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Se.

12
(1) Any person under
investigation for the commission of an
offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent
and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his
own choice. If the person cannot afford
the services of counsel, he must be
provided with one. These rights cannot
be waived except in writing and in the
presence of counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence,
threat, intimidation or any other means
which vitiates the free will shall be used
against him. Secret detention places,
solitary, incommunicado, or other
similar forms of detention are
prohibited.
(3) any confession or admission
obtained in violation of this or section
17 hereof shall be inadmissible in
evidence against him.
(4) the law shall provide for penal
& civil sanctions for violations of this
section as well as compensation to &
rehabilitation of victims of torture or
similar practices, and their families.
Rights under investigation:
(1) The right to remain silent
(2) The right to competent & independent
counsel preferably of his own choice
(3) The right to be informed of such rights
Reason making the rule applicable to
investigation:
According to Miranda vs Arizona, it is but a
recognition of the fact that the psychological
if not physical atmosphere of custodial
investigations, in the absence of proper
safeguards, is inherently coercive.
Miranda v Arizona (immediate
jurisprudential antecedent )
Of all cases to make its way to the Supreme
Court, Miranda v Arizona may well be the
most popular to date. Virtually everyone has
heard of the "Miranda Rights" which are read
to suspects. While many people may be
familiar with the terminology from television

shows, not nearly as many understand the


true origins of the Miranda rights. The actual
case of Miranda v Illinois may be the case
the "Miranda Rights" are named after, but
several other Supreme Court decisions all
came together to form the ruling, including
Escabedo v Illinois. However, since Miranda
was the final case to be decided at the time
covering this issue, it is considered the father
of the "Right to remain silent."
On March 13, 1963, Ernesto Miranda was
arrested at Arizona his home. The police
took him into custody, and transported
him to a Phoenix police station. The witness
whom had filed the complaint identified him.
Miranda was then lead to the interrogation
room. Then, the police officers proceeded to
question him. Miranda had never been
informed of his rights prior to the
questioning. He was never told he had the
right to an attorney to be present during the
questioning. After two hours, the officers had
succeeded in getting a written confession
signed by Miranda. Located on the top of the
confession was a typed paragraph stating
that the confession was voluntary, without
any promises of immunity or threats. The
statement also said that Miranda signed the
confession "with full knowledge of my legal
rights, understanding any statement I make
may be used against me."
When Miranda's case went to trial, the
prosecution used the written confession
as evidence against him. The defense
objected, asking for the evidence to be
suppressed. However, the judge allowed the
confession to be admitted. Miranda was
convicted of all counts, which consisted of
kidnapping and rape. On each count he
was sentenced to 20 to 30 years, with the
sentences running concurrently. On
Miranda's first appeal, the Supreme Court of
Arizona ruled that his rights had not been
violated by the admission of the
confession, and therefore affirmed the
conviction. The basis for the decision was
connected to the fact that Miranda never
specifically requested council.
Identified in a police lineup, Miranda had
been questioned, had confessed, and had
signed a written statement without being
told that he had a right to a lawyer; his
confession was used at trial. In overturning
Miranda's conviction, Chief Justice
Earl Warren held that the prosecution may
not use statements made by a person in

police custody unless certain minimum


procedural safeguards were in place.
Before questioning, a person must be given
what is now known as a Miranda
warning: that you have the right to
remain silent; that anything you say
may be used as evidence against you;
that you may request the presence of an
attorney, either retained by you or
appointed by the court; and that you have
the right, even after beginning to
answer questions, to stop answering or
request an attorney. The Miranda decision
was one of the most controversial of the
Warren Court. Under Chief Justices
Warren Burger and William Rehnquist (who
as a legal spokesman for the Nixon
administration had proposed that Miranda be
overturned), a Supreme Court more friendly
to police operations limited its scope several
times, although failing to reverse its central
holding, and in 2000 the Rehnquist court, in
an opinion authored by the chief justice,
reaffirmed the original decision as a
constitutional rule that may not be
overturned by an act of Congress. Civil
liberties groups have continued to protest
that police routinely omit Miranda warnings
The ff constitutional requirements must
be observed in custodial investigations:
(1)The person in custody must be
informed at the outset in clear &
unequivocal terms that he has the
right to remain silent
(2)After being so informed, he must be
told that anything he says can and
will be used against him in court
(3)He must be clearly informed that he
has the right to consult with a
lawyer and to have the lawyer with
him during the interrogation. He
does not have to ask for a lawyer.
The investigators should tell him
that he has the right to counsel at
that point.
(4)He should be warned that not only
has he the right to consult with a
lawyer but also that if he is indigent,
a lawyer will be appointed to
represent him.
(5)Even if the person consents to
answer questions without the
assistance of counsel, the moment
he asks for a lawyer at any point in
the investigation, the interrogation
must cease until an attorney is
present.
(6)If the foregoing protections and
warnings are not demonstrated
during the trial to have been

observed by the prosecution, no


evidence obtained as a result of the
interrogation can be used against
him.
** The entirety of the Miranda Rule is
now part of Philippine Law
Pp vs DE LA CRUZ, alias RODOLFO
DOMINGO or "OMPONG
Rodolfo de la Cruz, aliasRodolfo Domingo or
"Ompong impugns his conviction for
multiple murder in Antipolo, Rizal. He
anchors his entreaty for the reversal thereof
mainly on the ground that he was not fully
and appropriately apprised of or
allowed to exercise his constitutional
rights prior to and while undergoing
custodial investigation.
The 3 Laroyas were all bloodied consequent
to numerous stab wounds, and each of them
had a knife still embedded in and protruding
from their bodies when found by neighbors in
Cainta, Rizal. Karen Verona also bore
external signs of sexual assault.
None of their neighbors, however, witnessed
the gruesome murders. Two of them later
testified in court, namely, Harold Jim F.
Balocating and Anita F. Pangan. The former
merely recounted how, while playing table
tennis in front of the Laroya residence, he
and his friends stumbled upon the dead
bodies of the victims. Anita Pangan, on the
other hand, recalled that at around 9:00 P.M.
of June 23, 1992, appellant, who was a
brother-in-law of Teodorico Laroya, Jr.,
purchased some candies at her store which
is located inside the village. 4
Both Balocating and Pangan had previously
executed sworn statements just three days
after the incident, the assertions in which
were of the same import as their respective
testimonies in court. 5On June 27, 1992, the
police authorities apprehended appellant at
the house of his brother in Fort Bonifacio.
SPO1 Carlos R. Atanacio, Jr., a member of the
Cainta Police Station in Cainta, Rizal
interrogated appellant regarding the crimes
on the same day that he was arrested.
This police officer declared in the trial court
that before he questioned appellant as to his
participation in said crimes, all steps were
undertaken to completely inform the
latter of his rights and this he did in the
presence of appellant's supposed

counsel, one Atty. Lorenza BernardinoVillanueva. Appellant then signed,


likewise in the presence of said counsel,
an extrajudicial confession wherein he
narrated in detail how he allegedly
snuffed out the lives of the victims.
When presented as the lone witness for
himself, appellant was observed by the trial
court to be afflicted with a problem in
expressing himself and an impediment
in his speech (ngo-ngo). By appellant's
own account, he only reached the fourth
grade of elementary schooling and,
although conversant with Tagalog, he is
unable to read and write, although he
can sign his name. He bluntly repudiated
the version of SPO1 Atanacio, Jr. and insisted
that he was never assisted by any
counsel of his choice, much less met said
Atty. Lorenza Bernardino-Villanueva, when he
was interrogated at the police headquarters
in Cainta, Rizal and signed his supposed
extrajudicial confession. Parenthetically, his
answers to the questions appearing therein
are in surprisingly fluent, flawless and
expressive Tagalog, which could not
have been done by him because of his
defect in speech and articulation.
He further claims that he was instead
tortured by the police authorities into
signing the same, and not that he did
so voluntarily. While he admits having
been at the residence of the victims on the
night that they were murdered, he flatly
denied having killed them as he left the
trio well and alive that same night when
he proceeded to his brother's place in
Fort Bonifacio.
In unambiguous and explicit terms, Section
12, paragraph 1, of Article III of the
Constitution requires that "[a]ny person
under investigation for the commission
of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent
and to have independent counsel
preferably of his own choice. If the
person cannot afford the services of
counsel, he must be provided with one.
These rights cannot be waived except in
writing and in the presence of counsel."
Corollary thereto, paragraph 3 thereof
declares that any confession or admission
obtained in violation of the same shall be
inadmissible in evidence against the
confessant.

An accused person must be informed of the


rights set out in said paragraph of Section 12
upon being held as a suspect and made to
undergo custodial investigation by the police
authorities. As explained by this Court
in People vs. Marra, custodial
investigation involves any questioning
initiated by law enforcement authorities
after a person is taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom of
action in any significant manner. And,
the rule begins to operate at once as
soon as the investigation ceases to be a
general inquiry into an unsolved crime
and direction is then aimed upon a
particular suspect who has been taken
into custody and to whom the police
would then direct interrogatory
question which tend to elicit
incriminating statements.
Furthermore, not only does the fundamental
law impose, as a requisite function of the
investigating officer, the duty to explain
those rights to the accused but also that
there must correspondingly be a
meaningful communication to and
understanding thereof by the accused. A
mere perfunctory reading by the
constable of such rights to the accused
would thus not suffice.
The defendant in the dock must be made to
understand comprehensively, in the
language or dialect that he knows, the
full extent of the same. A confession
made in an atmosphere characterized
by deficiencies in informing the accused
of all the rights to which he is entitled
would be rendered valueless and
inadmissible, perforated, as it is by noncompliance with the procedural and
substantive safeguards to which an
accused is entitled .
In the present case, SPO1 Atanacio, Jr.,
admitted in his the investigation
actually commenced at the time when
appellant was still without counsel.
While SPO1 Atanacio, Jr. informed appellant
in Tagalog of his right to remain silent, that
any statement he made could be used for or
against him in any court, and that he could
have counsel preferably of his own choice,
he nonetheless failed to tell appellant
that if the latter could not afford the
services of counsel, he could be
provided with one.

