RULE 130 - Rules of Admissibility

A. Object (Real) Evidence

Sec. 1 - Object as Evidence
1. ARMANDO JOSE y PAZ and MANILA CENTRAL BUS LINES (MCL), represented by its
General Manager MR. DANILO T. DE DIOS, petitioners vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
ROMMEL ABRAHAM, represented by his father FELIXBERTO ABRAHAM, JOSE
MACARUBO and MERCEDES MACARUBO, respondents.
SECOND DIVISION[G.R. Nos. 118441-42. January 18, 2000]D E C I S I O NMENDOZA, J.: r
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals, reversing the
decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 172, Valenzuela, Metro Manila and ordering
petitioners to pay damages for injuries to persons and damage to property as a result of a
vehicular accident.The facts are as follows:Petitioner Manila Central Bus Lines Corporation
(MCL) is the operator-lessee of a public utility bus (hereafter referred to as Bus 203) with plate
number NVR-III-TB-PIL and body number 203. Bus 203 is owned by the Metro Manila Transit
Corporation and is insured with the Government Service Insurance System.On February 22,
1985, at around six oclock in the morning, Bus 203, then driven by petitioner Armando Jose,
collided with a red Ford Escort driven by John Macarubo on MacArthur Highway, in Marulas,
Valenzuela, Metro Manila. Bus 203 was bound for Muntinlupa, Rizal, while the Ford Escort was
headed towards Malanday, Valenzuela on the opposite lane. As a result of the collision, the left
side of the Ford Escorts hood was severely damaged while its driver, John Macarubo, and its
lone passenger, private respondent Rommel Abraham, were seriously injured. The driver and
conductress of Bus 203 rushed Macarubo and Abraham to the nearby Fatima Hospital where
Macarubo lapsed into a coma. Despite surgery, Macarubo failed to recover and died five days
later. Abraham survived, but he became blind on the left eye which had to be removed. In
addition, he sustained a fracture on the forehead and multiple lacerations on the face, which
caused him to be hospitalized for a week.On March 26, 1985, Rommel Abraham, represented
by his father, Felixberto, instituted Civil Case No. 2206-V-85 for damages against petitioners
MCL and Armando Jose in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 172, Valenzuela.On July 17, 1986,
the spouses Jose and Mercedes Macarubo, parents of the deceased John Macarubo, filed their
own suit for damages in the same trial court, where it was docketed as Civil Case No. 2428-V86, against MCL alone. On the other hand, MCL filed a third-party complaint against Juanita
Macarubo, registered owner of the Ford Escort on the theory that John Macarubo was negligent
and that he was the "authorized driver" of Juanita Macarubo. The latter, in turn, filed a
counterclaim for damages against MCL for the damage to her car. Civil Case No. 2206-V-85 and
Civil Case No. 2428-V-86 were consolidated and later tried jointly. The facts, as found by the
trial court, are as follows: EsmscIn Civil Case No. 2206-V-85, the Court heard the testimonies
that during the night previous to the accident of February 22, 1985 at 6:15 a.m., Rommel
Abraham and John Macarubo were at a party. There was therefore, no sleep for them,
notwithstanding testimony to the contrary and the service of drinks cannot be totally discounted.
After the party at 11 p.m., while both Rommel and John were enroute home to Valenzuela from
La Loma, the car encountered mechanical trouble and had to be repaired as its cross-joint was

detached. The defect of a cross-joint is not minor and repair thereof would as testified to by
Rommel lasted up to early dawn and the car started to run only after five oclock in the morning.
With lack of sleep, the strains of a party still on their bodies, and the attention to the repair
coupled with the wait until the car was ready to run, are potentials in a driver for possible
accident. The accident happened at 6:15 a.m. when the physical and mental condition of the
driver John Macarubo was as expected not too fit for the driving as he could not anymore
control the car. The desire to be home quick for the much needed sleep could have prompted
him to overtake the preceding vehicle.Indeed the pictures taken of the two vehicles (Exh. 1,2
and 3) will clearly show that the MCL bus was at its proper lane and not in an overtaking
position while the car driven by John Macarubo was positioned in a diagonal manner and
crossed the line of the MCL, which is an indication of an overtaking act. If it were the bus that
was overtaking at the time, the car would have been thrown farther away from the point of the
impact.The court is convinced of the close supervision and control of MCL over their drivers,
and its exercise of due diligence in seeing to it that no recklessness is committed by its
employees, drivers especially, from the unrebutted testimonies of Cesar Cainglet.The Court
noted the respective damages of the two vehicles especially the point of the impact. From these
damages as shown by the picture, it can be clearly deduced which vehicle did the bumping. It
was the car driven by John Macarubo that hit the MCL which was on its right and correct lane.[2]
Based on the foregoing facts, the trial court rendered judgment on September 28, 1989,
dismissing both civil cases against MCL and ruling favorably on its third-party complaint against
Juanita Macarubo, ordering the latter to pay MCL P54,232.12 as actual damages, P24,000.00
for lost income, and P10,000.00 as attorneys fees.Rommel Abraham, the Macarubo spouses,
and third-party defendant Juanita Macarubo then appealed to the Court of Appeals which, on
December 21, 1994, rendered a decision reversing the decision of the trial court. It held (1) that
the trial court erred in disregarding Rommel Abrahams uncontroverted testimony that the
collision was due to the fault of the driver of Bus 203; (2) that the trial court erred in relying on
photographs (Exhs. 1-3) which had been taken an hour after the collision as within that span of
time, the positions of the vehicles could have been changed; (3) that the photographs do not
show that the Ford Escort was overtaking another vehicle when the accident happened and that
John Macarubo, its driver, was negligent; and (4) that MCL failed to make a satisfactory showing
that it exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its driver Armando Jose. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads: JksmWHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby
REVERSED and the defendants-appellees MCL and Armando Jose are adjudged to pay jointly
and severally:1. Rommel Abraham, represented by his father Felixberto Abraham:(a)
P37,576.47 as actual damages;(b) P50,000.00 as compensatory damages;(c) P15,000.00 as
moral damages;(d) P5,000.00 as exemplary damages; and(e) P10,000.00 as attorneys fees.2.
The heirs of John Macarubo:(a) P50,000.00 as indemnity for his death;(b) P50,000.00 as moral
damages;(c) P10,000.00 as exemplary damages; and(d) P10,000.00 as attorneys fees.Costs
against the appellees.SO ORDERED.Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. Petitioners
MCL and Armando Jose raise four issues which boil down to the question whether it was the
driver of Bus 203 or that of the Ford Escort who was at fault for the collision of the two vehicles.
It is well-settled that a question of fact is to be determined by the evidence offered to support the
particular contention.[3] In the proceedings below, petitioners relied mainly on photographs,
identified in evidence as Exhibits 1 to 3, showing the position of the two vehicles after the

collision. On the other hand, private respondents offered the testimony of Rommel Abraham to
the effect that the collision took place because Bus 203 invaded their lane.[4]The trial court was
justified in relying on the photographs rather than on Rommel Abrahams testimony which was
obviously biased and unsupported by any other evidence. Physical evidence is a mute but an
eloquent manifestation of truth, and it ranks high in our hierarchy of trustworthy evidence.[5] In
criminal cases such as murder or rape where the accused stands to lose his liberty if found
guilty, this Court has, in many occasions, relied principally upon physical evidence in
ascertaining the truth. In People v. Vasquez,[6] where the physical evidence on record ran
counter to the testimonial evidence of the prosecution witnesses, we ruled that the physical
evidence should prevail.[7] EsmIn this case, the positions of the two vehicles, as shown in the
photographs (Exhs. 1 to 3) taken by MCL line inspector Jesus Custodio about an hour and
fifteen minutes after the collision, disputes Abrahams self-serving testimony that the two
vehicles collided because Bus 203 invaded the lane of the Ford Escort and clearly shows that
the case is exactly the opposite of what he claimed happened. Contrary to Abrahams testimony,
the photographs show quite clearly that Bus 203 was in its proper lane and that it was the Ford
Escort which usurped a portion of the opposite lane. The three photographs show the Ford
Escort positioned diagonally on the highway, with its two front wheels occupying Bus 203s lane.
As shown by the photograph marked Exhibit 3, the portion of MacArthur Highway where the
collision took place is marked by a groove which serves as the center line separating the right
from the left lanes. The photograph shows that the left side of Bus 203 is about a few feet from
the center line and that the bus is positioned parallel thereto. This negates the claim that Bus
203 was overtaking another vehicle and, in so doing, encroached on the opposite lane occupied
by the Ford Escort.Indeed, Bus 203 could not have been overtaking another vehicle when the
collision happened. It was filled with passengers,[8] and it was considerably heavier and larger
than the Ford Escort. If it was overtaking another vehicle, it necessarily had to accelerate. The
acceleration of its speed and its heavy load would have greatly increased its momentum so that
the impact of the collision would have thrown the smaller and lighter Ford Escort to a
considerable distance from the point of impact. Exhibit 1, however, shows that the Ford Escorts
smashed hood was only about one or two meters from Bus 203s damaged left front. If there
had been a great impact, such as would be the case if Bus 203 had been running at a high
speed, the two vehicles should have ended up far from each other.In discrediting the physical
evidence, the appellate court made the following observations:We cannot believe that it was the
car which overtook another vehicle and proceeded to the lane occupied by the bus. There was a
traffic jam on the "bus lane" while traffic was light on the "car lane." Indeed, we find it
inconceivable that the car, occupying the lane without any traffic, would overtake and traverse a
heavy traffic lane.[9] (Underscoring supplied.)This is correct. However, the fact remains that
when the Ford Escort finally came to a stop, it encroached on the opposite lane occupied by
Bus 203.Significantly, Rommel Abraham testified that on February 21, 1985, the night before the
accident, he and John Macarubo went to a friends house in La Loma where they stayed until 11
p.m.[10] Abrahams explanation as to why they did not reach Valenzuela until six oclock in the
morning of the next day when the accident happened indicates that the Ford Escort careened
and slammed against Bus 203 because of a mechanical defect. Abraham told the court:[11]
EsmmisATTY. RESPICIO:Q: I am sorry, Your honor. After leaving Arnels place where did you
go?ROMMEL ABRAHAMA: We proceeded in going home, sir.Q: You were on your way home?

A: Yes, sir.Q: What time did you . . . I will reform the question. You met the accident at about
6:00 oclock the next day, 6:00 oclock in the morning the next day, did it take you long to reach
BBB?A: Our car had a mechanical trouble somewhere at 2nd Avenue, sir.Q: What kind of
trouble?A: The cross-joint were detached, sir.Q: Are you familiar with cars?A: A little, sir.COURT:
Q: What time was that when you have this cross-joint problem?A: About 12:00 oclock perhaps,
sir.Q: What happened to the cross joint?A: It was cut, maam.Q: You were able to repair that
cross-joint 12:00 oclock and you were able to run and reached this place of accident at 6:00
oclock?A: No, we were not able to get spare parts, maam.Q: Why were you able to reach this
place at 6:00 oclock?A: We went home and look for the spare parts in their house, maam.Q:
House of Macarubo?A: Yes, maam.Q: So you were able to repair the car?A: Yes, maam.Q:
What time were you able to repair the car?A: Around 5:00 oclock in the morning, sir.Q: You
were able to replace the cross-joint or what?A: Ginawaan ng paraan, maam.Q: How?A: The
cross-joint were welded in order to enable us to go home, maam.Q: No spare parts was
replaced? MsesmA: No, maam.Thus, as Rommel Abraham himself admitted, the Ford Escorts
rear cross-joint was cut/detached. This mechanism controls the movement of the rear tires.
Since trouble in the cross-joint affects a cars maneuverability, the matter should have been
treated as a serious mechanical problem. In this case, when asked if they were able to repair
the cross-joint, Abraham said "Ginawaan ng paraan, maam," by simply welding them just so
they could reach home. His testimony indicates that the rear cross-joint was hastily repaired and
that, at most, the kind of repairs made thereon were merely temporary; just enough to enable
Abraham and Macarubo to reach home. Given such fact, the likelihood is that while the Ford
Escort might not have been overtaking another vehicle, it actually strayed into the bus lane
because of the defective cross-joint, causing its driver to lose control of the vehicle.The
appellate court refused to give credence to the physical evidence on the ground that the
photographs were taken an hour after the collision and that within such span of time the bus
could have been moved because there was no showing that the driver left the scene of the
accident. This is not correct. Constancia Gerolada, Bus 203s conductress, testified that,
immediately after the collision, she and bus driver, petitioner Armando Jose, took the injured
driver and passenger of the Ford Escort to the Fatima Hospital.[12] This fact is not disputed by
private respondents.Rommel Abraham mentioned in his appellants brief in the appellate court a
sketch of the scene of the accident allegedly prepared by one Patrolman Kalale, which shows
Bus 203 to be occupying the Ford Escorts lane. However, the records of this case do not show
that such a sketch was ever presented in evidence in the trial court or that Patrolman Kalale
was ever presented as a witness to testify on the sketch allegedly prepared by him. Under Rule
132, 3 of the Rules on Evidence, courts cannot consider any evidence unless formally offered
by a party.Finally, the appellate court also ruled that MCL failed to make a satisfactory showing
that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its
bus driver, Armando Jose.[13] Under the circumstances of this case, we hold that proof of due
diligence in the selection and supervision of employees is not required.The Civil Code provides
in pertinent parts:Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is
no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed
by the provisions of this chapter.Art. 2180. The obligation imposed in Art. 2176 is demandable
not only for ones own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is

responsible. Esmso. . . .Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees
and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former
are not engaged in any business or industry.. . . .The responsibility treated of in this article shall
cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent damage.Thus, the responsibility of employers is premised upon the
presumption of negligence of their employees. As held in Poblete v. Fabros:[14][I]t is such a
firmly established principle, as to have virtually formed part of the law itself, that the negligence
of the employee gives rise to the presumption of negligence on the part of the employer. This is
the presumed negligence in the selection and supervision of the employee. The theory of
presumed negligence, in contrast with the American doctrine of respondent superior, where the
negligence of the employee is conclusively presumed to be the negligence of the employer, is
clearly deducible from the last paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code which provides that
the responsibility therein mentioned shall cease if the employers prove that they observed all
the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damages (12 Manresa, 657; Balica vs.
Litonjua and Leynes, 30 Phil. 624; Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Co., 30 Phil. 768), as observed
in the same cases just cited.Therefore, before the presumption of the employers negligence in
the selection and supervision of its employees can arise, the negligence of the employee must
first be established. While the allegations of negligence against the employee and that of an
employer-employee relation in the complaint are enough to make out a case of quasi-delict
under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, the failure to prove the employees negligence during the trial
is fatal to proving the employers vicarious liability. In this case, private respondents failed to
prove their allegation of negligence against driver Armando Jose who, in fact, was acquitted in
the case for criminal negligence arising from the same incident.[15]For the foregoing reasons,
we hold that the appellate court erred in holding petitioners liable to private respondents. The
next question then is whether, as the trial court held, private respondent Juanita Macarubo is
liable to petitioners.Article 2180 of the Civil Code makes the persons specified therein
responsible for the quasi-delicts of others. The burden is upon MCL to prove that Juanita
Macarubo is one of those specified persons who are vicariously liable for the negligence of the
deceased John Macarubo. ExsmIn its third-party complaint, MCL alleged that Juanita Macarubo
was the registered owner of the Ford Escort car and that John Macarubo was the "authorized
driver" of the car.[16] Nowhere was it alleged that John Macarubo was the son, ward, employee
or pupil of private respondent Juanita Macarubo so as to make the latter vicariously liable for the
negligence of John Macarubo. The allegation that John Macarubo was "the authorized driver" of
the Ford Escort is not equivalent to an allegation that he was an employee of Juanita Macarubo.
That John Macarubo was the "authorized driver" of the car simply means that he drove the Ford
Escort with the permission of Juanita Macarubo.Nor did MCL present any evidence to prove that
Juanita Macarubo was the employer of John Macarubo or that she is in any way liable for John
Macarubos negligence under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code. For failure to discharge its burden,
MCLs third-party complaint should be dismissed.WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of
Appeals is REVERSED and the complaints filed in Civil Cases Nos. 2206-V-85 and 24428-V-86
against Manila Central Bus Lines and Armando Jose, as well as the third-party complaint filed in
Civil Case No. 2206-V-85 against Juanita Macarubo, are hereby DISMISSED.SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------2. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. QUINCIANO RENDOQUE, SR. y

AMORES, VICTORINO BACUAC y QUISEL, FELIX ESTRELLADO y BACUAC, PABLITO
RENDOQUE y ABIO, QUINCIANO RENDOQUE, JR. y ABIO, and ESPERATO SALAQUIN y
BACUAC, accused, PABLITO RENDOQUE y ABIO, QUINCIANO RENDOQUE, JR. y ABIO,
and ESPERATO SALAQUIN y BACUAC, accused-appellants.
SECOND DIVISIONG.R. No. 106282
January 20, 2000QUISUMBING, J.:Appellants
assail the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City, Branch 36,1 in Criminal Case
No. 8341, convicting them of the crime of murder, imposing upon them the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, and ordering them to indemnify the heirs of the victim the amount of P30,000.00, and
to pay the costs. Their co-accused Quinciano Rendoque, Sr. y Amores, Victorino Bacuac y
Quisel, and Felix Estrellado y Bacuac were acquitted for failure of the prosecution to prove their
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.The facts, as summarized by the Office of the Solicitor General
and which we find to be supported by the records, are as follows:2On or about 8:00 o'clock in
the evening of April 21, 1988, Abundio Sido and the members of his family were resting inside
their house at Barangay Basiao, Municipality of San Jose, Negros Oriental. All of a sudden, a
group of armed men, six in number, arrived. One of them shouted "Abundio Sido lumabas kayo,
mga military kami" (pp. 7-8, tsn, March 1, 1989; p. 5-6, tsn, June 14, 1989). In return, Abundio
answered, "you come up, we will talk upstairs" (p. 9, tsn, March 1, 1989). The group however,
insisted that he comes (sic) down and so, Abundio instructed his wife Florida to open the door.
The latter, accompanied by her daughter Elvie who was holding a kerosene lamp, proceeded
towards the door to open it. When the door was opened, Florida and her daughter by the aid of
the kerosene lamp were able to recognize the six armed men standing in front of their house
wearing fatigue uniforms as Pablito Rendoque, Esperato Salaquin, Quinciano Rendoque, Sr.,
Quinciano Rendoque, Jr., Victorino Bacuac and Felix Estrellado. With the exception of
Quinciano Rendoque, Sr. who was seen carrying a revolver, the rest were all armed with
shotguns (pp. 10-11, tsn, March 1, 1989; p. 8, tsn, June 14, 1989).On that occasion when the
door was opened, Pablito Rendoque shouted "fire" to his companions. In obedience to his order,
Esperato Salaquin and Quinciano Rendoque, Jr. aimed and fired their respective shotguns
towards the direction of the wall inside the house where Abundio was sitting. As a result, the
victim was hit at the back and on the left shoulder by pellets which caused his death (pp. 11-12,
tsn, March 1, 1989; pp. 9-10, tsn, June 14, 1989). Thereafter, the armed group left leaving
Abundio's dead body behind (id.)Dr. Bienvenida Palongpalong, Municipal Health Officer of San
Jose, Negros Oriental, was able to conduct a post-mortem examination of the cadaver of
Abundio Sido and it was found that the latter sustained gunshot wounds at the deltoid region
and at the back lumber vertebrae which caused severe hemorrhage resulting in his death (p. 10,
tsn, May 23, 1990).Following police investigation, a criminal complaint for murder3 was filed
against all six (6) accused. At the preliminary investigation, they waived the filing of counteraffidavits.4 The Municipal Trial Judge issued aResolution5 finding sufficient ground to engender
a well-founded belief that a crime cognizable by the Regional Trial Court has been committed
and that accused are probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial, and forwarded the
records of the case to the Provincial Prosecutor of Dumaguete City, Negros Oriental for the filing
of the appropriate Information. The six (6) accused were accused of murder under an

Information,6 which pertinently reads as follows:That on or about the 21st day of April, 1988, at
Barangay Basiao, Municipality of San Jose, Province of Negros Oriental, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-name accused, conspiring and confederating
together and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill, evident premeditation and
treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and shoot
Abundio Sido with the use of home made firearms, thereby inflicting upon the body of Abundio
Sido the following injuries, to wit:1. Gunshot wounds 8 in number, 1 cm. in diameter, (L) Deltoid
region;2. 8 gunshot wounds 1 cm. in diameter x 3 inc depthness, back (not legible) 2nd and 3rd
and 4th Lumbar vertebrae.which directly caused the death of Abundio Sido immediately
thereafter.Contrary to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.Dumaguete City, Philippines,
August 26, 1988.Upon arraignment, the accused, duly assisted by counsel, entered pleas of "no
guilty."7 Through counsel, they filed a Motion for Consolidation8 with another criminal case
against the same accused, for murder involving the brother of the victim herein, committed on
the same night. In its Order dated November 24, 1988,9 the trial court, however, denied said
Motion because the proceedings had already reached different stages.The prosecution
presented the following witnesses: (1) Elvie Sido, the 15 year-old daughter of the victim; (2)
Florida Sido, the widow of the victim, both eyewitnesses to the shooting incident; (3) Dra.
Bienvenida Palongpalong, Municipal Health Officer of San Jose, Negros Oriental, who
conducted the post-mortem examination on the victim and testified that the cause of death was
"severe hemorrhage resulting from the (gunshot) wounds of the victim."10Testifying on their
behalf, appellants interposed the defenses of denial and alibi. Appellant Pablito Rendoque
claimed that on April 21, 1988, from 7 o'clock in the evening until 7:00 the following morning, he
was on duty as a security guard at Master Footwear in Dumaguete City.11 His testimony was
supported by the testimonies of several witnesses. Eduardo Dingal, his co-security guard,
testified that appellant Pablito Rendoque relieved him from duty at 7:00 P.M. of April 21, 1988.12
Dingal's wife, also testified that she visited her husband at Master Footwear at 7:00 P.M., and
saw appellant Pablito Rendoque take over her husband's post.13 Ernesto Amistoso, a member
of the PNP, San Jose, Negros Oriental, also testified that the day after the incident, he
confirmed with Dingal that appellant Pablito Rendoque relieved him from duty the previous
night.14 Aniano Eliseo, Officer-In-Charge of the Sherlock Security Agency, testified that he
conducted an inspection of the guards of the agency and saw appellant Pablito Rendoque at his
post in Master Footwear at around 7:00 on the night of the incident.15The other five accused
testified that on April 21, 1988, from 6 o'clock in the evening until around 8 o'clock the following
morning, they were in the house of Placido Despojo at Sto. Nio, San Jose, Negros Oriental to
attend an "Anti-Communist Trust In Oriental Negros" (ACTION) seminar, which however, was
postponed to the following day.16 Placido Despojo confirmed this fact.17 Millard Generoso, the
District Commander of ACTION, testified that on April 22, 1988, the day after the incident, the
five accused, except for appellant Pablito Rendoque, were at his house in Calindagan,
Dumaguete City from around 8 o'clock in the morning up to 11 o'clock in the evening attending
the seminar.18The defense also presented as its witness Patrolman Fred Redira, who testified
that on the night of the incident, one Celso Turtal reported to him that he (Turtal) was requested
by the wife of the victim to inform the authorities that the victim was shot by "unidentified
men."19 The defense also presented Patrolman Antonio Ramirez, the Officer-in-Charge of the
Police Station,20 and the custodian of the police logbook containing the aforesaid report.

Patrolman Ramirez testified that he prepared the affidavits of Elvie and Florida Sido wherein
they stated that the persons who shot the victim were Pablito Rendoque and Esperato Salaquin
only. However, Patrolman Ramirez claimed that the Municipal Mayor borrowed the affidavits and
never returned them again. He also testified that the affidavits of Elvie and Florida Sido which
were presented to him in court for identification were new affidavits, and not the ones which he
prepared.21On January 6, 1992, the trial court rendered a decision22 convicting the three (3)
appellants. As already stated, their three (3) co-accused were acquitted for failure of the
prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads:FOR ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, this court finds the accused Esperato
Salaquin, Quinciano Rendoque, Jr., and Pablito Rendoque guilty beyond doubt of the crime of
murder defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and sentences each
one of them to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua; to indemnify the heirs of the offended
party of the sum of P30,000.00 and to pay the cost. The instruments used if confiscated by the
government are deemed forfeited. The accused Quinciano Rendoque, Sr., Victorino Bacuac and
Felix Estrellado whose guilt are not established beyond doubt are acquitted.SO ORDERED.
Hence, the present appeal. In their consolidated brief, appellants assign the following errors:I.
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE AND MORE
WEIGHT TO THE TESTIMONIES OF PROSECUTION WITNESSES ELVIE SIDO AND
FLORIDA SIDO AND DID NOT CONSIDER THE TESTIMONIES OF P/CPL ANTONIO
RAMIREZ AND PATROLMAN FRED REDIRA REGARDING THE ENTRY IN THE LOGBOOK
ON APRIL 21, 1988, AS REPORTED BY A CERTAIN CELSO TURTAL, EXHIBIT "1" FOR THE
DEFENSE WHICH WAS NOT ADMITTED BY THE COURT AND THE VEHEMENT REFUSAL
AND OBJECTION OF THE COURT TO ALLOW FLORIDA SIDO TO TESTIFY IN COURT
PERTINENT TO EXHIBIT "1", AS A HOSTILE WITNESS, DESPITE THE CONFORMITY OF
FISCAL EDUVIGIS VERGARA IN OPEN COURT.II. THAT THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED
A SERIOUS ERROR IN GIVING MORE CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF ELVIE SIDO
AND FLORIDA SIDO AND TO DISREGARDED (sic) THE ALIBI OF THE ACCUSED PABLITO
RENDOQUE, SUPPORTED BY THE TESTIMONIES OF WITNESSES ELISEO ANIANO,
OFFICER-IN-CHARGE OF SHERLOCK AGENCY WITH DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE,
ELSAULA DINGAL, EDUARDO DINGAL AND ERNESTO AMISTOSO.III. THAT THE LOWER
COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING CONSIDERATION OF THE ALIBI OF THE ACCUSED
QUINCIANO RENDOQUE, JR., ESPERATO SALAQUIN, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS AND
CORROBORATED BY THE REST OF THE ACCUSED AND SUPPORTED BY THE
TESTIMONIES OF PLACIDO DESPOJO AND MILLARD GENEROSO.Appellants' brief
contends that the trial court erred in not considering the entry in the police logbook, and the
testimonies of the custodian and the entrant thereof that the victim's wife asked Celso Turtal to
report to the authorities that her husband was shot by "unidentified men" while sitting on the
porch of their house. Appellants claim that the statement of the widow should have been
considered as part of the res gestae under Section 42 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
Further, appellants insist that the trial court erred in not considering the Affidavit of Confirmation
executed by Celso Turtal regarding the incident. Appellants contend that the trial court erred in
not allowing the defense to present Florida Sido as a hostile witness. The foregoing evidence,
appellants claim, if properly considered, would destroy the positive identification of appellants
and co-accused as the perpetrators of the shooting incident. Appellants also fault the trial court

for not giving due credence to the defenses of denial and alibi of appellants considering that
these were sufficiently supported by the testimonies of their numerous witnesses.1wphi1.nt
The Office of the Solicitor General, on the other hand, contends that the issues raised pertain to
the credibility of witnesses, the assessment of which is within the province of the trial court. In
fact, the defense failed to point any significant flaw in the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses. The OSG further asserts that the entries in the police logbook cannot be correlated
to the alleged Affidavit of Confirmation of one Celso Turtal because the latter's affidavit is
inadmissible for being hearsay. The OSG also contends that the trial court could not be faulted
for denying the request of the defense to make Florida Sido a hostile witness since the defense
already cross-examined said witness extensively regarding her identification of the assailants.
On the defenses of denial and alibi, the OSG cites the finding of the trial court that the place of
work of Pablito Rendoque and the house of Placido Despojo are a mere eight (8) kilometers
away from the locus criminis. The OSG likewise prays that the award of death indemnity be
increased from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00 pursuant to existing jurisprudence.The crucial issue
raised by appellants, in our view, pertains solely to the credibility of the prosecution witnesses.
In particular, we have to consider the positive identification of appellants as the perpetrators of
the offense as against their defenses of denial and alibi.In a long line of cases, the Court has
consistently held that the determination of credibility of a witness is properly within the domain of
the trial court as it is in the best position to observe his demeanor and bodily movements.23
Findings of the trial court with respect to the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are
entitled to great respect, and even finality,24 unless said findings are arbitrary, or facts and
circumstances of weight and influence have been overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied by
the trial judge which, if considered, would have affected the case.25 In the present appeal, after
a thorough review of the records, no cogent reason justifies our departure from the aforecited
salutory rule. We are constrained not to disturb the factual findings of the trial court.The two
eyewitnesses, Elvie and Florida Sido, positively identified appellants as the perpetrators of the
fatal shooting.26 Both clearly narrated on the witness stand the extent of the appellants'
participation in the incident. They categorically testified that appellant Pablito Rendoque gave
the order to "fire,"27 and in obedience to such order, appellants Esperato Salaquin and
Quinciano Rendoque, Jr., fired their guns (known locally as "bali-ontod") against the victim.28
Witness Elvie Sido said that as the shooting was going on, she was rooted on the spot, looking
at the faces of the men firing at her father.29 Although the incident occurred at nighttime, the
house of the victim was sufficiently illuminated by two kerosene lamps (lamparillas), one carried
by the daughter of the victim and another located near the victim,30 which cast enough light for
purposes of identification. Numerous cases have held that illumination coming from a kerosene
lamp (also called "gasera") is sufficient for purposes of identification of an assailant.31 Aside
from the sufficient lighting, the two eyewitnesses were familiar with the faces of the assailants
because they were townmates,32 and appellants did not even bother to hide their identities by
covering their faces.33Appellants admitted that they could not ascribe any ill-motive against the
prosecution witnesses to falsely testify against them.34 Absent any evidence showing any
reason or motive for prosecution witnesses to perjure, the logical conclusion is that no such
improper motive exists, and their testimonies are thus worthy of full faith and credit.35 The fact
that the witnesses were the daughter and the widow of the deceased could not impair their
credibility. Blood or conjugal relationship between a witness and the victim does not per se

impair the credibility of the witness. On the contrary, relationship itself could strengthen
credibility in a particular case, for it is unnatural for an aggrieved relative to falsely accuse
someone other than the actual culprit. The earnest desire to seek justice for a dead kin is not
served should the witness abandon his conscience and prudence to blame one who is innocent
of the crime.36Failing to demolish the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses,
appellants now make a belated attempt to impeach their testimonies. Appellants fault the trial
court for not considering the Affidavit of Celso Turtal that Florida Sido told him that the
assailants were "unidentified men." The trial court correctly disregarded said affidavit for being
hearsay since Turtal did not testify in court. An affidavit is generally hearsay, and has no
probative value unless the affiant himself is placed on the witness stand to testify thereon.37
Hence, the trial court correctly rejected the admission of such affidavit in evidence.As to the
police logbook which was presented in evidence to prove the contents thereof, we have held
that entries in the police blotter should not be given undue significance or probative value, as
they do not constitute conclusive proof of the truth thereof.38 Entries in police blotters, although
regularly done in the course of the performance of official duty, are not conclusive proof of the
truth stated in such entries and should not be given undue significance or probative value
because they are usually incomplete and inaccurate. Sometimes they are based on partial
suggestion or inaccurate reporting and hearsay, untested in the crucible of a trial on the
merits.39Appellant Pablito Rendoque's defenses of denial and alibi, in our view, could not be
sustained. Although supported by testimonies of his superior and the guard who relieved him on
the night of the incident, as well as the guard's wife, they do not exculpate him. We have already
ruled that for alibi to prosper, it is not enough to prove that appellant was somewhere else when
the offense was committed. It must likewise be shown that he was so far away that it was not
possible for him to have been physically present at the place of the crime or its immediate
vicinity at the time of its commission.40 It should be noted that appellant was seen by said
witnesses at his post at 7 o'clock in the evening, while the shooting incident occurred at 8
o'clock in the evening. Appellant failed to prove that it was impossible for him to have been
physically present in the locus criminis at the very time of its commission. As to Quinciano
Rendoque, Jr. and Esperato Salaquin, the other two appellants, their alibis are equally
unavailing. Though the testimony of Placido Despojo sought to support them, their defense is
far from persuasive. As observed by the trial court, there is no proof of physical impossibility for
these appellants to be present in the locus criminis. Well settled is the doctrine that alibi is a
weak defense and should be rejected when the identities of the accused, as in this case, have
been sufficiently and positively established by eyewitnesses to the offense.41 Hence, in the light
of the positive identification of appellants by two eyewitnesses as the perpetrators of the crime,
their defenses of denial and alibi could not prosper.42As proved, the crime committed by the
three appellants is murder, since the killing was qualified by treachery. Treachery attended the
killing because at the time of the shooting, the victim was unarmed, sitting inside his house, and
was evidently not in a position to defend himself.43 Further, appellants consciously adopted the
particular means, method or form of attack employed by them when they went to the house of
the victim armed with shotguns.44The generic aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior
strength attended the killing, but is already absorbed in treachery.45 Evident premeditation while
alleged in the Information was not sufficiently proven by the prosecution, and therefore cannot
be appreciated.But since the victim was killed inside his house, even though the assailants were

outside the house, the aggravating circumstance of dwelling should be appreciated.46 Dwelling
is considered an aggravating circumstance because primarily of the sanctity of privacy the law
accords to human abode.47As to the actual participation of appellants in the crime charged,
appellant Pablito Rendoque, having given the order to shoot at the victim, is liable as a principal
under Article 17, No. 1 and No. 2 of the Revised Penal Code. His participation is direct; at the
same time he induced his co-appellants Esperato Salaquin and Quinciano Rendoque, Jr. to
commit the offense. These co-appellants obeyed the order by firing their shotguns at the victim,
hence they acted as principals by direct participation under Article 17, No. 1 of the Revised
Penal Code. The three appellants acted in concert and helped each other accomplish the
nefarious deed.The award of death indemnity in the amount of P30,000.00 should be increased
to P50,000.00, pursuant to existing jurisprudence.48 No moral damages can be awarded since
the wife and daughter of the victim did not testify with regard to moral damages. In view of the
attendance of an aggravating circumstance, pursuant to Article 2230 of the Civil Code,
exemplary damages in the amount of P20,000.00 should be awarded.49WHEREFORE, the
decision of the trial court finding appellants PABLITO RENDOQUE, ESPERATO SALAQUIN
AND QUINCIANO RENDOQUE, JR. guilty of the crime of MURDER and sentencing them to
RECLUSION PERPETUA is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as to damages. Appellants are
hereby ordered to pay the heirs of the victim the amounts of P50,000.00 as indemnity and
P20,000.00 as exemplary damages. Costs against appellants.SO ORDERED.Bellosillo,
Mendoza, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------B. Documentary Evidence
Sec. 2 - Documentary Evidence
3. REGINO CLEOFAS and LUCIA DELA CRUZ, petitioners, vs. ST. PETER MEMORIAL
PARK INC., BASILISA ROQUE, FRANCISCO BAUTISTA, ARACELI WIJANGCO, DEL
ROSARIO, BANCO FILIPINO, and REGISTER OF DEEDS OF RIZAL and REGISTER OF
DEEDS OF QUEZON CITY, respondents.
G.R. No. 84905
February 1, 2000BUENA, J.:This case dates back to 1973. It has
dragged on for 26 years and has reached this Court three times. We now write finis to this
controversy.The property subject of the present controversy is Lot No. 719 of the Piedad Estate
situated in the Municipality of Caloocan, Rizal, containing an area of 215,264 square meters. It
forms part of the land covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 614 of the Registry of Deeds of
Rizal, in the name of the Government of the Philippines.On March 20, 1909, the Director of
Lands, as administrator of the Piedad Estate, executed a contract in favor of Antonio Cleofas,
(predecessor-in-interest of herein petitioners) known as Sales Certificate No. 923. Antonio
Cleofas took possession of the lot and occupied the same until his death sometime in 1945.
Antonio's title was burned in a fire sometime in 1933. Subsequently, when petitioners tried to
reconstitute the lost certificate, they discovered that the lot was already registered in the name
of herein respondent Memorial Park. Hence, they filed on October 31, 1970 a suit against
respondents for annulment of certificate of title and recovery of possession before then Court of
First Instance of Rizal which was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-15001. In their complaint,
petitioners prayed, among others, that they be declared the rightful owners of Lot No. 719, that

the title of their predecessor, Antonio Cleofas, be reconstituted and that all certificates of title
over said lot issued in the names of the respondents be declared null and void. 1Respondent
Memorial Park, filed its answer alleging inter alia: that while Lot No. 719 was originally sold to
Antonio Cleofas by the government, Cleofas subsequently assigned his rights to a certain
Aniceto Martin and Trino Narciso, in whose favor Transfer Certificate of Title No. 21893 was
issued on June 17, 1932; that Martin and Narciso in turn conveyed the property to Nazario
Roque on May 11, 1937 resulting in the issuance of TCT No. 32258; and that Nazario's transfer
certificate of title was cancelled and the property was passed on to his heirs, Carmen and
Basilisa Roque from whom respondent St. Peter Memorial Park purchased the lot. 2After trial,
the lower court, on May 2, 1973, rendered judgment in favor of herein petitioners and against
respondents, the decretal portion of which reads:IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, it is
hereby declared that the plaintiffs are the rightful owners of Lot 719 of the Piedad Estate and
are entitled to possession of the same; that Transfer Certificate of Title No. 21893 issued by the
defendant Register of Deeds of Rizal is declared null and void, and the following Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. 32258 issued by defendant Register of Deeds of Rizal cancelling TCT
No. 21893; 12360 issued by defendants Register of Deeds of Quezon City, cancelling TCT No.
32258; 74978 in the name of defendant Araceli Wijangco del Rosario issued by defendant
Register of Deeds of Quezon City and a transfer from TCT No. 12360; 98115, 130328 and
131768 in the name of defendant Basilisa Roque-Bautista and in the name of defendant
corporation which are all mortgaged to the defendant Bank, and all issued by defendant
Register of Deeds of Quezon City; are hereby declared null and void and are deemed cancelled
and of no effect. The plaintiffs' petition for reconstitution of their lost title having been
consolidated with this case, the same is hereby granted, and the Register of Deeds of Quezon
City is directed to reconstitute plaintiffs' title on Lot 719. Piedad Estate, based on all available
records and other data appearing in said registry of property.It is further ordered that as prayed
for the defendant corporation St. Peter Memorial Park, Inc., and the defendants Francisco M.
Bautista and Basilisa Roque pay jointly and severally to the plaintiffs the amount of P40,000.00
as damages and the amount of P10,000.00 as Attorney's fees; plus costs.SO ORDERED. 3On
June 30, 1973, respondents Memorial Park and Banco Filipino filed a joint motion for new trial
on the ground of newly discovered evidence consisting of documents to show that the title
issued to Antonio Cleofas refers to lot 640 and not lot 719 of the Piedad Estate. The motion for
new trial was denied by the trial court on February 5, 1974. Aggrieved, respondents filed with
this Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition to set aside the trial court's order denying their
motion. The petition was docketed as G.R. No. L-38280. 4On March 21, 1975, this Court
granted respondents' motion and remanded the case to the Court of First Instance for new trial.
At the new trial, respondents introduced new evidence to show that Antonio Cleofas is the
awardee of Lot 640 of the Piedad Estate as evidenced by Deed No. 18562 dated August 10,
1929, as well as TCT No. 15694 covering the same lot. It is their theory that Sheet 15 of Original
Certificate of Title No. 614 which is the basis of petitioners' title over the subject lot, referred to
Lot No. 640 and not to Lot 719.On March 19, 1977, the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch
IV, Quezon City, then presided by Judge Ricardo P. Tensuan, rendered a decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads 5:IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision dated
May 2, 1973 is hereby revived and reinstated, and it is hereby declared that the (1) plaintiffs are
the rightful owners of Lot 719 of the Piedad Estate and are entitled to possession of the same;

that Transfer Certificate of Title No. 21893 issued by the defendant Register of Deeds of Rizal is
declared null and void, and the following Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 32258 issued by
defendant Register of Deeds of Rizal cancelling TCT Nos. 21893; 12360 issued by defendant
Register of Deeds of Quezon City, cancelling TCT Nos. 32258; 74978 in the name of the
defendant Araceli Wijangco del Rosario issued by defendant Register of Deeds of Quezon City
and a transfer from T.C.T Nos. 12360, 98115, 130328 and 131768 in the name of defendant
Basilisa Roque-Bautista and in the name of defendant corporation which are all mortgaged to
the defendant Bank, and all issued by defendant Register of Deeds of Quezon City; are hereby
declared null and void and are deemed cancelled and of no effect. The plaintiffs petition for
reconstitution of their lost title having been consolidated with this case, the same is hereby
granted and the Register of Deeds of Quezon City is directed to reconstitute plaintiffs' title on
Lot 719, Piedad Estate, based on all available records and other data appearing in said registry
of property.(2) It is further ordered that as prayed for, the defendant corporation St. Peter
Memorial Park, Inc., pay to the plaintiffs the amount of P40,000.00 as damages and the amount
of P10,000.00 as attorney's fees; plus costs.SO ORDERED.The trial court found the Deed of
Assignment in favor of Martin and Narciso, predecessors of herein respondent St. Peter
Memorial Park, spurious. The trial court dwelled on the fact that the Assignment of Certificate of
Sale No. 923 6 executed by Antonio Cleofas in favor of Martin and Narciso, Deed No. 25874 7
executed by the Director of Lands in favor or Martin and Narciso conveying lot 719 to the latter
and the deed of sale executed by Martin and Narciso in favor Nazario Roque were all in the
possession of respondent St. Peters and not with the proper custodians or repositories thereof
and that the alleged assignment bears only a thumbmark of Antonio Cleofas although there is
proof of his competence to sign the same. 8Again, respondents elevated the case to this Court
and on July 30, 1979, we rendered a decision affirming the trial court's decision, portions of
which is hereunder quoted:The deed of assignment in question of Lot No. 719, although more
than thirty years old, was not produced from a custody in which it would naturally be found if
genuine. It was found in the custody of the St. Peter Memorial Park, Inc., not in the folder of
Bureau of Lands for Lot No. 719. If, as contended by the petitioners the said deed of
assignment was the basis of the sale of Lot No. 719 by the Bureau of Lands in favor of Aniceto
Martin and Trino Narciso, the deed of assignment should have been placed in the folder of the
Bureau of Lands for Lot No. 719. No reason was given why the deed of assignment of Lot No.
719 in favor of Aniceto Martin and Trino Narciso was produced from the possession of St. Peter
Memorial Park, Inc.Moreover, the deed of assignment was principally signed by one Ruperto
Cleofas who was not a co-owner of Lot No. 719. Antonio Cleofas, who was the sole owner of
said lot, was only a co-assignor. Although he could write his name, Antonio Cleofas did not sign
the deed of assignment. There appears only a thumb mark over the typewritten name of Antonio
Cleofas. These suspicious circumstances were not explained by the petitioners. The deed of
assignment cannot be presumed genuine and authentic under Sec. 22, Rule 132 of the Revised
Rules of Court. It was not produced from a custody in which it would naturally be found if
genuine and it is blemished by circumstances of suspicion.The fact that petitioner, St. Peter
Memorial Park, Inc., was in possession of the deed of assignment of Lot No. 719 which the trial
court found to be spurious is a badge of bad faith. 9Again, respondents St. Peter Memorial Park
and Banco Filipino moved to reconsider the aforesaid decision. During the pendency of the
motion, respondent filed a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration praying alternatively, (1)

that the motion be considered in the light of the additional documentary evidence which they ask
the Court to take judicial notice of; or (2) if this Court is not inclined to do so on procedural or
technical grounds, that the case be remanded to the trial court for new trial in order to afford
them the opportunity to present newly discovered evidence. In their prayer for another new trial,
respondents have manifested that in view of the adverse finding as to the genuineness of the
deed of assignment, they continued their search for evidence to bolster their contention that the
deed of assignment of Sale Certificate No. 923 was a genuine document properly filed in a
government office and confirmed by entries in the records of the same. 10On March 28, 1983,
this Court set aside its decision of July 30, 1979 and remanded the case to the trial court of
Quezon City for new trial. In granting the second motion for new trial, this Court ratiocinated: 11
It is neither a valid objection that the petitioners had previously been afforded the opportunity to
present evidence which they failed to do during the trial. A second new trial is expressly
authorized by the Rules if "based on a ground not existing nor avoidable when the first motion
was made" (Sec. 4, Rule 37, Rules of Court). As pointed out above, the circumstances
surrounding the discovery of the evidence which the petitioners desire to present are adequate
justification for the failure to make them available during the original trial, or in the new trial
previously allowed.x x x
xxx
x x xThe evidentiary worth of the evidence proffered
by the petitioners may not be brushed aside by a simplistic and sweeping appraisal that "they
do not promise to change the results." Undeniably, if it is true that copies of Exhibits "1" and "2"
had actually been filed in the proper government office, but were only misplaced or misfiled
therein, there would be little doubt as to the authenticity of the copies in the possession of the
petitioners which had been presented in court as Exhibits "1" and "2". Such a finding would
meet squarely the pronouncement that Exhibits "1" and "2" are spurious. It would also serve to
dissipate the doubts as to their genuineness arising from the fact that Exhibit "1" was executed
not by Antonio Cleofas alone, and that it was thumbmarked and not signed by him.The peculiar
circumstances surrounding the discovery of the evidence that the petitioners seek to present;
their significance and materiality in arriving at a true appraisal of the matters involved in this
case which, as had been previously observed by Us, is one that "involves public interest"
affecting as it does many memorial lot buyers and the integrity of the torrens systems (63 SCRA
190); and the considerable value of the property herein litigated, behooves Us to proceed
cautiously and with circumspection in the determination of the true merits of the controversy,
regardless of technicalities and procedural niceties, with the primordial end in view of rendering
justice to whomsoever it may be due.In the second new trial, respondents presented
photocopies of OCT No. 543 of the Tala Estate which contain an entry of the sale by Antonio
Cleofas in favor of Narciso and Martin covering lot no. 719 of the Piedad Estate and the Notarial
Register of Notary Public Jose Ma. Delgado, showing entries of the deed of sale executed by
the Director of Lands in favor of Trino Narciso and Aniceto Martin over 719. 12On the basis of
the new evidence presented by respondent, the trial court on November 20, 1985 rendered
judgment dismissing petitioners' complaint. 13 The trial court opined that the deed of
assignment was not found in the possession of the person in which it would naturally be found
because the deed of conveyance was misrecorded in a memorandum sheet of OCT No. 543 of
the Tala Estate.Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals which was docketed as CA-G.R.
No. 12901. On September 2, 1988, the court rendered judgment 14 affirming in toto the trial
court's decision. The Court of Appeals anchored its ruling on the doctrine that a title which

emanated from a spurious source may be the root of a valid title.Petitioners now challenge the
court's decision before this Court arguing that the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion
when it disregarded pertinent and material facts of the case and went beyond the issues raised.
They assert that the doctrine relied upon by the Court of Appeals is not applicable to the case at
bar because in the three trials held, the only point raised is the spurious character of the alleged
deed of assignment.While we have in many cases recognized and applied the aforementioned
doctrine, we cannot, given the facts of the case, apply the said doctrine. Rather, we will delve on
the determination of the authenticity of the deed of assignment in relation to the additional
evidence presented by respondents during the second new trial.We have scrutinized the
evidence presented and we are convinced that the deed of assignment executed by Antonio
Cleofas in favor of Narciso and Trino, is authentic. Thus, we are reconsidering our ruling in St.
Peter Memorial Park, Inc. vs. Cleofas, (92 SCRA 407) where we held that the deed of
assignment is a spurious document which may not be accorded any evidentiary value.It must be
recalled that the decision of then Court of First Instance in May 1977 finding the Assignment of
Sales Certificate No. 923 spurious, relied on the fact that said assignment and Deed of
Conveyance No. 25874 were in the possession of respondent St. Peter Memorial Park, and
were not in the custody of the government offices where they should ordinarily be. 15 This was
sufficiently refuted by herein respondents during the second new trial where they presented
evidence showing that the said assignment and Deed No. 25874 were properly filed in the
Bureau of Land and confirmed by Risalina Concepcion, Chief of the Archives Division, Bureau
of Records Management, and Norberto Vasquez, Jr., Deputy Register of Deeds, District III,
Caloocan City. Respondents' failure to present evidence to show that the said documents were
properly recorded in the books of the Register of Deeds can be attributed to the fact that there
was a misrecording of the transactions on OCT No. 543 of the Tala Estate instead of OCT No.
614. When Aniceto Martin, who was also a grantee of two lots of the Tala Estate, presented the
deed of assignment of lot 719, this was recorded in a sheet pertaining to OCT No. 543 instead
of being inscribed in a sheet pertaining to OCT 614 covering the Piedad Estate.Moreover, we
believe that respondent St. Peter Memorial's possession of the documents is reasonable
considering that it is the vendee of the subject lot. In other words, it is reasonably expected that
respondent, as successor-in-interest of the assignees Trino and Narciso, and the purchaser of
the subject lot, be found in the possession of the documents.1wphi1.ntThe custody to be
shown for the purpose of making a document evidence without proof of execution is not
necessarily that of the person strictly entitled to the possession of the said document. It is
enough that if the person in whose custody the document is found is so connected with the
document that he may reasonably be supposed to be in possession of it without fraud. 16 Thus,
documents are said to be in proper custody where they are in the place in which, and under the
care of the person with whom, they would naturally be, as, for instance, where they are found
among the family papers of the persons entitled thereto, or where they are found in the hands of
an agent of the parties beneficially interested. 17Additionally, the fact that the deed of
assignment contain only a thumb mark of Antonio Cleofas is not indicative of the document's
spuriousness. Petitioners failed to present evidence to prove that the thumb mark appearing in
the deed of assignment is not that of Antonio Cleofas. Petitioners merely relied on the fact that
in the Sales Certificate No. 923, Antonio Cleofas signed his name. Thus, we agree with the trial
court's observation that:. . ., absent any evidence that the thumbmark purporting to be Antonio

Cleofas' in the Assignment of Certificate of Sale (Exh. "1") is not really his, the presumption of
law that the transfer transaction evidenced thereby was fair and regular must stand, more so
when the document was acknowledged before a notary public and was, furthermore, the basis
of several acts of public officers.18It is important to stress too that the deed of assignment was
duly notarized by Notary Public Vicente Garcia on July 15, 1921. 19 Also, Deed No. 25874
issued and executed by the Director of Lands on behalf of the government, granting and
conveying lot no. 719 to Trino and Martin was notarized by Notary Public Jose Ma. Delgado. 20
Having been notarized, the documents have in their favor the presumption of regularity, and to
contradict the same, there must be evidence that is clear, convincing and more than merely
preponderant. 21 Petitioners failed to rebut said presumption, hence the presumption stands.
Finally, petitioners' failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to
assert their right over the property warrants a presumption that they have abandoned their right
or declined to assert it. 22Petitioners admit that they were in possession of the land only until
1945. From that time until the filing of the complaint, petitioners never questioned respondents'
possession. They have waited more than 25 years before questioning respondents' title. Their
long inaction and passivity in asserting their rights over the disputed property precludes them
from recovering the same by laches. 23WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. No. 12901 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.SO ORDERED.Bellosillo,
Mendoza, Quisumbing and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------4. ALEXANDER VINOYA, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION,
REGENT FOOD CORPORATION AND/OR RICKY SEE (PRESIDENT), respondents.
G.R. No. 126586
February 2, 2000KAPUNAN, J.:This petition for certiorari under Rule 65
seeks to annul and set aside the decision,1 promulgated on 21 June 1996, of the National Labor
Relations Commission ("NLRC") which reversed the decision2 of the, Labor Arbiter, rendered on
15 June 1994, ordering Regent Food Corporation ("RFC") to reinstate Alexander Vinoya to his
former position and pay him backwages.Private respondent Regent Food Corporation is a
domestic corporation principally engaged in the manufacture and sale of various food products.
Private respondent Ricky See, on the other hand, is the president of RFC and is being sued in
that capacity.Petitioner Alexander Vinoya, the complainant, worked with RFC as sales
representative until his services were terminated on 25 November 1991.The parties presented
conflicting versions of facts.Petitioner Alexander Vinoya claims that he applied and was
accepted by RFC as sales representative on 26 May 1990. On the same date, a company
identification card3 was issued to him by RFC. Petitioner alleges that he reported daily to the
office of RFC, in Pasig City, to take the latter's van for the delivery of its products. According to
petitioner, during his employ, he was assigned to various supermarkets and grocery stores
where he booked sales orders and collected payments for RFC. For this task, he was required
by RFC to put up a monthly bond of P200.00 as security deposit to guarantee the performance
of his obligation as sales representative. Petitioner contends that he was under the direct control
and supervision of Mr. Dante So and Mr. Sadi Lim, plant manager and senior salesman of RFC,
respectively. He avers that on 1 July 1991, he was transferred by RFC to Peninsula Manpower
Company, Inc. ("PMCI"), an agency which provides RFC with additional contractual workers

pursuant to a contract for the supply of manpower services (hereinafter referred to as the
"Contract of Service").4 After his transfer to PMCI, petitioner was allegedly reassigned to RFC
as sales representative. Subsequently, on 25 November 1991, he was informed by Ms. Susan
Chua, personnel manager of RFC, that his services were terminated and he was asked to
surrender his ID card. Petitioner was told that his dismissal was due to the expiration of the
Contract of Service between RFC and PMCI. Petitioner claims that he was dismissed from
employment despite the absence of any notice or investigation. Consequently, on 3 December
1991, petitioner filed a case against RFC before the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal and nonpayment of 13th month pay.5Private respondent Regent Food Corporation, on the other hand,
maintains that no employer-employee relationship existed between petitioner and itself. It insists
that petitioner is actually an employee of PMCI, allegedly an independent contractor, which had
a Contract of Service6 with RFC. To prove this fact, RFC presents an Employment Contract7
signed by petitioner on 1 July 1991, wherein PMCI appears as his employer. RFC denies that
petitioner was ever employed by it prior to 1 July 1991. It avers that petitioner was issued an ID
card so that its clients and customers would recognize him as a duly authorized representative
of RFC. With regard to the P200.00 pesos monthly bond posted by petitioner, RFC asserts that
it was required in order to guarantee the turnover of his collection since he handled funds of
RFC. While RFC admits that it had control and supervision over petitioner, it argues that such
was exercised in coordination with PMCI. Finally, RFC contends that the termination of its
relationship with petitioner was brought about by the expiration of the Contract of Service
between itself and PMCI and not because petitioner was dismissed from employment.On 3
December 1991, when petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbiter,
PMCI was initially impleaded as one of the respondents. However, petitioner thereafter withdrew
his charge against PMCI and pursued his claim solely against RFC. Subsequently, RFC filed a
third party complaint against PMCI. After considering both versions of the parties, the Labor
Arbiter rendered a decision,8 dated 15 June 1994, in favor of petitioner. The Labor Arbiter
concluded that RFC was the true employer of petitioner for the following reasons: (1) Petitioner
was originally with RFC and was merely transferred to PMCI to be deployed as an agency
worker and then subsequently reassigned to RFC as sales representative; (2) RFC had direct
control and supervision over petitioner; (3) RFC actually paid for the wages of petitioner
although coursed through PMCI; and, (4) Petitioner was terminated per instruction of RFC.
Thus, the Labor Arbiter decreed, as follows:ACCORDINGLY, premises considered respondent
RFC is hereby declared guilty of illegal dismissal and ordered to immediately reinstate
complainant to his former position without loss of seniority rights and other benefits and pay him
backwages in the amount of P103,974.00.The claim for 13th month pay is hereby DENIED for
lack of merit.This case, insofar as respondent PMCI [is concerned] is DISMISSED, for lack of
merit.SO ORDERED.9RFC appealed the adverse decision of the Labor Arbiter to the NLRC. In
a decision,10 dated 21 June 1996, the NLRC reversed the findings of the Labor Arbiter. The
NLRC opined that PMCI is an independent contractor because it has substantial capital and, as
such, is the true employer of petitioner. The NLRC, thus, held PMCI liable for the dismissal of
petitioner. The dispositive portion of the NLRC decision states:WHEREFORE, premises
considered, the appealed decision is modified as follows:1. Peninsula Manpower Company Inc.
is declared as employer of the complainant;2. Peninsula is ordered to pay complainant his
separation pay of P3,354.00 and his proportionate 13th month pay for 1991 in the amount of

P2,795.00 or the total amount of P6,149.00.SO ORDERED.11Separate motions for

reconsideration of the NLRC decision were filed by petitioner and PMCI. In a resolution,12
dated 20 August 1996, the NLRC denied both motions. However, it was only petitioner who
elevated the case before this Court.In his petition for certiorari, petitioner submits that
respondent NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in reversing the decision of the Labor
Arbiter, and asks for the reinstatement of the latter's decision.Principally, this petition presents
the following issues:1. Whether petitioner was an employee of RFC or PMCI.2. Whether
petitioner was lawfully dismissed.The resolution of the first issue initially boils down to a
determination of the true status of PMCI, whether it is a labor-only contractor or an independent
contractor.In the case at bar, RFC alleges that PMCI is an independent contractor on the sole
ground that the latter is a highly capitalized venture. To buttress this allegation, RFC presents a
copy of the Articles of Incorporation and the Treasurer's Affidavit13 submitted by PMCI to the
Securities and Exchange Commission showing that it has an authorized capital stock of One
Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00), of which Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00) is
subscribed and Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) is paid-in. According to RFC, PMCI
is a duly organized corporation engaged in the business of creating and hiring a pool of
temporary personnel and, thereafter, assigning them to its clients from time to time for such
duration as said clients may require. RFC further contends that PMCI has a separate office,
permit and license and its own organization.Labor-only contracting, a prohibited act, is an
arrangement where the contractor or subcontractor merely recruits, supplies or places workers
to perform a job, work or service for a principal.14 In labor-only contracting, the following
elements are present:(a) The contractor or subcontractor does not have substantial capital or
investment to actually perform the job, work or service under its own account and responsibility;
(b) The employees recruited, supplied or placed by such contractor or subcontractor are
performing activities which are directly related to the main business of the principal.15On the
other hand, permissible job contracting or subcontracting refers to an arrangement whereby a
principal agrees to put out or farm out with a contractor or subcontractor the performance or
completion of a specific job, work or service within a definite or predetermined period,
regardless of whether such job, work or service is to be performed or completed within or
outside the premises of the principal.16 A person is considered engaged in legitimate job
contracting or subcontracting if the following conditions concur:(a) The contractor or
subcontractor carries on a distinct and independent business and undertakes to perform the job,
work or service on its own account and under its own responsibility according to its own manner
and method, and free from the control and direction of the principal in all matters connected with
the performance of the work except as to the results thereof;(b) The contractor or subcontractor
has substantial capital or investment; and(c) The agreement between the principal and
contractor or subcontractor assures the contractual employees entitlement to all labor and
occupational safety and health standards, free exercise of the right to self-organization, security
of tenure, and social and welfare benefits.17Previously, in the case of Neri vs. NLRC,18 we held
that in order to be considered as a job contractor it is enough that a contractor has substantial
capital. In other words, once substantial capital established it is no longer necessary for the
contractor to show evidence that it has investment in the form of tools, equipment, machineries,
work premises, among others. The rational for this is that Article 106 of the Labor Code does not
require that the contractor possess both substantial capital and investment in the form of tools,

equipment, machineries, work premises, among others.19 The decision of the Court in Neri,
thus, states:Respondent BCC need not prove that it made investments in the form of tools,
equipment, machineries, work premises, among others, because it has established that it has
sufficient capitalization. The Labor Arbiter and the NLRC both determined that BCC had a
capital stock of P1 million fully subscribed and paid for. BCC is therefore a highly capitalized
venture and cannot be deemed engaged in "labor-only" contracting.20However, in declaring that
Building Care Corporation ("BCC") was an independent contractor, the Court considered not
only the fact that it had substantial capitalization. The Court noted that BCC carried on an
independent business and undertook the performance of its contract according to its own
manner and method, free from the control and supervision of its principal in all matters except
as to the results thereof.21 The Court likewise mentioned that the employees of BCC were
engaged to perform specific special services for its principal.22 Thus, the Court ruled that BCC
was an independent contractor.The Court further clarified the import of the Neri decision in the
subsequent case of Philippine Fuji Xerox Corporation vs. NLRC.23 In the said case, petitioner
Fuji Xerox implored the Court to apply the Neri doctrine to its alleged job-contractor, Skillpower,
Inc., and declare the same as an independent contractor. Fuji Xerox alleged that Skillpower, Inc.
was a highly capitalized venture registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission, the
Department of Labor and Employment, and the Social Security System with assets exceeding
P5,000,000.00 possessing at least 29 typewriters, office equipment and service vehicles, and its
own pool of employees with 25 clerks assigned to its clients on a temporary basis.24 Despite
the evidence presented by Fuji Xerox the Court refused to apply the Neri case and explained:
Petitioners cite the case of Neri v. NLRC, in which it was held that the Building Care Corporation
(BCC) was an independent contractor on the basis of finding that it had substantial capital,
although there was no evidence that it had investments in the form of tools, equipment,
machineries and work premises. But the Court in that case considered not only the
capitalization of the BCC but also the fact that BCC was providing specific special services
(radio/telex operator and janitor) to the employer; that in another case, the Court had already
found that BCC was an independent contractor; that BCC retained control over the employees
and the employer was actually just concerned with the end-result; that BCC had the power to
reassign the employees and their deployment was not subject to the approval of the employer;
and that BCC was paid in lump sum for the services it rendered. These features of that case
make it distinguishable from the present one.25Not having shown the above circumstances
present in Neri, the Court declared Skillpower, Inc. to be engaged in labor-only contracting and
was considered as a mere agent of the employer.From the two aforementioned decisions, it
may be inferred that it is not enough to show substantial capitalization or investment in the form
of tools, equipment, machineries and work premises, among others, to be considered as an
independent contractor. In fact, jurisprudential holdings are to the effect that in determining the
existence of an independent contractor relationship, several factors might be considered such
as, but not necessarily confined to, whether the contractor is carrying on an independent
business; the nature and extent of the work; the skill required; the term and duration of the
relationship; the right to assign the performance of specified pieces of work; the control and
supervision of the workers; the power of the employer with respect to the hiring, firing and
payment of the workers of the contractor; the control of the premises; the duty to supply
premises, tools, appliances, materials and labor; and the mode, manner and terms of

payment.26Given the above standards and the factual milieu of the case, the Court has to
agree with the conclusion of the Labor Arbiter that PMCI is engaged in labor-only contracting.
First of all, PMCI does not have substantial capitalization or investment in the form of tools,
equipment, machineries, work premises, among others, to qualify as an independent contractor.
While it has an authorized capital stock of P1,000,000.00, only P75,000.00 is actually paid-in,
which, to our mind, cannot be considered as substantial capitalization. In the case of Neri, which
was promulgated in 1993, BCC had a capital stock of P1,000,000.00 which was fully subscribed
and paid-for. Moreover, when the Neri case was decided in 1993, the rate of exchange between
the dollar and the peso was only P27.30 to $127 while presently it is at P40.390 to $1.28 The
Court takes judicial notice of the fact that in 1993, the economic situation in the country was not
as adverse as the present, as shown by the devaluation of our peso. With the current economic
atmosphere in the country, the paid-in capitalization of PMCI amounting to P75,000,00 cannot
be considered as substantial capital and, as such, PMCI cannot qualify as an independent
contractor.Second, PMCI did not carry on an independent business nor did it undertake the
performance of its contract according to its own manner and method, free from the control and
supervision of its principal, RFC. The evidence at hand shows that the workers assigned by
PMCI to RFC were under the control and supervision of the latter. The Contract of Service itself
provides that RFC can require the workers assigned by PMCI to render services even beyond
the regular eight hour working day when deemed necessary.29 Furthermore, RFC undertook to
assist PMCI in making sure that the daily time records of its alleged employees faithfully reflect
the actual working hours.30 With regard to petitioner, RFC admitted that it exercised control and
supervision over him.31 These are telltale indications that PMCI was not left alone to supervise
and control its alleged employees. Consequently, it can be, concluded that PMCI was not an
independent contractor since it did not carry a distinct business free from the control and
supervision of RFC.Third, PMCI was not engaged to perform a specific and special job or
service, which is one of the strong indicators that an entity is an independent contractor as
explained by the Court in the cases of Neri and Fuji. As stated in the Contract of Service, the
sole undertaking of PMCI was to provide RFC with a temporary workforce able to carry out
whatever service may be required by it.32 Such venture was complied with by PMCI when the
required personnel were actually assigned to RFC. Apart from that, no other particular job, work
or service was required from PMCI. Obviously, with such an arrangement, PMCI merely acted
as a recruitment agency for RFC. Since the undertaking of PMCI did not involve the
performance of a specific job, but rather the supply of manpower only, PMCI clearly conducted
itself as labor-only contractor.Lastly, in labor-only contracting, the employees recruited, supplied
or placed by the contractor perform activities which are directly related to the main business of
its principal. In this case, the work of petitioner as sales representative is directly related to the
business of RFC. Being in the business of food manufacturing and sales, it is necessary for
RFC to hire a sales representative like petitioner to take charge of booking its sales orders and
collecting payments for such. Thus, the work of petitioner as sales representative in RFC can
only be categorized as clearly related to, and in the pursuit of the latter's business. Logically,
when petitioner was assigned by PMCI to RFC, PMCI acted merely as a labor-only contractor.
Based on the foregoing, PMCI can only be classified as a labor-only contractor and, as such,
cannot be considered as the employer of petitioner.However, even granting that PMCI is an
independent contractor, as RFC adamantly suggests, still, a finding of the same will not save the

day for RFC. A perusal of the Contract of Service entered into between RFC and PMCI reveals
that petitioner is actually not included in the enumeration of the workers to be assigned to RFC.
The following are the workers enumerated in the contract:1. Merchandiser2. Promo Girl3.
Factory Worker4. Driver33Obviously, the above enumeration does not include the position of
petitioner as sales representative. This only shows that petitioner was never intended to be a
part of those to be contracted out. However, RFC insists that despite the absence of his position
in the enumeration, petitioner is deemed included because this has been agreed upon between
itself and PMCI. Such contention deserves scant consideration. Had it really been the intention
of both parties to include the position of petitioner they should have clearly indicated the same in
the contract. However, the contract is totally silent on this point which can only mean that
petitioner was never really intended to be covered by it.Even if we use the "four-fold test" to
ascertain whether RFC is the true employer of petitioner that same result would be achieved. In
determining the existence of employer-employee relationship the following elements of the
"four-fold test" are generally considered, namely: (1) the selection and engagement of the
employee or the power to hire; (2) the payment of wages; (3) the power to dismiss; and (4) the
power to control the employee.34 Of these four, the "control test" is the most important.35 A
careful study of the evidence at hand shows that RFC possesses the earmarks of being the
employer of petitioner.With regard to the first element, the power to hire, RFC denies any
involvement in the recruitment and selection of petitioner and asserts that petitioner did not
present any proof that he was actually hired and employed by RFC.It should be pointed out that
no particular form of proof is required to prove the existence of an employer-employee
relationship.36 Any competent and relevant evidence may show the relationship.37 If only
documentary evidence would be required to demonstrate that relationship, no scheming
employer would ever be brought before bar of justice.38 In the case at bar, petitioner presented
the identification card issue to him on 26 May 1990 by RFC as proof that it was the latter who
engaged his services. To our mind, the ID card is enough proof that petitioner was previously
hired by RFC prior to his transfer as agency worker to PMCI. It must be noted that the
Employment Contract between petitioner and PMCI was dated 1 July 1991. On the other hand,
the ID card issued by RFC to petitioner was dated 26 May 1990, or more than one year before
the Employment Contract was signed by petitioner in favor of PMCI. It makes one wonder why,
if petitioner was indeed recruited by PMCI as its own employee on 1 July 1991, how come he
had already been issued an ID card by RFC a year earlier? While the Employment Contract
indicates the word "renewal," presumably an attempt to show that petitioner had previously
signed a similar contract with PMCI, no evidence of a prior contract entered into petitioner and
PMCI was ever presented by RFC. In fact, despite the demand made by the counsel of
petitioner for production of the contract which purportedly shows that prior to 1 July 1991
petitioner was already connected with PMCI, RFC never made a move to furnish the counsel of
petitioner a copy of the alleged original Employment Contract. The only logical conclusion which
may be derived from such inaction is that there was no such contract end that the only
Employment Contract entered into between PMCI and petitioner was the 1 July 1991 contract
and no other. Since, as shown by the ID card, petitioner was already with RFC on 26 May 1990,
prior to the time any Employment Contract was agreed upon between PMCI and petitioner, it
follows that it was RFC who actually hired and engaged petitioner to be its employee.With
respect to the payment of wages, RFC disputes the argument of petitioner that it paid his wages

on the ground that petitioner did not submit any evidence to prove that his salary was paid by it,
or that he was issued payslip by the company. On the contrary, RFC asserts that the invoices39
presented by it, show that it was PMCI who paid petitioner his wages through its regular monthly
billings charged to RFC.The Court takes judicial notice of the practice of employers who, in
order to evade the liabilities under the Labor Code, do not issue payslips directly to their
employees.40 Under the current practice, a third person, usually the purported contractor
(service or manpower placement agency), assumes the act of paying the wage.41 For this
reason, the lowly worker is unable to show proof that it was directly paid by the true employer.
Nevertheless, for the workers, it is enough that they actually receive their pay, oblivious of the
need for payslips, unaware of its legal implications.42 Applying this principle to the case at bar,
even though the wages were coursed through PMCI, we note that the funds actually came from
the pockets of RFC. Thus, in the end, RFC is still the one who paid the wages of petitioner albeit
indirectly.As to the third element, the power to dismiss, RFC avers that it was PMCI who
terminated the employment of petitioner. The facts on record, however, disprove the allegation
of RFC. First of all, the Contract of Service gave RFC the right to terminate the workers
assigned to it by PMCI without the latter's approval. Quoted hereunder is the portion of the
contract stating the power of RFC to dismiss, to wit:7. The First party ("RFC") reserves the right
to terminate the services of any worker found to be unsatisfactory without the prior approval of
the second party ("PMCI").43In furtherance of the above provision, RFC requested PMCI to
terminate petitioner from his employment with the company. In response to the request of RFC,
PMCI terminated petitioner from service. As found by the Labor Arbiter, to which we agree, the
dismissal of petitioner was indeed made under the instruction of RFC to PMCI.The fourth and
most important requirement in ascertaining the presence of employer-employee relationship is
the power of control. The power of control refers to the authority of the employer to control the
employee not only with regard to the result of work to be done but also to the means and
methods by which the work is to be accomplished.44 It should be borne in mind, that the
"control test" calls merely for the existence of the right to control the manner of doing the work,
and not necessarily to the actual exercise of the right.45 In the case at bar, we need not belabor
ourselves in discussing whether the power of control exists. RFC already admitted that it
exercised control and supervision over petitioner.46 RFC, however, raises the defense that the
power of control was jointly exercised with PMCI. The Labor Arbiter, on the other hand, found
that petitioner was under the direct control and supervision of the personnel of RFC and not
PMCI. We are inclined to believe the findings of the Labor Arbiter which is supported not only by
the admission of RFC but also by the evidence on record. Besides, to our mind, the admission
of RFC that it exercised control and supervision over petitioner, the same being a declaration
against interest, is sufficient enough to prove that the power of control truly exists.We, therefore,
hold that an employer-employee relationship exists between petitioner and RFC.Having
determined the real employer of petitioner, we now proceed to ascertain the legality of his
dismissal from employment.Since petitioner, due to his length of service, already attained the
status of a regular employee,47 he is entitled to the security of tenure provided under the labor
laws. Hence, he may only be validly terminated from service upon compliance with the legal
requisites for dismissal. Under the Labor Code, the requirements for the lawful dismissal of an
employee are two-fold, the substantive and the procedural aspects. Not only must the dismissal
be for a valid or authorized cause,48 the rudimentary requirements of due process notice and

hearing49 must, likewise, be observed before an employee may be dismissed. Without the
concurrence of the two, the termination would, in the eyes of the law, be illegal.50As the
employer, RFC has the burden of proving that the dismissal of petitioner was for a cause
allowed under the law and that petitioner was afforded procedural due process. Sad to say, RFC
failed to discharge this burden. Indeed, RFC never pointed to any valid or authorized cause
under the Labor Code which allowed it to terminate the services of petitioner. Its lone allegation
that the dismissal was due to the expiration or completion of contract is not even one of the
grounds for termination allowed by law. Neither did RFC show that petitioner was given ample
opportunity to contest the legality of his dismissal. In fact, no notice of such impending
termination was ever given him. Petitioner was, thus, surprised that he was already terminated
from employment without any inkling as to how and why it came about. Petitioner was definitely
denied due process. Having failed to establish compliance with the requirements on termination
of employment under the Labor Code, the dismissal of petitioner is tainted with illegality.An
employee who has been illegally dismissed is entitled to reinstatement to his former position
without loss of seniority rights and to payment of full backwages corresponding to the period
from his illegal dismissal up to actual reinstatement.51 Petitioner is entitled to no less.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the NLRC, dated 21 June 1996, as
well as its resolution, promulgated on 20 August 1996, are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The
decision of the Labor Arbiter, rendered on 15 June 1994, is hereby REINSTATED and
AFFIRMED.1wphi1.ntSO ORDERED.Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Pardo and Ynares-Santiago,
JJ., concur.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------5. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appelle vs. TEDDY M. PAJARO, CRISPINA P.ABEN and
FLOR S. LIBERTAD, Appellants
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 167860-65 June 17, 2008
DECISION YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: This
petition for review on certiorari assails the January 19, 2005[1] Decision of the Sandiganbayan
which found appellants guilty of four (4) counts of malversation of public funds through
falsification of public documents and two (2) counts of violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act
No. 3019 in Criminal Case Nos. 26728 to 26733 and its March 21, 2005 Resolution[2] denying
the motion for reconsideration. Appellant Teddy M. Pajaro (Pajaro) was the Municipal Mayor of
Lantapan, Bukidnon from 1989 to 1998; while appellants Crispina Aben (Aben) and Flor S.
Libertad (Libertad) served as acting Municipal Accountant and Municipal Treasurer respectively.
During their term of office, specifically from September 1997 to March 1998, they allegedly
caused the irregular disbursement of public funds as financial assistance pursuant to livelihood
projects and IEC-Peace and Order Program in the respective amounts of P179,000.00 and
P140,000.00. In a special audit of certain disbursements made during Pajaros administration,
State Auditor Rogelio Tero (Auditor Tero) noted that P74,000.00 of the money disbursed was not
actually received by the intended beneficiaries who were chosen arbitrarily; and that the
disbursements were irregularly processed and released to the prejudice of the local
government.[3] During preliminary investigation, Pajaro maintained that the subject
disbursements were made pursuant to Resolutions issued by the Sangguniang Bayan of

Lantapan and the Municipal Development Council approving and adopting respectively, 20% of
the municipal budget to be used for its local development programs such as livelihood projects
and intelligence data-gathering. He explained that the vouchers and the Requests for
Obligation of Allotments (ROAs) lacked certification by the municipal budget officer because the
latter refused to sign the documents despite the presence of supporting papers. He belied the
audits finding that the beneficiaries of the program were chosen arbitrarily and averred that
such beneficiaries attended a three-day orientation program and were required to submit project
proposals subject to review by the project coordinator; that non-government organizations were
also tapped to ensure a wider coverage in the selection of beneficiaries. Pajaro also presented
affidavits of alleged beneficiaries Anecito Penar (Penar) and Angelita Lacerna (Lacerna) to
prove that they received the disbursed amounts. He also stated that the financial assistance
under the IEC-Peace and Order Program in the amount of P140,000.0 was properly chargeable
to intelligence funds and may be justified solely on the certification of the head of agency that
the funds were used for a highly confidential project, the details of which cannot be divulged
without posing a threat to security or the success of the mission. Pajaro admitted there were
accounting lapses relative to the charging of these payments but same were eventually
corrected by appellant Aben, hence no project duly covered by the municipal budget was
impaired.[4] Appellants Aben and Libertad pleaded the same defenses in their counter-affidavits.
[5] Finding probable cause, the Office of the Ombudsman filed four Informations for
Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of Public Documents defined and penalized
under Article 217 in relation to Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code against appellants. Save
for the date of commission of the offense, the nature of the livelihood project, its beneficiaries
and the amount allegedly misappropriated, the Informations were similarly worded as follows:
That on or about (September 16, 1997 in Criminal Case No. 26728, November 24, 1997 in
Criminal Case No. 26729, December 10, 1997 in Criminal Case No. 26730 and February 18,
1998 in Criminal Case No. 26731), in the Municipality of Lantapan, Bukidnon, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused TEDDY M. PAJARO, a high-ranking
public officer, being then the Municipal Mayor of Lantapan, Bukidnon, and accused CRISPINA
ABEN and FLOR S. LIBERTAD, both low-ranking public officers, being then the Municipal
Accountant and Municipal Treasurer, respectively, of Lantapan, Bukidnon, conspiring and
confederating with one another, who, by reason of the duties of their office are accountable for
public funds, while in the performance of their official duties and taking advantage of their
positions, thus committing the offense in relation to their office, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously, appropriate, take, misappropriate or consent or permit another
person to take public funds for their own personal use and benefit in the amount of (P15,000.00
in Criminal Case No. 26728, P25,000.00 in Criminal Case No. 26729, P24,00.00 in Criminal
Case No. 26730 and P10,000.00 in Criminal case No. 26731) purportedly intended as payment
of financial assistance for corn production livelihood project to (Anecito Penar, in Criminal Case
No. 2678, 26729 and 26731; Angelita Didith Lacerna in Criminal Case No. 26730) by falsifying
the disbursement voucher and the supporting documents and making it appear that said amount
was received by said (Anecito Penar in Criminal Case Nos. 2678, 2679 and 26731; Angelita
Didith Lacerna in Criminal Case No. 26730), when in truth and in fact, as the accused well
knew, (Anecito Penar in Criminal Case Nos. 26728, 26729 and 26731; Angelita Didith Lacerna
in Criminal Case No. 26730) never received the said amount, to the damage and prejudice of

the government in the aforesaid amount. CONTRARY TO LAW. Also, two Informations[6] for
violation of Section 3, paragraph (e) of Republic Act No. 3019[7] were filed against appellants,
thus:
That on or about November 1997 to March 1998, or sometime prior or
subsequent thereto, in the Municipality of Lantapan, Bukidnon, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused TEDDY M. PAJARO, a high-ranking public
officer, being then the Municipal Mayor of Lantapan, Bukidnon, and accused CRISPINA ABEN
and FLOR S. LIBERTAD, both low-ranking public officers, being then the Municipal Accountant
and Municipal Treasurer, respectively, of Lantapan, Bukidnon, conspiring and confederating with
one another, while in the performance of their official duties and taking advantage of their
positions, thus committing the offense in relation to their office, through manifest partiality or
evident bad faith, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and criminally, cause undue injury to
the Government in the amount of (P179,000.00 in Criminal Case No. 26732 and PP140,00.00 in
Criminal Case No. 26733) by releasing and/or causing the release of the aforesaid amount (for
purported livelihood projects in Criminal Case No. 26732 and as purported financial assistance
under the IEC-Peace and Order program in Criminal Case No. 26733) without the approval or
knowledge of the Municipal Budget Officer, without being supported with complete documents
and without any terms and conditions for its repayment, benefiting individuals arbitrarily chosen,
to the damage and prejudice of the government in the aforesaid amount(s). CONTRARY TO
LAW. Appellants filed a Motion for Reinvestigation[8] but it was denied by the Sandiganbayan in
its Order[9] dated December 3, 2001. Upon arraignment all three pleaded not guilty.[10] At the
trial, Auditor Tero testified to the veracity of the findings in the audit report as follows: I.
With respect to the amount of P179,000.00 for livelihood projects: a.)
a total of
P74,000.00 in 4 disbursement vouchers were disbursed using the names of Anecito Penar and
Didith Lacerna who did not actually receive the amount;b.)
12 disbursement vouchers
for the payment of financial assistance for livelihood projects were paid in cash instead of check,
bypassing the Office of the Municipal Budget Officer and charging other items of appropriations
of the budget not intended for livelihood projects;c.)
The grant of financial assistance
under 12 disbursement vouchers were not supported with complete documents;d.)
The amount of P179,000.00 was released without any terms and conditions for its repayment;
e.)
The financial assistance of P179,000.00 benefited only individuals arbitrarily
chosen. II.
With respect to the payment and reimbursement of expenses amounting to
P140,00.00 as financial assistance for IEC-Peace and Order program: a.)
all 8
disbursement vouchers covering the payment and reimbursement of expenses were paid
bypassing the Office of the Municipal Budget Officer and charging the payments to other budget
appropriations not intended for IEC-Peace and Order program;b.)
The payment of financial
assistance under the 8 disbursement vouchers were not supported with complete documents;c.)
The amount of P140,000.00 paid as reimbursement and payment of financial assistance were
paid without any terms and conditions for its repayment;d.)
The financial assistance of
P140,000.00 benefited only individuals arbitrarily chosen.[11] The auditor stressed that under
COA rules and regulations,[12] the certification of the budget officer is a mandatory requirement
for the disbursement of public funds.[13] Municipal Budget Officer Dioscoro Rara (Rara)
corroborated the audit report and averred that the documents in question do not bear his
signature and lacked certification as required by law because the same did not pass through his
office in contravention of the standard procedure. [14] Penar and Lacerna denied signing the

questioned documents[15] and receiving the amounts of P50,00.00 and P24,000.00

respectively from appellant Libertad.[16] Although Penar admitted signing two affidavits dated
June 8 and July 24, 2000 attesting that he is a beneficiary of the livelihood program and
receiving the amount of P50,000.00, Penar explained however that he did not read the contents
of the affidavits but he signed them upon appellant Pajaros prodding. Penar claimed that after
signing the second affidavit, Pajaro gave him P700.00 for his fare and pocket money.[17]
Lacerna also admitted executing an affidavit[18] dated March 13, 2000 before Municipal Judge
Febrestina Villanueva stating that she did not sign Voucher No. 166 nor did she receive
P24,000.00 as financial assistance. When confronted with two subsequent affidavits[19]
containing statements in contradiction of her previous declarations, she explained that the
signatures contained therein were hers; however, she claimed that she signed the affidavits
without reading the contents because appellant Pajaro assured her that her brother has
received the money on her behalf.[20] For his part, appellant Pajaro claimed that the
disbursements were properly made pursuant to approved resolutions of the Sangguniang Bayan
and the Municipal Development Council and were provided for in the Municipal Budget Plan for
1998. He stated that as municipal mayor, his role was limited to approving the vouchers with
respect to the disbursement of local funds[21] and he usually does not have any personal
knowledge whether the amounts disbursed were received by the intended beneficiaries except
in the case of Penar whom he personally know and Lacerna whose brother received the money
on her behalf. He insisted that the subject documents were executed according to procedure
save for the budget officers certification because the municipal budget officer unjustifiably
refused to affix his signature on the documents despite the supporting attachments. [22]
Delilah Gayao, a casual employee in the municipal accounting office in charge of processing the
disbursement documents, corroborated Pajaros testimony and stated that the Municipal Budget
Officer refused to sign the subject vouchers and its corresponding ROAs when they were
brought to his office for certification.[23] Appellant Aben alleged that she processed the subject
vouchers even without prior certification from the budget officer because she knew that there is
a sufficient budget for it. Moreover, she claimed that Pajaro directed her to expedite the release
because the beneficiaries were in dire need of financial assistance.[24] She further averred that
as a matter of procedure, whenever proper disbursements are erroneously charged to other
appropriations she makes the necessary adjustments in the entries in the municipalitys Journal
of Analysis and Obligations (JAO) at the close of every fiscal year.[25] Aben stated that even
without Pajaros directive and prior certification from the budget officer she would still obligate
the ROAs and its corresponding vouchers as a matter of course because sufficient funding
exists to support its disbursement. Appellant Libertad averred that she served as the acting
disbursement officer who personally released the money to Penar and Lacerna, the latter being
accompanied by her brother when the money was given to her.[26] Lacernas brother, Roberto
Ramos (Ramos), corroborated the testimonies of Pajaro and Libertad that he was with his sister
when she personally received the money from Libertad.[27]
On January 19, 2005, the
Sandiganbayan rendered the assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the three accused, Teddy Pajaro, Crispina
Aben, and Flor Libertad guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged in the six (6)
informations and sentencing each of them to suffer the following penalties: 1.
In
Criminal Case No. 26728 - imprisonment of thirteen (13) years, one (1) month, and eleven (11)

days to eighteen (18) years, two (2) months, and twenty-one (21) days of reclusion temporal, as
minimum and maximum, respectively - and to pay a fine P15,000;2.
In Criminal Case
No. 26729 - reclusion perpetua - and to pay a fine of P25,000;3.
In Criminal Case No.
26730 - reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P24,000;4.
In Criminal Case No.
26731 - imprisonment of eight (8) years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day of prision mayor to
thirteen (13) years, one (1) month and eleven (11) days of reclusion temporal as minimum and
maximum, respectively - and to pay a fine of P10,000;5.
In Criminal Case No. 26732
- imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) month to ten (10) years; and6.
In Criminal
Case No. 26733 - imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) month to ten (10) years. In the
service of the sentence, the duration of their total imprisonment shall not exceed forty (40)
years. The three (3) accused are also sentenced to suffer perpetual special disqualification, and
to pay and indemnify, jointly and severally, the government the amounts of P179,000 and
P140,000, or a total of P319,000 plus costs. SO ORDERED.[28]
Appellants filed a Motion
for Reconsideration which was denied by the Sandiganbayan in its Order[29] dated March 21,
2005; hence this appeal. The Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) argues that appellants
failed to dispute the evidence adduced against them; and that the Sandiganbayan correctly
found the documents containing the alleged signatures of Lacerna and Penar as falsified. On
the other hand, appellants argue[30] that the Sandiganbayan overlooked some documentary
evidence which if considered would cast doubts on the validity of its conclusions; that Penar and
Lacerna were unreliable as shown by the contradictions and inconsistencies in their statements
as contained in their affidavits as well as those made during the trial. The appeal lacks merit.
Appellants are charged, in conspiracy with each other, with the complex crime of Malversation
of Public Funds thru Falsification of Public Documents defined and penalized under Article 217,
in relation to Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of which are as follows: a.)
The offender is a public officer;b.)
He has custody or control of the funds or property
by reason of the duties of his office;c.)
The funds or property are public funds or
property for which he is accountable; andd.)
He has appropriated, taken,
misappropriated or consented, or through abandonment or negligence, permitted another
person to take them.[31] It is undisputed that appellants are all public officers and the funds
allegedly misappropriated are public in character. Appellant Libertad, by reason of her office as
Municipal Treasurer had custody and control of such funds and is therefore accountable for the
same. Ordinarily, a municipalitys mayor and accountant are not accountable public officers as
defined under the law. However, a public officer who is not in charge of public funds or property
by virtue of his official position, or even a private individual, may be liable for malversation if
such public officer or private individual conspires with an accountable public officer to commit
malversation,[32] as in the instant case. In finding that appellants misappropriated the said
public funds, the Sandiganbayan ruled on the authenticity of the signatures of the alleged
beneficiaries Penar and Lacerna on the disbursement vouchers as follows: [T]he two affidavits
of Penar dated June 8, 2000, and July 24, 2000, respectively relied on by the defense, and
therefore bound by them, unwittingly show his true and real signature as one Penar, signed
without a longhand A like his two (2) signatures in his other affidavits, as distinguished from
the signatures in the questioned documents x x x where the alleged signatures of Penar were
signed with a longhand A or APenar, thereby showing that the signatures in the said
vouchers and receipts are not the signatures of Anecito Penar but are forged or falsified

signatures. Simply stated, Penars true and real signature is the one reflected in his affidavits
which is different from the signatures affixed in the questioned documents. In the same manner,
the two affidavits of Angelita Didith Lacerna dated June 26, 2000 and July 24, 2000,
respectively, that state that she allegedly received the subject amounts, also relied upon by the
defense and therefore also bound by them, likewise show her true and real signature which is a
sort of initials on top of her full name like her signatures in her other affidavits, which are
different from the signatures in the disbursement voucher and expense receipt which spell out
her family name DLacerna, thereby showing that these signatures are not her true signatures.
Otherwise said, Lacernas true and real signature is the one affixed in her affidavits and not the
one in the vouchers and receipts.[33] We agree with the Sandiganbayans findings that the
differences in the alleged beneficiaries signatures are so evident that there is no need for an
expert opinion.[34] Both Penar and Lacerna categorically denied that the signatures on the
subject vouchers were their signatures; or that they received the money allegedly disbursed to
them. That Penar and Lacerna signed several affidavits prior to their testimonies does not totally
impair the credibility of their averments. Contradictions between the contents of an affidavit of a
witness and his testimony on the witness stand do not always militate against the witness
credibility. It is established jurisprudence that affidavits, which are taken ex-parte are generally
considered to be inferior to a testimony given in open court as the latter is subject to the test of
cross-examination.[35] There is no doubt that appellants facilitated the illegal release of the
funds by signing the subject vouchers. Without their signatures, said monies could not have
been disbursed. Pajaro, as Mayor, initiated the request for obligation of allotments and certified
and approved the disbursement vouchers; Aben, as Acting Municipal Accountant, obligated the
allotments despite lack of prior certification from the budget officer. Municipal Treasurer
Libertad certified to the availability of funds and released the money even without the requisite
budget officers certification. Their combined acts, coupled with the falsification of the
signatures of Penar and Lacerna, all lead to the conclusion that appellants conspired to defraud
the government. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy need not be proved
by direct evidence and may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during and after
the commission of the crime, which are indicative of a joint purpose, concerted action and
concurrence of sentiments. In conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. Conspiracy is present
when one concurs with the criminal design of another, indicated by the performance of an overt
act leading to the crime committed. It may be deduced from the mode and manner in which the
offense was perpetrated.[36] Appellants were also correctly found liable of violation of Section
3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, the elements of which are as follows: 1.)
the accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions;2.)
he must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or inexcusable negligence; and3.)
that his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or giving any
private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions.
[37] The first element is not disputed; thus what needs to be resolved is the presence of the
second and third elements, that is, whether as public officers, appellants acted with manifest
partiality or evident bad faith and caused undue injury to the government in the respective
amounts of P179,000.00 and P140,000.00. Appellants admitted that the disbursements were
made in cash in violation of Section 9 of COA Circular 92-382 which provides that all

disbursements shall be made by check except in cases where cash advance is drawn and
maintained according to COA rules. When appellants disbursed the amounts in cash,
purportedly for reasons of expediency and practicality, they did not only make it difficult to keep
track of the disbursements whereabouts but they also engendered suspicion that they were
hiding something. Had they followed the prescribed procedure and released the funds in the
form of checks, they would have had documents at their disposal to prove the legitimacy of said
transactions. Appellants contention that the subject disbursements lacked prior certification by
the municipal budget officer because the latter unjustifiably refused to sign the disbursement
vouchers and ROAs deserves scant consideration. As correctly observed by the Office of the
Ombudsman, if that was indeed the case, it is surprising to note that no action, administrative or
otherwise, was instituted by appellant Pajaro against the budget officer. We are more inclined to
give credence to the budget officers categorical statement that he was not able to sign the
ROAs because the documents were not presented for his signature. COA Circular No. 92-382
issued on July 3, 1992 by the Commission on Audit laid down accounting and auditing rules and
regulations designed to implement the provisions[38] of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise
known as the Local Government Code of 1991. It is issued pursuant to the constitutional
authority[39] of the COA to define the scope of audit, make rules and disallow unnecessary
expenditures in the government. The circular is addressed to public officers concerned with
accounting and auditing of local funds such as mayors, local treasurers, accountants and
budget officers among others. It provides the prescribed accounting system for expenditure and
transfers of local funds as follows; First, the ROA shall be initially certified by the budget officer
with respect to the existence of appropriation that has been legally made for the purpose by
signing Certification No. 1 therein; Second, the treasurer shall certify that funds are available by
signing Certification No. 2; Third, the accountant shall review the ROA, assign an obligation
number thereto, and record the amount of the obligation in the Journal and Analysis of
Obligations (JAO) before certifying as to the obligation of the allotment by signing the ROA.[40]
Since the rules clearly delineate the procedure for disbursement of public or local funds there
was no reason for appellants to make judgment calls and substitute their own interpretation of
the above provision. The third element of the offense penalized in Section 3 (e) is satisfied when
the questioned conduct causes undue injury to any party, including the government, or gives
any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions to any
private party. Proof of the extent or quantum of damage is thus not essential, it being sufficient
that the injury suffered or benefit received can be perceived to be substantial enough and not
merely negligible.[41] The prosecutions evidence satisfactorily demonstrated that by
countervailing the clearly delineated procedure laid down in COA Circular 92-382, appellants
defrauded the government of a much needed resource by facilitating the release of local funds
which no one can account for and which did not reach the pockets of its intended recipients.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The January 19, 2005 Decision of the Sandiganbayan
finding appellants guilty of four (4) counts of malversation of public funds through falsification of
public documents and two (2) counts of violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as well as the
March 21, 2005 Resolution denying the Motion for Reconsideration are AFFIRMED.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------6. BIENVENIDO LIBRES and JULIE L. PANINGBATAN, Petitioners, - versus - SPOUSES
RODRIGO DELOS SANTOS and MARTINA OLBA, Respondents

