner. That being the case,
despite the reconsideration of said order, double jeopardy did not attach
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criminal case. Petitioner was not charged anew with a second criminal offense identical to the
first offense. The records clearly show that no second criminal offense was being imputed to
petitioner on appeal. In modifying the lower courts judgment, the appellate court did not
modify the judgment of acquittal. Nor did it order the filing of a second criminal case against
petitioner for the same offense. Obviously, therefore, there was no second jeopardy to speak
of. Petitioners claim of having been placed in double jeopardy is incorrect.
Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the civil liability of the
accused. First is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the author of the act or
omission complained of. This instance closes the door to civil liability, for a person who has
been found to be not the perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and can never be held liable
for such act or omission. There being no delict, civil liability ex delicto is out of the question, and
the civil action, if any, which may be instituted must be based on grounds other than
the delict complained of. This is the situation contemplated in Rule 111 of the Rules of Court.
The second instance is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. In this
case, even if the guilt of the accused has not been satisfactorily established, he is not exempt
from civil liability. This is the situation contemplated in Article 29 of the Civil Code, where the
civil action for damages is for the same act or omission. Although the two actions have
different purposes, the matters discussed in the civil case are similar to those discussed in the
criminal case. However, the judgment in the criminal proceeding cannot be read in evidence in
the civil action to establish any fact there determined, even though both actions involve the same
act or omission. The reason for this rule is that the parties are not the same and secondarily,
different rules of evidence are applicable. Hence, notwithstanding herein petitioners acquittal,
the Court of Appeals in determining whether Article 29 applied, was not precluded from looking
into the question of petitioners negligence or reckless imprudence.
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The rules of procedure allowing the discharge of an accused to instead be a witness for the state
has its origins in the common law of ancient England where faithful performance of such an
agreement with the Crown could entitle a criminal offender to an equitable right to a
recommendation for executive clemency. In the Philippines, this grant is not one of arbitrary
discretion but rather a sound judicial prerogative to be exercised with due regard to the proper
and correct dispensation of criminal justice. In this case, even while one might be convinced that
state witness Rodel de la Cruz would, on the basis of evidence ultimately submitted, appear to be
equally as, and not less than, guilty in conspiracy with appellant Carlos Feliciano, the hands of
the State are now stayed and the Court must assure the exemption of the witness from
punishment.
It is widely accepted that the discharge of an accused to become a state witness has the same
effect as an acquittal. The impropriety of the discharge would not have any effect on the
competency and quality of the testimony, nor would it have the consequence of withdrawing his
immunity from prosecution. A discharge, if granted at the stage where jeopardy has already
attached, is equivalent to an acquittal, such that further prosecution would be tantamount to the
state reneging on its part of the agreement and unconstitutionally placing the state witness in
double jeopardy. The rule, of course, is not always irreversible. In an instance where the
discharged accused fails to fulfill his part of the bargain and refuses to testify against his coaccused, the benefit of his discharge can be withdrawn and he can again be prosecuted for the
same offense.
Despite an obvious attempt to downgrade his own participation in the crime, state witness de la
Cruz, nevertheless, did not renege from his agreement to give a good account of the crime,
enough to indeed substantiate the conviction of his co-accused, now appellant Carlos Feliciano,
by the trial court. Appellant Carlos Feliciano was not able to sufficiently dispute his
participation therein. Neither his blanket denial nor his alibi, both inherently weak defenses, was
amply proved.
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial court except insofar as it imposed on Carlos
Feliciano the penalty of death which was reduced to reclusion perpetua.
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a petition to annul the foregoing Order of the trial court. The CA dismissed the petition. Hence,
the instant petition.
ISSUE: Whether reopening the criminal case will violate the accuseds right to double jeopardy
RULING: The criminal case was for rape with homicide. Although the public prosecutor
presented seven witnesses, none of these actually saw the commission of the crime. It was only
Joselito Nuada, one of the accused, who came forward and expressed willingness to turn state
witness. His testimony was vital for the prosecution, as it would provide the only eyewitness
account of the accuseds complicity in the crime. The trial court required the public prosecutor
to present evidence to justify Nuadas discharge as a state witness, but the latter insisted that
there was no need for such proof since Nuada had already been admitted into the Witness
Protection Program. The refusal to present the required evidence prompted the trial court to
deny the motion to discharge Nuada.
In the case at bar, the public prosecutor knew that he had not presented sufficient evidence to
convict the accused. He deliberately failed to present an available witness and thereby allowed
the court to declare that the prosecution has rested its case. The public prosecutor in this case
was guilty of blatant error and abuse of discretion, thereby causing prejudice to the offended
party. By refusing to comply with the trial courts order to present evidence, the public
prosecutor grossly violated the rules. Likewise guilty for serious nonfeasance was the trial
court. Notwithstanding its knowledge that the evidence for the prosecution was insufficient to
convict, especially after the public prosecutor tenaciously insisted on utilizing Nuada as state
witness, the trial court passively watched as the public prosecutor bungled the case.