The foregoing lapses on the part of the


police authorities are all fatal to the
admissibility of the extrajudicial
confession supposedly executed by
appellant before SPO1 Atanacio, Jr.
Jurisprudence along these lines have all been
too consistent an accused under custodial
interrogation must continuously have a
counsel assisting him from the very start
thereof.
Where he lacks a counsel of his choice
because of indigence or other
incapacitating cause, he shall be provided
with one. Without this further safeguard,
that his right thereto would mean simply that
he can consult a lawyer if he has one or has
the financial capacity to obtain legal
services, and nothing more.
Curiously, the record is completely bereft
of any indication as to how appellant was
able to engage the services of Atty.
Lorenza Bernardino-Villanueva, where
what emerges from a perusal of the record is
that this counsel was merely picked out
and provided by the law enforcers
themselves, thus putting into serious
doubt her independence and
competence in assisting appellant
during the investigation as to affect its
admissibility.
Again, about the only matter that bears out
the presence of such counsel at that stage of
custodial interrogation are the signatures
which she affixed on the affidavit. Withal, a
cursory reading of the confession itself and
SPO1 Atanacio's version of the manner in
which he conducted the interrogation, yields
no evidence or indication pointing to her
having explained to the appellant his rights
under the Constitution.
The objective is to prohibit
"incommunicado" interrogation of
individuals in a police-dominated
atmosphere, resulting in selfincriminating statements without
full warnings of constitutional
rights.
The rights above specified, to repeat,
exist only in "custodial
interrogations," or "in-custody
interrogation of accused persons."
And, as this Court has already stated,
by custodial interrogation is meant
"questioning initiated by law

enforcement officers after a


person has been taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of
his freedom of action in any
significant way." The situation
contemplated has also been more
precisely described by this Court.
. . . After a person is
arrested and his custodial
investigation begins, a
confrontation arises
which at best may be
termed unequal. The
detainee is brought to an
army camp or police
headquarters and there
questioned and "crossexamined" not only by
one but as many
investigators as may be
necessary to break down
his morale. He finds
himself in strange and
unfamiliar
surroundings, and
every person he
meets, he considers
hostile to him. The
investigators are welltrained and seasoned
in their work. They
employ all the
methods and means
that experience and
study have taught
them to extract the
truth, or what may
pass for it, out of the
detainee. Most
detainees are
unlettered and are not
aware of their
constitutional rights.
And even if they were,
the intimidating and
coercive presence of
the officers of the law
in such an atmosphere
overwhelms them into
silence. Section 20 of
the Bill of Rights seeks
to remedy this
imbalance.
Equally inadmissible, for being integral
parts of the uncouselled admission or
fruits of the poisonous tree are the
photographs of subsequent acts which

the accused was made to do in order to


obtain proof to support such admission
or confession, such as (a) his digging in
the place where Virginia Trangia was
allegedly buried, (b) his retrieving of
the bones discovered therein (c) his
posing before a photographer while
executing such acts.
Evidently, herein appellant cannot be
made to suffer the extreme penal
consequences of the crimes on account
of the shaky and decrepit circumstantial
evidence proffered by the prosecution.
While the defense of alibi advanced by
appellant is by nature a weak one by itself, it
assumes commensurate significance and
strength where the evidence for the
prosecution itself is frail and effete. For,
needless to state, the prosecution must
not rely on the weakness of the
evidence of the defense but upon the
vigor of its own. In sum, the presumption
of innocence enjoyed by appellant has
remained intact and impervious to the
prosecution's assault thereon.
accused-appellant Rodolfo de la
Cruz, alias Rodolfo Domingo or "Ompong," is
hereby ACQUITTED.
PEOPLE v ESCORDIAL
Facts
Petitioners were all living in the ground
floor of a boarding house. On the night of the
crime (December 27, 1997), a jeep was
parked in front of the boarding house where
children (later witnesses) were playing. They
were told to go home by a man who would
be later identified as the accused. While the
three were sleeping, Erma was awakened by
the presence of a man. This man had his
head covered with a t-shirt to prevent
identification and carried a knife about
four inches long. He asked for her
money and was able to get P500 from
her. She then turned to the other petitioners
who were already awake by that time and
was able to take P3100 from Michelle
and none from Teresa because her bag was
in the other room. After taking the money,
they were told to blindfold one another.
He then proceeded to have carnal
knowledge with Michelle. Michelle said
that although she was blindfolded and could
not see, she could feel that the man had no
cover on his face when he was raping

her. She felt that his chest was rough


and had some scars. When he placed her
hands on his nape, she felt that it was also
rough (keloid). On the other hand, Erma
claimed she was able to see through her
blindfold and that she saw the mans
face.
After he finished raping Michelle, he
sat down on the bed and talked to the
women. He then raped Michelle for the
second time, threatening her so shed
concede that it would be much worse if hed
call others (companions) from outside to
rape her. After which (about 12:30am) he
left. PO3 Tancinco was one of those who
responded to the crime. A report was made
in the police station. Subsequent searches,
through the descriptions of the petitioners,
the children playing in the jeep in front of the
boarding house, and others led to the
pinpointing of accused-appellant.
Accused was playing in basketball
when the police invited him to the
Pontevedra police station for questioning. At
the station Michelle saw him and she
identified him as his alleged robber and
rapist. He was also brought to the
Bacolod police station so that the other
witnesses could identify him. They
picked him out of four in the line-up.
Accused claims that he went home to
Pontevedra, Negros Occidental at the time of
the incident as testified by three other
witnesses for the defense.
(Accused, having become the focus of
attention by the police after he had been
pointed to by a certain Ramie as the
possible perpetrator of the crime)
Issue: WON, the accused is already
under custodial investigation?
HELD
SC held that when the out-of-court
identification was conducted by the
police, the accused was already under
custodial investigation.
OUT-OF-COURT IDENTIFICATION: This
should have been inadmissible because
identification of an uncounseled
accused made in a police line-up (where
the suspect is identified by a witness
from a group of persons gathered for
that purpose), or in a show-up (where
the accused is brought face to face with

witness for identification) for that


matter, after the start of the custodial
investigation is inadmissible as
evidence against him. However, again,
failure to object when these pieces of
evidence were presented constituted a
waiver.
During custodial investigation, these
types of identification have been
recognized as critical confrontations of
the accused by the prosecution,
necessitating the presence of counsel
for the accused. This is because the
result of these pre-trial proceedings
might well settle the fate of the
accused and reduce the trial to a mere
formality Thus, any identification of an
uncounseled accused made in a police
line-up or in a show-up after the start of
custodial investigation is inadmissible
in evidence against him.
TESTIMONIES OF THE WITNESSES (regarding
the identity of the accused): should be
regarded as inadmissible under the fruit of
the poisonous tree doctrine.
IN-COURT IDENTIFICATION: inadmissibility of
these out-of-court identifications does not
render the in-court identification of accusedappellant inadmissible for being the fruits of
the poisonous tree. As it was not derived or
drawn from the illegal arrest of accusedappellant or as a consequence
PEOPLE vs BENITO BRAVO
On January 15, 1994 the decomposing
body of nine year old girl named Juanita
Len-len Antolin was found in a vacant lot
along the road leading Rosario, Santiago City
between two concrete fences half naked,
shirtless and skirt pulled up, her panty
stuffed in her mouth. The scalp on the left
side of her head was detached exposing a
fracture on the left temporal lobe of her
skull. Vaginal examination showed fresh
laceration at 2:30 oclock and old
lacerations at 5:00 and 7:00 oclock and
easily accepts two fingers. The cause of
death was cerebral hemorrhage
On May 25, 1994 an Information for rape
with homicide[5] was filed against BENITO
BRAVO that he willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with lewd design and by means
of violence and intimidation, have carnal
knowledge with Len-len & inflicting upon her,

a fracture on the skull, which directly caused


her death.
On September 26, 1994 the accused was
arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged.
Evelyn San Mateo an eight year old
second grader from Rosario, Santiago City
neighbor and cousin of the victim testified
that she was with the deceased the
night before she disappeared. She
stated that while they stood on the
roadside watching Home Along Da
Riles from an open window of a neighbors
house the appellant approached them
and asked Len-Len to come with him to
a birthday party and then he will buy
her Coke and balut. Len-Len asked her
to go with them but she did not want to
because
she
was
watching
television. Len-Len went alone with the
accused. The following morning Len-Lens
mother told Evelyn and her mother that LenLen
was
missing. In
court,
Evelyn
positively identified the appellant as
the person last seen with Len-len
before she was found dead.
The owner of the house where Len-len
and Evelyn watched television, Gracia
Monahan, corroborated Evelyns testimony
that on the evening she saw the appellant
talking to Len-len while the two girls were
watching television from her open window
and that when she looked again towards the
end of the program to the direction where
the girls were situated, only Evelyn was
left
watching
television. Monahan
testified that she is familiar with the
appellant and the two children because they
are neighbors.
The Chief of the Intelligence Section of
the Santiago Police Department, Alexander
Mico interviewed Evelyn who pointed to the
appellant as the man last seen with the
deceased. Mico found the appellant at his
place of work at the Spring Garden Resort at
Sinsayon, Santiago City. Upon seeing Bravo,
Mico informed him that he is a suspect
in the killing of a girl in Rosario,
Santiago City and asked him to come
with him for questioning. The appellant
agreed. Mico further narrated in court that
at the police station the appellant
admitted he was with the girl and he
carried her on his shoulder but he was
so drunk that night that he does not