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 176358 June 17, 2008
DECISION YNARESSANTIAGO, J.: This petition for review on certiorari assails the September 11, 2006 Decision[1]
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 65722 reversing and setting aside the Decision[2] of
the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, Branch 68, in Civil Case No. 17416 holding
petitioners liable to respondents as follows: WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one entered ordering appellees Bienvenido Libres and
Julie Paningbatan to jointly pay the appellants, within ninety (90) days from notice the sum of
P150,000.00 together with legal interest at twelve percent (12%) per annum from August 18,
1995 until the obligation is fully paid. In case of non-payment, the mortgaged property shall be
sold on public auction in accordance with Rule 68 of the Rules of Court. SO ORDERED.[3] Also
assailed is the January 17, 2007 Resolution[4] denying the motion for reconsideration. As found
by the appellate court, the factual background of the case is as follows: On August 18, 1995, the
appellants (spouses Rodrigo and Martina delos Santos) filed with the court a quo a Complaint
for foreclosure of mortgage against the appellees (Bienvenido Libres and Julie Paningbatan),
alleging that appellee Bienvenido Libres executed, in favor of the appellants, three separate
deeds of Real Estate Mortgage[5] to secure the payment of three loans in the total amount of
One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P150,000.00), which amounts were supposedly delivered
by the appellants to appellee Julie L. Paningbatan, upon the instructions of appellee Bienvenido
Libres. According to the appellants, the appellees violated the terms of the mortgage when they
failed to pay the principal loan and the accrued interests. The appellants prayed for the court a
quo to render judgment ordering the appellees to pay the principal loan plus the stipulated
interests, attorneys fees, expenses and costs. Alternatively, in default of such payment, the
appellants prayed that the mortgaged property be ordered sold with the proceeds thereof
applied to the mortgage debt, accumulated interests, attorneys fees, expenses and costs. On
September 20, 1995, appellees filed their Answer (prepared and signed by appellee Bienvenido
Libres) and, except for the qualifications of the parties and the identity of the property involved,
appellees denied all the rest of the allegations in the Complaint. Appellees claimed that the
documents were falsified and their signatures appearing therein were forged. Moreover,
appellee Bienvenido Libres claimed that he never authorized appellee Julie L. Paningbatan to
represent him in such anomalous transactions. To prove his claim, appellee Bienvenido Libres
requested that his signatures in the documents be examined by a handwriting expert of the
National Bureau of Investigation. As relief, the appellees prayed that the case be dismissed with
cost against the plaintiffs and that they be paid the amount of P20,000.00 as and by way of
moral and exemplary damages and litigation expenses. During the trial on the merits, the
appellants presented two notaries public; an officer from the Registry of Deeds of Lingayen,
Pangasinan; three barangay officials who presided and witnessed the barangay confrontation
between the appellants and the appellees; and appellant Martina delos Santos herself. The
evidence of the appellants showed that appellees borrowed from the appellants the total amount
of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P150,000.00) which was delivered in three installments:
P25,000.00 on October 23, 1993, P75,000.00 on January 18, 1994, and P50,000.00 on
February 10, 1994. As security for the loan, appellee Bienvenido Libres executed three deeds of
Real Estate Mortgage, the due execution of which was attested to by the administering notaries

public. The deeds were likewise duly registered with the Office of the Register of Deeds of
Lingayen, Pangasinan. In violation of the terms of the Real Estate Mortgage, appellees failed to
pay the principal amount and the accrued interests. Formal demand was made but despite
receipt thereof, appellees refused to make any payment. Thus, Complaints were filed by the
appellants with the barangay against the appellees. Allegedly, during the barangay
confrontation, the appellees admitted their indebtedness and promised that they would pay. But
no payment was made by the appellees. For their part, appellees disputed the supposed loan in
the amount of P150,000.00. Appellee Bienvenido Libres denied his signature in the Real Estate
Mortgage and denied that he appeared before the notaries public to execute any document.
Rather, according to appellee Julie Paningbatan, she was the one who transacted with appellant
Martina delos Santos, and what she borrowed from the appellants was only P13,000.00.
Furthermore, according to appellee Julie Paningbatan, she caused the execution of a different
Real Estate Mortgage although similarly dated on October 30, 1993 but it was her godfather, a
certain Engr. Carlo Marias who signed the name of appellee Bienvenido Libres. Also, appellee
Julie Paningbatan denied that her father admitted in the barangay confrontation that he owed
the appellants in the amount of P35,000.00. Instead, she was the one who admitted the
indebtedness to Martina delos Santos of more or less P25,000.00 including interest. To support
their defense, appellees presented Adelia C. Demetillo, Senior Document Examiner of the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), who was qualified as an expert witness. Said witness
submitted to the court a quo Questioned Documents Report No. 545-697 dated July 4, 1997.
According to said handwriting expert, the signature of appellee Bienvenido Libres in the
questioned Real Estate Mortgage appears to be different from said appellees sample and
standard signatures. The same finding was made with respect to the signature of one of the
witnesses to the contract, Gloria Libres.[6] (Names in emphasis supplied) Respondent Martina
Olba testified during trial that petitioners are her barangaymates; that her husband Rodrigo is
an overseas contract worker; that on October 23, 1993, petitioners came to her house asking for
a loan in the amount of P150,000.00 for the medical expenses of Libres wife Maria Laverosa;
that she told them she had only P25,000.00 cash that day; that she asked for collateral, and
Bienvenido Libres (Libres) agreed to constitute a mortgage on their home situated at a 267
square meter unregistered lot in Zamora Street, Mangatarem, Pangasinan (the subject
property); that she handed the money to Julie Paningbatan (Paningbatan) who brought the
money to Manila; that on October 30, 1993, they proceeded to the residence of notary public
Filipina Lapurga Cardenas (Cardenas) who prepared and notarized the mortgage deed (the first
deed) which was signed by Libres and his children Juancho (or Pancho) and Gloria Libres as
witnesses; that in January 1994, petitioners again came to her house to borrow money for
Marias alleged eye operation; that they again proceeded to Cardenas residence, and the latter
prepared and notarized another mortgage deed (the second deed) which was signed by Libres
and his children Juancho (or Pancho) and Gloria Libres as witnesses; that again, Libres came to
her to borrow P50,000.00; this time, Cardenas was in Manila, so they proceeded to Atty. Lester
Escobar (Atty. Escobar) for the notarization and acknowledgment of the third mortgage deed;
that petitioners paid only a total of P5,000.00 by way of interest, prompting her to make a formal
demand for the return of the whole amount of P150,000.00 loaned out to them; that petitioners
failed to perform their obligation, and so the matter was brought to the attention of the barangay
authorities.[7] The two notaries public who notarized the three mortgage deeds, Cardenas and

Atty. Escobar, testified during trial that Libres, together with his witnesses as well as respondent
Martina, signed the subject mortgage deeds and acknowledged the same in their presence.
More particularly, Cardenas testified that Libres together with his witnesses Pancho Libres
and Gloria Libres, as well as respondent Martina personally went to her house in the morning
of October 30, 1993 and asked her to prepare a deed of real estate mortgage over a house and
lot which she (Cardenas) herself knew (she claims to have seen the same since it is located
within twenty houses from where she lived); that Libres personally wrote his Community Tax
Certificate (CTC) number on said deed (the first deed, or the October 30, 1993 mortgage
document); that on January 18, 1994, Libres, Martina, Pancho Libres and Gloria Libres again
came to her house to execute another deed of real estate mortgage over the same property for
an additional consideration, which she prepared and notarized after the parties signed and
acknowledged the same in her presence; that she knows the signature in said deeds to be
Libres because the latter personally affixed his signature upon said documents in front of her;
and that she explained the contents of the said documents in the Ilocano dialect, which Libres
and the parties to the documents knew and understood.[8] Atty. Escobar, on the other hand,
testified that with respect to the third mortgage deed (dated February 10, 1994), he personally
confirmed Libres identity by specifically asking him of the same; that he compared Libres
signature in the Tax Declaration to the property and in his residence certificate or CTC; and that
both documents were translated in the Ilocano dialect and explained to Libres as to be fully
understood by the latter.[9] It was shown as well during trial that on the occasion of conciliation
proceedings held at the barangay level, petitioners admitted to Barangay Captain Henry
Evangelista that they borrowed money from the respondents,[10] and petitioner Libres offered to
pay respondents with a portion of the subject property, which offer the latter declined.[11] On the
other hand, petitioners as defendants a quo presented as their first witness Mrs. Adela
Demetillo, Senior Document Examiner II of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), who
conducted an examination and evaluation of the signatures of Libres and his witnesses (Pancho
and Gloria Libres) in the questioned mortgage deeds as well as specimens of their respective
signatures. Her findings are contained in a Report[12] which essentially reads, thus:
FINDINGS: Comparative examination made on the specimens submitted under the
stereoscopic microscope, magnifying lens and with the aid of photographic enlargement reveals
the following: 1.
There are significant fundamental differences in handwriting characteristics
existing between the questioned and the standard/sample signatures B.A.
LIBRES/BIENVENIDO LIBRES, such as in: - manner of execution- structural formation of
letters- other minute identifying details 2.
There are significant fundamental differences in
handwriting characteristics existing between the questioned and the standard/sample signatures
GLORIA LIBRES/G.L. LIBRES, such as in: - manner of execution- structural formation of
letters- other minute identifying details 3.
No definite opinion can be rendered on the
questioned signatures JUANCHO L. LIBRES as the standard/sample signatures submitted are
insufficient/inappropriate to serve as basis for a scientific comparative examination.
CONCLUSION: 1.
The questioned and the standard/sample signatures B.A. LIBRES
BIENVENIDO LIBRES were NOT WRITTEN by one and the same person. 2.
The
questioned and the standard/sample signatures GLORIA LIBRES/G.L. LIBRES were NOT
WRITTEN by one and the same person. 3.
No definite opinion can be rendered, per
above FINDINGS 3. REMARKS: All the specimens submitted are forwarded to the Records

Section of this Bureau in the meantime, for safekeeping.[13] For his part, Libres testified that he
knows the respondents who are residents of the same barangay where he resides; that he owns
the subject property, which is where he and his family reside; that he knew notary public
Cardenas, but denies having appeared before her as well as before Atty. Escobar; that
petitioner Paningbatan is her daughter; that he denies having executed the three questioned
mortgage deeds; that he admits having appeared at conciliation proceedings before the
barangay captain; and that knowing that his signatures on the mortgage deeds were forged, he
nevertheless did not file a criminal case against those responsible due to financial constraints.
[14] Petitioner Paningbatan, on the other hand, testified that she was the one who obtained a
loan from respondents in the amount of P13,000.00, and not P150,000.00 which respondents
claim; that the said amount was for the purpose of redeeming her godfather, the late Engr. Carlo
Marias vehicle which was pawned to a certain Mrs. Margate; that in order to secure the
payment thereof, she executed a deed of mortgage dated October 30, 1993 over her father
Bienvenido Libres house and lot (the subject property), but that it was her godfather Engr.
Marias who signed forged her fathers signature on said mortgage deed; that she was able
to secure her fathers CTC and the Tax Declaration to the property; that she did all these without
the knowledge and consent of her father; that it is not true that her father secured a loan from
respondents in the total amount of P150,000.00 in order to pay for her mothers medical
expenses in relation to the latters eye and pulmonary problems; that it was her sister and
brother-in-law who paid for her mothers medical expenses; that she knows nothing of the three
mortgage deeds in issue; that she, together with her father, attended conciliation proceedings at
the barangay level.[15] Petitioners, however, did not call on the alleged witnesses to the
mortgage deeds, Pancho and Gloria Libres, to testify in their behalf. On November 3, 1999, the
trial court rendered its Decision[16] dismissing the case. The dispositive portion thereof reads as
follows: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered: 1.
Ordering
the dismissal of this instant case against the defendants Bienvenido Libres and Julie
Paningbatan with cost against the plaintiffs; and 2.
Ordering the plaintiffs to pay jointly and
severally defendants moral and exemplary damages in the sum of P20,000.00, and P10,000.00,
respectively, as well as litigation expenses of P10,000.00. SO ORDERED.[17] Respondents
filed their appeal with the Court of Appeals, which rendered the assailed Decision and
Resolution reversing the trial courts decision. The sole issue for resolution in the instant petition
is: WHETHER THE LOANS EXTENDED IN FAVOR OF THE PETITIONERS ARE SECURED
BY A VALID AND LEGAL REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE, WHEN IT WAS PROVEN DURING THE
TRIAL THAT THE ABSOLUTE OWNER THEREOF WAS NOT THE ONE WHO SIGNED THE
DEED OF REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE, MUCH LESS AUTHORIZED HIS OWN DAUGHTER
TO VALIDLY CONTRACT THE SAME. Petitioners insist that Libres did not execute the three
mortgage deeds sued upon, and that his signatures therein are mere forgeries. Hence, there
should be no mortgage upon the property that may be the object of respondents foreclosure
suit; that the trial court was correct in dismissing the same. In ordering the dismissal of the case,
the trial court gave more weight to the NBI handwriting experts opinion that it was possible that
Libres signatures in the three mortgage deeds in question could have been forged; that since
Bienvenido Libres did not sign the mortgage deeds, respondents claimed loan credits should be
negated; thus, the subject property covered by the falsified mortgage deeds may not be
foreclosed upon. The trial court believed Paningbatans explanation that she was the one who

obtained a loan from respondents in the amount of P13,000.00, and that it was Engr. Marias
who forged Bienvenidos signature on said mortgage deed. On the other hand, the Court of
Appeals placed weight on the direct testimonies of the two notaries public, who categorically
declared that Libres personally appeared before them and signed the mortgage deeds in their
presence. The appellate court opined that, since they possessed the character of public
documents by their subsequent notarization and acknowledgment, the questioned mortgage
deeds must be accorded the presumption of regularity. Evidence to contradict them must be
clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant.[18] It ruled that any claim of forgery of
these documents must be proved with evidence, which in petitioners case, was not sufficiently
established, beyond mere denials and the testimony and report of the NBI handwriting expert,
which it considered as unconvincing. The Court of Appeals held that the NBI handwriting
experts opinion is merely persuasive and not conclusive, citing Jimenez v. Commission on
Ecumenical Mission and Relations,[19] where we held that resort to handwriting experts,
although helpful in the examination of forged documents because of the technical procedure
involved in analyzing them, is not mandatory or indispensable to the examination or comparison
of handwriting, and a finding of forgery does not entirely depend upon the testimony of these
experts. The appellate court likewise found as fatal the failure of the petitioners to present the
testimonies in court of Pancho and Gloria Libres, who could have readily confirmed the truth of
petitioners defense. Finally, it found that Paningbatans claim of forgery committed by her
godfather was self-serving. We sustain the appellate court. Notarial documents executed with all
the legal requisites under the safeguard of a notarial certificate is evidence of a high character.
To overcome its recitals, it is incumbent upon the party challenging it to prove his claim with
clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant evidence.[20] A notarial document,
guaranteed by public attestation in accordance with the law, must be sustained in full force and
effect so long as he who impugns it does not present strong, complete, and conclusive proof of
its falsity or nullity on account of some flaws or defects provided by law.[21] Without that sort of
evidence, the presumption of regularity, the evidentiary weight conferred upon such public
document with respect to its execution, as well as the statements and the authenticity of the
signatures thereon, stand.[22] Against the bare denials and interested disavowals of the
petitioners, the testimonies of the two notaries public must prevail. Their identical and
categorical declarations that Libres signed the mortgage deeds in their presence present a more
convincing picture of the actual events that transpired. We agree with the appellate courts ruling
that petitioners failure to present the two witnesses to the mortgage deeds, Pancho and Gloria
Libres, is fatal to their cause. Their testimonies, if favorable to petitioners cause, would have
dissipated, by way of corroboration, the courts justifiable supposition that petitioners
testimonies are merely self-serving. He who disavows the authenticity of his signature on a
public document bears the responsibility to present evidence to that effect. Mere disclaimer is
not sufficient. At the very least, he should present corroborating witnesses to prove his
assertion. At best, he should present an expert witness.[23] This is because as a rule, forgery
cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear, positive and convincing evidence and the
burden of proof lies on the party alleging forgery.[24] Petitioners, left with no other recourse than
their self-serving declarations for lack of corroborating evidence, seek redemption through the
lone testimony of the NBI handwriting expert, who understandably is the sole disinterested
witness for the petitioners. This, however, cannot suffice. Standing alone amidst the mass of

evidence adduced by the respondents and their witnesses, the NBI handwriting experts opinion
may not overturn the categorical declaration of the notaries public that Libres signed the
mortgage deeds in their presence. As we held in Leyva v. Court of Appeals,[25] the positive
testimony of the attesting witnesses ought to prevail over expert opinions which cannot be
mathematically precise but which, on the contrary, are subject to inherent infirmities. Besides,
the handwriting experts testimony is only persuasive, not conclusive. We cannot discount
petitioners admission during barangay conciliation proceedings that they owed respondents
money and offered to pay the same with a portion of the subject property.[26] Certainly, there is
a preponderance of evidence in respondents favor. We see no conflicting factual milieu; the
dilemma lay merely in the appreciation of the evidence for both parties. Where in this respect
the trial and appellate courts could not agree, we must intervene and, once again, exhibit the
Courts wisdom in order to dispense justice with an even hand. We note however, that the
subject property is Bienvenido and Maria Libres family home, although the truth of this
observation could not be known from the evidence presented. It is thus incumbent upon the trial
court to make a prior determination in this respect, taking to mind the provisions of the Family
Code on the family home, specifically Articles 152 up to 162 thereof. WHEREFORE, the petition
is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated September 11, 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No.
65722 ordering petitioners to pay respondents the amount of P150,000.00 with legal interest
thereon of 12% until fully paid, and the Resolution dated January 17, 2007 denying the motion
for reconsideration, are AFFIRMED. However, considering the possibility that the subject
property constitutes the petitioners family home, the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen,
Pangasinan, Branch 68 is DIRECTED to conduct a thorough inquiry into the nature,
circumstances and value of the same, in accordance with and taking into consideration the
provisions of the Family Code, and immediately make the corresponding determination in
respect thereof prior to execution.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------1. BEST EVIDENCE RULE
Sec. 3 - Original Document must be produced; exceptions
7. CONCEPCION CHUA GAW, Petitioner, - versus - SUY BEN CHUA andFELISA CHUA,
Respondents.G.R. No. 160855
April 16, 2008
DECISION NACHURA, J.: This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari from the Decision[1] of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 66790 and Resolution[2] denying the motion for
reconsideration. The assailed decision affirmed the ruling of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in a
Complaint for Sum of Money in favor of the plaintiff.
The antecedents are as follows:
Spouses Chua Chin and Chan Chi were the founders of three business enterprises[3] namely:
Hagonoy Lumber, Capitol Sawmill Corporation, and Columbia Wood Industries. The couple had
seven children, namely, Santos Chua; Concepcion Chua; Suy Ben Chua; Chua Suy Phen; Chua
Sioc Huan; Chua Suy Lu; and Julita Chua. On June 19, 1986, Chua Chin died, leaving his wife
Chan Chi and his seven children as his only surviving heirs. At the time of Chua Chins death,
the net worth of Hagonoy Lumber was P415,487.20.[4] On December 8, 1986, his surviving
heirs executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition and Renunciation of Hereditary Rights in Favor
of a Co-Heir[5] (Deed of Partition, for brevity), wherein the heirs settled their interest in Hagonoy
Lumber as follows: one-half (1/2) thereof will pertain to the surviving spouse, Chan Chi, as her

share in the conjugal partnership; and the other half, equivalent to P207,743.60, will be divided
among Chan Chi and the seven children in equal pro indiviso shares equivalent to P25,967.00
each.[6] In said document, Chan Chi and the six children likewise agreed to voluntarily
renounce and waive their shares over Hagonoy Lumber in favor of their co-heir, Chua Sioc
Huan. In May 1988, petitioner Concepcion Chua Gaw and her husband, Antonio Gaw, asked
respondent, Suy Ben Chua, to lend them P200,000.00 which they will use for the construction of
their house in Marilao, Bulacan. The parties agreed that the loan will be payable within six (6)
months without interest.[7] On June 7, 1988, respondent issued in their favor China Banking
Corporation Check No. 240810[8] for P200,000.00 which he delivered to the couples house in
Marilao, Bulacan. Antonio later encashed the check. On August 1, 1990, their sister, Chua Sioc
Huan, executed a Deed of Sale over all her rights and interests in Hagonoy Lumber for a
consideration of P255,000.00 in favor of respondent.[9] Meantime, the spouses Gaw failed to
pay the amount they borrowed from respondent within the designated period. Respondent sent
the couple a demand letter,[10] dated March 25, 1991, requesting them to settle their obligation
with the warning that he will be constrained to take the appropriate legal action if they fail to do
so. Failing to heed his demand, respondent filed a Complaint for Sum of Money against the
spouses Gaw with the RTC. The complaint alleged that on June 7, 1988, he extended a loan to
the spouses Gaw for P200,000.00, payable within six months without interest, but despite
several demands, the couple failed to pay their obligation.[11] In their Answer (with Compulsory
Counterclaim), the spouses Gaw contended that the P200,000.00 was not a loan but petitioners
share in the profits of Hagonoy Lumber, one of her familys businesses. According to the
spouses, when they transferred residence to Marilao, Bulacan, petitioner asked respondent for
an accounting, and payment of her share in the profits, of Capital Sawmills Corporation,
Columbia Wood Industries Corporation, and Hagonoy Lumber. They claimed that respondent
persuaded petitioner to temporarily forego her demand as it would offend their mother who still
wanted to remain in control of the family businesses. To insure that she will defer her demand,
respondent allegedly gave her P200,000.00 as her share in the profits of Hagonoy Lumber.[12]
In his Reply, respondent averred that the spouses Gaw did not demand from him an accounting
of Capitol Sawmills Corporation, Columbia Wood Industries, and Hagonoy Lumber. He asserted
that the spouses Gaw, in fact, have no right whatsoever in these businesses that would entitle
them to an accounting thereof. Respondent insisted that the P200,000.00 was given to and
accepted by them as a loan and not as their share in Hagonoy Lumber.[13] With leave of court,
the spouses Gaw filed an Answer (with Amended Compulsory Counterclaim) wherein they
insisted that petitioner, as one of the compulsory heirs, is entitled to one-sixth (1/6) of Hagonoy
Lumber, which the respondent has arrogated to himself. They claimed that, despite repeated
demands, respondent has failed and refused to account for the operations of Hagonoy Lumber
and to deliver her share therein. They then prayed that respondent make an accounting of the
operations of Hagonoy Lumber and to deliver to petitioner her one-sixth (1/6) share thereof,
which was estimated to be worth not less than P500,000.00.[14] In his Answer to Amended
Counterclaim, respondent explained that his sister, Chua Sioc Huan, became the sole owner of
Hagonoy Lumber when the heirs executed the Deed of Partition on December 8, 1986. In turn,
he became the sole owner of Hagonoy Lumber when he bought it from Chua Sioc Huan, as
evidenced by the Deed of Sale dated August 1, 1990.[15] Defendants, in their reply,[16]
countered that the documents on which plaintiff anchors his claim of ownership over Hagonoy

Lumber were not true and valid agreements and do not express the real intention of the parties.
They claimed that these documents are mere paper arrangements which were prepared only
upon the advice of a counsel until all the heirs could reach and sign a final and binding
agreement, which, up to such time, has not been executed by the heirs.[17] During trial, the
spouses Gaw called the respondent to testify as adverse witness under Section 10, Rule 132.
On direct examination, respondent testified that Hagonoy Lumber was the conjugal property of
his parents Chua Chin and Chan Chi, who were both Chinese citizens. He narrated that, initially,
his father leased the lots where Hagonoy Lumber is presently located from his godfather, Lu
Pieng, and that his father constructed the two-storey concrete building standing thereon.
According to respondent, when he was in high school, it was his father who managed the
business but he and his other siblings were helping him. Later, his sister, Chua Sioc Huan,
managed Hogonoy Lumber together with their other brothers and sisters. He stated that he also
managed Hagonoy Lumber when he was in high school, but he stopped when he got married
and found another job. He said that he now owns the lots where Hagonoy Lumber is operating.
[18] On cross-examination, respondent explained that he ceased to be a stockholder of
Capitol Sawmill when he sold his shares of stock to the other stockholders on January 1, 1991.
He further testified that Chua Sioc Huan acquired Hagonoy Lumber by virtue of a Deed of
Partition, executed by the heirs of Chua Chin. He, in turn, became the owner of Hagonoy
Lumber when he bought the same from Chua Sioc Huan through a Deed of Sale dated August
1, 1990. [19] On re-direct examination, respondent stated that he sold his shares of stock in
Capitol Sawmill for P254,000.00, which payment he received in cash. He also paid the purchase
price of P255,000.00 for Hagonoy Lumber in cash, which payment was not covered by a
separate receipt as he merely delivered the same to Chua Sioc Huan at her house in Paso de
Blas, Valenzuela. Although he maintains several accounts at Planters Bank, Paluwagan ng
Bayan, and China Bank, the amount he paid to Chua Sioc Huan was not taken from any of
them. He kept the amount in the house because he was engaged in rediscounting checks of
people from the public market. [20] On December 10, 1998, Antonio Gaw died due to cardio
vascular and respiratory failure.[21] On February 11, 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision in
favor of the respondent, thus: WHEREFORE, in the light of all the foregoing, the Court hereby
renders judgement ordering defendant Concepcion Chua Gaw to pay the [respondent] the
following:1. P200,000.00 representing the principal obligation with legal interest from judicial
demand or the institution of the complaint on November 19, 1991;2.
P50,000.00 as
attorneys fees; and3.
Costs of suit.The defendants counterclaim is hereby dismissed for
being devoid of merit. SO ORDERED.[22]
The RTC held that respondent is entitled to
the payment of the amount of P200,000.00 with interest. It noted that respondent personally
issued Check No. 240810 to petitioner and her husband upon their request to lend them the
aforesaid amount. The trial court concluded that the P200,000.00 was a loan advanced by the
respondent from his own funds and not remunerations for services rendered to Hagonoy
Lumber nor petitioners advance share in the profits of their parents businesses. The trial court
further held that the validity and due execution of the Deed of Partition and the Deed of Sale,
evidencing transfer of ownership of Hagonoy Lumber from Chua Sioc Huan to respondent, was
never impugned. Although respondent failed to produce the originals of the documents,
petitioner judicially admitted the due execution of the Deed of Partition, and even acknowledged
her signature thereon, thus constitutes an exception to the best evidence rule. As for the Deed

of Sale, since the contents thereof have not been put in issue, the non-presentation of the
original document is not fatal so as to affect its authenticity as well as the truth of its contents.
Also, the parties to the documents themselves do not contest their validity. Ultimately, petitioner
failed to establish her right to demand an accounting of the operations of Hagonoy Lumber nor
the delivery of her 1/6 share therein. As for petitioners claim that an accounting be done on
Capitol Sawmill Corporation and Columbia Wood Industries, the trial court held that respondent
is under no obligation to make such an accounting since he is not charged with operating these
enterprises.[23]
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the CA, alleging that the trial court
erred (1) when it considered the amount of P200,000.00 as a loan obligation and not
Concepcions share in the profits of Hagonoy Lumber; (2) when it considered as evidence for
the defendant, plaintiffs testimony when he was called to testify as an adverse party under
Section 10 (e), Rule 132 of the Rules of Court; and (3) when it considered admissible mere
copies of the Deed of Partition and Deed of Sale to prove that respondent is now the owner of
Hagonoy Lumber.[24] On May 23, 2003, the CA affirmed the Decision of the RTC. [25] The
appellate court found baseless the petitioners argument that the RTC should not have included
respondents testimony as part of petitioners evidence. The CA noted that the petitioner went
on a fishing expedition, the taking of respondents testimony having taken up a total of eleven
hearings, and upon failing to obtain favorable information from the respondent, she now
disclaims the same. Moreover, the CA held that the petitioner failed to show that the inclusion of
respondents testimony in the statement of facts in the assailed decision unduly prejudiced her
defense and counterclaims. In fact, the CA noted that the facts testified to by respondent were
deducible from the totality of the evidence presented. The CA likewise found untenable
petitioners claim that Exhibits H (Deed of Sale) and Exhibit I (Deed of Partition) were merely
temporary paper arrangements. The CA agreed with the RTC that the testimony of petitioner
regarding the matter was uncorroborated she should have presented the other heirs to attest
to the truth of her allegation. Instead, petitioner admitted the due execution of the said
documents. Since petitioner did not dispute the due execution and existence of Exhibits H and
I, there was no need to produce the originals of the documents in accordance with the best
evidence rule.[26]
On December 2, 2003, the CA denied the petitioners motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit.[27] Petitioner is before this Court in this petition for review on
certiorari, raising the following errors: I.
THAT ON THE PRELIMINARY IMPORTANT
RELATED ISSUE, CLEAR AND PALPABLE LEGAL ERROR HAS BEEN COMMITTED IN THE
APPLICATION AND LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RULE ON EXAMINATION OF ADVERSE
PARTY OR HOSTILE WITNESS UNDER SECTION 10 (d) AND (e) OF RULE 132, CAUSING
SERIOUS DOUBT ON THE LOWER COURTS APPEALED DECISIONS OBJECTIVITY,
ANNEX C. II.
THAT ON THE IMPORTANT LEGAL ISSUE RELATIVE TO THE
AFORESAID TWO OPPOSING CLAIMS OF RESPONDENT AND PETITIONER, CLEAR AND
PALPABLE LEGAL ERROR HAS BEEN COMMITTED UNDER THE LOWER COURTS
DECISION ANNEX C AND THE QUESTIONED DECISION OF MAY 23, 2003 (ANNEX A)
AND THE RESOLUTION OF DECEMBER 2, 2003, (ANNEX B) IN DEVIATING FROM AND
DISREGARDING ESTABLISHED SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ENJOINING COURTS NOT
TO OVERLOOK OR MISINTERPRET IMPORTANT FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES,
SUPPORTED BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE ON RECORD, AND WHICH ARE OF
GREAT WEIGHT AND VALUE, WHICH WOULD CHANGE THE RESULT OF THE CASE AND

ARRIVE AT A JUST, FAIR AND OBJECTIVE DECISION. (Citations omitted) III.

THAT
FINALLY, AS TO THE OTHER LEGAL IMPORTANT ISSUE RELATIVE TO CLAIM OR
OWNERSHIP OF THE HAGONOY LUMBER FAMILY BUSINESS, CLEAR AND PALPABLE
LEGAL ERROR HAS BEEN COMMITTED ON THE REQUIREMENTS AND CORRECT
APPLICATION OF THE BEST EVIDENCE RULE UNDER SECTION 3, RULE 130 OF THE
REVISED RULES OF COURT.[28] The petition is without merit.
Petitioner contends that her
case was unduly prejudiced by the RTCs treatment of the respondents testimony as adverse
witness during cross-examination by his own counsel as part of her evidence. Petitioner argues
that the adverse witness testimony elicited during cross-examination should not be considered
as evidence of the calling party. She contends that the examination of respondent as adverse
witness did not make him her witness and she is not bound by his testimony, particularly during
cross-examination by his own counsel.[29] In particular, the petitioner avers that the following
testimony of the respondent as adverse witness should not be considered as her evidence:
(11.a) That RESPONDENT-Appellee became owner of the HAGONOY LUMBER business
when he bought the same from Chua Sioc Huan through a Deed of Sale dated August 1, 1990
(EXH.H); (11.b) That the HAGONOY LUMBER, on the other hand, was acquired by the sister
Chua Sioc Huan, by virtue of Extrajudicial Partition and Renunciation of Hereditary Rights in
favor of a Co-Heir (EXH. I); (11.c) That the 3 lots on which the HAGONOY LUMBER business
is located were acquired by Lu Pieng from the Santos family under the Deed of Absolute Sale
(EXH. J); that Lu Pieng sold the Lots to Chua Suy Lu in 1976 (EXHS. K, L, & M.); that Chua
Siok Huan eventually became owner of the 3 Lots; and in 1989 Chua Sioc Huan sold them to
RESPONDENT-Appellee (EXHS. Q and P); that after he acquired the 3 Lots, he has not sold
them to anyone and he is the owner of the lots.[30] We do not agree that petitioners case was
prejudiced by the RTCs treatment of the respondents testimony during cross-examination as
her evidence. If there was an error committed by the RTC in ascribing to the petitioner the
respondents testimony as adverse witness during cross-examination by his own counsel, it
constitute a harmless error which would not, in any way, change the result of the case. In the
first place, the delineation of a piece of evidence as part of the evidence of one party or the
other is only significant in determining whether the party on whose shoulders lies the burden of
proof was able to meet the quantum of evidence needed to discharge the burden. In civil cases,
that burden devolves upon the plaintiff who must establish her case by preponderance of
evidence. The rule is that the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not
upon the weakness of the defendants evidence. Thus, it barely matters who with a piece of
evidence is credited. In the end, the court will have to consider the entirety of the evidence
presented by both parties. Preponderance of evidence is then determined by considering all the
facts and circumstances of the case, culled from the evidence, regardless of who actually
presented it.[31] That the witness is the adverse party does not necessarily mean that the
calling party will not be bound by the formers testimony. The fact remains that it was at his
instance that his adversary was put on the witness stand. Unlike an ordinary witness, the
calling party may impeach an adverse witness in all respects as if he had been called by the
adverse party,[32] except by evidence of his bad character.[33] Under a rule permitting the
impeachment of an adverse witness, although the calling party does not vouch for the witness
veracity, he is nonetheless bound by his testimony if it is not contradicted or remains unrebutted.
[34] A party who calls his adversary as a witness is, therefore, not bound by the latters

testimony only in the sense that he may contradict him by introducing other evidence to prove a
state of facts contrary to what the witness testifies on.[35] A rule that provides that the party
calling an adverse witness shall not be bound by his testimony does not mean that such
testimony may not be given its proper weight, but merely that the calling party shall not be
precluded from rebutting his testimony or from impeaching him.[36] This, the petitioner failed to
do. In the present case, the petitioner, by her own testimony, failed to discredit the respondents
testimony on how Hagonoy Lumber became his sole property. The petitioner admitted having
signed the Deed of Partition but she insisted that the transfer of the property to Chua Siok Huan
was only temporary. On cross-examination, she confessed that no other document was
executed to indicate that the transfer of the business to Chua Siok Huan was a temporary
arrangement. She declared that, after their mother died in 1993, she did not initiate any action
concerning Hagonoy Lumber, and it was only in her counterclaim in the instant that, for the first
time, she raised a claim over the business. Due process requires that in reaching a decision, a
tribunal must consider the entire evidence presented.[37] All the parties to the case, therefore,
are considered bound by the favorable or unfavorable effects resulting from the evidence.[38]
As already mentioned, in arriving at a decision, the entirety of the evidence presented will be
considered, regardless of the party who offered them in evidence. In this light, the more vital
consideration is not whether a piece of evidence was properly attributed to one party, but
whether it was accorded the apposite probative weight by the court. The testimony of an
adverse witness is evidence in the case and should be given its proper weight, and such
evidence becomes weightier if the other party fails to impeach the witness or contradict his
testimony. Significantly, the RTCs finding that the P200,000.00 was given to the petitioner and
her husband as a loan is supported by the evidence on record. Hence, we do not agree with the
petitioners contention that the RTC has overlooked certain facts of great weight and value in
arriving at its decision. The RTC merely took into consideration evidence which it found to be
more credible than the self-serving and uncorroborated testimony of the petitioner.At this
juncture, we reiterate the well-entrenched doctrine that the findings of fact of the CA affirming
those of the trial court are accorded great respect, even finality, by this Court. Only errors of
law, not of fact, may be reviewed by this Court in petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
[39] A departure from the general rule may be warranted where the findings of fact of the CA are
contrary to the findings and conclusions of the trial court, or when the same is unsupported by
the evidence on record.[40] There is no reason to apply the exception in the instant case
because the findings and conclusions of the CA are in full accord with those of the trial court.
These findings are buttressed by the evidence on record. Moreover, the issues and errors
alleged in this petition are substantially the very same questions of fact raised by petitioner in
the appellate court. On the issue of whether the P200,000.00 was really a loan, it is well to
remember that a check may be evidence of indebtedness.[41] A check, the entries of which are
in writing, could prove a loan transaction.[42] It is pure naivet to insist that an entrepreneur who
has several sources of income and has access to considerable bank credit, no longer has any
reason to borrow any amount. The petitioners allegation that the P200,000.00 was advance on
her share in the profits of Hagonoy Lumber is implausible. It is true that Hagonoy Lumber was
originally owned by the parents of petitioner and respondent. However, on December 8, 1986,
the heirs freely renounced and waived in favor of their sister Chua Sioc Huan all their hereditary
shares and interest therein, as shown by the Deed of Partition which the petitioner herself

signed. By virtue of this deed, Chua Sioc Huan became the sole owner and proprietor of
Hagonoy Lumber. Thus, when the respondent delivered the check for P200,000.00 to the
petitioner on June 7, 1988, Chua Sioc Huan was already the sole owner of Hagonoy Lumber. At
that time, both petitioner and respondent no longer had any interest in the business enterprise;
neither had a right to demand a share in the profits of the business. Respondent became the
sole owner of Hagonoy Lumber only after Chua Sioc Huan sold it to him on August 1, 1990. So,
when the respondent delivered to the petitioner the P200,000.00 check on June 7, 1988, it could
not have been given as an advance on petitioners share in the business, because at that
moment in time both of them had no participation, interest or share in Hagonoy Lumber. Even
assuming, arguendo, that the check was an advance on the petitioners share in the profits of
the business, it was highly unlikely that the respondent would deliver a check drawn against his
personal, and not against the business enterprises account. It is also worthy to note that both
the Deed of Partition and the Deed of Sale were acknowledged before a Notary Public. The
notarization of a private document converts it into a public document, and makes it admissible in
court without further proof of its authenticity.[43] It is entitled to full faith and credit upon its face.
[44] A notarized document carries evidentiary weight as to its due execution, and documents
acknowledged before a notary public have in their favor the presumption of regularity. Such a
document must be given full force and effect absent a strong, complete and conclusive proof of
its falsity or nullity on account of some flaws or defects recognized by law.[45] A public
document executed and attested through the intervention of a notary public is, generally,
evidence of the facts therein express in clear unequivocal manner.[46] Petitioner, however,
maintains that the RTC erred in admitting in evidence a mere copy of the Deed of Partition and
the Deed of Sale in violation of the best evidence rule. In addition, petitioner insists that the
Deed of Sale was not the result of bona fide negotiations between a true seller and buyer. The
best evidence rule as encapsulated in Rule 130, Section 3,[47] of the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure applies only when the content of such document is the subject of the inquiry. Where
the issue is only as to whether such document was actually executed, or exists, or on the
circumstances relevant to or surrounding its execution, the best evidence rule does not apply
and testimonial evidence is admissible. Any other substitutionary evidence is likewise
admissible without need to account for the original.[48] Moreover, production of the original may
be dispensed with, in the trial courts discretion, whenever the opponent does not bona fide
dispute the contents of the document and no other useful purpose will be served by requiring
production.[49] Accordingly, we find that the best evidence rule is not applicable to the instant
case. Here, there was no dispute as to the terms of either deed; hence, the RTC correctly
admitted in evidence mere copies of the two deeds. The petitioner never even denied their due
execution and admitted that she signed the Deed of Partition.[50] As for the Deed of Sale,
petitioner had, in effect, admitted its genuineness and due execution when she failed to
specifically deny it in the manner required by the rules.[51] The petitioner merely claimed that
said documents do not express the true agreement and intention of the parties since they were
only provisional paper arrangements made upon the advice of counsel.[52] Apparently, the
petitioner does not contest the contents of these deeds but alleges that there was a
contemporaneous agreement that the transfer of Hagonoy Lumber to Chua Sioc Huan was only
temporary. An agreement or the contract between the parties is the formal expression of the
parties rights, duties and obligations. It is the best evidence of the intention of the parties.[53]

The parties intention is to be deciphered from the language used in the contract, not from the
unilateral post facto assertions of one of the parties, or of third parties who are strangers to the
contract.[54] Thus, when the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is deemed
to contain all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors
in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement.[55]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66790 dated May 23, 2003 and Resolution dated December 2,
2003 are AFFIRMED.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------8. WILSON CHAM, Complainant, - versus - ATTY. EVA PAITA-MOYA,Respondent
A.C. No. 7494 June 27, 2008 R E S O L U T I O N CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us is
a Complaint[1] for disbarment filed by complainant Wilson Cham against respondent Atty. Eva
Paita-Moya, who he alleged committed deceit in occupying a leased apartment unit and,
thereafter, vacating the same without paying the rentals due. According to the Complaint, on 1
October 1998, respondent entered into a Contract of Lease[2] with Greenville Realty and
Development Corp. (GRDC), represented by complainant as its President and General
Manager, involving a residential apartment unit owned by GRDC located at No. 61-C Kalayaan
Avenue, Quezon City, for a consideration of P8,000.00 per month for a term of one year. Upon
the expiration of said lease contract, respondent informed the complainant that she would no
longer renew the same but requested an extension of her stay at the apartment unit until 30
June 2000 with a commitment that she would be paying the monthly rental during the extension
period. Complainant approved such request but increased the rental rate to P8,650.00 per
month for the period beginning 1 October 1999 until 30 June 2000. Respondent stayed at the
leased premises up to October 2000 without paying her rentals from July to October 2000. She
also failed to settle her electric bills for the months of September and October 2000. The
Statement of Account as of 15 October 2004[3] shows that respondents total accountability is
P71,007.88. Sometime in October 2000, a report reached complainants office that respondent
had secretly vacated the apartment unit, bringing along with her the door keys. Also,
respondent did not heed complainants repeated written demands for payment of her obligations
despite due receipt of the same, compelling complainant to file the present Complaint. In her
Answer,[4] respondent alleged that she had religiously paid her monthly rentals and had not
vacated the apartment unit surreptitiously. She also averred that she transferred to another
place because she was given notice by the complainant to vacate the premises to give way for
the repair and renovation of the same, but which never happened until presently. Respondent
actually wanted to ask that complainant to account for her deposit for the apartment unit, but
she could not do so since she did not know complainants address or contact number. For the
same reason, she could not turn over to the complainant the door keys to the vacated
apartment unit. After the mandatory preliminary conference conducted by the Commission on
Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) at the IBP Building, Ortigas Center,
Pasig City, the parties were given time to submit their respective Position Papers per Order[5]
dated 17 February 2006. On 29 March 2006, complainant filed his Position Paper.[6]
Respondent, despite the extension given, did not file hers. Hence, the case was deemed
submitted for resolution. On 8 September 2006, Investigating Commissioner Acerey C.

Pacheco submitted his Report and Recommendation,[7] recommending the imposition of the
penalty of three-month suspension on respondent for violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, to wit: WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that herein respondent be
held guilty of having violated the aforequoted provision of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and imposed upon her the penalty of three (3) months suspension from the
practice of law.
The IBP Board of Governors, however, passed Resolution No.
XVII-2006-585[8] dated 15 December 2006, amending the recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner and approving the dismissal of the Complaint, thus: RESOLVED to AMEND, as it
is hereby AMENDED, the Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, and to
APPROVE the DISMISSAL of the above-entitled case for lack of merit. We do not agree with
the foregoing Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors. The Complaint should not be
dismissed and respondent must face the consequences of her actions. It is undisputed that by
virtue of a lease contract she executed with GRDC, respondent was able to occupy the
apartment unit for a period of one year, from 1 October 1998 to 30 September 1999, paying a
monthly rental of P8,000.00. Upon the expiration of the lease contract[9] on 30 September
1999, the same was renewed, but on a month-to-month basis at an increased rental rate of
P8,650.00. Under such an arrangement, respondent was able to stay at the leased premises
until October 2000, undoubtedly incurring electric bills during the said period. A review of the
records would reveal that respondent is, indeed, guilty of willful failure to pay just debt.
Complainant is able to fully substantiate that respondent has existing obligations that she failed
to settle. Annex D[10] of the Complaint is a letter dated 11 September 2000 signed by
complainant and addressed to respondent demanding that she settle her unpaid rentals for the
period of three months, particularly, from 1 July to 30 September 2000. The letter appears to
have been received by one Purificacion D. Flores. Annex H of the same Complaint is another
letter dated 30 August 2004 by complainant reiterating his earlier demand for respondent to
settle her unpaid rentals, as well as her unpaid Meralco bills. This second letter of demand was
sent through registered mail and received by one Nonie Catindig. Respondent did not expressly
deny receipt of both letters of demand in her Answer to the Complaint. Having failed to rebut
the foregoing allegations, she must be deemed to have admitted them. Section 11, Rule 8 of
the Rules of Court, provides: SECTION 11. Allegations not specifically denied deemed admitted.
Material averment in the complaint, other than those as to the amount of unliquidated
damage, shall be deemed admitted when not specifically denied. Moreover, a settled rule of
evidence is that the one who pleads payment has the burden of proving it. Even where it is the
plaintiff (complainant herein) who alleges non-payment, the general rule is that the burden rests
on the defendant (respondent herein) to prove payment, rather than on the plaintiff to prove
non-payment. The debtor has the burden of showing with legal certainty that the obligation has
been discharged by payment.[11] Apropos is another well-settled rule in our jurisprudence that a
receipt of payment is the best evidence of the fact of payment.[12] In Monfort v. Aguinaldo,[13]
the receipts of payment, although not exclusive, were deemed to be the best evidence. A
receipt is a written and signed acknowledgment that money or goods have been delivered. In
the instant case, the respondent failed to discharge the burden of proving payment, for she was
unable to produce receipts or any other proof of payment of the rentals due for the period of 1
July to 20 September 2000. It is thus evident to this Court that respondent willfully failed to pay
her just debts. Her unpaid rentals and electric bills constitute just debts, which could be any of

the following: (1) claims adjudicated by a court of law; or (2) claims the existence and justness
of which are admitted by the debtor.[14] Having incurred just debts, respondent had the moral
duty and legal responsibility to settle them when they became due. Respondent should have
complied with just contractual obligations, and acted fairly and adhered to high ethical standards
to preserve the courts integrity, since she is an employee thereof. Indeed, when respondent
backtracked on her duty to pay her debts, such act already constituted a ground for
administrative sanction. Respondent left the apartment unit without settling her unpaid
obligations, and without the complainants knowledge and consent. Respondents
abandonment of the leased premises to avoid her obligations for the rent and electricity bills
constitutes deceitful conduct violative of the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly
Canon I and Rule 1.01 thereof, which explicitly state: CANON 1- A lawyer shall uphold the
constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes. Rule
1.01- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Respondents defense that she does not know where to find the complainant or his office is
specious and does not inspire belief considering that she had been occupying the apartment
unit and paying the rents due (except for the period complained of) for almost two years. How
she could have dealt with complainant and GRDC for two years without at all knowing their
office address and contact numbers totally escapes this Court. This is only a desperate attempt
to justify what is clearly an unjustifiable act. Lawyers are instruments for the administration of
justice. As vanguards of our legal system, they are expected to maintain not only legal
proficiency but also a high standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing.[15] In so
doing, the peoples faith and confidence in the judicial and legal system is ensured. Verily,
lawyers must at all times faithfully perform their duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to
their clients. As part of those duties, they must promptly pay their financial obligations. Their
conduct must always reflect the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the
Code of Professional Responsibility. On these considerations, the Court may disbar or suspend
lawyers for any professional or private misconduct showing them to be wanting in moral
character, honesty, probity and good demeanor -- or to be unworthy to continue as officers of
the Court.[16] The Court stresses that membership in the legal profession is a privilege.[17] It
demands a high degree of good moral character, not only as a condition precedent to
admission, but also as a continuing requirement for the practice of law.[18] In this case,
respondent fell short of the exacting standards expected of her as a guardian of law and justice.
[19] Any gross misconduct of a lawyer in his or her professional or private capacity is a ground
for the imposition of the penalty of suspension or disbarment because good character is an
essential qualification for the admission to the practice of law and for the continuance of such
privilege.[20] The Court has held that the deliberate failure to pay just debts and the issuance of
worthless checks constitute gross misconduct,[21] for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with
one years suspension from the practice of law,[22] or a suspension of six months upon partial
payment of the obligation.[23] Accordingly, administrative sanction is warranted by respondents
gross misconduct. The case at bar merely involves the respondents deliberate failure to pay
her just debts, without her issuing a worthless check, which would have been a more serious
offense. The Investigating Commissioner of the IBP recommended that she be suspended from
the practice of law for three months, a penalty which this Court finds sufficient. WHEREFORE,
Atty. Eva Paita-Moya is found guilty of gross misconduct and is hereby SUSPENDED for one

month from the practice of law, effective upon her receipt of this Decision. She is warned that a
repetition of the same or a similar act will be dealt with more severely. Let copies of this
Resolution be entered in the record of respondent and served on the IBP, as well as on the
court administrator who shall circulate it to all courts for their information and guidance.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------9. XERXES A. ABADIANO Petitioner, - versus -SPOUSES JESUS and LOLITA MARTIR,
Respondents G.R. No. 156310 July 31, 2008
DECISION NACHURA, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of
Civil Procedure assailing the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated March 14, 2002
and its Resolution[2] dated November 21, 2002 in CA-G.R. CV No. 51679. The CA affirmed the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kabankalan, Negros Occidental[3] declaring
respondents as the owners of the property in question. The case stemmed from an action for
quieting of title and/or recovery of possession[4] of a parcel of land filed by herein respondents
against Roberto Abadiano, Faustino Montao, and Quirico Mandaguit. Petitioner Xerxes A.
Abadiano intervened in that case. Lot No. 1318 of the Kabankalan Cadastre consists of 34,281
square meters covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 20461 issued on November 19,
1923 in the name of the spouses Inocentes Baares and Feliciana Villanueva. Before the
issuance of OCT No. 20461, however, Inocentes and the heirs of Feliciana Villanueva (who had
predeceased her husband) executed an Agreement of Partition dated June 1, 1922 over Lot No.
1318. The lot was partitioned and distributed as follows: (1) 14,976 sq m denominated as Lot
No. 1318-A, in favor of Demetrio Baares; (2) 10,125 sq m denominated as Lot No. 1318-B, in
favor of Ramon and David Abadiano (grandchildren of Inocentes and Feliciana); and (3) 10,180
sq m denominated as Lot No. 1318-C, in favor of Amando Baares. The partition is embodied in
a Deed of Partition executed on June 1, 1922 and notarized the following day by Notary Public
Jose Peralta with notarial inscriptions Reg. No. 64, Pag. 69, Libro III.[5] On September 30,
1939, David Abadiano, who was absent during the execution of the Agreement of Partition,
executed a Deed of Confirmation acknowledging and ratifying the document of partition.[6] OCT
No. 20461 was administratively reconstituted on February 15, 1962 and in lieu thereof OCT No.
RO-8211 (20461) was issued over Lot No. 1318, still in the name of Inocentes Baares and
Felicidad Villanueva. Annotated at the back of the reconstituted title were the Agreement of
Partition and the Deed of Confirmation.[7] On June 14, 1957 Demetrio Baares sold his share of
the lot to his son, Leopoldo. The same was annotated at the back of OCT No. RO-8211 (20461).
[8] Subsequently, on February 21, 1962, Leopoldo Baares filed before the Court of First
Instance (CFI) of Negros Occidental an ex-parte petition praying for: first, the confirmation of the
Agreement of Partition, the Conformity executed by David Abadiano, and the Deed of Sale
between him and his father; and second, the cancellation of OCT No. RO-8211 (20461) and, in
lieu thereof, the issuance of a new certificate of title over the property. In an Order dated
February 22, 1962, the court ordered the cancellation of OCT No. RO-8211 (20461) and the
issuance of a new certificate of title in the names of Dr. Leopoldo Baares, Amando Baares,
and Ramon and David Abadiano. Pursuant thereto, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T31862 was issued by the Register of Deeds for Negros Occidental.[9] Petitioner insists that this
is still the valid and subsisting title over Lot No. 1318 and that no sale of the portion pertaining to
Ramon and David Abadiano ever took place.[10] On the other hand, respondent spouses
alleged that, prior to the issuance of TCT No. T-31862, Ramon Abadiano, for himself and on

behalf of David Abadiano, had already sold their rights and interests over Lot No. 1318-C[11] to
Victor Garde. The sale was allegedly evidenced by a document of sale (Compra Y Venta) dated
June 3, 1922 and acknowledged before Notary Public Jose Peralta and bearing notarial
inscription Doc. No. 64, Pag. No. 60, Book No. III, series of 1922. The sale was allegedly
affirmed by David Abadiano in a document dated September 30, 1939.[12] They further alleged
that from the time of the sale, Victor Garde and his heirs were in continuous, public, peaceful,
and uninterrupted possession and occupation in the concept of an owner of Lot No. 1318-C.[13]
On December 29, 1961, the heirs of Victor Garde sold their rights and interests over Lot No.
1318-C[14] to Jose Garde, who immediately took possession thereof. Jose Garde continuously
planted sugarcane on the land until he sold the property to Lolita Martir in 1979.[15] After
acquiring the property, respondent spouses continued to plant sugarcane on the land.
Sometime in March 1982, after respondent Jesus Martir harvested the sugarcane he had
planted on Lot No. 1318-C, defendant below Roberto Abadiano (son of Ramon) allegedly
entered the property and cultivated the remaining stalks of sugarcane and refused to vacate
despite demands to do so. The following year, defendants Roberto Abadiano, Faustino
Montao, and Quirico Mandaguit again harvested the sugarcane on Lot No. 1318-C.[16]
Further, the defendants also entered the property and harvested the sugarcane on Lot No.
1318-B,[17] which by then had been acquired by Lolita B. Martir from her adoptive father,
Amando Baares.[18] Thus, in April 1982, herein respondent-spouses filed the Action to Quiet
Title and/or Recovery of Possession with Damages before the then CFI of Negros Occidental. In
their Answer with Counterclaim,[19] defendants denied that the subject property was ever sold
by Ramon and David Abadiano, and that, consequently, defendant Roberto Abadiano had
inherited the same from Ramon. They also alleged, by way of Special and Affirmative Defenses,
that the subject land still belonged to the estate of Ramon and David Abadiano and was never
alienated. They alleged further that the act of spouses Martir in planting sugarcane on the land
was without Robertos consent; that Roberto had demanded that the spouses Martir pay him
reasonable rental for the land but that they had persistently refused to do so; and that sometime
in March 1981, Roberto and the spouses Martir came to an agreement whereby the defendant
continued to cultivate the remaining stalks of sugarcane left by plaintiffs and that until the
harvest of said sugarcane, plaintiffs never posed any objection thereto. Xerxes Abadiano
intervened in the proceedings before the trial court alleging likewise that his predecessor
Ramon Abadiano never sold their share of the property to Victor Garde.[20] After trial, the court
issued a Decision[21] dated June 23, 1995, ruling in favor of the spouses Martir, thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants
declaring plaintiffs spouses Jesus and Lolita Martir as the true and legitimate owners of portions
of Lot No. 1318 Kabankalan Cadastre denominated as Lots 1318-B and 1318-C and ordering:
(1)
That the defendants Roberto Abadiano and the intervenor Xerxes Abadiano shall
surrender Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-31862 to the Registrar of Deeds of Negros
Occidental who is directed to partially cancel said title and issue new Certificate of Title
corresponding to Lots 1318-B and 1318-C in the names of the spouses Jesus and Lolita Martir;
(2)
That the defendants shall jointly and severally pay to the plaintiffs the amount of
Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos representing the value of the sugarcanes of plaintiffs
which defendants harvested and milled with SONEDCO and; (3)
To pay the costs of
this suit. SO ORDERED.[22] The trial court rejected therein defendants contention that the

Compra Y Venta was null and void because the co-owner, David Abadiano, did not sign the
same. It held that the Supreme Court has ruled to the effect that the sale by a co-owner of the
entire property without the consent of the other co-owners was not null and void but that only
the rights of the co-owner-seller are transferred, making the buyer a co-owner. The trial court
also held that although the Compra Y Venta was not annotated either on the OCT or on the
reconstituted OCT, the validity of the sale was not vitiated. The registration or annotation is
required only to make the sale valid as to third persons. Thus, the trial court concluded that the
Compra Y Venta was valid between the parties, Ramon Abadiano and Victor Garde. The trial
court also brushed aside the defendants contention that the Compra Y Venta contained the
same notarial inscription as the Deed of Partition. It said that assuming this to be true, this may
be considered an error which did not nullify the Compra Y Venta; at most, the document would
be non-registrable but still valid. On the contention that the alleged confirmation executed by
David Abadiano was for the Deed of Partition and not for the Compra Y Venta, the trial court
agreed. It, however, interpreted the same to mean that David Abadiano must not have
authorized his brother to sell his share in Lot No. 1318-C. The effect was that David Abadiano
continued to be one of the registered owners of the property and his heirs stepped into his
shoes upon his death. However, the trial court found that the plaintiffs (respondents) claim that
they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the property for more than
sixty (60) years was duly established. In contrast, the court found that defendants and
intervenor, and their deceased parents, had not been in possession of their share in the
property. It held that the defendants and intervenor were guilty of laches for failing to avail of the
many opportunities for them to bring an action to establish their right over Lot No. 1318-C.
Defendants appealed to the CA. However, the same was summarily dismissed in a Resolution
dated February 11, 1997 due to defendants failure to pay the required docket fee within the
period set. Nonetheless, the records were retained for the appeal of Xerxes Abadiano,
intervenor in the trial court. On March 14, 2002, the CA rendered a Decision affirming the
Decision of the RTC in toto.[23] Xerxes Abadiano now comes before this Court raising the
following arguments: A THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED, BASED ON ITS
MISAPPREHENSION AND/OR OMISSION OF THE FACTS, IN DISREGARDING THE
PRIMORDIAL ISSUE OF WHETHER OR NOT THE DEED OF SALE (COMPRA Y VENTA) IS
A SPURIOUS DOCUMENT B THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING
PETITIONER GUILTY OF LACHES OVER REGISTERED LAND[24] The Petition is impressed
with merit. We believe the trial court and the CA erred in ruling for the respondents. Accordingly,
we reverse the assailed Decision and Resolution. It is well settled that the findings of fact of the
trial court, especially when affirmed by the CA, are accorded the highest degree of respect, and
generally will not be disturbed on appeal. Such findings are binding and conclusive on the
Court. Further, it is not the Courts function under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure to review, examine and evaluate or weigh the probative value of the evidence
presented. The jurisdiction of the Court in a petition for review under Rule 45 is limited to
reviewing only errors of law. Unless the case falls under the recognized exceptions, the rule
shall not be disturbed.[25] However, this Court has consistently recognized the following
exceptions: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or
conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3)
when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension

of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings, the CA went
beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the
appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8)
when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;
(9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are
not disputed by the respondent; and (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the
supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.[26] In the present
case, we find that the trial court based its judgment on a misapprehension of facts, as well as on
the supposed absence of evidence which is contradicted by the records. In appreciating the
alleged Compra Y Venta presented by respondents, the trial court concluded that [t]he parties
have no quarrel on the existence of a Deed of Sale of a portion of Lot No. 1318 executed by
Ramon Abadiano for himself and as representative of David Abadiano, dated June 3, [1922] in
favor of Victor Garde.[27] The trial court erred in its conclusion. Borne very clearly by the
records is the defendants repudiation of the existence of the sale in their Answer with
Counterclaim. They stated: 2. That defendants admit plaintiffs allegation in paragraph 4 that
there has been no particular designation of lot number (sic) for each of the co-owner (sic) of Lot
No. 1318 but specifically deny under oath the other allegations thereof the truth being that the
property referred to here as Lot No. 1318 remains undivided to this day that the owners thereof
as shown by the TCT No. 31862 co-own the same pro-indiviso; 3. That defendants have no
knowledge sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations in paragraph 5[28] and
therefore specifically deny the same under oath the truth being that Ramon Abadiano and David
Abadiano had not sold the land at bar to anyone and that consequently, defendant Roberto
Abadiano had inherited the same from the former; x x x.[29] (emphasis supplied). Likewise,
petitioner specifically denied the allegations in paragraph 5 of the Complaint. He alleged that the
lot had never been sold or alienated and the same still remains intact as the property of the
Intervenor and his co-owners by operation of law.[30] This was testified to by Roberto Abadiano
during the trial, thus: Q:
During the lifetime of your father, do you know if your father has
ever sold to any party his share on Lot No. 1318? A:
He has not sold his share.[31] These
statements were enough to impugn the due execution of the document. While it is true that this
Court had previously ruled that mere denials would not have sufficed to impeach the document,
in this case, there was an effective specific denial as contemplated by law in accordance with
our ruling that - defendant must declare under oath that he did not sign the document or that it is
otherwise false or fabricated. Neither does the statement of the answer to the effect that the
instrument was procured by fraudulent representation raise any issue as to its genuineness or
due execution. On the contrary such a plea is an admission both of the genuineness and due
execution thereof, since it seeks to avoid the instrument upon a ground not affecting either.[32]
It was error then for the RTC to have brushed aside this issue and then make so sweeping a
conclusion in the face of such opposition. In light of this challenge to the very existence of the
Compra Y Venta, the trial court should have first resolved the issue of the documents
authenticity and due execution before deciding on its validity. Unfortunately, the CA did not even
discuss this issue. We are cognizant, however, that it is now too late in the day to remand the
case to the trial court for the determination of the purported Compra Y Ventas authenticity and
due execution. Thus, we will resolve this very issue here and now in order to put an end to this
protracted litigation. There is no denying that TCT No. 31862 is still the subsisting title over the

parcel of land in dispute. It is also a fact that the purported Compra Y Venta was not annotated
on TCT No. 31862 until April 1982, shortly before the complaint was commenced, even though
the deed was allegedly executed in 1922. Considering that the action is one for quieting of title
and respondents anchored their claim to the property on the disputed Compra Y Venta, we find
it necessary to repeat that it was incumbent upon the trial court to have resolved first the issue
of the documents due execution and authenticity, before determining its validity. Rule 130,
Section 3 of the Revised Rules of Court reads: Original document must be produced;
exceptions. When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be
admissible other than the original document itself, except in the following cases: (a) When the
original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court without bad faith on the part
of the offeror; (b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against
whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice; (c) When
the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in
court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the
general result of the whole; (d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public
officer or is recorded in a public office. Respondents attached only a photocopy of the Compra
Y Venta to their complaint. According to respondent Lolita Martir, the original of said document
was in the office of the Register of Deeds. They allegedly tried to obtain a copy from that office
but their request was refused. No other evidence but these bare assertions, however, was
presented to prove that the original is indeed in the custody of the Register of Deeds or that
respondents due and diligent search for the same was unsuccessful. The Rule states that when
the original document is unavailable, has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in
court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability
without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in
some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated.[33] In the case
at bar, respondents failed to establish that the offer in evidence of the document was made in
accordance with any of the exceptions allowed under the abovequoted rule, and yet, the trial
court accepted the document as genuine and proceeded to determine its validity based on such
assumption. The trial court likewise brushed aside the apparent defect that the document
presented contained the same notarial inscription as the Agreement on Partition. Indeed, the
Deed of Partition and the Compra Y Venta, though executed on different days, were notarized
on the same day, and both documents contained the signatures of the same witnesses and the
same notarial inscription. This notwithstanding, the court concluded, Assuming this to be true,
same could be considered an error which did not nullify, (sic) the Deed of Sale or Compra Y
Venta. At most, the document would be a non-registrable, but valid document.[34] We stress
that a notarial document is evidence of the facts in the clear unequivocal manner therein
expressed and has in its favor the presumption of regularity.[35] In this case, while it is true that
the error in the notarial inscription would not have invalidated the sale if indeed it took place
the same error would have meant that the document cannot be treated as a notarial document
and thus, not entitled to the presumption of regularity. The document would be taken out of the
realm of public documents whose genuineness and due execution need not be proved.[36]
Accordingly, respondents not having proven the due execution and genuineness of the
purported Compra Y Venta, the weight of evidence preponderates in favor of petitioner. Next, we
determine if petitioner is guilty of laches. On this issue, we rule in the negative. Under the

Property Registration Decree,[37] no title to registered land in derogation of the title of the
registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession.[38] Indefeasibility
and imprescriptibility are the cornerstones of land registration proceedings. Barring any mistake
or use of fraud in the procurement of the title, owners may rest secure on their ownership and
possession once their title is registered under the protective mantle of the Torrens system.[39]
Nonetheless, even if a Torrens title is indefeasible and imprescriptible,[40] the registered
landowner may lose his right to recover the possession of his registered property by reason of
laches.[41] Laches has been defined as neglect or omission to assert a right, taken in
conjunction with lapse of time and other circumstances causing prejudice to an adverse party,
as will operate as a bar in equity. It is a delay in the assertion of a right which works
disadvantage to another because of the inequity founded on some change in the condition or
relations of the property or parties. It is based on public policy which, for the peace of society,
ordains that relief will be denied to a stale demand which otherwise could be a valid claim.[42]
The four basic elements of laches are: (1) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under
whom he claims, giving rise to the situation of which complaint is made and for which the
complaint seeks a remedy; (2) delay in asserting the complainant's rights, the complainant
having had knowledge or notice of the defendants conduct and having been afforded an
opportunity to institute suit; (3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the
complainant would assert the right on which he bases his suit; and (4) injury or prejudice to the
defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant or the suit is not held to be barred.
[43] The reason for the rule is not simply the lapse of time during which the neglect to enforce
the right has existed, but the changes of condition which may have arisen during the period in
which there has been neglect. In other words, where a court finds that the position of the
parties will change, that equitable relief cannot be afforded without doing injustice, or that the
intervening rights of third persons may be destroyed or seriously impaired, it will not exert its
equitable powers in order to save one from the consequences of his own neglect.[44] Though
laches applies even to imprescriptible actions, its elements must be proved positively. Laches is
evidentiary in nature and cannot be established by mere allegations in the pleadings.[45] Based
on the foregoing, we hold that petitioner is not guilty of laches. The evidence on record does not
support such finding. Petitioner had reasonable ground to believe that the property, being still in
the name of his predecessor in interest, continued to be theirs, especially considering that the
annotation of the purported sale was done only in 1982. According to petitioner, his father had
told him that his (the fathers) inheritance was in the possession of their uncle, Amando Baares
who knew likewise that the property was theirs. Thus, Roberto Abadiano testified: Q:
Before
Amando Baares died, did you know that your father is a part owner of Lot No. 1318? A:
Yes, Sir. Q:
And did you not complain to Amando Baares that your father is a pert owner of
that lot? A:
No, Sir. We did not complain because he was our grandfather and when he
dies, the property will go back to us.[46] And herein petitioner testified: Atty. Garaygay Q:
Before the war who was occupying this lot which you claimed belonging (sic) to your father? A:
The uncle of my father, Amando Baares, Sir. Q:
As a matter of fact, before and after the
war and during the lifetime of Amando Baares, he was the one in possession of Lot No. 1318?
A:
Yes, sir. Q:
What was the condition of the lot under the possession of the lot under
the possession of Amando Baares was it under lease? A:
As far as I can remember, my
father told me that his inheritance was with Amando Baares, his uncle.[47] From the

testimonies of petitioner and the defendants during trial, it would appear that they were unaware
of any of respondents actions in relation to the property until the death of their grandfather,
Amando Baares. When they did find out that respondents were occupying the land, they
immediately took action to occupy what they believed was still rightfully theirs. On this point,
petitioner testified, thus: Q:
When did you initiate the move to claim Lot No. 1318-B as your
inheritance from your late father? A:
It was shortly after the death of Amando Baares. Q:
Who were these, who initiated the move to claim Lot No. 1318-B? A:
I advised my brothers
here in Kabankalan to take action to possess the land which was then occupied before by our
(sic) great uncle, Amando Baares. Q:
When was that, in what year, because we do not
know when did your uncle (sic) die? A:
It was after the death of Amando Baares
sometime in 1973 or 1974. Q:
Why did it take you that long before you initiated the move to
claim the inheritance? A:
Considering that relatives were involved and the fact we
understand that our late parents revered our uncle so, we cautiously tried to take action shortly
after his death, so as not to antagonize our relatives. Q:
What did you do in order to claim
your inheritance? A:
Now, after learning that it was being farmed by Lolita Martir, I advised
my brothers here in Kabankalan to go to Bacolod City to seek the intercession of the Philippine
Constabulary Commander in order to thresh out the matter in a way that there will be no hostility
or adverse reaction. Q:
What other reactions did you take, if any? A:
Well, I told my
brother that they have a confrontation in the Office of the PACLAP known as the Presidential
Action Commission on Land Problems. Q:
Besides that confrontation at the PACLAP, what
other action did you personally take as an heir of Lot No. 1318-B? A:
After that
confrontation, I advised my brothers to occupy the land in question to farm it because it belongs
to us. Q:
With respect to the Transfer Certificate of Title, what action, if any, did you
undertake? A:
Well, we drew out a Declaration of Heirship and Adjudication and after it was
approved by the Court, it was annotated at the back of the Transfer Certificate of Title No. T31862 and we were given a co-owners copy of the said title by the Register of Deeds. x x x x Q:
Mr. Witness, when did you and your co-owners executed (sic) this Declaration of Heirship and
Adjudication over Lot 1318-B? A:
That was on July 17, 1976. Q:
Was that before or
after the plaintiffs have filed this present case? A:
That was almost 6 or 7 years before this
present case was filed.[48] On the other hand, Roberto Abadiano testified: Atty. Garaygay Q:
Now, according to you, your father is the co-owner of Lot No. 1318. Prior to the death of your
father, who was in possession of Lot No. 1318? Witness A:
What I know is it was
Amando Baares. Q:
You mean to say that when your father was still alive, it was Amando
Baares who was in possession of Lot No. 1318? A:
Yes, sir. Q:
And until when did
you know that Amando Baares has been in possession of Lot No. 1318? A:
Up to 1976
when he died. Q:
After his death in 1976, who was in possession of the said lot? A:
I
made a verification in the Office of the Register of Deeds, and when I went to the said lot, it was
vacant. Q:
When was that? A:
In 1976-1977, and I have it planted in 1978.[49] That
petitioner and his co-heirs waited until the death of Amando Baares to try and occupy the land
is understandable. They had to be careful about the actions they took, lest they sow dissent
within the family. Furthermore, they knew that their parents revered Amando.[50] The Court has
recognized that this reaction cannot be characterized as such delay as would amount to laches,
thus: in determining whether a delay in seeking to enforce a right constitutes laches, the
existence of a confidential relationship between the parties is an important circumstance for

consideration, a delay under such circumstances not being so strictly regarded as where the
parties are strangers to each other. The doctrine of laches is not strictly applied between near
relatives, and the fact that parties are connected by ties of blood or marriage tends to excuse an
otherwise unreasonable delay.[51] In addition, several other factors militate against the finding
of laches on the part of the petitioner. When the Original Certificate of Title was reconstituted on
February 15, 1962, no annotation therein was made of the Compra Y Venta or of the Deed of
Sale between Ramon Abadiano and Victor Garde. Only the Agreement of Partition, the
Confirmation by David Abadiano, and the sale from Demetrio to Leopoldo Baares were
annotated therein.[52] Neither does the Deed of Sale of Demetrios share in favor of Leopoldo,
executed in 1957, mention that the property belonged to anyone other than the parties to the
Deed of Partition.[53] Likewise, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-31862, which was issued in
1962 pursuant to an Order of the Kabankalan CFI, was issued in the names of Leopoldo
Baares, Amando Baares, and Ramon and David Abadiano. Even at the time of the issuance
of said TCT, there was no annotation of the alleged sale to Victor Garde, which according to
respondents took place in 1922. If respondents contention were true, the TCT should not have
been issued in April 1962 in the name of Ramon and David Abadiano, but in the name of Victor
Garde or Jose Garde who by then had supposedly acquired the property by virtue of the
Declaration of Heirship and Deed of Sale executed on December 29, 1961.[54] As it is, neither
respondents nor any of their predecessors in interest participated in any of the proceedings for
the issuance of the OCT, the reconstituted OCT, or the TCT. The petitioners testimony on the
matter is revealing: Q:
Based on your investigation, did you find records of the proceedings
of the reconstitution of title of Lot 1318 or any evidence as to the participation of the plaintiffs in
this Reconstitution Petition? A:
Based on the existing records, they did not participate. Q:
How about in the Reconstitution of Original Certificate of Title No. (sic) did the plaintiffs
participate therein? A:
They did not also. Q:
How about in the issuance of the new
Transfer Certificate of Title, did the plaintiffs participate therein? A:
No, sir.[55] Again, the
TCT bears out the fact that the purported Compra Y Venta to Victor Garde was annotated
thereon only on April 23, 1982. On the other hand, several entries made in 1981 evince that
petitioner and his co-heirs took steps after Amandos death to assert their rights over the
property.[56] In 1976, the heirs of David Abadiano executed a Special Power of Attorney in favor
of Roberto Abadiano giving the latter authority to act, sue, and/or represent them in any suit or
action for recovery of possession or of whatever kind or nature.[57] For their part, the heirs of
Ramon Abadiano executed a Declaration of Heirship and Adjudication over the part of Lot No.
1318 pertaining to their predecessor.[58] Ranged against these positive steps, respondents only
have their bare assertions to support their claim that they indeed had possession of the land
through their predecessors in interest, which are insufficient to overcome the testimony that it
was Amando Baares and not Victor Garde who had possession of the property during the
formers lifetime, or that after Amandos death, the lot remained unoccupied. In sum, we find that
petitioner is not guilty of such neglect or inaction as would bar his claim to the property in
question. In contrast, it is most telling that respondents, who are claiming to have been in
possession of the property by virtue of an alleged duly constituted sale for almost 60 years,
have themselves failed within that long period to have the same property transferred in their
name or even only to have the sale annotated on the title of the property. Finally, we come to
the issue of damages. Petitioner prays that respondents be made to pay actual damages of not

less that P30,000.00 plus rentals on the property from the time of the latters occupation, moral
damages amounting to P100,000.00, and exemplary damages, as well as attorneys fees. The
record shows that petitioner testified on the prevailing rate of rentals on the subject property
from the time of Amando Baares death in 1976 until the time of the trial. According to
petitioner, the rental rate from 1976 until 1985 was P3,000.00 per hectare, while from 1985 until
the time of his testimony in 1994, the rental rate was P5,000.00 per hectare. We thus rule that
the actual damages that may be awarded shall be based only on these rates.[59] Considering,
however, that petitioners co-heirs (defendants Roberto Abandiano, et al.) were able to enter the
property and harvest the sugarcane therein in 1981 and, thereafter, the land remained
unoccupied, the rent must be reckoned only from the time respondents actually occupied the
land until March 1981. The claims for moral damages must be anchored on a definite showing
that the claiming party actually experienced emotional and mental sufferings.[60] In this case,
we find that petitioners testimony that he suffered from sleepless nights from worrying about
this case and considering the great distance he had to travel from his home in Tacloban to see
the case through are enough bases to award him moral damages. With the award of moral
damages, exemplary damages are likewise in order.[61] Attorneys fees are recoverable when
exemplary damages are awarded, or when the court deems it just and equitable. The grant of
attorneys fees depends on the circumstances of each case and lies within the discretion of the
court.[62] Given the circumstances of this case, we grant the prayer for attorneys fees.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51679 are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.
A new one is entered: (1)
reversing the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Kabankalan, Negros Occidental in Civil Case No. 1331; (2)
declaring the heirs of
Ramon and David Abadiano as the lawful owners of Lot No. 1318-B, a portion of Lot No. 1318
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-31862, Kabankalan Cadastre, Negros Occidental;
and (3)
ordering respondents to pay petitioner and his co-heirs rentals at the rate of
P3,000.00 per hectare per year, from the time of actual occupation of the land in 1976 until
March 1981, moral damages in the amount of P100,00.00, exemplary damages in the amount
of P30,000.00, and attorneys fees in the amount of P10,000.00.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Sec. 4 - Original Document
(no case)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------2. SECONDARY EVIDENCE
Sec. 5 - When original Document is Unavailable
(no case)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Sec. 6 - When original Document is in Adverse Party's Custody or Control
(no case)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Sec. 7 - Evidence Admissible when Original Document is a Public Record