Inasmuch as the acquittal of the accused by the court was done without regard to due process of
law, the same is null and void. It is as if there was no acquittal at all, and the same cannot
constitute a claim for double jeopardy.
By contending that the challenged Decision is void for having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the petition does not violate the right of
the accused against double jeopardy. Thus, even assuming that a writ of certiorari is granted, the
accused would not be placed in double jeopardy because, from the very beginning, the lower
tribunal had acted without jurisdiction. Precisely, any ruling issued without jurisdiction is, in
legal contemplation, necessarily null and void and does not exist.
POTOT vs. PEOPLE
FACTS: Joey S. Potot, petitioner, was charged with homicide. Upon arraignment, he pleaded
guilty to the charge. Thereupon, the trial court rendered and promulgated its judgment,
convicting him of homicide. Petitioner then filed a manifestation with motion informing the trial
court that he is not appealing from the Decision and praying that a commitment order be issued
so he could immediately serve his sentence. However, the wife of the victim filed a motion for
reconsideration/retrial praying that the Decision be set aside and that the case be heard again
because there were irregularities committed before and during the trial which caused miscarriage
of justice. The trial court granted the motion. It likewise ordered that the records of the case be
remanded to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor for re-evaluation of the evidence and to file
the corresponding charge. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the trial
court has no jurisdiction to issue the order as the Decision had become final, and that the said
order would place the accused in double jeopardy. The trial court denied the motion for
reconsideration for the reason that the State is not bound by the error or negligence of its
prosecuting officers, hence, jeopardy does not attach.
ISSUE: Whether or not the judgment has become final that the accuseds right against double
jeopardy will be violated upon re-trial of the same case
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alleged in the information, cannot be appreciated against them. Appellants motion for
reconsideration was denied in an Order dated July 13, 1998. However, an Amended Decision
was rendered where the phrase abuse of superior strength was replaced with TREACHERY
in the body of the Decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a violation of the right against double jeopardy when the trial
court rendered the second decision
RULING: Under Rule 121, Section 1 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, a motion for
reconsideration of a judgment of conviction may be filed by the accused, or initiated by the
court, with the consent of the accused. Likewise, under Rule 120, Section 7, a judgment of
conviction may be modified or set aside only upon motion of the accused. These provisions
changed the previous rulings of the Court to the effect that such modification may be made upon
motion of the fiscal, provided the same is made before a judgment has become final or an appeal
has been perfected. The requisite consent of the accused to such motion for reconsideration or
modification is intended to protect the latter from having to defend himself anew from more
serious offenses or penalties which the prosecution or the court may have overlooked.
Accordingly, once the judgment has been validly promulgated, any reconsideration or
amendment to correct a manifest substantial error, even if unwittingly committed by the trial
court through oversight or an initially erroneous comprehension, can be made only with the
consent or upon the instance of the accused. Errors in the decision cannot be corrected unless the
accused consents thereto, or himself moves for reconsideration of, or appeals from, the decision.
However, the protection against double jeopardy in the foregoing rules may be waived by the
accused. Thus, when the accused himself files or consents to the filing of a motion for
reconsideration or modification, double jeopardy cannot be invoked because the accused waived
his right not to be placed therein by filing such motion. His motion gives the court an opportunity
to rectify its errors or to reevaluate its assessment of facts and conclusions of law and make them
conformable with the statute applicable to the case in the new judgment it has to render. In effect,
a motion for reconsideration or modification filed by or with consent of the accused renders the
entire evidence open for the review of the trial court without, however, conducting further
proceedings, such as the taking of additional proof.
Clearly, therefore, appellants cannot dictate upon the trial court which aspects of the judgment of
conviction should be reviewed. Having filed a timely motion for reconsideration asking the
court to acquit, or in the alternative, convict them of the lesser offense of homicide, appellants
waived the defense of double jeopardy and effectively placed the evidence taken at the trial open
for the review of the trial court. At any rate, the issue of the attendant qualifying circumstance in
the case at bar was squarely raised by the appellants in their alternative prayer for conviction for
the lesser offense of homicide in view of the erroneous appreciation of the qualifying
circumstance of abuse of superior strength which was not alleged in the information. Hence, the
court a quo is not only empowered but also under obligation to rectify its mistake in appreciating
the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength instead of treachery. Verily, it is
precluded from considering the attendance of a qualifying circumstance if the complaint or
information did not allege such facts. Even before the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure took
effect on December 1, 2000, qualifying circumstances were required to be so specified in the
complaint or information, otherwise they cannot be appreciated against the accused.