remember what he did to her. On crossexamination Mico admitted that he did not
inform the appellant of his constitutional
rights to remain silent, to counsel and of his
right against self-incrimination before the
appellant made the said admission because
he was only informally interviewing the
accused when he made the admission and
that custodial interrogation proper was
conducted by the assigned investigator.
Appellant admitted in court that he
passed by the house of Gracia Monahan but
stated that he did not see the two girls
watching television along the road. At
home, he found his mother very sick and so
he decided to stay home all night. He woke
up the following morning at around 4:30 a.m.
and prepared to go to work. On January 15,
1994 a policeman came to his place of work
and apprehended him without a warrant
of arrest and at the police station he
was forced to admit commission of the
crime of rape. The appellant denied the
accusation and stated that the deceased
was his godchild and that he has known
Fely Handoc, the mother of the child, for
three years prior to this proceedings
Juanito Bravo, the brother of the
appellant testified that the appellant stayed
home on the night of January 12, 1994 to
take care of their sick mother who died a few
days thereafter. Ernesto Pastor, the foreman
at the Spring Garden Resort where the
appellant was employed, testified that he
has known the appellant for a long time and
that he knows him to be hardworking
and of good moral character. Pastor
corroborated the appellants testimony
that police investigator Mico came to the
Spring Garden Resort and arrested Bravo
without a warrant.
The testimony of the Municipal Health
Officer who conducted the autopsy was
dispensed with by the prosecution as the
handwritten Autopsy Report made by the
Municipal Health Officer of Santiago, Isabela,
marked as Exhibit B, was admitted by both
parties.
Was investigated under the mango tree
where the crime was committed and left side
of the face is covered by sand (done by
anay) with rigor mortis and with putrification,
easy pulling of the skin and plenty of small
worms coming out from the ears, nose,

eyes and mouth (without panty), the whole


body is edematous.
After complete washing, coming out of small
worms on both eyes and ears and mouth,
scalp on the left side was detached and
skull exposed.
-Fracture of the skull with left temporal
-Edematous
-Abdomen, extremities has no pertinent
findings except easy pulling of skin and all
are edematous
Vaginal examination- shows fresh laceration
at 2:30 oclock, old lacerations at 5:00 and
7:00 oclock-could easily accept two fingers.
Cause of death- cerebral hemorrhage
(fracture of skull temporal region, left).
trial court Wherefore, finding the accused
BENITO BRAVO GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of RAPE WITH HOMICIDE
This case is before us on automatic review
in view of the penalty imposed by the trial
court.
Both counsels for the accused-appellant
and the appellee plead for the acquittal of
the accused. Both the accused-appellant
and
the
appellee
invoke
the
constitutionally guarded presumption of
innocence in favor of the accused and
the latters right to remain silent and to
counsel. The testimony of the policeman
that the accused admitted he was with the
victim on the evening of January 12, 1994
but the latter was too drunk to remember
what happened should have been held
inadmissible by the trial court in view of the
policemans own admission, he did not
inform the accused of his constitutional
rights before he asked him of his
participation
in
the
crime
under
investigation.
Trial court erred in relying merely the
sole circumstantial evidence that the victim
was last seen by her cousin in the
company of the accused whereas the
Rules of Court clearly requires the
presence of at least two proven
circumstances & cannot serve as basis
for any conclusion leading to the guilt of
the accused of the crime charged. The

evidence for the prosecution falls short of


the quantum of evidence required by the
Rules to establish guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt. In sum, both
the appellant and the appellee profess that
the presumption of innocence of the accused
was not successfully overturned by the
prosecution.
We resolve to acquit Benito Bravo.
Section 12 of Article III of the 1987
Constitution embodies the mandatory
protection afforded a person under
investigation for the commission of a
crime and the correlative duty of the
State and its agencies to enforce such
mandate. It states:
The mantle of protection under this
constitutional provision covers the period
from the time a person is taken into
custody for investigation of his possible
participation in the commission of a crime
or from the time he is singled out as a
suspect in the commission of a crime
although
not
yet
in
custody The
exclusionary rule sprang from a recognition
that police interrogatory procedures lay
fertile grounds for coercion, physical
and psychological, of the suspect to
admit responsibility for the crime under
investigation. It is to protect the
accused from admitting what he is
coerced to admit although untrue. Law
enforcement agencies are required to
effectively communicate the rights of a
person under investigation and to
insure that it is fully understood. Any
measure short of this requirement is
considered a denial of such right. Courts are
not
allowed
to
distinguish
between
preliminary
questioning
and
custodial
investigation proper when applying the
exclusionary rule. Any information or
admission given by a person while in
custody which may appear harmless or
innocuous at the time without the
competent
assistance
of
an
independent counsel should be struck
down as inadmissible. It has been held,
however, that an admission made to
news reporters or to a confidant of the
accused
is
not
covered
by
the
exclusionary rule.
The admission was allegedly made to the
arresting officer during an informal talk at
the police station after his arrest as a prime

suspect. The arresting policeman admitted


that he did not inform the appellant of
his constitutional rights to remain silent
and to counsel. We note that the alleged
admission is incriminating because it
places the accused in the company of the
victim at the time the crime was probably
committed.
The exclusionary rule applies.
Any statement allegedly made by him
pertaining to his possible complicity in the
crime without prior notification of his
constitutional rights is inadmissible in
evidence. The appellant was not invited
to the police station as part of a general
inquiry for any possible lead to the
perpetrators
of
the
crime
under
investigation. At the time the alleged
admission was made the appellant was
in custody and had been arrested as the
prime suspect in the rape and killing.
The exclusionary rule presumes that the
alleged admission was coerced, the very evil
the rule stands to avoid. Supportive of such
presumption is the absence of a written
extra-judicial confession to that effect and
the appellants denial in court of the alleged
oral admission. The alleged admission
should be struck down as inadmissible.
. We must however uphold the
primacy
of
the
presumption
of
innocence in favor of the accused when
the evidence at hand falls short of the
quantum
required
to
support
conviction.
The appellant
acquitted.

Benito

Bravo

is

**A police line-up is not considered a


part of any custodial inquest, because it
is conducted before that stage of
investigation is reached.

PEOPLE VS. BALOLOY


FACTS: At the waterfalls of Barangay
Inasagan, Aurora, Zamboanga del Sur, on the
evening of August 3, 1996, the dead body of
an 11-year-old girl Genelyn Camacho
was found. Autopsy reports found that
Genelyn was raped before she was
drowned. The one who caused its
discovery was accused-appellant Juanito

Baloloy himself, who claimed that he had


caught sight of it while he was catching
frogs in a nearby creek. While in the
wake of Genelyn, Juanito confessed to the
Barangay Captain that he only wanted to
frighten the girl but ended up raping and
throwing her body in the ravine. While in the
custody of the authorities, he was asked
incriminating questions by Judge Dicon
who justified his actions saying that Juanito
was not yet in custodial investigation.
Based on his alleged extrajudicial confession,
coupled with circumstantial evidence, the
trial court found Juanito guilty of rape
with homicide and sentenced him to death.
On appeal, Juanito maintains that the trial
court violated Section 12(1) of Article III
of the Constitution when it admitted in
evidence
his
alleged
extrajudicial
confession to Barangay Captain Ceniza
and Judge Dicon. According to him, the two
failed to inform him of his constitutional
rights before they took it upon themselves to
elicit from him the incriminatory information.
It is of no moment that Ceniza and Dicon are
not police investigators, for as public
officials it was incumbent upon them to
observe the express mandate of the
Constitution. While these rights may be
waived, the prosecution failed to show that
he effectively waived his rights through a
written waiver executed in the presence of
counsel. He concludes that his extrajudicial
confession is inadmissible in evidence.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not Juanitos extrajudicial
confession before the barangay captain was
admissible.
(2) Whether or not Juanitos extrajudicial
confession before the was admissible.
HELD:
(1)YES. As to his confession with the Baragay
Captain Ceniza, it has been held that the
constitutional provision on custodial
investigation does not apply to a
spontaneous statement, not elicited
through questioning by the authorities
but given in an ordinary manner
whereby the suspect orally admits
having committed the crime. Neither
can
it
apply
to
admissions
or
confessions made by a suspect in the
commission of a crime before he is
placed under investigation. What the
Constitution bars is the compulsory
disclosure of incriminating facts or
confessions. In the instant case, Juanito
voluntarily narrated to Ceniza that he raped
GENELYN and thereafter threw her body into
the ravine. This narration was a spontaneous
answer, freely and voluntarily given in an
ordinary manner. It was given before he was
arrested or placed under custody for
investigation
in
connection
with
the

commission of the offense. Moreover, Juanito


did not offer any evidence of improper or
ulterior motive on the part of Ceniza, which
could have compelled her to testify falsely
against him.
(2) NO. However, there is merit in
Juanitos claim that his constitutional
rights during custodial investigation
were violated by Judge Dicon when the
latter propounded to him incriminating
questions without informing him of his
constitutional rights. It is settled that at
the moment the accused voluntarily
surrenders to, or is arrested by, the
police
officers,
the
custodial
investigation
is
deemed
to
have
started. So, he could not thenceforth be
asked about his complicity in the offense
without the assistance of counsel. Judge
Dicon's claim that no complaint has yet been
filed and that neither was he conducting a
preliminary investigation deserves scant
consideration. The fact remains that at that
time Juanito was already under the
custody of the police authorities, who
had already taken the statement of the
witnesses who were then before Judge
Dicon for the administration of their
oaths on their statements.