10. EDSA SHANGRI-LA HOTEL AND RESORT, INC., RUFO B. COLAYCO, RUFINO L.
SAMANIEGO, KUOK KHOON CHEN, and KUOK KHOON TSEN, Petitioners, - versus - BF
CORPORATION, Respondent.
G.R. No. 145842. June 27, 2008
x ------------------------------------------- x CYNTHIA ROXAS-DEL CASTILLO, Petitioner, - versus BF CORPORATION, Respondent.
G.R. No. 145873
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x D E C I S I O N VELASCO, JR., J.:
Before us are these two (2) consolidated petitions
for review under Rule 45 to nullify certain issuances of the Court of Appeals (CA). In the first
petition, docketed as G.R. No. 145842, petitioners Edsa Shangri-la Hotel and Resort, Inc.
(ESHRI), Rufo B. Colayco, Rufino L. Samaniego, Kuok Khoon Chen, and Kuok Khoon Tsen
assail the Decision[1] dated November 12, 1999 of the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 57399, affirming
the Decision[2] dated September 23, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 162 in
Pasig City in Civil Case No. 63435 that ordered them to pay jointly and severally respondent BF
Corporation (BF) a sum of money with interests and damages. They also assail the CA
Resolution dated October 25, 2000 which, apart from setting aside an earlier Resolution[3] of
August 13, 1999 granting ESHRIs application for restitution and damages against bond,
affirmed the aforesaid September 23, 1996 RTC Decision. In the second petition, docketed as
G.R. No. 145873, petitioner Cynthia Roxas-del Castillo also assails the aforementioned CA
Decision of November 12, 1999 insofar at it adjudged her jointly and severally liable with
ESHRI, et al. to pay the monetary award decreed in the RTC Decision. Both petitions
stemmed from a construction contract denominated as Agreement for the Execution of Builders
Work for the EDSA Shangri-la Hotel Project[4] that ESHRI and BF executed for the construction
of the EDSA Shangri-la Hotel starting May 1, 1991. Among other things, the contract stipulated
for the payment of the contract price on the basis of the work accomplished as described in the
monthly progress billings. Under this arrangement, BF shall submit a monthly progress billing to
ESHRI which would then re-measure the work accomplished and prepare a Progress Payment
Certificate for that months progress billing.[5] In a memorandum-letter dated August 16, 1991 to
BF, ESHRI laid out the collection procedure BF was to follow, to wit: (1) submission of the
progress billing to ESHRIs Engineering Department; (2) following-up of the preparation of the
Progress Payment Certificate with the Head of the Quantity Surveying Department; and (3)
following-up of the release of the payment with one Evelyn San Pascual. BF adhered to the
procedures agreed upon in all its billings for the period from May 1, 1991 to June 30, 1992,
submitting for the purpose the required Builders Work Summary, the monthly progress billings,
including an evaluation of the work in accordance with the Project Managers Instructions (PMIs)
and the detailed valuations contained in the Work Variation Orders (WVOs) for final remeasurement under the PMIs. BF said that the values of the WVOs were contained in the
progress billings under the section Change Orders.[6] From May 1, 1991 to June 30, 1992, BF
submitted a total of 19 progress billings following the procedure agreed upon. Based on
Progress Billing Nos. 1 to 13, ESHRI paid BF PhP 86,501,834.05.[7] According to BF, however,
ESHRI, for Progress Billing Nos. 14 to 19, did not re-measure the work done, did not prepare
the Progress Payment Certificates, let alone remit payment for the inclusive periods covered. In

this regard, BF claimed having been misled into working continuously on the project by ESHRI
which gave the assurance about the Progress Payment Certificates already being processed.
After several futile attempts to collect the unpaid billings, BF filed, on July 26, 1993, before the
RTC a suit for a sum of money and damages. In its defense, ESHRI claimed having overpaid
BF for Progress Billing Nos. 1 to 13 and, by way of counterclaim with damages, asked that BF
be ordered to refund the excess payments. ESHRI also charged BF with incurring delay and
turning up with inferior work accomplishment. The RTC found for BF On September 23, 1996,
the RTC, on the main finding that BF, as plaintiff a quo, is entitled to the payment of its claim
covered by Progress Billing Nos. 14 to 19 and to the retention money corresponding to Progress
Billing Nos. 1 to 11, with interest in both instances, rendered judgment for BF. The fallo of the
RTC Decision reads: WHEREFORE, defendants [EHSRI], Ru[f]o B. Colayco, Rufino L.
Samaniego, Cynthia del Castillo, Kuok Khoon Chen, and Kuok Khoon Tsen, are jointly and
severally hereby ordered to: 1.
Pay plaintiff the sum of P24,780,490.00 representing unpaid
construction work accomplishments under plaintiffs Progress Billings Nos. 14-19; 2.
Return
to plaintiff the retention sum of P5,810,000.00; 3.
Pay legal interest on the amount of
P24,780,490.80 representing the construction work accomplishments under Progress Billings
Nos. 14-19 and on the amount of P5,810,000.00 representing the retention sum from date of
demand until their full Payment; 4.
Pay plaintiff P1,000,000.00 as moral damages,
P1,000,000.00 as exemplary damages, P1,000,000.00 as attorneys fees, and cost of the suit.
[8]
According to the RTC, ESHRIs refusal to pay BFs valid claims constituted evident
bad faith entitling BF to moral damages and attorneys fees. ESHRI subsequently moved for
reconsideration, but the motion was denied by the RTC, prompting ESHRI to appeal to the CA
in CA-G.R. CV No. 57399.
Pending the resolution of CA-G.R. CV No. 57399, the
following events and/or incidents transpired:(1) The trial court, by Order dated January 21,
1997, granted BFs motion for execution pending appeal. ESHRI assailed this order before the
CA via a petition for certiorari, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 43187.[9] Meanwhile, the branch
sheriff garnished from ESHRIs bank account in the Philippine National Bank (PNB) the amount
of PhP 35 million. (2) On March 7, 1997, the CA issued in CA-G.R. SP No. 43187 a writ of
preliminary injunction enjoining the trial court from carrying out its January 21, 1997 Order upon
ESHRIs posting of a PhP 1 million bond. In a supplemental resolution issued on the same day,
the CA issued a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction directing the trial court judge and/or his
branch sheriff acting under him (a) to lift all the garnishments and levy made under the enjoined
order of execution pending appeal; (b) to immediately return the garnished deposits to PNB
instead of delivering the same to ESHRI; and (c) if the garnished deposits have been delivered
to BF, the latter shall return the same to ESHRIs deposit account. (3) By a Decision dated June
30, 1997 in CA-G.R. SP No. 43187, the CA set aside the trial courts January 21, 1997 Order.
The CA would later deny BFs motion for reconsideration. (4) Aggrieved, BF filed before this
Court a petition for review of the CA Decision, docketed as G.R. No. 132655.[10] On August 11,
1998, the Court affirmed the assailed decision of the CA with the modification that the recovery
of ESHRIs garnished deposits shall be against BFs bond.[11] We denied the motions for
reconsideration of ESHRI and BF. (5) Forthwith, ESHRI filed, and the CA by Resolution of
August 13, 1999 granted, an application for restitution or damages against BFs bond.
Consequently, BF and Stronghold Insurance Co., Inc., the bonding company, filed separate
motions for reconsideration. On November 12, 1999, in CA-G.R. CV No. 57399, the CA

rendered a Decision resolving (1) the aforesaid motions of BF and its surety and (2) herein
petitioners appeal from the trial courts Decision dated September 23, 1996. This November 12,
1999 Decision, finding for BF and now assailed in these separate recourses, dispositively reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED in toto. This
Courts Resolution dated 13 August 1999 is reconsidered and set aside, and defendantsappellants application for restitution is denied for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.[12]
The
CA predicated its ruling on the interplay of two main reasons. First, the issues the parties raised
in their respective briefs were, for the most part, factual and evidentiary. Thus, there is no
reason to disturb the case disposition of the RTC, inclusive of its award of damages and
attorneys fees and the reasons underpinning the award. Second, BF had sufficiently
established its case by preponderance of evidence. Part of what it had sufficiently proven
relates to ESHRI being remiss in its obligation to re-measure BFs later work accomplishments
and pay the same. On the other hand, ESHRI had failed to prove the basis of its disclaimer from
liability, such as its allegation on the defective work accomplished by BF. Apropos ESHRIs
entitlement to the remedy of restitution or reparation arising from the execution of the RTC
Decision pending appeal, the CA held that such remedy may peremptorily be allowed only if the
executed judgment is reversed, a situation not obtaining in this case. Following the denial by the
CA, per its Resolution[13] dated October 25, 2000, of their motion for reconsideration,
petitioners are now before the Court, petitioner del Castillo opting, however, to file a separate
recourse. G.R. No. 145842
In G.R. No. 145842, petitioners ESHRI, et al. raise the
following issues for our consideration: I.
Whether or not the [CA] committed grave abuse
of discretion in disregarding issues of law raised by petitioners in their appeal [particularly in
admitting in evidence photocopies of Progress Billing Nos. 14 to 19, PMIs and WVOs]. II.
Whether or not the [CA] committed grave abuse of discretion in not holding respondent guilty of
delay in the performance of its obligations and, hence, liable for liquidated damages [in view that
respondent is guilty of delay and that its works were defective]. III.
Whether or not the [CA]
committed grave abuse of discretion in finding petitioners guilty of malice and evidence bad
faith, and in awarding moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees to respondent. IV.
Whether or not the [CA] erred in setting aside its Resolution dated August 13, 2000.[14] The
petition has no merit. Prefatorily, it should be stressed that the second and third issues tendered
relate to the correctness of the CAs factual determinations, specifically on whether or not BF
was in delay and had come up with defective works, and whether or not petitioners were guilty
of malice and bad faith. It is basic that in an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45, only questions
of law may be presented by the parties and reviewed by the Court.[15] Just as basic is the rule
that factual findings of the CA, affirmatory of that of the trial court, are final and conclusive on
the Court and may not be reviewed on appeal, except for the most compelling of reasons, such
as when: (1) the conclusion is grounded on speculations, surmises, or conjectures; (2) the
inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion;
(4) the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are conflicting;
(6) such findings are contrary to the admissions of both parties; and (7) the CA manifestly
overlooked certain relevant evidence and undisputed facts, that, if properly considered, would
justify a different conclusion.[16] In our review of this case, we find that none of the above
exceptions obtains. Accordingly, the factual findings of the trial court, as affirmed by the CA, that
there was delay on the part of ESHRI, that there was no proof that BFs work was defective, and

that petitioners were guilty of malice and bad faith, ought to be affirmed. Admissibility of
Photocopies of Progress Billing Nos. 14 to 19,PMIs and WVOs Petitioners fault the CA, and
necessarily the trial court, on the matter of the admission in evidence of the photocopies of
Progress Billing Nos. 14 to 19 and the complementing PMIs and the WVOs. According to
petitioners, BF, before being allowed to adduce in evidence the photocopies adverted to, ought
to have laid the basis for the presentation of the photocopies as secondary evidence,
conformably to the best evidence rule.
Respondent BF, on the other hand, avers having
complied with the laying-the-basis requirement. Defending the action of the courts below in
admitting into evidence the photocopies of the documents aforementioned, BF explained that it
could not present the original of the documents since they were in the possession of ESHRI
which refused to hand them over to BF despite requests.
We agree with BF. The only
actual rule that the term best evidence denotes is the rule requiring that the original of a writing
must, as a general proposition, be produced[17] and secondary evidence of its contents is not
admissible except where the original cannot be had. Rule 130, Section 3 of the Rules of Court
enunciates the best evidence rule:
SEC. 3. Original document must be produced;
exceptions. When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be
admissible other than the original document itself, except in the following cases: (a) When the
original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on the part
of the offeror; (b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against
whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
(Emphasis added.)
Complementing the above provision is Sec. 6 of Rule 130, which
reads:
SEC. 6. When original document is in adverse partys custody or control. If the
document is in the custody or under control of the adverse party, he must have reasonable
notice to produce it. If after such notice and after satisfactory proof of its existence, he fails to
produce the document, secondary evidence may be presented as in the case of loss.
Secondary evidence of the contents of a written instrument or document refers to evidence
other than the original instrument or document itself.[18] A party may present secondary
evidence of the contents of a writing not only when the original is lost or destroyed, but also
when it is in the custody or under the control of the adverse party. In either instance, however,
certain explanations must be given before a party can resort to secondary evidence. In our
view, the trial court correctly allowed the presentation of the photocopied documents in question
as secondary evidence. Any suggestion that BF failed to lay the required basis for presenting
the photocopies of Progress Billing Nos. 14 to 19 instead of their originals has to be dismissed.
The stenographic notes of the following exchanges between Atty. Andres and Atty. Autea,
counsel for BF and ESHRI, respectively, reveal that BF had complied with the requirements:
ATTY. ANDRES:
During the previous hearing of this case, your Honor,
likewise, the witness testified that certain exhibits namely, the Progress Payment Certificates
and the Progress Billings the originals of these documents were transmitted to ESHRI, all the
originals are in the possession of ESHRI since these are internal documents and I am referring
specifically to the Progress Payment Certificates. We requested your Honor, that in order that
plaintiff [BF] be allowed to present secondary original, that opposing counsel first be given
opportunity to present the originals which are in their possession. May we know if they have
brought the originals and whether they will present the originals in court, Your Honor. (Emphasis
added.) ATTY. AUTEA:
We have already informed our client about the

situation, your Honor, that it has been claimed by plaintiff that some of the originals are in their
possession and our client assured that, they will try to check. Unfortunately, we have not heard
from our client, Your Honor.
Four factual premises are readily deducible from the above
exchanges, to wit: (1) the existence of the original documents which ESHRI had possession of;
(2) a request was made on ESHRI to produce the documents; (3) ESHRI was afforded sufficient
time to produce them; and (4) ESHRI was not inclined to produce them.
Clearly, the
circumstances obtaining in this case fall under the exception under Sec. 3(b) of Rule 130. In
other words, the conditions sine qua non for the presentation and reception of the photocopies
of the original document as secondary evidence have been met. These are: (1) there is proof of
the original documents execution or existence; (2) there is proof of the cause of the original
documents unavailability; and (3) the offeror is in good faith.[19] While perhaps not on all fours
because it involved a check, what the Court said in Magdayao v. People, is very much apt, thus:
x x x To warrant the admissibility of secondary evidence when the original of a writing is in the
custody or control of the adverse party, Section 6 of Rule 130 provides that the adverse party
must be given reasonable notice, that he fails or refuses to produce the same in court and that
the offeror offers satisfactory proof of its existence. x x x x The mere fact that the original of the
writing is in the custody or control of the party against whom it is offered does not warrant the
admission of secondary evidence. The offeror must prove that he has done all in his power to
secure the best evidence by giving notice to the said party to produce the document. The notice
may be in the form of a motion for the production of the original or made in open court in the
presence of the adverse party or via a subpoena duces tecum, provided that the party in
custody of the original has sufficient time to produce the same. When such party has the
original of the writing and does not voluntarily offer to produce it or refuses to produce it,
secondary evidence may be admitted.[20] (Emphasis supplied.) On the Restitution of the
Garnished Funds We now come to the propriety of the restitution of the garnished funds. As
petitioners maintain, the CA effectively, but erroneously, prevented restitution of ESHRIs
improperly garnished funds when it nullified its own August 13, 1999 Resolution in CA-G.R. SP
No. 43187. In this regard, petitioners invite attention to the fact that the restitution of the funds
was in accordance with this Courts final and already executory decision in G.R. No. 132655,
implying that ESHRI should be restored to its own funds without awaiting the final outcome of
the main case. For ease of reference, we reproduce what the appellate court pertinently wrote in
its Resolution of August 13, 1999: BASED ON THE FOREGOING, the Application (for
Restitution/Damages against Bond for Execution Pending Appeal) dated May 12, 1999 filed by
[ESHRI] is GRANTED. Accordingly, the surety of [BF], STRONGHOLD Insurance Co., Inc., is
ORDERED to PAY the sum of [PhP 35 million] to [ESHRI] under its SICI Bond. x x x In the event
that the bond shall turn out to be insufficient or the surety (STRONGHOLD) cannot be made
liable under its bond, [BF], being jointly and severally liable under the bond is ORDERED to
RETURN the amount of [PhP 35 million] representing the garnished deposits of the bank
account maintained by [ESHRI] with the [PNB] Shangri-la Plaza Branch, Mandaluyong City.
Otherwise, this Court shall cause the implementation of the Writ of Execution dated April 24,
1998 issued in Civil Case No. 63435 against both [BF], and/or its surety, STRONGHOLD, in
case they should fail to comply with these directives.
SO ORDERED.[21]
Petitioners contention on the restitution angle has no merit, for, as may be recalled, the CA,
simultaneously with the nullification and setting aside of its August 13, 1999 Resolution,

affirmed, via its assailed November 12, 1999 Decision, the RTC Decision of September 23,
1996, the execution pending appeal of which spawned another dispute between the parties. And
as may be recalled further, the appellate court nullified its August 13, 1999 Resolution on the
basis of Sec. 5, Rule 39, which provides:
Sec. 5. Effect of reversal of executed judgment.
Where the executed judgment is reversed totally or partially, or annulled, on appeal or
otherwise, the trial court may, on motion, issue such orders of restitution or reparation of
damages as equity and justice may warrant under the circumstances.
On the strength of
the aforequoted provision, the appellate court correctly dismissed ESHRIs claim for restitution
of its garnished deposits, the executed appealed RTC Decision in Civil Case No. 63435 having
in fact been upheld in toto. It is true that the Courts Decision of August 11, 1998 in G.R. No.
132655 recognized the validity of the issuance of the desired restitution order. It bears to
emphasize, however, that the CA had since then decided CA-G.R. CV No. 57399, the main
case, on the merits when it affirmed the underlying RTC Decision in Civil Case No. 63435. This
CA Decision on the original and main case effectively rendered our decision on the incidental
procedural matter on restitution moot and academic. Allowing restitution at this point would not
serve any purpose, but only prolong an already protracted litigation. G.R. No. 145873
Petitioner Roxas-del Castillo, in her separate petition, excepts from the CA Decision affirming, in
its entirety, the RTC Decision holding her, with the other individual petitioners in G.R. No.
145842, who were members of the Board of Directors of ESHRI, jointly and severally liable with
ESHRI for the judgment award. She presently contends: I.
THE [CA] ERRED IN
NOT DECLARING THAT THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT ADJUDGING PETITIONER
PERSONALLY LIABLE TO RESPONDENT VOID FOR NOT STATING THE FACTUAL AND
LEGAL BASIS FOR SUCH AWARD. II.
THE [CA] ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT AS
FORMER DIRECTOR, PETITIONER CANNOT BE HELD PERSONALLY LIABLE FOR ANY
ALLEGED BREACH OF A CONTRACT ENTERED INTO BY THE CORPORATION. III.
THE [CA] ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT RESPONDENT IS NOT ENTITLED TO AN AWARD
OF MORAL DAMAGES. IV.
THE [CA] ERRED IN HOLDING PETITIONER
PERSONALLY LIABLE TO RESPONDENT FOR EXEMPLARY DAMAGES. V.
THE
[CA] ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT RESPONDENT IS NOT ENTITLED TO ANY AWARD OF
ATTORNEYS FEES.[22]
First off, Roxas-del Castillo submits that the RTC decision in
question violated the requirements of due process and of Sec. 14, Article VII of the Constitution
that states, No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. Roxas-del Castillos threshold posture is
correct. Indeed, the RTC decision in question, as couched, does not provide the factual or legal
basis for holding her personally liable under the premises. In fact, only in the dispositive portion
of the decision did her solidary liability crop up. And save for her inclusion as party defendant in
the underlying complaint, no reference is made in other pleadings thus filed as to her liability.
The Court notes that the appellate court, by its affirmatory ruling, effectively recognized the
applicability of the doctrine on piercing the veil of the separate corporate identity. Under the
circumstances of this case, we cannot allow such application. A corporation, upon coming to
existence, is invested by law with a personality separate and distinct from those of the persons
composing it. Ownership by a single or a small group of stockholders of nearly all of the capital
stock of the corporation is not, without more, sufficient to disregard the fiction of separate
corporate personality.[23] Thus, obligations incurred by corporate officers, acting as corporate

agents, are not theirs but direct accountabilities of the corporation they represent. Solidary
liability on the part of corporate officers may at times attach, but only under exceptional
circumstances, such as when they act with malice or in bad faith.[24] Also, in appropriate cases,
the veil of corporate fiction shall be disregarded when the separate juridical personality of a
corporation is abused or used to commit fraud and perpetrate a social injustice, or used as a
vehicle to evade obligations.[25] In this case, no act of malice or like dishonest purpose is
ascribed on petitioner Roxas-del Castillo as to warrant the lifting of the corporate veil. The
above conclusion would still hold even if petitioner Roxas-del Castillo, at the time ESHRI
defaulted in paying BFs monthly progress bill, was still a director, for, before she could be held
personally liable as corporate director, it must be shown that she acted in a manner and under
the circumstances contemplated in Sec. 31 of the Corporation Code, which reads: Section 31.
Directors or trustees who willfully or knowingly vote for or assent to patently unlawful acts of the
corporation or acquire any pecuniary interest in conflict with their duty as such directors or
trustees shall be liable jointly and severally for all damages resulting therefrom suffered by the
corporation, its stockholders or members and other persons. (Emphasis ours.) We do not find
anything in the testimony of one Crispin Balingit to indicate that Roxas-del Castillo made any
misrepresentation respecting the payment of the bills in question. Balingit, in fact, testified that
the submitted but unpaid billings were still being evaluated. Further, in the said testimony, in no
instance was bad faith imputed on Roxas-del Castillo. Not lost on the Court are some material
dates. As it were, the controversy between the principal parties started in July 1992 when
Roxas-del Castillo no longer sat in the ESHRI Board, a reality BF does not appear to dispute. In
fine, she no longer had any participation in ESHRIs corporate affairs when what basically is the
ESHRI-BF dispute erupted. Familiar and fundamental is the rule that contracts are binding only
among parties to an agreement. Art. 1311 of the Civil Code is clear on this point: Article 1311.
Contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs, except in cases where
the rights and obligations are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision
of law. In the instant case, Roxas-del Castillo could not plausibly be held liable for breaches of
contract committed by ESHRI nor for the alleged wrongdoings of its governing board or
corporate officers occurring after she severed official ties with the hotel management. Given the
foregoing perspective, the other issues raised by Roxas-del Castillo as to her liability for moral
and exemplary damages and attorneys fees are now moot and academic. And her other
arguments insofar they indirectly impact on the liability of ESHRI need not detain us any longer
for we have sufficiently passed upon those concerns in our review of G.R. No. 145842.
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 145842 is DISMISSED, while the petition in G.R. No.
145873 is GRANTED. Accordingly, the appealed Decision dated November 12, 1999 of the CA
in CA-G.R. CV No. 57399 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the petitioner in G.R. No.
145873, Cynthia Roxas-del Castillo, is absolved from any liability decreed in the RTC Decision
dated September 23, 1996 in Civil Case No. 63435, as affirmed by the CA.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Sec. 8 - Party who calls for document not bound to offer it
(no case)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------3. PAROL EVIDENCE RULE
Sec. 9 - Evidence of written agreement

11. ACI PHILIPPINES, INC., Petitioner, - versus - EDITHA C. COQUIA, DOING BUSINESS IN
THE NAME OF E. CARDOZO COQUIA ENTERPRISES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 174466. July 14, 2008
D
E C I S I O N TINGA, J.:
Petitioner ACI Philippines, Inc.[1] is
engaged in the business of manufacturing fiberglass, which is used in both commercial and
industrial equipment for thermal and acoustic insulation. In 1993, it ceased from using silica
sand in the manufacture of fiberglass and started using instead recycled broken glass or flint
cullets to save on manufacturing costs.[2]
Petitioner contracted with respondent Editha C.
Coquia for the purchase of one (1) lot of flint cullets, consisting of 2,500 to 3,000 metric tons, at
a price of P4.20 per kilo under Purchase Order No. 106211[3] dated 6 October 1994. Several
deliveries made by respondent were accepted and paid for by petitioner at the unit price of
P4.20 per kilo as indicated in Purchase Order No. 106211.[4]
However, on 28 October
1994, petitioner demanded the reduction of the purchase price from P4.20 per kilo to P3.65 per
kilo to which respondent acceded, albeit allegedly under duress. Petitioner accordingly issued
Purchase Order No. 106373[5] explicitly superseding Purchase Order No. 106211. Deliveries
were again made by respondent on 5, 8 and 12 November 1994 under Delivery Receipt Nos.
901, 719 and 735,[6] respectively. Petitioner accepted the deliveries but refused to pay for them
even at the reduced price of P3.65 per kilo, demanding instead that the unit price be further
reduced to P3.10 per kilo.[7]
Respondent then filed a Complaint[8] for specific
performance and damages against petitioner seeking payment for the deliveries made under
Delivery Receipt Nos. 901, 719 and 735, amounting to 46,390 kilos at the renegotiated price of
P3.65 per kilo. Respondent further demanded that petitioner be directed to accept and pay for
the remaining deliveries to complete the one (1) lot of flint cullets originally contracted for.
On 26 November 1994, three (3) days after the complaint against it was filed, petitioner paid for
the flint cullets under Delivery Receipt Nos. 901, 719 and 735 at the unit price of P3.65 per kilo.
Ruling in favor of the respondent, the trial court ordered petitioner to accept deliveries of
the flint cullets contracted for under Purchase Order No. 106211 and to pay for the said
deliveries within ten (10) days from each delivery at the unit price of P4.20 per kilo. It further
directed petitioner to pay P2,540,300.00 in damages plus interest at the legal rate from the time
of the filing of the complaint on 23 November 1994 until fully paid. The trial court also awarded
respondent attorneys fees in the amount of P200,000.00, litigation expenses in the amount of
P20,000.00 and costs of suit.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court
but deleted the award of attorneys fees, litigation expenses and costs of suit. In its Decision[9]
dated 15 September 2005, the appellate court held that Purchase Order No. 106211 is a
contract of adhesion whose terms must be strictly construed against petitioner. It also deemed
as contrary to the original agreement, which pegged the unit price of flint cullets at P4.20 per
kilo, petitioners willful refusal to pay for the deliveries unless the price is reduced, for which
petitioner should be held liable.
The appellate court denied petitioners Partial Motion for
Reconsideration,[10] as well as respondents Urgent Ex Parte Application for Attachment,[11] in
its Resolution[12] dated 30 August 2006.
Petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals
erred in ruling that Purchase Order No. 106211 is a contract of adhesion despite the fact that
respondent is an established businesswoman who has the freedom to negotiate the terms and

conditions of any contract she enters into. It stresses that Purchase Order No. 106211 was
superseded by Purchase Order No. 106373 and that in both contracts, it was made clear to
respondent that her assurance of prompt delivery of the flint cullets motivated the transaction.
Petitioner asserts that the appellate court erred in affirming the trial courts decision which
compelled it to accept and pay for the deliveries at the price of P4.20 per kilo and at the same
required it to pay damages representing respondents alleged unrealized profits. It also alleges
that the appellate court erroneously applied Article 21 of the Civil Code despite the existence of
purchase orders which should govern the contractual obligations of the parties.
Apart from
stating that petitioner appears to have shut down its operations, respondents Comment[13]
dated 12 January 2007 merely reiterates her position that Purchase Order No. 106373 was a
product of intimidation practiced upon her by petitioner.
In its Reply[14] dated 22 April
2007, petitioner asserts that its juridical personality continues to subsist despite the change of
its corporate name from ACI Philippines, Inc. to Asia Pacific Insulation Corporation. It
emphasizes that Purchase Order No. 106211 is not a contract of adhesion and should be
considered valid and binding considering that the parties voluntarily executed the same and
that, furthermore, Purchase Order No. 106211 had already been superseded by Purchase
Order No. 106373.
Petitioner maintains that it did not exercise any intimidation on
respondent to force the latter to acquiesce to the new purchase order and that assuming that it
did, the resultant voidable contract was ratified by respondents delivery of the flint cullets and
the fact that the Statement of Account dated 28 October and 16 November 1994 sent by
respondent to petitioner already reflected the reduced unit price of P3.65 per kilo.
Petitioner also maintains that it entered into a contract with respondent upon the latters
assurance that she could promptly deliver the 2,500-3,000 metric tons of flint cullets required by
petitioner. However, it believes that the trial court and the appellate court erroneously refused to
receive evidence aliunde to prove that time was an important element of the agreement.
The Court of Appeals identified the three issues for resolution: (1) whether petitioner may be
bound to accept the deliveries of washed cullets from respondent; (2) what is the unit price
applicable; and (3) who is entitled to damages. Central to these issues is the soundness of the
appellate courts pronouncement that the purchase orders in question are contracts of adhesion
whose terms must be strictly construed against petitioner.
A contract of adhesion is one
wherein a party, usually a corporation, prepares the stipulations in the contract, and the other
party merely affixes his signature or his "adhesion" thereto. Through the years, the courts have
held that in this type of contract, the parties do not bargain on equal footing, the weaker party's
participation being reduced to the alternative to take it or leave it. Thus, adhesion contracts are
viewed as traps for the weaker party whom the courts of justice must protect. However, we
have also been steadfast in reminding courts to be careful in their evaluation of allegations of
blind adherence to contracts.[15]
There is every indication in this case that respondent, a
presumably astute businesswoman who has dealings with big corporations such as La Tondea
as the latters sole buyer of cullets and has the financial savvy to obtain a loan from a bank,[16]
gave her assent to Purchase Order No. 106211 with full knowledge. She was, in fact, the one
who sought a contract with petitioner upon learning of the latters need for a supply of flint
cullets. Respondent testified: Q:
Could you tell the Court how you were able to get this
PO?A:
I went to ACI, sir. Q:
You went to ACI because you have knowledge that they
were in need of flint cullets?A:
Yes, sir. Q:
And who told you that ACI is in need of flint

cullets?A:
With information, I learned that ACI is in need of cullets, so I went to ACI. Q:
You went to ACI to see a person, who is that person?A:
I went to see ACI that I will deliver
cullets, and then I was ordered to go to the purchasing department, sir. Q:
When you went
to ACI, you said to deliver cullets?A:
To sell cullets, sir.[17]
We cannot, therefore,
apply the rule on contracts of adhesion in construing the provisions of the purchase orders in
this case. Even the conditions of purchase enumerated at the reverse side of the purchase
orders, which uniformly provide 1.
Acknowledgement by the Vendor to the Purchaser or
any delivery made by the Vendor pursuant to this order shall constitute acceptance by the
Vendor of this order and a contract between the Vendor and the Purchaser in terms of this order
to the exclusion of all other terms and conditions between them. 2.
The Vendor guarantees
the goods ordered to be of merchantable quality and condition and this condition shall apply
notwithstanding any examination of the goods by or on behalf of the Purchaser. Any stipulation
as to the quality of goods is also a condition of any contract arising from this order. If a sample
of the goods has been made available to the Purchaser then contract arising from this order
shall have contract for sale by sample as well as a contract for sale by descriptions. 3.
The
prices stated in this order are firm prices save that any reduction in price resulting from a
reduction in customs duties or sales tax from those in force at the date hereof is to be allowed to
the Purchase in reduction of the price agreed hereunder. 4.
Delivery of the goods must be
made at the Purchasers address shown on the face of this order or as otherwise directed, on a
working day between the hours of 8:00 and 3:30 p.m. Until delivery the goods shall be at the
Vendors risk. Any delivery date shown on this order shall be of the essence of any contract
arising. Delivery must be made in strict accordance with the order or delivery schedule and any
quantities delivered in excess of that specified on the order may be returned by the Purchaser at
the Vendors risk and expense. 5.
All goods must be suitably packed or otherwise prepared
for delivery to the satisfaction of the carrier. No charges are to be made for wrapping packing
cartons boxes or crating unless authorized by this order. 6.
The Purchaser may without
prejudice to any other rights at any time after delivery of the good reject them if on inspection
the Purchaser considers them not to be in conformity with any contract arising from this order.
Goods rejected will be held at the vendors risk and are returnable at the Vendors risk and
expense. 7.
All drawings, blueprints, tools or patterns furnished in connection with this order
at any time, are confidential to the Vendor and Purchaser and shall be used solely to complete
this contract or any other contract relating to the products between the Vendor and the
Purchaser, and for no other purpose, except with the prior consent in writing of the Purchaser,
and shall remain the property of the Purchaser and be returned to the Purchaser on demand.
The Vendor shall not without the written prior approval of the Purchaser furnish to any third party
any goods for the manufacture of which drawings, blueprints, tools, patterns, specifications or
samples have been supplied to the Vendor by the Purchaser, or manufacture such articles
except for the Purchaser. This restriction shall continue notwithstanding termination of this order.
8.
The Purchaser reserves the right to cancel or suspend this order or any part thereof, if the
goods are not delivered according to deliveries as specified, or if the Purchaser is unable to
accept delivery for any cause beyond the Purchasers control.
The Purchaser further
reserves the right to cancel this order if the goods are not in accordance with drawings,
blueprints, approved samples or specifications, or are defective in workmanship or material or
are not otherwise satisfactory to the Purchaser. 9.
Vendor warrants that the sale to the

Purchaser and the use by the Purchaser of the goods in any way will not infringe any patent,
[trademark], [copyright], industrial design or process of manufacture, and covenants that Vendor
will, at Vendors own expense, upon demand of Purchaser, investigate and deal with every claim
and/or suit or action, which may be brought against Purchaser or against those selling or using
any goods or products of Purchaser for any alleged infringement or claim of infringement of any
patent, [trademark], [copyright], industrial design, or process of manufacture by reason of the
sale or use of the goods by the Purchaser and will pay all costs[,] damages and expenses which
Purchaser may sustain by reason of any such claim and/or suit [or] action. 10. Invoices quoting
this Order number and Vendors packing slip numbers are required for each individual order and
shipment, and shall be mailed to the Purchaser not later than the day of despatch of the goods.
All products shall be accompanied by original packing slips. Overseas Vendors must render an
additional certified invoice for Philippines Customs purposes. Negotiable bills of lading or
consignment notes properly signed by the Carrier must be attached to the Vendors invoices. 11.
Waiver by the Purchaser of any specific defaults by the Vendor, or failure of the Purchaser to
cancel this order or any part thereof when such a right arises shall not constitute a waiver by the
Purchaser of any of the conditions of this order except such defaults as are specifically waived
and then only in respect of the actual defaults.[18] do not reveal any hint of one-sidedness in
favor of petitioner.
If anything, in fact, Condition 4 above seems to have worked to
petitioners disadvantage as it underpins the refusal of the trial court to accept evidence aliunde
to show that time was of the essence in the transaction. The said condition specifically
mentions that the delivery date shown on (the purchase order) shall be of the essence of any
contract arising and that delivery must be made in strict accordance with the order or delivery
schedule Purchase Order No. 106211, however, is unusually silent as to the date the flint
cullets are needed.
Petitioner remedied this seeming inadvertence by squarely raising
the failure of the purchase order to express the true intent of the parties, i.e., that petitioner
entered into a contract with respondent conditioned upon the latters prompt delivery of flint
cullets, as an issue in its Answer with Counterclaims.[19] Unfortunately, the trial court sustained
respondents objection based on the parol evidence rule.
It is a cardinal rule of evidence,
not just one of technicality but of substance, that the written document is the best evidence of its
own contents. It is also a matter of both principle and policy that when the written contract is
established as the repository of the parties stipulations, any other evidence is excluded and the
same cannot be used as a substitute for such contract, nor even to alter or contradict them.[20]
This rule, however, is not without exception. Section. 9, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court states
that a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the agreement if he
puts in issue in his pleading the failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and
agreement of the parties. Since an exception to the parol evidence rule was squarely raised as
an issue in the answer, the trial court should not have been so inflexible as to completely
disregard petitioners evidence.
Sifting through the testimony of respondent, we find that
although she was not given definite days during which she should deliver the flint cullets, she
was indeed apprised of petitioners urgent need for large quantities thereof.[21] Furthermore,
petitioner presented the unrebutted testimony of Ermilinda Batalon, its materials control
manager, to prove that it agreed to the P4.20 per kilo purchase price only because respondent
assured it of prompt deliveries sufficient for petitioners production requirements.[22] These
testimonies give us a more complete picture of the transaction between the parties and allow for

a more reasoned resolution of the issues, without over-reliance on the tenuous application of
the rule on contracts of adhesion.
Coming now to the second purchase order, we find that
Purchase Order No. 106211 had indeed been superseded by Purchase Order No. 106373 as
the latter plainly states. Respondent testified that the deliveries of flint cullets on 28 October
1994 and on subsequent dates were already covered by the new purchase order which did
indicate the reduced unit price but did not mention the quantity to be delivered. She said: Q:
And of course you were told by Mrs. Batalon that the PO that will be issued to you is an open
PO? Atty. Tanopo: What do you mean by open PO? Atty. Buyco: It does not indicate the
quantity that will deliver. Q:
There is no quantity mentioned as to how much you are going
to deliver, you deliver as they come. [I]n other words at P3.65?A:
Yes, sir. Q:
So much
so that your subsequent deliveries after October 28 is already on the basis of this PO?A:
Yes, sir. Q:
Exhibit D?A:
Yes, sir. Q:
Now, your counsel earlier manifested that he
filed this complaint on November 24, 1994, it was after November 23, 1994 Mrs. Coquia [sic]
that there were developments that substantially affected the allegations in this complaint, like
substantial payments made by you by ACI, Philippines? Atty. Tanopo:
Counsel may show
us, your Honor. Court: Counsel may stipulate. Q:
Did the deliveries of invoices no. [901,
719] and 735[,] Exhibits F, F1 and F2 has already been paid by the plaintiff? Atty. Tanopo:
Admitted, paid at the rate of P3.65.[23] Clearly, respondent knew, at the time she made the
deliveries on 28 October 1994 and thereafter, that Purchase Order No. 106373 would already
govern the transaction. Significantly, payments on these deliveries were made by petitioner on
26 November and 8 December 1994, after the complaint for specific performance was filed and
without respondent making as much as a whimper of protest against the terms of the new
purchase order or the reduced purchase price indicated therein. By acquiescing to the new
purchase order which no longer indicated a specific quantity of flint cullets to be delivered,
respondent knew or should be presumed to have known that deliveries made thereafter were no
longer meant to complete the original quantity contracted for under Purchase Order No. 106211.
The foregoing leads us to resolve the first and second issues framed by the Court of
Appeals in favor of petitioner. Petitioner accepted deliveries under Purchase Order No. 106211
on 8, 12, 15, 18, 20 and 22 October 1994 and paid for these deliveries in accordance with the
terms of the purchase order, i.e., at the contract price of P4.20 per kilo. However, the original
contract between the parties evidenced by Purchase Order No. 106211 was unequivocally
novated by Purchase Order No. 106373, thereby extinguishing the original obligation of
petitioner to accept deliveries from respondent until the 2,500-3,000 metric tons of flint cullets
originally contracted for is filled.[24] Petitioner, therefore, cannot be compelled to accept more
deliveries of flint cullets from respondent to complete the quantity originally contracted for.
By the same token, petitioner cannot be tied down to the P4.20 per kilo unit price under
Purchase Order No. 106211, nor even to the P3.65 per kilo indicated in Purchase Order No.
106373, the latter contract not having stated the quantity petitioner is willing to accept delivery of
and pay for under that price. As regards damages, we find the award thereof to respondent to
be without factual basis. Respondent sought to prove the actual damages she incurred merely
through her own testimony, without adducing any documentary evidence to substantiate her
alleged losses. While she claims that she obtained a bank loan at an interest rate of 21%,
respondent did not present any document to prove the said loan or the use thereof to purchase
flint cullets for delivery to petitioner. Neither did respondent present documents to prove her

alleged stock of 1,000 metric tons of flint cullets for which she allegedly invested P2,500,000.00.
The claim for actual damages in this case should be admitted with extreme caution since it is
based only on bare assertions without support from independent evidence. In determining
actual damages, the Court cannot rely on mere assertions, speculations, conjectures or
guesswork but must depend on competent proof and on the best evidence obtainable regarding
the actual amount of loss.[25] Finally, we find the appellate courts citation of Article 21 of the
Civil Code misplaced not only because of the pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties which bars the application of this provision, but more importantly because we do not
deem petitioner to have acted fraudulently or in bad faith.[26] WHEREFORE, the Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 57678 dated 15 September 2005, and its Resolution dated
30 August 2006 are REVERSED. The complaint dated 23 November 1994 filed by Editha C.
Coquia against ACI Philippines, Inc. is hereby DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------12. SPOUSES WILFREDO and ANGELA AMONCIO, Petitioners, - v e r s u s - AARON GO
BENEDICTO, Respondent.
G.R. No. 171707 July 28, 2008
D E C I S I O N CORONA, J.: At bar is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 79341[1] which, in
turn, affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 82 of Quezon City. The
facts follow. On July 15, 1997, petitioners Wilfredo and Angela Amoncio entered into a contract
of lease with a certain Ernesto Garcia over a 120 sq. m. portion of their 600 sq. m. property in
Quezon City. On August 20, 1997, petitioners entered into another contract of lease, this time
with respondent Aaron Go Benedicto over a 240 sq. m. portion of the same property. The
contract read: WHEREAS, the Lessor is the absolute owner of a parcel of land with an area of
(600) [sq. m.] situated in Neopolitan, Quezon City covered by T.C. T. No. 50473 of the Register
of Deeds of Quezon City, 240 [sq. m.] of which is being leased to the lessee; That for and in
consideration of the amount of NINETEEN THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED PESOS
(P19,200.00), Philippines Currency, monthly rental[,] the Lessor herein lease a portion of said
parcel of land with an area of 240 sq. m. to the lessee, subject to the following terms and
conditions: 1.
That the term of the lease is for [f]ive (5) years renewable
annually for a maximum of five (5) years from the execution of this contract;2.
The Lessee shall pay in advance the monthly rental for the land in the amount of ONE
HUNDRED FIFTEEN THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED PESOS (P115,200.00) Philippines
Currency equivalent to three (3) months deposit and three (3) months advance rental;
commencing November, 1997;3.
The [Lessee] shall issue postdated checks for
the succeeding rentals to the Lessor;4.
That in the event of failure to complete
the term of the lease, the lessee is still liable to answer for the rentals of the remaining period;5.
That all the improvement on the land leased shall automatically become the property of the
Lessor after the expiration of the term of the lease;6.
That the leased parcel of
land shall be devoted exclusively for the construction supply business of the [Lessee];[2]
xxx
xxx
xxx10.
Design specification needs final approval by the
Lessor[,] while structural improvements would have to conform to local government

specification, taxes on structural improvement will be for the account of the Lessee.[3]
In
December 1997, Garcia and respondent took possession of their respective leased portions. In
July 1999, Garcia pre-terminated his contract with petitioners. Respondent, on the other hand,
stayed on until June 8, 2000. According to petitioners, respondent stopped paying his monthly
rentals in December 1999. Shortly thereafter, petitioners claimed they discovered respondent
putting up improvements on another 120 sq. m. portion of their property which was never leased
to him nor to Garcia. They added he had also occupied Garcias portion immediately after the
latter left.[4] Petitioners asked respondent to pay his arrears and desist from continuing with his
construction but he took no heed. Because of respondents failure to meet petitioners demands,
they asked him to vacate the property. On January 27, 2000, they rescinded the lease contract.
On June 23, 2000, petitioners filed in the RTC of Quezon City a case[5] for recovery of
possession of real property against respondent. In the complaint, petitioners asked respondent
to pay the following: (1) rent from January 27, 2000 or from the time his lease contract was
rescinded until he vacated the property; (2) rent for Garcias portion from August 1999 until he
vacated it and (3) rent for the remaining 120 sq. m. which was not covered by his or Garcias
contract. Petitioners likewise insisted that respondent was liable to pay his arrears from
December 1999 until the expiration of his lease contract in August 2002. According to them, the
lease contract provided: in the event of [respondents] failure to complete the term of the lease,
[he would] still be liable to answer for the rentals of the remaining period.[6]
In his
answer with counterclaim, respondent denied petitioners accusations and alleged that it was
them who owed him money. According to him, he and petitioner Wilfredo Amoncio agreed to
construct five commercial buildings on petitioners property. One of the buildings was to go to
Garcia, two to petitioners and the last two to him. They also agreed that he was to finance the
construction and petitioners were to pay him for the two buildings assigned to them.
Respondent added he was to pay the rentals for five years and surrender the buildings (on his
leased portion) to petitioners after the lapse of said period. However, in June 2000, he vacated
the premises after he and petitioners could no longer settle things amicably. Respondent asked
to be paid: (1) P600,000 for the construction cost of the two buildings that went to petitioners[7];
(2) P300,000 as adjusted cost of the portion leased to him and (3) P10,000 as attorneys fees.
After trial, the RTC gave credence to respondents version and dismissed petitioners case for
lack of factual and legal basis. It also granted respondents counterclaim: WHEREFORE,
premises considered. Judgment is hereby rendered in favor of [respondent] and against
[petitioners] DISMISSING the latters complaint for lack of factual and legal basis.
On the
counterclaim, [petitioners] are hereby ordered to pay [respondent] as follows: a.
The sum of SIX HUNDRED THOUSAND (P600,000) PESOS representing the cost of the two
improvements constructed on the remaining portion of the [petitioners] lot. b.
The sum of THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P300,000) PESOS representing the
adjusted cost of the two improvements likewise constructed by [respondent][,] possession of
which was terminated two and a half years before the stipulated term of five (5) years. c.
The sum of TEN THOUSAND (P10,000) PESOS as and by way of attorneys fees. SO
ORDERED.[8] Petitioners elevated the case to the CA. There, petitioners argued that the RTC
erred in (1) denying their claim for payment of rentals both for the unexpired period of the lease
and for the portions of the property used by respondent which was not covered by his lease
contract and (2) granting respondents counterclaim although they did not allow the construction

of the buildings. Petitioners likewise contended the trial court disregarded the parol evidence
rule[9] which disallowed the court from looking into any other evidence relating to the agreement
of the parties outside the written contract between them.
In its assailed decision, the CA
affirmed the RTCs decision and dismissed petitioners appeal. It held that:(1) petitioners did
not adduce evidence to prove that respondent had actually occupied portions of their property
not covered by his contract;(2) petitioners could not insist that respondent pay the remaining
period under the contract since they were the ones who demanded that respondent vacate the
premises and(3) the rule on parol evidence could no longer apply after they failed to object to
respondents testimony (in the lower court) about their agreement regarding the construction of
the buildings.[10]
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied.[11]
Hence, this petition.[12]
In support of this petition, petitioners essentially argue that the
CA erred in ruling that: (1) they consented to the construction of the buildings by respondent; (2)
they waived their right to respondents assertion of facts that were not embodied in the lease
contract and (3) respondent was not a builder in bad faith.[13] PETITIONERS ALLOWED
THECONSTRUCTION OF THE BUILDINGS
Petitioners first argument necessitates a
review of the facts of the case which, as a general rule, is not the task of this Court. Under Rule
45 of the Rules, this Court shall not pass upon the findings of fact by lower courts unless they
ignored salient points that would otherwise affect the outcome of the case.[14] There is no
reason for us to overturn the factual conclusions of the lower courts.
Moreover, the
lower courts findings of fact were supported by the records of the case which indubitably
showed petitioners acquiescence to the construction of the buildings on their property.
Petitioners denial cannot negate the overwhelming proof that it was petitioner Wilfredo Amoncio
himself who secured the building permit for the project. He also required that all design
specifications were to be approved by him.[15] APPLICATION OF THEPAROL EVIDENCE
RULE
Rule 130, Section 9 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 9. Evidence of
written agreements. When the terms of the agreement have been reduced in writing, it is
considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and
their successors, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement.
xxx
xxx
xxx The so-called parol evidence forbids any addition to or
contradiction of the terms of a written instrument by testimony purporting to show that, at or
before the signing of the document, other terms were orally agreed on by the parties.[16] Under
the aforecited rule, the terms of the written contract are conclusive upon the parties and
evidence aliunde is inadmissible to vary an enforceable agreement embodied in the document.
However, the rule is not absolute and admits of exceptions: xxx
xxx
xxx
However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the written
agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading: (a)
An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or
imperfection in the written agreement; (b)
The failure of the written agreement to
express the true intent and agreement of the parties thereto; (c)
The validity of the
written agreement; or (d)
The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their
successors in interest after the execution of the written agreement. The term agreement shall
include wills. The first exception applies when the ambiguity or uncertainty is readily apparent
from reading the contract. The wordings are so defective that what the author of the document
intended to say cannot be deciphered.[17] It also covers cases where the parties commit a
mutual mistake of fact,[18] or where the document is manifestly incomplete as the parties do not

intend to exhibit the whole agreement but only to define some of its terms.[19] The second
exception includes instances where the contract is so obscure that the contractual intention of
the parties cannot be understood by mere inspection of the instrument.[20] Thus, extrinsic proof
of its subject matter, of the relation of the parties and of the circumstances surrounding them
when they entered into the contract may be received as evidence.[21] Under the third exception,
the parol evidence rule does not apply where the purpose of introducing the evidence is to show
the invalidity of the contract.[22] This includes cases where a party alleges that no written
contract ever existed, or the parties fail to agree on the terms of the contract, or there is no
consideration for such agreement.[23] The fourth exception involves a situation where the due
execution of the contract or document is in issue.[24] The present case does not appear to fall
under any of the given exceptions. However, a party to a contract may prove the existence of
any separate oral agreement as to any matter which is not inconsistent with its terms.[25] This
may be done if, from the circumstances of the case, the court believes that the document does
not convey entirely the whole of the parties transaction.[26] In this case, there are tell-tale signs
that petitioners and respondent had other agreements aside from those established by the lease
contract. And we find it difficult to ignore them. We agree with the trial court: [T]hat
[respondent], indeed, undertook the construction subject hereof, is not disputed by [petitioners].
[Respondent] testified that two units thereof were intended for [petitioners], another two units for
him and one for Garcia at the cost of P300,000.00 per unit or for a total budget of P1.5
million. Evidence further disclosed that the [b]uilding [p]ermit issued therefor by the Building
Official bore the signature of [petitioner] Wilfredo Amoncio the Court cannot be unmindful of
[petitioner Wilfredo Amoncios denial by any knowledge of the whole construction undertaken by
herein [respondent.] But it is evident that [petitioners] have chosen to adopt inconsistent
positions which, by applicable jurisprudence, [are] barred. Said the Court in this regard: The
doctrine of estoppel prohibits a party from assuming inconsistent position based on the principle
of election, and precludes him from repudiating an obligation voluntarily assumed after having
accepted benefits therefrom. To countenance such repudiation would be contrary to equity and
would put a premium on fraud and misrepresentation[27] Moreover, petitioners also failed to
make a timely objection against respondents assertion of their prior agreement on the
construction of the buildings. Where a party entitled to the benefit of the parol evidence rule
allows such evidence to be received without objection, he cannot, after the trial has closed and
the case has been decided against him, invoke the rule in order to secure a reversal of the
judgment.[28] Hence, by failing to object to respondents testimony in the trial court, petitioners
waived the protection of the parol evidence rule.[29] PAYMENT OF RENTAL
Petitioners
demand the payment of the following: (1) rent from December 19, 1999 to June 8, 2000;[30] (2)
rent for the unexpired period of the lease or until August 2002[31] and (3) rent corresponding to
the portions of the property used by respondent which, according to petitioners, were not
covered by his lease contract.[32] Pursuant to the lease agreement, respondent paid three
months advance and three months deposit (at the inception of the lease contract), in effect
already settling his rentals for six months from December 1999 to June 8, 2000. The CA
correctly ruled:
While [respondent] stopped paying rentals in December 1999 and
left before June 8, 2000, a period covering six (6) months, [respondent], nonetheless, had
already paid [petitioners] the amount equivalent to six (6) months rentals [advance payment
equivalent to three (3) monthly rentals plus deposit equivalent to [another] three (3) monthly

rentals][33] (emphasis supplied)

Regarding petitioners second claim (rent for the
unexpired period of lease), we agree with the lower courts that they (petitioners) are not entitled
to it. Without doubt, petitioners already benefited immensely from the construction of the five
buildings on their property. The amount of their claim is a pittance compared to the increase in
value of their property over the years. It would unjustly enrich them if we were to rule in their
favor considering that they did not spend a single centavo for the construction of the buildings. It
was respondent who financed the entire project which, however, was taken over completely by
petitioners. As a rule, the contract is the law between the parties that must be enforced in sensu
strictione. However, it cannot be done under the circumstances of this case. To do so would
result in a patently unjust juridical situation. We, as a court not only of justice but of equity as
well, may exercise our equitas jurisdictio to refine the rough edges of the rule and avoid
injustice.[34] Lastly, petitioners claim for rental payment for the portions (not covered by
respondents lease contract) must be dismissed. This claim was never substantiated.
PETITIONERS LIABILITY TO RESPONDENT
What remains to be resolved is
petitioners liability to respondent, as held by both the RTC and the CA. Were petitioners indeed
liable to respondent for the cost of the buildings constructed on their property? Yes.
Since
the trial court allowed respondents testimony as evidence of the parties prior agreement
(regarding the construction of the buildings and the cost thereof), petitioners should pay
respondent. Petitioners never disputed the construction of the two buildings given to them. If
one of the contracting parties derived some benefit but did not give anything for it to the other, it
is only fair that he should return the amount by which he was unjustly enriched.[35] Equity
dictates that petitioners be held liable for the expenses incurred by respondent in constructing
the buildings that went to them. No man ought to be enriched by anothers injury.[36] Nemo ex
alterius incommonde debet lecupletari.
Finally, following our ruling that petitioners knew of
the construction of the buildings, any discussion on the issue of whether respondent was a
builder in bad faith is no longer necessary.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 79341 is hereby AFFIRMED.
Treble costs against
petitioners.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------13. SEAOIL PETROLEUM CORPORATION, Petitioner, - versus -AUTOCORP GROUP and
PAUL Y. RODRIGUEZ, Respondents. G.R. No. 164326 October 17, 2008 DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated May
20, 2004 in CA-G.R. CV No. 72193, which had affirmed in toto the Decision[2] of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 157, dated September 10, 2001 in Civil Case No. 64943.
The factual antecedents, as summarized by the CA, are as follows: On September 24, 1994,
defendant-appellant Seaoil Petroleum Corporation (Seaoil, for brevity) purchased one unit of
ROBEX 200 LC Excavator, Model 1994 from plaintiff-appellee Autocorp Group (Autocorp for
short). The original cost of the unit was P2,500,000.00 but was increased to P3,112,519.94
because it was paid in 12 monthly installments up to September 30, 1995. The sales agreement
was embodied in the Vehicle Sales Invoice No. A-0209 and Vehicle Sales Confirmation No. 258.
Both documents were signed by Francis Yu (Yu for short), president of Seaoil, on behalf of said
corporation. Furthermore, it was agreed that despite delivery of the excavator, ownership
thereof was to remain with Autocorp until the obligation is fully settled. In this light, Seaoils

contractor, Romeo Valera, issued 12 postdated checks. However, Autocorp refused to accept
the checks because they were not under Seaoils name. Hence, Yu, on behalf of Seaoil, signed
and issued 12 postdated checks for P259,376.62 each with Autocorp as payee. The excavator
was subsequently delivered on September 26, 1994 by Autocorp and was received by Seaoil in
its depot in Batangas. The relationship started to turn sour when the first check bounced.
However, it was remedied when Seaoil replaced it with a good check. The second check
likewise was also good when presented for payment. However, the remaining 10 checks were
not honored by the bank since Seaoil requested that payment be stopped. It was downhill from
thereon. Despite repeated demands, Seaoil refused to pay the remaining balance of
P2,593,766.20. Hence, on January 24, 1995, Autocorp filed a complaint for recovery of personal
property with damages and replevin in the Regional Trial Court of Pasig. The trial court ruled for
Autocorp. Hence, this appeal. Seaoil, on the other hand, alleges that the transaction is not as
simple as described above. It claims that Seaoil and Autocorp were only utilized as conduits to
settle the obligation of one foreign entity named Uniline Asia (herein referred to as Uniline), in
favor of another foreign entity, Focus Point International, Incorporated (Focus for short). Paul
Rodriguez (Rodriguez for brevity) is a stockholder and director of Autocorp. He is also the owner
of Uniline. On the other hand, Yu is the president and stockholder of Seaoil and is at the same
time owner of Focus. Allegedly, Uniline chartered MV Asia Property (sic) in the amount of
$315,711.71 from its owner Focus. Uniline was not able to settle the said amount. Hence,
Uniline, through Rodriguez, proposed to settle the obligation through conveyance of vehicles
and heavy equipment. Consequently, four units of Tatamobile pick-up trucks procured from
Autocorp were conveyed to Focus as partial payment. The excavator in controversy was
allegedly one part of the vehicles conveyed to Focus. Seaoil claims that Rodriguez initially
issued 12 postdated checks in favor of Autocorp as payment for the excavator. However, due to
the fact that it was company policy for Autocorp not to honor postdated checks issued by its own
directors, Rodriguez requested Yu to issue 12 PBCOM postdated checks in favor of Autocorp. In
turn, said checks would be funded by the corresponding 12 Monte de Piedad postdated checks
issued by Rodriguez. These Monte de Piedad checks were postdated three days prior to the
maturity of the PBCOM checks. Seaoil claims that Rodriguez issued a stop payment order on
the ten checks thus constraining the former to also order a stop payment order on the PBCOM
checks. In short, Seaoil claims that the real transaction is that Uniline, through Rodriguez, owed
money to Focus. In lieu of payment, Uniline instead agreed to convey the excavator to Focus.
This was to be paid by checks issued by Seaoil but which in turn were to be funded by checks
issued by Uniline. x x x[3] As narrated above, respondent Autocorp filed a Complaint for
Recovery of Personal Property with Damages and Replevin[4] against Seaoil before the RTC of
Pasig City. In its September 10, 2001 Decision, the RTC ruled that the transaction between
Autocorp and Seaoil was a simple contract of sale payable in installments.[5] It also held that
the obligation to pay plaintiff the remainder of the purchase price of the excavator solely
devolves on Seaoil. Paul Rodriguez, not being a party to the sale of the excavator, could not be
held liable therefor. The decretal portion of the trial courts Decision reads, thus: WHEREFORE,
judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff Autocorp Group and against defendant Seaoil
Petroleum Corporation which is hereby directed to pay plaintiff: P2,389,179.23
plus 3% interest from the time of judicial demand until full payment; and 25% of
the total amount due as attorneys fees and cost of litigation. The third-party complaint filed by

defendant Seaoil Petroleum Corporation against third-party defendant Paul Rodriguez is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED. Seaoil filed a Petition for Review before the CA.
In its assailed Decision, the CA dismissed the petition and affirmed the RTCs Decision in toto.
[6] It held that the transaction between Yu and Rodriguez was merely verbal. This cannot alter
the sales contract between Seaoil and Autocorp as this will run counter to the parol evidence
rule which prohibits the introduction of oral and parol evidence to modify the terms of the
contract. The claim that it falls under the exceptions to the parol evidence rule has not been
sufficiently proven. Moreover, it held that Autocorps separate corporate personality cannot be
disregarded and the veil of corporate fiction pierced. Seaoil was not able to show that Autocorp
was merely an alter ego of Uniline or that both corporations were utilized to perpetrate a fraud.
Lastly, it held that the RTC was correct in dismissing the third-party complaint since it did not
arise out of the same transaction on which the plaintiffs claim is based, or that the third partys
claim, although arising out of another transaction, is connected to the plaintiffs claim. Besides,
the CA said, such claim may be enforced in a separate action. Seaoil now comes before this
Court in a Petition for Review raising the following issues: I Whether or not the Court of Appeals
erred in partially applying the parol evidence rule to prove only some terms contained in one
portion of the document but disregarded the rule with respect to another but substantial portion
or entry also contained in the same document which should have proven the true nature of the
transaction involved. II Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred in its judgment based
on misapprehension of facts when it declared absence of facts which are contradicted by
presence of evidence on record. III Whether or not the dismissal of the third-party complaint
would have the legal effect of res judicata as would unjustly preclude petitioner from enforcing
its claim against respondent Rodriguez (third-party defendant) in a separate action. IV Whether
or not, given the facts in evidence, the lower courts should have pierced the corporate veil. The
Petition lacks merit. We sustain the ruling of the CA. We find no fault in the trial courts
appreciation of the facts of this case. The findings of fact of the trial court are conclusive upon
this Court, especially when affirmed by the CA. None of the exceptions to this well-settled rule
has been shown to exist in this case. Petitioner does not question the validity of the vehicle
sales invoice but merely argues that the same does not reflect the true agreement of the parties.
However, petitioner only had its bare testimony to back up the alleged arrangement with
Rodriguez. The Monte de Piedad checks the supposedly clear and obvious link[7] between
the documentary evidence and the true transaction between the parties are equivocal at best.
There is nothing in those checks to establish such link. Rodriguez denies that there is such an
agreement. Unsubstantiated testimony, offered as proof of verbal agreements which tends to
vary the terms of a written agreement, is inadmissible under the parol evidence rule.[8] Rule
130, Section 9 of the Revised Rules on Evidence embodies the parol evidence rule and states:
SEC. 9. Evidence of written agreements.When the terms of an agreement have been reduced
to writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between
the parties and their successors-in-interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents
of the written agreement.
However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or
add to the terms of the written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading:
(a) An
intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement;
(b) The failure of
the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the parties thereto;
(c)
The validity of the written agreement; or
(d) The existence of other terms agreed to by

the parties or their successors-in-interest after the execution of the written agreement. The term
"agreement" includes wills. The parol evidence rule forbids any addition to, or contradiction of,
the terms of a written agreement by testimony or other evidence purporting to show that
different terms were agreed upon by the parties, varying the purport of the written
contract.[9] This principle notwithstanding, petitioner would have the Court rule that this case
falls within the exceptions, particularly that the written agreement failed to express the true
intent and agreement of the parties. This argument is untenable. Although parol evidence is
admissible to explain the meaning of a contract, it cannot serve the purpose of incorporating into
the contract additional contemporaneous conditions which are not mentioned at all in the writing
unless there has been fraud or mistake.[10] Evidence of a prior or contemporaneous verbal
agreement is generally not admissible to vary, contradict or defeat the operation of a valid
contract.[11] The Vehicle Sales Invoice[12] is the best evidence of the transaction. A sales
invoice is a commercial document. Commercial documents or papers are those used by
merchants or businessmen to promote or facilitate trade or credit transactions.[13] Business
forms, e.g., order slip, delivery charge invoice and the like, are commonly recognized in ordinary
commercial transactions as valid between the parties and, at the very least, they serve as an
acknowledgment that a business transaction has in fact transpired.[14] These documents are
not mere scraps of paper bereft of probative value, but vital pieces of evidence of commercial
transactions. They are written memorials of the details of the consummation of contracts.[15]
The terms of the subject sales invoice are clear. They show that Autocorp sold to Seaoil one unit
Robex 200 LC Excavator paid for by checks issued by one Romeo Valera. This does not,
however, change the fact that Seaoil Petroleum Corporation, as represented by Yu, is the
customer or buyer. The moment a party affixes his or her signature thereon, he or she is bound
by all the terms stipulated therein and is subject to all the legal obligations that may arise from
their breach.[16] Oral testimony on the alleged conditions, coming from a party who has an
interest in the outcome of the case, depending exclusively on human memory, is not as reliable
as written or documentary evidence.[17] Hence, petitioners contention that the document falls
within the exception to the parol evidence rule is untenable. The exception obtains only where
the written contract is so ambiguous or obscure in terms that the contractual intention of the
parties cannot be understood from a mere reading of the instrument. In such a case, extrinsic
evidence of the subject matter of the contract, of the relations of the parties to each other, and of
the facts and circumstances surrounding them when they entered into the contract may be
received to enable the court to make a proper interpretation of the instrument.[18] Even
assuming there is a shred of truth to petitioners contention, the same cannot be made a basis
for holding respondents liable therefor. As pointed out by the CA, Rodriguez is a person
separate and independent from Autocorp. Whatever obligations Rodriguez contracted cannot be
attributed to Autocorp[19] and vice versa. In fact, the obligation that petitioner proffers as its
defense under the Lease Purchase Agreement was not even incurred by Rodriguez or by
Autocorp but by Uniline. The Lease Purchase Agreement[20] clearly shows that the parties
thereto are two corporations not parties to this case: Focus Point and Uniline. Under this Lease
Purchase Agreement, it is Uniline, as lessee/purchaser, and not Rodriguez, that incurred the
debt to Focus Point. The obligation of Uniline to Focus Point arose out of a transaction
completely different from the subject of the instant case. It is settled that a corporation has a
personality separate and distinct from its individual stockholders or members, and is not

affected by the personal rights, obligations and transactions of the latter.[21] The corporation
may not be held liable for the obligations of the persons composing it, and neither can its
stockholders be held liable for its obligation.[22] Of course, this Court has recognized instances
when the corporations separate personality may be disregarded. However, we have also held
that the same may only be done in cases where the corporate vehicle is being used to defeat
public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime.[23] Moreover, the wrongdoing
must be clearly and convincingly established. It cannot be presumed.[24] To reiterate, the
transaction under the Vehicle Sales Invoice is separate and distinct from that under the Lease
Purchase Agreement. In the former, it is Seaoil that owes Autocorp, while in the latter, Uniline
incurred obligations to Focus. There was never any allegation, much less any evidence, that
Autocorp was merely an alter ego of Uniline, or that the two corporations separate personalities
were being used as a means to perpetrate fraud or wrongdoing. Moreover, Rodriguez, as
stockholder and director of Uniline, cannot be held personally liable for the debts of the
corporation, which has a separate legal personality of its own. While Section 31 of the
Corporation Code[25] lays down the exceptions to the rule, the same does not apply in this
case. Section 31 makes a director personally liable for corporate debts if he willfully and
knowingly votes for or assents to patently unlawful acts of the corporation. Section 31 also
makes a director personally liable if he is guilty of gross negligence or bad faith in directing the
affairs of the corporation.[26] The bad faith or wrongdoing of the director must be established
clearly and convincingly. Bad faith is never presumed.[27] The burden of proving bad faith or
wrongdoing on the part of Rodriguez was, on petitioner, a burden which it failed to discharge.
Thus, it was proper for the trial court to have dismissed the third-party complaint against
Rodriguez on the ground that he was not a party to the sale of the excavator. Rule 6, Section 11
of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure defines a third-party complaint as a claim that a
defending party may, with leave of court, file against a person not a party to the action, called
the third-party defendant, for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief, in respect
of his opponents claim. The purpose of the rule is to permit a defendant to assert an
independent claim against a third party which he, otherwise, would assert in another action, thus
preventing multiplicity of suits.[28] Had it not been for the rule, the claim could have been filed
separately from the original complaint.[29] Petitioners claim against Rodriguez was fully
ventilated in the proceedings before the trial court, tried and decided on its merits. The trial
courts ruling operates as res judicata against another suit involving the same parties and same
cause of action. This is rightly so because the trial court found that Rodriguez was not a party to
the sale of the excavator. On the other hand, petitioner Seaoils liability has been successfully
established by respondent. A last point. We reject Seaoils claim that the ownership of the
subject excavator, having been legally and completely transferred to Focus Point International,
Inc., cannot be subject of replevin and plaintiff [herein respondent Autocorp] is not legally
entitled to any writ of replevin.[30] The claim is negated by the sales invoice which clearly
states that [u]ntil after the vehicle is fully paid inclusive of bank clearing time, it remains the
property of Autocorp Group which reserves the right to take possession of said vehicle at any
time and place without prior notice.[31] Considering, first, that Focus Point was not a party to
the sale of the excavator and, second, that Seaoil indeed failed to pay for the excavator in full,
the same still rightfully belongs to Autocorp. Additionally, as the trial court found, Seaoil had
already assigned the same to its contractor for the construction of its depot in Batangas.[32]

Hence, Seaoil has already enjoyed the benefit of the transaction even as it has not complied
with its obligation. It cannot be permitted to unjustly enrich itself at the expense of another.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Petition is hereby DENIED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 20, 2004 in CA-G.R. CV No. 72193 is AFFIRMED.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------14. ADELA G. RAYMUNDO, EDGARDO R. RAYMUNDO, LOURDES R. RAYMUNDO,
TERESITA N. RAYMUNDO, EVELYN R. SANTOS, ZENAIDA N. RAYMUNDO, LUIS N.
RAYMUNDO, JR. and LUCITA R. DELOS REYES, Petitioners, - versus - ERNESTO
LUNARIA, ROSALINDA RAMOS and HELEN MENDOZA, Respondents.
G.R. No. 171036
October 17, 2008DECISION QUISUMBING, J.:
Assailed in this
petition for review are the Court of Appeals Decision[1] dated October 10, 2005 and the
Resolution[2] dated January 10, 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No. 75593.
The facts in this case are as follows:
Sometime in May 1996, petitioners approached respondent Lunaria to help them find a buyer
for their property situated at Marilao, Bulacan with an area of 12,126 square meters for the
amount of P60,630,000. Respondent Lunaria was promised a 5% agents commission in the
event that he finds a buyer. After respondents found a buyer, Cecilio Hipolito, an Exclusive
Authority to Sell[3] was executed embodying the agreement made by the parties. After the
corresponding Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property[4] was registered in the Registry of
Deeds, a copy thereof was given to the Far East Bank and Trust Co., which was then holding in
escrow the amount of P50,000,000 to be disbursed or paid against the total consideration or
price of the property.
On February 14, 1997, Ceferino G. Raymundo, one of the co-owners, advised
respondents to go to the bank to receive the amount of P1,196,000 as partial payment of their
total commission. Also, respondents were instructed to return after seven days to get the
balance of the commission due them.
On February 21, 1997, respondents returned to the bank. However, the check covering the
balance of their commission was already given by the bank manager to Lourdes R. Raymundo,
the representative of the petitioners. Respondents tried to get the check from the petitioners,
however, they were told that there is nothing more due them by way of commission as they
have already divided and distributed the balance of the commissions among their nephews and
nieces.
For their part, petitioners counter that there was a subsequent verbal agreement entered into by
the parties after the execution of the written agreement. Said verbal agreement provides that the
5% agents commission shall be divided as follows: 2/5 for the agents, 2/5 for Lourdes
Raymundo, and 1/5 for the buyer, Hipolito. The share given to Lourdes Raymundo shall be in
consideration for the help she would extend in the processing of documents of sale of the
property, the payment of the capital gains tax to the Bureau of Internal Revenue and in securing
an order from the court. The 1/5 commission given to Hipolito, on the other hand, will be used
by him for the payment of realty taxes.
Hence, for failure of the respondents to receive the balance of their agents commission, they
filed an action for the collection of a sum of money before the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela
City, Branch 172. On January 22, 2002, the trial court rendered a Decision[5] in favor of the

respondents. The dispositive portion of said decision reads:WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby

rendered as follows:
1) Ordering the defendants, jointly and severally, to pay the
plaintiffs the amount of P1,834,900.00, representing the unpaid commission, plus interest
thereon at the legal rate from the filing of this case until fully paid;
2) Ordering the
defendants to, jointly and severally, pay the plaintiffs the amount of P200,000.00 as moral
damages and the amount of P100,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
3) Ordering the
defendants [to], jointly and severally, pay the plaintiffs the amount of P150,000.00 as attorneys
fees, plus the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.[6]
Aggrieved, petitioners appealed. In a
Decision dated October 10, 2005, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court
with the modification that the amount of moral and exemplary damages awarded to respondents
shall be reduced. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision dated January 22, 2002 is affirmed, subject to the
modification that the award of moral damages is reduced to P50,000.00 and exemplary
damages to P25,000.00.SO ORDERED.[7]
On October 28, 2005, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration.[8] However, it was denied
in a Resolution dated January 10, 2006. Hence, the instant petition raising the following issues:
I.THE HONORABLE COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN APPLYING THE PAROLE EVIDENCE
RULE IN THIS CASE (DECISION, PAGE 7, PARAGRAPH 1). THIS PRINCIPLE HAS NO
APPLICATION TO THE FACTS OF THE INSTANT CASE.
II.
FURTHER, IT ERRED IN REQUIRING, ALBEIT IMPLICITLY, THE PETITIONERS TO
ESTABLISH THE VERBAL AGREEMENT MODIFYING THE EARLIER WRITTEN AGREEMENT
(THE EXCLUSIVE AUTHORITY TO SELL) BY MORE THAN A PREPONDERANCE OF
EVIDENCE (DECISION, PAGE 8). THIS IS PLAINLY CONTRARY TO LAW THAT MERELY
REQUIRES PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE IN CIVIL CASES.III.FINALLY, EVEN
CONCEDING FOR THE SAKE OF ARGUMENT THAT PETITIONERS STILL OWE THE
RESPONDENTS THE BALANCE OF THEIR COMMISSION, THE HONORABLE COURT
ERRED IN RULING THE PETITIONERS ARE EACH JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY [LIABLE]
FOR THE PAYMENT OF THE ENTIRE BROKERS FEES. THIS RULING HAS NO LEGAL
BASIS AND IS CONTRARY TO ART. 1207 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE.[9]Plainly stated, the
issues for resolution are: Did the Court of Appeals err (1) in applying the parol evidence rule; (2)
in requiring petitioners to establish their case by more than a preponderance of evidence; and
(3) in holding petitioners jointly and severally liable for the payment of the entire brokers fees?
Anent the first issue, petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred in applying the parol
evidence rule to the facts of the case because the verbal agreement was entered into
subsequent to the written agreement. Further, they aver that there is no rule that requires an
agreement modifying an earlier agreement to be in the same form as the earlier agreement in
order for such modification or amendment to be valid.
Conversely, respondents argue that the Court of Appeals did not apply the parol evidence rule in
this case. Although the appellate court stated and emphasized the general legal principle and
rule on parol evidence, it did not apply the parol evidence rule with regard to the evidence
adduced by the petitioners.
We rule for the respondents. To begin with, we agree with petitioners claim that the parol
evidence rule does not apply to the facts of this case. First, the parol evidence rule forbids any
addition to or contradiction of the terms of a written instrument by testimony or other evidence

purporting to show that, at or before the execution of the parties written agreement, other or
different terms were agreed upon by the parties, varying the purport of the written contract.[10]
Notably, the claimed verbal agreement was agreed upon not prior to but subsequent to the
written agreement. Second, the validity of the written agreement is not the matter which is being
put in issue here. What is questioned is the validity of the claim that a subsequent verbal
agreement was agreed upon by the parties after the execution of the written agreement which
substantially modified their earlier written agreement.
Nonetheless, even if we apply the parol evidence rule in this case, the evidence presented by
the petitioners fell short in proving that a subsequent verbal agreement was in fact entered into
by the parties. We subscribe to the findings of both the trial court and the appellate court that
the evidence presented by petitioners did not establish the existence of the alleged subsequent
verbal agreement. As pointed out by the trial court:
Note that no written evidence was presented by the defendants to show that the plaintiffs
[herein respondents] agreed to the above-sharing of the commission. The fact is that the
plaintiffs are denying having ever entered into such sharing agreement. For if the plaintiffs as
sales agents indeed agreed to share the commission they are entitled to receive by virtue of the
Exclusive Authority to Sell with Lourdes G. Raymundo and Hipolito, it passes understanding
why no written agreement to that effect was ever made. The absence of such written agreement
is mute but telling testimony that no such sharing arrangement was ever made.[11]As to the
second issue, petitioners contend that the appellate court erred in requiring them to prove the
existence of the subsequent verbal agreement by more than a mere preponderance of evidence
since no rule of evidence requires them to do so. In support of this allegation, petitioners
presented petitioner Lourdes Raymundo who testified that she was given 2/5 share of the
commission pursuant to the verbal sharing scheme because she took care of the payment of
the capital gains tax, the preparation of the documents of sale and of securing an authority from
the court to sell the property.
For their part, respondents counter that the appellate court did not require petitioners to prove
the existence of the subsequent oral agreement by more than a mere preponderance of
evidence. What the appellate court said is that the petitioners failed to prove and establish the
alleged subsequent verbal agreement even by mere preponderance of evidence.Petitioners
abovecited allegation has no merit. By preponderance of evidence is meant that the evidence
as a whole adduced by one side is superior to that of the other.[12] It refers to the weight, credit
and value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually considered to be synonymous
with the term greater weight of evidence or greater weight of the credible evidence. It is
evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in
opposition thereto.[13]
Both the appellate court and trial court ruled that the evidence presented by the petitioners is
not sufficient to support their allegation that a subsequent verbal agreement was entered into by
the parties. In fact, both courts correctly observed that if Lourdes Raymundo was in reality
offered the 2/5 share of the agents commission for the purpose of assisting respondent Lunaria
in the documentation requirement, then why did the petitioners not present any written court
order on her authority, tax receipt or sales document to support her self-serving testimony?
Moreover, even the worksheet allegedly reflecting the commission sharing was unilaterally
prepared by petitioner Lourdes Raymundo without any showing that respondents participated in

the preparation thereof or gave their assent thereto. Even the alleged payment of 1/5 of the
commission to the buyer to be used in the payment of the realty taxes cannot be given credence
since the payment of realty taxes is the obligation of the owners, and not the buyer. Lastly, if the
said sharing agreement was entered into pursuant to the wishes of the buyer, then he should
have been presented as witness to corroborate the claim of the petitioners. However, he was
not.
As to the third issue, petitioners contend that the appellate court erred in holding that the
petitioners were each jointly and severally liable for the payment of the brokers fees. They
contend that the Civil Code provides that unless the parties have expressly agreed to be jointly
and severally liable for the entire brokers fees, each of the petitioners should only be held liable
to the extent of their pro-indiviso share in the property sold.
For their part, respondents argue that the appellate court did not err in affirming the joint and
several liability of the petitioners. They aver that if there was error on the part of the trial court, it
was not raised or assigned as error by petitioners in their appeal. It was also not included in the
Statement of Issues in their brief which they submitted for resolution by the Court of Appeals. In
fact, the same was never mentioned, much less questioned, by petitioners in their brief.
On this score, we agree with respondents. The general rule is that once an issue has been
adjudicated in a valid final judgment of a competent court, it can no longer be controverted anew
and should be finally laid to rest.[14] In this case, petitioners failed to address the issue on their
solidary liability when they appealed to the Court of Appeals. They are now estopped to
question that ruling. As to them, the issue on their liability is already valid and binding.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated October 10, 2005
and the Resolution dated January 10, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 75593
are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.SO ORDERED.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------15. SOLEDAD LEONOR PEA SUATENGCO and ANTONIO ESTEBAN SUATENGCO,
Complainants, - versus - CARMENCITA O. REYES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 162729. December 17, 2008
D
E C I S I O N LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This resolves the petition for review
on certiorari seeking the modification of the Decision[1] dated October 29, 2003 and the
Resolution[2] dated March 10, 2004 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 53185.
The assailed decision affirmed with modification the Decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Marinduque, Branch 30 in Civil Case No. 95-4 in an action for collection of a sum of
money with damages commenced by herein respondent, Carmencita O. Reyes against herein
petitioners, spouses Soledad Leonor Pea Suatengco (also known as Sylvia Pea Suatengco)
and Antonio Esteban Suatengco. The essential facts of the case, as recounted by the trial court,
are as follows: This is an action for Sum of Money with Damages filed by Carmencita O. Reyes
against defendants [petitioners] Spouses Soledad Leonor Pea and Antonio Esteban
Suatengco, wherein plaintiff (respondent) claimed that sometime in the first quarter of 1994,
defendant Sylvia (Soledad) approached her for the purpose of borrowing a sum of money in
order to pay her obligation to Philippine Phosphate Fertilizer Corporation (Philphos for brevity).
On May 31, 1994, plaintiff paid Philphos the amount of P1,336,313.00 and by reason thereof
defendants Spouses Sylvia (Soledad) and Antonio executed on June 24, 1994 a Promissory
Note binding themselves jointly and severally to pay plaintiff the said amount in 31 monthly

installments beginning June 30, 1994. Of the amount, however, only one (1) payment in the
amount of P15,000.00 on July 27, 1994 have been made by defendants. That pursuant to a
specific clause in the Promissory Note, defendants have unequivocally waived the necessity of
demand to be made upon them to pay as well as a Notice of Dishonor and presentation with
acceleration clause. As of March 31, 1995 defendants owe plaintiff P1,321,313.00 exclusive of
interest, other charges which is already due and demandable but remains unpaid, hence this
collection suit with prayer for moral damages and attorneys fees. A perusal of the record
showed that notwithstanding the leniency graciously observed by this court in giving defendants
several extensions of time to file their answer with responsive pleading, they failed to do the
same thus, upon motion of plaintiffs counsel, defendants were declared as in default on
October 27, 1995 and the ex-parte reception of plaintiffs evidence was delegated to the Clerk of
Court. At the ex-parte hearing, ATTY. EDMUNDO O. REYES, JR., a lawyer by profession
connected with the Siguion Reyna, Montecillo and Ongsiako Law Offices, testified that he is the
attorney-in-fact of his mother Congresswoman Carmencita O. Reyes, herein plaintiff, to enter
into and execute, among other acts, any agreement with the defendant Soledad Leonor Pea
Suatengco to collect the amount of around P1.4 MILLION and to hold the same in trust for her
as shown by a Special Power of Attorney marked Exhibits A to A-2. Confronted with a document
styled as Promissory Note dated June 24, 1994 (Exhibit B), he identified the signatures of
Soledad Pea Suatengco (also known as Sylvia Pea Suatengco) (Exhs. B-1, B-5, B-10 and B13), Antonio Suatengco (Exhs. B-2, B-6, B-11 and B-14), Atty. Domingo Ganuelas (Exhs. B-3, B7, B-9 and B-15) and his own signatures (Exhs. B-4, B-8, B-12 and B-16). That their signatures
were signed in his presence on June 24, 1994 at the Siguion Reyna, Montecillo and Ongsiako
Law Offices. Atty. Domingo Ganuelas was there at the time to assist and advise defendants
before executing the Promissory Note. He explained that defendants own and manage
Goldfields Business Development Corporation. Of the P1,336,313.00 paid by plaintiff to
Philphos on May 31, 1994, which defendants jointly and severally assumed to pay plaintiff under
the Promissory Note (Exh. B), only P15,000.00 had been paid by them thereby leaving an
outstanding balance of P1,321,313.00 plus 12% interest per annum computed from May 31,
1994 and attorneys fees equivalent to 20% of defendants total outstanding balance inclusive of
interest, which he believes to be reasonable based on experience considering that the case will
be prosecuted outside Metro Manila and the long distance would entail quite an amount of travel
for retained counsel. To corroborate the testimony of Atty. Edmundo O. Reyes, Jr. and to prove
the obligation due as well as the damages prayed for, plaintiff Congresswoman CARMENCITA
O. REYES representative of the lone district of Marinduque testified that she has been a
member of Congress since 1978 until it was abolished in 1986 but after which re-elected in
1987, 1992 and 1995. She identified her signature on Exhibit A Special Power of Attorney
(Exhs. A-1 and A-2) as well as her signature on the verification portion of her complaint (page 8,
Record) and affirmed that she had caused the preparation of the same and that the contents
thereof are true and correct. That on May 31, 1994, she paid Philphos the amount of
P1,336,313.00 representing defendants obligation with Philphos. In return for the sum she had
advanced, defendants agreed to issue the Promissory Note (Exh. B) for the total amount of
indebtedness but out of the said amount of P1,336,313.00 only P15,000.00 had been paid by
them. As a result, her feeling was hurt and wounded. She felt degraded because after helping
them to get out of their indebtedness without asking for any interest, it would seem that they lost

interest in paying their obligations. She was even more deeply hurt when she found out that the
sheriff of this court who went to their place to take some actions regarding this case, was even
threatened exposing her constituent to such danger. Said amount is substantial enough to help
her constituents because as much as possible she would not deny them everytime they come to
her since it would really be a matter of life and death for them.[4] As can be gleaned from the
above narration, the RTC declared the petitioners in default for failure to file their Answer to the
complaint. Thereafter, trial ex parte was delegated to the Clerk of Court to receive respondents
evidence. Testimonial and documentary evidence were all admitted. On November 29, 1995,
the lower court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff and against defendants ordering
defendants: a) To pay plaintiff actual damages in the amount of P1,321,313.00 plus interest at
12% per annum from May 31, 1994 representing the total outstanding balance of defendants
indebtedness to plaintiff by virtue of the Promissory Note dated June 24, 1994. b) To pay
plaintiff moral damages in the amount of P1,000,000.00; c) To pay plaintiff attorneys fees in
the amount of 20% of the sum collected; and d) To pay costs of suit. SO ORDERED.[5] In
their appeal to the CA, petitioners did not question the amount of the judgment debt for which
they were held liable but limited the issue to the award of attorneys fees. On October 29,
2003, the CA promulgated a decision affirming with modification the trial courts decision. It
upheld the award of attorneys fees equivalent to 20% of the balance of petitioners obligation
and modified the decision of the trial court by lowering the award of moral damages from One
Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) to Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00). Dispositively,
the decision reads: WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of Branch 30, of the Regional Trial
Court of Marinduque in Civil Case No. 95-4 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The
defendant-appellants are ordered to pay plaintiff-appellee moral damages in the amount of
P200,000.00. [6] Petitioners moved for the reconsideration of the CAs decision, but the same
was denied by the CA in its Resolution dated March 10, 2004. Aggrieved, petitioners elevated
the case to this Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
submitting thusly 1. The Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion and committed
a mistake of law in awarding 20% attorneys fees contrary to the 5% as stipulated in the
promissory note, Exhibit B. 2. The Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion and
committed a mistake of law in not reducing the award of the 12% penalty interest. Clearly from
the foregoing formulation of the issues in the present petition, petitioners do not dispute the
amount of their indebtedness. They only seek a modification of the decision of the CA insofar
as it upheld the RTCs award of attorneys fees equivalent to 20% of their total
indebtedness/obligation and the 12% per annum interest of the said obligation. In support of
their contention that the award of attorneys fees was illegal or erroneous, petitioners point to
the unqualified rate of 5% stipulated in the promissory note as the stipulated amount which
was way lower than the 20% as awarded by the RTC. Petitioners cited the case of Chua v.
Court of Appeals[7] where the Court ruled that is not the province of the court to alter a contract
by construction or to make a new contract for the parties; its duty is confined to the
interpretation of the one which they have made for themselves, without regard to its wisdom or
folly, as the court cannot supply material stipulations or read into contract words which it does
not contain. The testimony of Atty. Edmundo O. Reyes that the attorneys fees should be 20%
of the outstanding balance cannot prevail over the 5% stipulated in the promissory note. Citing

the case of Baas v. Asia Pacific Finance Corporation,[8] petitioners maintained that oral
evidence cannot prevail over the written agreement of the parties. On the other hand,
respondent contend that petitioners have already waived their rights to question the award for
attorneys fees because in their Appellants Brief filed before the CA, they stated that the
stipulated attorneys fees was 20% (not 5%) of the total balance of the outstanding
indebtedness. Respondent adds that despite such stipulation, said attorneys fees are subject to
judicial control. According to respondent it was not surprising for the CA to focus on the issue of
reasonableness of the said attorneys fees because petitioners line of argument was focused on
the same. The petition is partly meritorious. The fifth paragraph of the Promissory Note
executed by petitioners in favor of respondent undeniably carried a stipulation for attorneys fees
and interest in case of the latters default in the payment of any installment due. It specifically
provided that: Failure on the part of Sylvia and/or Antonio Suatengco to pay any installment due
will render the entire unpaid balance immediately, due and demandable and Cong. Reyes
becomes entitled not only for the unpaid balance but also for 12% interest per annum of the
outstanding balance of P1,336,313.00 from May 31, 1994 until fully paid plus attorneys fees
equivalent to 5% of the total outstanding indebtedness. Strictly speaking, the attorneys fees
herein litigated are in the nature of liquidated damages and not the attorneys fees recoverable
as between attorney and client enunciated and regulated by the Rules of Court.[9] Liquidated
damages are those agreed upon by the parties to a contract to be paid in case of breach
thereof.[10] The stipulation on attorneys fees contained in the said Promissory Note constitutes
what is known as a penal clause. A penalty clause, expressly recognized by law, is an
accessory undertaking to assume greater liability on the part of the obligor in case of breach of
an obligation. It functions to strengthen the coercive force of obligation and to provide, in effect,
for what could be the liquidated damages resulting from such a breach. The obligor would then
be bound to pay the stipulated indemnity without the necessity of proof on the existence and on
the measure of damages caused by the breach.[11] It is well-settled that so long as such
stipulation does not contravene law, morals, or public order, it is strictly binding upon the obligor.
The attorneys fees so provided are awarded in favor of the litigant, not his counsel.[12] In this
case, there is a contractual stipulation in the Promissory Note that in case of petitioners default
on the terms and conditions of the said Promissory Note by failing to pay any installment due,
then this will render the entire balance of the obligation immediately due and payable. The total
obligation of petitioners amounted to P1,321,313.00 (P1,336,313.00 less P15,000.00) plus the
12% interest per annum of the said balance, as well as attorneys fees equivalent to 5% of the
total outstanding indebtedness. The Promissory Note was signed by both parties voluntarily,
thus the stipulation therein has the force of law between the parties and should be complied with
by them in good faith. The RTC and CA, in awarding attorneys fees equivalent to 20% of
petitioners total obligation, disregarded the stipulation expressly agreed upon in the Promissory
Note and instead increased the award of attorneys fees by giving weight and value to the
testimony of prosecution witness Atty. Reyes. In agreeing to the reasonableness of the
attorneys fees, the CA erroneously took into account the time spent, the extent of the services
rendered, as well as the professional standing of the lawyer. Oral evidence certainly cannot
prevail over the written agreements of the parties. The courts need only to rely on the faces of
the written contracts to determine their true intention on the principle that when the parties have
reduced their agreements in writing, it is presumed that they have made the writings the only

repositories and memorials of their true agreement.[13] Moreover, it is undeniable from the
evidence submitted by respondent herself to the trial court that the agreement of the parties with
respect to attorneys fees is only 5% of the total obligation and the trial court granted the 20%
rate based on the testimony of respondents counsel who opined that the same is the
reasonable amount of attorneys fees, despite the unequivocal agreement of the parties. Even
granting that petitioners may have erroneously stated that the stipulated attorneys fees is 20%
in their appellants brief before the CA, they have nonetheless squarely raised the matter of the
lower rate of attorneys fees agreed upon by the parties in the promissory note before that court
in their motion for reconsideration. In our mind, there was essentially no change in petitioners
theory of the case before the CA since in their appellants brief and their motion for
reconsideration, their main contention remains the same: that the attorneys fees awarded by
the trial court and affirmed by the CA were unwarranted and contrary to law. Neither can we
give credence to respondents assertion that the 5% attorneys fees agreed upon in the
promissory note were intended only to be the minimum rate as the promissory note never
mentioned a minimum. In sum, we find it improper for both the RTC and the CA to increase the
award of attorneys fees despite the express stipulation contained in the said Promissory Note
which we deem to be proper under these circumstances, since it is not intended to be
compensation for respondents counsel but was rather in the nature of a penalty or liquidated
damages. On the matter of interest, we affirm the amount of interest awarded by the two courts
below, there being a written stipulation as to its rate. In Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals,[14] we laid down the following guidelines on the imposition of legal interest:xxx
xxx
xxx II.
With regard particularly to an award of interest in the concept of
actual and compensatory damages, the rate of interest, as well as the accrual thereof, is
imposed, as follows:1.
When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a
sum of money, i.e., a loan or forbearance of money, the interest due is that which may have
been stipulated in writing. Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn legal interest from the
time it is judicially demanded. In the absence of stipulation, the rate of interest shall be 12% per
annum to be computed from default, i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial demand under and subject
to the provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil Code.2.
When an obligation, not constituting a
loan or forbearance of money, is breached, an interest on the amount of damages awarded may
be imposed at the discretion of the court at the rate of 6% per annum xxx3.
When the
judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and executory, the rate of legal
interest, whether the case falls under paragraph 1 or paragraph 2, above, shall be 12% per
annum from such finality until its satisfaction, this interim period being deemed to be by then an
equivalent to a forbearance of credit.The stipulated interest in this case is 12% per annum. As
of July 1994, the total indebtedness of petitioners amounted to P1,321,313.00. From then on,
the P1,321,313.00 should have earned the stipulated interest of 12% per annum plus attorneys
fees equivalent to 5% of the total outstanding indebtedness. However, once the judgment
becomes final and executory and the amount adjudged is still not satisfied, legal interest at the
rate of 12% applies until full payment. The rate of 12% per annum is proper because the interim
period from the finality of judgment, awarding a monetary claim and until payment thereof, is
deemed to be equivalent to a forbearance of credit. The actual base for the computation of this
12% interest is the amount due upon finality of this decision.[15] WHEREFORE, the Decision
dated October 29, 2003 of the Court of Appeals is hereby MODIFIED in that the amount of

attorneys fees is reduced to five percent (5%) of the total balance of the outstanding
indebtedness but the said Decision is AFFIRMED in all other respects. No costs.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------4. INTERPRETATION OF DOCUMENTS
Sec. 10 - Interpretation of writing according to its legal meaning
(no case)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Sec. 11 - Instrument construed so as to give effect to all provisions
16. HANJIN HEAVY INDUSTRIES AND CONSTRUCTION CO., LTD., Petitioner,- versus DYNAMIC PLANNERS AND and CONSTRUCTION CORP., Respondent.
G.R. Nos. 169408 & 170144
April 30, 2008 D E C I S I O N
VELASCO, JR., J.: Central
to the dispute between petitioner Hanjin Heavy Industries and Construction Co., Ltd. (Hanjin),
as contractor, and respondent Dynamic Planners and Construction Corporation (Dynamic), as
subcontractor, is the Davao International Airport Project (Project). Hanjin seeks a reversal of the
decision rendered by the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC), as affirmed with
modifications by the Court of Appeals (CA). It is Hanjins basic posture that Dynamic was in
delay in the prosecution of, and eventually abandoned, the Project, prompting Hanjin to
complete the same. Hanjin thus claims that Dynamic should not be entitled to the retention
money and should instead be held liable for damages.Dynamic denies having abandoned the
Project, then nearing completion, some time in December 2002, but admits suspending work
thereon on account of Hanjins act of withholding the release of the down payment and the
payment of its progress billing. Dynamic claims being entitled to the release of its retention
money, to partial payment in foreign currency, and to payment for escalation costs. The parties
question certain items covered by the award, the corresponding amount due for each item, and
the computations adopted first by the CIAC and then by the CA in arriving at a final award. The
Case
The instant Petitions for Review on Certiorari, both filed under Rule 45, arose from
CIAC Case No. 07-2004 entitled Dynamic Planners & Construction Corporation v. Hanjin Heavy
Industries & Construction Co., Ltd., a request for arbitration initiated by Dynamic before the
CIAC. On September 7, 2004, the CIAC rendered a decision denominated as Final Award,[1]
allowing and ordering payment of most of Dynamics claims, albeit on lowered amounts.
Therefrom, both parties appealed to the CA, Dynamics appeal docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
86641, while that of Hanjins as CA-G.R. SP No. 86633. The separate appeals were eventually
raffled to and resolved by different divisions of the CA.
On July 6, 2005, in CA-G.R. SP
No. 86641, the CA rendered a Decision,[2] modifying the CIACs decision, the modification
favoring Dynamic. Hanjins motion for reconsideration was denied by the CA per its Resolution
dated August 31, 2005.[3] Hanjin thus filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari dated
October 20, 2005 docketed as G.R. No. 169408, assailing the above CA decision and
resolution.
Earlier, in CA-G.R. SP No. 86633, the CA issued a Decision dated January 28,
2005,[4] also modifying the CIAC Decision. Hanjin then sought reconsideration but the CA
similarly denied the motion via a Resolution of October 14, 2005.[5] Hanjin then interposed a
petition for review docketed as G.R. No. 170144, questioning the decision and resolution of the