PEOPLE vs. CLEMENTE JOHN LUGOD

Rape with homicide was filed against


CLEMENTE JOHN LUGOD in Cavinti,
province of Laguna by means force and
intimidation and with lewd designs, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have carnal knowledge with one NAIRUBE J.
RAMOS, an eight-year old girl, against her
will and by reason or on the same occasion
and in order to hide the crime he just
committed, dump the victim in the
grassy coconut plantation area, which
resulted in her death due to shock
secondary to vulvar laceration
EDILBERTO CASTILLO, the medicolegal officer who examined the cadaver of
Nairube on September 19, 1997, testified
that during the course of his examination of
the cadaver, he discovered an 8 cm. wound
penetration in her vagina which was
probably caused by the insertion of a penis;
that the cadaver was in an advanced state of
decomposition; that more or less, the
approximate time of death of the victim was
three (3) days prior to his examination; and
that the cause of death of the victim was

hypovolenic
laceration.[4]

shock

secondary

to

the

RICARDO VIDA, the Task Force Chief of


Cavinti, the accused pointed out where
the body of the victim was; he was
handcuffed to the accused
VIOLETA
CABUHAT
;
LORETO
VELORIA;
PEDRO
DELA
TORRE;
ROMUALDO RAMOS; ALMA DIAZ ; HELEN
DANILO RAMOS, the parents of the victim
and
SPO2 QUIRINO GALLARDO testified
that on September 16, 1997 at around 7:30
in the a.m., Helen Ramos reported that
her daughter, Nairube, was missing. He
thereafter proceeded to the house of the
victim together with members of the Crime
Investigation Group, the PNP and some
townspeople
to
conduct
an
ocular
inspection. Helen Ramos gave him a pair
of slippers and pointed to him the
location
where
she
found
the
same. Alma Diaz also gave him a black
T-shirt which she found. Loreto Veloria
informed him that the two items were
worn by the accused when he went to
the house of Violeta Cabuhat. At around
7:00 p.m., he apprehended the accused on
the basis of the pair of slippers and the black
T-shirt. He then brought the accused to the
police station where he was temporarily
incarcerated. At first, the accused denied
that he did anything to Nairube but after he
told him what happened to the
girl. Gallardo claims that the accused told
him that after the drinking spree on
September 15, 1997, the accused wanted to
have sexual intercourse with a woman. So
after the drinking spree, the accused
went to the house of Gemma Lingatong,
the neighbor of Helen Ramos. Upon his
arrival at the house of Gemma, he bumped
pots which awakened the occupants of the
house. Considering the commotion he
caused, he left and went to the house of
Nairube Ramos. After removing his slippers,
he entered the house of Nairube and slowly
went upstairs. He saw that Helen Ramos
was sleeping beside her husband so he
took Nairube instead. In court, Gallardo
demonstrated how the accused claimed to
have lifted the child by raising two of his
hands as if he was lifting something off
the ground. After taking Nairube, he
brought her to the farm where according to
the accused; he raped her three

times. After successfully raping Nairube,


the accused slept. When he woke up, he
saw the lifeless body of Nairube which
he wrapped in a blanket and hid in a
grassy place. Then, he took a bath in the
river. He then returned to Villa Anastacia
and went out through its gate. Although he
admitted to having raped and killed Nairube,
the accused refused to make a statement
regarding the same. After having been
informed that the body of Nairube was in the
grassy area, Gallardo together with other
members of the PNP, the Crime Watch
and the townspeople continued the
search but they were still not able to find
the body of Nairube. It was only when they
brought the accused to Villa Anastacia to
point out the location of the cadaver that
they found the body of Nairube. Gallardo
stated that the accused pointed to the
location by using his lips. (PO2 ANTONIO
DECENA agree)
FLORO ESGUERRA, the Vice-Mayor of
Cavinti, he attended the funeral of
Nairube. After the funeral, he visited the
accused in his cell. In the course of his
conversation with the accused, the accused
confessed to the commission of the offense
RTC rendered a decision finding the
accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of rape with homicide.
In view of the imposition of the death
penalty, the case is now before this Court on
automatic review.
In support of his appeal, accused-appellant
submits that the evidence presented by the
prosecution fails to establish that he raped
and killed Nairube Ramos beyond reasonable
doubt. He claims that the alleged
confession he made to the vice-mayor
was not a confession.
Issue: WON, accused entitled with Miranda
rights?

Held:.
Yes. There is no question that at the time
of his apprehension, accused-appellant was
already placed under arrest and was
suspected of having something to do with
the disappearance of Nairube. In fact, the
lower
court
declared
that
accused-

appellants warrantless arrest was valid


based on Section 5 (b) of Rule 113 of the
Rules of Court.[19] However, at the time of his
arrest, the apprehending officers did not
inform the accused-appellant and in
fact acted in a blatant and wanton
disregard of his constitutional rights
specified in Section 12, Article III of the
Constitution.
He was not informed of his right to
remain silent and to counsel, and that if
he cannot afford to have counsel of his
choice, he would be provided with
one. Moreover, there is no evidence to
indicate that he intended to waive
these rights. Besides, even if he did
waive these rights, in order to be valid,
the waiver must be made in writing and
with
the
assistance
of
counsel. Consequently,
his
act
of
confessing to SPO2 Gallardo that he raped
and killed Nairube without the assistance of
counsel cannot be used against him for
having transgressed accused-appellants
rights under the Bill of Rights. This is a
basic tenet of our Constitution which
cannot be disregarded or ignored no matter
how brutal the crime committed may
be. In the same vein, the act in pointing out
the location of the body of Nairube was also
elicited in violation of the accusedappellants right to remain silent. The same
was an integral part of the uncounselled
confession and is considered a fruit of the
poisonous tree. Thus, reiterated People vs.
De La Cruz.
Even if we were to assume that accusedappellant was not yet under interrogation
and thus not entitled to his constitutional
rights at the time he was brought to the
police station, the acts of accused-appellant
subsequent to his apprehension cannot be
characterized as having been voluntarily
made considering the peculiar circumstances
surrounding his detention. His confession
was elicited by SPO2 Gallardo who promised
him that he would help him if he told the
truth. Furthermore, when accused-appellant
allegedly pointed out the body of the victim,
SPO2 Gallardo, the whole police force as well
as nearly one hundred (100) of the
townspeople of Cavinti escorted him
there. Ricardo
Vida
stated
that
the
townspeople were antagonistic towards
accused-appellant and wanted to hurt him.
The atmosphere from the time accusedappellant was apprehended and taken to the

police station up until the time he was


alleged to have pointed out the location of
the body of the victim was highly
intimidating and was not conducive to a
spontaneous response. Amidst such a highly
coercive atmosphere, accused-appellants
claim that he was beaten up and maltreated
by the police officers raises a very serious
doubt as to the voluntariness of his alleged
confession. The Vice-Mayor, who testified
that when he visited accused-appellant in
the jail cell, he noticed that the accusedappellant
had
bruises
on
his
face,
corroborated accused-appellants assertion
that he was maltreated.[24]
In addition, the records do not support
the confession allegedly made by the
accused-appellant to the Mayor and ViceMayor of Cavinti. Records show that the
Mayor of Cavinti did not testify in the
criminal trial. Moreover, the testimony of
the Vice-Mayor with respect to the alleged
confession made by the accused-appellant is
not
conclusive. The
Vice-Mayors
testimony reads as follows:
As can be seen from the testimony of the
Vice-Mayor,
accused-appellant
merely
responded to the ambiguous questions
that the Vice-Mayor propounded to
him. He did not state in certain and
categorical terms that he raped and
killed Nairube. In fact, the Vice-Mayor
admitted that the accused-appellant did not
tell him that he raped and killed Nairube. In
addition, we note the contradiction between
the testimony of the Vice-Mayor who stated
that he was alone when he spoke to the
accused-appellant and that of SPO2 Gallardo
who claimed that he was present when
accused-appellant confessed to the Mayor
and Vice-Mayor.
Not having the benefit of counsel & not
having been informed of his rights, the
confession is inadmissible, thus, Clemente
John Lugod alias HONASAN is ACQUITTED.