CA. The Facts The facts, as found by the CIAC and the CA, are as follows: On August 23, 1999,
the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) awarded to Hanjin the contract
for the construction of the Project for the aggregate sum of PhP 1,701,353,495.92, 65% of
which is payable in Philippine peso and the remaining 35% in US dollars at the stipulated
exchange rate of PhP 34.10 to USD 1.[6] Thereafter, steps were taken and negotiations
undertaken towards a sub-contracting arrangement between Hanjin and Dynamic. On February
28, 2000, Hanjin and Dynamic executed a Subcontract Agreement over a 76.5% portion of the
main contract for the price of PhP 924,670,819.[7] Among others, the subcontract contained
provisions on down or advance payment and progress billing, the first item payable within 20
days from contract signing.[8] To note, progress billings represent claims for payment for works
accomplished and materials delivered as construction progresses.As drawn, the subcontract
was a unit price, as distinguished from a lump sum, agreement. As such, the quantities
specified therein and upon which the subcontract price was determined were provisional.
Accordingly, after re-measuring and after determining actual quantities required for the works on
the basis of changes in the specifications, the estimated quantities were substantially reduced.
The reduction resulted in an adjustment of the subcontract price to PhP 714,868,129.[9] As of
January 2000, Dynamic already mobilized its equipment and manpower, albeit it has yet to
receive a Notice to Proceed from Hanjin. This advance accommodating arrangement was made
so that the mobilization would coincide with the Notice to Proceed that the DOTC issued to
Hanjin. By March 2000, when it received a Notice to Proceed from Hanjin, Dynamic had already
spent a tidy sum for mobilization purposes. In a clear breach of the subcontract agreement
which obligated Hanjin to give Dynamic an advance/down payment within 20 days from contract
execution,[10] Hanjin paid Dynamic the stipulated down payment in 10 installments spread over
a six-month period. Payments for Dynamics progress billings likewise came late and also
effected in installments, when the subcontract called for progress billing payment within seven
working days from the payment by the client (DOTC) to the contractor (Hanjin).[11] It may be
stated at this stage that shortly after the subcontract signing, Dynamic secured a US dollar
denominated loan from GRB Capital, Inc. (GRB) of California. As security for the loan, Dynamic
agreed to assign its receivables from the Project to GRB, but Hanjin opposed the security
arrangement on the ground that the assignment might interfere with Dynamics performance.
Prior to the start of the construction works, Dynamic engaged the services of Gregorio E.
Origenes, a structural engineer with 38-years experience behind him, to check on the designs of
the Project. After examining the plans and specifications for the Project, Origenes found that
[t]he depth of the girder was undersigned [sic] considering the length of the beam and
considering further that no post tensioning cables were provided; and [t]he framing system of
the beams and girders was poorly designed.[12] Dynamic called Hanjins attention to such
design deficiency. But upon the prodding of Hanjin which relied on a contrary assessment of the
Davao Airport Consultants (DAC), Dynamic nonetheless proceeded with the construction as
designed. The flawed design would later, however, manifest themselves by cracks appearing in
the beams to the second floor slab in the Passenger Terminal Building. Initially, Hanjin
considered such defects as construction in nature attributable to Dynamic, not design defects.
However, the Association of Structural Engineers of the Philippines, Task Force Davao
International Airport, upon investigation, discovered no evidence of deviation from the design
plans and specifications, and stated the opinion that there is a failure of structural design for

some of the beams and girders of Passenger Terminal Buildings 1 and 2.[13] To address the
adverted design defect, Dynamic recommended post-tensioning. However, Hanjin balked at this
recommendation. Eventually, Hanjin and the DAC approved the use of carbon fiber as posttensioning material of the structures to be used by a new subcontractor, the Composite
Technology Corporation.[14] On December 31, 2000, the parties executed a modificatory
Supplementary Agreement[15] in a bid to ensure the timely completion of the Project, with
Hanjin assisting Dynamic in the scheduled works. Under this supplementary contract, Hanjin
would, among other things, take over the responsibility for canvassing of quotations,
procurement, and delivery of materials and installation works. Dynamic would still provide for
temporary facilities, such as scaffoldings, formwork materials, and the like.[16] As of April 2002,
89% of the Project had been finished. Hanjin would, however, inform Dynamic that no progress
billing payment would be forthcoming after April 2002. As of that time, a total of 20 progress
billings were submitted to Hanjin in the total amount of PhP 582,103,359.35, 10% of which, or
over PhP 58.2 million, was retained by Hanjin.[17] By December 2002, when project works had
reached a 94% completion level, Hanjin took over the Project for the reason of alleged
abandonment.[18] Dynamic was thus impelled to demand payment from Hanjin for work done
on the Project, which then went unheeded. Such was the state of things when Dynamic
submitted its claim against Hanjin for arbitration to the CIAC. In its Answer, Hanjin made
counterclaims, such as costs of takeover, contractual negative balance, and damages. At the
CIAC, the parties entered into a Terms of Reference whereby the issues they raised were
embodied, viz: 1.
Is Claimant [Dynamic] entitled to the release of its retention amounting to
P58,210,336.00 when DOTC released to the Respondent [Hanjin] the retained amount of
P89,492,594.56? 2.
Is Claimant entitled to its claim for payment of escalation cost and/or
price adjustment amounting to P60,000,000.00? 3.
Is Claimant entitled to its claim for
payment of a foreign currency adjustment in the amount of P160,688,069.00? 4.
Is Claimant
entitled to its claim for payment of its work accomplishments valued at P27,790,675.00? 5.
Whether or not Claimant is entitled to claim payment at 40% mark-up of the following variation
orders: (1) Variation Order amounting to P219,171,878.00 x 40% = P87,668,722.00; (2)
Variation Order amounting to P60,923,533.00 x 40% = P24,369,413.20? 6.
Is Claimant
entitled to its claim for payment for the installation of three systems of arrival carousel in the
amount of P34,297,691.91? 7.
x x x x 8.
Is Claimant entitled to its claim for payment for
interest computed at the rate of 12% per annum in the amount of P51,288,786.36? 9.
Was
respondent guilty of bad faith and deceit in its dealings with the Claimant when (a) it released
the down payment in installments; x x x (c) it delayed payment of progress billings; (d) it refused
to release to the Claimant 35% of the foreign currency portion of its contract with DOTC; x x x (f)
it overpriced the materials it purchased for the Claimant under the Supplementary Agreement
between the parties, and claimed reimbursement for materials for which it failed to produce
supporting receipts and also claimed reimbursement for transporting materials from abroad
using unreasonable and unacceptable method of transporting materials? 10. Were there
deductions from the work accomplishments of Claimant, which were unauthorized and undue?
Did the Claimant abandon the works? If it did, is the Claimant liable to Respondent for additional
expenses it incurred in completing the work in the aggregate amount of P107,459,925.51? 11.
Is Claimant liable for the claim x x x, for the cost of the supplies, materials and equipment,
inclusive of taxes and customs duties, supplied by the Respondent x x x for the performance of

the Subcontracted Works? If so, how much of this claim is Respondent entitled to x x x ? 12.
Was the Claimant (i) mismanaged, (ii) lacking in capacity to perform the Subcontracted Works,
(iii) lacking in technical Know-how x x x (iv) lacking in expert engineers and qualified manpower
x x x (v) financially incapable of accomplishing the Subcontracted Works x x x ? 13. Did
Claimant discover the deficiency in the structural design of the buildings to be constructed by it,
namely: (i) the Passenger Terminal Building, (ii) the ATC-Administration Building, and (iii) the
Central Plant Building? If so, did it call the attention of the Respondent to this deficiency? Did
the Respondent instruct the Claimant to proceed with the construction of the shop drawings and
the construction of the buildings? Did cracks occur in the concrete beams of the buildings
causing the DOTC through its consultant to provide procedures for correction of the defects and
determine their cause? x x x Who between Claimant and Respondent is liable for the cost of
retrofitting the cracked slabs and beams? 14. Is the Claimant liable for the claims of
Respondent, described generally as Contractual Negative Balance x x x ? 15. Is Claimant
liable to Respondent for delay x x x ? 16. Is the Claimant liable to the Respondent for x x x
moral damages x x x and attorneys fees x x x ? 17. Is Claimant entitled to its claim for payment
of attorneys fees in the amount of P25,554,857.55?[19] The following is a summary of the
parties claims and counterclaims submitted before the CIAC:
[DYNAMICS CLAIMS:]
Retention Money
P
58,210,336.00
Escalation
Cost/Price Adjustment
60,000,000.00
Foreign Currency
Adjustment
160,688,069.00
Work Accomplishments
27,790,675.00
Variation Orders
153,119,284.73
Interest for Late Payments
51,288,786.36
Attorneys Fees
25,554,857.55
P
536,652,008.64
[HANJINS COUNTERCLAIMS:]
Contractual
Negative Balance
P
121,273,314.00
Increase Manpower
81,486,997.00
Equipment
635,500.00
Electrical Consumption
419,939.16
Miscellaneous Materials
481,734.81
Liquidated
Damages
12,600,000.00
Expenses for
Preparation of Final Drawing
11,705,354.12
Miscellaneous Expenses
of
Claimants Subcontractors
130,500.00
Moral Damages
1,000,000.00
Exemplary
Damages
1,000,000.00
Attorneys Fees
2,000,000.00
P
232,733,339.51[20]
Thereafter, the CIAC issued a Final Award awarding the following
amounts for the items as indicated:
The total credits to Dynamic are:
Adjusted Subcontract Price
P 1,028,932,282.36
Share in
Profit in VOs
9,295,667.94
Materials Overpurchased
54,847,739.30
TOTAL
P
1,093,075,739.30
The total deductions are:
Payment,
Progress Billings Nos. 1-20 P
582,103,359.35
Net Cost to Complete
368,578,828.92
Repayment Un-recouped
Advance Payment
16,398,419.74TOTAL
P
967,080,608.01

xxxx
BALANCE
P
125,995,131.29[21]
Following the denial of Dynamics Motion to Correct Award per
the CIACs Order of September 24, 2004,[22] both parties appealed to the CA. The Rulings of
the Court of Appeals
In CA-G.R. SP No. 86633, the CA rendered the first appealed
Decision dated January 28, 2005, veritably affirming the factual findings of the CIAC, but
nonetheless modified the latters ruling insofar only as the award of attorneys fees, rate of
interest imposable, and liability for arbitration fees were concerned. The fallo of the January 28,
2005 CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the assailed CIAC Final Award dated
September 7, 2004 is MODIFIED and/or RECTIFIED as follows: (a) to order the parties to
equally share the costs of arbitration conformably with Article 24 of their Subcontract
Agreement; (b) to delete the award of attorneys fees in favor of respondent [Dynamic]; and, (c)
to reduce the rate of interest imposable after the finality of the award from 15% to 12% per
annum. The rest is AFFIRMED in toto.[23]
The CA would subsequently deny Hanjins
motion for reconsideration in its Resolution of October 14, 2005.
On the other hand, the
appellate courts Decision dated July 6, 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 86641 dispositively reads:
Foregoing premises considered we vote to GRANT the instant petition. The Final Award dated
September 7, 2004 in CIAC Case No. 07-2004 is hereby MODIFIED; the net award shall be
computed as follows:
Original Subcontract Price
PhP
714,868,129.00
Foreign Currency Adjustment
131,338,674.80
Price Escalation
48,171,585.32
Variation Orders
156,786,932.62
Adjusted Subcontract Price
PhP
1,051,165,321.74
xxxx
Share in Profit in VOs
61,400,096.07
Materials Over-Purchased
54,847,789.94
Total
PhP
1,167,413,207.75
Less: Total Deductions
Progress Billings Nos. 1-20
net of retention money 523,893,023.35
Net Cost to Complete
368,578,828.92
Repayment, Unrecouped
Advance Payment
16,398,419.74
908,870,252.01
Net Award
PhP 258,542,935.74
================
The net award in favor of petitioner Dynamic x x x shall be [PhP
258,542,935.74] plus attorneys fees of [PhP 500,000]. Respondent Hanjin x x x is hereby
ordered to pay petitioner corporation the amount of [PhP 259,042,935.74]; plus interest at 12%
per annum from the promulgation of the assailed Final Award on September 7, 2004, until paid.
The cost of arbitration, however, should be equally borne by the parties in accordance with
Article 24 of the Subcontract Agreement.
SO ORDERED.[24]
Upon motion for
reconsideration filed by both parties, the CA recomputed and came up with a higher net award
as set forth in its Resolution of August 31, 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 86641, disposing as follows:
Due to the complexity of the computations involved, We deem it wise to RESTATE Our
Decision. The net award shall be recomputed as follows:
Original Subcontract Price
PhP
714,868,129.00
Foreign Currency Adjustment
131,338,674.80
Price Escalation
53,744,697.39
Variation Orders (VOs)
141,535,238.92

___________________
Adjusted Subcontract Price
PhP
1,041,486,740.11
Share in Profit in VOs
9,295,667.94
Materials Over-Purchased
54,847,789.94
___________________
Total
PhP
1,105,630,197.99
Less, Total Deductions
Progress Billings Nos. 1-20
net of retention money
523,893,023.35
Unadjusted Net Cost to
Complete
470,183,498.41
Plus: Mech. Works (EFQ)
7,776,735.77
Less:
Amount to be reimbursed
to [Dynamic]
(3,338,736.57)
Disallowed items
(93,983,040.38)
Additional disallowed
(8,381,856.00)
Overcharging of Materials
for VOs
(104,208,856.26)
Amended Cost to Complete
271,386,481.54
Repayment, Un-recouped
Advance Payment
16,398,419.74
811,677,924.63
_____________
_____________
Net Award
PhP
293,952,273.36
==============The net award in favor of petitioner [Dynamic] shall be [PhP 293,952,273.36]
plus attorneys fees of [PhP 500,000]. Respondent [Hanjin] is hereby ordered to pay petitioner x
x x the amount of [PhP 293,952,273.36] plus interest at 12% per annum from the promulgation
of the assailed Final Award on September 7, 2004, until paid. Hanjin is likewise ordered to
release to [Dynamic] the retention money in the amount of PhP 58,210,336.00, plus interest at
12% per annum from the time the Request for Arbitration was filed with the CIAC on February
20, 2004, until fully paid. The cost of arbitration, however, should be equally borne by the
parties in accordance with Article 24 of the Subcontract Agreement. SO ORDERED.[25]
From the CA Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 86633, Hanjin has come to this Court on a Petition
for Review on Certiorari, the same docketed as G.R. No. 170144. And from the more adverse
CA Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 86641, Hanjin also filed a similar petition, docketed as G.R.
No. 169408.
In a Resolution dated February 28, 2007,[26] this Court consolidated the
above cases.The Issues Hanjin raises identical issues in both of its petitions, to wit: I
WHETHER A REVIEW OF THE INSTANT CASE BY WAY OF THE INSTANT PETITION FOR
REVIEW IS WARRANTED II
WHETHER THE [CA] ERRONEOUSLY READ INTO THE SUBCONTRACT AGREEMENT
EXTRANEOUS AND CONTRACTUALLY INEXISTENT TERMS AND CONDITIONS TO
LAMELY JUSTIFY ITS AWARD TO RESPONDENT DYNAMIC OF PAYMENT IN FOREIGN
CURRENCY III
WHETHER THE [CAS] AWARD OF PRICE ESCALATION IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENT
DYNAMIC IS WITH LEGAL BASIS IV
WHETHER THE [CAS] IMPOSITION OF CERTAIN ITEMS, PERCENTAGES AND AMOUNTS
IN RESPONDENT DYNAMICS CLAIM TO VARIATION ORDERS IS WITH LEGAL BASIS V
WHETHER THE [CA] WAS LEGALLY JUSTIFIED IN ITS COMPUTATION WITH REGARD TO
THE ITEMS ON COSTS TO COMPLETE IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER HANJIN VI
WHETHER THE [CA] COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT DISREGARDED THE

EVIDENCE ESTABLISHED ON RECORD BY REWARDING RESPONDENT DYNAMIC

PAYMENT OF RETENTION MONEY DESPITE ITS ABANDONMENT OF THE
SUBCONTRACTED WORKS VII WHETHER PETITIONER HANJIN IS LEGALLY ENTITLED
TO REIMBURSEMENT OF THE COST OF ATTORNEYS FEES, MORAL AND EXEMPLARY
DAMAGES VIII WHETHER THERE WAS LEGAL BASIS FOR THE [CAS] RULING THAT
RESPONDENT DYNAMIC IS ENTITLED TO INTEREST PAYMENT[27] The Ruling of the Court
The Propriety of the Petitions for Review
Dynamic maintains that the issues Hanjin raised
in its petitions are factual in nature and are, therefore, not proper subject of review under
Section 1 of Rule 45, prescribing that a petition under the said rule, like the one at bench, shall
raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth.
Dynamics contention is
valid to point as, indeed, the matters raised by Hanjin are factual, revolving as they do on the
entitlement of Dynamic to the awards granted and computed by the CIAC and the CA.
Generally, this would be a question of fact that this Court would not delve upon. Imperial v.
Jaucian suggests as much. There, the Court ruled that the computation of outstanding
obligation is a question of fact: Arguing that she had already fully paid the loan x x x, petitioner
alleges that the two lower courts misappreciated the facts when they ruled that she still had an
outstanding balance of P208,430. This issue involves a question of fact. Such question exists
when a doubt or difference arises as to the truth or the falsehood of alleged facts; and when
there is need for a calibration of the evidence, considering mainly the credibility of witnesses
and the existence and the relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances, their relation to
each other and to the whole, and the probabilities of the situation.[28] (Emphasis supplied.)
The rule, however, precluding the Court from delving on the factual determinations of the CA,
admits of several exceptions. In Fuentes v. Court of Appeals, we held that the findings of facts
of the CA, which are generally deemed conclusive, may admit review by the Court in any of the
following instances, among others: (1) when the factual findings of the [CA] and the trial court
are contradictory; (2) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or
conjectures; (3) when the inference made by the [CA] from its findings of fact is manifestly
mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (4) when there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation
of facts; (5) when the [CA], in making its findings, goes beyond the issues of the case, and such
findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (6) when the judgment of
the [CA] is premised on a misapprehension of facts; (7) when the [CA] fails to notice certain
relevant facts which, if properly considered, will justify a different conclusion; (8) when the
findings of fact are themselves conflicting; (9) when the findings of fact are conclusions without
citation of the specific evidence on which they are based; and (10) when the findings of fact of
the [CA] are premised on the absence of evidence but such findings are contradicted by the
evidence on record.[29]
Significantly, jurisprudence teaches that mathematical
computations as well as the propriety of the arbitral awards are factual determinations.[30] And
just as significant is that the factual findings of the CIAC and CAin each separate appealed
decisionspractically dovetail with each other. The perceptible essential difference, at least
insofar as the CIACs Final Award and the CA Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 86641 are
concerned, rests merely on mathematical computations or adjustments of baseline amounts
which the CIAC may have inadvertently utilized.
At any rate, the challenge hurled by
Hanjin against the merits of the CAs findings, particularly those embodied in its Decision in CAG.R. SP No. 86641, must fail, such findings being fully supported by, or deducible from, the

evidence on record. Issue of Payment in Foreign Currency

Hanjin argues that there is no
provision in the subcontract agreement, as supplemented, for the partial payment of the contract
price in foreign currency.
Hanjin is wrong, a peso-dollar payment mix being effectively
contemplated in the subcontract. In construing a contract, the provisions thereof should not be
read in isolation, but in relation to each other and in their entirety so as to render them effective,
having in mind the intention of the parties and the purpose to be achieved.[31] Thus, Article
1374 of the Civil Code provides that the various stipulations of a contract shall be interpreted
together attributing to the doubtful ones that sense which result from all of them taken jointly.
In other words, the stipulations in a contract and other contract documents should be interpreted
together with the end in view of giving effect to all.[32] The CA, as did the CIAC, found the
Hanjin-Dynamic Subcontract Agreement as including and incorporating the provisions of other
agreements entered into by and between the parties respecting the Project. They appropriately
cited Art. 1 of the Subcontract Agreement, stating: ARTICLE 1. SUBCONTRACT DOCUMENTS
1.1)
The following documents shall be deemed to form and be read and be construed as an
integral part of the Subcontract Agreement in the same order of precedence as below: a)
Subcontract Agreement No. DAV-2-Sub-A-OO 1b)
Special Conditions as the Annex 1
c)
General Conditions of the Main Contractd)
Technical Specifications of
the Main Contracte)
Tender Drawingsf)
Priced Bill of Quantities as the
Annex 2. 1.2)
The Subcontractor is deemed to have examined and fully understood the
aforesaid Subcontract Agreement Documents.[33] (Emphasis supplied.)
It is abundantly
clear from the emphasized portions of the aforequoted provision that the DOTC-Hanjin Main
Contract forms as an integral part of the Subcontract Agreement. It is settled that if the terms
of a contract leave no doubt as to the parties intention, the literal meaning of its stipulations
should control.[34] The categorical finding of the CA, affirmatory of that of the CIAC, was that
the Subcontract is a back-to-back contract with Hanjins contract with DOTC. Under the Main
Contract, DOTC undertook to pay Hanjin 35% of the contract price in US dollars. Be that as it
may, and on the postulate that the Main Contract is an integral part of the Subcontract
Agreement, it behooves Hanjin to extend to Dynamic the same benefits otherwise accruing to
Hanjin under the Main Contract. Apart from dollar payment, other benefits contemplated include
the payment of price adjustment or escalation. An application of the back-to-back arrangement
between Hanjin and Dynamic to the contrary would be tantamount to a construction against the
terms of the Subcontract Agreement.
Before the CIAC, Hanjin argued that Dynamics
entitlement to a share in the foreign currency portion of the contract price is conditioned on the
completion of the Project by April 2002.[35] The CIAC, however, correctly made short shrift of
this argument, tagging the condition to be an impossible one and noting that Hanjins very act of
releasing advance payments to Dynamic in trickles, rather than in one full payment, as agreed
upon, and delaying payments for approved progress billings ensured that Dynamic would not
meet the April 2002 deadline. The CA, it bears to stress, echoed these CIAC findings, and
stated the observation that Hanjins actions not only delayed the Project, but also rendered its
completion on the date imposed by Hanjin impossible. Hanjin, therefore, cannot plausibly fault
and penalize Dynamic for not meeting the imposed deadline, the latter having in its favor Art.
1186 of the Civil Code, which says that [t]he condition shall be deemed fulfilled when the
obligor voluntarily prevents its fulfillment.
Given the above perspective, the condition
imposed for Dynamics entitlement to a share in Hanjins foreign currency receipts is, for the

nonce, deemed fulfilled. Accordingly, there is no legal obstacle to the award of a foreign
currency adjustment to Dynamic. Furthermore, Hanjins admission before the CIAC that
Dynamic is entitled to a foreign currency portion of the subcontract price veritably placed Hanjin
in estoppel from claiming otherwise. Under the doctrine of estoppel, an admission or
representation is rendered conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot be denied or
disproved as against the person relying thereon.[36] Issue of Computation of Foreign Currency
Adjustment
As to the amount of foreign currency adjustment due Dynamic, the CIAC
arrived at the figure PhP 131,338,674.80. The CA agreed with the CIACs computation and the
ratiocination therefor. We reproduce with approval what the CIAC wrote:
Dynamics
Subcontract Price of P714,868,129.00 is 76% of what Hanjin will derive from DOTC for the
Subcontract Works. 35% of this amount represents the foreign currency portion of the
Subcontract Price. This amounts to P250,203,845.00. At the exchange rate of Hanjin which is
P34.10: US$1, this amount of P250,203,845.00 is equivalent to US$7,337,356.15. Converted
again into its value in pesos at the time when the Subcontract was performed which ranged
from P50.00 to P54.00 to US$1, or an average rate of P52.00: US$1, its peso equivalent is
P381,542,519.80. This is the rate used by Hanjin in charging Dynamic for the peso value of the
importation of foreign materials. The difference between P381,542,519.80 and P250,203,845.00
is P131,338,674.80. We award to Dynamic as its share of the foreign currency portion of the
Subcontract Price the amount of P131,338,674.80 which shall be added to the Subcontract
Price.[37]
Issue of Applicable Exchange Rate
Hanjin questions the PhP 52: USD 1 exchange rate
adopted by the CA and by the CIAC earlier, asserting that what is applicable is the PhP 34.10:
USD 1 exchange rate, the same being stipulated in the DOTC-Hanjin Main Contract.
Hanjins assertion may be accorded some cogency but for the fact that, as the CA and the CIAC
found, Hanjin charged Dynamic for all the costs related to the importation of raw materials to be
used in the Project at the average exchange rate of PhP 52.00: USD 1. And as the CA aptly
observed, the Subcontract called for the importation of a substantial amount of equipment and
materials for the project. We need not belabor the iniquitousness of the lopsided formula
foisted by Hanjin and the undue enrichment resulting therefrom. Issue of Computation of Total
Escalation
Hanjin assails the CA for failing to use the 52 formulas and price indexes from
the National Statistics Office and the National Statistical Coordination Board in computing the
escalation cost or price adjustment. Alternatively, it argues that if Dynamic is indeed entitled to
any price escalation, then the applicable figure is 35% of price index only. Notably, Hanjin
admitted before the CIAC that Dynamic is entitled to price escalation of PhP 25,938,545.94 for
the local portion,[38] which amount the CIAC awarded to Dynamic. In view of such admission,
Hanjins arguments contesting the award for price escalation are puerile.
As against,
however, the CIACs computation of escalation cost which the CIAC predicated on works
accomplished as of April 2002 and covered by the 20 progress billings, the Court is inclined to
sustain the CAs computation of the price escalation as summarized in its Resolution of August
31, 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 86641, for the CA rightfully took into account Dynamics
accomplishment after April 2000 but before Hanjin took over the Project, thus:
x x x. In
Our assailed Decision [of July 6, 2005], We granted [Dynamic] additional escalation as to the
local portion i.e., on 65% of [Dynamic] billings based on the formula: [Dynamic] Billing
multiplied by 65% of the said billing, multiplied by the percentage of the escalation. However,

We computed escalation of the total amount of PhP 545,162,305.61 because the CIAC
computed escalation up to this extent only. It appears that a total of twenty (20) progress
billings have been submitted by [Dynamic] to Hanjin because it was advised that no payments
were forthcoming for subsequent progress billings.
xxxx
This being the case,
We have no recourse but to limit the award of escalation only up to the period covered by
Progress Billing No. 20 or up to April 2002 as the value of all subsequent accomplishments
remained undetermined. It appears however, that the total amount billed up to the time was
PhP 582,103,359.35. We have computed escalation only up to the PhP 545,162,035.61 or
short as to PhP 36,941,052.74. Applying the formula mentioned above, an additional [PhP
5,573,112.07] is due [Dynamic] as escalation computed: PhP 36,941,053.74 x 65% x 0.2321,
over and above PhP 22,233,039.38, so that a total of [PhP 27,806,151.45] is due [Dynamic] as
additional escalation over and above that computed by the CIAC.[39]
As it were, the
records do not show that Hanjin presented any of the supposed 52 formulas and price indexes,
the utilization of which would have resulted, so it claims, in a more exact price escalation figure.
Hanjin did not adduce any evidence to provide legal support to its assertion that the price
escalation portion to which Dynamic is entitled to is 35% of the price index only. The Court
agrees with the CA that, in computing price escalation, the allowable escalation is to be pegged
on the local portion, that is, on 65% of the Dynamic billing multiplied by 100% price index,
because Dynamic is entitled to both price adjustment and price escalation under the
Subcontract Agreement.
As may be noted, the CA initially followed the baseline amount
used by the CIAC in computing the amount of price escalation at PhP 545,162,305.61.
However, after another look at the case, the CA found the CIAC to have erred in starting at the
figure of PhP 582,103,359.35 as the baseline amount which, as earlier indicated, represented
the total billing as of April 2002. Accordingly, the CA granted a total award of PhP
27,806,151.45 by adding the amount of PhP 5,573,112.07 to its previous award of PhP
22,233,039.38 to Dynamic based on the corrected computation. At bottom then, the CA merely
corrected its own computation error, a process which it can undoubtedly do as long as
jurisdiction over the matter has not been lost, as here.[40] Issue of Computation of Variation
Order
Hanjin also challenges the CAs computation of Dynamics share in the profit in the
Variation Orders (VOs). The CA, in its July 6, 2005 Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 86641, found
the amount of Dynamics share in the VOs to be PhP 61,400,096.07, up from the PhP
9,295,667.94 awarded by the CIAC. On reconsideration, the CA returned to the original CIAC
figure. Instead, in its August 31, 2005 Resolution, the appellate court deducted the whole
amount of PhP 104,208,856.26 from Hanjins Net Cost to Complete Claim. This amount
represented the cost of materials with the overcharge component passed by Hanjin to Dynamic.
The CA arrived at the figure of PhP 104,208,856.26 after a painstaking, itemized comparison of
the items and amounts common in the Tables of Variance submitted by the parties in the two
tables.
We see no reason to disturb the CAs findings which appear to be supported by
the evidence on record. The computation of awards is, to stress, purely factual which the Court,
not being a trier of facts, need not evaluate and analyze all over again.
On another point,
Hanjin argues that the original contract price on the items subject to VOs should be added to the
DOTC-approved amount for the same items. And from this sum total should be deducted the
amount representing what the CA considered as overcharging Hanjin passed onto Dynamic.
According to Hanjin, the amount it was charging Dynamic represents the actual cost of work

done on the items subject to VOs. Hanjins posture would necessarily diminish the amount
allegedly overcharged by Hanjin to Dynamic.
The Court is not convinced. At the outset,
we find Hanjins presentation of a partial list[41] in its Memorandum of the items each party is
charging the other quite disturbing. As the petitioner in this case, Hanjin is charged with the
burden of establishing the grave error allegedly committed by the CA in its computation of the
overcharged amount. Its failure to provide a complete and clear computation of what it
considers as the correct one militates against the supposed merit of its argument.
Hanjins own annexes to its Petition indicate the deleted items from the original subcontract
price of PhP 924,670,819, as follows: Original Subcontract Price
PhP 924,670,819.00Deleted after re-measurement
PhP 118,338,206.31Deleted due
change of specifications subject to VOs
91,464,481.64
209,802,687.95
PhP 714,868,129.05[42]
==============
Also pertinent is a list of VOs[43] approved by the DOTC with an
aggregate amount of PhP 37,326,381.54,[44] corresponding to the same items previously
deleted, as shown above, amounting to PhP 91,464,481.64.
Hanjin presently asks the
Court to add the original subcontract price of the items subject to VOs, that is, PhP
91,464,481.64, to the DOTC- approved amount for the corresponding VOs in the amount of PhP
37,326,381.54, the sum of which to be deducted from the amount of PhP 141,535,238.92[45]
which Hanjin is charging Dynamic to arrive at the amount of the overcharge.
Hanjin
knows fully well that the amount of PhP 91,464,481.64 covers items deleted from the contract
price by reason of the VOs. Such deleted items lowered the original aggregate subcontract
price from PhP 924,670,819 to PhP 714,868,129. The amount of PhP 91,464,481.64,
representing items already deleted by reason of VOs, has been superseded by the succeeding
changes in specifications which the DOTC approved in the amount of PhP 37,326,381.54.
Hence, only the amount approved by the DOTC for the items actually installed should be the
subject of computation. The amounts representing items already deleted should necessarily be
excluded from the computation.
From the foregoing consideration, it is unreasonable for
Hanjin to charge Dynamic the amount of PhP 141,535,238.92 for the items subject to VOs when
DOTC actually approved only PhP 37,326,381.54 for the same items. And lest it be overlooked,
Dynamic was credited only the amount approved by DOTC at PhP 37,326,381.54 of the subject
VOs. To charge Dynamic more than the approved amount for the VOs would result in an
overcharging on the part of Hanjin. Issue on Computation of Hanjins Net Cost to Complete
As regards the issue of disallowed deductions from Hanjins Net Cost to Complete, the CA, in its
underlying decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 86641, included the amount of PhP 8,558,652.78 and
PhP 1,257,417.30, being not properly receipted, as additional disallowed deductions to the
CIACs figure of PhP 84,166,970.47[46] or a total disallowable deduction of PhP 93,983,040.38.
[47] We agree and thus affirm the CAs holding that when expenses or offered deductions are
not properly documented, such deductions should not be allowed, such deductions being in the
nature of actual damages. To be recoverable, actual damages must be pleaded and adequately
proven in court. An award thereof cannot be predicated on flimsy, remote, speculative, and
insubstantial proof.[48] Again, we see no reason to deviate from the CAs findings on the matter
of how much Hanjin expended to complete the Project.
To be sure, the Court cannot close
its eyes to the consistent findings of the appellate court, affirmatory of that of the CIAC, that
Hanjin padded expenses chargeable against Dynamic. Consider the following apt observations

of the CIAC on the computation of deductions Hanjin charged Dynamic under Net Cost to
Complete:
The Dynamic Summary is divided into two parts: The first part covered all
purchases, payments to subcontractors and all expenses deducted from Dynamics progress
billings nos. 1 to 20. We reviewed the Dynamic Summary to ascertain the expenses that are
questioned. We assume that those not questioned are admitted to be proper expenses and are
deductible from the [adjusted subcontract price]. We agree with Dynamic that we should
disallow certain items for the following reasons: 1. The expense is outside the scope of work of
Dynamic;2. The expense relates to an item that is subject to a prior
deduction; in other
words, in the cases of double deduction.3. The expense is undocumented.
We came
across a substantial number of imported items where there was a material variance between the
value of an imported item as reflected in a Customs declaration and the value reflected in
private documents. The value reflected in the Bureau of Customs declaration is less, in some
cases, substantially less than that reflected in other documents. We chose to rely on the value
in the Bureau of Customs declaration. First, because it is a public document. Second, because
if the case is one in which Hanjin undervalued the imported goods, which is a criminal act, we
will not allow it to profit from its own wrong.[49] Issue of Dynamics Abandonment of Work
Hanjin claims as being entitled to other costs which it incurred when Dynamic later abandoned
the subcontracted works in December 2002. Both the issues of other costs and
abandonment are factual matters settled in the proceedings below. The CIAC findings argue
against the notion of abandonment on the part of Dynamic. Wrote the CIAC:
Even
if it were true, as argued by Hanjin, that there were other aspects of the work that could have
been aggressively pursued by Dynamic, it could have given the guarantee requested by
Dynamic that it will be paid even if DOTC does not in turn pay Hanjin for the same work.
Moreover, the admission by Hanjin that after the April 2002 progress billings, it did not pay
Dynamic for work it had accomplished, in our view, provides sufficient legal justification for not
continuing with the work. Article 1169 [of the] Civil Code, invoked by Dynamic provides:
ART. 1169. In reciprocal obligations, neither party incurs in delay if the other does not comply or
is not ready to comply in a proper manner with what is incumbent upon him. From the moment
one of the parties fulfills the obligation, delay by the other begins.
Under the
Subcontract, Dynamic agreed to perform the Subcontract Works in consideration for which
Hanjin agreed to pay Dynamic the stipulated Subcontract Price in accordance with the terms
and conditions of the Subcontract. The payment for performing the Subcontract Works
consisted of an advance payment exclusively to cover the costs of mobilization and monthly
progress payments within seven (7) days after DOTC pays Hanjin. [Hanjin has not argued] that
DOTC was remiss in the payment of Hanjins progress billings. Clearly, therefore, there was
failure on the part of Hanjin to comply with its obligation to pay Dynamic. Thus, we hold that x x
x Dynamic did not abandon the Works. As will be shown later, Dynamic was squeezed out of
the Subcontract and was rendered by Hanjin incapable of performing its obligations therein.
Under Article 1186 of the Civil Code, The condition shall be deemed fulfilled when the obligor
voluntarily prevents its fulfillment.[50] (Emphasis supplied.)
In its Resolution dated
August 31, 2005, the CA sustained the CIACs finding on non-abandonment, as follows:
[T]he CIAC found that [Dynamic] did not abandon the subcontract works, but that it was
squeezed out of the Subcontract and was rendered by Hanjin incapable of performing the
obligations therein. It found certain circumstances to justify the suspension of work by

[Dynamic], to wit: that [Dynamic] was forced to de-mobilize because it was not being paid for
work undertaken; that the issue of retrofitting had not been resolved; and that the manner of
retrofitting still had to be decided upon. Despite the same, [Dynamic] continued with the work
not affecting the retrofitting work, but Hanjin terminated the Subcontract. The CIAC thus held
that Hanjin, the obligor, in voluntarily preventing the fulfillment by [Dynamic], the obligee, of its
obligation, the condition was deemed fulfilled.[51]
It cannot be overemphasized that
conclusions arrived at on factual issues by the CIAC, when affirmed by the CA, are accorded
great respect and even finality, if supported by substantial evidence.[52] In the instant case,
both the CIAC and the CA found more than ample evidence to support Dynamics disclaimer of
having abandoned the Project.
The Court concurs with the parallel findings of the CIAC
and the CA on the issue of abandonment. Indeed, Hanjin, by its unjustifiable and unfair actions,
veritably forced Dynamic out of the Project at a time when the subcontract works were already
94% complete. In net effect, Hanjin accepted the benefits arising from the subcontract
agreement without as much as asking Dynamic to finish its part of the bargain. Under Art. 1235
of the Civil Code, the obligation is deemed fully complied with when an obligee accepts the
performance thereof knowing its incompleteness or irregularity, and without expressing any
protest or objection. An obligee is deemed to have waived strict compliance by an obligor with
an obligation when the following elements are present: (1) an intentional acceptance of the
defective or incomplete performance; (2) with actual knowledge of the incompleteness or defect;
and (3) under circumstances that would indicate an intention to consider the performance as
complete and renounce any claim arising from the defect.[53]
These elements obtain in
the instant case. At the time it booted out Dynamic from the Project, Hanjin knew that the
subcontract works were not yet complete. In fact, there were unresolved matters involving
structural design deficiencies and the methods to be used in the retrofitting of the cracked slabs
and beams in the Passenger Terminal Building. Hanjin served notice that it will not pay the
progress billings for works done after April 2000. In December 2002, it refused entry to
Dynamics workers at the project site. Hanjin took all these actions without demanding that
Dynamic finish its contractual undertaking. By operation of law, Hanjin is thus deemed to have
waived its right to claim any payment for expenses it incurred in completing the unfinished six
percent of the work. No reversible error can thus be attributed to the CA in refusing to allow
additional completion costs to Hanjin. Issue of Dynamics Entitlement to Retention Money
Hanjin, as stated at the outset, refused to release Dynamics retention money on the ground of
abandonment and non-completion of the Project. Arts. 6.2, 7, and 8.3 of the Subcontract
Agreement, relating to the matter on retention money, respectively read, as follows: 6.2)
Monthly progress billing calculated on the basis of actual works
measured and sixty
percent (60%) of the material costs of the
delivered goods according to the Bill of
quantities, x x x shall be
paid with deductions of advance payment stipulated in Article
6.1
and ten percent (10%) of billing amount as the retention money stipulated in Article
7.1 for the period covered. Monthly progress
billing[s] shall be paid by the Contractor
and to the Subcontractor
within seven (7) working days after the Client pays the
Contractor. x x x x ARTICLE 7. RETENTION 7.1)
The retention money, ten percent (10%) of
every progress billing
with cumulative amount not exceeding ten percent (10%) of the
Subcontract Price shall be deducted therefrom in order to secure
the remedy of defects.
7.2)
Fifty percent (50%) of the retention money shall be released to the
Subcontractor

immediately after the Contractor issues the Taking Over Certificate to the Subcontractor and
against presentation of
Warranty Bond x x x valid for the duration of the Defects Liability
Period specified in Article 8.
The other fifty percent (50%) retention shall be released pro
rata, if
no defects have been found, after the Client releases retention
money to the
Contractor, after the Subcontractor issues a Clearance
Certificate to the Contractor
attesting that the Contractor is free
from all liens and encumbrances in relation to the
Subcontract
Works and after the Subcontractor submits an acceptable Warranty
Bond
to the Contractor which is valid until the defects liability period of the Main Contract plus 2
months. x x x x 8.3)
Defects Liability Period shall be three hundred sixty-five (365) days
from the date of issuance of the Taking Over Certificate.
Within this period, the
Subcontractor shall repair and make good
all defects in the Subcontract Works at his own
cost x x x. The Subcontractor shall assume full and sole responsibility for the
removal,
repair and replacement of any defective or nonconforming works.[54] x x x
The
retention money, as described above, is intended to ensure defect and deficiency-free work as
evidenced by the contractors issuance of a Take Over Certificate. Hanjin, as contractor, never
issued this key document to Dynamic. Instead, it discharged Dynamic from the 94%-done
Project rendering the issuance of such certificate a virtual impossibility. On June 1, 2003, the
DOTC issued a Take Over Certificate to Hanjin and released the latters retention money under
the Main Contract. But even earlier, the DOTC released Hanjins retention money covering the
period February 2000 to December 2001, a development which would have obligated Hanjin to
release the corresponding Dynamics retention money for the same period. But instead of
paying, Hanjin held onto Dynamics retention money. Worse still, Hanjin willfully and in apparent
bad faith took over the unfinished work of Dynamic. To us, and to CIAC and the CA earlier,
Hanjin in effect waived any and all of its rights to hold Dynamic liable for any defects,
deficiencies, or unfinished work. Consequently, there is no legal basis for Hanjin to further
withhold payment of Dynamics retention money. Issue of Entitlement to Moral and Exemplary
Damages
Hanjins ascription of bad faith and gross negligence on the part of Dynamic, as
basis for its claim of attorneys fees against the latter, has nothing to commend itself for
concurrence. In fact, both the CIAC and CA are one in saying that it was Hanjin which acted in
bad faith in its contractual relation with Dynamic. The CIAC, in awarding attorneys fees to
Dynamic, categorically stated:
On the basis of the evidence before us, we do not find any
basis to hold Dynamic liable to Hanjin for x x x damages and attorneys fees. On the other
hand, on the basis of our finding that Hanjin acted in bad faith and had persistently acted in a
manner that we interpret as attempts to squeeze out Dynamic from the Subcontract, and for
attempting to pass on to Dynamic a part of the cost of retrofitting when, it is clear from the
evidence, it was free from fault, and all the difficulties encountered by Dynamic in trying to
enforce its rights under the Subcontract, we should find Hanjin liable to pay Dynamic exemplary
damages but we cannot award exemplary damages as they are not part of the claim of
Dynamic. x x x We, however, award attorneys fees of P500,000.00.[55] Issue of Entitlement to
Attorneys Fees
The Subcontract Agreement, as supplemented, is silent as to payment of
attorneys fees. The applicable law, Art. 2208 of the Civil Code, must thus govern any award
thereof. It reads:
ART. 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorneys fees and
expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot be recovered except:
xxxx
2)
When the defendants acts or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons

or to incur expenses to protect its interest;

xxxx
5) Where the defendant acted in
gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiffs plainly valid, just and demandable
claim;
xxxx
11) In any case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorneys
fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered.
An award of attorneys fees being
the exception,[56] some compelling legal reason must obtain to bring the case within the
exception and justify such award. In the case at bench, there is a categorical finding by the
CIAC and CA that Hanjins refusal to satisfy Dynamics just claims amounted to gross and
evident bad faith. This to us presents the justifying ingredient for the award of attorneys fees.
Accordingly, we affirm the award of attorneys fees in CA-G.R. SP No. 86641 to Dynamic in the
amount of PhP 500,000. Issue of Computation of Interest The Court of Appeals Erred in Its
Award of Interest Payment
In its appealed Resolution of August 31, 2005, the CA
decreed that: [Hanjin] x x x is hereby ordered to pay [Dynamic] the amount of [PhP
293,952,273.36]; plus interest at 12% per annum from the promulgation of the assailed Final
Award on September 7, 2004, until paid. Hanjin is likewise ordered to release to [Dynamic] the
retention money in the amount of PhP 58,210,336.00, plus interest at 12% per annum from the
time the Request for Arbitration was filed with the CIAC on February 20, 2004, until fully paid.
[57] x x x
In the landmark case of Eastern Shipping Lines v. Court of Appeals, the Court
summarized the rules on interest award, as follows: II. With regard particularly to an award of
interest in the concept of actual and compensatory damages, the rate of interest, as well as the
accrual thereof, is imposed, as follows: 1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the
payment of a sum of money, i.e., a loan or forbearance of money, the interest due should be
that which may have been stipulated in writing. Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn
legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded. In the absence of stipulation, the rate of
interest shall be 12% per annum to be computed from default, i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial
demand under and subject to the provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil Code. 2. When an
obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is breached, an interest on the
amount of damages awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the court at the rate of 6% per
annum. No interest, however, shall be adjudged on unliquidated claims or damages except
when or until the demand can be established with reasonable certainty. Accordingly, where the
demand is established with reasonable certainty, the interest shall begin to run from the time the
claim is made judicially or extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil Code) but when such certainty cannot
be so reasonably established at the time the demand is made, the interest shall begin to run
only from the date the judgment of the court is made (at which time the quantification of
damages may be deemed to have been reasonably ascertained). The actual base for the
computation of legal interest shall, in any case, be on the amount finally adjudged. 3. When the
judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and executory, the rate of legal
interest, whether the case falls under paragraph 1 or paragraph 2, above, shall be 12% per
annum from such finality until its satisfaction, this interim period being deemed to be by then an
equivalent to a forbearance of credit.[58]
The contract under consideration does not
partake of a loan or forbearance of money; it is a construction contract. Thus, the matter of
interest award proceeding from the dispute would fall under the second paragraph of the abovequoted decision.
The reckoning point in the determination of the period of application of
the six percent interest is from the time extrajudicial demand is made. In the instant case, the
Terms of Reference submitted before the CIAC shows that, in a letter dated November 20,

2003, Dynamic served notice that should Hanjin fail to pay the formers claims, the case shall be
submitted for arbitration. Thus, the six percent interest due shall start to run from November 20,
2003 until the award becomes final and executory. Only then will the 12% interest referred to in
the aforequoted third paragraph of Eastern Shipping Lines start to run until the same is paid.
WHEREFORE, the CA Decision dated July 6, 2005, as modified by the Resolution
dated August 31, 2005, both rendered in CA-G.R. SP No. 86641, are hereby AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that the interest to be imposed on the sum total of the net award (PhP
293,952,273.36) and retention money (PhP 58,210,336) awarded to Dynamic shall be six
percent (6%) interest per annum, reckoned from November 20, 2003 until the total award
becomes final and executory. A yearly interest of twelve percent (12%) on the total amount
adjudged by the CIAC, as modified in the CA Resolution and further modified by this Decision,
as due to Dynamic, shall be assessed against Hanjin, computed from the finality of the CIAC
Final Award, as thus modified, until the final satisfaction thereof.
Insofar as they are
inconsistent with this Decision, the CA Decision dated January 28, 2005 and Resolution dated
October 14, 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 86633 are MODIFIED accordingly. The petitions of Hanjin
are PARTIALLY GRANTED in a sense as above discussed. Costs against Hanjin
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sec. 12 - Interpretation according to intention; general and particular provisions

17. TSPIC CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. TSPIC EMPLOYEES UNION (FFW), representing
MARIA FE FLORES, FE CAPISTRANO, AMY DURIAS,1 CLAIRE EVELYN VELEZ, JANICE
OLAGUIR, JERICO ALIPIT, GLEN BATULA, SER JOHN HERNANDEZ, RACHEL NOVILLAS,
NIMFA ANILAO, ROSE SUBARDIAGA, VALERIE CARBON, OLIVIA EDROSO, MARICRIS
DONAIRE, ANALYN AZARCON, ROSALIE RAMIREZ, JULIETA ROSETE, JANICE NEBRE,
NIA ANDRADE, CATHERINE YABA, DIOMEDISA ERNI,2 MARIO SALMORIN, LOIDA
COMULLO,3 MARIE ANN DELOS SANTOS,4 JUANITA YANA, and SUZETTE DULAY,
respondents.
G.R. No. 163419
February 13, 2008
D E C I S I O NVELASCO, JR., J.:The path towards industrial peace is a two-way street.
Fundamental fairness and protection to labor should always govern dealings between labor and
management. Seemingly conflicting provisions should be harmonized to arrive at an
interpretation that is within the parameters of the law, compassionate to labor, yet, fair to
management.In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, petitioner TSPIC
Corporation (TSPIC) seeks to annul and set aside the October 22, 2003 Decision5 and April 23,
2004 Resolution6 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 68616, which affirmed the
September 13, 2001 Decision7 of Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Josephus B. Jimenez in
National Conciliation and Mediation Board Case No. JBJ-AVA-2001-07-57.TSPIC is engaged in
the business of designing, manufacturing, and marketing integrated circuits to serve the
communication, automotive, data processing, and aerospace industries. Respondent TSPIC
Employees Union (FFW) (Union), on the other hand, is the registered bargaining agent of the
rank-and-file employees of TSPIC. The respondents, Maria Fe Flores, Fe Capistrano, Amy

Durias, Claire Evelyn Velez, Janice Olaguir, Jerico Alipit, Glen Batula, Ser John Hernandez,
Rachel Novillas, Nimfa Anilao, Rose Subardiaga, Valerie Carbon, Olivia Edroso, Maricris
Donaire, Analyn Azarcon, Rosalie Ramirez, Julieta Rosete, Janice Nebre, Nia Andrade,
Catherine Yaba, Diomedisa Erni, Mario Salmorin, Loida Comullo, Marie Ann Delos Santos,
Juanita Yana, and Suzette Dulay, are all members of the Union.In 1999, TSPIC and the Union
entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA)8 for the years 2000 to 2004. The CBA
included a provision on yearly salary increases starting January 2000 until January 2002.
Section 1, Article X of the CBA provides, as follows:Section 1. Salary/ Wage Increases.
Employees covered by this Agreement shall be granted salary/wage increases as follows:a)
Effective January 1, 2000, all employees on regular status and within the bargaining unit on or
before said date shall be granted a salary increase equivalent to ten percent (10%) of their basic
monthly salary as of December 31, 1999.b) Effective January 1, 2001, all employees on regular
status and within the bargaining unit on or before said date shall be granted a salary increase
equivalent to twelve (12%) of their basic monthly salary as of December 31, 2000.c) Effective
January 1, 2002, all employees on regular status and within the bargaining unit on or before
said date shall be granted a salary increase equivalent to eleven percent (11%) of their basic
monthly salary as of December 31, 2001.The wage salary increase of the first year of this
Agreement shall be over and above the wage/salary increase, including the wage distortion
adjustment, granted by the COMPANY on November 1, 1999 as per Wage Order No. NCR-07.
The wage/salary increases for the years 2001 and 2002 shall be deemed inclusive of the
mandated minimum wage increases under future Wage Orders, that may be issued after Wage
Order No. NCR-07, and shall be considered as correction of any wage distortion that may have
been brought about by the said future Wage Orders. Thus the wage/salary increases in 2001
and 2002 shall be deemed as compliance to future wage orders after Wage Order No. NCR-07.
Consequently, on January 1, 2000, all the regular rank-and-file employees of TSPIC received a
10% increase in their salary. Accordingly, the following nine (9) respondents (first group) who
were already regular employees received the said increase in their salary: Maria Fe Flores, Fe
Capistrano, Amy Durias, Claire Evelyn Velez, Janice Olaguir, Jerico Alipit, Glen Batula, Ser John
Hernandez, and Rachel Novillas.9The CBA also provided that employees who acquire regular
employment status within the year but after the effectivity of a particular salary increase shall
receive a proportionate part of the increase upon attainment of their regular status. Sec. 2 of the
CBA provides:SECTION 2. Regularization Increase.A covered daily paid employee who
acquires regular status within the year subsequent to the effectivity of a particular salary/wage
increase mentioned in Section 1 above shall be granted a salary/wage increase in proportionate
basis as follows:Regularization PeriodEquivalent Increase1st Quarter 100%2nd
Quarter
75%3rd Quarter
50%4th Quarter
25%Thus, a daily paid employee
who becomes a regular employee covered by this Agreement only on May 1, 2000, i.e., during
the second quarter and subsequent to the January 1, 2000 wage increase under this
Agreement, will be entitled to a wage increase equivalent to seventy-five percent (75%) of ten
percent (10%) of his basic pay. In the same manner, an employee who acquires regular status
on December 1, 2000 will be entitled to a salary increase equivalent to twenty-five percent
(25%) of ten percent (10%) of his last basic pay.On the other hand, any monthly-paid employee
who acquires regular status within the term of the Agreement shall be granted regularization
increase equivalent to 10% of his regular basic salary.Then on October 6, 2000, the Regional

Tripartite Wage and Productivity Board, National Capital Region, issued Wage Order No. NCR0810 (WO No. 8) which raised the daily minimum wage from PhP 223.50 to PhP 250 effective
November 1, 2000. Conformably, the wages of 17 probationary employees, namely: Nimfa
Anilao, Rose Subardiaga, Valerie Carbon, Olivia Edroso, Maricris Donaire, Analyn Azarcon,
Rosalie Ramirez, Julieta Rosete, Janice Nebre, Nia Andrade, Catherine Yaba, Diomedisa Erni,
Mario Salmorin, Loida Comullo, Marie Ann Delos Santos, Juanita Yana, and Suzette Dulay
(second group), were increased to PhP 250.00 effective November 1, 2000.On various dates
during the last quarter of 2000, the above named 17 employees attained regular employment11
and received 25% of 10% of their salaries as granted under the provision on regularization
increase under Article X, Sec. 2 of the CBA.In January 2001, TSPIC implemented the new wage
rates as mandated by the CBA. As a result, the nine employees (first group), who were senior to
the above-listed recently regularized employees, received less wages.On January 19, 2001, a
few weeks after the salary increase for the year 2001 became effective, TSPICs Human
Resources Department notified 24 employees,12 namely: Maria Fe Flores, Janice Olaguir,
Rachel Novillas, Fe Capistrano, Jerico Alipit, Amy Durias, Glen Batula, Claire Evelyn Velez, Ser
John Hernandez, Nimfa Anilao, Rose Subardiaga, Valerie Carbon, Olivia Edroso, Maricris
Donaire, Analyn Azarcon, Rosalie Ramirez, Julieta Rosete, Janice Nebre, Nia Andrade,
Catherine Yaba, Diomedisa Erni, Mario Salmorin, Loida Comullo, and Marie Ann Delos Santos,
that due to an error in the automated payroll system, they were overpaid and the overpayment
would be deducted from their salaries in a staggered basis, starting February 2001. TSPIC
explained that the correction of the erroneous computation was based on the crediting provision
of Sec. 1, Art. X of the CBA.The Union, on the other hand, asserted that there was no error and
the deduction of the alleged overpayment from employees constituted diminution of pay. The
issue was brought to the grievance machinery, but TSPIC and the Union failed to reach an
agreement.Consequently, TSPIC and the Union agreed to undergo voluntary arbitration on the
solitary issue of whether or not the acts of the management in making deductions from the
salaries of the affected employees constituted diminution of pay.On September 13, 2001,
Arbitrator Jimenez rendered a Decision, holding that the unilateral deduction made by TSPIC
violated Art. 10013 of the Labor Code. The fallo reads:WHEREFORE, in the light of the law on
the matter and on the facts adduced in evidence, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
Union and the named individual employees and against the company, thereby ordering the
[TSPIC] to pay as follows:1) to the sixteen (16) newly regularized employees named above, the
amount of P12,642.24 a month or a total of P113,780.16 for nine (9) months or P7,111.26 for
each of them as well as an additional P12,642.24 (for all), or P790.14 (for each), for every
month after 30 September 2001, until full payment, with legal interests for every month of delay;
2) to the nine (9) who were hired earlier than the sixteen (16); also named above, their
respective amount of entitlements, according to the Unions correct computation, ranging from
P110.22 per month (or P991.98 for nine months) to P450.58 a month (or P4,055.22 for nine
months), as well as corresponding monthly entitlements after 30 September 2001, plus legal
interests until full payment,3) to Suzette Dulay, the amount of P608.14 a month (or P5,473.26),
as well as corresponding monthly entitlements after 30 September 2001, plus legal interest until
full payment,4) Attorneys fees equal to 10% of all the above monetary awards.The claim for
exemplary damages is denied for want of factual basis.The parties are hereby directed to
comply with their joint voluntary commitment to abide by this Award and thus, submit to this

Office jointly, a written proof of voluntary compliance with this DECISION within ten (10) days
after the finality hereof.SO ORDERED.14TSPIC filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was
denied in a Resolution dated November 21, 2001.Aggrieved, TSPIC filed before the CA a
petition for review under Rule 43 docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 68616. The appellate court,
through its October 22, 2003 Decision, dismissed the petition and affirmed in toto the decision of
the voluntary arbitrator. The CA declared TSPICs computation allowing PhP 287 as daily wages
to the newly regularized employees to be correct, noting that the computation conformed to WO
No. 8 and the provisions of the CBA. According to the CA, TSPIC failed to convince the
appellate court that the deduction was a result of a system error in the automated payroll
system. The CA explained that when WO No. 8 took effect on November 1, 2000, the concerned
employees were still probationary employees who were receiving the minimum wage of PhP
223.50. The CA said that effective November 1, 2000, said employees should have received the
minimum wage of PhP 250. The CA held that when respondents became regular employees on
November 29, 2000, they should be allowed the salary increase granted them under the CBA at
the rate of 25% of 10% of their basic salary for the year 2000; thereafter, the 12% increase for
the year 2001 and the 10% increase for the year 2002 should also be made applicable to
them.15TSPIC filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the CA in its April 23,
2004 Resolution.TSPIC filed the instant petition which raises this sole issue for our resolution:
Does the TSPICs decision to deduct the alleged overpayment from the salaries of the affected
members of the Union constitute diminution of benefits in violation of the Labor Code?TSPIC
maintains that the formula proposed by the Union, adopted by the arbitrator and affirmed by the
CA, was flawed, inasmuch as it completely disregarded the "crediting provision" contained in the
last paragraph of Sec. 1, Art. X of the CBA.We find TSPICs contention meritorious.A Collective
Bargaining Agreement is the law between the partiesIt is familiar and fundamental doctrine in
labor law that the CBA is the law between the parties and they are obliged to comply with its
provisions.16 We said so in Honda Phils., Inc. v. Samahan ng Malayang Manggagawa sa
Honda:A collective bargaining agreement or CBA refers to the negotiated contract between a
legitimate labor organization and the employer concerning wages, hours of work and all other
terms and conditions of employment in a bargaining unit. As in all contracts, the parties in a
CBA may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem
convenient provided these are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public
policy. Thus, where the CBA is clear and unambiguous, it becomes the law between the parties
and compliance therewith is mandated by the express policy of the law. 17Moreover, if the terms
of a contract, as in a CBA, are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the contracting
parties, the literal meaning of their stipulations shall control.18 However, sometimes, as in this
case, though the provisions of the CBA seem clear and unambiguous, the parties sometimes
arrive at conflicting interpretations. Here, TSPIC wants to credit the increase granted by WO No.
8 to the increase granted under the CBA. According to TSPIC, it is specifically provided in the
CBA that "the salary/wage increase for the year 2001 shall be deemed inclusive of the
mandated minimum wage increases under future wage orders that may be issued after Wage
Order No. 7." The Union, on the other hand, insists that the "crediting" provision of the CBA
finds no application in the present case, since at the time WO No. 8 was issued, the
probationary employees (second group) were not yet covered by the CBA, particularly by its
crediting provision.As a general rule, in the interpretation of a contract, the intention of the

parties is to be pursued.19 Littera necat spiritus vivificat. An instrument must be interpreted

according to the intention of the parties. It is the duty of the courts to place a practical and
realistic construction upon it, giving due consideration to the context in which it is negotiated and
the purpose which it is intended to serve.20 Absurd and illogical interpretations should also be
avoided. Considering that the parties have unequivocally agreed to substitute the benefits
granted under the CBA with those granted under wage orders, the agreement must prevail and
be given full effect.Paragraph (b) of Sec. 1 of Art. X of the CBA provides for the general
agreement that, effective January 1, 2001, all employees on regular status and within the
bargaining unit on or before said date shall be granted a salary increase equivalent to twelve
(12%) of their basic monthly salary as of December 31, 2000. The 12% salary increase is
granted to all employees who (1) are regular employees and (2) are within the bargaining unit.
Second paragraph of (c) provides that the salary increase for the year 2000 shall not include the
increase in salary granted under WO No. 7 and the correction of the wage distortion for
November 1999.The last paragraph, on the other hand, states the specific condition that the
wage/salary increases for the years 2001 and 2002 shall be deemed inclusive of the mandated
minimum wage increases under future wage orders, that may be issued after WO No. 7, and
shall be considered as correction of the wage distortions that may be brought about by the said
future wage orders. Thus, the wage/salary increases in 2001 and 2002 shall be deemed as
compliance to future wage orders after WO No. 7.Paragraph (b) is a general provision which
allows a salary increase to all those who are qualified. It, however, clashes with the last
paragraph which specifically states that the salary increases for the years 2001 and 2002 shall
be deemed inclusive of wage increases subsequent to those granted under WO No. 7. It is a
familiar rule in interpretation of contracts that conflicting provisions should be harmonized to
give effect to all.21 Likewise, when general and specific provisions are inconsistent, the specific
provision shall be paramount to and govern the general provision.22 Thus, it may be reasonably
concluded that TSPIC granted the salary increases under the condition that any wage order that
may be subsequently issued shall be credited against the previously granted increase. The
intention of the parties is clear: As long as an employee is qualified to receive the 12% increase
in salary, the employee shall be granted the increase; and as long as an employee is granted
the 12% increase, the amount shall be credited against any wage order issued after WO No. 7.
Respondents should not be allowed to receive benefits from the CBA while avoiding the
counterpart crediting provision. They have received their regularization increases under Art. X,
Sec. 2 of the CBA and the yearly increase for the year 2001. They should not then be allowed to
avoid the crediting provision which is an accompanying condition.Respondents attained regular
employment status before January 1, 2001. WO No. 8, increasing the minimum wage, was
issued after WO No. 7. Thus, respondents rightfully received the 12% salary increase for the
year 2001 granted in the CBA; and consequently, TSPIC rightfully credited that 12% increase
against the increase granted by WO No. 8.Proper formula for computing the salaries for the
year 2001Thus, the proper computation of the salaries of individual respondents is as follows:(1)
With regard to the first group of respondents who attained regular employment status before the
effectivity of WO No. 8, the computation is as follows:For respondents Jerico Alipit and Glen
Batula:23Wage rate before WO No. 8PhP 234.67Increase due to WO No.
8 setting the minimum wage at PhP 250....15.33Total Salary upon effectivity of WO
No. 8.PhP 250.00Increase for 2001 (12% of 2000 salary)......PhP 30.00Less

the wage increase under WO No. 8.15.33Total difference between the wage
increase for 2001 and the increase granted under WO No. 8..PhP 14.67Wage rate by
December 2000.PhP 250.00Plus total difference between the wage
increase for 2001 and the increase granted under WO No. 8..14.67Total (Wage rate range
beginning January 1, 2001). PhP 264.67For respondents Ser John Hernandez and Rachel
Novillas:24Wage rate range before WO No. 8..PhP 234.68Increase due to WO
No. 8 setting the minimum wage at PhP 25015.32Total Salary upon effectivity of
WO No. 8.PhP 250.00Increase for 2001 (12% of 2000 salary)..PhP 30.00
Less the wage increase under WO No. 815.32Total difference between the wage
increase for 2001 and the increase granted under WO No. 8PhP 14.68Wage rate by
December 2000.PhP 250.00Plus total difference between the wage
increase for 2001 and the increase granted under WO No. 814.68Total (Wage rate range
beginning January 1, 2001) PhP 264.68For respondents Amy Durias, Claire Evelyn Velez, and
Janice Olaguir:25Wage rate range before WO No. 8..PhP 240.26Increase due to WO
No. 8 setting the minimum wage at PhP 2509.74Total Salary upon effectivity of WO No.
8.PhP 250.00Increase for 2001 (12% of 2000 salary)PhP 30.00Less the wage
increase under WO No. 89.74Total difference between the wage increase for 2001
and the increase granted under WO No. 8PhP 20.26Wage rate by December
2000PhP 250.00Plus total difference between the wage increase for 2001
and the increase granted under WO No. 820.26Total (Wage rate range beginning January
1, 2001). PhP 270.26For respondents Ma. Fe Flores and Fe Capistrano:26Wage rate range
before WO No. 8PhP 245.85Increase due to WO No. 8 setting the minimum wage at
PhP 250..4.15Total Salary upon effectivity of WO No. 8...PhP 250.00Increase for 2001
(12% of 2000 salary)PhP 30.00Less the wage increase under WO No.
8.........4.15Total difference between the wage increase for 2001 and the increase granted
under WO No. 8PhP 25.85Wage rate by December 2000PhP
250.00Plus total difference between the wage increase for 2001 and the increase granted under
WO No. 825.85Total (Wage rate range beginning January 1, 2001). PhP 275.85(2) With
regard to the second group of employees, who attained regular employment status after the
implementation of WO No. 8, namely: Nimfa Anilao, Rose Subardiaga, Valerie Carbon, Olivia
Edroso, Maricris Donaire, Analyn Azarcon, Rosalie Ramirez, Julieta Rosete, Janice Nebre, Nia
Andrade, Catherine Yaba, Diomedisa Erni, Mario Salmorin, Loida Comullo, Marie Ann Delos
Santos, Juanita Yana, and Suzette Dulay, the proper computation of the salaries for the year
2001, in accordance with the CBA, is as follows:Compute the increase in salary after the
implementation of WO No. 8 by subtracting the minimum wage before WO No. 8 from the
minimum wage per the wage order to arrive at the wage increase, thus:Minimum Wage per
Wage Order..PhP 250.00Wage rate before Wage Order..223.50Wage
Increase.PhP 26.50Upon attainment of regular employment status,
the employees salaries were increased by 25% of 10% of their basic salaries, as provided for in
Sec. 2, Art. X of the CBA, thus resulting in a further increase of PhP 6.25, for a total of PhP
256.25, computed as follows:Wage rate after WO No. 8.PhP 250.00
Regularization increase (25 % of 10% of basic salary). 6.25Total (Salary for the end of year
2000).PhP 256.25To compute for the increase in wage rates for the year 2001,
get the increase of 12% of the employees salaries as of December 31, 2000; then subtract from

that amount, the amount increased in salaries as granted under WO No. 8 in accordance with
the crediting provision of the CBA, to arrive at the increase in salaries for the year 2001 of the
recently regularized employees. Add the result to their salaries as of December 31, 2000 to get
the proper salary beginning January 1, 2001, thus:Increase for 2001 (12% of 2000 salary)
...PhP 30.75Less the wage increase under WO No. 8.26.50
Difference between the wage increase for 2001 and the increase granted under WO No. 8
PhP 4.25Wage rate after regularization increase...PhP 256.25Plus total difference
between the wage increase and the increase granted under WO No. 8.4.25Total
(Wage rate beginning January 1, 2001).PhP 260.50With these computations, the
crediting provision of the CBA is put in effect, and the wage distortion between the first and
second group of employees is cured. The first group of employees who attained regular
employment status before the implementation of WO No. 8 is entitled to receive, starting
January 1, 2001, a daily wage rate within the range of PhP 264.67 to PhP 275.85, depending on
their wage rate before the implementation of WO No. 8. The second group that attained regular
employment status after the implementation of WO No. 8 is entitled to receive a daily wage rate
of PhP 260.50 starting January 1, 2001.Diminution of benefitsTSPIC also maintains that
charging the overpayments made to the 16 respondents through staggered deductions from
their salaries does not constitute diminution of benefits.We agree with TSPIC.Diminution of
benefits is the unilateral withdrawal by the employer of benefits already enjoyed by the
employees. There is diminution of benefits when it is shown that: (1) the grant or benefit is
founded on a policy or has ripened into a practice over a long period; (2) the practice is
consistent and deliberate; (3) the practice is not due to error in the construction or application of
a doubtful or difficult question of law; and (4) the diminution or discontinuance is done
unilaterally by the employer.27As correctly pointed out by TSPIC, the overpayment of its
employees was a result of an error. This error was immediately rectified by TSPIC upon its
discovery. We have ruled before that an erroneously granted benefit may be withdrawn without
violating the prohibition against non-diminution of benefits. We ruled in Globe-Mackay Cable
and Radio Corp. v. NLRC:Absent clear administrative guidelines, Petitioner Corporation cannot
be faulted for erroneous application of the law. Payment may be said to have been made by
reason of a mistake in the construction or application of a "doubtful or difficult question of law".
(Article 2155, in relation to Article 2154 of the Civil Code). Since it is a past error that is being
corrected, no vested right may be said to have arisen nor any diminution of benefit under Article
100 of the Labor Code may be said to have resulted by virtue of the correction.28Here, no
vested right accrued to individual respondents when TSPIC corrected its error by crediting the
salary increase for the year 2001 against the salary increase granted under WO No. 8, all in
accordance with the CBA.Hence, any amount given to the employees in excess of what they
were entitled to, as computed above, may be legally deducted by TSPIC from the employees
salaries. It was also compassionate and fair that TSPIC deducted the overpayment in
installments over a period of 12 months starting from the date of the initial deduction to lessen
the burden on the overpaid employees. TSPIC, in turn, must refund to individual respondents
any amount deducted from their salaries which was in excess of what TSPIC is legally allowed
to deduct from the salaries based on the computations discussed in this Decision.As a last
word, it should be reiterated that though it is the states responsibility to afford protection to
labor, this policy should not be used as an instrument to oppress management and capital.29 In

resolving disputes between labor and capital, fairness and justice should always prevail. We
ruled in Norkis Union v. Norkis Trading that in the resolution of labor cases, we have always
been guided by the State policy enshrined in the Constitution: social justice and protection of the
working class. Social justice does not, however, mandate that every dispute should be
automatically decided in favor of labor. In any case, justice is to be granted to the deserving and
dispensed in the light of the established facts and the applicable law and doctrine.30
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the September 13, 2001 Decision of the Labor Arbitrator
in National Conciliation and Mediation Board Case No. JBJ-AVA-2001-07-57 and the October
22, 2003 CA Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 68616 are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
TSPIC is hereby ORDERED to pay respondents their salary increases in accordance with this
Decision, as follows:Name Daily Wage Rate No. of Working Days in a Month No. of Months in a
Year Total 2001Nimfa Anilao 260.5 26 12 81,276.00Rose Subardiaga 260.5 26 12
81,276.00Valerie Carbon 260.5 26 12 81,276.00Olivia Edroso 260.5 26 12 81,276.00
Maricris Donaire 260.5 26 12 81,276.00Analyn Azarcon 260.5 26. 12 81,276.00Rosalie
Ramirez 260.5 26 12 81,276.00Julieta Rosete 260.5 26. 12 81,276.00Janice Nebre 260.5 26 12
81,276.00Nia Andrade 260.5 2612 81,276.00Catherine Yaba 260.5 26. 12 81,276.00Diomedisa
Erni 260.5 26 12 81,276.00Mario Salmorin 260.5 26 12 81,276.00Loida Camullo 260.5 26 12
81,276.00Marie Ann Delos Santos 260.5 26 12 81,276.00Juanita Yana 260.5 26 12 81,276.00
Suzette Dulay 260.5 26 181,276.00
Jerico Alipit 264.67 26 1 82,577.04Glen Batula 264.67 26 12 82,577.04Ser John Hernandez
264.68 26 12 82,580.16Rachel Novillas 264.68 26 12 82,580.16
Amy Durias 270.26 26 12 84,321.12Claire Evelyn Velez 270.26 26 12 84,321.12Janice Olaguir
270.26 26 12 84,321.12Maria Fe Flores 275.85 26 12 86,065.20Fe Capistrano 275.85,26 12
86,065.20The award for attorneys fees of ten percent (10%) of the total award is MAINTAINED.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------18. ANDRE T. ALMOCERA, Petitioner, - versus - JOHNNY ONG, Respondent.
G.R. No. 170479 February 18, 2008 D E C I S I O N CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before
Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
which seeks to set aside the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dated 18 July 2005 in CA-G.R.
CV No. 75610 affirming in toto the Decision[2] of Branch 11 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Cebu City in Civil Case No. CEB-23687 and its Resolution[3] dated 16 November 2005 denying
petitioners motion for reconsideration. The RTC decision found petitioner Andre T. Almocera,
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of First Builder Multi-Purpose Cooperative (FBMC),
solidarily liable with FMBC for damages. Stripped of non-essentials, the respective versions of
the parties have been summarized by the Court of Appeals as follows:
Plaintiff Johnny
Ong tried to acquire from the defendants a townhome described as Unit No. 4 of Atrium
Townhomes in Cebu City. As reflected in a Contract to Sell, the selling price of the unit was
P3,400,000.00 pesos, for a lot area of eighty-eight (88) square meters with a three-storey
building. Out of the purchase price, plaintiff was able to pay the amount of P1,060,000.00.
Prior to the full payment of this amount, plaintiff claims that defendants Andre Almocera and
First Builders fraudulently concealed the fact that before and at the time of the perfection of the
aforesaid contract to sell, the property was already mortgaged to and encumbered with the Land
Bank of the Philippines (LBP). In addition, the construction of the house has long been delayed
and remains unfinished. On March 13, 1999, Lot 4-a covered by TCT No. 148818, covering the

unit was advertised in a local tabloid for public auction for foreclosure of mortgage. It is the
assertion of the plaintiff that had it not for the fraudulent concealment of the mortgage and
encumbrance by defendants, he would have not entered into the contract to sell.
On the
other hand, defendants assert that on March 20, 1995, First Builders Multi-purpose Coop. Inc.,
borrowed money in the amount of P500,000.00 from Tommy Ong, plaintiffs brother. This
amount was used to finance the documentation requirements of the LBP for the funding of the
Atrium Town Homes. This loan will be applied in payment of one (1) town house unit which
Tommy Ong may eventually purchase from the project. When the project was under way,
Tommy Ong wanted to buy another townhouse for his brother, Johnny Ong, plaintiff herein,
which then, the amount of P150,000.00 was given as additional partial payment. However, the
particular unit was not yet identified. It was only on January 10, 1997 that Tommy Ong identified
Unit No. 4 plaintiffs chosen unit and again tendered P350,000.00 as his third partial payment.
When the contract to sell for Unit 4 was being drafted, Tommy Ong requested that another
contract to sell covering Unit 5 be made so as to give Johnny Ong another option to choose
whichever unit he might decide to have. When the construction was already in full blast,
defendants were informed by Tommy Ong that their final choice was Unit 5. It was only upon
knowing that the defendants will be selling Unit 4 to some other persons for P4million that
plaintiff changed his choice from Unit 5 to Unit 4.[4] In trying to recover the amount he paid as
down payment for the townhouse unit, respondent Johnny Ong filed a complaint for Damages
before the RTC of Cebu City, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-23687, against defendants Andre
T. Almocera and FBMC alleging that defendants were guilty of fraudulent concealment and
breach of contract when they sold to him a townhouse unit without divulging that the same, at
the time of the perfection of their contract, was already mortgaged with the Land Bank of the
Philippines (LBP), with the latter causing the foreclosure of the mortgage and the eventual sale
of the townhouse unit to a third person. In their Answer, defendants denied liability claiming that
the foreclosure of the mortgage on the townhouse unit was caused by the failure of complainant
Johnny Ong to pay the balance of the price of said townhouse unit. After the pre-trial conference
was terminated, trial on the merits ensued. Respondent and his brother, Thomas Y. Ong, took
the witness stand. For defendants, petitioner testified. In a Decision dated 20 May 2002, the
RTC disposed of the case in this manner:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing
premises, judgment is hereby rendered in this case in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendants:
(a) Ordering the defendants to solidarily pay to the plaintiff the sum of
P1,060,000.00, together with a legal interest thereon at 6% per annum from April 21, 1999 until
its full payment before finality of the judgment. Thereafter, if the amount adjudged remains
unpaid, the interest rate shall be 12% per annum computed from the time when the judgment
becomes final and executory until fully satisfied;
(b) Ordering the defendants to solidarily
pay to the plaintiff the sum of P100,000.00 as moral damages, the sum of P50,000.00 as
attorneys fee and the sum of P15,619.80 as expenses of litigation; and
(c) Ordering the
defendants to pay the cost of this suit.[5] The trial court ruled against defendants for not acting
in good faith and for not complying with their obligations under their contract with respondent. In
the Contract to Sell[6] involving Unit 4 of the Atrium Townhomes, defendants agreed to sell said
townhouse to respondent for P3,400,000.00. The down payment was P1,000,000.00, while the
balance of P2,400,000.00 was to be paid in full upon completion, delivery and acceptance of the
townhouse. Under the contract which was signed on 10 January 1997, defendants agreed to

complete and convey to respondent the unit within six months from the signing thereof. The trial
court found that respondent was able to make a down payment or partial payment of
P1,060,000.00 and that the defendants failed to complete the construction of, as well as deliver
to respondent, the townhouse within six months from the signing of the contract. Moreover,
respondent was not informed by the defendants at the time of the perfection of their contract
that the subject townhouse was already mortgaged to LBP. The mortgage was foreclosed by
the LBP and the townhouse was eventually sold at public auction. It said that defendants were
guilty of fraud in their dealing with respondent because the mortgage was not disclosed to
respondent when the contract was perfected. There was also non-compliance with their
obligations under the contract when they failed to complete and deliver the townhouse unit at
the agreed time. On the part of respondent, the trial court declared he was justified in
suspending further payments to the defendants and was entitled to the return of the down
payment. Aggrieved, defendants appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals assigning the
following as errors: 1.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PLAINTIFF HAS
A VALID CAUSE OF ACTION FOR DAMAGES AGAINST DEFENDANT(S). 2.
THE
LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT DEFENDANT ANDRE T. ALMOCERA IS
SOLIDARILY LIABLE WITH THE COOPERATIVE FOR THE DAMAGES TO THE PLAINTIFF.[7]
The Court of Appeals ruled that the defendants incurred delay when they failed to deliver the
townhouse unit to the respondent within six months from the signing of the contract to sell. It
agreed with the finding of the trial court that the nonpayment of the balance of P2.4M by
respondent to defendants was proper in light of such delay and the fact that the property subject
of the case was foreclosed and auctioned. It added that the trial court did not err in giving
credence to respondents assertion that had he known beforehand that the unit was used as
collateral with the LBP, he would not have proceeded in buying the townhouse. Like the trial
court, the Court of Appeals gave no weight to defendants argument that had respondent paid
the balance of the purchase price of the townhouse, the mortgage could have been released. It
explained: We cannot find fault with the choice of plaintiff not to further dole out money for a
property that in all events, would never be his. Moreover, defendants could, if they were really
desirous of satisfying their obligation, demanded that plaintiff pay the outstanding balance
based on their contract. This they had not done. We can fairly surmise that defendants could
not comply with their obligation themselves, because as testified to by Mr. Almocera, they
already signified to LBP that they cannot pay their outstanding loan obligations resulting to the
foreclosure of the townhouse.[8] Moreover, as to the issue of petitioners solidary liability, it said
that this issue was belatedly raised and cannot be treated for the first time on appeal.
On
18 July 2005, the Court of Appeals denied the appeal and affirmed in toto the decision of the
trial court. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE
FOREGOING, this appeal is DENIED. The assailed decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 11, Cebu City in Civil Case No. CEB-23687 is AFFIRMED in toto.[9]
In a
Resolution dated 16 November 2005, the Court of Appeals denied defendants motion for
reconsideration.
Petitioner is now before us pleading his case via a Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The petition raises the following
issues: I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT DEFENDANT HAS INCURRED DELAY. II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN SUSTAINING RESPONDENTS REFUSAL TO PAY THE

BALANCE OF THE PURCHASE PRICE. III.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT DEFENDANT ANDRE T. ALMOCERA IS SOLIDARILY
LIABLE WITH THE DEFENDANT COOPERATIVE FOR DAMAGES TO PLAINTIFF.[10]
It cannot be disputed that the contract entered into by the parties was a contract to sell. The
contract was denominated as such and it contained the provision that the unit shall be conveyed
by way of an Absolute Deed of Sale, together with the attendant documents of Ownership the
Transfer Certificate of Title and Certificate of Occupancy and that the balance of the contract
price shall be paid upon the completion and delivery of the unit, as well as the acceptance
thereof by respondent. All these clearly indicate that ownership of the townhouse has not
passed to respondent.
In Serrano v. Caguiat, [11] we explained: A contract to sell is akin
to a conditional sale where the efficacy or obligatory force of the vendors obligation to transfer
title is subordinated to the happening of a future and uncertain event, so that if the suspensive
condition does not take place, the parties would stand as if the conditional obligation had never
existed. The suspensive condition is commonly full payment of the purchase price.
The
differences between a contract to sell and a contract of sale are well-settled in jurisprudence.
As early as 1951, in Sing Yee v. Santos [47 O.G. 6372 (1951)], we held that:
x x x [a]
distinction must be made between a contract of sale in which title passes to the buyer upon
delivery of the thing sold and a contract to sell x x x where by agreement the ownership is
reserved in the seller and is not to pass until the full payment of the purchase price is made. In
the first case, non-payment of the price is a negative resolutory condition; in the second case,
full payment is a positive suspensive condition. Being contraries, their effect in law cannot be
identical. In the first case, the vendor has lost and cannot recover the ownership of the land
sold until and unless the contract of sale is itself resolved and set aside. In the second case,
however, the title remains in the vendor if the vendee does not comply with the condition
precedent of making payment at the time specified in the contract. In other words, in a contract
to sell, ownership is retained by the seller and is not to pass to the buyer until full payment of the
price. The Contract to Sell entered into by the parties contains the following pertinent
provisions:
4. TERMS OF PAYMENT:
4a. ONE MILLION PESOS (P1,000,000.00)
is hereby acknowledged as Downpayment for the above-mentioned Contract Price.
4b.
The Balance, in the amount of TWO MILLION FOUR HUNDRED PESOS (P2,400,000.00) shall
be paid thru financing Institution facilitated by the SELLER, preferably Landbank of the
Philippines (LBP).
Upon completion, delivery and acceptance of the BUYER of the
Townhouse Unit, the BUYER shall have paid the Contract Price in full to the SELLER.
x
x x x 6. COMPLETION DATES OF THE TOWNHOUSE UNIT: The unit shall be completed and
conveyed by way of an Absolute Deed of Sale together with the attendant documents of
Ownership in the name of the BUYER the Transfer Certificate of Title and Certificate of
Occupancy within a period of six (6) months from the signing of Contract to Sell.[12]
From the foregoing provisions, it is clear that petitioner and FBMC had the obligation to
complete the townhouse unit within six months from the signing of the contract. Upon
compliance therewith, the obligation of respondent to pay the balance of P2,400,000.00 arises.
Upon payment thereof, the townhouse shall be delivered and conveyed to respondent upon the
execution of the Absolute Deed of Sale and other relevant documents.
The evidence
adduced shows that petitioner and FBMC failed to fulfill their obligation -- to complete and
deliver the townhouse within the six-month period. With petitioner and FBMCs non-fulfillment of

their obligation, respondent refused to pay the balance of the contract price. Respondent does
not ask that ownership of the townhouse be transferred to him, but merely asks that the amount
or down payment he had made be returned to him.
Article 1169 of the Civil Code reads:
Art. 1169. Those obliged to deliver or to do something incur in delay from the time the obligee
judicially or extrajudicially demands from them the fulfillment of their obligation.
However,
the demand by the creditor shall not be necessary in order that delay may exist:
(1)
When the obligation or the law expressly so declares; or
(2) When from the nature and
the circumstances of the obligation it appears that the designation of the time when the thing is
to be delivered or the service is to be rendered was a controlling motive for the establishment of
the contract; or
(3) When demand would be useless, as when the obligor has rendered it
beyond his power to perform.
In reciprocal obligations, neither party incurs in delay if the
other does not comply or is not ready to comply in a proper manner with what is incumbent
upon him. From the moment one of the parties fulfills his obligation, delay by the other begins.
The contract subject of this case contains reciprocal obligations which were to be fulfilled by
the parties, i.e., to complete and deliver the townhouse within six months from the execution of
the contract to sell on the part of petitioner and FBMC, and to pay the balance of the contract
price upon completion and delivery of the townhouse on the part of the respondent.
In the
case at bar, the obligation of petitioner and FBMC which is to complete and deliver the
townhouse unit within the prescribed period, is determinative of the respondents obligation to
pay the balance of the contract price. With their failure to fulfill their obligation as stipulated in
the contract, they incurred delay and are liable for damages.[13] They cannot insist that
respondent comply with his obligation. Where one of the parties to a contract did not perform
the undertaking to which he was bound by the terms of the agreement to perform, he is not
entitled to insist upon the performance of the other party.[14]
On the first assigned error,
petitioner insists there was no delay when the townhouse unit was not completed within six
months from the signing of the contract inasmuch as the mere lapse of the stipulated six (6)
month period is not by itself enough to constitute delay on his part and that of FBMC, since the
law requires that there must either be judicial or extrajudicial demand to fulfill an obligation so
that the obligor may be declared in default. He argues there was no evidence introduced
showing that a prior demand was made by respondent before the original action was instituted
in the trial court. We do not agree. Demand is not necessary in the instant case. Demand by
the respondent would be useless because the impossibility of complying with their (petitioner
and FBMC) obligation was due to their fault. If only they paid their loans with the LBP, the
mortgage on the subject townhouse would not have been foreclosed and thereafter sold to a
third person. Anent the second assigned error, petitioner argues that if there was any delay, the
same was incurred by respondent because he refused to pay the balance of the contract price.
We find his argument specious. As above-discussed, the obligation of respondent to pay the
balance of the contract price was conditioned on petitioner and FBMCs performance of their
obligation. Considering that the latter did not comply with their obligation to complete and
deliver the townhouse unit within the period agreed upon, respondent could not have incurred
delay. For failure of one party to assume and perform the obligation imposed on him, the other
party does not incur delay.[15] Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, we find that
respondent is justified in refusing to pay the balance of the contract price. He was never in
possession of the townhouse unit and he can no longer be its owner since ownership thereof

has been transferred to a third person who was not a party to the proceedings below. It would
simply be the height of inequity if we are to require respondent to pay the balance of the
contract price. To allow this would result in the unjust enrichment of petitioner and FBMC. The
fundamental doctrine of unjust enrichment is the transfer of value without just cause or
consideration. The elements of this doctrine which are present in this case are: enrichment on
the part of the defendant; impoverishment on the part of the plaintiff; and lack of cause. The
main objective is to prevent one to enrich himself at the expense of another. It is commonly
accepted that this doctrine simply means a person shall not be allowed to profit or enrich himself
inequitably at another's expense.[16] Hence, to allow petitioner and FBMC keep the down
payment made by respondent amounting to P1,060,000.00 would result in their unjust
enrichment at the expense of the respondent. Thus, said amount should be returned.
What is worse is the fact that petitioner and FBMC intentionally failed to inform respondent that
the subject townhouse which he was going to purchase was already mortgaged to LBP at the
time of the perfection of their contract. This deliberate withholding by petitioner and FBMC of
the mortgage constitutes fraud and bad faith. The trial court had this say:
In the light of
the foregoing environmental circumstances and milieu, therefore, it appears that the defendants
are guilty of fraud in dealing with the plaintiff. They performed voluntary and willful acts which
prevent the normal realization of the prestation, knowing the effects which naturally and
necessarily arise from such acts. Their acts import a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity
and conscious doing of a wrong. The said acts certainly gtive rise to liability for damages (8
Manresa 72; Borrell-Macia 26-27; 3 Camus 34; OLeary v. Macondray & Company, 454 Phil.
812; Heredia v. Salinas, 10 Phil. 157). Article 1170 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines
provides expressly that those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud and
those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof are liable for damages.[17] On the last
assigned error, petitioner contends that he should not be held solidarily liable with defendant
FBMC, because the latter is a separate and distinct entity which is the seller of the subject
townhouse. He claims that he, as Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of FBMC, cannot be
held liable because his representing FBMC in its dealings is a corporate act for which only
FBMC should be held liable. This issue of piercing the veil of corporate fiction was never raised
before the trial court. The same was raised for the first time before the Court of Appeals which
ruled that it was too late in the day to raise the same. The Court of Appeals declared: In the
case below, the pleadings and the evidence of the defendants are one and the same and never
had it made to appear that Almocera is a person distinct and separate from the other defendant.
In fine, we cannot treat this error for the first time on appeal. We cannot in good conscience, let
the defendant Almocera raise the issue of piercing the veil of corporate fiction just because of
the adverse decision against him. x x x.[18] To allow petitioner to pursue such a defense would
undermine basic considerations of due process. Points of law, theories, issues and arguments
not brought to the attention of the trial court will not be and ought not to be considered by a
reviewing court, as these cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. It would be unfair to the
adverse party who would have no opportunity to present further evidence material to the new
theory not ventilated before the trial court.[19]
As to the award of damages granted by the
trial court, and affirmed by the Court of Appeals, we find the same to be proper and reasonable
under the circumstances.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the