PEOPLE VS. JUDGE AYSON [175 SCRA


216; G.R. NO. 85215; 7 JUL 1989]

Facts: Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight


clerk of the Philippine Airlines, assigned
at its Baguio City station. It was alleged that
he was involved in irregularities in the

sales
of
plane
tickets,
the
PAL
management notified him of an investigation
to be conducted. That investigation was
scheduled in accordance with PAL's Code of
Conduct and Discipline, and the Collective
Bargaining Agreement signed by it with the
Philippine Airlines Employees' Association
(PALEA) to which Ramos pertained. A letter
was sent by Ramos stating his willingness to
settle the amount of P76,000. The findings of
the Audit team were given to him, and he
refuted that he misused proceeds of tickets
also stating that he was prevented from
settling said amounts. He proffered a
compromise however this did not ensue. Two
months after a crime of estafa was charged
against Ramos. Ramos pleaded not guilty.
Evidence by the prosecution contained
Ramos written admission and statement, to
which defendants argued that the confession
was taken without the accused being
represented by a lawyer. Respondent
Judge did not admit those stating that
accused was not reminded of his
constitutional rights to remain silent
and to have counsel. A motion for
reconsideration filed by the prosecutors was
denied. Hence this appeal.
Issue: Whether or Not the respondent Judge
correct in making inadmissible as evidence
the admission and statement of accused.
Held: No. Section 20 of the 1987
constitution provides that the right against
self-incrimination (only to witnesses other
than accused, unless what is asked is
relating to a different crime charged- not
present in case at bar).
This is accorded to every person who gives
evidence, whether voluntarily or under
compulsion of subpoena, in any civil,
criminal, or administrative proceeding. The
right is not to "be compelled to be a witness
against himself. It prescribes an "option of
refusal
to
answer
incriminating
questions and not a prohibition of
inquiry." the right can be claimed only when
the specific question, incriminatory in
character, is actually put to the witness. It
cannot be claimed at any other time. It does
not give a witness the right to disregard a
subpoena, to decline to appear before the
court at the time appointed, or to refuse to
testify altogether. It is a right that a witness
knows or should know. He must claim it and
could
be
waived.
Rights in custodial interrogation as laid down
in miranda v. Arizona: the rights of the
accused include:
1) he shall have the right to remain

silent and to counsel, and to be


informed of such right.
2)
nor
force,
violence,
threat,
intimidation, or any other means which
vitiates the free will shall be used
against him.
3) any confession obtained in violation
of these rights shall be inadmissible in
evidence.
The
individual
may
knowingly
and
intelligently waive these rights and agree to
answer or make a statement. But unless and
until
such
rights
and
waivers
are
demonstrated by the prosecution at the trial,
no evidence obtained as a result of
interrogation can be used against him.
custody investigation which has been
defined as questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has been
taken into custody or otherwise deprived of
his freedom of action in any significant way.
The rule begins to operate at once as soon
as the investigation ceases to be a general
inquiry into an unsolved crime, and direction
is then aimed upon a particular suspect who
has been taken into custody and to whom
the police would then direct interrogatory
questions which tend to elicit incriminating
statements.
NAVALLO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
Facts: Accused was the Collecting and
Disbursing Officer of the Numancia
National Vocational School, which school
is also located at del Carmen, Surigao del
Norte. His duties included the collection of
tuition fees, preparation of vouchers
for salaries of teachers and employees,
and remittance of collections exceeding
P500.00 to the National Treasury. An
information for malversation of public
funds was filed. A warrant of arrest was
issued, but accused-petitioner could not be
found.
on 10 December 1978, Presidential Decree
No. 1606 took effect creating the
Sandiganbayan and conferring on it original
and exclusive jurisdiction over crimes
committed by public officersembraced in
Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. On 15
November 1984, Navallo was finally arrested.
He was released on provisional liberty
upon the approval of his property bail
bond
Upon motion of the prosecution, the RTC
transferred the case and transmitted its
records to the Sandiganbayan. Special
Prosecutor Luz L. Quiones-Marcos opined
that since Navallo had already been
arraigned before the case was
transferred to the Sandiganbayan, the
RTC should continue taking cognizance of the
case. The matter was referred to the Office

of the Ombudsman which held otherwise.


The information was then docketed with the
Sandiganbayan. A new order for Navallo's
arrest was issued by the Sandiganbayan. The
warrant was returned with a certification by
the RTC Clerk of Court that the accused had
posted a bail bond. Navallo filed a motion to
quash, contending (1) that the
Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over
the offense and the person of the
accused and (2) that since the accused had
already been arraigned by the RTC, the
attempt to prosecute him before the
Sandiganbayan would constitute double
jeopardy. However this was denied and trial
ensued and he was found guilty.

interview, he admitted that it was his


nephew Endino who shot Aquino and he
was only an accomplice in the crime. This
interview was aired on TV Patrol.

Issue: Whether or Not the constitutional


right against custodial investigations in favor
of the accused violated?

HELD

Held: No. Appellant is not in custodial


investigation. A person under a normal
audit examination is not under
custodial investigation. An audit
examiner himself can hardly be deemed
to be the law enforcement
officer contemplated in the above rule.
In any case, the allegation of his having
been "pressured" to sign the
Examination Report prepared by
Dulguime (examined cash, as ordered by
Espino, the provincial auditor) appears to
be belied by his own testimony.
The rights enumerated are not available
before police investigators become
involved. Thus the protection is not
available to a person undergoing audit
because an audit examiner is not a law
enforcement officer.

People vs. Edward Endino and Gerry


Galgarin
FACTS:
Edward Endino, with the aid of his uncle
Gerry Galgarin, were charged with the
murder of Dennis Aquino who was
Endino's rival for the love of Aquino's
girlfriend Clara Agagas. The suspects fled
after killing Aquino. However, through the
combined efforts of the Antipolo and Palawan
police forces, Galgarin was arrested and
taken into custody in the Antipolo
Police Station. He was to be transferred
to Palawan for him to be tried there.
On their way to the airport, they stopped at
the ABS CBN TV station where Galgarin
had an interview with the media. In the

However, during the trial, the accusedappellant pleaded not guilty and disowned
his interview with TV Patrol. He claimed that
he was coerced by police officers to
admit to the crime.
ISSUE
WON, the accused-appellant's videotaped
confession is admissible as evidence in
court?

YES. The interview did not form part of


the custodial investigation. Moreover, it
was made spontaneously and voluntarily
by the accused-appellant. There was no
evidence that he was indeed coerced or
threatened by the police to do the interview.

Nevertheless, the Court still left a word of


caution
against
presumptions
that
confessions to the media are always
voluntary and permissible as evidence
in court. The constitutional safeguards for
the rights of the accused should never be
disregarded.
Therefore,
people
must
ascertain whether such confessions are
made under duress or with the influence of
police officers.
** SC ruled that the admission of the
videotaped confession is proper. The
interview was recorded on video and it
showed accused unburdening his guilt
willingly, openly, and publicly in the presence
of newsmen. Such confession does not form
part of custodial investigation as it was not
given to police officers but to media men in
an attempt to solicit sympathy and
forgiveness from the public. There was no
showing that the interview was coerced or
against his will. However, because of the
inherent danger in the use of television as a
medium for admitting ones guilt, courts are
reminded that extreme caution must be
taken
in
further
admitting
similar
confessions.
**Such investigation does not form part of
custodial investigation as it was not given to
police officers but to media men in an
attempt to elicit sympathy and forgiveness

from the public. Besides, if he had indeed


been forced into confessing, he could have
easily sought succor from the newsmen who,
in
all
likelihood,
would
have
been
sympathetic with him. However, because of
the inherent danger in the use of the
television as a medium for admitting ones
guilt, and the recurrence of this phenomenon
in several cases, it is prudent that the trial
courts are reminded that extreme caution
must be taken in further admitting similar
confessions. For in all probability, the police,
with the connivance of unscrupulous media
practitioners, may attempt to legitimize
coerced extrajudicial confessions and place
them beyong the exclusionary rule by having
an accused admit an offense on television.
We should never presume that all media
confessions described as voluntary have
been freely given.
People vs. Eric Guillermo GR 147786,
January 20, 2004
FACTS
This is an automatic review of the Antipolo
RTC's decision to convict accused Guillermo
of the crime of murder, thereby sentencing
him to death.
The accused allegedly murdered Victor
Keyser, the owner of Keyser Plastics and
employer of the accused. According to the
security guard of the factory, the accused
asked him to dispose of Keyser's corpse.
Shocked by this revelation, the guard ran to
the police station and reported the matter to
the authorities.
When the police officers arrived at the scene,
the accused calmly surrendered and
admitted that he killed Keyser. He even
narrated how he bashed Keyser on the head
and dismembered him thereafter. He also
said that he did not regret his actions.
The accused was interviewed by news
reporters Gus Abelgas of ABS CBN and Karen
David of GMA. Both interviews were
broadcast nationwide. He also told David the
details of the killing.
The accused initially entered a plea of guilty,
but subsequently changed it to not guilty.
His defense consisted of outright denial and
he alleged that he was just framed-up.
ISSUE

1
2

Whether the police officers violated


the accused's Miranda rights.
Whether the accused's confession to
the media is admissible as evidence
against him.

HELD
1

YES. First, he made his confession


without the assistance of counsel. The
police also did not make an active
effort to make sure he was provided
with
one
before
they
began
questioning the accused.

Second, although the police contended that


the accused was informed of his rights, it
was found that the accused was only made
to read a list of rights posted on the wall of
the police station. There was no evidence
that he actually understood those rights.
According to the Court, a mere reading of the
constitutional rights of the accused is not
enough; the authorities must also make sure
that the accused understood his rights.
Third, the confession that the police obtained
from him was inadmissible as evidence
against the accused because it did not
conform to the following requirements: (1) it
must be voluntary; (2) it must be express; (3)
it must be made in the presence of counsel;
and (4) it must be made in writing.
Last, even if the police alleged that the
accused waived his right to counsel, there
was no showing that he actually did so
voluntarily, expressly, in the presence of
counsel and in writing.
2

YES, because it was voluntary and


spontaneous. In fact, he even narrated
how and why he killed the victim. This
strongly contrasts with and overcomes
his outright denial in court.

**Spontaneous statements or those not


elicited through questioning by law
enforcement officers, but given in an
ordinary manner where the appellant
verbally admits to having committed
the offense, are admissible.