Court of Appeals dated 18 July 2005 in CA-G.R. CV No. 75610 is AFFIRMED. Costs against
the petitioner.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Sec. 13 - Interpretation according to circumstances
19. LUCIA CARLOS ALIO,substituted by her Surviving Heirs,MNicolas C. Alio and
Potenciano C. Alio, Petitioners,M- versus - HEIRS OF ANGELICA A. LORENZO namely:
Servillano V. Lorenzo, Agerico Lorenzo, Virginia Servangelli L. Aspera, Ben Errol Aspera,
Servillano A. Lorenzo, Jr., Servillano Santiago A. Lorenzo III, Ma. Angelica A. Lorenzo,
Servillano II and Anthony A. Lorenzo, represented by Servillano V. Lorenzo, Sr.
(father),mand Atty. Armando Lauban, in his capacity as Register of Deeds for Cotabato
City, Respondents.
G.R. No. 159550 June 27, 2008 D E C I S I O N AUSTRIAMARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court assailing the Decision[1] dated February 21, 2003 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 44857 which affirmed the Decision dated October 28, 1993 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 13, Cotabato City dismissing the complaint in Civil Case No.
2823, and the CA Resolution[2] dated August 20, 2003 which denied petitioners' Motion for
Reconsideration.
The present case arose from a controversy involving a 1,745-square
meter parcel of land known as Lot 183-A-1-B-3-A of Subdivision Plan Psd-12-001000, located at
Sinsuat Avenue, Rosary Heights, Cotabato City. The subject lot was registered in the name of
petitioner Lucia Carlos Alio (Lucia) under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-15443 issued
by the Registry of Deeds of the City of Cotabato.
On April 2, 1979, Angelica A. Lorenzo
(Angelica), Lucia's daughter, bought the subject lot for P10,000.00 under a Deed of Absolute
Sale.[3] Consequently, TCT No. T-15443 was canceled and TCT No. T-15500[4] was issued in
Angelica's name. The subject lot was declared for taxation purposes in Angelica's name under
Tax Declaration No. 14136.[5]
In the meantime, Lucia continued to pay, under her name,
the real estate taxes due on the subject lot from 1980 to 1987.[6] Sometime in 1984, Lucia
designated Vivian Losaria (Vivian) as caretaker of the subject lot.[7] Vivian built a 100-square
meter house on the subject lot and resided thereon.[8] She took care of the fruit-bearing trees
on the subject lot and delivered the fruits thereof to Lucia every harvest season.[9] She also
notified tenants of the two adjacent properties owned by Lucia when their rent was due.[10]
On October 3, 1985, Angelica died, leaving private respondents, as surviving heirs, her
husband, Servillano, Sr. and their eight children, namely: Servillano, Leila Lorenzo-Gepte,
Agerico, Servillano II, Virginia Servangelli Lorenzo-Aspera, Servillano III, Ma. Angelica and
Anthony. Two and a half years later, or on May 31, 1988, Angelica's heirs executed an ExtraJudicial Settlement of her estate.[11] The subject lot was adjudicated to Servillano III, Ma.
Angelica and Anthony, then all minors. As a result, TCT No. T-15500 was canceled and TCT
No. T-24417[12] was issued in the name of the three minors.
Meanwhile, on January
31, 1989, Lucia executed a document entitled Authority to Look for a Buyer[13] authorizing
Felixberto Bautista to look for a buyer for her lots in Rosary Heights. Subsequently, in Proposal
to Sell Real Property[14] dated February 1, 1989, Lucia offered to sell to the Central Bank of the
Philippines (CBP) her lots in Rosary Heights, including the subject lot, as registered in

Angelica's name.
On April 12, 1989, Lucia wrote a letter to Servillano, Sr. demanding the
return of the subject lot.[15] When Servillano, Sr. refused to accede to Lucia's demand, Lucia
filed on August 3, 1989 a Complaint[16] against the heirs of Angelica[17] for the declaration of
nullity of the Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 2, 1979, annulment of the extra-judicial
settlement and partition of estate and reconveyance of land title with damages. She alleged
that the sale of the subject lot was simulated, intended to merely accommodate the housing
loan application of Angelica.
In their Answer,[18] the heirs of Angelica denied Lucia's
allegations, contending that the subject lot was acquired for valuable consideration.
Following trial on the merits, the RTC rendered a Decision[19] on October 28, 1993, dismissing
the complaint and ordering Lucia to pay the heirs of Angelica P30,000.00 as attorney's fees. It
held that the sale was not simulated because Lucia recognized Angelica's ownership of the
subject lot when she paid the taxes for the same, gave written offers to sell her properties, along
with Angelica's property, to the CBP, and issued an Authority to Look for a Buyer indicating
Angelica's children as owners of the subject lot; that Lucia did not take concrete steps to
recover the subject lot for 10 years until she demanded from Servillano, Sr. its return.
Dissatisfied, Lucia appealed. On February 21, 2003, the CA rendered a Decision[20] adopting
the findings of the RTC that Lucia recognized Angelica's ownership of the subject lot by her
payment of the real property taxes and the written offers to sell and authority to look for a buyer.
It also emphasized that the deed of sale was a notarized document and enjoyed the
presumption of regularity which Lucia failed to overcome. It, however, deleted the award for
attorney's fees.
Since Lucia died[21] during the pendency of the appeal, she was
substituted by her surviving heirs, Nicolas and Potenciano.[22] In a Resolution[23] dated
August 20, 2003, the CA denied their Motion for Reconsideration.[24]
Hence, the
present petition. Potenciano died[25] during the pendency of the present petition and he was
substituted by his wife, Rosita Pinto Alio.[26]
The core issue posed before the
Court is whether or not the Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 2, 1979 executed by Lucia in favor
of Angelica is valid and binding upon the parties.
Petitioners contend that the sale was
simulated, considering the complete absence of any attempt on the part of Angelica or
Servillano, Sr. to assert dominical rights over the subject property, even as Lucia remained in
continuous, open and adverse possession of the subject lot and continued to pay the real
property taxes due thereon. They also point to the gross disproportion between the purchase
price and the market value of the property, the non-payment of the consideration, and sale
having been made in Angelica's name only as other indications of simulation.
Respondent heirs, on the other hand, submit that the sale was not simulated because Lucia's
subsequent acts affirmed the genuineness of the sale. They also contend that Lucia did not
take any concrete steps to recover the subject lot.
The Court finds for the petitioners.
The general rule is that in the exercise of the Supreme Courts power of review, the Court not
being a trier of facts, does not normally embark on a re-examination of the evidence presented
by the contending parties during the trial of the case considering that the findings of facts of the
CA are conclusive and binding on the Court.[27] This rule, however, has several wellrecognized exceptions: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or
conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3)
when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension
of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the CA went

beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the
appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court; (8) when the
findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when
the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not
disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed
absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) when the CA
manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly
considered, would justify a differentconclusion.[28] Exceptions (1), (2), (4) and (11) are
present in the instant case.
It is a cardinal rule in the interpretation of contracts that the
intention of the parties shall be accorded primordial consideration.[29] Such intention is
determined from the express terms of their agreement,[30] as well as their contemporaneous
and subsequent acts.[31] When the parties do not intend to be bound at all, the contract is
absolutely simulated; if the parties conceal their true agreement, then the contract is relatively
simulated.[32] Characteristic of simulation is that the apparent contract is not really desired or
intended to produce legal effects or in any way alter the juridical situation of the parties.[33]
In Suntay v. Court of Appeals,[34] the Court held that the most protuberant index of simulation is
the complete absence of an attempt in any manner on the part of the vendee to assert his rights
of ownership over the disputed property. This pronouncement was reiterated in such cases as
Sps. Santiago v. Court of Appeals,[35] Cruz v. Bancom Finance Corporation,[36] Ramos v. Heirs
of Honorio Ramos, Sr.,[37] Manila Banking Corporation v. Silverio,[38] and most recently in
Tating v. Marcella.[39]
In the present case, the evidence clearly shows that
Angelica or Servillano, Sr. did not attempt to exercise any act of dominion over the subject lot.
From the time the sale was effected on April 2, 1979 up to the time of the institution of the
complaint on August 3, 1989,[40] Angelica or Servillano, Sr. did not enter the subject lot and
occupy the premises. When Servillano, Sr. transferred his residence, he did not even choose to
utilize the subject lot.[41] None of the respondent heirs also took possession of the subject lot.
In contrast, Lucia was in actual possession of the property. She designated Vivian as
caretaker of the subject lot in 1984.[42] Vivian constructed a house on the subject lot and has
been residing therein since then.[43] It is well-settled that actual possession of land consists in
the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as those a party would naturally
exercise over his own property.[44] It is not necessary that the owner of a parcel of land should
himself occupy the property as someone in his name may perform the act. In other words, the
owner of real estate has possession, either when he himself is physically in occupation of the
property, or when another person who recognizes his rights as owner is in such occupancy.[45]
Furthermore, Lucia religiously paid the realty taxes on the subject lot from 1980 to 1987.
[46] While tax receipts and declarations of ownership for taxation purposes are not, in
themselves, incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they constitute at least proof that the holder
has a claim of title over the property,[47] particularly when accompanied by proof of actual
possession.[48] They are good indicia of the possession in the concept of owner, for no one in
his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or at least
constructive possession.[49] The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for taxation
purposes manifests not only ones sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the property and
announces his adverse claim against the State and all other interested parties, but also the
intention to contribute needed revenues to the Government.[50] Such an act strengthens ones

bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership.[51]

On the other hand, respondent heirs
failed to present evidence that Angelica, during her lifetime, paid the realty taxes on the subject
lot. They presented only two tax receipts showing that Servillano, Sr. belatedly paid taxes due
on the subject lot for the years 1980-1981 and part of year 1982 on September 8, 1989,[52] or
about a month after the institution of the complaint on August 3, 1989,[53] a clear indication that
payment was made as an afterthought to give the semblance of truth to their claim.
Thus, the subsequent acts of the parties belie the intent to be bound by the deed of sale.
The lower courts fault Lucia for allegedly not taking concrete steps to recover the subject lot,
demanding its return only after 10 years from the registration of the title. They, however, failed
to consider that Lucia was in actual possession of the property.
It is well-settled that an
action for reconveyance prescribes in 10 years, the reckoning point of which is the date of
registration of the deed or the date of issuance of the certificate of title over the property. In an
action for reconveyance, the decree of registration is highly regarded as incontrovertible. What
is sought instead is the transfer of the property or its title, which has been erroneously or
wrongfully registered in another persons name, to its rightful or legal owner or to one who has a
better right.[54]
However, in a number of cases in the past, the Court has consistently
ruled that if the person claiming to be the owner of the property is in actual possession thereof,
the right to seek reconveyance, which in effect seeks to quiet title to the property, does not
prescribe.[55] The reason for this is that one who is in actual possession of a piece of land
claiming to be the owner thereof may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked
before taking steps to vindicate his right.[56] The reason being, that his undisturbed possession
gives him the continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to ascertain the nature of the
adverse claim of a third party and its effect on his title, which right can be claimed only by one
who is in possession.[57] Thus, considering that Lucia continuously possessed the subject lot,
her right to institute a suit to clear the cloud over her title cannot be barred by the statute of
limitations.
Having resolved the core issue on the validity of the deed of sale, the
Court sees no need to further discuss the remaining matters raised in the petition. Suffice it to
state that the concept of inadequacy or non-payment of price is irreconcilable with the concept
of simulation. If there exists an actual consideration for transfer evidenced by the alleged act of
sale, no matter how inadequate it be, the transaction could not be a simulated sale.[58] As to
filial relationship, i.e., the sale was effected in the name of the daughter only, the same, by itself,
cannot be considered an indication of simulation, absent an indication of the absence of intent
to be bound by the contract,[59] which in the present case was shown by subsequent acts of the
parties.
WHEREFORE, the present petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated February
21, 2003 and Resolution dated August 20, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
44857 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 2, 1979 is
declared NULL and VOID ab initio. Accordingly, respondent heirs are ordered to reconvey the
subject lot to petitioners within fifteen (15) days after the Decision becomes final and executory,
failing in which, the Clerk of Court is ordered to execute the Deed of Reconveyance in favor of
the petitioners. The respondent Register of Deeds shall cancel TCT No. T-24417 upon
presentation of said Deed of Reconveyance and issue a Transfer Certificate of Title in the name
of petitioners. Costs against private respondents.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

20. ALEXANDER and JEAN BACUNGAN - versus -mCOURT OF APPEALS and SPS.
NAPOLEON and VICTORIA VELO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 170282. December 18, 2008
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, assailing the decision[2] and resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. CV No. 64370. The Decision dated 21 March 2005 reversed and set aside the judgment[4]
of dismissal by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 53, Pangasinan in the action for
reconveyance filed by respondents against petitioners, while the resolution denied petitioners
motion for reconsideration of the CA decision.
The following factual antecedents are
matters of record.
Respondents Napoleon and Victoria Velo instituted an action for
reconveyance with damages against petitioners Alexander and Jean Jimeno Bacungan before
the RTC of Rosales, Pangasinan. In the complaint,[5] docketed as Civil Case No. 1085-R,
respondents alleged that they were the registered owners of 18 parcels of land situated in
Rosales, Pangasinan and embraced in Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 34998, 36022,
35158, 36017, 18128, 26761, 36020, 28387, 35585, 25739, 36023, 40059, 40055, 40060,
40057, 40056, 36967 and 35268.[6]
Respondents claimed that sometime in February of
1993, they had experienced business reversals and financial difficulties and had sought
assistance from petitioners in securing a loan. Petitioners allegedly proposed that they would
obtain the loan from the bank provided that respondents secure the transfer of the titles to
petitioners that would be used as security for the loan. Respondents agreed, executed the
corresponding deeds of sale and caused the cancellation and issuance of new TCTs over the
properties in favor of petitioners. However, respondents claimed that after petitioners had
obtained the new titles, they never applied for a loan with the bank but had secretly negotiated
for the sale of the properties to third parties.[7] In their answer,[8] petitioners asserted that
respondents offered to sell to them 23 parcels of land, 18 of which were used as collateral for
the loan respondents had obtained from Traders Royal Bank. Petitioners claimed to have
bought 22 parcels of land and executed the corresponding deeds of sale on 26 February 1993
and 10 March 1993. They also allegedly paid in full respondents obligation with said bank but
only 18 certificates of title released by the bank were delivered to petitioners. Petitioners further
maintained that out of their gratuitousness, they returned one of the deeds of sale to
respondents and considered the sale as cancelled. Petitioners averred that the amounts they
paid to respondents, as well as their payments to the bank, were more than enough as
consideration of the 23 contracts.[9] After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered a decision on 20
April 1999, dismissing the complaint for lack of merit. The RTC gave evidentiary weight on the
notarized deeds of sale, the presumed validity and due execution of which, according to the
RTC, were not overcome by the uncorroborated testimony of respondent Victoria Velo. The RTC
held that in any case, respondents admitted to have voluntarily consented to the simulation of
the contracts, thus, the principle of in pari delicto must prevail and both parties were at fault and
should be left at where the law finds them. Respondents elevated the matter to the CA via a
petition for review, arguing that the contracts between respondents and petitioners were
simulated. On 21 March 2005, the CA rendered the assailed decision, reversing the RTCs
judgment. The dispositive portion of the CAs decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the assailed
decision dated 20 April 1999 of the Regional Trial Court of Rosales, Pangasinan is SET ASIDE.

Judgment is hereby rendered: 1.

Declaring the Deeds of Sale covering parcels of land under
TCT Nos. 34998, 36022, 35158, 36017, 18128, 26761, 36020, 28381, 35585, 25739, 36023,
40059, 40055, 40060, 40057, 40056, 36967and 35268 as simulated; and2. Ordering the
defendants-appellees to reconvey the aforesaid properties to the plaintiffs-appellants. SO
ORDERED.[10]
In reversing the RTC decision, the CA held that by their contemporaneous
and subsequent acts, the deeds of sale were simulated as the parties did not intend to be bound
by them at all. Among the indicators pointed out by the appellate court in support of its
conclusion were the gross inadequacy of prices, respondents failure to receive any part of the
purchase price stated in the deeds of sale, the offer by petitioners to return some of the
certificates of title and petitioner Alexander Bacungans admission that the sale was simulated.
[11] Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration,[12] raising the CAs failure to consider the
amounts tendered by petitioners for the redemption of the properties as well as the amounts
advanced by petitioners as payments of the properties. On 7 November 2005, the CA issued the
assailed resolution, denying petitioners motion for reconsideration. Hence, the instant petition,
raising the following arguments: (1) the deeds of sale embody the real agreement of the parties
and are not nullified by the gross inadequacy of the prices; (2) the contracts of sale cannot be
simulated because prior to their execution, petitioner extended a loan to respondents which was
used to redeem the mortgaged properties; and (3) respondents admitted that the only
agreement was the contracts of sale; thus, the appellate court erred in interpreting the acts of
the parties before and after their execution.[13] The petition is partly meritorious. Respondents
and petitioners advance contrasting claims. Petitioners would have this Court uphold the validity
of the deeds of sale while respondents seek their nullification. Neither is claiming that they had
agreed other terms and conditions not embodied in the deeds of sale or that the deeds of sale
do not embody their real agreement. However, after a perusal of the records of the case, the
Court finds that the resolution of the controversy cannot be limited only to determining whether
the deeds of sale were void. Such issue may still be considered and resolved by the Court in the
interest of substantial justice, if it finds that to do so is necessary to arrive at a just decision, or
when an issue is closely related to an issue raised in the trial court and the Court of Appeals and
is necessary for a just and complete resolution of the case.[14] After a careful examination of
the records of the case, the Court finds that the deeds of absolute sale do not embody the real
intention of the parties. The records reveal that respondents had earlier executed several real
estate mortgages over the properties to secure the payment of the total amount of P350,000.00.
[15] Respondents defaulted on the payments, prompting the bank to foreclose the properties.
However, as illustrated in the testimony of respondent Victoria Velo, respondents and petitioners
devised a plan in which they agreed that in exchange for the apparent transfer of ownership of
the parcels of land to petitioners, the latter would provide for the funds for the redemption of the
properties from the bank in addition to the loan that petitioners would obtain from the bank.
Thus, respondents were able to redeem the properties for the amount of P369,000.00 that was
advanced by way of mortgage to them by petitioners.[16] The amount approximates the total
loans in the amount of P350,000.00 secured by the properties subject of the real estate
mortgages executed by respondents.[17] Thereafter, respondents executed several deeds of
sale purporting to transfer the 18 parcels of lands for a total consideration of P232,000.00. The
parties further agreed that upon the transfer of the properties in the name of petitioners, the
latter would obtain another loan from the bank using the properties as collateral. Petitioners

were supposed to remit the loan proceeds to respondents after deducting the amount of
P369,000.00 lent by petitioners to respondents and, thereafter, allow respondents to buy back
the properties. However, because petitioners had failed to secure a loan from the bank after the
transfer of the titles in their names, respondents instituted the present action to nullify the deeds
of sale on the ground that the sale was simulated. This kind of arrangement, where the
ownership of the land is supposedly transferred to the buyer who provides for the funds to
redeem the property from the bank but nonetheless allows the seller to later on buy back the
properties, is in the nature of an equitable mortgage governed by Articles 1602 and 1604 of the
Civil Code, which provide: Article 1602. The contract shall be presumed to be an equitable
mortgage, in any of the following cases:(1) When the price of a sale with right to repurchase is
unusually inadequate; (2) When the vendor remains in possession as lessee or otherwise; (3)
When upon or after the expiration of the right to repurchase another instrument extending the
period of redemption or granting a new period is executed; (4) When the purchaser retains for
himself a part of the purchase price; (5) When the vendor binds himself to pay the taxes on the
thing sold; (6) In any case where it may be fairly inferred that the real intention of the parties is
that the transaction shall secure the payment of a debt or the performance of any other
obligation.In any of the foregoing cases, any money, fruits, or other benefit to be received by the
vendee as rent or otherwise shall be considered as interest which shall be subject to the usury
laws.Art. 1604. The provisions of Article 1602 shall also apply to a contract purporting to be an
absolute sale.
From a reading of the above-quoted provisions, for a presumption of an
equitable mortgage to arise, two requisites must be satisfied, namely: that the parties entered
into a contract denominated as a contract of sale and that their intention was to secure an
existing debt by way of mortgage. Under Art. 1604 of the Civil Code, a contract purporting to be
an absolute sale shall be presumed to be an equitable mortgage should any of the conditions in
Art. 1602 be present. The existence of any of the circumstances therein, not a concurrence or
an overwhelming number of such circumstances, suffices to give rise to the presumption that
the contract is an equitable mortgage.[18] In the instant case, three telling circumstances
indicating that an equitable mortgage exists are present. First, as established by the CA, the
price of each of the properties was grossly inadequate. Second, petitioners retained part of the
purchase price when they failed to turn over to the respondents the loan that they were
supposed to secure from the bank. Third, petitioners insisted that part of the consideration of the
sale consisted of amounts previously borrowed by respondents from them, indicating that
petitioners were using the properties as security for the payment of respondents other loans
from them.
The CA concluded that the sale was simulated because of the gross
inadequacy of the prices and the failure by respondents to receive the purchase price. Gross
inadequacy of price by itself will not result in a void contract. Gross inadequacy of price does
not even affect the validity of a contract of sale, unless it signifies a defect in the consent or that
the parties actually intended a donation or some other contract. Inadequacy of cause will not
invalidate a contract unless there has been fraud, mistake or undue influence.[19] That
respondents did not receive the purchase price is not entirely correct. As already discussed
above, the consideration for the transaction was to secure the payment of respondents loan to
petitioners. Also, the CAs conclusion that petitioner Alexander Bacungan admitted that the sale
was simulated is not supported by the records of the case. Petitioners merely admitted that
previous to the execution of the deeds of sale, respondents had borrowed other sums of money

from them. All told, while the deeds of sale do not reflect the true intention of the parties, their
real agreement must nonetheless be recognized and enforced. While neither party claimed that
the real agreement was an equitable mortgage, the factual circumstances of the case nudge the
Court to declare the real agreement as such and enforce the rights and liabilities of the parties
accordingly. This being the case, the proper remedy availed by either party was to institute an
action for the reformation of the deeds of sale in order to reflect the true intention of the parties.
However, instead of dismissing the complaint altogether, the just and expeditious manner is to
settle once and for all the rights and obligations of the parties under the equitable mortgage. It
has been established that petitioners advanced the sum of P369,000.00 to respondents that
prompted the latter to transfer the properties to petitioners. Thus, before the respondents can
recover the said amount, respondents must first return the amount of P369,000.00 to
petitioners. In Lustan v. Court Appeals,[20] where the Court established the reciprocal
obligations of the parties under an equitable mortgage, the Court ordered the reconveyance of
the property to the rightful owner therein upon the payment of the loan within 90 days from the
finality of this decision.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is PARTLY
GRANTED and the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 64370
are AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS: 1) DECLARING the Deeds of Absolute
Sale as equitable mortgages; and 2) ORDERING petitioners to RECONVEY to respondents the
properties covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 34998, 36022, 35158, 36017, 18128,
26761, 36020, 28381, 35585, 25739, 36023, 40059, 40055, 40060, 40057, 40056, 36967 AND
35268 of the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan UPON THE PAYMENT OF P369,000.00 by
respondents within NINETY DAYS FROM THE FINALITY OF THIS DECISION.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------21. FRANCISCO R. NUNGA, JR. and VICTOR D. NUNGA, Petitioners, - versus FRANCISCO N. NUNGA III, Respondent.
G.R. No. 178306. December 18, 2008
D E C I S I O NCHICO-NAZARIO, J.:Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision[1] dated 31 January 2007 and
Resolution[2] dated 4 June 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 78424. The
appellate court, in its assailed decision, reversed the Decision[3] dated 25 October 2002 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of the City of San Fernando, Pampanga, Branch 42, in Commercial
Case No. 018, which ordered the registration of the transfer of ownership of the disputed shares
of stock in the Rural Bank of Apalit, Inc. (RBA) in favor of petitioners; and in its resolution,
denied the Motion for Reconsideration of the aforementioned decision.
Presented hereunder are the factual antecedents of the case.On 30 January 1996, the RBA
conducted its Annual Stockholders Meeting at its principal office in San Vicente, Apalit,
Pampanga. Attending the said meeting were stockholders representing 28,150 out of the
35,956 total outstanding shares of stock of RBA.[4] Petitioner Francisco R. Nunga, Jr.
(Francisco Jr.), his son petitioner Victor D. Nunga (Victor), and his nephew respondent
Francisco N. Nunga III (Francisco III) were among the stockholders of RBA. However, petitioner
Francisco Jr. was not present at the meeting, as he was then in the United States of America
where he is a naturalized citizen.

Quorum having been established at the meeting, the stockholders proceeded with the election
of the RBA Board of Directors to serve for the fiscal year 1996. Francisco III was voted the
Chairman of the Board; with Ma. Elena Rueda, Ma. Rosario Elena Nacario, Cecilia Viray and
Dwight Nunga, the Members. In the same meeting, stockholder Jesus Gonzalez (Gonzalez)
made known his intention to sell his shareholdings.
Victor, thereafter, informed his father, Francisco Jr., of Gonzalezs intention to sell his shares.
Francisco Jr. then instructed Victor to inquire from Gonzalez the terms of the sale. After a series
of negotiations, Gonzalez ultimately agreed to sell his shares of stock to Francisco Jr.On 19
February 1996, Gonzalez executed a Contract to Sell[5] in favor of Francisco Jr., which
pertinently provided: CONTRACT TO SELL KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS
This CONTRACT TO SELL, executed this 19th day of February, 1996, at Quezon City, by
JESUS J. GONZALE[Z], of legal age, Filipino citizen, married to Cristina D. Gonzale[z], residing
at No. 10 2nd Ave., Crame, Quezon City, hereinafter referred to as the VENDOR; in favor of
FRANCISCO D. (sic) NUNGA, JR., of legal age, single, residing at Poblacion, Masantol,
Pampanga[,] hereinafter referred to as the PURCHASER; WITNESSETH That the VENDOR
is the absolute registered owner of several shares of stocks of the RURAL BANK OF APALIT,
INC. located at Apalit, Pampanga, more particularly described as follows: Stock Cert. No.
No. of shares represented
Date of Issue Journal Folio No.5
250
May,1978
136
122
Jan,1991
1105 264
Feb,1991
5152 487
Nov,1993
7166 8
Feb,1994
7181 525
July,1994
8213 336
That the VENDOR has offered to sell the abovestated (sic) shares of stocks and the
PURCHASER has agreed to purchase the same for a total consideration of P200,000; That it is
hereby agreed that out of the total consideration or contract price, the purchaser will pay the
amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00), receipt of which is herein acknowledged
by the purchaser, at the date and place below stated and the remaining balance of P150,000
will be paid in full on February, (sic) 28, 1996;That it is further agreed that the VENDOR will
execute an authorization in favor of the herein purchaser or his representative, Victor D.
Nunga[,] to retrieve all the corresponding Stocks (sic) Certificates as above indicated from the
Apalit Rural Bank, Inc.WHEREFORE, for and in consideration of the total amount of P200,000
(sic) receipt in part of which is herein acknowledged in the amount of P50,000.00, the vendor
hereby agrees to sell, cede and transfer all the above stated shares of stocks to the
PURCHASER, his heirs[,] successors, and assigns, absolutely free from any encumbrance and
lien whatsoever.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my signature this 19th
day of FEBRUARY, (sic) 1996, at Quezon City, Philippines.
(signed)
JESUS J. GONZALES
VendorOn even date, Victor gave the initial payment of P50,000.00 to Gonzalez, who duly
acknowledged the same.[6] In exchange, Gonzalez handed Victor RBA Stock Certificates No.
105, No. 152 and No. 166. As to the four other certificates that were in the possession of the
RBA, Gonzalez issued a letter[7] addressed to Isabel Firme (Firme), the RBA Corporate
Secretary, which instructed the latter to turn over to Victor the remaining stock certificates in
Gonzalezs name. Upon being presented with Gonzalezs letter, Firme gave Victor Stock
Certificate No. 181, but alleged that Stock Certificates No. 5 and No. 36 could no longer be

located in the files of RBA. Firme advised Victor to merely reconstitute the missing stock
certificates.[8] A reading of the said Contract to Sell would reveal, however, that the same was
only notarized on 28 February 1996. Before Francisco Jr. and Victor could pay the balance of
the contract price for Gonzalezs RBA shares of stock, Gonzalez entered into another contract
involving the very same shares. It would appear that on 27 February 1996, Gonzalez executed
a Deed of Assignment[9] of his RBA shares of stock in favor of Francisco III, the relevant terms
of which recite: DEED OF ASSIGNMENT KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
For
value (sic) consideration received, the undersigned ASSIGNOR JESUS GONZALE[Z], of legal
age, Filipino and resident of #10 2ND AVENUE, CUBAO, QUEZON CITY, METRO MANILA
hereby sells, assigns and transfers unto FRANCISCO N. NUNGA III (AS ASSIGNEE), Filipino,
of legal age and with postal address at 1122 Alhambra St., Ermita 1000 Metro Manila, his
assigns and successors, all their rights, titles and interests to the following shares of stocks
owned by the ASSIGNOR in Apalit Rural Bank, Inc., with par value of one hundred pesos only
(P100.00) per share, free from all liens and encumbrances. Date. SC. No. No. of Share. Amount
May 24,1969 4 (sic). 250. P 25,000.00January 02,1975 36 122. 12,200.0
February 19, 1991 105. 264 26,400.00November 10, 1993 152 487 48,700.00February
22, 1994. 166. 8
800.00July 25, 1994. 181. 525
52,500.00February 2, 1996. 213. 336
33,600.00
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the ASSIGNOR have (sic) cause (sic) these
presents to be signed at Quezon City, this 27 day of February, 1996.(signed)JESUS J.
GONZALE[Z]Assignor At the same time the afore-quoted Deed was executed, Francisco III paid
in full the agreed purchase price of P300,000.00 using a BPI (Bank of the Philippine Islands)
Family Bank Check No. 0347505 issued in favor of Gonzalez. An acknowledgment receipt
signed by Gonzalez and witnessed by his wife Cristina D. Gonzalez evidenced the payment.[10]
Since the stock certificates covering the shares were already in Victors possession, Gonzalez
immediately wrote Victor a letter,[11] demanding that Victor hand over the said stock certificates
to Francisco III, the supposed new owner of the shares. The next day, on 28 February 1996,
Francisco Jr. arrived from the United States of America. He and Victor then promptly proceeded
to the residence of Gonzalez in order to pay the balance of P150,000.00 of the purchase price
stated in their Contract to Sell with Gonzalez. Gonzalez, however, informed them that he
already sold his shares of stock to Francisco III.[12] After discussing the matter, Gonzalez was
somehow convinced to accept the balance of the purchase price and sign his name at the
dorsal portion of the stock certificates to endorse the same to Francisco Jr. Gonzalez also
executed a Deed of Absolute Sale[13] in favor of Francisco Jr., which states: DEED OF
ABSOLUTE SALEKNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:This DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE,
executed this 28th day of February, 1996, at SAN JUAN, M.M. by:JESUS J. GONZALE[Z], of
legal age, Filipino citizen, married to Cristina D. Gonzale[z], residing at No. 10 2nd Ave., Crame,
Quezon City, hereinafter referred to as the VENDOR;in favor of
FRANCISCO R. NUNGA, JR., of legal age, married, residing at Poblacion, Masantol,
Pampanga[,] hereinafter referred to as the PURCHASER[;] WITNESSETH: That the VENDOR
is the absolute registered owner of several shares of stocks of the RURAL BANK OF APALIT,
INC. located at Apalit, Pampanga, more particularly described as follows: Stock Cert. No. No. of
Shares. Represented. Date of Issue. Journal Folio No.5. 250. May, 1978. 136. 122. Jan., 1991.
1105. 264. Feb., 1991. 5152. 487. Nov., 1993. 7166. 8. Feb., 1994. 7

181. 525. July, 1994. 8213. 336 That Stock Certificate Nos. 5 and 36 respectively representing
250 and 122 shares of the Rural Bank of Apalit[,] Inc. were lost and is (sic) currently in the
process of reconstitution;That the VENDOR has offered to sell the abovestated (sic) shares of
stocks and the PURCHASER has agreed to purchase the same.WHEREFORE, for and in
consideration of the total amount of TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P 200,000.00),
receipt of which in full is herein acknowledged, the VENDOR hereby sells, cedes and transfers
all the above stated shares of stocks to the PURCHASER, his heirs, successors, and assigns,
absolutely free from any encumbrance and lien whatsoever.IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have
hereunto set my signature this 28 day of FEB (sic), 1996, at SAN JUAN, MM, Philippines.
(signed)JESUS J. GONZALE[Z]Vendor Incidentally, on that same day, Francisco III delivered to
Firme the Deed of Assignment which Gonzalez executed in his favor, and a copy of Gonzalezs
letter to Victor dated 27 February 1996 demanding the latter to surrender the stock certificates
in his possession to Francisco III. Accordingly, on 1 March 1996, Firme wrote Victor a letter[14]
requesting that the latter immediately comply with the enclosed 27 February 1996 letter of
Gonzalez. Victor refused to comply with Firmes request and instead demanded that the sale of
shares of stock by Gonzalez in favor of Francisco Jr. on 28 February 1996 be entered into the
Corporate Book of Transfer of RBA. Firme, in turn, rejected Victors demand, alleging that
Francisco III already bought Gonzalezs shares.[15]Consequently, on 14 March 1996, Victor
filed a Petition[16] with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) against Francisco III
and Firme, which was docketed as SEC Case No. 03-96-5288. Victor prayed that the SEC
declare null and void the Stockholders Meeting held on 30 January 1996 for lack of the required
majority quorum; as well as the votes cast for the shares of the deceased stockholders, namely,
Teodorico R. Nunga, Carmencita N. Nunga and Jesus Enrico N. Nunga. Victor additionally
requested that the transfer of Gonzalezs RBA shareholdings to Francisco Jr. be annotated on
the RBA Corporate Transfer Book and new stock certificates be issued in favor of Francisco Jr.
Victor finally pleaded that Francisco III and Firme be ordered to jointly pay him P50,000.00 as
attorneys fees, damages and litigation expenses.On the same date, Francisco III likewise filed
a Complaint[17] against Gonzalez, Francisco Jr., and Victor before the SEC, which was
docketed as SEC Case No. 03-96-5292. Francisco III sought the issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) against Francisco Jr. and Victor, who were allegedly conspiring to oust
him and the other members of the RBA Board of Directors. Francisco III also prayed, inter alia,
for judgment ordering (a) Victor to surrender Gonzalezs stock certificates in order that the same
may be transferred to Francisco IIIs name; and (b) Francisco Jr. and Victor to desist from
attempting to register the purported sale by Gonzales of his RBA shares of stock to Francisco
Jr., who had already become a naturalized American citizen and was, thus, disqualified from
owning shares in RBA. Francisco III and Firme filed their joint Answer[18] in SEC Case No. 0396-5288, while Francisco Jr. and Victor filed their Answer[19] in SEC Case No. 03-96-5292.
Gonzalez, however, was considered in default in both SEC cases for failure to file his answers
despite notice.Eventually, Francisco Jr.[20] and Victor filed a Motion for Consolidation[21] of the
two cases pending before the SEC, alleging that they involved common questions of fact and
law, which required the presentation of similar evidence. Said Motion was granted in an
Order[22] dated 30 September 1996. Thereafter, SEC Cases No. 03-96-5288 and No. 03-965292 were jointly heard. After the parties submitted their respective Offers of Evidence, but
before the SEC could rule on the same, the cases were eventually turned over to the RTC

pursuant to Administrative Circular AM No. 00-11-03[23] of the Supreme Court dated 21

November 2000.[24] In the RTC, SEC Cases No. 03-96-5288 and No. 03-96-5292 were
docketed as Commercial Cases No. 001 and No. 018, respectively. Francisco Jr. and Victor
subsequently filed a Motion to Resolve their Formal Offer of Exhibits, which the SEC was not
able to act upon. In an Order[25] dated 30 April 2002, the RTC admitted the formal offers of
evidence in both cases.On 25 October 2002,[26] the RTC promulgated its Decision. With
respect to Commercial Case No. 001, Victors Petition, the RTC ruled:The Court, after a careful
study on the evidences on record finds that [herein petitioner Victor] failed to substantiate the
allegation in the petition. [Victor] failed to controvert the documentary evidences presented by
[herein respondent Francisco III] to wit: Minutes of the Stockholders Meeting, showing the
number of shares present in person or in proxy[;] written Proxy in favor of Dwight N. Nunga in
(sic) behalf of deceased Teodorico R. Nunga by virtue of the Extrajudicial Settlement of estate in
(sic) behalf of Carmencita Noel Nunga proxy executed by Ma. Del Carmen N. Leveriza in her
capacity as the Judicial Administratrix duly appointed by the RTC Branch 60, Makati[,] Metro
Manila in Special Proceedings No. M-1461[27]; Affidavit of respondent Isabel C. Firme stating
thereat the fact that the certificate of stock delivered for registration in the Corporate Transfer
Book were mere xerox copies thus, the refusal. Thus further, proved [Victors] lack of cause of
action against [Francisco III] and as a result of which damages on the part of [Francisco III] and
Isabel C. Firme who were constrained to hire the services of their counsel to protect their right
(sic). (Emphasis ours.) As regards Commercial Case No. 018,[28] Francisco IIIs Complaint, the
RTC decreed:The Court[,] after a careful study on the aforementioned evidences (sic) on
record[,] finds and holds that [herein petitioner Francisco Jr.] has a better right over the subject
shares considering that the Contract to Sell was executed prior to the Deed of Assignment
presented by the [herein respondent Francisco III]. The Court gleaned also from the evidences
(sic) that the Deed of Assignment was executed in bad faith as [Francisco III] is aware of the
transaction between [herein petitioner Victor] in (sic) behalf of his father and [Gonzalez], thus,
the conclusion that the Deed of Assignment was executed with malice. The Contract to Sell
may not be a public instrument[29] but being a consensual contract it is, therefore, valid there
being a meeting of the mind (sic) between the parties. Further, there being no contention on
(sic) the contrary, on the validity of the Deed of Absolute Sale interposed by [Gonzalez] coupled
with the proof of full payment and the endorsement of the Stock Certificate at the back by the
owner[,] which is the only operative act of valid transfer of shares of stock certificate provided for
by law and jurisprudence, clearly convinced the Court that the latter honored the transaction
between him and [Victor] in (sic) behalf of his father [Francisco Jr.] and[,] to bind third parties,
the fact of transfer should be registered with the transfer book of the corporation.
xxxx
Further, with respect to the issue on the citizenship of [Francisco Jr.], not being qualified
to own such share (sic), the Court is inclined to give credence on (sic) the contention of the
latter[,] it being supported by R.A. 8179[,] known as An Act to Further Liberalize Foreign
Investment,[] to wit: "SEC. 9. Investment Rights of Former Natural-born Filipinos. For
purposes of this Act, former natural born citizens of the Philippines shall have the same
investment rights of a Filipino citizen in Cooperatives under Republic Act No. 6938, Rural Banks
under Republic Act No. 7353, Thrift Banks and Private Development Banks under Republic Act
No. 7906, and Financing Companies under Republic Act No. 5980.Furthermore, insofar as (sic)
[Gonzalez], the same was (sic) considered as in default for failure to appear and participate

despite notice. (Emphasis ours.) In the end, the RTC disposed of the two cases in this wise:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in Commercial Case No.
001 ordering the dismissal of the Petition filed by [herein petitioner Victor] against [herein
respondent Francisco III] and Isabel C. Firme.
Insofar as Commercial Case No. 018[,]
judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the [herein petitioners Victor and Francisco Jr.] and
against [Francisco III] ordering the following:1) Ordering the Corporate Secretary of the Rural
Bank of Apalit, Inc, (sic) to register the fact of the transfer of ownership in favor of [Francisco Jr.]
and to cancel Stock certificate (sic) in the name of Jesus [Gonzalez] and to issue a new one
(sic) in the name of [Francisco Jr.] upon presentation of Stock Certificate Nos. 105, 152, 166,
181, 213, 5 and 36 duly endorsed by Jesus [Gonzalez];2) The [respondent Francisco III] to pay
the [petitioners Victor and Francisco Jr.] the amount of P100,000.00 [for] moral damages[;]3)
The amount of P100,000.00 [for] exemplary damages[;]4) The amount of P50,000.00 [for]
attorneys (sic) fees and the cost of suit.[30
Francisco III filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration[31] of the afore-quoted Decision, but it
was denied by the RTC in an Order[32] dated 31 January 2003. Thus, Francisco III filed with
the RTC a Notice of Appeal.[33] His appeal before the Court of Appeals was docketed as CAG.R. CV No. 78424. Before the Court of Appeals, Francisco III argued that the RTC erred in: (1)
ruling that Francisco Jr. had a better right over the disputed shares of stock, considering that the
prior contract which he had entered into with Gonzalez was a mere contract to sell; (2) finding
that the Deed of Assignment in Francisco IIIs favor was executed in bad faith, inasmuch as it
was not supported by any of the evidence presented by all the parties; and (3) giving retroactive
effect to Republic Act No. 8179,[34] which grants former natural born citizens (such as
Francisco Jr.) equal investment rights in rural banks of the Philippines as Philippine citizens. In
relation to his third assignment of error, Francisco III pointed out that Republic Act No. 8179 took
effect only on 16 April 1996, after Francisco Jr. entered into the questionable contracts with
Gonzalez; hence, the said statute cannot benefit Francisco Jr. On 31 January 2007, the Court of
Appeals rendered its assailed Decision favoring Francisco III. It held that Francisco Jr. cannot
invoke the provisions of Republic Act No. 8179 based on the following ratiocination: In the
instant case, there is nothing in Republic Act No. 8179 [An Act to Further Liberalize Foreign
Investment] which provides that it should retroact to the date of effectivity of Republic Act No.
7353 [The Rural Banks Act of 1992]. Neither is it necessarily implied from Republic Act No.
8179 that it or any of its provisions should be given a retroactive effect. On the contrary, there is
an express provision in Republic Act No. 8179 that it shall take effect fifteen (15) days after
publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines. Being crystal clear
on its prospective application, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without further
interpretation (BPI Leasing Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 416 SCRA 4, 13 [2003]). Republic
Act No. 8179 was published on March 31, 1996 at the Manila Times and Malaya; hence, it took
effect on April 15, 1996. x x x. Republic Act No. 7353 specifically states that the capital stock of
any rural bank shall be fully owned and held directly or indirectly by citizens of the Philippines
xxx. It bears stressing that the use of the word shall alone, applying the rule on statutory
construction, already underscores the mandatory nature of the law, and hence; (sic) requires
adherence thereto. xxx Therefore, it is Our considered view that the sale and the subsequent
transfer on February 28, 1996 of the shares of stock of JESUS [Gonzalez] to FRANCISCO, JR.,

a naturalized American citizen, were made in patent violation of Republic Act No. 7353.
Considering that Republic Act No. 7353 did not contain any provision authorizing the validity of
the sale and transfer of the shares of stock to a foreigner, specifically to a former natural-born
citizen of the Philippines, the same should be deemed null and void pursuant to Article 5 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, which reads:
ART. 5. Acts executed against the provisions
of mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void, except when the law itself authorizes their
validity.
x x x The fact that
Republic Act No. 8179 expressly granted to former natural-born citizens of the Philippines
investment rights similar to those of citizens of the Philippines bolsters the view that Republic
Act No. 7353 indeed prohibited foreign nationals from owning shares of stock in rural banks.
Had it been necessarily implied from the provisions of Republic Act No. 7353 that foreign
nationals could own shares of stock in rural banks, the legislature would not have wasted time
and effort in inserting a new provision granting to former natural-born citizens of the Philippines
equal investment rights in Republic Act No. 8179.
Furthermore, there is no merit in the assertion of FRANCISCO JR. and VICTOR that Republic
Act No. 8179 should be given a retroactive effect in accordance with the following rule:The
principle that a new law shall not have retroactive effect only governs rights arising from acts
done under the rule of the former law; but if a right be declared for the first time by a new law it
shall take effect from the time of such declaration, even though it has arisen from acts subject to
the former laws, provided that it does not prejudice another acquired right of the same origin. x
x x. Republic Act No. 8179 cannot be applied retroactively insofar as the instant case is
concerned, as its application would prejudice the (sic) FRANCISCO III who had acquired vested
right over the shares of stock prior to the effectivity of the said law. Such right was vested to
him when the Deed of Assignment was executed by Jesus in his favor on February 27, 1996.
Undoubtedly, FRANCISCO III had a better right over the shares of stock of JESUS inasmuch as
the validity of the Deed of Assignment was not affected despite the prior execution of the
Contract to Sell in favor of FRANCISCO JR. on February 19, 1996. As previously adverted to,
the said Contract, as well as the Deed of Absolute Sale and the subsequent transfer of the
shares of stock to FRANCISCO JR., was null and void for violating a mandatory provision of
Republic Act No. 7353. x x x.[35] The Court of Appeals, however, decided to award Francisco
III only attorneys fees and cost of suit, but not moral and exemplary damages:We hold that
FRANCISCO III is not entitled to moral damages. FRANCISCO III made no mention in his
Complaint and during the hearing that he sustained mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded
feelings and other emotional and mental sufferings by reason of the double sale. x x x.
Likewise, FRANCISCO III is not entitled to exemplary damages. x x x In the instant case,
FRANCISCO III failed to sufficiently prove his entitlement to moral, temperate or compensatory
damages. Hence, his claim for exemplary damages must similarly fail. However, as to his claim
for attorneys fees and cost of suit, We find it to be tenable as the records of the case clearly
reveal that FRANCISCO III was compelled to litigate or to incur expenses to protect his interest
because of the double sale. x x x. Under the circumstances obtaining in the instant case, We
deem that the award of P20,000.00 as attorneys fees is reasonable.[36] The fallo of the Court
of Appeals Decision thus reads: WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the
Decision dated October 25, 2002 of Branch 42 of the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando,

Pampanga with respect to Commercial Case No. 018 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A
new one is hereby rendered ORDERING the following:1)
Victor Nunga to surrender the stock
certificates of Jesus Gonzalez to the Corporate Secretary of Rural Bank of Apalit, Inc.; 2)
[T]he Corporate Secretary of Rural Bank of Apalit, Inc. to register the assignment of shares of
stock in favor of Francisco Nunga III, to cancel the stock certificates of Jesus Gonzale[z], and to
issue new ones in the name of Francisco Nunga III; and, 3)
Jesus Gonzale[z], Francisco
Nunga, Jr., and Victor Nunga to pay, jointly and severally, the sum of P20,000.00 as attorneys
fees, plus the cost of suit.[37]Francisco Jr. and Victor, together with Gonzalez, filed a Motion for
Reconsideration[38] of the foregoing Decision. Their Motion, however, was denied by the Court
of Appeals in its assailed Resolution dated 4 June 2007. Refusing to concede, Francisco Jr. and
Victor filed the instant Petition,[39] which they anchor on the following assignment of errors: I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THE SALE OF THE
SHARES OF STOCK OF GONZALE[Z] TO FRANCISCO JR., NULL AND VOID AB INITIO ON
THE BASIS OF THE ALLEGED DISQUALIFICATION OF FRANCISCO JR. UNDER REPUBLIC
ACT NO. 7353? II. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT FRANCISCO III HAS A VESTED RIGHT TO THE SHARES OF STOCK OF
GONZALE[Z], WHICH WOULD BE IMPAIRED BY THE RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8179? III. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ERRED [IN] AWARDING DAMAGES TO FRANCISCO III AND WITHDRAWING THE AWARD
OF NOMINAL DAMAGES TO PETITIONERS BY THE TRIAL COURT? Essentially, the
fundamental issue that this Court is called upon to resolve is who among the parties to this case
has a better right to the disputed RBA shares of stock.Francisco Jr. and Victor contend that the
consummated sale of the RBA shares of stock by Gonzalez to Francisco Jr. gives the latter a
superior right over the same, since the transaction complied with all the elements of a valid sale.
Contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, Francisco Jr. and Victor claim that there was no
provision in Republic Act No. 7353, prior to its amendment, which explicitly prohibited any
transfer of shares to individuals who were not Philippine citizens, or which declared such a
transfer void. Hence, there was an implied recognition by the legislature that to declare the
nullity of such acts would be more disadvantageous and harmful to the purposes of the law.
Moreover, Francisco Jr. and Victor contend that the passage of Republic Act No. 8179, An Act to
Further Liberalize Foreign Investment, cured whatever legal infirmity there may have been in the
purchase by Francisco Jr. of the RBA shares of stock from Gonzalez. As Republic Act No. 8179
expressly creates and declares for the first time a substantive right, then it may be given
retroactive effect. The Deed of Assignment between Francisco III and Gonzalez did not confer
upon Francisco III a vested interest that could be impaired by the retroactive application of
Republic Act No. 8179. The Deed was not only executed later in time, but the check issued for
its payment was also never encashed. There was, therefore, a total absence of consideration,
making the said contract between Francisco III and Gonzalez inexistent.The Court finds the
Petition devoid of merit.As the Court of Appeals declared, Francisco Jr. was disqualified from
acquiring Gonzalezs shares of stock in RBA. The argument of Francisco Jr. and Victor that
there was no specific provision in Republic Act No. 7353 which prohibited the transfer of rural
bank shares to individuals who were not Philippine citizens or declared such transfer void, is
both erroneous and unfounded. Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7353 explicitly provides:

Section 4. x x x With exception of shareholdings of corporations organized primarily to hold

equities in rural banks as provided for under Section 12-C of Republic Act 337, as amended,
and of Filipino-controlled domestic banks, the capital stock of any rural bank shall be fully
owned and held directly or indirectly by citizens of the Philippines or corporations, associations
or cooperatives qualified under Philippine laws to own and hold such capital stock: x x x.
(Emphasis ours.)Otherwise stated, the afore-quoted provision categorically provides that only
citizens of the Philippines can own and hold, directly or indirectly, the capital stock of a rural
bank, subject only to the exception also clearly stated in the same provision. This was the very
interpretation of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7353 made by this Court in Bulos, Jr. v. Yasuma,
[40] on the basis of which the Court disqualified therein respondent Yasuma, a foreigner, from
owning capital stock in the Rural Bank of Paraaque. In the instant case, it is undisputed that
when Gonzalez executed the Contract to Sell and the Deed of Absolute Sale covering his RBA
shares of stock in favor of Francisco Jr., the latter was already a naturalized citizen of the United
States of America. Consequently, the acquisition by Francisco Jr. of the disputed RBA shares
by virtue of the foregoing contracts is a violation of the clear and mandatory dictum of Republic
Act No. 7353, which the Court cannot countenance.
Even the subsequent enactment of Republic Act No. 8179 cannot benefit Francisco Jr. It is true
that under the Civil Code of the Philippines, laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the
contrary is provided.[41] But there are settled exceptions to this general rule, such as when the
statute is CURATIVE or REMEDIAL in nature, or when it CREATES NEW RIGHTS.[42]
Francisco Jr. and Victor assert that, as an exception to the cardinal rule of prospective
application of laws, Republic Act No. 8179 may be retroactively applied, since it creates for the
first time a substantive right in favor of natural-born citizens of the Philippines. Francisco Jr. and
Victor, however, overlooked the vital exception to the exception. While it is true that a law
creating new rights may be given retroactive effect, the same can only be made possible if the
new right does not prejudice or impair any vested right.[43] The Court upholds the finding of the
Court of Appeals that Republic Act No. 8179 cannot be applied retroactively to the present case,
as to do so would prejudice the vested rights of Francisco III to the disputed RBA shares of
stock. Francisco III, who is undeniably a citizen of the Philippines, and who is fully qualified to
own shares of stock in a Philippine rural bank, had acquired vested rights to the disputed RBA
shares of stock by virtue of the Deed of Assignment executed in his favor by Gonzalez. It would
not matter that Gonzalez executed the Contract to Sell in favor of Francisco Jr. prior to the Deed
of Assignment in favor of Francisco III. As established in the previous discussion, the Contract
to Sell between Gonzalez and Francisco Jr. was void and without force and effect for being
contrary to law. It intended to effect a transfer, which was prohibited by Republic Act No. 7353.
It is even irrelevant that the terms of said Contract to Sell had been fully complied with and
performed by the parties thereto, and that a Deed of Absolute Sale was already executed by
Gonzalez in favor of Francisco Jr. A void agreement will not be rendered operative by the
parties' alleged performance (partial or full) of their respective prestations. A contract that
violates the law is null and void ab initio and vests no rights and creates no obligations. It
produces no legal effect at all.[44] With respect to the award of damages, the Court agrees in
the findings of the Court of Appeals that Francisco III failed to establish his entitlement to moral
damages in view of the absence of proof that he endured physical suffering, mental anguish,

fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation, or any similar injury.[45] As regards the grant of exemplary damages, we likewise
uphold the ruling of the appellate court that the same was not warranted under the
circumstances, as FRANCISCO III was not able to prove that he was entitled to moral,
temperate or compensatory damages. Exemplary damages are imposed by way of example or
correction for the public good, in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory
damages.[46] In contracts and quasi-contracts, exemplary damages may be awarded if the
defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner.[47] It
cannot, however, be considered as a matter of right; the court has to decide whether or not such
damages should be adjudicated.[48] Before the court may consider an award for exemplary
damages, the plaintiff must first show that he is entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory
damages; but it is not necessary that he prove the monetary value thereof.[49] As to the
contention that the Court of Appeals erred in withdrawing the award of nominal damages to the
petitioners by the RTC, the Court finds the same to be utterly misleading. The appellate court
did not decree any such withdrawal, as the RTC had not awarded any nominal damages in
favor of the petitioners in the first place. However, as Francisco III was indeed compelled to
litigate and incur expenses to protect his interests,[50] the Court sustains the award by the
Court of Appeals of P20,000.00 as attorneys fees, plus costs of suit. WHEREFORE, premises
considered, the Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is hereby DENIED. The
assailed Decision dated 31 January 2007 and Resolution dated 4 June 2007 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 78424 are hereby AFFIRMED in toto. No costs.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Sec. 14 - Peculiar signification of terms
22.BENGUET CORPORATION, DENNIS R. BELMONTE, EFREN C. REYES and GREGORIO
A. FIDER, petitioners, vs. CESAR CABILDO, respondent.
G.R. No. 151402
August 22, 2008
D E C I S I O NNACHURA, J.:This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Court of
Appeals (CA) decision1 in CA-G.R. CV No. 37123 which affirmed with modification the
decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 6, Baguio City in Civil Case No. 593-R.
Petitioner Benguet Corporation is a mining company with three (3) mining sites: Balatoc,
Antamok and Acupan. Petitioners Dennis R. Belmonte,3 Efren C. Reyes,4 and Gregorio A.
Fider5 are all officers and employees of Benguet Corporation.6 On the other hand, respondent
Cesar Cabildo and Rolando Velasco, defendant before the lower courts, were former employees
of Benguet Corporation.At the time of his retirement on August 31, 1981, Cabildo was
Department Manager of Benguet Corporation's Transportation and Heavy Equipment
Department and had worked there for twenty-five (25) years. Thereafter, Cabildo became a
service contractor of painting jobs.Sometime in February 1983, Cabildo submitted his quotation
and bid for the painting of Benguet Corporation's Mill Buildings and Bunkhouses located at
Balatoc mining site. He then negotiated with petitioners Reyes and Fider, the recommending
approval and approving authority, respectively, of Benguet Corporation, on the scope of work for
the Balatoc site painting job which included necessary repairs. Reyes and Cabildo discussed
the price schedule, and the parties eventually agreed that Benguet Corporation would provide

the needed materials for the project.Upon approval of his quotation and bid, Cabildo forthwith
wrote Reyes on March 5, 1983 requesting the needed materials, so that he could immediately
commence work. On March 7, 1983, even without a written contract, Cabildo began painting the
Mill Buildings at Balatoc.On March 9, 1983, Cabildo again wrote Reyes requesting the
assignment of a representative by Benguet Corporation to closely monitor the daily work
accomplishments of Cabildo and his workers. According to Cabildo, the request was made in
order to: (1) preclude doubts on claims of payment; (2) ensure that accomplishment of the job is
compliant with Benguet Corporation's standards; and (3) guarantee availability of the required
materials to prevent slowdown and/or stoppage of work.On even date, Cabildo submitted his
first work accomplishment covering carpentry work and installation of the scaffolding for which
he received a partial payment of P10,776.94.Subsequently, on March 23, 1983, Cabildo and
Benguet Corporation, represented by petitioner Belmonte, formally signed the Contract of Work
for the painting of the Mill Buildings and Bunkhouses at the Balatoc mining site including the
necessary repair works thereon. The Contract of Work, in pertinent part, reads:(1) [Cabildo]
shall paint the Mill Buildings at Balatoc Mill and all the bunkhouses at Balatoc, Itogon, Benguet,
including certain repair works which may be necessary.(2) For and in consideration of the work
to be done by [Cabildo], [Benguet Corporation] shall pay [Cabildo] at the rate herein provided,
as follows:(a) Painting
Steel & ConcretesWood1st coatP2.90/sq. m.P2.50/sq. m.2nd coat
2.50/sq. m.2.10/sq. m.(b) Scrapping and CleaningP1.85/sq. m.(c) ScaffoldingP0.50/sq. m.(d)
De-zincingP1.25/sq. m.(e) Dismantling of sidings & ceilingsP2.50/sq. m.(f) Installation of sidings
& ceilingsP5.50/sq. m.(g) Handling of Lumber & installationP275.00/cu. m.(3) [Cabildo] shall
employ his own workers and employees, and shall have the sole and exclusive obligation to pay
their basic wage, overtime pay, ECOLA, medical treatment, SSS premiums, and other benefits
due them under existing Philippine laws or other Philippine laws which might be enacted or
promulgated during the life of this Contract. If, for any reason, BENGUET CORPORATION is
made to assume any liability of [Cabildo] on any of his workers and employees, [Cabildo] shall
reimburse [Benguet Corporation] for any such payment.(4) [Cabildo] shall require all persons
before hiring them in the work subject of this Contract to obtain their clearance from the Security
Department of Baguio District Gold Operations of BENGUET CORPORATION.(5) BENGUET
CORPORATION shall retain 10% of every performance payment to [Cabildo] under the terms
and conditions of this Contract. Such retention shall be cumulative and shall be paid to [Cabildo]
only after thirty (30) days from the time BENGUET CORPORATION finally accepts the works as
fully and completely finished in accord with the requirements of [Benguet Corporation]. Before
the 10% retention of performance payments will, however, be fully paid to [Cabildo], all his
workers and employees shall certify under oath that they have been fully paid their wages, SSS,
medicare, and ECC premiums, ECOLA, overtime pay, and other benefits due them under laws
in force and effect and that they have no outstanding claim against [Cabildo]. BENGUET
CORPORATION has the right to withhold from the 10% retention any amount equal to the
unsatisfied claim of any worker against [Cabildo] until the claim of the worker is finally settled.(6)
[Cabildo] shall not be allowed to assign or subcontract the works, or any phase thereof, and any
violation of this provision will entitle BENGUET CORPORATION the sole and exclusive right to
declare this Contract as cancelled and without any further force and effect.(7) [Cabildo] and his
heirs shall be solely and directly liable - to the exclusion of BENGUET CORPORATION, its
stockholders, officers, employees, and agents and representatives - for civil damages for any

injury or death of any of his employees, workers, officers, agents and representatives or to any
third person and for any damage to any property due to faulty or poor workmanship or
negligence or willful act of [Cabildo], his workers, employees, or representatives in the course
of, during or when in any way connected with, the works and construction. If for any reason
BENGUET CORPORATION is made to assume any liability of [Cabildo], his workers,
employees, or representatives in the course of, during or when in any way connected with, the
works and construction. If for any reason BENGUET CORPORATION is made to assume any
liability of [Cabildo], his workers, employees, or agents or representatives under this provision,
[Cabildo] and his heirs shall reimburse the CORPORATION for any payment.(8) [Cabildo]
hereby undertakes to complete the work subject of this Contract within (no period fixed)
excluding Sundays and Holidays, otherwise, [Benguet Corporation] shall have the sole and
exclusive right to cancel this Contract.IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have hereunto
affixed their signatures on this 23rd day of March, 1983 at Itogon, Benguet Province.BENGUET
CORPORATIONBy:
(sgd.)DENNIS R. BELMONTEVice-PresidentBenguet Gold Operations(sgd.)CESAR Q.
CABILDOContractor
SIGNED IN OUR PRESENCE:_____sgd.______ Witnesses _____sgd.______7Apart from the
price schedule stipulated in the Contract of Work, which only reproduced the quotation and bid
submitted by Cabildo, and the preliminary discussions undertaken by the parties, all the
stipulations were incorporated therein by Benguet Corporation which solely drafted the contract.
To undertake the project, Cabildo recruited and hired laborers - thirty-three (33) painters and
carpenters - including petitioner Velasco as his general foreman.The succeeding events,
narrated by the trial court as echoed by the appellate court in their respective decisions, led to
the parties' falling out:[I]t must be pointed out that the Mill Buildings in Balatoc were about 28
buildings in all interconnected with each other grouped into 9 areas with some buildings very
dangerous since it housed the machineries, agitators and tanks with cyanide solutions to mill
the ores while the bunkhouses, which housed the laborers, were about 38 buildings in all
averaging about 30 to 35 meters in height or more than 100 feet and thus would take sometime
to paint and repair probably for about one and a half (1) years.Thus, the need for scaffoldings
to paint the Mill buildings and bunkhouses so that the workers would be safe, can reach the
height of the buildings and avoid the fumes of cyanide and other chemicals used in the Milling of
the ores.Payment was to be made on the basis of work accomplished at a certain rate per
square meter in accordance with the prices indicated in the Contract. The procedure followed
was that [Cabildo] requested the office of Reyes for measurement; then Reyes assign[s] an
employee to do the measurement; the employee was accompanied by [Cabildo] or his
authorized representative for the measurement; upon completion of the measurement, the
computations were submitted to Engr. Manuel Flores, the Supervisor assigned to the work area;
if Engr. Flores approved the computation, it was then recommended to Reyes for liquidation;
and Reyes thereafter issued the Liquidation Memo to schedule payment of work accomplished.
[Cabildo] was represented in the measurement by either his foreman or his son while Mr.
Licuben was assigned to do the measurement for the company.x x x xOn May 30, 1983,
Velasco left [Cabildo] as the latter's general foreman and went on his own as contractor, offering
his services for painting jobs.On June 6, 1983, Velasco entered into a Contract of Work with

[Benguet Corporation], represented by Godofredo Fider, to paint the Breakham bridge at

Antamok Mine, Barangay, Loakan, Itogon Benguet for the sum of P2,035.00.x x x Apparently,
the above contract of work of Velasco is in Antamok while the Contract of Work of [Cabildo] is in
Balatoc.On June 9, 1983 (6/9/83), Reyes recommended approval of the Quotation of Velasco
for the painting of the inner mill compound of Balatoc for Areas 2, 3, 5, 6 & 7 and approved by
Fider on June 13, 1983 at a lower price schedule per sq. meter than that of [Cabildo].Hence, on
June 13, 1983, Rolando Velasco entered into another Contract of Work with [Benguet
Corporation], represented by Godofredo Fider, to paint the underneath of Mill Buildings No. 702
at Balatoc Mill, Barangay Virac, Itogon, Benguet and install the necessary scaffoldings for the
work for the sum of P5,566.60.On the same date of June 13, 1983, Velasco entered into
another Contract of Work with [Benguet Corporation], represented by Godofredo Fider, to
scrape, clean and paint the structural steel members at the Mill crushing plant at Balatoc Mill,
Barangay Virac, Itogon, Benguet and install the necessary scaffoldings for the purpose for the
consideration of P8,866.00.x x x x[Cabildo] complained and protested but Reyes said the
Contract of Work of [Cabildo] covers only the painting of exterior of the Mill Buildings in Balatoc
but not the interior although the same was not expressly stated in the Contract. This caused the
souring of relationship of [Cabildo] and [petitioners] because at that time [Cabildo] had already
painted the top roof and three (3) sidings both interior and exterior of Mill Building 702.8Because
of these developments, Cabildo enlisted the services of Atty. Galo Reyes, who wrote both Fider
and Jaime Ongpin, President of Benguet Corporation, regarding the ostensibly overlapping
contracts of Cabildo and Velasco.Parenthetically, at some point in June 1983, Cabildo was
allowed to paint the interiors of various parts of the Mill Buildings, specifically, the Mill and
Security Office, Electrical Office, Baldemor Office, and Sala Shift Boss.On June 30, 1983,
Cabildo was prevented from continuing work on the job site, as Fider and Reyes were
supposedly investigating Cabildo's participation in the incident where a galvanized iron sheet fell
on one of the agitator tanks. For three (3) months, Cabildo was not allowed to perform work
stipulated in the agreement and complete painting of the Mill Buildings and Bunkhouses at
Balatoc. He was only allowed to do repairs for previously accomplished work. Further, Benguet
Corporation continued to withhold payment of Cabildo's last work accomplishment for the period
from June 16 to 30, 1983.On July 2, 1983, Benguet Corporation's Group Manager for Legal and
Personnel, Atty. Juanito Mercado, who prepared and notarized the Contract of Work, responded
to Cabildo's counsel, declaring that Benguet Corporation's Contract of Work with Cabildo only
covered exterior painting of the Mill Buildings and Bunkhouses, whereas the contract with
Velasco covered interior painting of the Mill Buildings, steel structures and underneath the GI
Roofing.Eventually, upon his visit to Benguet Corporation accompanied by counsel, Cabildo was
paid for the June 16 to 30, 1983 work accomplishment. In this regard, petitioner Reyes issued
Liquidation Memo dated July 25, 1983 which, curiously, had an intercalation that payment made
was for the exterior painting of the Mill Buildings in Balatoc.As regards the repairs of defects and
leaks of previous work accomplishments, which were the only job Cabildo was allowed to work
on, these were repaired satisfactorily and Cabildo was paid the previously withheld amount of
P19,775.00.Once again, in August of the same year, Cabildo wrote petitioner Belmonte
appealing his preclusion from continuing the Contract of Work and the overlapping contracting
jobs continuously given to Velasco. Yet, Cabildo was still disallowed to perform the job under the
Contract of Work for the month of September up to December 1983.With respect to the

Bunkhouses, the petitioners did not require Cabildo to paint them. Neither did petitioners
provide the materials needed therefor. The petitioners simply claimed that Cabildo was not at all
allowed to perform work on the Bunkhouses due to the rainy season and because of the
financial difficulties Benguet Corporation was then experiencing.Thus, Cabildo filed a complaint
for damages against the petitioners and Velasco before the RTC, claiming breach by Benguet
Corporation of their Contract of Work. Further, Cabildo sought damages for the petitioner's
harassment and molestation to thwart him from performing the job under the Contract of Work.
Lastly, Cabildo prayed for damages covering lack of payments and/or underpayments for
various work accomplishments.The RTC rendered a decision in favor of Cabildo and found the
petitioners, as well as Velasco, defendant before the RTC, jointly and severally liable to Cabildo
for: (1) P27,332.60 as actual damages; (2) P300,000.00 as indemnification for unrealized profit;
(3) P100,000.00 as moral damages; (4) P50,000.00 as exemplary damages; (5) P30,000.00 as
attorney's fees; and (5) costs of suit.On appeal, the CA affirmed with modification the RTC's
ruling. The appellate court excluded Velasco from liability for the foregoing damages.Hence, this
appeal by the petitioners positing the following issues:WHETHER [OR NOT] THERE IS
BREACH OF CONTRACT AS BASIS FOR AWARD OF DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY'S FEES[?]
WHETHER [OR NOT] THE COUNTERCLAIM OF PETITIONERS SHOULD BE GRANTED[?]9
We deny the petition. We see no need to disturb the findings of the trial and appellate courts on
the petitioners' liability for breach of the subject Contract of Work.It is a well-entrenched doctrine
that factual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the appellate court, are
accorded the highest degree of respect and are conclusive between the parties and even on
this Court.10 Nonetheless, jurisprudence recognizes highly meritorious exceptions, such as: (1)
when the findings of a trial court are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures;
(2) when a lower court's inference from its factual findings is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts; (4) when the
findings of the appellate court go beyond the issues of the case or fail to notice certain relevant
facts which, if properly considered, will justify a different conclusion; (5) when there is a
misappreciation of facts; and (6) when the findings of fact are conclusions without mention of
the specific evidence on which they are based, are premised on the absence of evidence, or are
contradicted by evidence on record.11 It is noteworthy that none of these exceptions which
would warrant a reversal of the assailed decision obtains herein.The petitioners insist that the
CA erred in awarding Cabildo damages because his Contract of Work with Benguet Corporation
only covered painting of the exterior of the Mill Buildings and Bunkhouses at the Balatoc mining
site. In effect, petitioners claim that their respective contracts with Cabildo and Velasco cover
separate and different subject matters, i.e., painting of the exterior and interior of the Mill
Buildings, respectively.We cannot agree with the petitioners' obviously strained reasoning. The
Contract of Work with Cabildo did not distinguish between the exterior and interior painting of
the Mill Buildings. It simply stated that Cabildo "shall paint the Mill Buildings at Balatoc Mill and
all the Bunkhouses at Balatoc, Itogon, Benguet." There is nothing in the contract which will
serve as a basis for the petitioners' insistence that Cabildo's scope of work was merely confined
to the painting of the exterior part of the Mill Buildings.To bolster their position, the petitioners
contend that there is an apparent conflict between the wording of the contract and the actual
intention of the parties on the specific object of the painting job. The petitioners argue that
Cabildo knew of Benguet Corporation's practice to have only the exterior of buildings painted

and was, therefore, aware that the Contract of Work referred only to the exterior painting of the
Mill Buildings, excluding the interior portion thereof. Thus, the petitioners submit that when there
is a conflict as regards the interpretation of a contract, the obvious intention of the parties must
prevail.We reject the petitioners' flawed contention. Apart from the petitioners' self-serving
assertion, nothing in the record points to the parties' intention different from that reflected in the
Contract of Work. To the contrary, the records reveal an unequivocal intention to have both the
exterior and interior of the Mill Buildings painted.Article 1370 of the Civil Code sets forth the first
rule in the interpretation of contracts. The article reads:Art. 1370. If the terms of a contract are
clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its
stipulations shall control.If the words appear to be contrary to the evident intention of the parties,
the latter shall prevail over the former.In the recent case of Abad v. Goldloop Properties, Inc.,12
we explained, thus:The cardinal rule in the interpretation of contracts is embodied in the first
paragraph of Article 1370 of the Civil Code: "[i]f the terms of a contract are clear and leave no
doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations shall
control." This provision is akin to the "plain meaning rule" applied by Pennsylvania courts, which
assumes that the intent of the parties to an instrument is "embodied in the writing itself, and
when the words are clear and unambiguous the intent is to be discovered only from the express
language of the agreement." It also resembles the "four corners" rule, a principle which allows
courts in some cases to search beneath the semantic surface for clues to meaning. A court's
purpose in examining a contract is to interpret the intent of the contracting parties, as objectively
manifested by them. The process of interpreting a contract requires the court to make a
preliminary inquiry as to whether the contract before it is ambiguous. A contract provision is
ambiguous if it is susceptible of two reasonable alternative interpretations. Where the written
terms of the contract are not ambiguous and can only be read one way, the court will interpret
the contract as a matter of law. If the contract is determined to be ambiguous, then the
interpretation of the contract is left to the court, to resolve the ambiguity in the light of the
intrinsic evidence.In our jurisdiction, the rule is thoroughly discussed in Bautista v. Court of
Appeals:The rule is that where the language of a contract is plain and unambiguous, its
meaning should be determined without reference to extrinsic facts or aids. The intention of the
parties must be gathered from that language, and from that language alone. Stated differently,
where the language of a written contract is clear and unambiguous, the contract must be taken
to mean that which, on its face, it purports to mean, unless some good reason can be assigned
to show that the words should be understood in a different sense. Courts cannot make for the
parties better or more equitable agreements than they themselves have been satisfied to make,
or rewrite contracts because they operate harshly or inequitably as to one of the parties, or alter
them for the benefit of one party and to the detriment of the other, or by construction, relieve one
of the parties from the terms which he voluntarily consented to, or impose on him those which
he did not.In the case at bench, the Contract of Work leaves no room for equivocation or
interpretation as to the exact intention of the parties. We also note that Benguet Corporation's
counsel drafted and prepared the contract. Undoubtedly, the petitioners' claimed ambiguity in
the wordings of the contract, if such an ambiguity truly exists, cannot give rise to an
interpretation favorable to Benguet Corporation. Article 1377 of the Civil Code provides:Art.
1377. The interpretation of obscure words or stipulations in a contract shall not favor the party
who caused the obscurity.Still, the petitioners insist that the parties' intention was different, and

that Cabildo knew of, and acquiesced to, the actual agreement.We remain unconvinced. Even if
we were to patronize the petitioners' stretched logic, the supposed intention of the parties is not
borne out by the records. Article 1371 of the same code states:Art. 1371. In order to judge the
intention of the contracting parties, their contemporaneous and subsequent acts shall be
principally considered.In stark contrast to the petitioners' assertions are the following:First, the
procedure for work accomplishments and payments followed by the parties required
representatives and/or employees of Benguet Corporation to closely monitor Cabildo's
performance of the job. Notably, when Cabildo painted both the exterior and interior of the Mill
Buildings except for the interior of the refinery buildings where gold is being minted, he was
under the close supervision of petitioners Reyes and Fider. If, as the petitioners claim, the
intention was only to paint the exterior of the Mill Buildings, then Reyes and Fider, or any of
Benguet Corporation's representatives assigned to monitor the work of Cabildo, should have,
posthaste, stopped Cabildo from continuing the painting of the interiors.Moreover, the materials
for the painting work were provided by Benguet Corporation as listed and requested by Cabildo.
The petitioners had the opportunity to disapprove Cabildo's requests for materials needed to
paint the interiors of the Mill Buildings, but they failed to do so.Second, although Cabildo
concedes that he knew of Benguet Corporation's practice to have only the exteriors of buildings
painted, he refutes the petitioners' claim that the aforesaid practice extended to the painting of
the Mill Buildings. Cabildo asseverates that the practice of painting only the exterior of buildings
was confined to the Bunkhouses. Evidently, Cabildo's knowledge of the claimed practice, as
qualified by Cabildo himself, does not translate to an inference that the parties had intended
something other than what is written in the Contract of Work.Lastly, a singular document, the
Liquidation Memo dated July 25, 1983 issued by petitioner Reyes, further highlights the
petitioners' lame attempt to paint an intention different from the specific language used in the
Contract of Work. This belated qualification in the Liquidation Memo stating that payment was
being made for the exterior painting of the Mill Buildings speaks volumes of the parties' actual
intention captured in the Contract of Work, as none of the Liquidation Memos issued by the
petitioners for Cabildo's previous work accomplishments qualified the painting performed by
Cabildo on the Mill Buildings.From the foregoing, it is crystal clear that the petitioners breached
the Contract of Work with Cabildo by awarding Velasco a contract covering the same subject
matter, quite understandably, because Velasco offered a price schedule lower than Cabildo's.
We completely agree with the uniform findings of the lower courts that the petitioners waylaid
Cabildo and prevented him from performing his obligation under the Contract of Work.With
respect to the painting of the Bunkhouses, the petitioners claim that Cabildo was not allowed to
paint them due to the rainy season and because of the financial difficulties of Benguet
Corporation. Suffice it to state that the Contract of Work did not provide for a suspension clause.
Thus, Benguet Corporation cannot unilaterally suspend the Contract of Work for reasons not
stated therein.Consequent to all these disquisitions, we likewise affirm the lower courts'
dismissal of the petitioners' counterclaim.WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is
hereby DISMISSED. The Court of Appeals decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 37123 is AFFIRMED.
Costs against the petitioners.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Sec. 15 - Written words control over printed
(no case)

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sec. 16 - Experts and interpreters to be used in explaining certain writings

23. MARY ANN DEHEZA-INAMARGA, Petitioner, - versus - CELENIA C. ALANO, BERNALDA
A. PAROHINOG, GODOFREDO ALANO, AVELINO ALANO, ESTRELLA ALANO, FORTUNATA
ALANO, NANY ALANO, SALLY ALANO, ADIONITO ALANO, and SUFRONIA ALANO,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 171321 December 18, 2008
DECISION QUISUMBING, J.:This petition for review on certiorari assails the Decision[1]
dated September 8, 2004 and Resolution[2] dated January 4, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 64164. The appellate court had affirmed the Decision[3] dated November 26,
1998 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 1, Kalibo, Aklan in Civil Case No. 4278.
The facts of the case are as follows:Tomas Alano, husband of respondent Celenia Alano, owned
two parcels of land covered by Original Certificates of Title (OCT) Nos. P-761 and P-762. He
mortgaged the properties in favor of Renato Gepty on September 20, 1972. In 1976, Gepty
demanded that Tomas pay the loan. Tomas, however, did not have money at that time to
redeem his properties so he sought help from his niece, petitioner Mary Ann Deheza-Inamarga.
Petitioner agreed to pay the loan while the spouses, in turn, mortgaged said properties to her.
Petitioner kept in her possession OCT Nos. P-761 and P-762 and asked the spouses to sign
blank pieces of paper which petitioner said will be converted into receipts evidencing their
indebtedness to her.In November 1990, after Tomas had passed away, respondents Celenia
and her children went to petitioner to redeem the property. Petitioner, however, told them that
she had mortgaged the property to the Rural Bank of Libacao. Respondents verified the matter
with the bank and discovered that OCT Nos. P-761 and P-762 have been cancelled and in lieu
thereof, Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. T-9080 and T-9081 were issued in petitioners
name. Respondents learned that the TCTs in petitioners favor were issued by virtue of a Deed
of Sale purportedly executed by the Spouses Alano in her favor.On January 24, 1991,
respondents filed a complaint for the declaration of nullity of document, reconveyance and
damages against petitioner and the Rural Bank of Libacao. Respondents contended that the
deed of sale is null and void because the signatures of the Spouses Alano were forged and
even if they were the signatures of the spouses, they were affixed on blank sheets of paper
which were not intended to be a deed of sale.Petitioner, on the other hand, denied the allegation
of forgery and maintained that the deed of sale was valid. She claimed that the spouses offered
to sell her the property so they can use the purchase price of P7,000 to redeem the property
from Gepty. Petitioner added that the action is barred by prescription, laches and estoppel.On
November 26, 1998, the RTC rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows:WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:1. Declaring the transaction between the
plaintiffs and defendant Mary Ann Deheza (Inamarga) as an EQUITABLE MORTGAGE and
declaring the plaintiffs entitled to redeem the mortgaged properties which shall be effected upon
payment of the mortgage debt to said defendant in the amount of P2,400.00 with legal rate of
interest from 1983, the year plaintiffs ceased paying said defendant interests;2. Declaring the
nullity of the Deed of Absolute Sale (Exh. B) dated March 4, 1978 allegedly executed by