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR


vs. JUDGE AUGUSTO SUMILANG
Respondents Judge Augusto Sumilang,
Felicidad Malla, Edelita Lagmay and Nieva
Mercado,
court
employees
of
the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Pila, Laguna

(hereinafter referred to as the lower court),


were charged in a memorandum report by
the Office of Court Administrator dated
August 16, 1994,[1] for misappropriating
funds deposited by the plaintiff in Civil
Case No. 858, entitled Spouses Entero
Villarica and Felicidad Domingo v. Teodorico
Dizon. (administrative complaint )
In addition, a second complaint was
lodged against Malla for removing judicial
records outside the court premises.
This case arose as an aftermath of an
on-the-spot audit examination of the
official cashbook and other documents
of the lower court. It appears from the
evidence that court interpreter Malla who
was the officer-in-charge from July 1, 1992 to
November 15, 1992, took a maternity leave
for one (1) month (November 16, 1992 to
December 15, 1992) and reassumed her
position on December 16, 1992, until her
resignation on August 31, 1993.
On September 1, 1993, Rebecca
Avanzado assumed the position of officer in
charge. It was during her tenure on
August 8, 1994, that an on-the-spot audit
examination was conducted by the
Fiscal Audit Division of the Office of
Court Administrator. In the course of the
examination, several anomalous transactions
were
discovered. One
involved
a
managers check deposited in the name of
Teodorico Dizon in connection with Civil Case
No. 858, wherein Entero Villarica, on August
7, 1992 during the tenure of Malla
entrusted the amount of P240,000.00 to
said respondent instead of handling it
over to the Clerk of Court pursuant to
Supreme Court Circular.
When
asked
to
explain
where
the P240,000.00 was, Malla, explained that
she deposited it at the Sta Cruz, Laguna
branch of the Philippine National Bank but
she and Judge Sumilang later withdrew it
allegedly under the belief that the
defendant, Dizon, would demand the
delivery of the money upon the termination
of the case. Upon further questioning by the
examining team, however, Malla admitted
that she lent the amount of P87,000.00
to steno-reporter Lagmay,P40,000.00 to
steno-reporter Mercado, and P81,000.00 to
Mrs. Sumilang, wife of Judge Sumilang. She
spentP32,000.00 for the hospitalization
of her husband and the remaining
balance for personal purposes.[6]
Later on, she executed an affidavit
stating that only Lagmay and Mercado
borrowed P55,000.00
and P40,000.00,
respectively. On the other hand, she
used P100,000.00 for her personal needs. [7]
Upon learning that they were being
implicated in the anomalous transaction,
Lagmay executed an affidavit stating that

the amount of P55,000.00 was from the


personal account of Malla and not from
the P240,000.00 amount deposited before
the court and such loan has already been
paid.[8] Mercado, on the other hand, claims
that the amount of P40,000.00 was borrowed
only two weeks before the audit took place,
when Malla was no longer employed with the
court.[9] Mrs. Sumilang, for her part, denied
any involvement in any of the transactions.
[10]
After carefully studying the records of this
case, the Court is convinced that
respondents did commit acts prejudicial
to the service for which they should be
held accountable.
The evidence against Judge Sumilang
adequately proves his gross negligence in
this matter. In his proffered explanation, he
averred that his wife did not borrow any
money from Malla and that he had no
knowledge of the irregularities involving
members of his own staff.[11] It bears
emphasizing that this is not the first time
that respondent judge has been charged with
an
administrative
case. In Arviso
v.
Sumilang,[12] this Court found him guilty of
gross negligence and ordered him to pay a
fine of P3,000.00 for his failure to act on a
motion to dismiss in an expeditious manner.
A judge must always remember that as
the administrator of his court, he is
responsible
for
the
conduct
and
management thereof. He has the duty to
supervise his court personnel to ensure
prompt and efficient dispatch of business in
his court. The ignorance of respondent Judge
as to the irregularities occurring in his own
backyard constitutes serious breach of
judicial ethics
Judge Sumilangs excuse, that upon
learning of the irregularities being committed
by his court personnel, he immediately acted
with haste and instructed Malla to turn over
the
money,[15] is
specious
and
unconvincing. His admission that he had no
knowledge regarding the anomalies going
on in his court underscores his inefficiency
and incompetence. It clearly demonstrates a
lack of control expected of a judge exercising
proper office management.
The evidence against Malla is equally
incriminating. It
has
been
clearly
established, and this is not denied by Malla,
[16]
that she misappropriated for her own use
the amount of P240,000.00 which she
received from Villarica, the plaintiff in Civil
Case No. 858, instead of directing him to
deposit said amount with the Municipal
Treasurer. A court interpreter should not
receive payments made by litigants in
relation to their cases in his personal charge.
[17]

In her defense, Malla testified that her


uncle Entero Villarica allowed her to use the

money on the condition that she should be


ready to produce it when necessary. [18] Malla,
however, never presented Villarica as her
witness to bolster her claim which,therefore,
has no evidentiary value for being selfserving. Besides, there is a disputable
presumption
that
evidence
wilfully
suppressed would be adverse if produced
during trial.[19]
Malla
further
claims
that
her
constitutional rights under Section 12,
Article III of the Constitution[20] were
violated when she was pressured to
sign an affidavit before the Office of the
Court
Administrator,
where
she
admitted
her
misdeed.[21] Thus,
she
concludes
that
the
affidavit
is
inadmissible in evidence.
In People v. Loveria,[22] however, we ruled
that the aforementioned constitutional
provision may be invoked only during
custodial investigation or as in
custody investigation which has been
defined as questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has
been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way.] The investigation is
defined as an investigation conducted
by police authorities which will include
investigation
conducted
by
the
Municipal Police, P.C. (now PNP) and the
NBI and such other police agencies in our
government. Thus, the Office of the Court
Administrator can hardly be deemed to
be the law enforcement authority
contemplated in the constitutional
provision. At any rate, Malla admitted
during her testimony that she received the
said check from Villarica covering the
amount
of P240,000.00
payable
to
Dizon. However, when she tried to deposit it
with the Municipal Treasurer, the latter
refused because there was no order from
Judge
Sumilang. Consequently,
Villarica
entrusted said check to her. It was at this
juncture that she used the money for
personal purposes.
Worth stressing is the well-entrenched
principle that in administrative proceedings,
such as the instant case, the quantum of
proof necessary for a finding of guilt is only
substantial evidence.[30] Substantial evidence
has been defined as such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.[31]
In resolving this case, this Court
emphasizes the Constitutional tenet that
(p)ublic office is a public trust. Public
officers and employees must at all times be
accountable to the people, serve them with
outmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and
efficiency, act with patriotism and justice,
and lead modest lives.

WHEREFORE,
respondent
Judge
Augusto Sumilang is hereby found guilty of
gross negligence .Respondent Felicidad Malla
is found guilty of misappropriating funds .
**Because the court administrator is not
a
law
enforcement
officer,
an
investigation conducted by him does
not constitute custodial investigation
within
the
contemplation
of
the
constitutional guarantee.

PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINE, vs. ABELARDO SALONGA
Abelardo Salonga, Flaviano Pangilinan, Amiel
Garcia and Ricardo Licup were charged with
the crime of Qualified Theft through
Falsification of Commercial Document.
That on or before the 23rd day of October,
1986, in the Municipality of Makati, accused,
conspiring and confederating with one
another and mutually helping and aiding one
another, and as such had access to the
preparation of checks in the said
Metrobank and Trust Company, with
grave abuse of confidence, intent of gain
and without the knowledge and consent
of the owner thereof, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take,
steal and carry away the total amount of
P36,480.30 by forging the signature of
officers authorized to sign the said
check and have the said check
deposited in the account of Firebrake
Sales and Services, the supposed payee
when in truth and in fact there is no such
transaction between Firebrake and
Metrobank, thereby causing the preparation
and use of a simulated check described as
Check No. 013702 in the amount of
P36,480.30 making it appear genuine and
authorized, through which they succeeded in
its encashment, enabling them to gain for
themselves the total sum of P36,480.30, to
the damage and prejudice of Metrobank and
Trust Company in the total amount of
P36,480.30.
On January 7, 1991, Salonga was arraigned
and pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.
His co-accused, Flaviano Pangilinan, Amiel
Garcia and Ricardo Licup are still at large.
On July 19, 1993, the RTC rendered its
decision finding Salonga guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Qualified Theft
through Falsification of Commercial
Document.
On January 20, 1987, Arthur Christy Mariano,
lead examiner of Metrobanks Loans and
Placement Department, conducted a spot

audit of the Loans and Placement


Department of Metrobank.

7. The case was already endorsed to the


Department of Internal Affairs by the
Controller.

Unauthorized Issuance of Cashiers check


Test-verification of the daily issuance of
cashiers checks by the Loans and Placement
Department disclosed the following:
1. There was a cashiers check issued on
October 23, 1986 under CC No. 013702
payable to a certain Firebreak Sales and
Services for P36,480.30 the xerox copy of
which is shown as EXHIBIT A.
2. The signatures of the authorized
signatories appearing on the subject
cashiers check have an apparent
dissimilarity with their genuine
signature particularly that of Mrs.
Antonia L. Manuel, Manager of Loans
and Placement Department.
3. At the back portion of the Cashiers check,
it was traced that the same was deposited to
Account No. 3021-3900-53 maintained at
BPI-Ayala Ave. Branch. However, we were not
able to establish the name/owner of the
account at BPI.
4. On the day of issuance of the cashiers
check, it was found out that the
corresponding debit and credit balances
appearing in the proof sheet of Loans
and Placement Department are
balanced. However, the supporting
accounting ticket debiting Accounts payable
was short by P36,480.30, the amount of the
cashiers check while the credit accounting
ticket for the Cashiers and Gift Checks
account reflects the correct total of issuances
for the day but the signature of the
Authorized Signature space is forged
5. The Cashiers check in question was
properly recorded in the register maintained
at the FX/Loans Accounting Section. It
passed to the usual clearing procedure
except for the signature verification of
the authorized signatories. Thus, the
unauthorized issuance/dissimilarity of
the signatures could not be readily
detected.
6. The matter was brought to the attention of
the Division Heads concerned who
immediately confronted the responsible
officers, Mr. Abelardo A. Salonga, Acting
Asst. Cashier and Custodian of the
unissued cashiers check at the Loans &
Placement Department and Mr. Flaviano M.
Pangilinan, Asst. Manager of FX/Loans
Accounting Section. Both admitted their
participation on the irregularity/unauthorized
issuance of said cashiers check.