Tomas Alano in favor of Mary Ann Deheza;3. Declaring the nullity of Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-9080 and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-9081 in the name of Mary Ann Deheza;4.
Ordering the reconveyance of Lot 7 and Lot 2, all of Psu-235010, by defendant Mary Ann
Deheza Inamarga in favor of the plaintiffs. In the event that said defendant fails to reconvey to
plaintiffs said lots, the Clerk of Court is hereby directed to execute it pursuant to the provisions
of Section 10 of Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. As Amended;5. Ordering
defendant Mary Ann Deheza-Inamarga to pay plaintiffs exemplary damages in the amount of
P50,000.00 and attorneys fees in the amount of P10,000.00.Costs against said defendant.SO
ORDERED.[4]Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals but her appeal was denied.
[5] The appellate court held that the signatures in the Deed of Sale were forged and even if
they were genuine, the agreement entered into by the parties was one of equitable mortgage. It
likewise upheld the trial courts award of damages, ruling that the transactions involved in the
case were repeatedly tainted with fraud.Petitioners motion for reconsideration having been
denied, petitioner filed the instant appeal, assigning errors as follows:I.THE LOWER COURT
ERRED IN DECLARING THE TRANSACTION BETWEEN [THE] SPOUSES TOMAS AND
CELENIA ALANO AND THE [PETITIONER] MARY ANN DEHEZA-INAMARGA AS ONE OF
EQUITABLE MORTGAGE AND NOT ONE OF SALE.II.THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN
ORDERING THE RECONVEYANCE OF THE LANDS IN QUESTION IN FAVOR OF THE
[RESPONDENTS] AND ORDERING THE NULLITY OF TCT NO. T-9080 AND TCT NO. T-9081
IN THE NAME OF MARY ANN DEHEZA.III.THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT
THE QUESTIONED DEED OF SALE WAS A FORGERY OR THAT IT WAS SIGNED IN BLANK
BY [THE] SPOUSES TOMAS AND CELENIA ALANO AND I[N] GIVING CREDENCE TO THE
EVIDENCE OF THE [RESPONDENTS].IV.THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING
THAT [RESPONDENTS] ACTION IS ALREADY BARRED BY PRESCRIPTION, LACHES OR
ESTOPPEL.V.THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN AWARDING EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND
ATTORNEYS FEE[S] TO THE [RESPONDENTS].[6]
Essentially, the issues for
resolution are: (1) whether the Deed of Sale is a forgery; (2) whether the transaction between
petitioner and the Spouses Alano is one of sale or equitable mortgage; (3) whether respondents
action is already barred by prescription, laches or estoppel; and (4) whether the award of
exemplary damages and attorneys fees in favor of respondents is legal and justifiable.As to the
first issue, petitioner contends that respondents never presented a handwriting expert to prove
that the signatures of Tomas and Celenia Alano were forged and such allegation of forgery
cannot overcome the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty of the notary public
as well as the due execution of the public document.[7] Respondents, in turn, contend that the
findings of handwriting experts are not conclusive upon the trial court.The question of forgery is
one of fact.[8] It is well-settled that when supported by substantial evidence or borne out by the
records, the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are conclusive and binding on the parties
and are not reviewable by this Court.[9]It is a hornbook doctrine that the findings of fact of trial
courts are entitled to great weight on appeal and should not be disturbed except for strong and
valid reasons. It is not a function of this Court to analyze and weigh evidence by the parties all
over again. Our jurisdiction is limited to reviewing errors of law that might have been committed
by the Court of Appeals. Where the factual findings of the trial court are affirmed in toto by the
Court of Appeals as in this case, there is great reason for not disturbing such findings and for
regarding them as not reviewable by this Court.[10]Moreover, after a careful perusal of the

records and a thorough consideration of this case, this Court finds sufficient basis for the finding
of the Court of Appeals that the said signatures were indeed forged. The Court of Appeals cited
apparent differences in the signatures on the face of the documentary evidence submitted
before the RTC. Also, it found that the signatures on the deed of sale appeared to be different
in characteristics, spacing and strokes from the signatures of the Spouses Alano appearing in
other documents forming part of the records of this case which are admittedly genuine.
Moreover, contrary to petitioners contention, the presentation of a handwriting expert is not
necessary. Handwriting experts are usually helpful in the examination of forged documents
because of the technical procedure involved in analyzing them. But resort to these experts is
not mandatory or indispensable to the examination or the comparison of handwriting.[11] The
findings of handwriting experts are not conclusive upon the courts. As this Court has once
observed, the authenticity of signatures is not a highly technical issue in the same sense that
questions concerning, e.g., quantum physics or topology or molecular biology, would constitute
matters of a highly technical nature. The opinion of a handwriting expert on the genuineness of
a questioned signature is certainly much less compelling upon a judge than an opinion rendered
by a specialist on a highly technical issue. The signatures on a questioned document can be
examined visually by a judge who can and should exercise independent judgment on the issue
of authenticity of such signatures.[12]With regard to the second issue, petitioner contends that
it was the Spouses Alano who caused the execution of the deed of sale in question and that the
document was signed by them in the presence of the notary public. She likewise argues that
after the sale, she took possession of the land; and she adds that the consideration for the
property was adequate because the property was not productive.[13] On the other hand,
respondents aver that the transaction between the Spouses Alano and petitioner is not one of
sale but one of equitable mortgage. Respondents stress that they continued to be in
possession of the property even after the alleged execution of the Deed of Sale and they claim
that the P7,000 consideration is grossly inadequate for the market value of the property.
Respondents further stated that they paid P500 interest annually for the loan.[14]In our
considered view, the appellate court did not err in sustaining the decision of the trial court
holding that the transaction between the parties is an equitable mortgage.An equitable
mortgage is one which, although lacking in some formality, or form, or words, or other requisites
demanded by a statute, nevertheless reveals the intention of the parties to charge real property
as security for a debt, and contains nothing impossible or contrary to law.[15]Articles 1602 and
1604 of the Civil Code of the Philippines state:ART. 1602. The contract shall be presumed to be
an equitable mortgage, in any of the following cases:(1)
When the price of the sale with right
to repurchase is unusually inadequate;(2)
When the vendor remains in possession as
lessee or otherwise;(3)
When upon or after the expiration of the right to repurchase another
instrument extending the period of redemption or granting a new period is executed;(4)
When the purchaser retains for himself a part of the purchase price;(5)
When the vendor
binds himself to pay the taxes on the thing sold;(6)
In any case where it may be fairly
inferred that the real intention of the parties is that the transaction shall secure the payment of a
debt or the performance of any other obligation.In any of the foregoing case, any money, fruits,
or other benefit to be received by the vendee as rent or otherwise shall be considered as
interest which shall be subject to the usury laws.ART. 1604. The provisions of Article 1602 shall
also apply to a contract purporting to be an absolute sale.In the instant case, the RTC, as

affirmed by the Court of Appeals, correctly found that more than one of the circumstances
enumerated in Article 1602 are present, to wit: the inadequacy of the selling price of the
properties in relation to its true value; the vendors (Spouses Alano) remained in possession as
lessee or otherwise; respondents paid the real property taxes; and the spouses secured the
payment of the principal debt owed to petitioner with said properties.[16] On this score, we are
in agreement that the parties intended an equitable mortgage and not a contract of sale.On the
third issue, petitioner claims that the complaint was barred by extinctive prescription as it was
filed only on January 24, 1991, or almost 13 years from March 7, 1978 when the TCTs were
issued in favor of petitioner. Petitioner argues that the prescriptive period for reconveyance of
land based on implied or constructive trust is 10 years.[17] Respondents counter that since the
deed of sale and the certificates of title in the name of petitioner are all null and void,
prescription, laches or estoppel has not set in.[18]Again, we find for the respondents. Where
there is no consent given by one party in a purported contract, such contract was not perfected;
therefore, there is no contract to speak of. The deed of sale relied upon by petitioner is deemed
a void contract. This being so, the action based on said deed of sale shall not prescribe in
accordance with Article 1410[19] of the Civil Code.On the issue of damages, petitioner contends
that the award of exemplary damages and attorneys fees were not justified under the law and
the facts obtaining in this case.[20] Respondents, on their part, state that petitioner having
acted in bad faith to the damage and prejudice of respondents, it is but proper that she should
pay for such deception and unlawful acts.[21]We do not find any cogent reason to disturb the
findings of the RTC on this point as affirmed by the Court of Appeals with respect to the award
of damages and attorneys fees. As correctly held by the RTC, the act of petitioner of inducing
her two trusting old relatives to sign blank pieces of paper purporting to be a deed of sale so
that the certificates of title of their properties could be transferred in her name is a fraudulent
act. Exemplary damages were rightfully imposed in order to deter persons similarly disposed
from committing such acts of fraud. Consequently, with the grant of exemplary damages,
attorneys fees should likewise be awarded.[22]WHEREFORE, the Decision dated September
8, 2004 and the Resolution dated January 4, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
64164 are AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------24. SOLEDAD E. DIZON, CORAZON R. ESPINOSA, CYNTHIA R. ESPINOSA, JENNIFER R.
ESPINOSA, JULIE R. ESPINOSA GELACIO R. ESPINOSA, JR., and QUISUMBING, J.,
JOSELITO R. ESPINOSA, Petitioners, - versus - RODRIGO G. TUAZON and
ESTRELLA M. TUAZON, Respondents.
G.R. No. 172167July 9, 2008 D E C I S I O N TINGA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review[1]
of the Decision[2] and Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 79523 dated 26
January 2006 and 31 March 2006, respectively, which reversed and set aside the Decision[4] of
the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City, Branch 63 dated 19 May 2003.
The facts of the
case, as culled from the decisions of the lower courts, follow.
Petitioners are the heirs of
Segundo Espinosa (Segundo), owner of one-half undivided share[5] in two parcels of land
individually covered by OCT No. 0-279[6] and TCT No. 38284[7] and both situated in Brgy.
Tibag, Tarlac, Tarlac. When Segundo was widowed, he cohabited with one Laureana Bondoc
and sired Estrella Tuazon (Estrella), one of the respondents in this case.
In 1988,
petitioner Soledad Dizon (Soledad), daughter of Segundo, discussed with her brother the

transfer of the properties in their name. They informed Segundo of their plan and the latter
agreed. However, Segundo told them that the titles of the properties were in the name of the
spouses Estrella and respondent Rodrigo Tuazon (Rodrigo). Soledad inquired from
respondents and was told that they had already bought the subject property.
Soledad
went to the Register of Deeds and was able to secure copies of the Deed of Absolute Sale and
Affidavit of Non-tenancy allegedly executed by Segundo in favor of respondents. In 1990,
respondents also allegedly prepared an Agreement of Subdivision and made it appear therein
that Segundo had signed and executed the same. When Segundo was shown the documents,
he claimed that he was fooled by respondents to enter into the transaction and that his
signature had been forged. He met with a certain Atty. Conrado Genilo, the lawyer who
notarized the documents, and was informed that he had merely notarized the said documents
prepared by his secretary. Atty. Genito also told Segundo that he was willing to testify in his
favor.
The parties brought the matter to the barangay for conciliation but no settlement
was reached. Hence, Segundo prepared and signed a complaint for annulment of the Deed of
Absolute Sale, the Affidavit of Non-tenancy and the Agreement of Subdivision. However, the
complaint was not filed in court because Segundo fell ill and Soledad was then working abroad.
Segundo died on 16 October 1995.
Petitioners filed a complaint for declaration of
nullity of sale and damages against respondents on 16 November 1995. They claimed that
respondents fraudulently prepared the three documents, namely, the Deed of Absolute Sale
dated 30 August 1985,[8] the Affidavit of Non-tenancy dated 30 August 1985[9] and the
Agreement of Subdivision dated 21 February 1990,[10] in all of which respondents made it
appear that Segundo had signed, executed and acknowledged the said documents before a
notary public. Respondents claimed that when Segundos mortgage obligation to Philippine
National Bank (PNB)[11] fell due, he sought financial assistance from respondents in order to
avert the foreclosure of the mortgage. They obliged and made several payments on the
mortgage debt. In return, Segundo promised to transfer to respondent Estrella his share in the
mortgaged properties, which he fulfilled when he freely delivered to her and her husband the
Deed of Absolute Sale and Affidavit of Non-tenancy in 1985. Respondents also alleged that in
1990, Segundo executed the Agreement of Subdivision to effect the actual conveyance of title to
the properties subject of the sale.[12] The trial court rendered its judgment on 19 May 2003,
holding that the signatures appearing in the documents were not Segundos and granting the
reliefs prayed for in the complaint. It declared as null and void the Deed of Absolute Sale, the
Affidavit of Non-tenancy, and the Agreement of Subdivision, and accordingly ordered the
cancellation of the titles to the properties in respondents names and the restoration of the
former titles. It also ordered petitioners to pay the litigation expenses and attorneys fees.[13]
Respondents appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals, which in turn reversed the
decision of the trial court.[14] According to the Court of Appeals, petitioners were unable to
establish the charge of forgery by a preponderance of evidence. Before us, petitioners contend
that the Court of Appeals erred when it reversed the judgment of the trial court. They claim that
it disregarded the evaluation made by the trial court and instead gave credence to the
testimonies of the witnesses who testified that they saw Segundo sign the questioned deed.[15]
Moreover, the appellate court allegedly failed to consider petitioners evidence proving the
charge of falsification, to wit: (1) the NBI report which stated that the signatures S. Espinosa
and Segundo Espinosa were written by two different persons; (2) the combined testimony of

petitioner Soledad and Theodore Espinosa (Theodore), Segundos grandson, that the signature
of Segundo was falsified; (3) the memorandum of the proceedings before the Office of the
Barangay Lupon of Tibag, Tarlac which established the fact that Segundo had already
questioned the genuiness of his signature as early as 27 September 1989; and (4) the fact that
despite the alleged sale, the tenants on the land continued paying rentals to them.[16]
Petitioners also claim that the Court of Appeals misconstrued respondents possession of the
PNB receipts as proof of their having purchased the property for valuable consideration,
because they gained access to the said receipts only after Segundo and the mother of Estrella
had started to live together.[17] For the same reason, according to petitioners, respondents
gained access to the owners copies of TCT No. 38284 and OCT No. 0-279 and thus, it could
not be said that Segundo had voluntarily given the documents to them.[18]
For their part,
respondents claim that petitioners gave a constricted statement of the matters involved since
they relied completely and only on the findings of the trial court.[19] They defend the decision of
the Court of Appeals, noting that the latter has made a thorough evaluation and analysis of the
documentary evidence and the testimonies of the witnesses.[20]
The determination of
whether Segundos signature was forged is a question of fact which calls for a review of the
evidence presented by the parties. While such determination is usually not within the Courts
domain, we will delve into factual issues in this case due to the conflicting findings of the Court
of Appeals and of the trial court.[21] In ruling that Segundos signature in the subject documents
is a forgery, the trial court based its conclusion on the NBI Report[22] which stated that the
abbreviated signature in the Agreement of Subdivision and the standard sample signatures of
Segundo were not affixed by one and the same person; hence, the document is falsified.[23]
Anent the Deed of Sale and the Affidavit of Non-tenancy, the trial court concluded that the
signatures therein could not have been Segundos because Segundo always affixed his
signature by writing his full name and surname.[24] It also gave credence to the testimonies of
Soledad, Theodore and the other witnesses who identified the genuine signatures of Segundo.
[25] It noted that the only iota of evidence presented by petitioners was a piece of
mimeographed paper with a handwritten name S. Espinosa, which the trial court found to be
not Segundos signature but rather of the clerk who made the entry.[26] In addition, the trial
court noted that as early as 27 September 1989, Segundo had already questioned the
supposed sale of the property to respondents and hence, he could not have agreed to sign and
execute the Agreement of Subdivision dated 21 February 1990.[27]
On the contrary, the
Court of Appeals ruled that petitioners were unable to establish their claim by preponderance of
evidence, save for their assertion that the signature of Segundo was falsified because it was not
the latters usual signature. Even the NBI report stated that no definite opinion of
falsification/forgery could be rendered on the questioned signatures appearing in the Deed of
Absolute Sale since the sample signatures could not serve as sufficient basis for a scientific
comparative examination. The appellate court noted that while petitioners claim that the
abbreviated signature of Segundo was forged, they nevertheless could not explain the
appearance of the full signature of Segundo in the second page of the document. Thus, the
Court of Appeals concluded that if Segundo had signed the second page, it follows that he
likewise signed the first page except that he signed it in abbreviated form.[28]
The Court
of Appeals also gave credence to the testimonies of Marino Tabaquero (Tabaquero), the
secretary of the notary public who personally witnessed Segundo affix his signature, and

respondent Rodrigo, the buyer of the subject property who was likewise present when Segundo
signed the documents.[29] It took into consideration respondents possession of the original
PNB receipts, proof that they were the ones who secured the release of the mortgage and
which, in turn, is evidence of the valuable consideration for which the Deed of Sale was
executed.[30] The appellate court also noted that in July 1986, the sale was inscribed at the
back of the title of the subject property which proves that the owners copy of the certificates of
title was surrendered and presented to the Register of Deeds; thus, as of 1986, Segundo
already had constructive notice of the alleged falsification/forgery but did not take the necessary
legal steps to annul the deed.[31] Finally, the appellate court held that petitioners failed to
overcome the legal presumption of authenticity and due execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale,
it being a notarized document.[32]
The petition must be denied.
As notarized
documents, the Deed of Absolute Sale, the Affidavit of Non-tenancy, and the Agreement of
Subdivision carry evidentiary weight conferred upon them with respect to their due execution
and enjoy the presumption of regularity which may only be rebutted by evidence so clear, strong
and convincing as to exclude all controversy as to falsity. Absent such evidence, the
presumption must be upheld. The burden of proof to overcome the presumption of due
execution of a notarized document lies on the one contesting the same.[33] To recapitulate,
petitioners rely on the following evidence in support of their case: (i) the NBI Report which
concluded that the S. Espinosa in the Agreement of Subdivision and the Segundo Espinosa
in the sample signatures were not written by one and the same person; (ii) the combined
testimony of Soledad and Theodore, who both claimed familiarity with Segundos signature,
that the signatures appearing in the questioned documents were affixed by Segundo; (iii) the
memorandum of the barangay lupon proceedings captioned Isang Paglilipat Pansin
(Endorsement) dated 27 September 1989 relative to the questioned Deed of Absolute Sale;
[34] and (iv) the fact that the rent payments on the land purportedly sold to respondents were
being paid to petitioners despite the alleged sale.
However, these pieces of evidence,
these are not enough to overcome the presumption of regularity in the execution and validity of
the questioned deeds. Hence, we are inclined to agree with the findings of the Court of
Appeals.
In the first place, the court is not bound by the findings of a handwriting expert.
Expert opinion evidence is to be considered or weighed by the court like any other testimony, in
the light of its own general knowledge and experience upon the subject of inquiry.[35] The
probative force of the testimony of an expert does not lie in a mere statement of his theory or
opinion, but rather in the aid that he can render to the courts in showing the facts which serve as
a basis for his criterion and the reasons upon which the logic of his conclusion is founded.[36]
The handwriting expert gave only a definitive conclusion as to Segundos signature in the
Agreement of Subdivision, and not in the Affidavit of Non-tenancy or more importantly in the
Deed of Absolute Sale.[37] An accurate examination to determine forgery should dwell on both
the differences and similarities between the questioned signatures.[38] Obviously, the
abbreviated signature is different from the full signature presented by petitioners. However, we
find that there are only slight dissimilarities between the surname Espinosa in the questioned
documents and in the samples. These slight dissimilarities do not indicate forgery for these are
natural, expected and inevitable variations in genuine signatures made by one and the same
person.[39] Even Segundos sample signatures submitted by petitioners show clear variations
in structure, flourish and size. The passage of time and a persons increase in age may have

decisive influences in his writing characteristics and so, in order to bring about an accurate
comparison and analysis, the standards of comparison must be as close as possible in point
and time to the suspected signature.[40] This was in fact the reason why the handwriting expert
stated in her report that no definite opinion of falsification/forgery could be rendered on the
questioned signatures appearing in the Deed of Absolute Sale since the sample signatures
submitted could not serve as sufficient basis for a scientific comparative examination.[41] We
also note that petitioners were unable to rebut the genuineness of the full signature appearing
on the second page of the Deed of Absolute Sale, which signature we observe to be similar to
Segundos sample/specimen signatures.
Neither are we swayed by the testimonies of
Soledad and Theodore, who both professed that Segundo always signed his name in full and
not by mere initials. These testimonies alone do not lead to the conclusion that the signatures
appearing in the questioned documents were forged. Besides, Soledads testimony that
Segundo one told her that he had never signed the questioned documents[42] is hearsay, as
this was not of her own personal knowledge but was rather narrated merely to her. We are more
inclined to believe the testimony of Tabaquero and Rodrigo, who both personally witnessed
Segundo affix his signature. Tabaquero testified that when he called Segundos attention to
the difference in the signatures on page one and page two of the Deed of Absolute Sale,
Segundo answered, Yanaman yan, ana ( That is just the same. That is my signature.)[43]
Rodrigo, for his part, stated that he heard Tabaqueros comment on the dissimilarity of the
signatures as well as Segundos reply, This is the same.[44]
Furthermore, even if the
endorsement from the Barangay Lupon is indeed proof that as early as 1989 there has
already been a dispute between Segundo and respondents concerning the sale, nowhere in the
said document is it mentioned that Segundo claimed the forgery of his signature. Instead, we
read that the issue in the barangay proceedings is the amount actually paid by respondents and
petitioners desire to repurchase the property. Thus:
Bagamat sa pandinig ng mga bagay
na ito dito sa barangay, waring ninanais malaman ng mga nanghahabulan kung magkano
naman ang ipinaabot o ibinayad ng mga bumili sa nagbili at hangad nilang matubos kung sakasakali man ang nabanggit na mahalagang ari-arian.[45]
The claim that rental
payments of one of the tenants of the subject properties were given to Segundo and, after his
death, to Soledad likewise does not point to the conclusion that Segundos signature was
forged.
A final note. Petitioners claim that Atty. Genilo, the lawyer who notarized the
questioned documents, was willing to testify in their favor. However, despite their opportunity to
present and even compel him to testify as their witness, petitioners nevertheless failed to do so
despite the fact that his testimony is crucial to the determination of whether Segundo appeared
before him and actually signed the questioned documents. WHEREFORE, the petition is
DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 26 January 2006 is AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioners.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------25. ROSENDO BACALSO, RODRIGO BACALSO, MARCILIANA B. DOBLAS, TEROLIO
BACALSO, ALIPIO BACALSO, JR., MARIO BACALSO, WILLIAM BACALSO, ALIPIO
BACALSO III and CRISTITA B. BAES, Petitioners, - versus - MAXIMO PADIGOS,
FLAVIANO MABUYO, GAUDENCIO PADIGOS, DOMINGO PADIGOS, VICTORIA P.
ABARQUEZ, LILIA P. GABISON, TIMOTEO PADIGOS, PERFECTO PADIGOS, PRISCA
SALARDA, FLORA GUINTO, BENITA TEMPLA, SOTERO PADIGOS, ANDRES PADIGOS,

EMILIO PADIGOS, DEMETRIO PADIGOS, JR., WENCESLAO PADIGOS, NELLY PADIGOS,

EXPEDITO PADIGOS, HENRY PADIGOS and ENRIQUE P. MALAZARTE, Respondents.
G.R. No. 173192. April 14, 2008 D E C I S I O N CARPIO MORALES, J.:The case at bar
involves a parcel of land identified as Lot No. 3781 (the lot) located in Inayawan, Cebu, covered
by Original Certificate of Title No. RO-2649 (0-9092)[1] in the name of the following 13 coowners, their respective shares of which are indicated opposite their names:
Fortunata Padigos (Fortunata) 1/8Felix Padigos (Felix) 1/8Wenceslao Padigos (Wenceslao) 1/8
Maximiano Padigos (Maximiano) 1/8Geronimo Padigos (Geronimo). 1/8
Macaria Padigos. 1/8
Simplicio Padigos (Simplicio). 1/8Ignacio Padigos (Ignacio). 1/48Matilde Padigos 1/48Marcelo
Padigos 1/48
Rustica Padigos. 1/48Raymunda Padigos. 1/48Antonino Padigos. 1/48Maximo Padigos
(Maximo), Flaviano Mabuyo (Flaviano), Gaudencio Padigos (Gaudencio), Domingo Padigos
(Domingo), and Victoria P. Abarquez (Victoria), who are among the herein respondents, filed on
April 17, 1995, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, a Complaint,[2] docketed as
Civil Case No. CEB-17326, against Rosendo Bacalso (Rosendo) and Rodrigo Bacalso
(Rodrigo) who are among the herein petitioners, for quieting of title, declaration of nullity of
documents, recovery of possession, and damages. The therein plaintiffs-herein respondents
Maximo and Flaviano claimed that they are children of the deceased co-owner Simplicio; that
respondents Gaudencio and Domingo are children of the deceased co-owner Ignacio; and that
respondent Victoria and respondent Lilia P. Gabison (Lilia) are grandchildren of the late coowner Fortunata.[3] Respondents also alleged that the therein defendants-petitioners Rosendo
and Rodrigo are heirs of Alipio Bacalso, Sr. (Alipio, Sr.) who, during his lifetime, secured Tax
Declaration Nos. L-078-02223 and L-078-02224 covering the lot without any legal basis; that
Rosendo and Rodrigo have been leasing portions of the lot to persons who built houses
thereon, and Rosendo has been living in a house built on a portion of the lot;[4] and that
demands to vacate and efforts at conciliation proved futile,[5] prompting them to file the
complaint at the RTC. In their Answer[6] to the complaint, petitioners Rosendo and Rodrigo
claimed that their father Alipio, Sr. purchased via deeds of sale the shares in the lot of
Fortunata, Simplicio, Wenceslao, Geronimo, and Felix from their respective heirs, and that
Alipio, Sr. acquired the shares of the other co-owners of the lot by extraordinary acquisitive
prescription through continuous, open, peaceful, and adverse possession thereof in the concept
of an owner since 1949.[7]By way of Reply and Answer to the Defendants Counterclaim,[8]
herein respondents Gaudencio, Maximo, Flaviano, Domingo, and Victoria alleged that the
deeds of sale on which Rosendo and Rodrigo base their claim of ownership of portions of the lot
are spurious, but assuming that they are not, laches had set in against Alipio, Sr.; and that the
shares of the other co-owners of the lot cannot be acquired through laches or prescription.
Gaudencio, Maximo, Flaviano, Domingo, and Victoria, with leave of court,[9] filed an Amended
Complaint[10] impleading as additional defendants Alipio, Sr.s other heirs, namely, petitioners
Marceliana[11] Doblas, Terolio Bacalso, Alipio Bacalso, Jr., Mario Bacalso, William Bacalso,
Alipio Bacalso III, and Christine B. Baes.[12] Still later, Gaudencio et al. filed a Second
Amended Complaint[13] with leave of court,[14] impleading as additional plaintiffs the other
heirs of registered co-owner Maximiano, namely, herein respondents Timoteo Padigos, Perfecto
Padigos, Frisca[15] Salarda, Flora Quinto (sometimes rendered as Guinto), Benita Templa,

Sotero Padigos, Andres Padigos, and Emilio Padigos.[16] In their Answer to the Second
Amended Complaint,[17] petitioners contended that the Second Amended Complaint should be
dismissed in view of the failure to implead other heirs of the other registered owners of the lot
who are indispensable parties.[18]A Third Amended Complaint[19] was thereafter filed with
leave of court[20] impleading as additional plaintiffs the heirs of Wenceslao, namely, herein
respondents Demetrio Padigos, Jr., Wenceslao Padigos, and Nelly Padigos, and the heirs of
Felix, namely, herein respondents Expedito Padigos (Expedito), Henry Padigos, and Enrique P.
Malazarte.[21] After trial, Branch 16 of the Cebu City RTC decided[22] in favor in the therein
plaintiffs-herein respondents, disposing as follows: WHEREFORE, premises considered,
judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants.1. Declaring
the plaintiffs to be entitled to the ownership and possession of the lot in litigation;2. Declaring as
null and void the Deeds of Absolute Sale in question;3. Ordering the defendants to pay plaintiffs
the sum of P50,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages[,] the sum of P20,000.00 as
attorneys fees, and P10,000.00 as litigation expenses. 4. Ordering the defendants to pay the
costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.[23] (Emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied)The defendants-herein
petitioners Bacalsos appealed.[24] Meanwhile, the trial court, on respondents Motion for
Execution Pending Appeal,[25] issued a writ of execution which was implemented by, among
other things, demolishing the houses constructed on the lot.[26]By Decision[27] of September 6,
2005, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts decision. Their Motion for
Reconsideration[28] having been denied,[29] petitioners filed the present Petition for Review on
Certiorari,[30] faulting the Court of Appeals:. . . when it ruled that the Second Amended
Complaint is valid and legal, even if not all indispensable parties are impleaded or joined . . .. . .
when [it] wittingly overlooked the most potent, unescapable and indubitable fact or circumstance
which proved the continuous possession of Lot No. 3781 by the defendants and their
predecessors in interest, Alipio Bacalso [Sr.] and/or when it sanctioned impliedly the glaring
arbitrary RTC order of the demolition of the over 40 years old houses, situated on Lot No. 3781
Cebu Cad., belonging to the old lessees, long allowed to lease or stay thereat for many years,
by Alipio Bacalso [Sr.], father and [predecessor] in interest of the defendants, now the herein
Petitioners. The said lessees were not even joined as parties in this case, much less were they
given a chance to air their side before their houses were demolished, in gross violation of the
due process clause provided for in Sec. 1[,] Art. III of the Constitution . . .. . . in upholding as
gospel truth the report and conclusion of Nimrod Vao, the supposed handwriting expert[,] that
signatures and thumb marks appearing on all documents of sale presented by the defendants
are forgeries, and not mindful that Nimrod Vao was not cross-examined thoroughly by the
defense counsel as he was prevented from doing so by the trial judge, in violation of the law
more particularly Sec. 6, Rule 132, Rules of Court and/or the accepted and usual course of
judicial proceedings and is therefore not admissible in evidence. . . . [when it] . . . wittingly or
unwittingly, again overlooked the vital facts, the circumstances, the laws and rulings of the
Supreme Court, which are of much weight, substance and influence which, if considered
carefully, undoubtedly uphold that the defendants and their predecessors in interests, have long
been in continuous, open, peaceful and adverse, and notorious possession against the whole
world of Lot No. 3781, Cebu Cad., in concept of absolute owners for 46 years, a period more

than sufficient to sustain or uphold the defense of prescription, provided for in Art. 1137 of the
Civil Code even without good faith.[31] (Emphasis and underscoring in the original; italics
supplied) Respondents admit that Teodulfo Padigos (Teodulfo), an heir of Simplicio, was not
impleaded.[32] They contend, however, that the omission did not deprive the trial court of
jurisdiction because Article 487 of the Civil Code states that [a]ny of the co-owners may bring
an action in ejectment.[33]Respondents contention does not lie. The action is for quieting of
title, declaration of nullity of documents, recovery of possession and ownership, and damages.
Arcelona v. Court of Appeals[34] defines indispensable parties under Section 7 of Rule 3, Rules
of Court as follows:[P]arties-in-interest without whom there can be no final determination of an
action. As such, they must be joined either as plaintiffs or as defendants. The general rule with
reference to the making of parties in a civil action requires, of course, the joinder of all
necessary parties where possible, and the joinder of all indispensable parties under any and all
conditions, their presence being a sine qua non for the exercise of judicial power. It is precisely
when an indispensable party is not before the court (that) the action should be dismissed. The
absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for
want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.
Petitioners are co-owners of a fishpond . . . The fishpond is undivided; it is impossible to
pinpoint which specific portion of the property is owned by Olanday, et. al. and which portion
belongs to petitioners. x x x Indeed, petitioners should have been properly impleaded as
indispensable parties. x x xx x x x[35] (Underscoring supplied)The absence then of an
indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of a court null and void for want of authority
to act, not only as to the absent party but even as to those present.[36]Failure to implead
indispensable parties aside, the resolution of the case hinges on a determination of the
authenticity of the documents on which petitioners in part anchor their claim to ownership of the
lot. The questioned documents are:1. Exhibit 3 a notarized Deed of Sale executed by
Gaudencio, Domingo, a certain Hermenegilda Padigos, and the heirs of Fortunata, in favor of
Alipio, Sr. on June 8, 1959;2. Exhibit 4 a notarized Deed of Sale executed on September
9, 1957 by Gavino Padigos (Gavino), alleged son of Felix, in favor of Alipio Gadiano;3. Exhibit
5 a private deed of sale executed in June 1957 by Macaria Bongalan, Marciano Padigos,
and Dominga Padigos, supposed heirs of Wenceslao, in favor of Alipio, Sr.;4. Exhibit 6 a
notarized deed of sale executed on September 9, 1957 by Gavino and Rodulfo Padigos, heirs of
Geronimo, in favor of Alipio Gadiano; 5. Exhibit 7 a notarized deed of sale executed on
March 19, 1949 by Irenea Mabuyo, Teodulfo and Maximo, heirs of Simplicio;6. Exhibit 8 a
private deed of sale executed on May 3, 1950 by Candido Padigos, one of Simplicios children,
in favor of Alipio, Sr.; and7. Exhibit 9 a notarized deed of sale executed on May 17, 1957
by Alipio Gadiano in favor of Alipio, Sr. Exhibits 3, 4, 6, 7, and 8, which are notarized
documents, have in their favor the presumption of regularity.[37] Forgery, as any other
mechanism of fraud, must be proved clearly and convincingly, and the burden of proof lies on
the party alleging forgery.[38] The trial court and the Court of Appeals relied on the findings of
Nimrod Bernabe Vao (Vao), expert witness for respondents, that Gaudencios signature on
Exhibit 3 (Deed of Absolute Sale covering Fortunatas share in the lot) and Maximos
thumbprint on Exhibit 7 (Deed of Sale covering Simplicios share in the lot) are spurious.[39]
Vaos findings were presented by respondents to rebut those of Wilfredo Espina (Espina),

expert witness for petitioners, that Gaudencios signature and Maximos thumbprint are genuine.
[40]
Expert opinions are not ordinarily conclusive. They are generally regarded as purely advisory in
character.[41] The courts may place whatever weight they choose upon and may reject them, if
they find them inconsistent with the facts in the case or otherwise unreasonable.[42] When
faced with conflicting expert opinions, courts give more weight and credence to that which is
more complete, thorough, and scientific.[43] The Court observes that in examining the
questioned signatures of respondent Gaudencio, petitioners expert witness Espina used as
standards 15 specimen signatures which have been established to be Gaudencios,[44] and that
after identifying similarities between the questioned signatures and the standard signatures, he
concluded that the questioned signatures are genuine. On the other hand, respondents expert
witness Vao used, as standards, the questioned signatures themselves.[45] He identified
characteristics of the signatures indicating that they may have been forged. Vaos statement of
the purpose of the examination is revealing:x x x [t]o x x x discover, classify and determine the
authenticity of every document that for any reason requires examination be [sic] scrutinized in
every particular that may possibly throw any light upon its origin, its age or upon quality element
or condition that may have a bearing upons [sic] its genuineness or spuriousness.[46]
(Emphasis supplied)The Court also notes that Vao also analyzed the signatures of the
witnesses to the questioned documents, the absence of standard specimens with which those
signatures could be compared notwithstanding.[47] On the other hand, Espina refrained from
making conclusions on signatures which could not be compared with established genuine
specimens.[48]Specifically with respect to Vaos finding that Maximos thumbprint on Exhibit 7
is spurious, the Court is not persuaded, no comparison having been made of such thumbprint
with a genuine thumbprint established to be Maximos.[49]Vaos testimony should be received
with caution, the trial court having abruptly cut short his cross-examination conducted by
petitioners counsel,[50] thus: COURT: You are just delaying the proceedings in this case if you
are going to ask him about the documents one by one. Just leave it to the Court to determine
whether or not he is a qualified expert witness. The Court will just go over the Report of the
witness. You do not have to ask the witness one by one on the document,[51]thereby depriving
this Court of the opportunity to determine his credibility. Espina, on the other hand, withstood
thorough cross-examination, re-direct and re-cross examination.[52] The value of the opinion of
a handwriting expert depends not upon his mere statements of whether a writing is genuine or
false, but upon the assistance he may afford in pointing out distinguishing marks, characteristics
and discrepancies in and between genuine and false specimens of writing which would
ordinarily escape notice or detection from an unpracticed observer.[53] While differences exist
between Gaudencios signatures appearing on Exhibits 3-3-D and his signatures appearing
on the affidavits accompanying the pleadings in this case,[54] the gap of more than 30 years
from the time he affixed his signatures on the questioned document to the time he affixed his
signatures on the pleadings in the case could explain the difference. Thus Espina observed: x x
x x 4. Both questioned and standard signatures exhibited the same style and form of the
movement impulses in its execution; 5. Personal habits of the writer were established in both
questioned and standard signatures such as misalignment of the whole structure of the
signature, heavy penpressure [sic] of strokes from initial to the terminal, formation of the loops

and ovals, poor line quality and spacing between letters are all repeated; 6. Both questioned
and standard signatures [show] no radical change in the strokes and letter formation in spite o[f]
their wide difference in dates of execution considering the early writing maturity of the writer; 7.
Variations in both writings questioned and standards were considered and properly evaluated. x
x x x Fundamental similarities are observed in the following characteristics to wit: x x x x
SIGNATURES 1.
Ovals of a either rounded or angular at the base; 2.
Ovals of d either
narrow, rounded, or angular at the base; 3.
Loop stems of d consistently tall and retraced in
both specimens questioned and standards;4.
Base alignment of e and i are repeated with
sameness;5.
Top of c either with a retrace, angular formation or an eyelet; 6.
Terminal
ending of o heavy with a short tapering formation; 7.
Loop stem of P with wide space and
angular;8.
Oval of P either rounded or multi-angular;9.
Base loop of g consistently
short either a retrace, a blind loop or narrow space disproportionate to the top oval; 10. Angular
top of s are repeated with sameness;11. Terminal ending of s short and heavy with blind loop
or retrace at the base. [55] And Espina concluded x x x x [t]hat the four (4) questioned
signatures over and above the typewritten name and word GAUDENCIO PADIGOS Vendor on
four copies of a DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE (original and carbon) dated June 8, 1959 were
written, signed, and prepared by the hand who wrote the standard specimens Exh. G and
other specimen materials collected from the records of this case that were submitted or
comparison; a product of one Mind and Brain hence GENUINE and AUTHENTIC.[56]
(Emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied)Respondents brand Maximos thumbmark on
Exhibit 7 as spurious because, so they claim, Maximo did not affix his signature thru a
thumbmark, he knowing how to write.[57] Such conclusion is a non sequitur, however, for a
person who knows how to write is not precluded from signing by thumbmark. In affirming the
nullification by the trial court of Exhibits 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8, the Court of Appeals held: x
x x xFirst of all, facts about pedigree of the registered owners and their lawful heirs were
convincingly testified to by plaintiff-appellant Gaudencio Padigos and his testimony remained
uncontroverted.
x x x x Giving due weight to his testimony, we find that x x x the vendors in the aforesaid Deeds
of Sale x x x were not the legal heirs of the registered owners of the disputed land. x x xx x x x
As for Exhibit 4, the vendor Gavino Padigos is not a legal heir of the registered owner Felix
Padigos. The latters heirs are plaintiff-appellants Expedito Padigos, Henry Padigos and
Enrique P. Malazarte. Accordingly, Exhibit 4 is a patent nullity and did not vest title of Felix
Padigos share of Lot 3781 to Alipio [Gadiano]. As for Exhibit 6, the vendors Gavino and
Rodulfo Padigos are not the legal heirs of the registered owner Geronimo Padigos. Therefore,
these fictitious heirs could not validly convey ownership in favor of Alipio [Gadiano]. x x x xAs for
Exhibit 8, the vendor Candido Padigos is not a legal heir of Simplicio Padigos. Therefore, the
former could not vest title of the land to Alipio Bacalso. As for Exhibit 3, the vendors
Gaudencio Padigos, Hermenegilda Padigos and Domingo Padigos are not the legal heirs of
registered owner Fortunata Padigos. Hermenegilda Padigos is not a known heir of any of the
other registered owners of the property. On the other hand, plaintiffs-appellants Gaudencio and
Domingo Padigos are only some of the collateral grandchildren of Fortunata Padigos. They
could not by themselves dispose of the share of Fortunata Padigos. x x x xAs for Exhibit 5, the
vendors in Exhibit 5 are not the legal heirs of Wenceslao Padigos. The children of registered
owner Wenceslao Padigos are: Wenceslao Padigos, Demetrio Padigos and Nelly Padigos.

Therefore, Exhibit 5 is null and void and could not convey the shares of the registered owner
Wenceslao Padigos in favor of Alipio Bacalso. As for Exhibit 9, the Deed of Sale executed by
Alipio [Gadiano] in favor of Alipio Bacalso is also void because the shares of the registered
owners Felix and Geronimo Padigos were not validly conveyed to Alipio [Gadiano] because
Exhibit 4 and 6 were void contracts. Thus, Exhibit 9 is also null and void.[58] (Italics in the
original; underscoring supplied) The evidence regarding the facts of pedigree of the registered
owners and their heirs does not, however, satisfy this Court. Not only is Gaudencios selfserving testimony uncorroborated; it contradicts itself on material points. For instance, on direct
examination, he testified that Ignacio is his father and Fortunata is his grandmother.[59] On
cross-examination, however, he declared that his father Ignacio is the brother of Fortunata.[60]
On direct examination, he testified that his co-plaintiffs Victoria and Lilia are already dead.[61]
On cross-examination, however, he denied knowledge whether the two are already dead.[62]
Also on direct examination, he identified Expedito, Henry, and Enrique as the children of Felix.
[63] Expedito himself testified, however, that he is the son of a certain Mamerto Padigos, the
son of a certain Apolonio Padigos who is in turn the son of Felix.[64]At all events, respondents
are guilty of laches the negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,
warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it has either abandoned it or declined
to assert it.[65] While, by express provision of law, no title to registered land in derogation of
that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession, it is an
enshrined rule that even a registered owner may be barred from recovering possession of
property by virtue of laches.[66] Respondents insist, however, that they only learned of the
deeds of sale in 1994, the year that Alipio, Sr. allegedly commenced possession of the property.
[67] The record shows, however, that although petitioners started renting out the land in 1994,
they have been tilling it since the 1950s,[68] and Rosendos house was constructed in about
1985.[69] These acts of possession could not have escaped respondents notice given the
following unassailed considerations, inter alia: Gaudencio testified that he lived on the lot from
childhood until 1985, after which he moved to a place three kilometers away, and after he
moved, a certain Vicente Debelos lived on the lot with his permission.[70] Petitioners witness
Marina Alcoseba, their employee,[71] testified that Gaudencio and Domingo used to cut kumpay
planted by petitioners tenant on the lot.[72] The tax declarations in Alipio, Sr.s name for the
years 1967-1980 covering a portion of the lot indicate Fortunatas share to be the north and east
boundaries of Alipio, Sr.s;[73] hence, respondents could not have been unaware of the acts of
possession that petitioners exercised over the lot. Upon the other hand, petitioners have been
vigilant in protecting their rights over the lot, which their predecessor-in-interest Alipio, Sr. had
declared in his name for tax purposes as early as 1960, and for which he had been paying taxes
until his death in 1994, by continuing to pay the taxes thereon.[74] Respondents having failed
to establish their claim by preponderance of evidence, their action for quieting of title,
declaration of nullity of documents, recovery of possession, and damages must fail. A final word.
While petitioners attribution of error to the appellate courts implied sanction of the trial courts
order for the demolition pending appeal of the houses of their lessees is well taken, the Court
may not consider any grant of relief to them, they not being parties to the case.WHEREFORE,
the petition is GRANTED. The September 6, 2005 decision of the Court of Appeals is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. CEB-17326 of Branch 16 of the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu City is DISMISSED.

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Sec. 17 - Of two constructions, which preferred

(no case)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Sec. 18 - Construction in favor od natural right
26. ASSOCIATED BANK (now UNITED OVERSEAS BANK [PHILS.]), Petitioner, - versus SPOUSES RAFAEL and MONALIZA PRONSTROLLER, Respondents. SPOUSES
EDUARDO and MA. PILAR VACA, Intervenors. G.R. No. 148444 September 3, 2009
RESOLUTION NACHURA, J.:
For resolution are the Motion for
Reconsideration[1] filed by petitioner Associated Bank (now United Overseas Bank [Phils.]) and
Motion for Leave to Intervene[2] filed by Spouses Eduardo and Ma. Pilar Vaca (spouses Vaca).
After a thorough examination of petitioners motion for reconsideration, together with its
voluminous attachments, it is readily apparent that no new issues are raised and the arguments
presented are a mere rehash of what have been discussed in its pleadings, all of which have
been considered and found unmeritorious in the July 14, 2008 Decision.[3]
Be that as it
may, we would like to reiterate that the second letter-agreement modified the first one entered
into by petitioner, through Atty. Jose Soluta, Jr. (Atty. Soluta). In previously allowing Atty. Soluta
to enter into the first letter-agreement without a board resolution expressly authorizing him,
petitioner had clothed him with apparent authority to modify the same via the second letteragreement.[4]
As early as June 1993, respondents already requested a modification of
the earlier agreement such that the full payment should be made upon receipt of this Courts
decision confirming petitioners right to the subject property. Instead of acting on the request,
the Board of Directors deferred action on it. It was only after one year and after the banks
reorganization that the board rejected respondents request. We cannot, therefore, blame
respondents for believing that the second letter-agreement signed by Atty. Soluta was
petitioners action on their request.[5]
We also would like to stress that the first letteragreement was not rescinded by respondents failure to deposit in escrow their full payment
simply because the date of full payment had already been modified by the later agreement.
Neither was the second letter-agreement rescinded by respondents new offer because the offer
was made only to demonstrate their capacity to purchase the subject property.[6]
In our
Decision, we affirmed the factual findings of the Court of Appeals (CA) because they were
amply supported by the evidence on record. Well-established is the rule that if there is no
showing of error in the appreciation of facts by the CA, this Court treats them as conclusive.
The conclusions of law that the appellate court drew from those facts are likewise accurate and
convincing.[7]
Hence, we deny with finality petitioners motion for reconsideration. No
further pleadings will be entertained.
After the promulgation of the July 14, 2008 Decision,
spouses Vaca filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene alleging that they are the registered owners
of the subject property and are thus real parties-in-interest. They add that they stand to be
deprived of their family home without having been given their day in court. They also contend
that the Court should order petitioner to reimburse the spouses Vaca the amount received from
the latter.
The Motion for Leave to Intervene must be denied. Section 2, Rule 19 of the

Rules of Court, provides:

SEC. 2. Time to intervene. The motion to intervene may be
filed at any time before rendition of judgment by the trial court. A copy of the pleading-inintervention shall be attached to the motion and served on the original parties.[8]
Obviously, the spouses Vacas motion for leave to intervene before this Court was belatedly
filed.
The purpose of intervention is to enable a stranger to an action to become a party to
protect his interest, and the court, incidentally, to settle all conflicting claims.[9] The spouses
Vaca are not strangers to the action. Their legal interest in the litigation springs from the sale of
the subject property by petitioner in their favor during the pendency of this case. As transferee
pendente lite, the spouses Vaca are the successors-in-interest of the transferor, the petitioner,
who is already a party to the action. Thus, the applicable provision is Section 19, Rule 3 of the
Rules of Court, governing transfers of interest pendente lite. It provides:
SEC. 19.
Transfer of interest. In case of any transfer of interest, the action may be continued by or
against the original party, unless the court upon motion directs the person to whom the interest
is transferred to be substituted in the action or joined with the original party. In Natalia Realty,
Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[10] citing Santiago Land Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals,
[11] we have ruled that: [A] transferee pendente lite of the property in litigation does not have a
right to intervene. We held that a transferee stands exactly in the shoes of his predecessor-ininterest, bound by the proceedings and judgment in the case before the rights were assigned to
him. It is not legally tenable for a transferee pendente lite to still intervene. Essentially, the law
already considers the transferee joined or substituted in the pending action, commencing at the
exact moment when the transfer of interest is perfected between the original party-transferor
and the transferee pendente lite.[12]
That the Certificate of Title covering the subject
property is in the name of the spouses Vaca is of no moment. It is noteworthy that a notice of lis
pendens was timely annotated on petitioners title. This was done prior to the sale of the
property to the spouses Vaca, the cancellation of petitioners title, and the issuance of the new
Transfer Certificate of Title in the name of the spouses. By virtue of the notice of lis pendens, the
spouses Vaca are bound by the outcome of the litigation subject of the lis pendens. Their
interest is subject to the incidents or results of the pending suit, and their Certificate of Title will
afford them no special protection.[13]
Lastly, the spouses Vacas claim for
reimbursement, if any, must be ventilated in a separate action against petitioner. To allow the
intervention would unduly delay and prejudice the rights especially of respondents who have
been deprived of the subject property for so long.
IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, we
deny petitioners motion for reconsideration and the Spouses Vacas Motion for Intervention.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Sec. 19 - Interpretation according to usage
(no case)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------C. TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE
1. QUALIFICATION OF WITNESSES
Sec. 20 - Witnesses; their qualifications

(no case)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Sec. 21 - Disqualification by reason of mental incapacity or immaturity
(no case)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Sec. 22 - Disqualification by reason of marriage
(no case)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Sec. 23 - Disqualification by reason of death or insanity of adverse party
27. Inestate estate of Marcelino Tongco, represented by JOSEFA TONGCO,
administratrix, plaintiff-appellant, vs. ANASTACIA VIANZON, defendant-appellee.
G.R. No. 27498
September 20, 1927MALCOLM, J.:The fundamental question which is
being litigated in this case and its companion case, R. G. No. 27499,1 is whether the property in
dispute should be assigned to the estate of Marcelino Tongco, or whether it should be set aside
as belonging exclusively to the widow.Marcelino Tongco and Anastacia Vianzon contracted
marriage on July 5, 1894. The first named died on July 8, 1925, leaving the second named as
his widow. The niece of the deceased, Josefa Tongco, was named administratrix of the estate. It
appears that shortly before the death of Marcelino Tongco, he had presented claims in a
cadastral case in which he had asked for titles to certain properties in the name of the conjugal
partnership consisting of himself and his wife, and that corresponding decrees for these lots
were issued in the name of the conjugal partnership not long after his death.In the cadastral
case, the widow began action on April 28, 1926, when she presented a motion for a revision of
certain decrees within the one-year period provided by the Land Registration Law. Issue was
joined by the administratrix of the estate. A decision was rendered by Judge of First Instance
Rovira concluding with this pronouncement of a judgment: "Therefore, and by virtue of the
provisions of section 38 of Act. No. 496, decrees Nos. 191390, 191504, and 190925, relative to
lots Nos. 1062, 1263, and 491 of this cadastral record, as well as the original certificates of title
Nos. 3247, 3298, and 3297 in regard thereto, and hereby annulled and set aside, and it is
ordered that in lieu thereof new decrees and certificates of title be issued for lots Nos. 1062,
1263, and 491, as the exclusive property of Anastacia Vianzon, of legal age, widow, and
resident of Orani Bataan, free from all encumbrances and liens. In regard to lot No. 460, the
court sustains the decree already issued in due time with respect to said lot." Sometime later, a
motion for a new trial was presented with accumulated affidavits by counsel for the losing party.
This motion was denied by the trial judge.On July 19, 1926, the administratrix of the estate
began action against Anastacia Vianzon for the recovery of specified property and for damages.
The issue was practically the same as in the cadastral case Judgment was rendered by Judge
Rovira couched in the following language: "Therefore, the court renders judgment absolving the
defendant from the complaint in this case, and only declares that one- half of the value of the
shares in the Sociedad Cooperativa de Credito Rural de Orani, to the amount of ten pesos
(P10), belonging to the intestate estate of Marcelino Tongco, which one-half interest must
appear in the inventory of the property of the estate of the deceased Marcelino Tongco." The
motion for a new trial was denied by His Honor, the trial judge.From both of the judgments
hereinbefore mentioned, the administratrix of the estate of Marcelino Tongco had appealed. The

first action filed, which was in the cadastral case, has now become the last in number and is
27399. The second action filed in the property case has now become the first in number and is
27498. As pursuant to the agreement of the parties the two cases were tried together, they can
be best disposed of together on appeal.The first, third, fourth, and fifth errors assigned in the
property case and the second error assigned in the cadastral case primarily concern findings of
fact and relate to the discretionary power of the trail judge. The second error assigned in the
property case and the first error assigned in the cadastral case attack the ruling of the trial judge
to the effect that the widow was competent to testify.It is true that by reason of the provisions of
article 1407 of the Civil Code the presumption is that all the property of the spouses is
partnership property in the absence of proof that it belongs exclusively to the husband or to the
wife. But even proceeding on this assumption, we still think that the widow has proved in a
decisive and conclusive manner that the property in question belonged exclusively to her, that
is, it would, unless we are forced to disregard her testimony. No reversible error was committed
in the denial of the motion for a new trial for it is not at all certain that it rested on a legal
foundation, or that if it had been granted it would have changed the result.Counsel for the
appellant, however, asserts that if the testimony of the widow be discarded, as it should be, then
the presumption of the Civil Code, fortified by the unassailable character of Torrens titles, arises,
which means that the entire fabric of appellee's case is punctured. Counsel relies on that portion
of section 383 of the Code of Civil Procedure as provides that "Parties or assignors of parties to
an action or proceeding, or persons in whose behalf an action or proceeding is prosecuted,
against an executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased person, . . ., upon a
claim or demand against the estate of such deceased person . . ., cannot testify as to any
matter of fact occurring before the death of such deceased person . . . ." Counsel is eminently
correct in emphasizing that the object and purpose of this statute is to guard against the
temptation to give false testimony in regard to the transaction is question on the part of the
surviving party. He has, however, neglected the equally important rule that the law was
designed to aid in arriving at the truth and was not designed to suppress the truth.The law twice
makes use of the word "against." The actions were not brought "against" the administratrix of
the estate, nor were they brought upon claims "against" the estate. In the first case at bar, the
action is one by the administratrix to enforce demand "by" the estate. In the second case at bar,
the same analogy holds true for the claim was presented in cadastral proceedings where in one
sense there is no plaintiff and there is no defendant. Director of Lands vs. Roman Catholic
Archibishop of Manila [1920], 41 Phil., 120 nature of cadastral proceedings; Fortis vs.
Gutierrez Hermanos [1906], 6 Phil., 100 in point by analogy; Maxilom vs. Tabotabo [1907], 9
Phil., 390 and Kiel vs. Estate of P. S. Sabert [1924], 46 Phil., 193 both clearly distinguishable
as can be noted by looking at page 197 of the last cited case; Sedgwick vs. Sedgwick [1877], 52
Cal., 336, 337; Myers vs. Reinstein [1885], 67 Cal., 89; McGregor vs. Donelly [1885], 67 Cal.,
149, 152; Booth vs. Pendola [1891], 88 Cal., 36; Bernardis vs. Allen [1902], 136 Cal., 7; Calmon
vs. Sarraille [1904], 142 Cal., 638, 642; Bollinger vs. Wright [1904], 143 Cal., 292, 296; Whitney
vs. Fox [1897], 166 U. S. 637, 648.) Moreover, a waiver was accomplished when the adverse
party undertook to cross-examine the interested person with respect to the prohibited matters.
(4 Jones on Evidence, pp. 767 et seq.; Stair vs. McNulty [1916], 133 Minn., 136; Ann. Cas.,
1918D 201.) We are of the opinion that the witness was competent.The result, therefore, must

be to adhere to the findings and rulings of the trial judge. No prejudicial error is noted in the
proceedings.Judgment affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the appellant.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Sec. 24 - Disqualification by reason of priveleged communication
(no case)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------2. TESTIMONIAL PRIVELEGE
Sec. 25 - Parental and Filial Privelege
28. IN RE: PETITION FOR CANCELLATION AND CORRECTION OF ENTRIES IN THE
RECORD OF BIRTH, EMMA K. LEE, Petitioner, - versus - COURT OF APPEALS, RITA K.
LEE, LEONCIO K. LEE, LUCIA K. LEE-ONG, JULIAN K. LEE, MARTIN K. LEE, ROSA LEE
VANDERLEK, MELODY LEE-CHIN, HENRY K. LEE, NATIVIDAD LEE-MIGUEL,
VICTORIANO K. LEE, and THOMAS K. LEE, represented by RITA K. LEE, as Attorney-inFact, Respondents.
G.R. No. 177861. July 13, 2010
DECISION ABAD, J.: This case is about
the grounds for quashing a subpoena ad testificandum and a parents right not to testify in a
case against his children. The Facts and the Case
Spouses Lee Tek Sheng (Lee) and
Keh Shiok Cheng (Keh) entered the Philippines in the 1930s as immigrants from China. They
had 11 children, namely, Rita K. Lee, Leoncio K. Lee, Lucia K. Lee-Ong, Julian K. Lee, Martin K.
Lee, Rosa Lee-Vanderlek, Melody Lee-Chin, Henry K. Lee, Natividad Lee-Miguel, Victoriano K.
Lee, and Thomas K. Lee (collectively, the Lee-Keh children). In 1948, Lee brought from China a
young woman named Tiu Chuan (Tiu), supposedly to serve as housemaid. The respondent
Lee-Keh children believe that Tiu left the Lee-Keh household, moved into another property of
Lee nearby, and had a relation with him. Shortly after Keh died in 1989, the Lee-Keh children
learned that Tius children with Lee (collectively, the Lees other children) claimed that they, too,
were children of Lee and Keh. This prompted the Lee-Keh children to request the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to investigate the matter. After conducting such an investigation,
the NBI concluded in its report: [I]t is very obvious that the mother of these 8 children is certainly
not KEH SHIOK CHENG, but a much younger woman, most probably TIU CHUAN. Upon
further evaluation and analysis by these Agents, LEE TEK SHENG is in a quandary in fixing the
age of KEH SHIOK CHENG possibly to conform with his grand design of making his 8 children
as their own legitimate children, consequently elevating the status of his second family and
secure their future. The doctor lamented that this complaint would not have been necessary
had not the father and his second family kept on insisting that the 8 children are the legitimate
children of KEH SHIOK CHENG.[1] The NBI found, for example, that in the hospital records, the
eldest of the Lees other children, Marcelo Lee (who was recorded as the 12th child of Lee and
Keh), was born of a 17-year-old mother, when Keh was already 38 years old at the time.
Another of the Lees other children, Mariano Lee, was born of a 23-year-old mother, when Keh
was then already 40 years old, and so forth. In other words, by the hospital records of the Lees
other children, Kehs declared age did not coincide with her actual age when she supposedly
gave birth to such other children, numbering eight. On the basis of this report, the respondent
Lee-Keh children filed two separate petitions, one of them before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)

of Caloocan City[2] in Special Proceeding C-1674 for the deletion from the certificate of live birth
of the petitioner Emma Lee, one of Lees other children, the name Keh and replace the same
with the name Tiu to indicate her true mothers name. In April 2005 the Lee-Keh children filed
with the RTC an ex parte request for the issuance of a subpoena ad testificandum to compel
Tiu, Emma Lees presumed mother, to testify in the case. The RTC granted the motion but Tiu
moved to quash the subpoena, claiming that it was oppressive and violated Section 25, Rule
130 of the Rules of Court, the rule on parental privilege, she being Emma Lees stepmother.[3]
On August 5, 2005 the RTC quashed the subpoena it issued for being unreasonable and
oppressive considering that Tiu was already very old and that the obvious object of the
subpoena was to badger her into admitting that she was Emma Lees mother. Because the RTC
denied the Lee-Keh childrens motion for reconsideration, they filed a special civil action of
certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP 92555. On December 29, 2006 the
CA rendered a decision,[4] setting aside the RTCs August 5, 2005 Order. The CA ruled that
only a subpoena duces tecum, not a subpoena ad testificandum, may be quashed for being
oppressive or unreasonable under Section 4, Rule 21 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. The CA
also held that Tius advanced age alone does not render her incapable of testifying. The party
seeking to quash the subpoena for that reason must prove that she would be unable to
withstand the rigors of trial, something that petitioner Emma Lee failed to do. Since the CA
denied Emma Lees motion for reconsideration by resolution of May 8, 2007,[5] she filed the
present petition with this Court. The Question Presented The only question presented in this
case is whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the trial court may compel Tiu to testify in the
correction of entry case that respondent Lee-Keh children filed for the correction of the
certificate of birth of petitioner Emma Lee to show that she is not Kehs daughter. The Ruling of
the Court Petitioner Emma Lee claims that the RTC correctly quashed the subpoena ad
testificandum it issued against Tiu on the ground that it was unreasonable and oppressive, given
the likelihood that the latter would be badgered on oral examination concerning the Lee-Keh
childrens theory that she had illicit relation with Lee and gave birth to the other Lee children.
But, as the CA correctly ruled, the grounds citedunreasonable and oppressiveare proper for
subpoena ad duces tecum or for the production of documents and things in the possession of
the witness, a command that has a tendency to infringe on the right against invasion of privacy.
Section 4, Rule 21 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, thus provides: SECTION 4. Quashing a
subpoena. The court may quash a subpoena duces tecum upon motion promptly made and,
in any event, at or before the time specified therein if it is unreasonable and oppressive, or the
relevancy of the books, documents or things does not appear, or if the person in whose behalf
the subpoena is issued fails to advance the reasonable cost of the production thereof. Notably,
the Court previously decided in the related case of Lee v. Court of Appeals[6] that the Lee-Keh
children have the right to file the action for correction of entries in the certificates of birth of Lees
other children, Emma Lee included. The Court recognized that the ultimate object of the suit
was to establish the fact that Lees other children were not children of Keh. Thus: It is precisely
the province of a special proceeding such as the one outlined under Rule 108 of the Revised
Rules of Court to establish the status or right of a party, or a particular fact. The petitions filed
by private respondents for the correction of entries in the petitioners' records of birth were
intended to establish that for physical and/or biological reasons it was impossible for Keh Shiok
Cheng to have conceived and given birth to the petitioners as shown in their birth records.

Contrary to petitioners' contention that the petitions before the lower courts were actually
actions to impugn legitimacy, the prayer therein is not to declare that petitioners are illegitimate
children of Keh Shiok Cheng, but to establish that the former are not the latter's children. There
is nothing to impugn as there is no blood relation at all between Keh Shiok Cheng and
petitioners.[7] (Underscoring supplied) Taking in mind the ultimate purpose of the Lee-Keh
childrens action, obviously, they would want Tiu to testify or admit that she is the mother of
Lees other children, including petitioner Emma Lee. Keh had died and so could not give
testimony that Lees other children were not hers. The Lee-Keh children have, therefore, a
legitimate reason for seeking Tius testimony and, normally, the RTC cannot deprive them of
their right to compel the attendance of such a material witness. But petitioner Emma Lee raises
two other objections to requiring Tiu to come to court and testify: a) considering her advance
age, testifying in court would subject her to harsh physical and emotional stresses; and b) it
would violate her parental right not to be compelled to testify against her stepdaughter. 1.
Regarding the physical and emotional punishment that would be inflicted on Tiu if she were
compelled at her age and condition to come to court to testify, petitioner Emma Lee must
establish this claim to the satisfaction of the trial court. About five years have passed from the
time the Lee-Keh children sought the issuance of a subpoena for Tiu to appear before the trial
court. The RTC would have to update itself and determine if Tius current physical condition
makes her fit to undergo the ordeal of coming to court and being questioned. If she is fit, she
must obey the subpoena issued to her. Tiu has no need to worry that the oral examination might
subject her to badgering by adverse counsel. The trial courts duty is to protect every witness
against oppressive behavior of an examiner and this is especially true where the witness is of
advanced age.[8] 2.
Tiu claimed before the trial court the right not to testify against her
stepdaughter, petitioner Emma Lee, invoking Section 25, Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence,
which reads: SECTION 25. Parental and filial privilege.- No person may be compelled to testify
against his parents, other direct ascendants, children or other direct descendants. The above is
an adaptation from a similar provision in Article 315 of the Civil Code that applies only in criminal
cases. But those who revised the Rules of Civil Procedure chose to extend the prohibition to all
kinds of actions, whether civil, criminal, or administrative, filed against parents and other direct
ascendants or descendants. But here Tiu, who invokes the filial privilege, claims that she is the
stepmother of petitioner Emma Lee. The privilege cannot apply to them because the rule
applies only to direct ascendants and descendants, a family tie connected by a common
ancestry. A stepdaughter has no common ancestry by her stepmother. Article 965 thus
provides:
Art. 965. The direct line is either descending or ascending. The former unites
the head of the family with those who descend from him. The latter binds a person with those
from whom he descends. Consequently, Tiu can be compelled to testify against petitioner
Emma Lee. WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP 92555.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------3. ADMISSIONS AND CONFESSIONS
Sec. 26. - Admission of a party
29. ZENON R. PEREZ, Petitioner, - versus - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and
SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondents.

G.R. No. 164763

February 12, 2008
D
E C I S I O N REYES, R.T., J.: PETITIONER Zenon R. Perez seeks a review[1] of his
conviction by the Sandiganbayan[2] for malversation of public funds[3] under Article 217 of the
Revised Penal Code.
This is not a big case but its implications are wide-ranging and the
issues We resolve include the rights to speedy trial and speedy disposition of a criminal case,
the balancing test, due process, and cruel and unusual punishment. The Facts On December
28, 1988, an audit team headed by Auditor I Arlene R. Mandin, Provincial Auditors Office,
Bohol,[4] conducted a cash examination on the account of petitioner, who was then the acting
municipal treasurer of Tubigon, Bohol. Petitioner was absent on the first scheduled audit at his
office on December 28, 1988. A radio message was sent to Loon, the town where he resided,
to apprise him of the on-going audit. The following day, the audit team counted the cash
contained in the safe of petitioner in his presence. In the course of the audit, the amount of
P21,331.79 was found in the safe of petitioner. The audit team embodied their findings in the
Report of Cash Examination,[5] which also contained an inventory of cash items. Based on the
said audit, petitioner was supposed to have on hand the total amount of P94,116.36, instead of
the P21,331.79, incurring a shortage of P72,784.57.[6] The report also contained the Cash
Production Notice[7] dated January 4, 1989, where petitioner was informed and required to
produce the amount of P72,784.57, and the cash count sheet signed and acknowledged by
petitioner indicating the correctness of the amount of P21,331.79 found in his safe and counted
in his presence. A separate demand letter[8] dated January 4, 1989 requiring the production of
the missing funds was sent and received by petitioner on January 5, 1989. When asked by the
auditing team as to the location of the missing funds, petitioner verbally explained that part of
the money was used to pay for the loan of his late brother, another portion was spent for the
food of his family, and the rest for his medicine.[9] As a result of the audit, Arlene R. Mandin
prepared a memorandum[10] dated January 13, 1989 addressed to the Provincial Auditor of
Bohol recommending the filing of the appropriate criminal case against petitioner. On January
16, 1989, petitioner remitted to the Office of the Provincial Treasurer of Bohol the amounts of
P10,000.00 and P15,000.00, respectively. On February 14, 1989, petitioner again remitted to
the Provincial Treasurer an additional amount of P35,000.00, followed by remittances made on
February 16, 1989 in the amounts of P2,000.00 and P2,784.00. An administrative case was filed
against petitioner on February 13, 1989. He filed an Answer[11] dated February 22, 1989
reiterating his earlier verbal admission before the audit team. On April 17, 1989, petitioner again
remitted the amount of P8,000.00 to the Provincial Treasurer of Bohol. Petitioner had then fully
restituted his shortage in the amount of P72,784.57. The full restitution of the missing money
was confirmed and shown by the following receipts:[12] Official Receipt No.
Date Issued
and Received
Amount
8266659
January 16, 1989
P10,000.00
8266660
January 16, 1989
P15,000.00
8266662
February 14, 1989
P35,000.00
8266667
February 16, 1989
P 2,000.00
8266668
February 16, 1989
P 2,784.00
8266675
April 17, 1989
P 8,000.00
TOTAL - P72,784.57 Later, petitioner was charged before the Sandiganbayan with
malversation of public funds, defined and penalized by Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code in
an Information that read: That on or about the period covering from December 28, 1988 to

January 5, 1989, and for sometime prior thereto, in the Municipality of Tubigon, Province of
Bohol, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
Zenon R. Perez, a public officer being then Acting Municipal Treasury of the said Municipality, by
reason of the duties of his official position was accountable for the public funds collected and
received by him, with grave abuse of confidence did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously misappropriate, misapply, embezzle and take away from the said funds the total
amount of SEVENTY-TWO THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED EIGHTY-FOUR PESOS and
57/100 (P72,784.57), which said fund was appropriated and converted by the said accused to
his own personal use and benefit to the damage and prejudice of the government in the
aforementioned amount. CONTRARY TO LAW.[13] (Underscoring supplied) On March 1, 1990,
petitioner, duly assisted by counsel de parte, entered a plea of not guilty.[14] Pre-trial was
initially set on June 4-5, 1990 but petitioners counsel moved for postponement. The
Sandiganbayan, however, proceeded to hear the case on June 5, 1990, as previously
scheduled, due to the presence of prosecution witness Arlene R. Mandin, who came all the way
from Bohol. On said date, the Sandiganbayan dispensed with pre-trial and allowed the
prosecution to present its witness. Arlene R. Mandin testified as narrated above. The defense
presented evidence through petitioner Zenon R. Perez himself. He denied the contents of his
first Answer[15] to the administrative case filed against him by the audit team. He claimed it
was prepared without the assistance of counsel and that at the time of its preparation and
submission, he was not in peak mental and physical condition, having been stricken with
diabetes mellitus.[16] He then revoked his Answer dated February 22, 1989 and filed his second
Answer dated March 2, 1989.[17] In the latter, he vehemently denied that he incurred a cash
shortage P72,784.57. According to petitioner, the alleged shortage was in the possession and
custody of his accountable personnel at the time of the audit examination. Several amounts
totalling P64,784.00 were remitted to him on separate dates by his accountable officer, starting
January 16, 1989 to February 16, 1989. The same were turned over by him to the Office of the
Provincial Treasurer, leaving an unremitted sum of P8,000.00 as of February 16, 1989.[18] He
remitted the P8,000.00 on April 17, 1989 to the Provincial Treasurer of Bohol, fully restoring the
cash shortage. Petitioner further testified that on July 30, 1989, he submitted his Position
Paper[19] before the Office of the Ombudsman, Cebu City and maintained that the alleged cash
shortage was only due to oversight. Petitioner argued that the government did not suffer any
damage or prejudice since the alleged cash shortage was actually deposited with the Office of
the Provincial Treasurer as evidenced by official receipts.[20] Petitioner completed his testimony
on September 20, 1990. He rested his case on October 20, 1990.[21] Sandiganbayan
Disposition
On September 24, 2003, the Sandiganbayan rendered a judgment of
conviction with a fallo reading: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused
ZENON R. PEREZ, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Malversation of Public
Funds as defined in and penalized by Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code and, there being
one mitigating circumstance without any aggravating circumstance to offset the same, is hereby
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of from TEN (10) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of
prision mayor as the minimum to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS and EIGHT (8) MONTHS of
reclusion temporal as the maximum and to suffer perpetual special disqualification. The
accused Zenon R. Perez is likewise ordered to pay a FINE equal to the total amount of the
funds malversed, which is Seventy-Two Thousand Seven Hundred Eighty-Four Pesos and Fifty-

Seven Centavos (P72, 784.57). SO ORDERED.[22] (Emphasis in the original) On January 13,
2004, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration[23] which the prosecution opposed on
January 28, 2004.[24] Petitioner replied[25] to the opposition. On August 6, 2004, petitioners
motion was denied with finality.
On September 23, 2004, petitioner resorted to the instant
appeal[26] raising the following issues, to wit: I. THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN BY UNDULY
AND UNREASONABLY DELAYING THE DECISION OF THE CASE FOR OVER THIRTEEN
(13) YEARS VIOLATED THE PETITIONERS RIGHT TO SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF HIS
CASE AND DUE PROCESS. II. THE LAW RELIED UPON IN CONVICTING THE
PETITIONER AND THE SENTENCE IMPOSED IS CRUEL AND THEREFORE VIOLATES
SECTION 19 OF ARTICLE III (BILL OF RIGHTS) OF THE CONSTITUTION.[27] (Underscoring
supplied) Our Ruling
Before addressing petitioners twin assignment of errors, We first
tackle the propriety of petitioners conviction for malversation of public funds. I. Petitioner was
correctly convicted of malversation. Malversation is defined and penalized under Article 217 of
the Revised Penal Code. The acts punished as malversation are:
(1) appropriating
public funds or property, (2) taking or misappropriating the same, (3) consenting, or through
abandonment or negligence, permitting any other person to take such public funds or property,
and (4) being otherwise guilty of the misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property.
[28] There are four elements that must concur in order that one may be found guilty of the
crime. They are: (a) That the offender be a public officer; (b) That he had the custody or
control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office; (c) That those funds or
property involved were public funds or property for which he is accountable; and (d) That he
has appropriated, took or misappropriated or consented or, through abandonment or
negligence, permitted another person to take them.[29] Evidently, the first three elements are
present in the case at bar. At the time of the commission of the crime charged, petitioner was a
public officer, being then the acting municipal treasurer of Tubigon, Bohol. By reason of his
public office, he was accountable for the public funds under his custody or control. The question
then is whether or not petitioner has appropriated, took or misappropriated, or consented or
through abandonment or negligence, permitted another person to take such funds. We rule in
the affirmative. In malversation, all that is necessary to prove is that the defendant received in
his possession public funds; that he could not account for them and did not have them in his
possession; and that he could not give a reasonable excuse for its disappearance. An
accountable public officer may be convicted of malversation even if there is no direct evidence
of misappropriation and the only evidence is shortage in his accounts which he has not been
able to explain satisfactorily.[30] Verily, an accountable public officer may be found guilty of
malversation even if there is no direct evidence of malversation because the law establishes a
presumption that mere failure of an accountable officer to produce public funds which have
come into his hands on demand by an officer duly authorized to examine his accounts is prima
facie case of conversion.[31] Because of the prima facie presumption in Article 217, the burden
of evidence is shifted to the accused to adequately explain the location of the funds or property
under his custody or control in order to rebut the presumption that he has appropriated or
misappropriated for himself the missing funds. Failing to do so, the accused may be convicted
under the said provision. However, the presumption is merely prima facie and a rebuttable one.
The accountable officer may overcome the presumption by proof to the contrary. If he adduces
evidence showing that, in fact, he has not put said funds or property to personal use, then that

presumption is at end and the prima facie case is destroyed.[32] In the case at bar, petitioner
was not able to present any credible evidence to rebut the presumption that he malversed the
missing funds in his custody or control. What is extant in the records is that the prosecution,
through witness Arlene R. Mandin, was able to prove that petitioner malversed the funds under
his custody and control. As testified by Mandin: Atty. Caballero:Q: Was Mr. Zenon Perez
actually and physically present during the time of your cash examination? Witness:A. Yes, Sir.
Q: From December 28, to January 5, 1989?A: He was present on December 28, 1988 and
January 4 and 5, 1989, Sir. Q: Did he not make any verbal explanation as the reason why he
was short of about P72,000.00, after you conducted the cash count on January 5, 1989?A:
Yes, Sir, he did. Q: What did he tell you?A: He told us that he used some of the money to
pay for the loan of his brother and the other portion was spent for food of his family; and the rest
for his medicine.[33] (Emphasis supplied) Petitioner gave himself away with his first Answer
filed at the Office of the Provincial Treasurer of Bohol in the administrative case filed against
him. In that Answer, petitioner narrated how he disposed of the missing funds under his custody
and control, to wit: (1) about P30,000.00 was used to pay the commercial loan of his late
brother; (2) he spent P10,000.00 for the treatment of his toxic goiter; and (3) about P32,000.00
was spent for food and clothing of his family, and the education of his children. He there stated:
1.
That the circumstances surrounding the cash shortage in the total amount of P72,784.57
during the examination of the respondents cash accounts by the Commission on Audit on
December 28-29, 1988 and January 4-5, 1989 are as follows, to wit: (a)
That respondent
paid the amount of about P30,000.00 to the Philippine National Bank, Tagbilaran Branch as
interests of the commercial loan of his late brother Carino R. Perez using respondents house
and lot as collateral thereof. If the interests would not be paid, the loan would be foreclosed to
respondents great prejudice and disadvantage considering that he and his family are residing in
said house used as collateral; (b)
That respondent spent the amount of P10,000.00 in
connection with the treatment of his toxic goiter; (c)
That the rest of the amount amounting
to about P32,000.00 was spent by him for his familys foods, clothings (sic), and education of his
children because his monthly salary is not enough for the needs of his family.[34] By the explicit
admission of petitioner, coupled with the testimony of Arlene R. Mandin, the fourth element of
the crime of malversation was duly established. His conviction thus stands in terra firma. True it
is that petitioner filed another Answer on March 2, 1989 with the Office of the Provincial
Treasurer of Bohol, substantially changing the contents of his earlier answer of February 22,
1989. His second Answer averred: 3.
That the truth of the matter is that the alleged total
cash shortage of P72,784.57 were still in the possession and custody of his accountable
personnel at the time of the examination held by the auditor of the Commission on Audit; 4.
That out of the alleged cash shortage of P72,784.57, almost all of said amount were already
remitted to him by his accountable personnel after January 5, 1989, and only the remaining
amount of P8,000.00 remains to be remitted to him by his accountable personnel.[35] The
sudden turnaround of petitioner fails to convince Us. To Our mind, petitioner only changed his
story to exonerate himself, after realizing that his first Answer put him in a hole, so to speak. It is
contended that petitioners first Answer of February 22, 1989 should not have been given
probative weight because it was executed without the assistance of counsel.[36] There is no
law, jurisprudence or rule which mandates that an employee should be assisted by counsel in
an administrative case. On the contrary, jurisprudence is in unison in saying that assistance of

counsel is not indispensable in administrative proceedings. Walang batas, hurisprudensiya, o

tuntunin na nagsasabi na ang isang kawani ay dapat may tulong ng abogado sa isang kasong
administratibo. Sa katunayan, ang hurisprudensiya ay iisa ang sinasabi na ang pagtulong ng
isang abogado ay hindi kailangang-kailangan sa kasong administratibo. The right to counsel,
which cannot be waived unless the waiver is in writing and in the presence of counsel, is a right
afforded a suspect or accused during custodial investigation. It is not an absolute right and may
be invoked or rejected in a criminal proceeding and, with more reason, in an administrative
inquiry.[37] Ang karapatang magkaroon ng abogado, na hindi maaaring talikdan malibang ang
waiver ay nakasulat at sa harap ng abogado, ay karapatang ibinibigay sa suspek o nasasakdal
sa isang custodial investigation. Ito ay hindi lubos na karapatan at maaring hingin o tanggihan
sa isang prosesong kriminal, at lalo na sa isang administratibong pagsisiyasat. While
investigations conducted by an administrative body may at times be akin to a criminal
proceeding, the fact remains that under existing laws, a party in an administrative inquiry may or
may not be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of respondents
capacity to represent himself, and no duty rests on such body to furnish the person being
investigated with counsel.[38] Thus, the right to counsel is not imperative in administrative
investigations because such inquiries are conducted merely to determine whether there are
facts that merit disciplinary measures against erring public officers and employees, with the
purpose of maintaining the dignity of government service.[39] Kung gayon, ang karapatang
magkaroon ng abogado ay hindi sapilitan sa isang administratibong imbestigasyon sapagkat ito
ay ginagawa lamang upang malaman kung may sapat na batayan na patawan ng disiplina ang
nagkasalang opisyal o empleyado, para mapanatili ang dignidad ng paglilingkod sa
pamahalaan. There is nothing in the Constitution that says that a party in a non-litigation
proceeding is entitled to be represented by counsel and that, without such representation, he
shall not be bound by such proceedings. The assistance of lawyers, while desirable, is not
indispensable. The legal profession was not engrafted in the due process clause such that
without the participation of its members, the safeguard is deemed ignored or violated. The
ordinary citizen is not that helpless that he cannot validly act at all except only with a lawyer at
his side.[40] More than that, petitioners first Answer may be taken against him, as he executed
it in the course of the administrative proceedings below. This is pursuant to Rule 130, Section
26 of the Rules of Court which provides that the act, declaration or omission of a party as to a
relevant fact may be given against him. In People v. Lising,[41] the Court held: Extrajudicial
statements are as a rule, admissible as against their respective declarants, pursuant to the rule
that the act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given against him.
This is based upon the presumption that no man would declare anything against himself, unless
such declarations were true. A mans act, conduct and declarations wherever made, provided
they be voluntary, are admissible against him, for the reason that it is fair to presume that they
correspond with the truth and it is his fault if they are not. There is also no merit in the
contention that petitioners sickness affected the preparation of his first Answer. He presented
no convincing evidence that his disease at the time he formulated that answer diminished his
capacity to formulate a true, clear and coherent response to any query. In fact, its contents
merely reiterated his verbal explanation to the auditing team on January 5, 1989 on how he
disposed of the missing funds. II. There is no violation of the rights to a speedy disposition of
the case and to due process of law. We now discuss the right to a speedy trial and disposition,

the balancing test, due process, and cruel and unusual punishment. Petitioner asserts that his
right to due process of law and to speedy disposition of his case was violated because the
decision of the Sandiganbayan was handed down after the lapse of more than twelve years.
The years that he had to wait for the outcome of his case were allegedly spent in limbo, pain
and agony.[42] We are not persuaded. Due process of law as applied to judicial proceedings
has been interpreted to mean a law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds on
inquiry, and renders judgment only after trial.[43] Petitioner cannot complain that his right to
due process has been violated. He was given all the chances in the world to present his case,
and the Sandiganbayan rendered its decision only after considering all the pieces of evidence
presented before it. Petitioners claim of violation of his right to a speedy disposition of his case
must also fail. The 1987 Constitution[44] guarantees the right of an accused to speedy trial.
Both the 1973 Constitution in Section 16 of Article IV and the 1987 Constitution in Section 16 of
Article III, Bill of Rights, are also explicit in granting to the accused the right to speedy
disposition of his case.[45] In Barker v. Wingo,[46] the United States Supreme Court was
confronted for the first time with two rigid approaches on speedy trial as ways of eliminating
some of the uncertainty which courts experience protecting the right.[47] The first approach is
the fixed-time period which holds the view that the Constitution requires a criminal defendant
to be offered a trial within a specified time period.[48] The second approach is the demandwaiver rule which provides that a defendant waives any consideration of his right to speedy
trial for any period prior to which he has not demanded trial. Under this rigid approach, a prior
demand is a necessary condition to the consideration of the speedy trial right.[49] The fixedtime period was rejected because there is no constitutional basis for holding that the speedy
trial can be quantified into a specific number of days or months.[50] The demand-waiver rule
was likewise rejected because aside from the fact that it is inconsistent with this Courts
pronouncements on waiver of constitutional rights,[51] it is insensitive to a right which we have
deemed fundamental.[52] The Court went on to adopt a middle ground: the balancing test, in
which the conduct of both the prosecution and defendant are weighed.[53] Mr. Justice Powell,
ponente, explained the concept, thus: A balancing test necessarily compels courts to approach
speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis. We can do little more than identify some of the factors
which courts should assess in determining whether a particular defendant has been deprived of
his right. Though some might express them in different ways, we identify four such factors:
Length of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendants assertion of his right, and prejudice to
the defendant. The length of the delay is to some extent a triggering mechanism. Until there is
some delay which is presumptively prejudicial, there is no necessity for inquiry into the other
factors that go into the balance. Nevertheless, because of the imprecision of the right to speedy
trial, the length of delay that will provoke such an inquiry is necessarily dependent upon the
peculiar circumstances of the case. To take but one example, the delay that can be tolerated for
an ordinary street crime is considerably less than for a serious, complex conspiracy charge.
Closely related to length of delay is the reason the government assigns to justify the delay.
Here, too, different weights should be assigned to different reasons. A deliberate attempt to
delay the trial in order to hamper the defense should be weighted heavily against the
government. A more neutral reason such as negligence or overcrowded courts should be
weighted less heavily but nevertheless should be considered since the ultimate responsibility for
such circumstances must rest with the government rather than with the defendant. Finally, a

valid reason, such as a missing witness, should serve to justify appropriate delay. We have
already discussed the third factor, the defendants responsibility to assert his right. Whether and
how a defendant asserts his right is closely related to the other factors we have mentioned. The
strength of his efforts will be affected by the length of the delay, to some extent by the reason for
the delay, and most particularly by the personal prejudice, which is not always readily
identifiable, that he experiences. The more serious the deprivation, the more likely a defendant
is to complain. The defendants assertion of his speedy trial right, then, is entitled to strong
evidentiary weight in determining whether the defendant is being deprived of the right. We
emphasize that failure to assert the right will make it difficult for a defendant to prove that he
was denied a speedy trial. A fourth factor is prejudice to the defendant. Prejudice, of course,
should be assessed in the light of the interests of defendants which the speedy trial right was
designed to protect. This Court has identified three such interests: (i) to prevent oppressive
pretrial incarceration; (ii) to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and (iii) to limit the
possibility that the defense will be impaired. Of these, the most serious is the last, because the
inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system.
If witnesses die or disappear during a delay, the prejudice is obvious. There is also prejudice if
defense witnesses are unable to recall accurately events of the distant past. Loss of memory,
however, is not always reflected in the record because what has been forgotten can rarely be
shown.[54] (Emphasis supplied) Philippine jurisprudence has, on several occasions, adopted
the balancing test. In 1991, in Gonzales v. Sandiganbayan,[55] this Court ruled: It must be here
emphasized that the right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial, is
deemed violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive
delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or when
without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party
having his case tried. Equally applicable is the balancing test used to determine whether a
defendant has been denied his right to a speedy trial, or a speedy disposition of a case for that
matter, in which the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant are weighed, and such
factors as length of the delay, reason for the delay, the defendants assertion or non-assertion of
his right, and prejudice to the defendant resulting from the delay, are considered. (Underscoring
supplied) Subsequently, in Dela Pea v. Sandiganbayan,[56] this Court again enumerated the
factors that should be considered and balanced, namely: (1) length of delay; (2) reasons for
the delay; (3) assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused; and (4) prejudice caused
by the delay.[57] Once more, in Mendoza-Ong v. Sandiganbayan,[58] this Court reiterated that
the right to speedy disposition of cases, like the right to speedy trial, is violated only when the
proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays.[59] In the
determination of whether said right has been violated, particular regard must be taken of the
facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.[60] The conduct of both the prosecution and
defendant, the length of the delay, the reasons for such delay, the assertion or failure to assert
such right by accused, and the prejudice caused by the delay are the factors to consider and
balance.[61] Moreover, the determination of whether the delays are of said nature is relative and
cannot be based on a mere mathematical reckoning of time.[62] Measured by the foregoing
yardstick, We rule that petitioner was not deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of his
case. More important than the absence of serious prejudice, petitioner himself did not want a
speedy disposition of his case.[63] Petitioner was duly represented by counsel de parte in all

stages of the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan. From the moment his case was deemed
submitted for decision up to the time he was found guilty by the Sandiganbayan, however,
petitioner has not filed a single motion or manifestation which could be construed even remotely
as an indication that he wanted his case to be dispatched without delay. Petitioner has clearly
slept on his right. The matter could have taken a different dimension if during all those twelve
years, petitioner had shown signs of asserting his right to a speedy disposition of his case or at
least made some overt acts, like filing a motion for early resolution, to show that he was not
waiving that right.[64] Currit tempus contra decides et sui juris contempores: Time runs against
the slothful and those who neglect their rights. Ang panahon ay hindi panig sa mga tamad at
pabaya sa kanilang karapatan. Vigilantis sed non dormientibus jura in re subveniunt. The law
aids the vigilant and not those who slumber in their rights. Ang batas ay tumutulong sa mga
mapagbantay at hindi sa mga humihimbing sa kanilang karapatan. Pending his conviction by
the Sandiganbayan, petitioner may have truly lived in suspicion and anxiety for over twelve
years. However, any prejudice that may have been caused to him in all those years was only
minimal. The supposed gravity of agony experienced by petitioner is more imagined than real.
This case is analogous to Guerrero v. Court of Appeals.[65] There, the Court ruled that there
was no violation of petitioners right to speedy trial and disposition of his case inasmuch as he
failed seasonably to assert his rights: In the present case, there is no question that petitioner
raised the violation against his own right to speedy disposition only when the respondent trial
judge reset the case for rehearing. It is fair to assume that he would have just continued to
sleep on his right a situation amounting to laches had the respondent judge not taken the
initiative of determining the non-completion of the records and of ordering the remedy precisely
so he could dispose of the case. The matter could have taken a different dimension if during all
those ten years between 1979 when accused filed his memorandum and 1989 when the case
was re-raffled, the accused showed signs of asserting his right which was granted him in 1987
when the new Constitution took effect, or at least made some overt act (like a motion for early
disposition or a motion to compel the stenographer to transcribe stenographic notes) that he
was not waiving it. As it is, his silence would have to be interpreted as a waiver of such right.
While this Court recognizes the right to speedy disposition quite distinctly from the right to a
speedy trial, and although this Court has always zealously espoused protection from oppressive
and vexatious delays not attributable to the party involved, at the same time, we hold that a
partys individual rights should not work against and preclude the peoples equally important
right to public justice. In the instant case, three people died as a result of the crash of the
airplane that the accused was flying. It appears to us that the delay in the disposition of the case
prejudiced not just the accused but the people as well. Since the accused has completely failed
to assert his right seasonably and inasmuch as the respondent judge was not in a position to
dispose of the case on the merits due to the absence of factual basis, we hold it proper and
equitable to give the parties fair opportunity to obtain (and the court to dispense) substantial
justice in the premises. III. The law relied upon in convicting petitioner is not cruel and unusual.
It does not violate Section 19, Article III of the Bill of Rights. What constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment has not been exactly defined.[66] The Eighth Amendment of the United States
Constitution,[67] the source of Section 19, Article III of the Bill of Rights[68] of our own
Constitution, has yet to be put to the test to finally determine what constitutes cruel and inhuman
punishment.[69] Cases that have been decided described, rather than defined, what is meant by

cruel and unusual punishment. This is explained by the pronouncement of the United States
Supreme Court that [t]he clause of the Constitution, in the opinion of the learned
commentators, may be therefore progressive, and is not fastened to the obsolete, but may
acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice.[70] In Wilkerson
v. Utah,[71] Mr. Justice Clifford of the United States Supreme Court opined that [d]ifficulty would
attend the effort to define with exactness the extent of the constitutional provision which
provides that cruel and unusual punishments shall not be inflicted; but it is safe to affirm that
punishments of torture, x x x and all others in the same line of unnecessary cruelty, are
forbidden by that amendment to the constitution.[72] In In Re: Kemmler,[73] Mr. Chief Justice
Fuller of that same Court stated that [p]unishments are cruel when they involve torture or a
lingering death; but the punishment of death is not cruel within the meaning of that word as used
in the constitution. It implies x x x something more inhuman and barbarous, something more
than the mere extinguishment of life.[74]
Again, in Weems v. U.S.,[75] Mr. Justice
McKenna held for the Court that cadena temporal and its accessory penalties has no fellow in
American legislation. Let us remember that it has come to us from a government of a different
form and genus from ours. It is cruel in its excess of imprisonment and that which accompanies
and follows imprisonment. It is unusual in character. Its punishments come under the
condemnation of the Bill of Rights, both on account of their degree and kind. And they would
have those bad attributes even if they were found in a Federal enactment, and not taken from
an alien source. In Echegaray v. Executive Secretary,[76] this Court in a per curiam Decision
held that Republic Act No. 8177,[77] even if it does not provide in particular the details involved
in the execution by lethal injection, is not cruel, degrading or inhuman, and is thus constitutional.
Any infliction of pain in lethal injection is merely incidental in carrying out the execution of the
death penalty and does not fall within the constitutional proscription against cruel, degrading or
inhuman punishment.[78] The Court adopted the American view that what is cruel and unusual
is not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened
by humane justice and must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark
the progress of a maturing society.[79] In his last ditch effort to exculpate himself, petitioner
argues that the penalty meted for the crime of malversation of public funds that ha[ve] been
replenished, remitted and/or returned to the government is cruel and therefore unconstitutional,
as government has not suffered any damage.[80] The argument is specious on two grounds.
First. What is punished by the crime of malversation is the act of a public officer who, by reason
of the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or property, shall appropriate the same,
or shall take and misappropriate or shall consent, or through abandonment or negligence shall
permit any other person to take such public funds or property, wholly or partially, or shall
otherwise be guilty of the misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property.[81]
Payment or reimbursement is not a defense for exoneration in malversation; it may only be
considered as a mitigating circumstance. This is because damage is not an element of
malversation. Second. There is strong presumption of constitutionality accorded to statutes. It is
established doctrine that a statute should be construed whenever possible in harmony with,
rather than in violation of, the Constitution.[82] The presumption is that the legislature intended
to enact a valid, sensible and just law and one which operates no further than may be
necessary to effectuate the specific purpose of the law.[83] It is presumed that the legislature
has acted within its constitutional powers. So, it is the generally accepted rule that every

statute, or regularly accepted act, is, or will be, or should be, presumed to be valid and
constitutional.[84] He who attacks the constitutionality of a law has the onus probandi to show
why such law is repugnant to the Constitution. Failing to overcome its presumption of
constitutionality, a claim that a law is cruel, unusual, or inhuman, like the stance of petitioner,
must fail. IV. On the penalty
The Sandiganbayan sentenced petitioner to an indeterminate
sentence of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years
and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum. In imposing the penalty, it found that
petitioner was entitled to the mitigating circumstance of payment which is akin to voluntary
surrender. Article 217 penalizes malversation in the following tenor: Article 217. Malversation of
public funds or property. Presumption of malversation. Any public officer who, by reason of
the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or property, shall appropriate the same, or
shall take and misappropriate or shall consent, or through abandonment or negligence shall
permit any other person to take such public funds or property, wholly or partially, or shall
otherwise be guilty of the misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property. x x x x 4.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods, if the amount involved is
more than 12,000 but is less than 22,000 pesos. If the amount exceeds the latter, the penalty
shall be reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua. In all cases, persons
guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty of perpetual special disqualification and a fine
equal to the amount of the funds malversed or equal to the total value of the property
embezzled. The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property
with which he is chargeable upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie
evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal uses. (Underscoring
supplied) The amount malversed totalled P72,784.57. The prescribed penalty is reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua, which has a range of seventeen (17)
years, four (4) months and one (1) day to forty (40) years. However, the commission of the
crime was attended by the mitigating circumstance akin to voluntary surrender. As correctly
observed by the Sandiganbayan, petitioner restituted the full amount even before the
prosecution could present its evidence. That is borne by the records. It bears stressing that the
full restitution of the amount malversed will not in any way exonerate an accused, as payment is
not one of the elements of extinction of criminal liability. Under the law, the refund of the sum
misappropriated, even before the commencement of the criminal prosecution, does not exempt
the guilty person from liability for the crime.[85] At most, then, payment of the amount malversed
will only serve as a mitigating circumstance[86] akin to voluntary surrender, as provided for in
paragraph 7 of Article 13[87] in relation to paragraph 10[88] of the same Article of the Revised
Penal Code.
But the Court also holds that aside from voluntary surrender, petitioner is
entitled to the mitigating circumstance of no intention to commit so grave a wrong,[89] again in
relation to paragraph 10 of Article 13.[90]
The records bear out that petitioner
misappropriated the missing funds under his custody and control because he was impelled by
the genuine love for his brother and his family. Per his admission, petitioner used part of the
funds to pay off a debt owed by his brother. Another portion of the misappropriated funds went
to his medications for his debilitating diabetes.
Further, as shown earlier, petitioner
restituted all but Eight Thousand Pesos (P8,000.00) of the funds in less than one month and a
half and said small balance in three (3) months from receipt of demand of COA on January 5,
1999. Evidently, there was no intention to commit so grave a wrong. Of course, the end does

not justify the means. To condone what petitioner has done because of the nobility of his
purpose or financial emergencies will become a potent excuse for malefactors and open the
floodgates for more corruption in the government, even from small fry like him. The bottom line
is a guilty person deserves the penalty given the attendant circumstances and commensurate
with the gravity of the offense committed. Thus, a reduction in the imposable penalty by one
degree is in order. Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code is explicit: Art. 64. Rules for the
application of penalties which contain three periods. In cases in which the penalties prescribed
by law contains three periods, whether it be a single divisible penalty or composed of three
difference penalties, each one of which forms a period in accordance with the provisions of
Articles 76 and 77, the courts shall observe for the application of the penalty, the following rules,
according to whether there are no mitigating or aggravating circumstances: x x x x 5. When
there are two or more mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstances are present,
the court shall impose the penalty next lower to that prescribed by law, in the period that it may
deem applicable, according to the number and nature of such circumstances. (Underscoring
supplied) Considering that there are two mitigating circumstances, the prescribed penalty is
reduced to prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its medium period, to
be imposed in any of its periods. The new penalty has a range of ten (10) years and one (1) day
to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,[91] the
maximum term could be ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor maximum, while the
minimum term is again one degree lower[92] and could be four (4) years, two (2) months and
one (1) day of prision correccional maximum. In the 1910 case of U.S. v. Reyes,[93] the trial
judge entered a judgment of conviction against the accused and meted to him the penalty of
three years imprisonment, to pay a fine of P1,500.00, and in case of insolvency to suffer
subsidiary imprisonment at the rate of one day for every P2.50 that he failed to pay, which
subsidiary imprisonment, however, should not exceed one third of the principal penalty and to
be perpetually disqualified for public office and to pay the costs. This was well within the
imposable penalty then under Section 1 of Act No. 1740,[94] which is imprisonment for not less
than two months nor more than ten years and, in the discretion of the court, by a fine of not
more than the amount of such funds and the value of such property. On appeal to the Supreme
Court, the accuseds conviction was affirmed but his sentence was modified and reduced to six
months. The court, per Mr. Justice Torres, reasoned thus: For the foregoing reasons the several
unfounded errors assigned to the judgment appealed from have been fully refuted, since in
conclusion it is fully shown that the accused unlawfully disposed of a portion of the municipal
funds, putting the same to his own use, and to that of other persons in violation of Act. No. 1740,
and consequently he has incurred the penalty therein established as principal of the crime of
misappropriation; and even though in imposing it, it is not necessary to adhere to the rules of
the Penal Code, the court in using its discretional powers as authorized by law, believes that the
circumstances present in the commission of crimes should be taken into consideration, and in
the present case the amount misappropriated was refunded at the time the funds were counted.
[95] (Underscoring supplied) We opt to exercise an analogous discretion. WHEREFORE, the
Decision of the Sandiganbayan dated September 24, 2003 is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that petitioner is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four
(4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum term, to ten (10)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum term, with perpetual special

disqualification. He is likewise ORDERED to pay a fine of P72,784.57, the amount equal to the
funds malversed. Costs against petitioner.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Sec. 27 - Offer of compromise not admissible
30. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee - versus - MANUEL AGUILAR,
Accused-Appellant.
G.R. No. 185206
August 25, 2010 DECISION PEREZ, J.:
We review in this appeal
the 12 December 2007 decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR- H.C. No.
00154, partially affirming the 22 April 2002 decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
31, Dumaguete City, Negros Oriental. The CA decision found appellant Manuel Aguilar
(appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Simple Rape and sentenced him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
In line with the ruling of this Court in People v.
Cabalquinto,[2] the real name and identity of the rape victim, as well as the members of her
immediate family, are not disclosed. Instead, the rape victim shall herein be referred to as XYZ;
her mother, AAA; and her aunt, CCC. THE FACTS
Appellant was charged before the RTC
with the crime of rape in an Information,[3] the accusatory portion of which reads:
That
on February 4, 1998 at about 12:00 oclock midnight at Sitio Sawa-an, Sto. Rosario, Sta.
Catalina, Negros Oriental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused by means of force and intimidation, with abuse of confidence, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, did lie and succeeded in having carnal knowledge with a 13 year old
minor [XYZ], accuseds Step-daughter.
Contrary to Article 335 of the Revised Penal
Code.
Dumaguete City, Philippines, April 17, 1998.
Upon arraignment, appellant
pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. The prosecution presented XYZ, AAA and Dr. Rosita
Muoz as its witnesses. The appellant took the witness stand as the sole witness for the
defense.
The victim in this case was, at the time of the incident, a 13-year-old lass, who,
together with her siblings, lived with her mother and the latters live-in partner, appellant Manuel
Aguilar. XYZ is AAAs daughter with her deceased husband. The four other siblings of XYZ are
AAAs children with accused-appellant.
XYZ testified that she was born on 26 January
1985. She declared that on that fateful evening of 4 February 1998, while she was asleep,
accused took off her shorts and panty, laid on top of her and had sexual intercourse with her
against her will. She wanted to shout but accused-appellant gagged her mouth with his hand
and threatened to kill her if she will utter a word. She averred that she felt intense pain in her
vagina. Accused-appellant, who was at that time naked, was caught in the act by AAA.
In the morning of 5 February 1998, AAA brought XYZ to the police station. Thereafter, XYZ was
required to undergo medical examination before the municipal health doctor of Sta. Catalina,
Negros Oriental.
Dr. Rosita Muoz testified for the prosecution and declared that XYZ
came to her clinic at the Rural Health Unit of Sta. Catalina, Negros Oriental. She physically
examined the victim and found that she had vaginal discharges. Considering that the clinic
lacked laboratory equipments, she forwarded the vaginal discharges of the victim to the District
Hospital of Bayawan, Negros Oriental for examination. The examination yielded the presence
of spermatozoa, positively establishing that XYZ had undergone a very recent sexual activity.
Dr. Muoz issued a medical certificate certifying the presence of spermatozoa based on the

laboratory results.
AAA testified that at about 12 midnight of 4 February 1998, she woke
up to urinate and proceeded to the urinal located across the room. While groping in the dark on
her way to the urinal, she accidentally touched the buttocks and the back of the body of the
accused. The accused was naked and acting to lie on top of XYZ. When she lighted a lamp,
AAA saw the naked accused at the right side of XYZ facing the latter. XYZ was then wearing
only a T-shirt without shorts and underwear. When AAA asked accused-appellant what he did to
XYZ, the accused-appellant did not reply. AAA then asked XYZ what the accused-appellant did
to her and the latter revealed that she was raped by the accused-appellant. Immediately
thereafter, XYZ ran towards the place of her aunt CCC.
The accused, for his part,
denied having raped XYZ. He declared during the direct-examination that in the evening of 4
February 1998, he slept wearing only his underwear with the upper part of his body left bare and
naked. He claimed that he was used to wearing only a brief without any clothing to cover his
upper body everytime he sleeps at night. At 12 midnight that evening, he urinated in the urinal
located near the place where his two children and XYZ were sleeping. He was not able to finish
urinating because there was someone who grabbed him from behind. It was at this time that
his wife, AAA, asked him why he molested XYZ.
Accused-appellant denied the
allegations against him. He maintained that his wife testified against him because he urinated in
the urinal near the place where XYZ was sleeping. Moreover, AAA allegedly felt bad and
jealous about his having conversations with their female neighbors. The filing of the complaint
was AAAs way of getting back at him. With regard to XYZ, accused-appellant claimed that she
harbored a grudge against him since he forbade her from going out with her male friends.
Accused-appellant also claimed that it was improbable for him to commit the offense
considering that there were seven of them then sleeping in the house that evening. He argued
that even assuming that he had carnal knowledge of XYZ, there was some sort of consent on
the part of the victim since she failed to struggle and shout for help. He alleged that the
absence of any showing of resistance casts reasonable doubt upon his guilt.
After trial on
the merits, the RTC rendered a decision finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of rape and sentenced him to suffer the capital penalty of death. The RTC
further ordered accused-appellant to indemnify XYZ in the amount of P75,000.00. The
dispositive portion of its judgment reads:
Wherefore, xxx the Court finds accused
Manuel Aguilar guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape defined and [p]enalized
under Article 335, as amended by Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659, and sentence said
accused the capital penalty of death. And, xxx, accused is hereby ordered to indemnify [XYZ]
the amount of P75,000.00.[4]
On intermediate review, the appellate court partially
affirmed the ruling of the RTC. The Court of Appeals convicted the accused not of qualified rape
but of simple rape in the following tenor:
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the
Regional Trial Court dated April 22, 2002 is PARTIALLY AFFIRMED. Manuel Aguilar is hereby
found and declared guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Simple Rape and is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Accordingly, he is ordered to pay XYZ
only P50,000.00 as civil indemnity. However, to conform with existing jurisprudence, he is
likewise directed to pay P50,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.[5]
The
case is now on final review before us. OUR RULING
We affirm the ruling of the appellate
court that appellant Aguilar is guilty only of simple rape and not of qualified rape.
Article
335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353, otherwise known as the