UNAUTHORIZED ISSUANCE OF CASHIERS


CHECK
Except _for the unauthorized issuance of
Cashiers Check No. 013702 for P36,480.30
on October 23, 1986, we found out that the
transactions involving Accounts payable
account are in order per verification
conducted from October to December 1986.
All items lodged under said account were
properly accounted for. As have been
reported, the perpetrators on this particular
scheme are Messrs. Flaviano M. Pangilinan
and Abelardo A. Salonga, Assistant Manager
and Acting Assistant Cashier, respectively.
Mr. Pangilinan made a payment of
P17,500.00 on January 28, 1987 under O.R.
No. 65696 while no payment was received
from Mr. Salonga as of this writing.
Antonia Manuel and Arthur Christy Mariano
both testified that the signature of the
former appearing on the subject check
and on Metrobank Debit (Local) Ticket TR
No. 8 dated October 23, 1986 which was
prepared by accused Amiel S. Garcia
(Exhibits 1, 1-1, 1-2) corresponding to the
subject check, is a forgery after
comparison thereof with the genuine
signature of Antonia Manuel appearing
on the cashiers checks also issued by
the Loans and Placement Department of
Metrobank
Arthur Mariano declared that while the
amount of accounts payable for October 23,
1986 as reflected in the proof sheet of
Metrobanks Loans and Placement
Department is P97,112.17 (Exhibits J, J-1, J2), the total amount of accounts payable by
said department for October 23, 1986 under
Metrobank Debit (Local) Tickets TR No. 8
both dated October 23, 1986 is P60,631.87
(P60,390.58 + P241.29) (Exhibits K, K-1, K-2;
L, L-1, L-2, respectively), which two amounts
under normal circumstances, should be
equal. The difference of the two aforesaid
amounts totaled P36,480.30 which is
equivalent to the amount stated in the
subject cashiers check, which allegedly
shows that the check was issued bereft
of any transaction.
By virtue of the alleged anomaly surrounding
the issuance of the subject cashiers check,
accused Abelardo Salonga was summoned
to appear before Valentino Elevado,
Assistant Accountant, Department of
Internal Affairs of Metrobank. After
allegedly appraising Abelardo Salonga of his
constitutional right to remain silent and
to counsel, an interview in a question and
answer from was conducted. Accused

Abelardo Salonga allegedly waived his


constitutional rights and submitted
himself to the interview. In the course of
the interview, accused Abelardo Salonga
admitted having issued the subject
cashiers check without any legitimate
transaction, to accused Amiel Garcia as
accused who was then encountering
financial difficulties. That out of the
amount of the check, P8,500.00 went to the
personal benefit of accused Abelardo
Salonga.
A letter dated September 15, 1987 was
addressed by accused Abelardo Salonga to
Atty. Severino Tobias of Metrobank Head
Office wherein the former signified his
intention to compromise the case (Exhibits C
to C-3).
Upon the other hand, accused-appellant
relied on denial as his defense; attributed to
simple negligence the loss of the check
which was admittedly in his custody
and also repudiated his extra-judicial
confession. The evidence for the defense
was summarized by the trial court as follows:

and neither did they believe this claim of


innocence.
Upon learning that a criminal complaint was
filed against him, accused Abelardo Salonga
sought the assistance of a lawyer and wrote
a letter to the Personnel Head of Metrobank.
In the said letter, accused Abelardo Salonga
admitted his negligence in connection with
the subject check because of the threats
employed by the investigators and that he
has never been employed nor has he any
interest whatsoever with Firebreak Sales and
Services.
In the letter which accused Abelardo Salonga
sent to Atty. Severino Tabios of Metrobank
(Exhibit C prosecution), said accused offered
to pay the bank the amount of P8,500.00 just
to finish the case so that he can earn a living
and get a new job.
Giving full credence to the evidence of the
prosecution, the trial court convicted
accused-appellant of the crime charged

Defense:
x x x x Abelardo Salonga testified that from
1973 to 1987, he was employed by
Metrobank as an acting assistant cashier.
In such capacity, he was in charge of
managing money market placements and
payments of maturing money placement
investments. Before accused Abelardo
Salonga may prepare and issue a
cashiers check, he must first be instructed
by his manager to do so. Then the prepared
check will be back to the Accounting Section
for examination, then back to the manager
for his signature and to the other officer for
his counter-signature, the check is then
returned to accused Abelardo Salonga for
eventual release to the banks client.
According to Abelardo Salonga, he first
learned that he was being accused of the
present charge after the audit of his
department was concluded. Two persons
from the Internal Affairs Department invited
him to an investigation.
During the investigation, accused Abelardo
Salongas alleged statement was typewritten
but he was neither asked any questions nor
did the investigators talk to him. He was
given an opportunity to read his
statement but only for a limited period
of time. He allegedly affixed his signature
involuntarily on the typewritten statement
after the investigators threatened him and
hit him on the nape. The investigators
never informed him of his right to counsel

IssueWON THE TRIAL COURT ERRED


IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE
ALLEGED EXTRA JUDICIAL
CONFESSION/ADMISSION (EXH. `B') OF
THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT ABELARDO
SALONGA WHICH WAS OBTAINED IN
VIOLATION OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT TO COUNSEL.
HELD: admissibility of accused-appellants
extra-judicial confession/admission
we reject accused-appellants argument that
his so-called extra-judicial
confession/admission is inadmissible in
evidence on the ground that the waiver of
his right to counsel was made without
the assistance of counsel in violation of
Section 20, Article IV of the 1973
Constitution which mandates-- any person
under investigation for the commission of an
offense shall have the right to remain
silent and to counsel, and to be informed
of such right. Any confession obtained
in violation of this section shall be
inadmissible in evidence.
Applying said provision of the 1973
Constitution, the Court in Morales, Jr. vs.
Enrile laid down the guidelines to be
observed strictly by law enforcers during
custodial investigation:

At the time a person is arrested, it shall be


the duty of the arresting officer to inform him
of the reason for the arrest and he must be
shown the warrant of arrest, if any. He shall
be informed of his constitutional rights to
remain silent and to counsel, and that any
statement he might make could be used
against him. The person arrested shall have
the right to communicate with his lawyer, a
relative, or anyone he chooses by the most
expedient means by telephone if possible or by letter or messenger. It shall be the
responsibility of the arresting officer to see to
it that that this is accomplished. No custodial
investigation shall be conducted unless it be
in the presence of counsel engaged by the
person arrested, by any person on his behalf,
or appointed by the court upon petition
either of the detainee himself or by anyone
on his behalf. The right to counsel may be
waived but the waiver shall not be valid
unless made with the assistance of counsel.
Any statement obtained in violation of the
procedure herein laid down, whether
exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in
part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.
Clearly, the constitutional right to counsel as
enunciated in the aforecited case may be
invoked only by a person under custodial
investigation for an offense. Accusedappellants extra-judicial confession was
properly admitted and considered by the trial
court considering that when accusedappellant gave his statement he was not
under custodial investigation. Custodial
investigation is the stage where the police
investigation is no longer a general
inquiry into an unsolved crime but has
begun to focus on a particular suspect
taken into custody by the police who
carry out a process of interrogation that
lends itself to elicit incriminating
statements. Indeed, custodial investigation
refers to questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has
been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way.
In this case, when Arthur Christy Mariano of
the spot audit group discovered that there
was a discrepancy in the proof sheet brought
about by the issuance of a cashiers check
made payable to Firebrake Sales and
Services in the amount of (P36,480.30),
accused-appellant was summoned to
appear before Valentino Elevado,
Assistant Accountant, Department of
Internal Affairs of Metrobank for
questioning. It bears stressing that Elevado
is not a police officer or law enforcer but a
private person who was a bank officer. In the
course of the interview, accused-appellant
admitted having issued the subject cashiers
check without any legitimate transaction, to
his co-accused Amiel Garcia who was then

encountering financial difficulties. He also


admitted that out of the amount of the
check, P8,500.00 went to his personal
benefit. His admissions were reduced
into writing and offered as Exhibit B by the
prosecution. It is well-settled that the legal
formalities required by the fundamental law
of the land apply only to those extra-judicial
confessions obtained during custodial
investigation.
Salonga contends that his confession is
inadmissible as evidence as it violated his
constitutional right to counsel.
HELD: The confession was admissible. His
right to counsel only existed when he is
under custodial investigation. He was not
under custodial investigation during his
interview. He was interviewed by a bank
officer, not a police officer.
**Where, after an audit, the accused
was summoned to appear before the
Assistant Accountant of MetroBank and,
in the course of the interview, accused
admitted having issued the subject
cashiers checks without any legitimate
transaction, the written confession was
held admissible in evidence in as much
as the interview did not constitute
custodial investigation.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,


vs.
AUGUSTO MANZANO y
REYES, respondent.
An information filed on 05 September 1983
before the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
charges
. . . AUGUSTO MANZANO Y
REYES (with) Violation of
Section 4, Article II in relation to
section 2 (i) Article I of Republic
Act No. 6425, as amended by
P.D. 44, as further amended by
P.D. 1675, committed as follows:
That on or about September 2,
1983, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused,
not being authorized by law to
sell, deliver, distribute or
transport to another any
prohibited drug, did then and
there willfully and unlawfully
sell and deliver for monetary
consideration seven (7) teatbag size plastic containing
marijuana flowering tops at

P5.00 per tea bag, which is a


prohibited drug.
The trial of the case was originally presided
over by Hon. Oscar C. Fernandez. When Hon.
Romeo J. Callejo assumed the post of Judge
Fernandez, he promptly ordered the Court
Stenographic Reporters to submit their
transcripts of stenographic notes. To his
dismay, however, discrepancies were
discovered in the transcripts; the
transcriptions submitted by one Mercedes
Velasquez were incomprehensible; and no
stenographic notes were apparently taken
during the testimony of defense witness
Leonardo Quiambao. Upon motion of the
accused's counsel, the incumbent judge
ordered the retaking of the testimonies of
Pat. Gaudencio Quebuyen and defense
witness Leonardo Quiambao and the crossexamination of Pat. Paterno Banawel.
Additional documentary evidence was
likewise admitted.
On 02 October 1987, the court a quo,
following the formal submission of evidence,
rendered judgment, finding the accused
guilty of the crime charged and sentencing
him, thus
WHEREFORE, judgment is
hereby rendered finding the
Accused Augusto Manzano y
Reyes, guilty beyond reasonable
doubt, as principal, for the
crime of violation of Section 4
Article II in relation to Section 2
(e) (i) of Republic Act 6425, as
amended and hereby sentences
him to the penalty
ofRECLUSION PERPETUA, with
accessory penalties of the law
and to pay a fine of P25,000.00,
without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and to pay the costs
of the suit.
The marijuana subject matter of
this case is hereby declared
forfeited in favor of the
government.
The Accused shall be credited
for the entire period of his
detention during the pendency
of this case provided that he
undertook in writing, to abide
by and comply strictly with the
rules and regulations of the City
Jail of Manila.
In this appeal, the accused claims that
THE LOWER COURT (HAS)
GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE

ACCUSED GUILTY OF THE CRIME


CHARGED NOTWITHSTANDING
THE FOLLOWING:
(a) Inadmissibility of evidence
obtained in violation of the
accused's rights under the
Constitution (; and)
(b) Proof of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt has not been
adequately, positively and
convincingly established.
The trial court, in convicting the accusedappellant, relied, in main, on the evidence for
the prosecution, thus
The Drug Enforcement Section of the
Western Police District received information
that the accused was engaged in the sale of
marijuana. On 02 September 1983, a "trialbuy" operation was conducted by the law
enforcement operatives. At five o'clock that
afternoon, a civilian poseur-buyer was able to
purchase from the accused dried flowering
tops of suspected marijuana with cigarette
rolling papers contained in three (3) tea-bag
sized plastic bags. Each bag sold for P5.00.
No arrest was made. At seven o'clock in the
evening of the same day, however, a "buybust" operation, this time conducted by
police officers Sgt. Gaudencio Quebuyen, Pat.
Rolando Anza, Pat. Paterno Banawel, Pat.
Bernabe Yokingco and Pat. Eriberto Alameda,
with Rebecca Avila Reyes, a civilian informer,
as poseur buyer, was set into motion. The
team was so positioned as to have a clear
view of the transaction that was to take
place near an electric post. Not long after,
the poseur-buyer gave the accused four (4)
P5.00 marked bills. The accused left;
moments later, he returned and handed over
to the poseur-buyer four (4) plastic bags, teabag size, containing marijuana flowering tops
and pieces of white rolling paper. Forthwith,
the informer gave the pre-arranged signal
(by scratching her head). The team promptly
moved in and arrested the accused.
Accused-appellant firstly anchors his
assigned error on the fact that he has been
"investigated, interrogated and made to sign
an accomplished booking sheet and arrest
report without the benefit of counsel." 1 The
contention is without merit. This Court has
already emphasized that "(w)hen an arrested
person signs a booking sheet and arrest
report at a police station, he does not
(thereby) admit the commission of an
offense nor confess to any incriminating
circumstance." 2 The booking sheet is no
more than a record of arrest and a statement
on how the arrest is made. It is simply a
police report, and it has no probative value
as an extrajudicial statement of the person
being detained. 3 The signing by the accused

of the booking sheet and arrest report is not


a part of the custodial investigation which
would otherwise require the presence of
counsel to ensure the protection of the
accused's constitutional rights. 4
The appellant's plea of innocence on the
basis of reasonable doubt, however,
deserves serious considerations.
In the prosecution of an accused for an
illegal sale of prohibited drugs "what is
(initially) material is . . . the presentation in
court of the corpus delicti as evidence." 5 The
laboratory tests and the chemical
microscopic examination, conducted by NBI
Forensic Chemist Neva Gamosa, definitely
reveal the contents of the plastic bags to be
marijuana. 6 The chemistry report, attested
to by the forensic chemist, has undoubtly
established the corpus delicti of the crime. 7
The other question is whether or not the
prosecution has been able to prove the fact
of sale and delivery of the prohibited drug by
the accused, a matter that must likewise be
established beyond reasonable doubt. 8
In any criminal prosecution, it would be
imperative to establish the elements of the
offense; viz:

together with the accused) was not present


at the place of the incident. According,
however, to Patrolman Anza, 14 the accused
was seen with a companion who, in fact, was
chased by police officers. This conflicting
versions given by the prosecution itself,
again, were not explained.
More importantly, the prosecution has
missed putting on record any evidence to
indicate that the tea bags, supposedly
delivered to the poseur-buyer, had been
known by the accused to contain dangerous
drugs. Even the information itself has failed
to allege this fact. 15 Section (2) (f), Article I
of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended,
defines the term "deliver," the offense that is
charged in the information, as ". . . a
person's act of knowingly passing a
dangerous drug to another personally or
otherwise, and by any means, with or
without consideration."
Given all the above, it is readily discernible
that the testimony of the poseur-buyer would
have been most vital to the prosecution's
case. 16 Yet, the prosecution did not even
bother t have her take the witness stand.

A tedious and conscientious effort has been


made to evaluate the evidence presented by
the prosecution; the results, every time,
however, appear to yield more questions
than answers to a number of concerns that
has bewildered the Court.

A final remark on the buy-bust operation that


simply cannot escape one's attention. The
prosecution sought to prove that the accused
left the place of the transaction for a few
minutes and entered an alleyway to get the
marijuana tea bags from an unknown
supplier. No attempt was made to find out
who this person was, either before or after
the accused was apprehended. Then, while it
was asserted by the prosecution that the
informer gave the accused four P5.00marked bills, only one P5.00 marked bill was
recovered from the latter when he was
arrested. The three other P5.00-marked bills
were not accounted for.

First. The prosecution witnesses could not


agree on the number of marijuana tea bags
taken from the accused. Patrolman
Quebuyen 10 testified that three bags were
taken from the accused during the buy-bust
operation. On the other hand, Patrolman
Banawel 11 claimed that four marijuana bags
were sold by the accused to the informer.

Too much, indeed, has been left to


conjecture. While buy-bust operations have
been recognized as a valid means of
apprehending peddlers of drugs, 17 we also
did caution, however, that the use of poseurbuyer is to be employed with solicitude
being, as it is, easily susceptible to mistake,
harassment, extortion and abuse. 18

Second. The buy-bust team was supposed to


be composed of six members: five members
of the police force and a civilian informer.
Yet, the name of a sixth police officer kept on
cropping up that of Patrolman
Borlongan. 12No effort was made to clarify
who this Patrolman Borlongan is.

Considering the severity of the penalty


imposed, it behooves the law enforcement
agencies it its investigatorial work, the
prosecution in its presentation and
submission of the evidence, 19 and the courts
in its evaluation of the merits of the case, to
exercise no less that the extreme care and
professionalism demanded in these cases if
we are to attain a good degree of success in
our drive to curb the drug menace.
Unfortunately, the buy-bust operation,
assuming that it did not take place in this
particular instance, has appeared to have

(1) That the accused has sold and delivered


a prohibited drug to another; and
(2) That he knew that what he had sold and
delivered was a dangerous drug. 9

Third. Patrolman Quebuyen 13 testified that


only the accused was arrested and that
defense witness Leonardo Quiambao (who
claimed to have likewise been arrested

been laid out quite haphazardly. Instead of


taking that cue for it to excel on its own, the
prosecution regrettably has likewise
exhibited a lukewarm stance. The rule is
clear : The guilt of the accused must be
proved beyond reasonable doubt. 20 The
prosecution, on its part, must rely on the
strength of its own evidence and must not
simply depend on the weakness of the
defense. The slightest possibility of an
innocent man being convicted for an offense
he has never committed, let alone when no
less than a capital punishment is imposed,
would be far more dreadful than letting a
guilty person go unpunished for a crime he
may have perpetrated.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the accused is
hereby ACQUITTED of the offense charged.

**SC held that when an arrested person signs


a booking sheet and an arrest report at the
police station, he does not admit the
commission of an offense nor confess to any
incriminating circumstance. The booking
sheet is no more than a record of arrest & a
statement on how the arrest was made. It is
simply a police report, and it has no
probative value as an extrajudicial statement
of the person being detained. The signing by
the accused of the booking sheet and the
arrest report is not a part of custodial
investigation.

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