Anti-Rape Law of 1997, provides in part that:

The death penalty shall also be imposed if
the crime of rape is committed with any of the following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
1)When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant,
step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the
common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.
The concurrence of the minority of the
victim and her relationship to the offender being special qualifying circumstances, which
increases the penalty as opposed to a generic aggravating circumstance which only affects the
period of the penalty, should be alleged in the information, because of the accuseds right to be
informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him.[6] Existing jurisprudence instructs
that the death penalty may be imposed only if the complaint or information has alleged and the
evidence has proven both the minority of the victim and her relationship to the offender by the
quantum of proof required for conviction.[7]
The information in this case alleged that
accused-appellant, who is the step-father of XYZ, succeeded in having carnal knowledge of the
latter, who was then thirteen (13) years of age. The birth certificate of XYZ presented during the
trial clearly established that she was below 18 years old when the rape was committed on 4
February 1998. The records, however, revealed that accused-appellant and AAA were not
legally married but were merely engaged in a common-law relationship. Legally speaking, the
term stepparent refers to an accused who is legally married to one of the parents of the
victim.[8] Although a common-law husband is subject to the punishment of death, if he commits
rape against his wifes daughter, nevertheless, the death penalty cannot be imposed on
accused-appellant because the relationship alleged in the information in Criminal Case No.
13546 is different with that which was actually proven. As such, accused-appellant should be
sentenced with the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua.
This is in all fours with our rulings
in People v. Begino,[9] People v. Santos,[10] People v. Victor,[11] and People v. Ramirez.[12] As
we stated in Ramirez, All told, the guilt of the accused has been clearly established beyond
reasonable doubt. However, the death penalty was erroneously imposed for, as correctly
argued by the accused and sustained by the Solicitor General, the qualifying circumstance of
relationship has not been properly alleged in the Information. It appears that while the accused
was the common-law spouse of Michelle's mother, Michelle was referred to in the Information as
his "step-daughter." A step-daughter is defined as the daughter of one of the spouses by a
former marriage. We have consistently ruled that any of the circumstances under Sec. 11 of RA
7659 the attendance of which mandates the penalty of death, is in the nature of qualifying
circumstances which cannot be proved as such unless alleged in the Information. Evidently, the
technical flaw committed by the prosecution spared the accused from the gallows of death and it
constrains us to reduce the penalty of death to reclusion perpetua.[13] (Emphasis supplied.)
Three principles guide the courts in resolving rape cases: (1) an accusation for rape can be
made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the accused, though innocent, to
disprove; (2) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape in which only two persons are
usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution;
and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits, and cannot be
allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.[14]
In the
determination of guilt for the crime of rape, primordial is the credibility of the complainants
testimony because, in rape cases, the accused may be convicted solely on the testimony of the
victim, provided it is credible, natural, convincing and consistent with human nature and the

normal course of things.[15] Here, the victim, in the painstaking and well-nigh degrading public
trial, related her painful ordeal that she was raped by accused-appellant. Her testimony was
found by the trial court, which had the undisputed vantage in the evaluation and appreciation of
testimonial evidence, to be more credible than that of the defense.[16]
The accusedappellant was convicted beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape on the basis of the
following: (1) XYZs credible testimony concerning the rape incident; (2) XYZs positive
identification of the accused-appellant as the person who raped her; (3) AAAs testimony
regarding the alleged incident; (4) medical examination report showing the presence of
spermatozoa in XYZs vagina evidencing recent sexual intercourse; and (5) absence of ill
motive on XYZs and AAAs part in filing the complaint.
Testimonies of child victims are
given full weight and credit, for when a woman or a girl-child says that she has been raped, she
says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was indeed committed. Youth and maturity
are generally badges of truth and sincerity.[17]
The Court rebuffed accused-appellants
defense of denial. Aside from being weak, it is merely negative and self-serving evidence which
pales in comparison to XYZs and AAAs clear narration of facts and positive identification of the
appellant. The testimony of XYZ, coupled with the medical findings of Dr. Muoz, is enough to
confirm the truthfulness of the charge. Deeply entrenched in jurisprudence is the rule that
findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to the highest respect and
are not to be disturbed on appeal in the absence of any clear showing that the trial court
overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied facts or circumstances of weight and substance which
would have affected the result of the case.[18]
Accused-appellants contention that the
criminal complaint filed against him was caused by ill motive on the part of AAA and XYZ
deserves scant consideration. We cannot accept the claim that it was an offshoot of AAAs
jealousy and of XYZs grudge against him for living in with her mother and for forbidding her to
go out with her male friends. It is a negative self-serving evidence which cannot be given
greater weight than the testimony of credible witnesses who testified on affirmative matters.
Between the positive declarations of a prosecution witness and the negative statements of the
accused, the former deserves more credence.[19]
Accused-appellants contention that it
was improbable for the crime of rape to be committed considering that the whole household was
sleeping almost side by side at that time the rape was allegedly committed is likewise devoid of
merit. For the crime of rape to be committed, it is not necessary for the place to be ideal or the
weather to be fine, for rapists bear no respect for locale and time when they carry out their evil
deed.[20] In numerous cases, the Court held that rape can be committed even in places where
people congregate, in parks, along the roadsides, in school premises, in a house where there
are other occupants, in the same room where other members of the family are also sleeping,
and even in places which to many, would appear unlikely and high risk venues for its
commission. Besides, there is no rule that rape can be committed only in seclusion.[21]
We, likewise, find no merit in appellants contention that there was some sort of consent on the
part of the victim since she failed to struggle and shout for help. Accused-appellant argues that
the prosecution failed to establish force or intimidation; absence of which creates reasonable
doubt upon his guilt. The presence of intimidation, which is purely subjective, cannot be tested
by any hard and fast rule, but should be viewed in the light of the victims perception and
judgment at the time of the commission of the rape.[22] Not all victims react in the same way some people may cry out, some may faint, some may be shocked into insensibility, while others

may appear to yield to the intrusion.[23] Records of the case revealed that XYZ was coerced
into submission because of her fear that she will be killed.[24] She categorically declared that
she tried to shout for help but accused-appellant gagged her and threatened to kill her if she will
say anything. Physical resistance need not be established in rape cases when intimidation is
exercised upon the victim who submits against her will because of fear for her life and personal
safety. The force, violence, or intimidation in rape is a relative term, depending not only on the
age, size, and strength of the parties but also on their relationship with each other. A child like
XYZ can only cower in fear and yield into submission. Rape is nothing more than a conscious
process of intimidation by which a man keeps a woman in a state of fear and humiliation. Thus,
it is not even impossible for a victim of rape not to make an outcry against an unarmed
assailant.[25] In fact, the moral ascendancy and influence of accused-appellant, who during trial
was established to be the live-in partner of the victims mother and was exercising parental
authority over the victim, can take the place of threat and intimidation.
Although we affirm
the decision of the Court of Appeals, we find it necessary to modify the civil liability of the
appellant to include exemplary damages. The appellate court correctly ordered accusedappellant to pay the victim the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and another P50,000.00
as moral damages consistent with current jurisprudence on simple rape. However, the
exemplary damages in the amount of P30,000.00 should also be included in line with recent
case laws.
In People vs. Anthony R. Rante,[26] citing People vs. Antonio D. Dalisay[27]
and People vs. Cristino Caada,[28] the Court awarded exemplary damages to set a public
example, to serve as deterrent to elders who abuse and corrupt the youth, and to protect the
latter from sexual abuse.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby affirm with
modification the decision dated 12 December 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C.
No. 00154 finding Manuel Aguilar GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Simple
Rape. In addition to the awards of civil indemnity and moral damages in the amount of
P50,000.00 each, he is further ordered to pay P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Sec. 28 - Admission by third party
(no case)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Sec. 29 - Admission by co-partner or agent
(no case)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Sec. 30 - Admission by conspirator
(no case)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Sec. 31 - Admission by privies
(no case)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Sec. 32 - Admission by silence
31. EDUARDO BUGHAW, JR., Petitioner, - versus - TREASURE ISLAND INDUSTRIAL
CORPORATION, Respondent.

G.R. No. 173151. March 28, 2008D E C I S I O N CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before this Court
is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, filed by
petitioner Eduardo Bughaw, Jr., seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision,[1] dated 14 June
2005 and the Resolution,[2] dated 8 May 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
85498. The appellate court reversed the Decision dated 28 August 2003 and Resolution dated
27 February 2004 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC Case No. V000231-02 that found the petitioner to be illegally dismissed from employment by respondent
Treasure Island Industrial Corporation. The dispositive portion of the assailed appellate courts
Decision thus reads: WHEREFORE, discussion considered, the decision dated August 28, 2003
of the National Labor Relations Commission, Fourth Division, Cebu City, in NLRC Case No. V000231-02 (RAB VII-06-1171-01), is hereby VACATED and SET ASIDE en toto. The award of
money claims to [herein petitioner] is NULLIFIED and RECALLED.[3] The factual and
procedural antecedents of the instant Petition are as follows:Sometime in March 1986, petitioner
was employed as production worker by respondent. Respondent was receiving information that
many of its employees were using prohibited drugs during working hours and within the
company premises.[4] On 5 June 2001, one of its employees, Erlito Loberanes (Loberanes) was
caught in flagrante delicto by the police officers while in possession of shabu. Loberanes was
arrested and sent to jail. In the course of police investigation, Loberanes admitted the
commission of the crime. He implicated petitioner in the crime by claiming that part of the money
used for buying the illegal drugs was given by the latter, and the illegal drugs purchased were
for their consumption for the rest of the month.[5] In view of Loberaness statement, respondent,
on 29 June 2001, served a Memo for Explanation[6] to petitioner requiring him to explain within
120 hours why no disciplinary action should be imposed against him for his alleged involvement
in illegal drug activities. Petitioner was further directed to appear at the office of respondents
legal counsel on 16 June 2001 at 9:00 oclock in the morning for the hearing on the matter. For
the meantime, petitioner was placed under preventive suspension for the period of 30 days
effective upon receipt of the Notice. Notwithstanding said Memo, petitioner failed to appear
before the respondents legal counsel on the scheduled hearing date and to explain his side on
the matter.
On 19 July 2001, respondent, through legal counsel, sent a second letter[7] to
petitioner directing him to attend another administrative hearing scheduled on 23 July 2001 at
11:00 oclock in the morning at said legal counsels office but petitioner once again failed to
show up.
Consequently, respondent, in a third letter[8] dated 21 August 2001 addressed to
petitioner, terminated the latters employment retroactive to 11 June 2001 for using illegal drugs
within company premises during working hours, and for refusal to attend the administrative
hearing and submit written explanation on the charges hurled against him. On 20 July 2001,
petitioner filed a complaint[9] for illegal dismissal against respondent and its President,
Emmanuel Ong, before the Labor Arbiter. Petitioner alleged that he had been working for the
respondent for 15 years and he was very conscientious with his job. He was suspended for 30
days on 11 June 2001 based on the unfounded allegation of his co-worker that he used illegal
drugs within company premises. When petitioner reported back to work after the expiration of
his suspension, he was no longer allowed by respondent to enter the work premises and was
told not to report back to work.On 8 January 2002, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision[10] in
favor of petitioner since the respondent failed to present substantial evidence to establish the

charge leveled against the petitioner. Apart from Loberaness statements on petitioners alleged
illegal drug use, no other corroborating proof was offered by respondent to justify petitioners
dismissal. Further, respondent failed to comply with due process when it immediately
suspended petitioner and eventually dismissed him from employment. Petitioners immediate
suspension was not justified since no evidence was submitted by the respondent to establish
that petitioners continued employment pending investigation poses a serious and imminent
threat to respondents life or property or to the life or property of petitioners co-workers.
Finally, the Labor Arbiter observed that the notices of hearing sent by respondent to petitioner
were not duly received by the latter. The Labor Arbiter was not swayed by respondents
explanation that the reason therefor was that petitioner refused to receive said notices. The
Labor Arbiter thus ruled: WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
ordering [herein respondent] to pay [herein petitioner] the following: 1. Separation pay
P 74,100.002. Backwages
P 27,550.003. Unpaid wages
P
4,940.00
----------------Total
P 106,590.00
The case against respondent Emmanuel Ong is dismissed for lack of merit.[11] On appeal, the
NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiters Decision in its Decision dated 28 August 2003. The NLRC
decreed that respondent failed to accord due process to petitioner when it dismissed him from
employment. The use of illegal drugs can be a valid ground for terminating employment only if it
is proven true. An accusation of illegal drug use, standing alone, without any proof or evidence
presented in support thereof, would just remain an accusation.[12] The Motion for
Reconsideration filed by respondent was denied by the NLRC in a Resolution[13] dated 27
February 2004. Resolving respondents Petition for Certiorari, the Court of Appeals reversed the
Decisions of the Labor Arbiter and NLRC on the grounds of patent misappreciation of evidence
and misapplication of law. The appellate court found that petitioner was afforded the opportunity
to explain and defend himself from the accusations against him when respondents gave him
notices of hearing, but petitioner repeatedly ignored them, opting instead to file an illegal
dismissal case against respondent before the Labor Arbiter. The essence of due process in
administrative proceedings is simply an opportunity to explain ones side or to seek
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. Due process is not violated where one is
given the opportunity to be heard but he chooses not to explain his side.[14] Similarly ill-fated
was petitioners Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the Court of Appeals in its
Resolution[15] dated 8 May 2006. Hence, this instant Petition for Review on Certiorari[16] under
Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court filed by petitioner impugning the foregoing Court of
Appeals Decision and Resolution, and raising the sole issue of: WHETHER OR NOT
PETITIONER WAS ILLEGALLY DISMISSED FROM EMPLOYMENT. Time and again we
reiterate the established rule that in the exercise of the Supreme Courts power of review, the
Court is not a trier of facts[17] and does not routinely undertake the reexamination of the
evidence presented by the contending parties during the trial of the case considering that the
findings of facts of labor officials who are deemed to have acquired expertise in matters within
their respective jurisdiction are generally accorded not only respect, but even finality, and are
binding upon this Court,[18] when supported by substantial evidence.[19] The Labor Arbiter and
the NLRC both ruled that petitioner was illegally dismissed from employment and ordered the
payment of his unpaid wages, backwages, and separation pay, while the Court of Appeals found
otherwise. The Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, on one hand, and the Court of Appeals, on the

other, arrived at divergent conclusions although they considered the very same evidences
submitted by the parties. It is, thus, incumbent upon us to determine whether there is
substantial evidence to support the finding of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC that petitioner was
illegally dismissed. Substantial evidence is such amount of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other equally
reasonable minds might conceivably opine otherwise.[20] Under the Labor Code, the
requirements for the lawful dismissal of an employee are two-fold, the substantive and the
procedural aspects. Not only must the dismissal be for a just[21] or authorized cause,[22] the
rudimentary requirements of due process - notice and hearing[23] must, likewise, be observed
before an employee may be dismissed. Without the concurrence of the two, the termination
would, in the eyes of the law, be illegal,[24] for employment is a property right of which one
cannot be deprived of without due process.[25] Hence, the two (2) facets of a valid termination
of employment are: (a) the legality of the act of dismissal, i.e., the dismissal must be under any
of the just causes provided under Article 282 of the Labor Code; and (b) the legality of the
manner of dismissal, which means that there must be observance of the requirements of due
process, otherwise known as the two-notice rule.[26] Article 282 of the Labor Code enumerates
the just causes for terminating the services of an employee: ART. 282. Termination by
employer. - An employer may terminate an employment for any of the following causes: (a)
Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer
or representative in connection with his work; (b)
Gross and habitual neglect by the
employee of his duties; (c)
Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed
in him by his employer or his duly authorized representative; (d)
Commission of a crime
or offense by the employee against the person of his employer or any immediate member of his
family or his duly authorized representative; and (e)
Other causes analogous to the
foregoing. The charge of drug abuse inside the companys premises and during working hours
against petitioner constitutes serious misconduct, which is one of the just causes for
termination. Misconduct is improper or wrong conduct. It is the transgression of some
established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character,
and implies wrongful intent and not merely an error in judgment. The misconduct to be serious
within the meaning of the Act must be of such a grave and aggravated character and not merely
trivial or unimportant. Such misconduct, however serious, must nevertheless, in connection with
the work of the employee, constitute just cause for his separation.[27] This Court took judicial
notice of scientific findings that drug abuse can damage the mental faculties of the user. It is
beyond question therefore that any employee under the influence of drugs cannot possibly
continue doing his duties without posing a serious threat to the lives and property of his coworkers and even his employer.Loberaness statements given to police during investigation is
evidence which can be considered by the respondent against the petitioner. Petitioner failed to
controvert Loberanes claim that he too was using illegal drugs. Records reveal that respondent
gave petitioner a first notice dated 11 June 2001, giving him 120 hours within which to explain
and defend himself from the charge against him and to attend the administrative hearing
scheduled on 16 June 2001. There is no dispute that petitioner received said notice as
evidenced by his signature appearing on the lower left portion of a copy thereof together with
the date and time of his receipt.[28] He also admitted receipt of the first notice in his
Memorandum before this Court.[29] Despite his receipt of the notice, however, petitioner did not

submit any written explanation on the charge against him, even after the lapse of the 120-day
period given him. Neither did petitioner appear in the scheduled administrative hearing to
personally present his side. Thus, the respondent cannot be faulted for considering only the
evidence at hand, which was Loberanes statement, and conclude therefrom that there was just
cause for petitioners termination. We thus quote with approval the disquisition of the Court of
Appeals: The [NLRC] did not find substantial evidence in order to establish the charge leveled
against [herein petitioner] claiming that the statement of Loberanes is legally infirm as it was an
admission made under custodial investigation; and there has been no corroborating evidence.
In administrative proceedings, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied
and administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial
sense. Xxx It is sufficient that [herein petitioner] was implicated in the use of illegal drugs and,
more importantly, there is no counter-statement from [herein petitioner] despite opportunities
granted to him submit to an investigation.[30]
It was by petitioners own omission and
inaction that he was not able to present evidence to refute the charge against him. Now we
proceed to judge whether the manner of petitioners dismissal was legal; stated otherwise,
whether petitioner was accorded procedural due process. In Pastor Austria v. National Labor
Relations Commission,[31] the Court underscored the significance of the two-notice rule in
dismissing an employee: The first notice, which may be considered as the proper charge,
serves to apprise the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is
sought. The second notice on the other hand seeks to inform the employee of the employers
decision to dismiss him. This decision, however, must come only after the employee is given a
reasonable period from receipt of the first notice within which to answer the charge and ample
opportunity to be heard and defend himself with the assistance of a representative if he so
desires. This is in consonance with the express provision of the law on the protection to labor
and the broader dictates of procedural due process. Non-compliance therewith is fatal because
these requirements are conditions sine qua non before dismissal may be validly effected.
(Emphases supplied.)While there is no dispute that respondent fully complied with the firstnotice requirement apprising petitioner of the cause of his impending termination and giving him
the opportunity to explain his side, we find that it failed to satisfy the need for a second notice
informing petitioner that he was being dismissed from employment. We cannot give credence
to respondents allegation that the petitioner refused to receive the third letter dated 21 August
2001 which served as the notice of termination. There is nothing on record that would indicate
that respondent even attempted to serve or tender the notice of termination to petitioner. No
affidavit of service was appended to the said notice attesting to the reason for failure of service
upon its intended recipient. Neither was there any note to that effect by the server written on
the notice itself. The law mandates that it is incumbent upon the employer to prove the validity
of the termination of employment.[32] Failure to discharge this evidentiary burden would
necessarily mean that the dismissal was not justified and, therefore, illegal.[33] Unsubstantiated
claims as to alleged compliance with the mandatory provisions of law cannot be favored by this
Court. In case of doubt, such cases should be resolved in favor of labor, pursuant to the social
justice policy of our labor laws and Constitution.[34] The burden therefore is on respondent to
present clear and unmistakable proof that petitioner was duly served a copy of the notice of
termination but he refused receipt. Bare and vague allegations as to the manner of service and
the circumstances surrounding the same would not suffice. A mere copy of the notice of

termination allegedly sent by respondent to petitioner, without proof of receipt, or in the very
least, actual service thereof upon petitioner, does not constitute substantial evidence. It was
unilaterally prepared by the petitioner and, thus, evidently self-serving and insufficient to
convince even an unreasonable mind. We cannot overemphasize the importance of the
requirement on the notice of termination, for we have ruled in a number of cases[35] that noncompliance therewith is tantamount to deprivation of the employees right to due process. This
is not the first time that the Court affirmed that there was just cause for dismissal, but held the
employer liable for non-compliance with the procedural due process. In Agabon v. National
Labor Relations Commission,[36] we found that the dismissal of the employees therein was for
valid and just cause because their abandonment of their work was firmly established.
Nonetheless, the employer therein was held liable because it was proven that it did not comply
with the twin procedural requirements of notice and hearing for a legal dismissal. However, in
lieu of payment of backwages, we ordered the employer to pay indemnity to the dismissed
employees in the form of nominal damages, thus:The violation of the petitioners right to
statutory due process by the private respondent warrants the payment of indemnity in the form
of nominal damages. The amount of such damages is addressed to the sound discretion of the
court, taking into account the relevant circumstances. We believe this form of damages
would serve to deter employers from future violations of the statutory due process rights of
employees. At the very least, it provides a vindication or recognition of this fundamental right
granted to the latter under the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules.[37] The above ruling
was further clarified in Jaka Food Processing Corporation v. Pacot.[38] In Jaka, the employees
were terminated because the corporation was financially distressed. However, the employer
failed to comply with Article 283 of the Labor Code which requires the employer to serve a
written notice upon the employees and the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) at
least one month before the intended date of termination. We first distinguished the case from
Agabon, to wit: The difference between Agabon and the instant case is that in the former, the
dismissal was based on a just cause under Article 282 of the Labor Code while in the present
case, respondents were dismissed due to retrenchment, which is one of the authorized causes
under Article 283 of the same Code. x x x x A dismissal for just cause under Article 282 implies
that the employee concerned has committed, or is guilty of, some violation against the
employer, i.e., the employee has committed some serious misconduct, is guilty of some fraud
against the employer, or, as in Agabon, he has neglected his duties. Thus, it can be said that
the employee himself initiated the dismissal process. On another breath, a dismissal for an
authorized cause under Article 283 does not necessarily imply delinquency or culpability on the
part of the employee. Instead, the dismissal process is initiated by the employers exercise of
his management prerogative, i.e., when the employer opts to install labor saving devices, when
he decides to cease business operations or when, as in this case, he undertakes to implement a
retrenchment program.[39] Then we elucidated on our ruling in Agabon in this wise: Accordingly,
it is wise to hold that: (1) if the dismissal is based on a just cause under Article 282 but the
employer failed to comply with the notice requirement, the sanction to be imposed upon him
should be tempered because the dismissal process was, in effect, initiated by an act imputable
to the employee; and (2) if the dismissal is based on an authorized cause under Article 283 but
the employer failed to comply with the notice requirement, the sanction should be stiffer
because the dismissal process was initiated by the employers exercise of his management

prerogative.[40]
The Agabon doctrine enunciates the rule that if the dismissal was for just
cause but procedural due process was not observed, the dismissal should be upheld. Where
the dismissal is for just cause, as in the instant case, the lack of statutory due process should
not nullify the dismissal or render it illegal or ineffectual. However, the employer should
indemnify the employee for the violation of his right to procedural due process. The indemnity
to be imposed should be stiffer to discourage the abhorrent practice of dismiss now, pay later,
which we sought to deter in the Serrano[41] ruling. In Agabon[42] the nominal damages
awarded was P30,000.00. Conformably, the award of backwages by the Labor Arbiter and the
NLRC should be deleted and, instead, private respondent should be indemnified in the amount
of P30,000.00 as nominal damages.[43]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant
Petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated 14 June 2005 is hereby AFFIRMED
WITH MODIFICATION in the sense that while there was a valid ground for dismissal, the
procedural requirements for termination as mandated by law and jurisprudence were not
observed. Respondent Treasure Island Corporation is ORDERED to pay the amount of
P30,000.00 as nominal damages. No costs.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------32. HILARIO P. SORIANO, Petitioner - versus - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, BANGKO
SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS (BSP), PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION
(PDIC), PUBLIC PROSECUTOR ANTONIO C. BUAN, and STATE PROSECUTOR ALBERTO
R. FONACIER, Respondents. [1] G.R. No. 16233 February 1, 2010D E C I S I O N DEL
CASTILLO, J.:
A bank officer violates the DOSRI[2] law when he acquires bank funds
for his personal benefit, even if such acquisition was facilitated by a fraudulent loan application.
Directors, officers, stockholders, and their related interests cannot be allowed to interpose the
fraudulent nature of the loan as a defense to escape culpability for their circumvention of
Section 83 of Republic Act (RA) No. 337.[3]Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[4]
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the September 26, 2003 Decision[5] and the
February 5, 2004 Resolution[6] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 67657. The
challenged Decision disposed as follows: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant
petition for certiorari is hereby DENIED.[7] Factual Antecedents
Sometime in 2000, the
Office of Special Investigation (OSI) of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP), through its
officers,[8] transmitted a letter[9] dated March 27, 2000 to Jovencito Zuo, Chief State
Prosecutor of the Department of Justice (DOJ). The letter attached as annexes five affidavits,
[10] which would allegedly serve as bases for filing criminal charges for Estafa thru Falsification
of Commercial Documents, in relation to Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1689,[11] and for
Violation of Section 83 of RA 337, as amended by PD 1795,[12] against, inter alia, petitioner
herein Hilario P. Soriano. These five affidavits, along with other documents, stated that spouses
Enrico and Amalia Carlos appeared to have an outstanding loan of P8 million with the Rural
Bank of San Miguel (Bulacan), Inc. (RBSM), but had never applied for nor received such loan;
that it was petitioner, who was then president of RBSM, who had ordered, facilitated, and
received the proceeds of the loan; and that the P8 million loan had never been authorized by
RBSM's Board of Directors and no report thereof had ever been submitted to the Department of
Rural Banks, Supervision and Examination Sector of the BSP. The letter of the OSI, which was
not subscribed under oath, ended with a request that a preliminary investigation be conducted
and the corresponding criminal charges be filed against petitioner at his last known address.

Acting on the letter-request and its annexes, State Prosecutor Albert R. Fonacier proceeded
with the preliminary investigation. He issued a subpoena with the witnesses affidavits and
supporting documents attached, and required petitioner to file his counter-affidavit. In due
course, the investigating officer issued a Resolution finding probable cause and correspondingly
filed two separate informations against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Malolos, Bulacan.[13]
The first Information,[14] dated November 14, 2000 and docketed
as Criminal Case No. 237-M-2001, was for estafa through falsification of commercial
documents, under Article 315, paragraph 1(b), of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), in relation to
Article 172 of the RPC and PD 1689. It basically alleged that petitioner and his co-accused, in
abuse of the confidence reposed in them as RBSM officers, caused the falsification of a number
of loan documents, making it appear that one Enrico Carlos filled up the same, and thereby
succeeded in securing a loan and converting the loan proceeds for their personal gain and
benefit.[15] The information reads: That in or about the month of April, 1997, and thereafter, in
San Miguel, Bulacan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused
HILARIO P. SORIANO and ROSALINDA ILAGAN, as principals by direct participation, with
unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence and taking advantage of their position as President of the
Rural Bank of San Miguel (Bulacan), Inc. and Branch Manager of the Rural Bank of San Miguel
San Miguel Branch [sic], a duly organized banking institution under Philippine Laws,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there, willfully and
feloniously falsify loan documents consisting of undated loan application/information sheet,
credit proposal dated April 14, 1997, credit proposal dated April 22, 1997, credit investigation
report dated April 15, 1997, promissory note dated April 23, 1997, disclosure statement on
loan/credit transaction dated April 23, 1997, and other related documents, by making it appear
that one Enrico Carlos filled up the application/information sheet and filed the aforementioned
loan documents when in truth and in fact Enrico Carlos did not participate in the execution of
said loan documents and that by virtue of said falsification and with deceit and intent to cause
damage, the accused succeeded in securing a loan in the amount of eight million pesos
(PhP8,000,000.00) from the Rural Bank of San Miguel San Ildefonso branch in the name of
Enrico Carlos which amount of PhP8 million representing the loan proceeds the accused
thereafter converted the same amount to their own personal gain and benefit, to the damage
and prejudice of the Rural Bank of San Miguel San Ildefonso branch, its creditors, the Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas, and the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation. CONTRARY TO LAW.
[16]
The other Information[17] dated November 10, 2000 and docketed as
Criminal Case No. 238-M-2001, was for violation of Section 83 of RA 337, as amended by PD
1795. The said provision refers to the prohibition against the so-called DOSRI loans. The
information alleged that, in his capacity as President of RBSM, petitioner indirectly secured an
P8 million loan with RBSM, for his personal use and benefit, without the written consent and
approval of the bank's Board of Directors, without entering the said transaction in the bank's
records, and without transmitting a copy of the transaction to the supervising department of the
bank. His ruse was facilitated by placing the loan in the name of an unsuspecting RBSM
depositor, one Enrico Carlos.[18] The information reads: That in or about the month of April,
1997, and thereafter, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, in his
capacity as President of the Rural Bank of San Miguel (Bulacan), Inc., did then and there,
willfully and feloniously indirectly borrow or secure a loan with the Rural Bank of San Miguel

San Ildefonso branch, a domestic rural banking institution created, organized and existing under
Philippine laws, amounting to eight million pesos (PhP8,000,000.00), knowing fully well that the
same has been done by him without the written consent and approval of the majority of the
board of directors of the said bank, and which consent and approval the said accused
deliberately failed to obtain and enter the same upon the records of said banking institution and
to transmit a copy thereof to the supervising department of the said bank, as required by the
General Banking Act, by using the name of one depositor Enrico Carlos of San Miguel, Bulacan,
the latter having no knowledge of the said loan, and one in possession of the said amount of
eight million pesos (PhP8,000,000.00), accused converted the same to his own personal use
and benefit, in flagrant violation of the said law. CONTRARY TO LAW.[19] Both cases were
raffled to Branch 79 of the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan.[20]
On June 8, 2001, petitioner
moved to quash[21] these informations on two grounds: that the court had no jurisdiction over
the offense charged, and that the facts charged do not constitute an offense.
On the
first ground, petitioner argued that the letter transmitted by the BSP to the DOJ constituted the
complaint and hence was defective for failure to comply with the mandatory requirements of
Section 3(a), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, such as the statement of address of petitioner and
oath and subscription.[22] Moreover, petitioner argued that the officers of OSI, who were the
signatories to the letter-complaint, were not authorized by the BSP Governor, much less by the
Monetary Board, to file the complaint. According to petitioner, this alleged fatal oversight
violated Section 18, pars. (c) and (d) of the New Central Bank Act (RA 7653).
On the
second ground, petitioner contended that the commission of estafa under paragraph 1(b) of
Article 315 of the RPC is inherently incompatible with the violation of DOSRI law (as set out in
Section 83[23] of RA 337, as amended by PD 1795),[24] hence a person cannot be charged for
both offenses. He argued that a violation of DOSRI law requires the offender to obtain a loan
from his bank, without complying with procedural, reportorial, or ceiling requirements. On the
other hand, estafa under par. 1(b), Article 315 of the RPC requires the offender to
misappropriate or convert something that he holds in trust, or on commission, or for
administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to return the same.[25]
Essentially, the petitioner theorized that the characterization of possession is different in the two
offenses. If petitioner acquired the loan as DOSRI, he owned the loaned money and therefore,
cannot misappropriate or convert it as contemplated in the offense of estafa. Conversely, if
petitioner committed estafa, then he merely held the money in trust for someone else and
therefore, did not acquire a loan in violation of DOSRI rules. Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
In an Order[26] dated August 8, 2001, the trial court denied petitioner's Motion to Quash for lack
of merit. The lower court agreed with the prosecution that the assailed OSI letter was not the
complaint-affidavit itself; thus, it need not comply with the requirements under the Rules of
Court. The trial court held that the affidavits, which were attached to the OSI letter, comprised
the complaint-affidavit in the case. Since these affidavits were duly subscribed and sworn to
before a notary public, there was adequate compliance with the Rules. The trial court further
held that the two offenses were separate and distinct violations, hence the prosecution of one
did not pose a bar to the other.[27] Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied
in an Order dated September 5, 2001.[28]
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Petition for
Certiorari[29] with the CA, reiterating his arguments before the trial court. Ruling of the Court of
Appeals
The CA denied the petition on both issues presented by petitioner.
On

the first issue, the CA determined that the BSP letter, which petitioner characterized to be a
fatally infirm complaint, was not actually a complaint, but a transmittal or cover letter only. This
transmittal letter merely contained a summary of the affidavits which were attached to it. It did
not contain any averment of personal knowledge of the events and transactions that constitute
the elements of the offenses charged. Being a mere transmittal letter, it need not comply with
the requirements of Section 3(a) of Rule 112 of the Rules of Court.[30]
The CA further
determined that the five affidavits attached to the transmittal letter should be considered as the
complaint-affidavits that charged petitioner with violation of Section 83 of RA 337 and for Estafa
thru Falsification of Commercial Documents. These complaint-affidavits complied with the
mandatory requirements set out in the Rules of Court they were subscribed and sworn to
before a notary public and subsequently certified by State Prosecutor Fonacier, who personally
examined the affiants and was convinced that the affiants fully understood their sworn
statements.[31]
Anent the second ground, the CA found no merit in petitioner's argument
that the violation of the DOSRI law and the commission of estafa thru falsification of commercial
documents are inherently inconsistent with each other. It explained that the test in considering a
motion to quash on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, is whether
the facts alleged, when hypothetically admitted, constitute the elements of the offense charged.
The appellate court held that this test was sufficiently met because the allegations in the
assailed informations, when hypothetically admitted, clearly constitute the elements of Estafa
thru Falsification of Commercial Documents and Violation of DOSRI law.[32]
Petitioners
Motion for Reconsideration[33] was likewise denied for lack of merit. Hence, this petition.
Issues
Restated, petitioner raises the following issues[34] for our consideration: I
Whether the complaint complied with the mandatory requirements provided under Section 3(a),
Rule 112 of the Rules of Court and Section 18, paragraphs (c) and (d) of RA 7653. II
Whether a loan transaction within the ambit of the DOSRI law (violation of Section 83 of RA 337,
as amended) could also be the subject of Estafa under Article 315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal
Code. III
Is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 the proper remedy against an Order
denying a Motion to Quash? IV
Whether petitioner is entitled to a writ of injunction. Our
Ruling
The petition lacks merit. First Issue: Whether the complaint complied with
the mandatory requirements provided under Section 3(a), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court and
Section 18, paragraphs (c) and (d) of Republic Act No. 7653 Petitioner moved to withdraw the
first issue from the instant petition
On March 5, 2007, the Court noted[35] petitioner's
Manifestation and Motion for Partial Withdrawal of the Petition[36] dated February 7, 2007. In
the said motion, petitioner informed the Court of the promulgation of a Decision entitled Soriano
v. Hon. Casanova,[37] which also involved petitioner and similar BSP letters to the DOJ.
According to petitioner, the said Decision allegedly ruled squarely on the nature of the BSP
letters and the validity of the sworn affidavits attached thereto. For this reason, petitioner
moved for the partial withdrawal of the instant petition insofar as it involved the issue of whether
or not a court can legally acquire jurisdiction over a complaint which failed to comply with the
mandatory requirements provided under Section 3(a), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court and
Section 18, paragraphs (c) and (d) of RA 7653.[38]
Given that the case had already
been submitted for resolution of the Court when petitioner filed his latest motion, and that all
respondents had presented their positions and arguments on the first issue, the Court deems it
proper to rule on the same. In Soriano v. Hon. Casanova, the Court held that the affidavits

attached to the BSP transmittal letter complied with the mandatory requirements under the
Rules of Court.
To be sure, the BSP letters involved in Soriano v. Hon. Casanova[39] are
not the same as the BSP letter involved in the instant case. However, the BSP letters in Soriano
v. Hon. Casanova and the BSP letter subject of this case are similar in the sense that they are
all signed by the OSI officers of the BSP, they were not sworn to by the said officers, they all
contained summaries of their attached affidavits, and they all requested the conduct of a
preliminary investigation and the filing of corresponding criminal charges against petitioner
Soriano. Thus, the principle of stare decisis dictates that the ruling in Soriano v. Hon. Casanova
be applied in the instant case once a question of law has been examined and decided, it
should be deemed settled and closed to further argument.[40] We held in Soriano v. Hon.
Casanova, after a close scrutiny of the letters transmitted by the BSP to the DOJ, that these
were not intended to be the complaint, as envisioned under the Rules. They did not contain
averments of personal knowledge of the events and transactions constitutive of any offense.
The letters merely transmitted for preliminary investigation the affidavits of people who had
personal knowledge of the acts of petitioner. We ruled that these affidavits, not the letters
transmitting them, initiated the preliminary investigation. Since these affidavits were subscribed
under oath by the witnesses who executed them before a notary public, then there was
substantial compliance with Section 3(a), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court.
Anent the
contention that there was no authority from the BSP Governor or the Monetary Board to file a
criminal case against Soriano, we held that the requirements of Section 18, paragraphs (c) and
(d) of RA 7653 did not apply because the BSP did not institute the complaint but merely
transmitted the affidavits of the complainants to the DOJ.
We further held that since the
offenses for which Soriano was charged were public crimes, authority holds that it can be
initiated by any competent person with personal knowledge of the acts committed by the
offender. Thus, the witnesses who executed the affidavits clearly fell within the purview of any
competent person who may institute the complaint for a public crime.
The ruling in
Soriano v. Hon. Casanova has been adopted and elaborated upon in the recent case of SantosConcio v. Department of Justice.[41] Instead of a transmittal letter from the BSP, the Court in
Santos-Concio was faced with an NBI-NCR Report, likewise with affidavits of witnesses as
attachments. Ruling on the validity of the witnesses sworn affidavits as bases for a preliminary
investigation, we held: The Court is not unaware of the practice of incorporating all allegations in
one document denominated as complaint-affidavit. It does not pronounce strict adherence to
only one approach, however, for there are cases where the extent of ones personal knowledge
may not cover the entire gamut of details material to the alleged offense. The private offended
party or relative of the deceased may not even have witnessed the fatality, in which case the
peace officer or law enforcer has to rely chiefly on affidavits of witnesses. The Rules do not in
fact preclude the attachment of a referral or transmittal letter similar to that of the NBI-NCR.
Thus, in Soriano v. Casanova, the Court held:
A close scrutiny of the letters transmitted
by the BSP and PDIC to the DOJ shows that these were not intended to be the complaint
envisioned under the Rules. It may be clearly inferred from the tenor of the letters that the
officers merely intended to transmit the affidavits of the bank employees to the DOJ. Nowhere
in the transmittal letters is there any averment on the part of the BSP and PDIC officers of
personal knowledge of the events and transactions constitutive of the criminal violations alleged
to have been made by the accused. In fact, the letters clearly stated that what the OSI of the

BSP and the LIS of the PDIC did was to respectfully transmit to the DOJ for preliminary
investigation the affidavits and personal knowledge of the acts of the petitioner. These affidavits
were subscribed under oath by the witnesses who executed them before a notary public. Since
the affidavits, not the letters transmitting them, were intended to initiate the preliminary
investigation, we hold that Section 3(a), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court was substantially
complied with.
Citing the ruling of this Court in Ebarle v. Sucaldito, the Court of Appeals
correctly held that a complaint for purposes of preliminary investigation by the fiscal need not be
filed by the offended party. The rule has been that, unless the offense subject thereof is one
that cannot be prosecuted de oficio, the same may be filed, for preliminary investigation
purposes, by any competent person. The crime of estafa is a public crime which can be
initiated by any competent person. The witnesses who executed the affidavits based on their
personal knowledge of the acts committed by the petitioner fall within the purview of any
competent person who may institute the complaint for a public crime. x x x (Emphasis and
italics supplied)
A preliminary investigation can thus validly proceed on the basis of an
affidavit of any competent person, without the referral document, like the NBI-NCR Report,
having been sworn to by the law enforcer as the nominal complainant. To require otherwise is a
needless exercise. The cited case of Oporto, Jr. v. Judge Monserate does not appear to dent
this proposition. After all, what is required is to reduce the evidence into affidavits, for while
reports and even raw information may justify the initiation of an investigation, the preliminary
investigation stage can be held only after sufficient evidence has been gathered and evaluated
which may warrant the eventual prosecution of the case in court.[42]
Following the
foregoing rulings in Soriano v. Hon. Casanova and Santos-Concio v. Department of Justice, we
hold that the BSP letter, taken together with the affidavits attached thereto, comply with the
requirements provided under Section 3(a), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court and Section 18,
paragraphs (c) and (d) of RA 7653.
Second Issue: Whether a loan transaction within the
ambit of the DOSRI law (violation of Section 83 of RA 337, as amended) could be the subject of
Estafa under Article 315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code The second issue was raised by
petitioner in the context of his Motion to Quash Information on the ground that the facts charged
do not constitute an offense.[43] It is settled that in considering a motion to quash on such
ground, the test is whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, would establish the
essential elements of the offense charged as defined by law. The trial court may not consider a
situation contrary to that set forth in the criminal complaint or information. Facts that constitute
the defense of the petitioner[s] against the charge under the information must be proved by
[him] during trial. Such facts or circumstances do not constitute proper grounds for a motion to
quash the information on the ground that the material averments do not constitute the offense.
[44]
We have examined the two informations against petitioner and we find that they
contain allegations which, if hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential elements of
the crime of DOSRI violation and estafa thru falsification of commercial documents.
In
Criminal Case No. 238-M-2001 for violation of DOSRI rules, the information alleged that
petitioner Soriano was the president of RBSM; that he was able to indirectly obtain a loan from
RBSM by putting the loan in the name of depositor Enrico Carlos; and that he did this without
complying with the requisite board approval, reportorial, and ceiling requirements.
In
Criminal Case No. 237-M-2001 for estafa thru falsification of commercial documents, the

information alleged that petitioner, by taking advantage of his position as president of RBSM,
falsified various loan documents to make it appear that an Enrico Carlos secured a loan of P8
million from RBSM; that petitioner succeeded in obtaining the loan proceeds; that he later
converted the loan proceeds to his own personal gain and benefit; and that his action caused
damage and prejudice to RBSM, its creditors, the BSP, and the PDIC.
Significantly, this is
not the first occasion that we adjudge the sufficiency of similarly worded informations. In
Soriano v. People,[45] involving the same petitioner in this case (but different transactions), we
also reviewed the sufficiency of informations for DOSRI violation and estafa thru falsification of
commercial documents, which were almost identical, mutatis mutandis, with the subject
informations herein. We held in Soriano v. People that there is no basis for the quashal of the
informations as they contain material allegations charging Soriano with violation of DOSRI rules
and estafa thru falsification of commercial documents. Petitioner raises the theory that he could
not possibly be held liable for estafa in concurrence with the charge for DOSRI violation.
According to him, the DOSRI charge presupposes that he acquired a loan, which would make
the loan proceeds his own money and which he could neither possibly misappropriate nor
convert to the prejudice of another, as required by the statutory definition of estafa.[46] On the
other hand, if petitioner did not acquire any loan, there can be no DOSRI violation to speak of.
Thus, petitioner posits that the two offenses cannot co-exist. This theory does not persuade us.
Petitioners theory is based on the false premises that the loan was extended to him by the bank
in his own name, and that he became the owner of the loan proceeds. Both premises are
wrong. The bank money (amounting to P8 million) which came to the possession of petitioner
was money held in trust or administration by him for the bank, in his fiduciary capacity as the
President of said bank.[47] It is not accurate to say that petitioner became the owner of the P8
million because it was the proceeds of a loan. That would have been correct if the bank
knowingly extended the loan to petitioner himself. But that is not the case here. According to
the information for estafa, the loan was supposed to be for another person, a certain Enrico
Carlos; petitioner, through falsification, made it appear that said Enrico Carlos applied for the
loan when in fact he (Enrico Carlos) did not. Through such fraudulent device, petitioner
obtained the loan proceeds and converted the same. Under these circumstances, it cannot be
said that petitioner became the legal owner of the P8 million. Thus, petitioner remained the
banks fiduciary with respect to that money, which makes it capable of misappropriation or
conversion in his hands. The next question is whether there can also be, at the same time, a
charge for DOSRI violation in such a situation wherein the accused bank officer did not secure a
loan in his own name, but was alleged to have used the name of another person in order to
indirectly secure a loan from the bank. We answer this in the affirmative. Section 83 of RA 337
reads: Section 83. No director or officer of any banking institution shall, either directly or
indirectly, for himself or as the representative or agent of others, borrow any of the deposits of
funds of such bank, nor shall he become a guarantor, indorser, or surety for loans from such
bank to others, or in any manner be an obligor for moneys borrowed from the bank or loaned by
it, except with the written approval of the majority of the directors of the bank, excluding the
director concerned. Any such approval shall be entered upon the records of the corporation and
a copy of such entry shall be transmitted forthwith to the Superintendent of Banks. The office of
any director or officer of a bank who violates the provisions of this section shall immediately
become vacant and the director or officer shall be punished by imprisonment of not less than

one year nor more than ten years and by a fine of not less than one thousand nor more than ten
thousand pesos. x x x
The prohibition in Section 83 is broad enough to cover various modes
of borrowing.[48] It covers loans by a bank director or officer (like herein petitioner) which are
made either: (1) directly, (2) indirectly, (3) for himself, (4) or as the representative or agent of
others. It applies even if the director or officer is a mere guarantor, indorser or surety for
someone else's loan or is in any manner an obligor for money borrowed from the bank or
loaned by it. The covered transactions are prohibited unless the approval, reportorial and
ceiling requirements under Section 83 are complied with. The prohibition is intended to protect
the public, especially the depositors,[49] from the overborrowing of bank funds by bank officers,
directors, stockholders and related interests, as such overborrowing may lead to bank failures.
[50] It has been said that banking institutions are not created for the benefit of the directors [or
officers]. While directors have great powers as directors, they have no special privileges as
individuals. They cannot use the assets of the bank for their own benefit except as permitted by
law. Stringent restrictions are placed about them so that when acting both for the bank and for
one of themselves at the same time, they must keep within certain prescribed lines regarded by
the legislature as essential to safety in the banking business.[51]A direct borrowing is obviously
one that is made in the name of the DOSRI himself or where the DOSRI is a named party, while
an indirect borrowing includes one that is made by a third party, but the DOSRI has a stake in
the transaction.[52] The latter type indirect borrowing applies here. The information in
Criminal Case 238-M-2001 alleges that petitioner in his capacity as President of Rural Bank of
San Miguel San Ildefonso branch x x x indirectly borrow[ed] or secure[d] a loan with [RBSM] x
x x knowing fully well that the same has been done by him without the written consent and
approval of the majority of the board of directors x x x, and which consent and approval the said
accused deliberately failed to obtain and enter the same upon the records of said banking
institution and to transmit a copy thereof to the supervising department of the said bank x x x by
using the name of one depositor Enrico Carlos x x x, the latter having no knowledge of the said
loan, and once in possession of the said amount of eight million pesos (P8 million), [petitioner]
converted the same to his own personal use and benefit.[53] The foregoing information
describes the manner of securing the loan as indirect; names petitioner as the benefactor of the
indirect loan; and states that the requirements of the law were not complied with. It contains all
the required elements[54] for a violation of Section 83, even if petitioner did not secure the loan
in his own name. The broad interpretation of the prohibition in Section 83 is justified by the fact
that it even expressly covers loans to third parties where the third parties are aware of the
transaction (such as principals represented by the DOSRI), and where the DOSRIs interest
does not appear to be beneficial but even burdensome (such as in cases when the DOSRI acts
as a mere guarantor or surety). If the law finds it necessary to protect the bank and the banking
system in such situations, it will surely be illogical for it to exclude a case like this where the
DOSRI acted for his own benefit, using the name of an unsuspecting person. A contrary
interpretation will effectively allow a DOSRI to use dummies to circumvent the requirements of
the law.In sum, the informations filed against petitioner do not negate each other. Third Issue: Is
a Rule 65 petition for certiorari the proper remedy against an Order denying a Motion to Quash?
This issue may be speedily resolved by adopting our ruling in Soriano v. People,[55]
where we held: In fine, the Court has consistently held that a special civil action for certiorari is
not the proper remedy to assail the denial of a motion to quash an information. The proper

procedure in such a case is for the accused to enter a plea, go to trial without prejudice on his
part to present the special defenses he had invoked in his motion to quash and if after trial on
the merits, an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by
law. Thus, petitioners should not have forthwith filed a special civil action for certiorari with the
CA and instead, they should have gone to trial and reiterated the special defenses contained in
their motion to quash. There are no special or exceptional circumstances in the present case
that would justify immediate resort to a filing of a petition for certiorari. Clearly, the CA did not
commit any reversible error, much less, grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petition.[56]
Fourth Issue: Whether petitioner is entitled to a writ of injunction?
The
requisites to justify an injunctive relief are: (1) the right of the complainant is clear and
unmistakable; (2) the invasion of the right sought to be protected is material and substantial;
and (3) there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. A
clear legal right means one clearly founded in or granted by law or is enforceable as a matter of
law. Absent any clear and unquestioned legal right, the issuance of an injunctive writ would
constitute grave abuse of discretion.[57] Caution and prudence must, at all times, attend the
issuance of an injunctive writ because it effectively disposes of the main case without trial
and/or due process.[58] In Olalia v. Hizon,[59] the Court held as follows:
It has been consistently held that there is no power the exercise of which is more delicate, which
requires greater caution, deliberation and sound discretion, or more dangerous in a doubtful
case, than the issuance of an injunction. It is the strong arm of equity that should never be
extended unless to cases of great injury, where courts of law cannot afford an adequate or
commensurate remedy in damages. Every court should remember that an injunction is a
limitation upon the freedom of action of the [complainant] and should not be granted lightly or
precipitately. It should be granted only when the court is fully satisfied that the law permits it
and the emergency demands it.
Given this Court's findings in the earlier issues of the
instant case, we find no compelling reason to grant the injunctive relief sought by petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed September 26, 2003 Decision as well as
the February 5, 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67657 are
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Sec. 33 - Confession
33.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. VICENTE VALLA[1], accusedappellant.
G.R. No. 111285. January 24, 2000
D E C I S I O NQUISUMBING, J.:On appeal is the decision dated March 29, 1993 of the
Regional Trial Court of Gumaca, Quezon, Branch 62, convicting appellant of the crime of rape
with homicide, imposing upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and ordering him to pay the
heirs of the victim the amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity and P30,000.00 as actual and moral
damages.Appellant was 28 years old, married, cousin of the victim, and resident of Barangay
Tayuman, San Francisco, Quezon, at the time of incident. The victim was an eight (8) year-old
girl, Dyesebel "Gigi" de la Cruz, who was reported missing and the following day found raped
and strangled to death near the riverbank of the Tayuman river in Quezon province.The facts, as

summarized by the Office of the Solicitor General, which we find to be supported by the records,
are as follows:"1. On April 14, 1991, at around nine oclock in the morning, Myra Pines, a
twelve-year old girl, was passing by the ricefield near the road located at Barangay Ilayang
Tayuman in the Municipality of San Francisco, Quezon Province. She was carrying bananas on
her way to the crossing in said municipality. (pp. 3-6, Pines, February 5, 1991)."2. As she
passed by the ricefield, she heard a voice coming from the direction of the forested area of the
place and it seemed to her that someone was being strangled. Listening closely, she recognized
the voice as belonging to her friend and playmate, Dyesebel de la Cruz, an eight-year old girl.
Frightened at the thought that Dyesebel was being strangled, Myra scampered and proceeded
to the crossing where she was originally headed for. After discharging her bananas at the
crossing, she went home. (pp. 5-6, tsn, Pines, February 5, 1991)."3. Later that day, at around
four oclock in the afternoon, Barangay Captain Aristeo Allarey of Barangay Ilayang Tayuman
was visited in his house by Mila de la Cruz, Dyesebels mother, who reported that her daughter
was missing. Allarey sought the assistance of his constituents and organized a search party
composed of the members of the Sangguniang Barangay, a Barangay Tanod, Dyesebels father
Gonzalo de la Cruz, and other residents of the barangay. Prosecution witnesses Bayani
Samadan, a Kagawad of the Sangguniang Barangay and Reynaldo Merle, a barangay tanod,
were among the searchers (pp. 10-13, tsn, Allarey, February 5, 1991; p. 24, tsn, De la Cruz,
February 5, 1991; pp. 6-7, tsn, Merle, July 18, 1991; pp. 4-7, tsn, Samadan, September 17,
1991)."4. Barangay Captain Allarey learned from Gonzalo de la Cruz that, earlier, Dyesebel was
in the company of accused-appellant Vicente Valla, and that both of them were tasked to watch
the ricefield. They went to the ricefield but appellant was not there. Allarey learned from a
barangay tanod that appellant was drinking liquor in the house of a friend within the same
barangay. He summoned appellant but the latter failed to immediately report to him. (pp. 14-15,
and 20, tsn, Allarey, February 5, 1991). Sd-aamiso"5. That afternoon, Allarey and his party
started their search but they had to stop at around 6:30 in the evening since it was already dark.
The following day, they continued their search for Dyesebel. (p. 12, tsn, Allarey, February 5,
1991; pp. 7-8, tsn, Merle, July 18, 1991)."6. While Allarey, De la Cruz and the rest of their
companions were searching for Dyesebel, they were joined by appellant who trailed behind
them. Earlier, appellant spoke to Allarey and told him that he knew nothing about Dyesebels
whereabouts. (pp. 15-16, tsn, Allarey, February 5, 1991; p. 24, tsn, De la Cruz, February 5,
1991; p. 13, tsn, Merle, July 18, 1991; pp. 8-9, tsn, Samadan, September 17, 1991)."7. At
around 11:00 oclock in the morning of that day, they finally found Dyesebel. Her body was
found near the river with her neck blackened and her vagina bloodied. She was still wearing her
dress but her panty had been pulled down to her mid-thigh. (pp. 13-14, tsn, Allarey, February 5,
1991; p. 23, tsn, De la Cruz, February 5, 1991; pp. 8-9, tsn, Merle, July 18, 1991; pp. 7-8, tsn,
Samadan, September 17, 1991)."8. Allarey and his companions immediately confronted
appellant who, out of remorse, admitted that he raped and killed Dyesebel. Thereafter, he
addressed Dyesebels father, in the presence of Allarey and company, offering his own daughter
in payment of Dyesebels life which he took and begged for forgiveness. De la Cruz told
appellant that he cannot accept appellants daughter and, thereafter, tried to unsheath his bolo.
But before De la Cruz could attack appellant, he was held back by the people around him.
Appellant was ordered arrested by Allarey. (pp. 16-17 and 21, tsn, Allarey, February 5, 1991; pp.
24-26 and 28, tsn, De la Cruz, February 5, 1991; pp. 11 and 18, tsn, Merle, July 18, 1991; pp. 9-

11 and 13-14, tsn, Samadan, September 17, 1991)."9. That same day, at around one oclock in
the afternoon, Allarey, accompanied by Samadan, Merle, De la Cruz, and one Abelardo Rego,
brought appellant to the police headquarters in San Francisco, Quezon. (pp. 5-6, tsn, Rosales,
November 6, 1991; p. 17, tsn, Allarey, February 5, 1991)."10. Dyesebels body was brought to
the Bondoc Peninsula District Hospital in Catanauan, Quezon, where an autopsy was
performed. Dyesebels skull bore a depression on the left temporal area which resulted from
being struck with a hard object. Her pubic area bore blisters brought about by a contact with a
lighted cigarette. Her hymen bore several lacerations indicative of repeated rape before and
possibly, after she was killed. (pp. 4-6, tsn, Madatu, January 14, 1992)."[2]On August 14, 1990,
appellant was charged with the crime of "rape with murder" under the following Information:[3]
"The undersigned upon complaint originally filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of San
Francisco-San Andres, by Gonzalo de la Cruz, father of the offended party Dyesebel de la Cruz,
accuses Vicente Valla (prisoner, (sic) of the crime of rape with murder, committed as follows: Sdaad"That on or about the 14th day of April 1990, at Barangay Ilayang Tayuman, in the
Municipality of San Francisco, Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused with lewd design, by means of force and violence,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of one Dyesebel
de la Cruz, a minor, 8 years of age, against her will; that by reason, and on the occasion of said
rape, the said accused with intent to kill and with treachery and taking advantage of his superior
strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and employ
violence against said Dyesebel de la Cruz, thereby inflicting upon the latter injuries on vital parts
of her body, which directly caused her death."Contrary to law."Upon arraignment, appellant, duly
assisted by counsel de oficio Atty. Ronaldo Salamillas, entered a plea of not guilty to the crime
charged.[4] Trial on the merits ensued.The prosecution presented the following witnesses: (1)
Myra Pines, the victims 12 year-old playmate, who heard the victims cries as she was being
strangled, but became afraid and went home instead; (2) Aristeo Allarey, the Barangay Captain
of Ilayang, Tayuman, San Francisco, Quezon, who organized a search party upon report of the
mother that her daughter was missing, and before whom, appellant admitted that he raped and
killed the victim, and even offered his (appellants) daughter in return; (3) Gonzalo de la Cruz,
father of the victim, who took part in the search party, and who witnessed appellants confession
to the commission of the crime; (4) Reynaldo Merle, Barangay Tanod of Barangay Ilayang,
Tayuman, San Francisco, Quezon, another member of the search party; (5) Bayani Samadan,
Kagawad of the Barangay, also a member of the search party; (6) Rodolfo Rosales, police
investigator of San Francisco, Quezon, Philippine National Police; (7) Dr. Araceli R. Madatu,
Senior Resident Physician of Bondoc Peninsula District Hospital, Catanauan, Quezon, who
testified that when the cadaver was brought for examination, it was in cadaveric rigidity, the legs
were spread like a woman about to give birth ("parang nanganganak"), the tongue sticking out
("nakalawit), the skull crushed ("basag"), and the pubic area had blisters resulting from cigarette
burns, ("pinagpapaso ng sigarilyo"), and the vagina had a laceration up to the anus, evidencing
that the child was raped.[5]In addition to the oral evidence, the prosecution offered as
documentary evidence the sworn statements of Barangay Captain Aristeo Allarey and Gonzalo
de la Cruz, the Criminal Complaints filed with the Municipal Trial Court of San Francisco, San
Andres, Quezon, and the Medico-legal Certificate signed by Dr. Madatu. Scs-daadOn the other
hand, the defense presented as its witnesses (1) appellant himself who bluntly denied any

participation in the rape/killing of the victim, or that he made any confessions to the barangay
captain; he interposed the defense of alibi that at the time of the alleged rape/killing, he was at
his house in Barangay Ilayang Tayuman, San Francisco, Quezon together with his wife, their
child and his brother, caring for his sick child,[6] and (2) his father Emilio Valla, who
corroborated his story.[7] The defense offered no documentary evidence.On March 29, 1993,
the trial court rendered a decision[8] finding appellant guilty of the crime of "rape with homicide,"
the dispositive portion of which reads:"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the fact that the
government has proved beyond an iota of a doubt that the accused is guilty, sentences him to
suffer an imprisonment of RECLUSION PERPETUA."Further the accused is ordered to
indemnify the heirs of the late Dyesebel de la Cruz the sum of P50,000.00 for her death and
P30,000.00 for actual and moral damages."SO ORDERED."Hence, the present appeal.
Appellant assigns the following errors:[9]I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING FULL
WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE CONFLICTING AND IMPROBABLE TESTIMONIES OF
THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES.II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE
ACCUSED GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT DESPITE INSUFFICIENCY OF
EVIDENCE TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.In his brief, appellant
claims that the testimony of prosecution witness Allarey was inconsistent since on direct
examination, Allarey narrated that when he summoned appellant, the latter did not immediately
appear,[10] but on cross-examination, he said that appellant immediately reported to him.[11]
Appellant also contends that Merles testimony that appellant was "tulala" at the time he
confessed to the commission of the crime[12] was inconsistent with appellants alleged begging
for forgiveness for the crime.[13] Further, appellant adds that his statement offering to exchange
his own daughter for the victim was made because of compulsion from the crowd. Appellant
further insists that his alibi should be given due consideration since the prosecution failed to
overturn his alibi which was duly corroborated by the testimony of his father.The Office of the
Solicitor General, on the other hand, recommends affirmance of the judgment in toto. The OSG
contends that the alleged inconsistencies, assuming them to be so, are too minor and
insignificant to destroy the credibility of said prosecution witnesses, particularly where the
testimonies of all the prosecution witnesses are consistent and compatible with each other on
material points. Anent the defense of alibi, the OSG points out that appellants house is located
within the same barangay where the incident took place, therefore there is no physical
impossibility regarding his commission of the crime. Supr-emaIn sum, the crucial issue centers
on the assessment of credibility of the witnesses. In this case, the trial court gave full faith and
credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. We find no reason to disturb this
finding. As consistently held by the Court, the trial judges evaluation of the testimony of a
witness is generally accorded not only the highest respect, but also finality, unless some weighty
circumstance has been ignored or misunderstood but which could change the result. Having
had the direct opportunity to observe the witness on the stand, the trial judge was in a vantage
position to assess his demeanor, and determine if he was telling the truth or not.[14]The alleged
inconsistency in the testimony of Allarey as to whether appellant immediately reported to him
after being summoned, and in the testimony of Merle that appellant was "tulala" at the time he
admitted responsibility for the crime, merely refer to minor details which do not in actuality touch
upon the "whys" and "wherefores" of the crime committed.[15] Inconsistencies in the testimony
of witnesses when referring only to minor details and collateral matters do not affect the

substance of their declaration, their veracity, or the weight of their testimony. Although there may
be inconsistencies on minor details, the same do not impair the credibility of the witnesses
where there is consistency in relating the principal occurrence and positive identification of the
assailants.[16] In fact, some minor inconsistencies could show that the witness was not
previously coached so as to tailor his testimony, and thus they serve as badges of credibility.
Further, the prosecution witnesses, particularly the barangay officials, had no motive to falsely
testify against appellant, who is their townmate, nor did they have any reason to impute such a
heinous crime against appellant if it were not true. Appellants claim that he was implicated in
the crime "because he did not immediately accomplish the cutting of the grass in the
ricefield"[17] is too preposterous to even merit consideration.More importantly, the declaration of
appellant acknowledging his guilt of the offense may be given in evidence against him under
Section 33 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court. Note that his extrajudicial confession is
corroborated by the corpus delicti as required by Section 3 of Rule 133. The Rules do not
require that all the elements of the crime must be clearly established by evidence independent
of the confession. Corpus delicti only means that there should be some concrete evidence
tending to show the commission of the crime apart from the confession. In this case, the fact of
the crime was sufficiently proven through the testimonies by witnesses such as Myra Pines, who
heard the cries of the victim, and the other members of the search party who found the body of
the victim, and witnessed the confession of the appellant, as well as documentary evidence
presented during trial such as the medico-legal certificate (Exhibit "D") attesting that the victim
had been raped and killed. Jur-isThe statement of the accused asking for forgiveness and even
offering his own daughter in exchange for his crime[18] may also be regarded as part of the res
gestae under Section 42 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. Res gestae means "things done".
[19] There are three requisites to admit evidence as part of the res gestae: (1) that the principal
act, the res gestae, be a startling occurrence, in this case the discovery of the body of the
victim; (2) the statements were made before the declarant had the time to contrive or devise a
falsehood, in this case, appellant had begged for forgiveness immediately after the body was
found; and (3) that the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediate
attending circumstances, in this case, appellant had admitted to raping and killing the victim,
and even "offered" his daughter in exchange for the victim.[20]Appellants defense of denial and
alibi is likewise riddled with glaring inconsistencies. During his testimony, he claimed that on the
night of the incident, he was at home with his wife and brother, taking care of his sick child, and
emphatically declared that nobody else was with them.[21] However, appellants father testified
that he was also with appellant at the time of the incident, creating a doubt regarding his alibi.
Although appellants father initially denied knowing the victim, he later admitted that he knew her
as the daughter of Gonzalo de la Cruz.[22] Evidently, appellants defense was fabricated in a
desperate attempt to exculpate him.As to the crime committed, the trial court correctly convicted
appellant of the special complex crime of "rape with homicide," and not "rape with murder" as
designated in the Information, since "homicide" is herein taken in its generic sense.The
aggravating circumstance of ignominy under Article 14, No. 17 of the Revised Penal Code
should be appreciated considering that the medico-legal officer testified that the pubic area of
the victim bore blisters brought about by a contact with a lighted cigarette. This circumstance
added disgrace and obloquy to the material injury inflicted upon the victim of the crime.[23]At
the time of the commission of the crime, Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code imposed the

penalty of death when by reason or on the occasion of the rape, homicide is committed.
However, the 1987 Constitution suspended the imposition of death penalty, and therefore, the
trial court correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua.As to the amount of damages,
however, the trial court erred in awarding P50,000.00 only as indemnity and P30,000.00 for
actual and moral damages. Hence, correction is called for. This being a case of rape with
homicide, civil indemnity in the amount of P100,000.00 should be awarded, pursuant to current
jurisprudence.[24] Moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 should also be awarded to the
heirs of the victim, without need of further proof.[25] In view of the attendance of one
aggravating circumstance, exemplary damages in the amount of P20,000.00 should likewise be
awarded, pursuant to Article 2230 of the New Civil Code. But the award of actual damages
cannot be allowed for lack of supporting evidence.WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Gumaca, Quezon, Branch 62 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS.
Appellant VICENTE VALLA is hereby sentenced to reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay the
heirs of the victim the amount of P100,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages,
and P20,000.00 as exemplary damages. Costs against appellant.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------34. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROMEO UGIABAN
LUMANDONG, accused-appellant.
G.R. No. 132745. March 9, 2000
D E C I S I O NDE LEON, JR., J.:Before us on automatic review is the Decision[1] in Criminal
Case No. 96-106 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 19, dated
February 2, 1998 finding Romeo Lumandong y Ugiaban guilty of murder for the killing of Analou
Eduave and sentencing him to suffer the supreme penalty of death.The lifeless and naked body
of eight (8) year old Analou Eduave was found by the local residents of Sitio Bolihon, Taglimao,
Cagayan de Oro City in the isolated and grassy portion of the Iponan River on December 1,
1995, at about 8:00 oclock in the morning. She sustained multiple stab and hack wounds on
different parts of her body. Her neck was slashed. There was no witness to the gruesome
murder. However, the relentless efforts of the barangay officials of Taglimao resulted in the
arrest of appellant Romeo Lumandong who allegedly confessed to the killing.The Information[2]
dated January 12, 1996 charging appellant Romeo Lumandong with the crime of Murder
defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, reads:"The
undersigned Prosecutor accuses Romeo Ugiaban Lumandong of the crime of Murder,
committed as follows:That on or about November 30, 1995, at more or less 9:00 oclock in the
evening, at (sic) Bolihon, Taglimao, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, armed with a bladed knife
which he was then conveniently provided, with treachery, and abuse of superior strength, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously kill one Analou L. Eduave, an 8 year old
child/girl, by then and there attacking her, stabbing and hitting her chest and different vital parts
of her body several times with said bladed knife, seriously injuring the said victim, resulting to
her sudden death.That the commission of the above offense is attended by the aggravating
circumstances of nighttime, and abuse of superior strength.Contrary to Article 248 in relation to
R.A. 7659 which took effect on January 1, 1994 and Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code."The
evidence of the prosecution shows that Rebecca Eduave and her four (4) children were in their

house in Sitio Bolihon, Taglimao, Cagayan de Oro City in the evening of November 30, 1995.
Her husband, Cruz Eduave, was not around as he stayed in the house of his elder brother in
Bubao, Iponan. After studying her school assignment, the victim, Analou Eduave, then a grade
two (2) student and second to the eldest, went to sleep. At about 8:30 in the evening, Rebecca
retired beside her children.[3]At about 2:00 oclock in the morning, Rebecca was awakened by
the cry of her youngest child. She lit the lamp inside the house and noticed that Analou was
missing.[4]Rebecca immediately went to the house of her parents-in-law which was just fifteen
(15) meters away from her house to inquire about her daughter but she was told that Analou
was not there. Initial search for Analou in the neighborhood, led by the barangay captain, proved
futile. It was already 8:00 oclock in the morning when the lifeless and naked body of Analou
was found by a couple in the grassy portion of the village near the Iponan River.[5]The body of
the victim was brought by a combined team of the police and NBI authorities to the funeral
parlor where a post mortem examination thereon was conducted by Dr. Tammy Cruz, M.D., of
the NBI medico-legal office in Cagayan de Oro City. The Autopsy Report[6] which is signed by
Dr. Tammy Cruz and noted by Atty. Sancho K. Chan, Jr., NBI Regional Director, Cagayan de
Oro City, contains the following findings:"Pallor, marked, generalized. Rigor mortis, lower legs
and knee joints."ABRASIONS, with fresh scabs, confluent: 2x1.2 cms. And 2.2x1 cms., midaspect of the forehead; 3x1.1 cms., right temple region."INCISED WOUND, with clean-cut
edges: 3.8 cms. long; located at the middle third of the left forearm, lateral aspect; with an
approximate depth of 0.8 cm.; involving the skin and underlying soft tissues and muscles."STAB
WOUNDS, non-penetrating: five (5) in number; elliptical in shapes; measuring 0.7 cm., 1 cm.,
0.5 cm., 1.5 cms., and 1.4 cms. long; located at the right shoulder joint region, right
infrascapular region, right subcostal region, left thigh, and left lumbar region; edges, clean cut;
one (1) extremity is sharp, the other, blunt; involving the skin and underlying tissues and
muscles; with approximate depths of 0.8 cm., 2.6 cms., 0.6 cm., 2.4 cms., and 1.5 cms.,
respectively."STAB WOUNDS, non-penetrating: two (2) in number; elliptical in shapes;
measuring 2.5 cms. and 3.5 cms. long; located at the left lateral infrascapular region and anterolateral aspect of the left thigh; edges, clean- cut; one (1) extremity is sharp, the other is blunt;
involving the skin and underlying soft tissues and muscles, with approximate depths of 3.4 cms.
and 4 cms."STAB WOUNDS, four (4) in number; elliptical in shapes; one (1) extremity is sharp,
the other is blunt; edges, clean-cut:-measuring 2.6 cms., 3.4 cms., 2.5 cms., and 1.1 cms. long.located at the left side of the chest, lower inner quadrant; right side of the chest, inferior aspect;
left upper quadrant of the abdomen; and left lower thoracic region of the back.-involving, among
others, the skin and underlying soft tissues and muscles.-completely cutting the fifth left rib,
piercing the left ventricle of the heart, the diaphragm, and the right lobe of the liver; with an
approximate depth of 8.2 cms.-partially cutting the upper border of the 7th right rib and piercing
the lower lobe of the right lung; with an approximate depth of 9.5 cms.-piercing the full thickness
of the abdominal wall and perforating portions of the small intestines with intestinal evisceration;
with an approximate depth of 5.5 cms.-through the 6th left intercostal space and piercing the
lower lobe of the left lung; with an approximate depth of 6.5 cms."HACK WOUND, neck, gaping;
14.5 cms. long; running from the right side to the left side of the neck; edges, clean-cut; the right
extremity is 10 cms. below and 1.5 cms. in front of the right external auditory meatus, while the
left extremity is 4 cms. below and 2 cms. behind the left external auditory meatus; directed
backward; involving among others, the skin and underlying soft tissues and muscles, the blood

vessels of the neck, including the left internal jugular vein and left internal carotid artery,
completely cutting the thyroid cartilage, partially cutting the 4th cervical vertebra and the
underlying spinal cord; with an approximate depth of 4.3 cms."HEMOTHORAX, right, about 100
cc.; left, about 50 cc."HEMOPERICARDIUM, about 50 cc. of dark fluid and clotted blood.
"HEMOPERITONEUM, about 200 cc. of dark fluid and clotted blood."Stomach, about filled
with semidigested corn grits and other food particles."Heart chambers, empty of blood."Brain
and other visceral organs, pale."CAUSE OF DEATH: Hemorrhage, severe, secondary to
multiple stab wounds, and hack wound of the neck."Dr. Uy explained that the victim suffered
abrasion on her forehead which could have been caused by a violent contact against a hard
surface. An incised wound which measures 3.8 centimeters was inflicted on the mid-section of
her left forearm. Moreover, the body of the victim bore eleven (11) stab wounds mostly on the
chest and abdomen. Four (4) of the stab wounds located on the chest and abdominal regions
penetrated the vital organs and were, therefore, fatal. The gaping wound on the neck which
completely cut through the left artery and the cartilage of the airway was also fatal. The weapon
used by the assailant was a sharp object such as a knife or a bolo.[7]The prosecution presented
in evidence a list[8] of expenses, certified by Ruben P. Obsioma, Barangay Captain of Taglimao,
Cagayan de Oro City, which were incurred due to the death of Analou Eduave.Ruben Obsioma,
Barangay Captain of Sitio Bolihon, Taglimao, Cagayan de Oro City instructed Kagawad Osias
Pabilona to prepare a list of the persons who attended the birthday party of a certain Bonifacio
Daang which was held in the same evening when Analou Eduave was killed. Appellant Romeo
Lumandong was among the persons included in the list that was subsequently forwarded to the
police. The investigation by the police of the said suspects yielded negative result. Later,
however, Barangay Captain Obsioma received information that appellant Lumandong had
knowledge about the crime.[9]Consequently, Barangay Captain Obsioma wrote a letter to
Homer Paduga requesting the latter to bring the appellant to his house in the afternoon of
December 17, 1995. At the appointed time and date, Homer Paduga and appellant Lumandong
appeared before Barangay Captain Obsioma in his house. Homer Paduga remained at the
terrace while the appellant proceeded to the backyard with the barangay captain. Obsioma
asked the appellant what he knew about the killing of Analou Eduave. The appellant initially
gave no answer and merely bowed his head. After having been asked for the third time,
appellant admitted the killing of Analou Eduave allegedly because her parents withheld his past
earnings in the farm. In addition, appellant revealed that it was actually Analous father whom he
intended to kill, but he was not in the house that fateful evening and that he stabbed Analou with
a double bladed knife only five (5) times, the other wounds being mere exit wounds. He also
said that he did not rape Analou and undressed her only to confuse the investigators about the
motive for the killing.[10]In view of the admissions of the appellant, Barangay Captain Obsioma
did not allow him anymore to leave his house that evening. On the following day, Obsioma
accompanied the appellant to the Homicide and Arson Division of the Cagayan de Oro police for
formal investigation.At the police headquarters, SPO1 Agbalog apprised the appellant of his
constitutional rights. Since the appellant had no lawyer, Agbalog suggested that he would be
given a lawyer who could provide him legal services for free to which the appellant agreed.
Thus, the legal services of Atty. Emelgar Paasa of the Public Attorneys Office (PAO) was
engaged by the police to assist the appellant during the investigation.[11]According to Atty.
Paasa, the appellant accepted him to act as his counsel during the custodial investigation. After

having been informed by Atty. Paasa of his rights under the Constitution, the appellant agreed to
give a statement[12] wherein he admitted stabbing Analou Eduave with a double bladed knife at
around midnight of November 30, 1995 in the grassy portion of the Iponan river in Sitio Bolihon
inasmuch as he harbored a grudge against her parents. Also in the presence of Atty. Paasa
during the same investigation, the appellant executed a waiver[13] for his continued detention.
Both documents were acknowledged by the appellant before Atty. Anabel Carmen S. Casino,
Branch Clerk of Court, RTC, Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 17.Appellant Lumandong testified
that he attended the birthday party of a certain Boni Daang in the afternoon of November 30,
1995. Among those who attended the birthday party were Homer Paduga, Isagani Pabilona,
Wilfredo Eduave, Zaldy Eduave and Rubio Paduga. After eating and drinking Red Horse beer,
appellant left the party at around 9:00 oclock in the evening and proceeded to sleep in the
house of Homer Paduga where he had been staying for eight (8) months.[14]Appellant
vehemently denied in court that he killed Analou Eduave and claimed that he confessed to the
crime before the barangay captain and the police for fear of his life. He stated that he and
Homer Paduga were fetched on December 17, 1995 from the latters house by a barangay
tanod upon order of the barangay captain. Upon reaching the house of the barangay captain,
the appellant was led to the back portion of the house while Homer Paduga was instructed to
remain at the terrace in front of the house. In the presence of six (6) barangay tanods, the
barangay captain asked the appellant three (3) times if he had anything to do with the killing of
Analou Eduave on November 30, 1995, to which he replied in the negative each time.
Apparently losing his patience, the barangay captain hit the appellant on the left side of his body
with the butt of his shotgun. The barangay tanods kicked and mauled the appellant on the
different parts of his body. Thereafter, appellant was handcuffed by the barangay captain and
the same was attached to a live electric wire which caused the appellant to feel numb and loss
consciousness. Upon recovering his consciousness and while still feeling the pain, appellant
pleaded for his life as he acceded to admit killing Analou Eduave. That evening, appellant
stayed in the house of the barangay captain inasmuch as he was not permitted to return home.
[15]In the early morning of the following day, the appellant was brought by the barangay captain
and the chief of the tanods to the police headquarters in Cagayan de Oro City. It was PO3
Agbalog who interrogated him about the killing of Analou Eduave in the presence of the
barangay captain and the chief of the tanods. He recalled having confessed his guilt before
Agbalog due to fear arising from the threat of the barangay captain that he will be killed by the
police if he would not admit to the crime. Atty. Emelgar Paasa arrived only after the interrogation
and informed him that he was going to be his counsel. Appellant denied that he admitted killing
the victim before Atty. Paasa and Atty. Casino, who appeared to have administered the oath to
him, inasmuch as they did not talk to him anymore.[16]Homer Paduga was presented by the
prosecution as a rebuttal witness. He testified that appellant Lumandong had been residing in
his house for almost eight (8) months before the killing happened on November 30, 1995 and
that a barangay tanod went to his house on December 17, 1995 upon order of the barangay
captain to fetch him and the appellant. Appellant went with the barangay captain inside his
house while Paduga remained outside. About thirty (30) minutes later, the barangay captain
went out and told Paduga that appellant admitted killing Analou Eduave. Thereafter, the
appellant narrated to the barangay captain and Homer Paduga how he killed the victim and the
reason for killing his said victim. He denied that appellant was mauled while the said appellant

was inside the house of the barangay captain. He emphasized that only the appellant and the
barangay captain talked during the occasion. In addition, Paduga disclosed that he was the one
who turned over to the barangay captain the knife[17] which was allegedly used by the appellant
in killing the victim.[18]After analyzing the evidence, the trial court adjudged the appellant guilty
of the crime of murder as charged in the Information. It stated, thus:"Accused first made his
admission of culpability in the presence of the Barangay Captain Ruben Obsioma and his
roommate Homer Paduga in Taglimao, Cagayan de Oro City, which admission became
confession when he agreed to set this down as affidavit before PO3 Vladimir Agbalog on
December 18, 1995 in the presence of counsel Emelgar Paasa, and swore to the truth thereof
before Atty. Anabel Carmen Casino. All these lady and gentlemen testified in courtin a
straightforward, clear and convincing manner without any sign of bias and prejudice against the
accused."xxx"The court is convinced that accused voluntarily and freely executed his
confession, and that his denial of the contents therein is an afterthought. There are so many
matters in the confession that are corroborated by the rest of the prosecution evidence and
which he himself knew and which had never been testified on by any other witness. Take
motive. For not having been paid the money due him from the parents of Analou Eduave, and
for so long a time before he started to stay for 8 months with Homer Paduga, despite his
repeated plea for payment to the Eduave spouses, he could not help himself from harboring illwill against said spouses. Then came November 30th (1995), Bonnie Daangs birthday where
he and others ate and drank Red Horse beer. There is no testimony about the amount of Red
Horse beer that he drank, nor that he was drunk, but having drunk could easily relate to
becoming bold and aggressive, outbalanced and reckless. It is not improbable that being
influenced by Red Horse, he remembered the Eduaves unjustness and inequity to him. Hence,
as he stated in his confession, Exh. "E", he proceeded to the Eduaves house with practically
open doors as there was no door shutter even of (sic) the sleeping room or space. His object
was Mr. Eduave, but he was not there, in the alternative, Mrs. Eduave, but he waxed fearful that
she might shout upon his assailing her. So he settled with the presumably meek 8 year old
Analou who he deemed he could carry away in silence even should she wake up, and brought
her 200 meters away from the Eduave house, near Iponan River and on a grassy spot struck
her and stabbed her 7 times with his double blade knife but inflicting 11 wounds, 4 of which
being fatal, and 7 being contributory to the victims demise."xxx"There are 5 aggravating and no
mitigating circumstances in the case, namely:1.
The fact that Analou was an 8 year old girl
thus making her death a crime of murder qualified by treachery.2.
Nighttime.3.
Abuse of
superior strength.4.
Uninhabited place (despoblado).5.
Cruelty."Nighttime and superior
strength are absorbed by treachery which is the qualifying circumstance. Uninhabited place and
cruelty are generic aggravating circumstances."[19]Therefore, the appellant was meted out the
following penalty:"WHEREFORE, the court finds accused guilty of the crime of murder for killing
Analou Eduave. He is hereby sentenced to death, and imposed the accessory penalties
provided by law. He is ordered to indemnify the heirs of his victim the following: P50,000.00 as
civil indemnity, P10,000.00 as moral damages, P10,000.00 as exemplary damages and
P5,000.00 as actual damages. He is also ordered to pay the costs of this case."[20]In the
instant appeal, appellant raised the following assignment of errors, to wit:"ITHE LOWER
COURT ERRED IN FINDING (sic) CONVICTION OF (sic) THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
DESPITE HAVING BEEN SHOWN THAT HIS CONFESSION WAS TAKEN THROUGH

THREAT, TORTURE AND VIOLENCE.IITHE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT GAVE

CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF THE PERSONS WHO ALLEGEDLY ASSISTED IN
EXTRACTING THE CONFESSION OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WHO WERE FOUND TO
HAVE FUMBLED IN THEIR TESTIMONIES."[21]It is clear from the records of this case that the
minority status of appellant Lumandong at the time of the commission of the crime was not
disputed by the prosecution. The appellant stated during the trial that he was born on March 15,
1981[22]. A verification with the Civil Registrars Office in Cagayan de Oro City proved futile
considering that all records of birth prior to 1986, according to the head of the said office, were
burned by fire[23]. Nevertheless, it is doctrinal that the claim of minority by an accused will be
upheld by the court even without any proof to corroborate his testimony until the same is
disproved by the prosecution[24]. Consequently, the trial court erred when it failed to consider
that appellant was a minor at the time of the commission of the crime. Minority being a
privileged mitigating circumstance under Article 13(2) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
appellant Lumandong should have automatically been spared the supreme penalty of death.
Anent the issue of admissibility of the extrajudicial confession of the appellant, this Court is
guided by four fundamental requirements, namely: 1) the confession must be voluntary; 2) the
confession must be made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel; 3) the
confession must be express; and 4) the confession must be in writing.[25]Appellant Lumandong
denied during the trial that he killed Analou Eduave. He alleged that he was maltreated by the
barangay officials in the house of Barangay Captain Obsioma in Sitio Bolihon, Taglimao,
Cagayan de Oro City in the evening of December 17, 1995. He also alleged that he confessed
before PO3 Agbalog due to fear arising from the threat from Obsioma that the police would kill
him should he refuse to admit the crime.An extrajudicial confession will be struck for being
involuntary if it had been obtained with the use of coercion, intimidation, inducement or false
promises.[26] The evidence, however, fails to support the allegation of the appellant that he was
maltreated by the barangay officials in the house of Barangay Captain Obsioma. It appears that
the appellant was accompanied by his friend, Homer Paduga, when he went to the house of
Barangay Captain Obsioma in Sitio Bolihon, Taglimao, Cagayan de Oro City in the afternoon of
December 17, 1995. Paduga waited for the appellant at the terrace while the latter was
conversing with the barangay captain at the backyard. After about thirty (30) minutes, the
barangay captain informed Paduga that the appellant admitted to him that he killed Analou
Eduave. He then inquired from the appellant himself and the latter confirmed that he was the
one who killed Analou Eduave on November 30, 1995.Homer Paduga categorically denied the
allegation of the appellant that he was maltreated by the barangay officials while he was in the
house of Barangay Captain Obsioma. Paduga disclosed that he even remained in the house of
Barangay Captain Obsioma the entire evening of December 17, 1995 to be with the appellant.
[27] Besides, the credibility of the appellant is seriously put to doubt when he failed to divulge
during the trial the names of the barangay tanods who allegedly mauled and kicked him despite
the fact that he was also a resident of the same village.Significantly, the appellant did not assail
the regularity of the custodial investigation that was conducted by the police at the police
headquarters in Cagayan de Oro City on December 18, 1995. His bare allegation of threats
from the barangay captain is certainly not convincing in view of the overwhelming evidence to
the contrary. Barangay Captain Obsioma and the chief of the barangay tanods merely
accompanied the appellant to the police headquarters in view of the latters previous admission

to the killing of Analou Eduave. Upon arrival thereat, Barangay Captain Obsioma immediately
turned over the appellant to the police and informed PO3 Vladimir Agbalog, who is the police
officer assigned to the case, that the appellant wanted to surrender for killing Analou Eduave.
Before formally starting with the investigation, PO3 Agbalog apprised the appellant of his rights
under Section 12 (1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution namely: 1) the right to remain silent; 2)
the right to have counsel of his own choice; and 3) the right to be informed of said rights. The
appellant indicated that he had no counsel. PO3 Agbalog then suggested that he would be
given a lawyer who could provide him legal assistance for free. The appellant agreed.PO3
Agbalog contacted the Public Attorneys Office in Cagayan de Oro City to request legal
assistance for the appellant. Accordingly, the head of the said office, Atty. Sofia Bacal,
designated Atty. Emelgar Paasa to assist the appellant during the custodial investigation.At the
police headquarters, Atty. Paasa talked to the appellant alone for about one (1) hour inside a
room away from the police and the barangay officials.[28] During the occasion, Atty. Paasa
asked the appellant if the latter was willing to accept him as his counsel to which the appellant
agreed. Atty. Paasa proceeded to explain to the appellant his constitutional rights before
inquiring about the incident. The appellant revealed that he harbored a grudge against the
parents of Analou Eduave inasmuch as they maltreated him. Consequently, on November 30,
1995 at almost midnight, the appellant carried Analou from her house toward the Iponan River
where he continuously stabbed her until she died. The appellant decided to surrender to the
police for the reason that he was bothered by his conscience and that he was also willing to
execute a written statement before the police.The written statement of appellant Lumandong
was taken by PO3 Agbalog in the presence of Atty. Paasa. PO3 Agbalog simultaneously typed
the questions and the corresponding answers of the appellant which were both made in the
Visayan dialect inasmuch as the same was comprehensible to the appellant. The truth of the
contents of the written statement was affirmed by the appellant before Atty. Annabel Carmen S.
Casino, Branch Clerk of Court, RTC, Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 17, after the latter also
informed the appellant of the consequences of his statement. Specifically, Atty. Casino warned
the appellant that he might be convicted for life and that appellant could still retract his
statements if the same were not true. However, the appellant stated that he was bothered by his
conscience and then proceeded to sign his written statement.[29] Thereafter, Atty. Emelgar
Paasa signed the written statement as the assisting counsel of the appellant before Atty. Casino
who likewise signed the same in her capacity as administering officer.The foregoing facts clearly
do not show that the appellant was coerced, intimidated nor induced to admit the killing of
Analou Eduave. The appellant failed to substantiate his allegations that he was maltreated and
intimidated by the barangay officials. Likewise, he never complained to the police or to Atty.
Paasa or Atty. Casino about the alleged maltreatment and intimidation which he allegedly
suffered at the hands of the barangay officials when he had all the opportunity to do so. The
failure of the appellant to present evidence of compulsion or duress or violence on his person
and to complain to the officers who administered the oath are clear indications of the
voluntariness of his confession.[30] In addition, the presence of Atty. Paasa, who is an officer of
the PAO, effectively insured that no force, threat or intimidation was employed to obtain a
confession from the appellant.[31]We agree with the lower court that the killing of Analou
Eduave by appellant Lumandong was attended by treachery in view of the age of the victim who
was only eight (8) years[32] old at the time of her death on November 30, 1995.[33] Likewise,

the aggravating circumstance of uninhabited place under Article 14(6) was correctly appreciated
against the appellant. It appears from the evidence that the appellant deliberately carried his
victim to the isolated and grassy portion of the Iponan River which is about two hundred (200)
meters away from her house[34] before killing his said victim thereby facilitating the commission
of the crime. The aggravating circumstances of nighttime and abuse of superior strength are
absorbed in treachery. The aggravating circumstance of cruelty may not be appreciated against
the appellant absent any showing that the other wounds found on the body of the victim were
inflicted to prolong her suffering before the fatal wound was delivered.[35]On the other hand, it
appearing that the appellant was only fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months, and fifteen (15)
days old at the time of the commission of the crime, he is entitled to a reduced penalty due to
the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority under Article 13(2) in relation to Article 68(1) of
the Revised Penal Code which provides at least two (2) degrees lower than that prescribed for
the crime of murder under Article 248 of the same code. Consequently, there being one (1)
aggravating circumstance, the imposable penalty on the appellant is prision mayor in its
maximum period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum shall be within the
range of the penalty next lower in degree that is prision correccional.WHEREFORE, the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 19, convicting Romeo
Lumandong y Ugiaban of the crime of Murder is hereby AFFIRMED subject to the
MODIFICATION that the penalty to be imposed on him is the indeterminate penalty of six (6)
years of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
maximum. The appellant is also ordered to pay the heirs of the victim the sum of P50,000.00 by
way of civil indemnity ex delicto, P50,000.00 as moral damages, P50,000.00 as exemplary
damages and P5,000.00 as actual damages.SO ORDERED.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------35. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ALBERTO DANO y JUGILON,
accused-appellant.
G.R. No. 117690. September 1, 2000
D E C I S I O NQUISUMBING, J.:
On appeal is the decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Miguel, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch
29, in Criminal Case No. 1579, promulgated on July 25, 1994, finding appellant Alberto Dano y
Jugilon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder, for the death of his brother Emeterio Dano,
and imposing upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua.The facts of this case are gleaned
from the records.On April 11, 1994, the Provincial Prosecutor of Zamboanga del Sur charged
appellant with the crime of murder, as follows:"That on or about March 16, 1994 at around 6:30
oclock in the evening, more or less, at Tiguian, Margosatubig, Zamboanga del Sur, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with treachery
and evident premeditation, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, assault,
attack, hack and stab his brother Emeterio Dano inflicting several mortal wounds causing his
instantaneous death."Contrary to law with qualifying aggravating circumstances of evident
premeditation and treachery."1On May 3, 1994, appellant was arraigned and with the assistance
of counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial on the merits then ensued.The
prosecution presented four witnesses: Wilfredo Tapian, a carpenter; Demosthenes Peralta, the
barangay captain of Tiguian, Margosatubig, Zamboanga del Sur; SPO3 Jesus Reales of the

Philippine National Police (PNP); and Teresita Dano, widow of the victim.The prosecutions
evidence established the following:On March 16, 1994, at around half past six oclock in the
evening, prosecution witness Wilfredo Tapian was resting in the house of a Neneng Miras in
Tiguian, Margosatubig, when Teresita Dano arrived and asked for his help. Teresita told Wilfredo
that her husband, Emeterio, attacked his brother Alberto, herein appellant, in the latters
house.2 Wilfredo immediately rushed to appellants house, which was some one hundred
meters away.On arriving at appellants house, Wilfredo saw the victim pacing back and forth in
appellants front yard. The victim, armed with a scythe was shouting at appellant, who was
looking out of the window, to come down so they could fight to the death. ("Kanaog diri kay
magkamatay ta.")3 Wilfredo tried to pacify the victim who kept repeating his challenge while
striking his scythe on the ground, but to no avail.4 Appellant also advised his younger brother to
go home, but the latter refused to listen. Suddenly, Emeterio leaped at appellant who was
standing with his head out of the window and slashed appellant with his scythe but missed.5
Seeing that his efforts to stop the fraternal quarrel were of no use and fearful of being hit in the
affray, Wilfredo left for home.Between the hours of six and seven oclock that same evening,
Demosthenes Peralta, the barangay captain of Tiguian, was informed by Wilfredo and a certain
Fernando Teves that the Dano brothers were quarreling.6 Demosthenes went to appellants
home to investigate. On his way, he met appellant. The latter told Peralta he had killed Emeterio
and voluntarily surrendered to him.7 Demosthenes left appellant in Wilfredos house and
proceeded to appellants residence where he saw the bloody corpse of the victim sprawled in
the yard, near the stairs.8 He noticed that the body bore several hacking and slashing wounds.9
Demosthenes fetched appellant from Wilfredos house and took him to the police station.Early in
the morning of the next day, Demosthenes fetched a doctor from the town proper of
Margosatubig. The latter examined the victims body, still lying in appellants yard. At the request
of the police station commander, Demosthenes took photos of the corpse, which he later turned
over to the police.10 He conducted a further examination of the crime scene and found a
bloodstained scythe beneath appellants house.11 The scythes wooden handle had the name
"Alberto Dano" carved on it. He turned over the scythe to the police.The necropsy report
established that the cause of death was acute blood loss, secondary to multiple hacking
wounds.12When interrogated by the police, appellant, without assistance of counsel, admitted
he killed his brother. The pertinent portion of his statement, contained in the police blotter, and
read into the records without objection by the defense, reads:"[S]ubject admitted of (sic) killing
his younger brother as the latter was drunk and provoked him for (sic) a scythe duel right
downstair(s) of his house that prompted him to get his scythe and come down from his house
and allegedly boxed first his brother and subsequently hacked several times as he was already
commanded by his evil thought(s)."13The victims widow admitted that the scythe, which her
late husband carried on that fateful day, was returned to her by some people in their
barangay.14 She did not turn over the scythe to the police.15The defense presented appellant
and his spouse as its witness.Appellant claimed that he acted in self-defense and in defense of
his family. He narrated that he and his family were preparing to go to bed at around 6:30 p.m.
March 16, 1994, when he heard somebody shout "Boy, come down and we will fight to death."
("Boy kanang diha kay magpatay ta")16 At first, he tried to ignore the challenge, but when it was
repeated several times, he looked out the window and saw his brother Emeterio outside, armed
with a scythe. He told his brother to go home but the latter, who appeared disturbed, did not

heed his words. Instead, he kept on hitting the ground with the scythe.17 Without any
provocation on his part, Emeterio suddenly leaped at him and attacked him with the scythe,
which he evaded.18 Emeterio then ascended the stairs to push open the bamboo door on the
porch leading to their living room.19 The door partially opened after Emeterio slammed it
several times. Appellants wife and children screamed and cried in fear.20 Appellant held and
twisted his brothers wrist to disarm him of the scythe.21 They grappled for the scythe while in
the porch, then tumbled down the stairs.22 When they hit the ground, the victim was dead.
Appellant did not know how many times he hit his brother or how many wounds he inflicted.23
He said he was not in a normal state of mind. Seeing that he had killed his brother, appellant
threw the scythe under his house and went to the barangay captain to surrender. His spouse
largely corroborated appellants version of the first round of the fratricidal affray.24 She claimed,
however, that she did not see how the victim was killed as they were inside the house and she,
as well as her children, had their eyes closed in shock and fear.25Appellant denied owning the
scythe found by the barangay captain beneath his house.26 He did not know why his name was
engraved on the wooden handle of said scythe.27 He was sure, however, that it was the same
scythe that his brother was carrying during the incident.28Appellant explained that he had a
previous misunderstanding with the victim over the purchase of a horse from his cousin Doroteo
Oliver on installment basis. Emeterio wanted to buy the horse, but appellant bought it ahead of
him, which caused the former to resent him.29The court below disbelieved appellants version
of the incident and decided as follows:"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the
accused Alberto Dano y Jugilon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, qualified
by treachery, defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, and there
being no proof of any modifying circumstances either to aggravate or mitigate the liability,
hereby sentences said accused to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua; to pay the heirs of
the deceased the sum of P50,000.00 by way of indemnity for the death of said victim; P3,000.00
as actual damages, compensatory damages of P2,000.00 by way of unrealized earnings and to
pay the costs."SO ORDERED."30On August 2, 1994, appellant seasonably filed his notice of
appeal. He assigns the following errors:ITHE LOWER COURT ERRED IN MAKING A
SWEEPING CONCLUSION THAT TREACHERY EXISTS IN THE CASE AT BAR.IITHE LOWER
COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING, IF NOT TOTALLY IGNORING, THE ACCUSEDS CLAIM
OF SELF-DEFENSE AND/OR DEFENSE OF RELATIVES, OR AT LEAST INCOMPLETE SELFDEFENSE AND/OR DEFENSE OF RELATIVES.IIITHE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT
SAID THAT EXHIBIT "E OF THE PROSECUTION WAS NOT OBJECTED TO BY THE
DEFENSE.IVTHE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RELYING TOO MUCH CREDENCE (sic) TO
THE TESTIMONY OF TERESITA DANO WHO DECLARED THAT THE SCYTHE (EXHIBIT "D"
FOR THE DEFENSE ON ONE HAND, WHILE EXHIBIT "4" FOR THE PROSECUTION) WAS
OWNED BY THE ACCUSED AND NOT THAT OF THE VICTIM.Simply stated, the pertinent
issues for our consideration are:(1) Did the trial court err in admitting the extrajudicial confession
of the accused?(2) Did the court a quo err in failing to appreciate appellants defense of selfdefense and/or defense of relatives, or at the least incomplete self-defense and/or defense of
relatives?(3) Did it err in convicting appellant of murder qualified by treachery and imposing the
penalty therefor?On the first issue, appellant avers that it was error for the trial court to give
weight to the admissions made by appellant during custodial investigation (Exhibit "E").
Appellant contends that his constitutional and statutory right to counsel during custodial

investigation was violated when the police took his statements without a lawyer to assist him.
He further argues that the trial court should have declared his statements before the police
inadmissible when they were objected to during the trial.A person under investigation for the
commission of an offense is guaranteed the following rights by the Constitution: (1) the right to
remain silent; (2) the right to have competent and independent counsel of his own choice, and
to be provided one if he cannot afford the services of counsel; and (3) the right to be informed of
these rights.31 These rights "cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel."32 A confession to be admissible must satisfy the following requirements: (1) the
confession must be voluntary; (2) the confession must be made with the assistance of
competent and independent counsel; (3) the confession must be express; and (4) the
confession must be in writing.33 In convicting the accused of the offense charged, the trial court
held:"Accuseds testimony on the witness stand however, contradicts his version appearing on
the police blotter of the police station of Margosatubig dated March 16, 1994, where he admitted
the killing of his younger brother Emeterio Dano as the latter was drunk and provoked him for
(sic) a scythe duel right downstairs of his house that prompted him to get his scythe and come
down from his house and allegedly boxed first his brother and subsequently hacked several
times as he was already commanded by evil thoughts."During the formal offer of evidence by
the prosecution, defense counsel admitted the authenticity of the extract of above entry in the
police blotter (Exhibit "B", prosecution) containing the foregoing recital as testified to by SPO4
Jesus Reales. Such entry in the police blotter when not objected to, is presumed to have been
accomplished in the regular performance of official duties by the police officer who made the
entry, hence is entitled to full faith and credit. It having been entered at the time when the
accused had just surrendered to the authorities in a remorseful attitude and in a spontaneous
manner free of any extraneous influence and coaching of a lawyer, the same entry carries great
weight and high probative value, in the absence of any proof of tampering or alteration thereof.
This Court therefore considers the recital in said entry more credible and easy to believe, than
the self-serving version of the accused given on the witness stand which is more a product of an
after-thought and concocted story than an honest and truthful version of what actually
happened."34We have carefully scrutinized the records including the List of Exhibits for the
Prosecution35 and the prosecutions offer of evidence36 and nowhere find mention of Exhibit
"E." What we find offered by the prosecution as evidence is the testimony of SPO3 Jesus
Reales "on the authenticity of the entries on the police blotter.37 The blotter recorded the
incident immediately after the crime and another entry in the morning, recorded what was
observed on the scene of the crime including a description of the prostrate body of the
accused."38 We also noted in the records that the defense objected to the admission of the
testimony of SPO3 Reales "because said witness is incompetent to testify as to the entry
having admittedthat he was not one who entered that (sic) events in the police blotter and
that he has no knowledge when the entries in the police blotter were made."39 Moreover, we
noted that SPO3 Reales admitted that as an assistant investigator, he was familiar with
investigation procedures.40 Under cross-examination, he also admitted appellant was
interrogated by the police regarding the incident,41 but there was no showing whatsoever
appellant was assisted by counsel during custodial investigation.42Considering the foregoing
circumstances, we find merit in appellants claim that his constitutional rights were
violated.1wphi1 First, the trial court erred when it relied on the supposed extrajudicial

confession of appellant in the police blotter. Extrajudicial confessions must conform to the
requirements of the Constitution.43 A suspects confession, whether verbal or non-verbal, when
taken without the assistance of counsel without a valid waiver of such assistance regardless of
the absence of coercion or the fact that it had been voluntarily given,44 is inadmissible in
evidence,45 even if appellants confession were gospel truth.We also find the courts reliance on
the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed46 misplaced. This presumption
cannot by itself prevail over positive averments concerning violations of the constitutional rights
of an accused.47It was also error for the trial court to have considered and relied on the
questioned entry in the police blotter, given the failure of the prosecution to offer it in evidence.
Evidence which has not been formally offered cannot be considered by courts.48 There is valid
reason, therefore, to strike down the lower courts reliance on the assailed police blotter entry in
convicting appellant.All these, however, do not suffice to acquit appellant of the offense charged.
Appellant admitted killing the victim before the barangay captain, who is neither a police officer
nor a law enforcement agent. Such admission, even if done without the assistance of a lawyer,
is not in violation of appellants constitutional rights.49 The constitutional requirements on
custodial investigation do not apply to spontaneous statements made in a voluntary manner
whereby appellant orally admitted authorship of the crime.50 What the Constitution proscribes is
the compulsory or coercive disclosure of incriminating facts.On the second issue, appellant
pleads self-defense and/or defense of relatives. When an accused invokes self-defense, the
onus probandi to show that the killing was justified shifts to him.51Even if the prosecution
evidence were weak, it could not be readily dismissed after the accused had openly admitted
his responsibility for the killing. Self-defense, like alibi, is inherently a weak defense, which can
easily be concocted.52For self-defense to prosper, appellant must prove by clear and
convincing evidence the following elements: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2)
reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person defending himself.53In order that defense of a relative
may be appreciated, the following requisites must concur: (1) unlawful aggression by the victim;
(2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) in case the
provocation was given by the person attacked, that the person making the defense took no part
therein.54Appellant faults the trial court when it concluded that unlawful aggression was absent
at the time of the killing. He insists that the killing of and the attack by the victim were nearly
simultaneous, without appreciable interval of time. Assuming that the number of wounds
sustained by the deceased negated self-defense and/or defense of relative, according to
appellant, the trial court erred in not appreciating incomplete self-defense, given the fact that the
other elements of the justifying circumstances involved were present, namely, unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim and lack of sufficient provocation on appellants part.The
Solicitor General counters that appellants defenses cannot be appreciated since the victim was
already unarmed when killed. There was no more danger to the life and limb of appellant or to
the members of his family. Unlawful aggression was absent at the time of the killing.
Furthermore, the appellant was unscathed in the tumult, while he was able to inflict twelve (12)
hacking wounds on the victim. This fact belies appellants theory and reveal an intent to kill the
victim. Inasmuch as appellant failed to prove there was no unlawful aggression, there cannot be
any self-defense, complete or incomplete, according to the Solicitor General.For self-defense or
defense of a relative, whether complete or incomplete, to be appreciated, the element of

unlawful aggression is indispensable.55 If there is no unlawful aggression, there is nothing to

prevent or repel.56 For unlawful aggression to be appreciated, there must be a positively strong
act of real aggression, and not merely a threat or an intimidating stance. Thus, the accused who
claims self-defense or defense of relative must positively establish that there was an actual,
sudden, and unexpected attack or imminent danger thereof, on the part of the victim.In the
instant case, the trial court found:"Despite the long scuffle over the possession of the scythe
with his deceased brother which started from the porch of their house up to the ground near the
stairway, accused has (sic) never sustained a single wound on his body, not even a scratch or a
bruise. In contrast, the deceased sustained twelve (12) multiple hacking wounds all over his
bodyHe admitted that from the time he gained control and possession of the scythe from his
brother, the deceased was already armless (sic) and there was no more danger to himself
coming from his brother."57The question of whether appellant acted in self-defense is
essentially a question of fact.58 In the instant case, the trial court found that appellant was able
to disarm the victim before the killing. It was also established that, despite appellants assertion
that he engaged in a life or death struggle for the possession of the weapon during which the
combatants fell from the porch to ground, he incredibly sustained nary a scratch or injury. By
contrast, the victim suffered twelve (12) ghastly wounds, some of which were at his back. In
view of these findings, the evidence for the defense cannot be characterized as clear and
convincing. The deceased and appellant were allegedly wrestling all over the crime scene for
possession of the weapon, yet the victim sustained wounds in the back. The number, location,
and gravity of the wounds that the victim sustained do not support the claim of unlawful
aggression on his part at the time he was killed. If appellant were merely defending himself, he
did not have to hack the deceased a dozen times. Moreover, appellants inability to explain why
he came out of the fierce struggle unscathed seriously and hopelessly damages his credibility.
Thus, in the absence of any showing that the factual findings were reached arbitrarily or without
sufficient basis, appellate courts accord the highest respect and even finality to findings of fact
by trial courts.59We share the view that appellant was able to disarm his assailant before the
latter was killed. Then there was no longer any real peril to the life or safety of the appellant or
his family when the victim lost his weapon. When unlawful aggression which has begun earlier
no longer exists, the one making the defense has no right to kill or even wound the former
aggressor.60 To successfully invoke self-defense and defense of relative, appellant must prove
by evidence most satisfactory, the concurrence of all the elements of self-defense and/or
defense of a relative, the most important of which is unlawful aggression on the victims part.
Absent unlawful aggression, there can be no self-defense or defense of a relative, complete or
incomplete, and conviction of appellant must follow.61On the third issue. Appellant submits the
qualifying element of treachery is absent in the instant case. He relies on People v. Butler, 120
SCRA 281(1983) where we held that treachery is not present where accused and victim
grappled with each other and People v. Maguddatu, 124 SCRA 594 (1983), where we ruled that
treachery cannot be appreciated where the killing was made on the spur of the moment.To this
the Solicitor General agrees. The Solicitor General points out that treachery cannot be
appreciated because the evidence on the record is bereft of any showing of the precise manner
in which the killing was done. He cites People v. Timple, 237 SCRA 52 (1994). Relying on
People v. Cedenio, 233 SCRA 356 (1994), he argues that treachery cannot be presumed but
must be proved by evidence as convincing and conclusive as the killing itself. Thus, he

concludes that appellant should only be convicted of the crime of homicide.Treachery occurs
when the accused employs means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof without risk to
himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.62 There is treachery
where the accuseds attack was so sudden and launched from behind that the victim was
caught off guard without an opportunity to defend himself.63The trial courts findings with
respect to the presence of treachery cannot be sustained.1wphi1 For treachery to be
appreciated, the following must be proven: (1) the employment of means of execution which
give the person assaulted no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate; and (2) the deliberate or
conscious adoption of such means adopted by the assailant.64 In this case, there was no
showing whatsoever by the prosecution that appellant deliberately adopted the means of attack
used to kill the victim. Note that it has been established that there was, initially, unlawful
aggression on the part of the deceased. Appellant in defending himself from the deadly assault
was able to grab the weapon of the victim, disarm him, and kill him. The circumstances of the
assault show that appellant did not have the luxury of time to deliberate and contemplate the
manner or method of killing the victim. Moreover, the deceased had deliberately provoked and
attacked appellant. For treachery to be appreciated there must not be even the slightest
provocation on the part of the victim.65Absent the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the
offense committed is not murder but only homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal
Code.66Lastly, we find that the trial court failed to appreciate two mitigating circumstances in
appellants favor, namely: (1) that sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the offended
party immediately preceded the killing, and (2) that appellant voluntarily surrendered himself to
a person in authority or his agents. The record is categorical that appellant surrendered to the
barangay captain of Tiguian after the incident. A barangay leader is a person in authority.67The
penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal. Where there are two mitigating circumstances and
no aggravating circumstances present, the court shall "impose the penalty next lower to that
prescribed by law in the period that it may deem applicable."68 The penalty next lower is prision
mayor. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum penalty to be imposed shall be
taken from the medium period of the imposable penalty which is prision mayor, while the
minimum shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree which is prision correcional in any
of its periods. Prision mayor in its medium period is eight (8) years and one (1) day to ten (10)
years. Prision correcional in its maximum period is four (4) years, two (2) months, and one (1)
day to six (6) years.WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED. Appellant
Alberto Dano y Jugilon is found GUILTY of the crime of HOMICIDE and consequently,
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of four (4) years, two (2) months, and one (1)
day of prision correcional as minimum to eight (8) years and twenty (20) days of prision mayor
as maximum, and to pay the heirs of Emeterio Dano P50,000.00 as indemnity for his death and
P3,000.00 for burial expenses.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------36. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. DONATO B. CONTINENTE and
JUANITO T. ITAAS, JOHN DOE, PETER DOE, JAMES DOE, PAUL DOE and SEVERAL
OTHER DOES (at large), accused, DONATO B. CONTINENTE and JUANITO T. ITAAS,
accused-appellants.
G.R. Nos. 100801-02. August 25, 2000D E C I S I O NDE LEON, JR., J.:Before us on appeal is
the Decision[1] dated February 27, 1991 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 88,

in Criminal Cases Nos. 89-4843 and 89-4844 finding herein appellants guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crimes of murder and frustrated murder, respectively for the killing of U.S. Col.
James N. Rowe and for seriously wounding Joaquin Vinuya.It appears that appellant Donato
Continente and several other John Does were initially charged with the crimes of murder and
frustrated murder in two (2) separate Informations dated June 20, 1989 in connection with the
shooting incident on April 21, 1989 at the corner of Tomas Morato Street and Timog Avenue in
Quezon City which caused the death of U.S. Col. James N. Rowe while seriously wounding his
driver, Joaquin Vinuya. After the arrest of another suspect, Juanito Itaas, on August 27, 1989 in
Davao City, the prosecution, with prior leave of court, filed two (2) separate amended
Informations for murder and frustrated murder to include Juanito T. Itaas, among the other
accused. The amended Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 89-4843 and 89-4844 read:
Criminal Case No. Q-89-4843 for Murder:"That on or about the 21st day of April, 1989, in
Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping one another, with intent
to kill, with evident premeditation and treachery and with the use of armalite rifles and motor
vehicles, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, and employ
personal violence upon the person of COL. JAMES N. ROWE, a U.S. Army Officer, by then and
there firing at him while then on board a Toyota car, hitting him on the different parts of his body,
thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal gunshot wounds, which were the direct and
immediate cause of his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said Col. James N.
Rowe in such amount as may be awarded under the provisions of the Civil Code.CONTRARY
TO LAW."Criminal Case No. Q-89-4844 for Frustrated Murder:"That on or about the 21st day of
April 1989, in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping one
another, with intent to kill, with evident premeditation and treachery and with the use of armalite
rifles and motor vehicles, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault
and employ personal violence upon the person of JOAQUIN BINUYA, by then and there firing at
him while then on board a Toyota car, hitting him on the scalp and body, thereby inflicting upon
him serious and mortal gunshot wounds, thus performing all the acts of execution which would
have produced the crime of murder, but nevertheless did not produce it, by reason of causes
independent of their own will, that is the timely intervention of medical assistance, to the
damage and prejudice of said Joaquin Binuya in such amount as may be awarded under the
provisions of the Civil Code.CONTRARY TO LAW."Upon being arraigned on August 31, 1989,
appellant Donato B. Continente, assisted by his counsel of choice, pleaded "Not guilty" to each
of the amended Informations in both criminal cases. On the scheduled arraignment of appellant
Juanito Itaas on October 31, 1989, appellant Itaas, upon the advice of his counsel, refused to
enter any plea. Hence, the trial court ordered that a plea of "Not guilty" be entered in each of
the amended Informations in both criminal cases for the said appellant.From the evidence
adduced by the prosecution, it appears that on April 21, 1989 at around 7:00 o'clock in the
morning, the car of U.S. Col. James N. Rowe, Deputy Commander, Joint U. S. Military
Assistance Group (JUSMAG for brevity), was ambushed at the corner of Tomas Morato Street
and Timog Avenue in Quezon City. Initial investigation by the Central Intelligence Service (CIS
for brevity), National Capital District Command, Camp Crame, Quezon City which was led by
Capt. Gil Meneses, Assistant Chief of the Special Investigation Branch, CIS, shows that on the

date and time of the ambush, Col. James Rowe, was on board his gray Mitsubishi Galant car
which was being driven by Joaquin Vinuya; and that they were at the corner of Tomas Morato
Street and Timog Avenue in Quezon City on their way to the JUSMAG Compound along Tomas
Morato Street when gunmen who were on board an old model Toyota Corolla car suddenly fired
at his car, thereby killing Col. Rowe and seriously wounding his driver, Joaquin Vinuya. The car
that was used by the gunmen was followed by a Mitsubishi Lancer car when it sped away from
the site of the ambush.[2] The same Toyota Corolla car was later recovered on the same day by
a team from the Philippine Constabulary (PC), North Sector Command, led by PC/Sgt. Fermin
Garma, at No. 4 Windsor Street, San Francisco Del Monte in Quezon City.[3]Upon further
investigation of the case, the CIS agents established through a confidential intelligence
information the involvement of appellant Donato Continente, an employee of the U.P. Collegian
in U.P. Diliman, Quezon City, in the ambush of Col. James Rowe and his driver. Accordingly, on
June 16, 1989, the CIS investigation team proceeded to the U.P. campus in Diliman, Quezon
City to conduct a surveillance on appellant Donato Continente. After accosting appellant
Continente inside the said U.P. campus, the CIS team took him to Camp Crame in Quezon City
for questioning.[4] During the interrogation which was conducted by CIS Investigator Virgilio
Pablico in the presence of Atty. Bonifacio Manansala in Camp Crame on June 17, 1989,
appellant Continente admitted to his participation in the ambush of Col. James Rowe and his
driver as a member of the surveillance unit under the Political Assassination Team of the CPPNPA.[5] Among the documents confiscated from appellant Continente by the CIS agents, and
for which a receipt dated June 16, 1989 was prepared and issued by Sgt. Reynaldo dela Cruz,
was a letter addressed to "Sa Kinauukulan". At the dorsal right hand side of the letter appear
the acronyms "STR PATRC" which allegedly mean "Sa Tagumpay ng Rebolusyon" and "Political
Assassination Team, Regional Command".[6]Another confidential intelligence information
established the participation of appellant Juanito Itaas in the said ambush of Col. James Rowe
and his driver on April 21, 1989. Appellant Itaas, who was a known member of the Sparrow Unit
of the NPA based in Davao City was arrested in Davao City and was brought to Manila by Capt.
Gil Meneses for investigation.[7] CIS Investigator Virgilio Pablico investigated and took down the
statements of appellant Itaas who disclosed during the investigation that he was an active
member of the Sparrow Unit of the NPA based in Davao City and confessed, in the presence of
Atty. Filemon Corpuz who apprised and explained to him his constitutional rights, that he was
one of those who fired at the gray Mitsubishi Galant car of Col. James Rowe at the corner of
Tomas Morato Street and Timog Avenue on April 21, 1989.[8] The said appellant identified the
Toyota Corolla car that the assailants rode on April 21, 1989 and the gray Mitsubishi Galant car
of Col. Rowe.[9]Meanwhile, it appears that the ambush on Col. James Rowe and his driver was
witnessed by a certain Meriam Zulueta. The testimony of prosecution eyewitness Meriam R.
Zulueta reveals that at around 7:00 o'clock in the morning of April 21, 1989, she was about to
cross the Tomas Morato Street on her way to the JUSMAG Compound in Quezon City to attend
a practicum in the JUSMAG Mess Hall when she heard several gunshots. Upon looking at the
direction where the gunshots emanated, she saw persons on board a maroon car firing at a
gray car at a distance of more or less one (1) meter at the corner of Tomas Morato Street and
Timog Avenue in Quezon City. Zulueta returned to the side of the street to seek for cover but
could not find any so she docked and covered her head with her bag while continuously looking
at the persons who were firing at the gray car.[10] She recognized appellant Juanito Itaas when

the latter was presented for identification in Camp Crame as the person, directly behind the
driver of the maroon car, whose body was half exposed while he was firing at the gray car with
the use of along firearm.[11] The shooting incident lasted for about five (5) seconds only after
which the maroon car made a U-turn to Timog Avenue toward the direction of Quezon
Boulevard while being followed by a white Mitsubishi Lancer car.[12]Prosecution eyewitness
Zulueta likewise recognized the driver of the white Mitsubishi Lancer car as the same person
whom she had encountered on two occasions. Zulueta disclosed that in the morning of April 19,
1989, the white Mitsubishi Lancer car was parked along the side of Tomas Morato Street which
was near the corner of Scout Madrinas Street. Her attention was caught by the driver of the car,
who was then reading a newspaper, when the latter remarked "Hoy pare, ang sexy. Sheboom!" as she was walking along the street toward the JUSMAG Compound. On April 20,
1989, she saw the same person inside the white Mitsubishi Lancer car which was then parked
along the side of Tomas Morato Street while she was again on her way to attend practicum in
the JUSMAG Compound. She learned of the identity of the driver as a certain Raymond
Navarro, who is allegedly a member of the NPA, from the pictures shown her by the CIS
investigators in Camp Crame.[13]Prosecution witness Zulueta also recognized appellant Donato
Continente whom she had encountered on at least three (3) occasions at a carinderia outside
the JUSMAG Compound. Her first encounter with appellant Continente was at around three
o'clock in the afternoon on April 17, 1989 when she went out of the JUSMAG Compound to a
carinderia nearby. She mistook the said appellant for a tricycle driver who was simply walking
around the premises. She saw appellant Continente in the same carinderia again on the
following day, April 18, 1989, and she was even teased by her companions that he was her
escort. On April 19, 1989, Zulueta saw appellant Continente for the third time inside the same
carinderia while the latter was merely standing. She came to know the identity of appellant
Continente when Continente was presented to her in Camp Crame for identification. She
thought that he was the tricycle driver whom she had seen in the carinderia near the JUSMAG
Compound.[14]Joaquin Vinuya testified that he was employed by the JUSMAG, as driver, and
assigned to Col. James Rowe. On April 21, 1989, he fetched Col. Rowe from his house in
Potsdam Street, Greenhills, Mandaluyong to report for work in JUSMAG, Quezon City. He
drove along EDSA and turned left upon reaching Timog Avenue in Quezon City. While he was
making a right turn at the intersection of Timog Avenue toward Tomas Morato Street, he noticed
four (4) people on board a red car, two (2) of whom suddenly opened fire at the car that he was
driving hitting him in the process. The shooting incident happened very fast and that he had no
opportunity to recognize the persons inside the red car. Despite the incident, Vinuya managed
to drive the car to the JUSMAG Compound. Upon arrival at the JUSMAG Compound, he found
out that Col. James Rowe, who was sitting at the back seat of the car, was also hit during the
shooting incident.[15]Col. James Rowe and Joaquin Vinuya were initially brought to the V. Luna
Hospital in Quezon City for treatment. Subsequently, they were transferred to the Clark Air
Base Hospital in Pampanga. It was only then that Vinuya learned of Col. James Rowe's death
whose body was already wrapped in a blanket. Vinuya was treated in the Clark Air Base
Hospital in Pampanga for four (4) days for the injuries he sustained on his head, shoulder, and
on the back portion of his left hand. Thereafter, he was taken back to JUSMAG Compound in
Quezon City to recuperate.[16]Prosecution witnesses Dr. Walter Divers and Dr. Jose Santiago
testified on their respective medical findings[17] on the victims. Dr. Divers confirmed in court the

contents of his medical report dated April 21, 1989 which shows that Col. Rowe sustained a
gunshot wound on the left side of his head and abrasions on other parts of his body and that he
was pronounced dead upon arrival at the V. Luna Hospital in Quezon City.[18] On the other
hand, Dr. Santiago identified the medical report dated April 25, 1989 that he prepared relative to
the treatment that he administered on Joaquin Vinuya. The report shows that Vinuya sustained
three (3) superficial injuries on the scalp, on the left shoulder, and on the back of the left hand
which could have been caused by bullets that came from a gun; and that the wounds could
have caused the death of Vinuya without the medical treatment that lasted for four (4) days.[19]
For the defense, appellant Juanito Itaas testified and denied the truth of the contents of his
sworn statements which are respectively dated August 29, 1989 and August 30, 1989, insofar
as the same establish his participation in the ambush of Col. James Rowe and his driver on
April 21, 1989. Appellant Itaas testified that he was allegedly tortured by his captors on August
27 and 28, 1989 in Davao City; that he was blindfolded and a masking tape was placed on his
mouth; and that subsequently, he was hit and mauled while a cellophane was placed on his
head thus, causing him to loss consciousness.[20]Appellant Itaas further testified that he affixed
his signatures on his sworn statements dated August 29 and 30, 1989 in the presence of the
CIS officers and that Atty. Filemon Corpus was not present during those two occasions. The
said appellant admitted having sworn to the truth of the contents of his said sworn statements
before the administering fiscal, but he disclosed that the CIS officers previously threatened him
to admit the contents of the two sworn statements.[21]Appellant Donato Continente testified that
he was working as messenger with the U.P. Collegian, an official monthly publication of the
University of the Philippines. He was walking on his way home inside the U.P. campus in
Diliman, Quezon City from his workplace in Vinzon's Hall in the late afternoon of June 16, 1989
when four (4) persons blocked his way and simultaneously held his body and covered his
mouth. He asked if they had any warrant of arrest but the persons simply boarded him inside a
waiting car where he was handcuffed and blindfolded. Thereafter, they took his wallet that
contained his NBI clearance, SSS, tax account number (TAN), identification card, two (2)
pictures, and a typewritten certification from "SINAG" where he used to work.[22]Appellant
Continente learned that he was taken to Camp Crame in Quezon City only in the following
morning when his blindfold was removed so that he could give his statement in connection with
the killing of Col. James Rowe before a CIS Investigator whom he later identified during the trial
as Virgilio Pablico. Appellant Continente affirmed the truth of his personal circumstances only
which appear on his sworn statement dated June 17, 1989 but denied having made the rest of
the statements embodied therein. The said appellant claimed that he initially denied any
knowledge in the killing of Col. James Rowe but CIS Investigator Pablico maintained that he
(Continente) knew something about it; that appellant Continente was alone with Investigator
Pablico during the investigation; that he signed his sworn statement in the presence of Pablico
and swore to the truth thereof before the administering fiscal for fear that something might
happen to him while he was alone; that he signed the last page of his sworn statement first
before signing the waiver of his constitutional rights upon arrival of Atty. Bonifacio Manansala
whose legal services was engaged by the CIS Investigators; and that he had no opportunity to
talk with Atty. Manansala who left after he (Atty. Manansala) signed, merely as witness, the first
page of his sworn statement, which is the waiver of his constitutional rights.[23]On rebuttal,
prosecution witness Sgt. Reynaldo dela Cruz testified that he prepared and issued the receipt

for the documents which he confiscated from appellant Continente on June 16, 1989; and that it
is the standard operating procedure in the CIS to put a blindfold on an arrested suspected NPA
member in order to withhold from him the view and location of the entrance, the exit and the
terrain in the camp.[24]The testimony of CIS Investigator Virgilio Pablico on rebuttal reveals that
during the investigation of appellants Donato Continente and Juanito Itaas, their respective
lawyers namely, Atty. Bonifacio Manansala and Atty. Filemon Corpuz, were present; that
appellants Continente and Itaas conferred with their lawyers before they gave their statements
to the CIS investigator; that the CIS investigator typed only the statements that the appellants
had given him in response to his questions during the investigation; that both appellants were
accompanied by their respective lawyers when they were brought to the fiscal for inquest; and
that said appellants were never tortured nor threatened during the investigations of these cases.
[25]The trial court rendered its decision[26] in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-89-4843 to 44 on
February 28, 1991 finding both appellants Juanito Itaas and Donato Continente guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crimes of murder and frustrated murder. It ruled, thus:"In assessing the
evidence against co-accused Continente, it is undeniable that the yardstick of his culpability
hangs in the validity of the extra-judicial confession he had executed. A close scrutiny of the
document would reveal that the confession is free from any taint of illegality and thus serves as
a basis for his conviction.The presumption of law that official duty has been regularly performed
has not been satisfactorily controverted by the accused.Circumstances show that Continente's
waiver was done with the assistance of a counsel of his choice. The records indicate that Atty.
Bonifacio Manansala was accused's counsel during his custodial investigation and his
arraignment and that his counsel during the trial was a relative of the aforementioned lawyer.
These factors are undeniable evidence of trust reposed upon Atty. Bonifacio Manansala by the
accused.Continente also admitted on cross-examination that he had read his statement which
included the PAGPAPATUNAY containing his waiver of constitutional rights (TSN 29 August
1990 p. 29). Accused was raised in Metro Manila and spoke Tagalog, thus would not have any
difficulty in comprehending the questions addressed to him and the information relayed to him
with respect to his rights. The court can not equate that whenever a suspect is taken into
custody and is fearful of his safety, the police authorities had exercised pressure or had
threatened if not subjected them to physical abuse. Moreover, the fact that the accused
admitted that his answers were typed as he spoke them (TSN August 30 1990 p.4) leaves no
room for Pablico to fabricate an answer.xxx xxx
xxx.The prosecution
evidence gathered against accused Itaas cradles on two incriminating points. The Zulueta
testimony and his extra judicial confession working independently, one without the other, have
the force capable of convicting the accused. The interplay of these two valuable evidence
solidifies a ruling of guilt against accused Itaas.The defense raised by the accused is not
sufficient to overrule this Court's determination of guilt against Itaas.The testimony of Zulueta
has been candid and straightforward, devoid of any material contradiction. No motive has been
imputed to assail the credibility of her testimony. xxxxxx xxx
xxx.With respect
to the extra-judicial confession executed by accused Itaas, the Court finds that such was made
pursuant to the Constitution. Although it may be argued that accused resides in Davao, the fact
that he could understand Tagalog as admitted by him in his testimony and proven by the
proceedings in court where he was answering questions addressed to him in Tagalog militates
against his inability to comprehend his right and its subsequent waiver. Counsel for accused

contests the independence and competence of Atty. Filemon Corpuz on the ground that said
lawyer was a military lawyer. Although the military background of Atty. Corpuz is admitted, this
does not automatically disqualify him to act as lawyer for the accused. Proof of the fact that he
failed to render his duty to safeguard the rights of the accused must be shown before this court
nullifies the weight of Itaas' extra-judicial confession. The allegation of torture similarly rings
hollow. No medical certificate had been shown by the accused that he had indeed suffered
brutal treatment from his jailers specially since he had alleged to have been treated by a doctor
for his injuries."Thereafter, the trial court meted out the following penalties on the appellants:
"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Court finds accused DONATO CONTINENTE y
BUENVENIDA and JUANITO ITAAS y TURA GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of
MURDER and FRUSTRATED MURDER, and each is hereby sentenced to suffer an
imprisonment of RECLUSION PERPETUA for the killing of Col. James Rowe, to pay
P30,000.00 to the heirs; and an imprisonment from Ten (10) Years and One (1) Day of PRISION
MAYOR as MINIMUM to Seventeen (17) Years, Four (4) Months and One (1) Day of
RECLUSION TEMPORAL as MAXIMUM for the crime committed against Joaquin Vinuya, and
to pay the cost.SO ORDERED."From the foregoing judgment of the trial court, appellants
Donato Continente and Juanito Itaas separately instituted the instant appeal.On March 15,
1993, appellant Donato Continente filed his Appellant's Brief[27] while appellant Juanito Itaas
filed his Appellant's Brief[28] on March 5, 1993. The Office of the Solicitor General filed the
Appellee's Brief[29] for the People on October 4, 1993. Appellant Itaas filed a Reply Brief[30] on
December 3, 1993.Appellant Continente raised the following assignments of error by the trial
court:ITHE HONORABLE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING AND GIVING PROBATIVE
VALUE TO THE EXTRA-JUDICIAL CONFESSION OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT CONTINENTE.
IITHE HONORABLE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE
IDENTIFICATION OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT CONTINENTE BY THE PROSECUTION'S
LONE WITNESS.IIITHE HONORABLE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSEDAPPELLANT CONTINENTE GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIMES
CHARGED.On the other hand, appellant Itaas interposed the following assignments of error:I
THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN ADMITTING AND
APPRECIATING THE EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY OF MERIAM ZULUETA.IITHE LOWER
COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN ADMITTING AND APPRECIATING THE
ALLEGED EXTRA-JUDICIAL CONFESSIONS OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT ITAAS.IIITHE
LOWER COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN ADMITTING TESTIMONIAL AND
PHOTOGRAPHIC EVIDENCE SHOWING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT POSING BESIDE THE
AMBUSHER'S AND THE VICTIM'S ALLEGED CARS.IVTHE LOWER COURT COMMITTED
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN HOLDING THAT THE PROSECUTION WAS ABLE TO PROVE ALL
THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE CRIMES CHARGED.VTHE EXTENSIVE PUBLICITY
BY THE AUTHORITIES DEPICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT ITAAS AS "THE ROWE KILLER",
A "COMMUNIST" AND A MEMBER OF THE CPP/NPA/NDF/ABB INFLUENCED MERIAM
ZULUETA'S IDENTIFICATION OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT AND THE LOWER COURT'S
JUDGMENT.The principal issues are:1. Whether or not the waivers of the constitutional rights
during custodial investigation by the appellants were valid; and2. Whether or not the testimony
of prosecution eyewitness Meriam Zulueta was credible.The rights of the accused during
custodial investigation are enshrined in Article III, Section 12 (1) of the 1987 Constitution which

provides that:"Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense
shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of
counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in
the presence of counsel."The rights to remain silent and to counsel may be waived by the
accused provided that the constitutional requirements are complied with. It must appear clear
that the accused was initially accorded his right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to
have a competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. In addition, the
waiver must be in writing and in the presence of counsel. If the waiver complies with the
constitutional requirements, then the extrajudicial confession will be tested for voluntariness,[31]
i. e., if it was given freely-without coercion, intimidation, inducement, or false promises; and
credibility,[32] i.e., if it was consistent with the normal experience of mankind.In assailing the
validity of their written statements, appellants Donato Continente and Juanito Itaas contend that
they were not properly informed of their custodial rights under the constitution as to enable them
to make a valid waiver. The pertinent portion of appellant Donato Continente's written statement
dated June 17, 1989 is quoted hereunder, to wit:PALIWANAG: G. Donato Continente, ang
pagsisiyasat na ito ay may kinalaman sa pagkaka-ambush at pagpatay kay U.S. Army Colonel
James Rowe ng JUSMAG.Bago kita simulang tanungin ay nais ko munang ipabatid sa iyo ang
iyong mga karapatan alinsunod sa ating umiiral na Saligang Batas. Ito ay ang mga sumusunod:
Una, ikaw ay may karapatang manahimik o huwag magbigay ng salaysay. Kung ikaw ay
magbibigay ng salaysay, ipinaalala ko sa iyo na anumang sasabihin mo sa salaysay mong ito
ay maaaring gamiting ebidensiya pabor o laban sa iyo sa anumang hukuman dito sa Pilipinas.
Ikalawa, karapatan mong magkaroon ng abogado ayon sa iyong sariling pili habang ikaw ay
aking tinatanong. Kung ikaw ay walang kakayanang umupa ng abogado, ikaw ay bibigyan
namin ng isang abogado ng gobyerno bilang tumayo na iyong tagapayo at ng sa gayon ay
maprotektahan ang iyong mga karapatan.Ikatlo, karapatan mong malaman at
mapagpaliwanagan ng mga karapatan mong ito.TANONG: Nauunawaan mo ba ang mga
karapatan mong ito?SAGOT:
Opo. Nauunawaan ko po.TANONG: Mayroon ka bang
abogado na naririto sa ngayon upang siya mong maging tagapayo?SAGOT:
Wala po pero
nakapagdesisyon na po ako na ako ay magbibigay ng salaysay kahit na wala akong nakaharap
na abogado.TANONG: G. Continente, ang pagsusuko ng mga karapatan, ayon narin sa batas,
ay kinakailangang gawin sa harap ng isang abogado. Payag ka bang magsuko ng iyong mga
karapatan sa harap ng isang abogado ng gobyerno?SAGOT:
Pumapayag po ako.TANONG:
Nakahanda ka rin bang lumagda sa isang pagpapatunay na ikaw ay napagpaliwanagan ng
iyong mga karapatan, at nauunawaan mo ang mga karapatan mong ito?SAGOT:
Opo.[33]On
the other hand, the pertinent portion of appellant Itaas' written statement dated August 29, 1989
is quoted, to wit:01. PALIWANAG: G. Juanito Itaas, ang pagsisiyasat na ito ay may kinalaman
sa pagkakaambush at pagpatay kay Colonel James Rowe ng JUSMAG at pagkasugat ng
kanyang driver. Bago kita simulang tanungin ay nais ko munang ipabatid sa iyo ang iyong mga
karapatan alinsunod sa ating Bagong Saligang Batas. Ito ay mga sumusunod. Una, ikaw ay
may karapatang manahimik o huwag magbigay ng salaysay. Kung ikaw ay magbibigay ng
salaysay, ipinaalala ko sa iyo na anumang sabihin mo sa salaysay mong ito ay maaaring
gamiting ebidensiya pabor o laban sa iyo sa anumang hukuman dito sa Pilipinas. Ikalawa,
karapatan mong magkaroon ng pili at sarili mong abogado habang ikaw ay aking tinatanong.

Kung ikaw ay walang pambayad ng abogado, ikaw ay bibigyan ng gobyerno ng abogado na

wala kang aalalahaning anumang kabayaran. Ikatlo, karapatan mong malaman at
mapagpaliwanagan ng mga karapatan mong ito.TANONG: Nauunawaan mo ba ang mga
karapatan mong ito?SAGOT:
Opo.TANONG: Mayroon ka bang abogado na naririto sa
ngayon upang ikaw ay patnubayan?SAGOT:
Wala po pero ako ay nakahandang magbigay
ng salaysay kahit na wala akong nakaharap na abogado.TANONG: G. Itaas, ayon din sa
batas, ang pagsusuko ng mga karapatan ay kailangan ding pagtibayin sa harap ng isang
abogado, nakahanda ka bang magsuko ng iyong mga karapatan sa harap ng isang abogado na
bigay sa iyo ng gobyerno?SAGOT:
Opo. Nakahanda po ako.TANONG: Nakahanda ka rin
bang lumagda sa isang pagpapatunay na ikaw ay napagpaliwanagan ng iyong mga karapatan
at nauunawaan mo naman ang mga karapatan mong ito?SAGOT:
Opo.[34]Also, the
pertinent portion of his (Itaas) supplemental written statement dated August 30, 1989 is quoted
hereunder, to wit:PALIWANAG:
G. Itaas, ang pagsisiyasat na ito ay may kinalaman pa rin
sa pagkaka-ambush at pagpatay kay U.S. Colonel James Rowe. Tulad sa nauna mong
pagbibigay ng salaysay, ipinaalala ko sa iyo na muli ang iyong mga karapatang manahimik,
magkaroon ng pili at sariling abogado at karapatang mapagpaliwanagan ng mga karapatan
mong ito. Nauunawaan mo ba ang mga karapatan mong ito?SAGOT:
Opo.TANONG:
Nakahanda ka pa rin bang magbigay ng salaysay at ipapatuloy ang pagbibigay mo ng
salaysay?SAGOT:
Opo.TANONG: Nakahanda ka bang lumagdang muli ng isang
pagpapatunay na ikaw ay napagpaliwanagan ng iyong mga karapatan at handa ka ring isuko
ang mga karapatan mo?SAGOT:
Opo.[35]We have consistently declared in a string of cases
that the advice or Paliwanag found at the beginning of extrajudicial confessions that merely
enumerate to the accused his custodial rights do not meet the standard provided by law. They
are terse and perfunctory statements that do not evince a clear and sufficient effort to inform
and explain to the appellant his constitutional rights.[36] We emphasized that when the
constitution requires a person under investigation "to be informed" of his rights to remain silent
and to have an independent and competent counsel preferably of his own choice, it must be
presumed to contemplate the transmission of meaningful information rather than just the
ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle.[37] In other words,
the right of a person under investigation "to be informed" implies a correlative obligation on the
part of the police investigator to explain, and contemplates an effective communication that
results in understanding of what is conveyed. Short of this, there is a denial of the right.[38]In
the case of People vs. Jara,[39] we declared that:"This stereotyped "advice" appearing in
practically all extrajudicial confessions which are later repudiated has assumed the nature of a
"legal form" or model. Police investigators either automatically type it together with the curt
"Opo" as the answer or ask the accused to sign it or even copy it in their own handwriting. Its
tired, punctilious, fixed, and artificially stately style does not create an impression of
voluntariness or even understanding on the part of the accused. The showing of a
spontaneous, free, and unconstrained giving up of a right is missing."It must be noted however,
that far from being a mere enumeration of the custodial rights of an accused, the aforequoted
portions ("Paliwanag") of the written statements contain an explanation as to the nature of the
investigation that is, regarding the respective participations of the appellants in the ambush on
April 21, 1989 that resulted in the killing of U.S. Col. James Rowe while seriously wounding his
driver, Joaquin Vinuya. They also include an advice that the appellants may choose not to give

any statement to the investigator and a warning that any statement obtained from the appellants
may be used in favor or against them in court. In addition, they contain an advice that the
appellants may engage the services of a lawyer of their own choice. If they cannot afford the
services of a lawyer, they will be provided with one by the government for free. Thereafter, both
appellants manifested to CIS Investigator Virgilio Pablico their intentions to give their statements
even in the absence of counsel.Despite the manifestations of the appellants, Investigator
Pablico requested for the legal services of Atty. Bonifacio Manansala to act as counsel for
appellant Continente and Atty. Felimon Corpuz for appellant Itaas. Significantly, Investigator
Pablico disclosed that appellant Continente conferred with Atty. Manansala in his presence for
about half an hour before the investigation started.[40] Nevertheless, the appellant (Continente)
maintained his decision to give a statement even in the absence of counsel. As proof thereof,
the appellant signed[41] the "Pagpapatunay" that contains an express waiver of his
constitutional rights in the presence of Atty. Manansala who also signed the same as counsel of
the appellant.With respect to appellant Itaas, Atty. Felimon Corpuz testified that his legal
services were requested on two (2) occasions to act as counsel for appellant Itaas after the
latter purportedly manifested his intention to waive his rights to remain silent and to counsel
during the investigation. Atty. Corpuz stated that he conferred with the appellant before the
investigations and explained to him his rights under the constitution and the consequences of
waiving said rights. After the explanation, appellant Itaas decided to sign the "Pagpapatunay",
which are entirely written in Tagalog, a dialect which he understands, in his written confessions
respectively dated August 29, 1989 and August 30, 1989 stating that his constitutional rights to
remain silent and to counsel were explained to him; that he fully understood the same; and that
he was willing to give a written confession even without the assistance of counsel.[42]Appellants
Donato Continente and Juanito Itaas likewise impugn their respective written statements. They
allege that the statements appearing therein were supplied by the CIS investigator. CIS
Investigator Pablico however, categorically denied on rebuttal the allegations of the appellants.
Pablico disclosed that during his investigations of the appellants on separate occasions he
simultaneously typewrote his questions to the appellants including their answers thereto which
are done entirely in Tagalog, thus leaving no room for Pablico to fabricate an answer. After the
investigation, he allowed the appellants to read their respective confessions,[43] a fact that was
admitted by appellant Continente.[44] Thereafter, the appellants voluntarily affixed their
signatures on every page of their written confessions.On July 18, 1989 appellant Continente
appeared before City Prosecutor Galicano of Quezon City and affirmed under oath the truth of
his statements by affixing his signature on the left hand portion of every page of his written
confession.[45] Likewise, appellant Itaas, accompanied by Atty. Corpuz, affirmed under oath the
truth of his statements in his written confessions by affixing his signature on every page thereof
before the administering officer.[46]In a desperate attempt to cast doubt on the voluntariness of
his confessions, appellant Continente claims that he was under pressure to read entirely his
written confession before he affixed his signature thereon. The unsubstantiated claim of the
appellant is belied by his own admission that he was treated fairly during the investigation, thus:
Court:
Proceed.Q: Now, Mr. Witness, since the time you were arrested on June 16, 1989
until this time, you said you were staying in Camp Crame, am I correct?A: Yes, sir.Q: And
from the time you were arrested up to this time, you were never harmed by anybody in Camp
Crame, that is also correct?A: No, sir.Q: In fact, from the time you were arrested when that

blindfold was removed, you were treated fairly, am I correct?A: Yes, sir.[47]There is also no
basis to support the claim of appellant Itaas that he was tortured into giving a confession and
was threatened by the CIS agents to admit the truth of the same before the administering
officer. This Court held that where the appellants did not present evidence of compulsion or
duress or violence on their persons; where they failed to complain to the officers who
administered the oaths; where they did not institute any criminal or administrative action against
their alleged intimidators for maltreatment; where there appeared to be no marks of violence on
their bodies and where they did not have themselves examined by a reputable physician to
buttress their claim, all these should be considered as factors indicating voluntariness of
confessions.[48]It has been established by the evidence that Atty. Filemon Corpuz was present
during both occasions that appellant Itaas was being investigated by Investigator Virgilio Pablico
in Camp Crame and even accompanied the said appellant before the administering officer.
Appellant Itaas did not present any evidence in court to buttress his bare claim despite the fact
that a doctor was summoned for his check up immediately upon his arrival in Manila after he
was previously arrested in Davao City.[49] He did not complain to the administering officer about
the threats and torture he allegedly suffered in the hands of the CIS agents. Neither did he file
any criminal nor administrative complaint against said agents for maltreatment. The failure of
the appellant to complain to the swearing officer or to file charges against the persons who
allegedly maltreated him, although he had all the chances to do so, manifests voluntariness in
the execution of his confessions.[50] To hold otherwise is to facilitate the retraction of his
solemnly made statements at the mere allegation of torture, without any proof whatsoever.[51]
The Court also notes that the respective written confessions of appellants are replete with
details which could be supplied only by someone in the know so to speak.[52] They reflect
spontaneity and coherence which psychologically cannot be associated with a mind to which
violence and torture have been applied.[53]In particular, appellant Juanito Itaas admitted in his
written confession[54] dated August 29, 1989 that he was an active member of the New
People's Army (NPA) and performed different functions mainly in the province of Davao; that he
was one of the two other members of the NPA who were sent to Manila sometime in March
1989; that appellant stayed in Merville, Paranaque before moving to an apartment in Santolan,
Pasig together with certain Vicky and her husband Ronnie, Onie, Bosyo and Bernie; that one
day before the ambush on Col. Rowe he (Itaas) was told by Ronnie to take part in a major
operation by the NPA; that he (Itaas) was not informed by Ronnie about the identity of their
supposed target; that on the following day, Ronnie and the appellant boarded a dark brown
Toyota car together with certain Edgar and James; that he (Itaas) was seated directly behind the
driver beside Edgar and James while Ronnie sat beside the driver; that they were armed with
M-16 rifles while Ronnie was armed with an ultimax; that after several minutes their car reached
a junction (circle) and was running alongside a dark gray car; that he fired automatic shots
toward the dark gray car only after his companions started firing at the said car; and that after
the ambush they drove back to their apartment in Santolan, Pasig while they were being
followed by a back up car allegedly being occupied by certain Liway, Fred and Eddie. Appellant
Itaas also identified in his written confession[55] dated August 30, 1989 the gray Mitsubishi car
that they ambushed on April 21, 1989 and the car that they used on the same date of ambush.
On the other hand, the written statement[56] dated June 17, 1989 of appellant Donato
Continente reveals that he had been a member of several revolutionary groups before

becoming a full fledged member of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) under the
Political Assassination Team (PAT) headed by a certain Kit; that the objective of their team was
primarily to conduct surveillance on foreigners and diplomats; that he did not know Col. James
Rowe prior to the shooting incident on April 21, 1989; that his participation in the ambush was
merely for having conducted a surveillance of the vicinity of the JUSMAG in Tomas Morato
Avenue in Quezon City; that he gathered certain data, specifically: the number of people and
volume of vehicles around the area, the measurement of the streets, as well as the distance of
the JUSMAG Compound from Tomas Morato Avenue; that his surveillance activity was
continued by certain Freddie Abella and Taddy who are also members of the PAT; and that he
came to know the identity of the victim of the ambush on April 21, 1989, through Freddie Abella
who informed him two days after the incident.Appellants Continente and Itaas may not validly
repudiate the counsels who rendered them legal assistance during their respective
investigations as biased and incompetent. It must be emphasized that both appellants never
signified their desire to have lawyers of their own choice. In any case, it has been ruled that
while the initial choice of the lawyer in cases where a person under custodial investigation
cannot afford the services of the lawyer is naturally lodged in the police investigators, the
accused really has the final choice as he may reject the counsel chosen for him and ask for
another one. A lawyer provided by the investigators is deemed engaged by the accused where
he never raised any objection against the former's appointment during the course of the
investigation and the accused thereafter subscribes to the veracity of his statement before the
swearing officer.[57]If Atty. Manansala and Atty. Corpuz decided against advising the appellants
not to give their statements involving the ambush, the said lawyers were merely complying with
their oaths to abide by the truth. The counsel should never prevent an accused from freely and
voluntarily telling the truth.[58] Whether it is an extrajudicial statement or testimony in open
court, the purpose is always the ascertainment of truth.[59] What is sought to be protected with
the constitutional right to counsel is the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts. The right
is guaranteed merely to preclude the slightest coercion as would lead the accused to admit
something false, not to provide him with the best defense.[60]We agree with the trial court's
observation that the retention by appellant Continente of Atty. Bonifacio Manansala as his
counsel until the early stages of his case in the lower court and his subsequent decision to
engage the legal services of Atty. Manansala's relative, Atty. Ceferino Manansala, who
represented the said appellant throughout the proceedings in the absence of the former
bespeaks of the trust he had for the said lawyer. On the other hand, while it is admitted that
Atty. Felimon Corpuz served in the military as prosecutor in the Efficiency and Separation Board
of the armed forces, such fact is not sufficient to adjudge the said lawyer as biased against the
appellant (Itaas) in the absence of any concrete evidence to that effect. The defense also failed
to adduce substantial evidence to support a finding that Atty. Corpuz was short of being a
vigilant and effective counsel for the said appellant.Moreover, the testimony of prosecution
eyewitness Meriam Zulueta confirms to a large extent the statements made by the appellants in
their written confessions. Zulueta positively identified appellant Juanito Itaas as among the
persons on board a car, directly behind the driver, whose body was half exposed, while firing at
the car of Col. James Rowe at the corner of Tomas Morato Street and Timog Avenue in Quezon
City. She also testified that she had seen appellant Donato Continente on at least three (3)
occasions at the carinderia outside the JUSMAG compound. She mistook appellant Continente

for a tricycle driver on April 17, 1989 while the latter was simply walking around the premises.
The second and third encounters with the appellant (Continente) took place on April 18 and 19,
1989 while the said appellant was standing inside the same carinderia.The defense assails the
propriety of the pre-trial identification by Meriam Zulueta of appellants Donato Continente and
Juanito Itaas as pointedly suggestive. However, there is no sufficient evidence on record to
show that the appellants were previously indicated by the CIS investigators to Zulueta that they
were the perpetrators of the crime.[61] Besides, a police line-up is not essential to a proper
identification of the appellants.[62]The defense for appellant Itaas further argues that the socalled "positive identification" of appellant Itaas by Meriam Zulueta cannot be considered
reliable inasmuch as the same was based on a fleeting glimpse of a stranger. To support its
argument, the defense cited cases[63] where the Court rejected the testimonies of prosecution
eyewitnesses for not being credible, such as: where the identification of a stranger is based
upon a single brief observation made during a startling occurrence; where the testimony of the
witness defies human nature and reason; where there are serious inconsistencies and glaring
omissions in the testimony of the eyewitness; and where the witness only identified the suspect
after he was arrested and the witness was informed by the police that the suspect was one of
the killers.It should be pointed out that the above rulings of the Court are based on the
circumstances peculiar to each of the abovecited cases that do not exactly obtain in the cases
at bench. It is accepted legal precept that persons react differently to a given situation.[64] In
the same way, certain witnesses to an unfolding crime may run or scamper to safety while
others would remain transfixed and strive to identify the perpetrators thereof. As found by the
trial court, Zulueta testified in an honest and straightforward manner that she was about to cross
the Tomas Morato Street on her way to the JUSMAG Compound in Quezon City to attend a
practicum in the JUSMAG Mess Hall when she heard several gunshots. Upon looking at the
direction where the gunshots emanated, she saw persons on board a maroon car firing at a
gray car. Zulueta returned to the sidewalk to seek for cover but could not find any so she
docked and covered her head with her bag while continuously looking at the persons who were
firing at the gray car. In acting the way she did, Meriam Zulueta was merely reacting naturally to
the crime that was unfolding before her. And while the shooting incident lasted for only about
five (5) seconds, that was all that Zulueta needed under the situation to recognize appellant
Itaas whose body was incidentally half exposed.The testimony of Meriam Zulueta does not
suffer from any serious and material contradictions that can detract from her credibility. The trial
court accorded full faith and credence to her said testimony. The defense failed to adduce any
evidence to establish any improper motive that may have impelled the same witness to falsely
testify against the appellants. It is well-settled rule that the evaluation of the testimonies of
witnesses by the trial court is received on appeal with the highest respect because such court
has the direct opportunity to observe the witnesses on the stand and determine if they are telling
the truth or not.[65]Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides:ART. 248.
Murder.-- Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246 shall kill another, shall
be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death if committed with any
of the following attendant circumstances:1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior
strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense or means or
persons to insure or afford impunity.2. In consideration of a price, reward or promise.3. By
means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel, derailment or

assault upon a railroad, fall of an airship, or by means of motor vehicles, or with the use of any
other means involving great waste and ruin.4. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated
in the preceding paragraph, or of an earthquake, eruption of a volcano, destructive cyclone,
epidemic or other public calamity.5. With evident premeditation.6. With cruelty, by deliberately
and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim, or outraging or scoffing at his person or
corpse."The trial court erroneously found that the appellants allegedly conspired in the
commission of the crimes charged in the instant criminal cases. While it is clear that the
appellants did not even know each other, the lower court opined that the Alex Boncayao Brigade
is such a large organization that there is great likelihood that the participants of the various
stages of the crime are unknown to each other. To justify its position, it cited the ruling in the
case of People vs. Geronimo[66], thus:When the defendants by their acts aimed at the same
object, one performing one part and the other performing another part as to complete it, with a
view to the attainment of the same object, and their acts, though apparently independent, were
in fact concerted and cooperative, indicating closeness of personal associations, concerted
action and concurrence of sentiments, the Court will be justified in concluding that said
defendants were engaged in a conspiracy.We disagree. Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code
provides that a conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning
the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. To prove conspiracy, the prosecution must
establish the following three (3) requisites: (1) that two or more persons come to an agreement;
(2) that the agreement concerned the commission of a crime; and (3) that the execution of the
felony was decided upon.[67] While conspiracy must be proven just like any criminal accusation,
that is, independently and beyond reasonable doubt,[68] the same need not be proved by direct
evidence and may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during, and after the
commission of the crime.[69]The case against appellant Donato Continente is primarily
anchored on the written statement[70] that he gave during the investigation of these cases. The
pertinent portions of his written statements are quoted hereunder, to wit:T: Ikaw ba'y naging
full fledged member ng Partido?S: Nito pong Oktubre 1988.T: Sino naman ang iyong
kinikilalang puno sa inyong Partido?S: Ganito po iyon. Mayroon kaming sariling grupo na kung
tawagin ay PAT. Ang ibig sabihin nito ay POLITICAL ASSASSINATION TEAM. Ang aming puno
ay tinatawag naming PO o Political Officer. Ang susunod sa kanya ay ang TL o Team Leader;
tapos po ay ang Vice Team Leader; at mga miembro na nagsasagawa ng activities tulad ng
gawaing edukasyon, surveillance at intelligence.x x
xT: Ano ang mga
alam mong objectives ng inyong team?S: , Ang mga objectives po namin ay magsagawa ng
surveillance sa mga foreigner o diplomat. Kinukuha namin ang plate number ng kanilang mga
sasakyan, make, model at kulay nito at ito ay aming tinitipon.x x
xT:
Nakikilala mo ba itong si Col. James Rowe ng U.S. Army na nagtrabaho sa JUSMAG?S:
Nakilala ko po lamang siya ng mapabalitang patay siya sa ambush sa may malapit sa JUSMAG
noong buwan ng Abril 1989.x x
xT: Ano ang iyong naging partisipasyon
sa pagkakapatay nitong si Col. Rowe?S: Surveillance po lamang ang aking naging papel dito.
T: Paano mo naman isinagawa itong pag-surveillance kay Colonel Rowe?S: Nagpunta po
ako sa area ng JUSMAG doon sa Tomas Morato Avenue, Q. C. at nagmanman doon tungkol sa
dami ng tao at sasakyang dumadaan tuwing tanghali. Inalaman ko din ang lawak ng kalsada at
layo ng Timog Avenue sa gate ng JUSMAG. Sa report ko ay sinabi ko na mga anim (6) na
hakbang ang luwag ng Tomas Morato Avenue, madalang ang daan ng tao at sasakyan at ang

layo ng Timog Avenue sa gate ng JUSMAG ay may tatlong poste o apat na poste lamang.T:
Ang pagrereport mo bang ito ay ginawa mo ng verbal lamang?S: Verbal lamang po.T:
Kanino ka naman nagreport?S: Kay Ka Freddie Abella po.x x
xT:
Bakit mo natiyak na ang ABB ang nagsagawa ng pag-ambush kay Colonel Rowe?S:
Dalawang (2) araw po matapos ang pag-ambush kay Col. Rowe ay nagkita kaming dalawa ni
Freddie sa aming bahay. Sa pagkikita naming iyon ay ikinuwento niya sa akin ang mga
pangyayari. xxxIt should be emphasized that conspirators are the authors of the crime, being
the ones who decide that a crime should be committed. Strictly speaking, a person may not be
considered a conspirator by his mere subsequent assent or cooperation in the commission of a
crime absent a clear showing, either directly or by circumstantial evidence, that he participated
in the decision to commit the same;[71] in which case, his culpability will be judged based on the
extent of his participation in the commission of the crime.In the case at bench, appellant Donato
Continente is liable for the crimes charged in these criminal cases only as an accomplice under
Article 18 of the Revised Penal Code. In order that a person may be considered an accomplice
in the commission of a criminal offense, the following requisites must concur: (a) community of
design, i.e., knowing the criminal design of the principal by direct participation, he concurs with
the latter in his purpose; (b) he cooperates in the execution of the offense by previous or
simultaneous acts; and (c) there must be a relation between the acts done by the principal and
those attributed to the person charged as accomplice.[72]The prosecution failed to establish,
either directly or by circumstantial evidence, that appellant Donato Continente was privy to any
conspiracy to carry out the ambush on Col. James Rowe and his driver on that fateful morning
of April 21, 1989. The evidence adduced disclose that the participation of appellant Continente
was made only after the plan or decision to ambush Col. Rowe was already a fait accompli.
Continente was merely assigned to the vicinity of the JUSMAG Compound in Tomas Morato
Street, Quezon City, before the shooting incident to gather certain data, specifically the number
of people and volume of vehicles in the area, the measurement of the streets, and the distance
of the JUSMAG Compound from Tomas Morato Street. Subsequently, Continente reported his
findings to Freddie Abella and that thereafter the latter had taken over the activity. Significantly,
appellant Continente was not even present at the scene of the crime on April 21, 1989.The error
of the trial court in its appreciation of appellant Continente's participation in the crimes charged
lies in its apparent confusion regarding the distinction between a conspirator and an accomplice.
In view of its effect on the liability of appellant Continente, the distinction between the two
concepts as laid down by this Court in the case of People vs. de Vera, et al.[73] needs to be
reiterated, thus:Conspirators and accomplices have one thing in common: they know and agree
with the criminal design. Conspirators, however, know the criminal intention because they
themselves have decided upon such course of action. Accomplices come to know about it after
the principals have reached the decision, and only then do they agree to cooperate in its
execution. Conspirators decide that a crime should be committed; accomplices merely concur
in it. Accomplices do not decide whether the crime should be committed; they merely assent to
the plan and cooperate in its accomplishment. Conspirators are the authors of the crime;
accomplices are merely their instruments who perform acts not essential to the perpetration of
the offense.With respect to appellant Juanito Itaas, however, the trial court correctly found that
the evidence against him which consist of his written confession and the straightforward and
credible testimony of prosecution eyewitness Meriam Zulueta, even if taken independently, are

sufficient to convict him. Appellant Itaas categorically admitted in his written confession that he
and his companions fired at the gray Mitsubishi car of Col. James Rowe at the corner of Timog
Avenue and Tomas Morato Street in Quezon City. Moreover, prosecution witness Meriam
Zulueta positively identified appellant Itaas as one of the persons she saw on board a car who
fired at a gray car at the same time and place where Col. Rowe and his driver were ambushed.
The shooting of Col. James Rowe and his driver, Joaquin Vinuya, was attended by treachery.
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against person, employing
means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and especially to ensure
its execution, without risk to himself arising from any defense which the offended party might
make.[74] The evidence clearly shows that the mode of execution was deliberately adopted by
the perpetrators to ensure the commission of the crime without the least danger unto
themselves arising from the possible resistance of their victims. Appellant Itaas and his
companions, who were all armed with powerful firearms, waited for the car of Col. Rowe which
was being driven by Joaquin Vinuya at the corner of Timog Avenue and Tomas Morato Street in
Quezon City. Without any warning, appellant Itaas and his companions suddenly fired at the
said car upon reaching the said place. Hence, the crime committed for the killing of Col. James
Rowe during the said ambush is murder.With respect to the liability of appellant Itaas for the
wounding of Joaquin Vinuya, it appears that the said victim sustained injuries on his scalp, on
the left shoulder and on the back portion of the left hand from the ambush. Under Article 6 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended, a felony is frustrated when the offender performs all the
acts of execution which would produce the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do
not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator. The evidence
adduced by the prosecution, particularly the opinion of Dr. Jose Santiago in his testimony, is not
sufficient to establish the crime of frustrated murder. This Court notes that the wounds
sustained by the victim are not fatal wounds but merely superficial wounds.[75] The records
disclose that Joaquin Vinuya managed to drive the car of Col. Rowe toward the JUSMAG
Compound which is 200 meters away from the site of the ambush.[76] It also appears that
Vinuya was treated for his wounds for only four (4) days at the Clark Air Base Hospital in
Pampanga after which he was brought back to the JUSMAG Compound in Quezon City to
recuperate. Hence, the crime committed as against him is only attempted murder.In view of the
foregoing, appellant Juanito Itaas should be held liable for the crimes of murder and attempted
murder for his direct participation in the killing of Col. James Rowe and in the wounding of his
driver Joaquin Vinuya, respectively. Due to the absence of any mitigating nor aggravating
circumstance in both cases, the penalty to be imposed on appellant Itaas is reclusion perpetua
for the murder of Col. James Rowe and the medium period of prision mayor for the attempt on
the life of Joaquin Vinuya. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law in the latter case, the
maximum of the penalty to be imposed on appellant Itaas is the medium period of prision mayor
and the minimum shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the
Revised Penal Code for the offense, that is, prision correccional.On the other hand, being an
accomplice to the crimes of murder and attempted murder, the penalty to be imposed on
appellant Donato Continente shall be the medium periods of reclusion temporal and prision
correccional, respectively. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law in both cases, the
maximum of the penalty to be imposed on appellant Continente as an accomplice to the crime
of murder is the medium period of reclusion temporal and the minimum shall be prision mayor,

while the maximum of the penalty to be imposed on the said appellant as an accomplice to the
crime of attempted murder is the medium period of prision correccional and the minimum shall
be arresto mayor.WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 88,
in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-89-4843 and Q-89-4844 is hereby MODIFIED, as follows:In Criminal
Case No. Q-89-4843, appellants Juanito Itaas and Donato Continente are found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder, as principal and as accomplice, respectively.
Appellant Itaas, as principal, is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment of reclusion perpetua.
Appellant Continente as accomplice, is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment for twelve (12)
years of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion
temporal, as maximum. Both appellants Itaas and Continente are ORDERED to pay jointly and
severally the amount of P50,000.00 to the heirs of the victim, Col. James Rowe, by way of civil
indemnity.In Criminal Case No. Q-89-4844, appellants Juanito Itaas and Donato Continente are
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of attempted murder, as principal and as
accomplice, respectively. Appellant Itaas, as principal, is hereby sentenced to suffer
imprisonment for six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to nine (9) years and six (6)
months of prision mayor, as maximum. Appellant Continente, as accomplice, is hereby
sentenced to suffer imprisonment of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two (2)
years and four (4) months of prision correccional, as maximum.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------37.THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, - versus - MILLANO MUIT, SERGIO
PANCHO, JR., EDUARDO, HERMANO ALIAS BOBBY REYES, ROLANDO DEQUILLO,
ROMEO PANCHO, and JOSEPH FERRAER, Appellants. G.R. No. 181043 October 8, 2008
D E C I S I O N Tinga, J.: Millano Muit y Munoz (Muit), Sergio Pancho y Cagumoc, Jr. (Pancho,
Jr.), Rolando Dequillo y Tampos (Dequillo), Romeo Pancho (Romeo), Eduardo Eddie Hermano
alias Bobby Reyes alias Eddie Reyes (Hermano), and Joseph Ferraer (Ferraer) were
charged withkidnapping for ransom with homicide[1] and carnapping[2] in two separate
informations. Only Muit, Pancho Jr., Dequillo, Romeo, and Ferraer were arrested and stood trial.
However, Ferraer was discharged from the criminal cases by the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
and was utilized as a state witness.[3] All appellants pleaded not guilty during their
arraignments.
The facts as culled from the records are as follows:
In the
afternoon of 11 November 1997, Orestes Julaton, (Julaton), a relative of Ferraer, arrived at the
latters house in Kaylaway, Nasugbu, Batangas with Sergio Pancho, Sr. (Pancho, Sr.), Pancho,
Jr., Dequillo and four other men on board a gray Mitsubishi car with plate number PSV-818.
Julaton introduced them to Ferraer and told the latter that Pancho, Sr. is also their relative.
Pancho, Sr. told Ferraer that they wanted to use his house as a safehouse for their visitor.
Ferraer was hesitant at first as he thought it was risky for him and his family. Hermano told
Ferraer not to worry because they are not killers; their line of work is kidnap for ransom.
Ferraer was assured that the money they will get would be shared equally among them.
Ferraer and Pancho, Sr. would guard their victim. Later, five other men came and they were
introduced to Ferraer as Muit, Morales, alias Tony, alias David and alias Puri. They had dinner
and chatted until midnight. That evening, Morales handed to Ferraer for safekeeping a folded
carton wrapped with masking tape contained in a big paper bag, and a green backpack.
Hermano told Ferraer that the package contained guns. Ferraer brought the package inside his
room; he inspected the contents before placing them under the bed, and saw that the carton

contained a shotgun and the green backpack, an Ingram folding. Morales and Udon also
showed him their .45 caliber guns tucked at their waists.[4] At one oclock in the afternoon of 24
November 1997, Ferraer saw Pancho, Jr., and Hermano with a companion, seated under the
tree in front of his house. Pancho, Jr. introduced their companion as Romeo. They informed
Ferraer that the following day, they would proceed with their plan. Romeo would be the
informant since he is an insider and a trusted general foreman of the victim. The next day, at
nine oclock in the morning, Pancho, Sr. arrived at Ferraers house alone and asked Ferraer if
he was already informed of the plan. Ferraer replied in the affirmative. Pancho, Sr. told him to
wait for the groups return. However, the group returned without the intended victim because the
latter did not show up at the construction site.[5] On 2 December 1997, the group received a call
from Romeo informing them that the victim was already at the construction site. Hermano,
Morales, Udon, Manuel, Bokbok, and Muit commuted to the construction site at Barangay
Darasa, Tanauan, Batangas. Pancho, Jr. was on board the Mitsubishi car as back-up.
At
around two oclock in the afternoon of the same date, 2 December 1997, Roger Seraspe
(Seraspe), the personal driver of the victim, drove a blue Pajero with plate number UDL-746
carrying Engr. Ruth Roldan and the victim to visit the Flexopac project site at Barangay Darasa,
Tanauan, Batangas. At the site, Engr. Roldan and the victim alighted from the Pajero and, along
with Engr. Ed dela Cruz, toured the construction site. Seraspe talked with Armand Chavez
(Chavez), the warehouseman of ILO Construction, while waiting for his boss.[6]
After the
site inspection, the three engineers walked towards the direction of the Pajero. Seraspe was
surprised to see that the three engineers who stood together suddenly lay prostrate on the
ground. Seraspe and Chavez saw an unidentified man standing near the three engineers.
Three more armed men surrounded the Pajero. Two of them approached Seraspe and Chavez.
One of the armed men, Muit, poked a gun at Seraspe and ordered him and Chavez to lay
prostrate on the ground.[7] The assailants dragged the victim towards the Pajero. They forced
the victim to order Seraspe to give them the keys to the Pajero. When the victim was already on
board the Pajero, Seraspe heard one of them say, Sarge, nandito na ang ating pakay.[8]
They then started the Pajero and drove away, passing through the Pag-asa Road gate. Two
more persons who were waiting at the Pag-asa road boarded the Pajero.[9]
At 2:30 that
same afternoon, Lipa City Deputy Chief of Police, Supt. Arcadio Mission (Supt. Mission)
received a radio message from the Tanauan Police Station that a kidnapping was ongoing and
the kidnappers on board a Pajero with plate number UDL-746 were heading towards Lipa City.
Supt. Mission immediately ordered the police posted near the Lipa City bus stop to put up a
barricade. In the meantime, two teams were organized to intercept the Pajero. They proceeded
to the barricade.[10]
Right after Supt. Mission and the teams arrived at the barricade, the
Pajero was spotted. When policemen flagged down the Pajero, the driver stopped the vehicle.
While two policemen approached the Pajero, the driver and front passenger opened their car
doors and started firing at the policemen. At this point, all the policemen present at the scene
fired back. The cross-fire lasted for around four minutes. All the occupants of the Pajero, except
the driver and the front passenger who managed to escape, died. SPO1 Rolando Cariaga
apprehended one of the escapees who turned out to be Muit, the driver of the Pajero, at
Barangay San Carlos, Batangas, about 200 meters from the place of the shootout.[11] On the
other hand, after the assailants carried their plan into action, Pancho, Jr. proceeded to their
agreed meeting place but did not find Hermanos group there. Pancho, Jr. waited along the

highway in front of the construction site. He thought that he had been left behind when he did
not see the group, so he left. When Pancho, Jr. returned to Ferraers house, he told Ferraer
what happened to their operation. Worried that something bad might have happened to the
group, Pancho, Jr. went back and looked for the rest of his group. Pancho, Jr. came back alone.
At around 5:30 in the morning of 3 December 1997, Ferraer saw Pancho, Sr. and Pancho, Jr.
watching the TV program Alas Singko y Medya. He joined them and saw on the news the
Pajero riddled with bullets. Pancho, Sr. and Pancho, Jr. left Ferraers house at around 9:00 in
the morning and they also left behind the Mitsubishi car they used. That night, Ferraer saw
on the news program TV Patrol a footage showing the cadavers of Udon, Morales, Manuel,
Bokbok and the victim, and the Pajero riddled with bullets. Ferraer also saw Muit in handcuffs.
The prosecution presented Ignacio Ong, Sr., the father of the victim Engr. Ignacio Ong, Jr.;
Seraspe; Chavez; Dr. Anthony Llamas, the PNP Medico-Legal Officer who conducted the
autopsy; Supt. Mission, Ferraer, as the state witness; and Atty. Narzal Mallare[12] (Atty.
Mallare), the lawyer who assisted appellants Pancho, Jr. and Dequillo in executing their
respective sworn statements as witnesses. Their accounts were corroborated by the
prosecutions documentary evidence such as the extra judicial confessions of Pancho, Jr. and
Dequillo, which were executed with the assistance of Atty. Mallare. Muit executed two extra
judicial confessions: the first statement was dated 4 December 1997, in which he was assisted
by Atty. Ernesto Vergara, and the second statement was dated 7 December 1997 in which he
was assisted by Atty. Solomon De Jesus and witnessed by his uncle, Bonifacio Muit (Bonifacio),
and his brother, Dominador Muit (Dominador). On the other hand, the defense presented
appellants Dequillo, Pancho, Jr.,
and Muit. Dequillo, for his part, claimed that for the period of
November to December 1997 he was working as a mason at Villanueva Construction in BF
Homes. His work starts at 8:00 in the morning and ends at 5:00 in the afternoon. He stated
that on 8 December 1997, he was arrested by the CIDG at his house in Purok Sto. Domingo,
Barangay Holy Spirit, Quezon City. At the CIDG Detention Center, he was questioned about the
guns used in the kidnapping of the victim. He was allegedly tortured when he denied any
knowledge about the kidnapping and was forced to sign a statement without being allowed to
read it. Atty. Mallare only came in after he had already signed the statement. He denied any
participation in the crimes charged against him.[13] Pancho, Jr. claimed that he was arrested on
7 December 1997 in Calbayog, Samar. He was first brought to the Calbayog City Police Station,
and then transferred to Camp Crame. He alleged that the police tortured him and forced him to
sign the written confession of his participation in the crimes. He denied having participated in
the commission of the offenses charged against him.[14] On the other hand, Muit claimed that
on 2 December 1997 he was in Lipa City, near the place of the shootout. He had just attended a
gathering of the Rizalistas and was waiting for his uncle Bonifacio when the police arrested him.
He denied having any knowledge of the crime. He denied knowing the people whose name
appeared in his two extra judicial confessions. He claimed that the names were supplied by the
police and that he was not assisted by counsel during the custodial investigation.[15]
In
a decision[16] dated 22 November 2002, the RTC, Branch 83 of Tanauan City, Batangas found
Muit, Pancho, Jr., Dequillo, and Romeo guilty.[17] Only the cases involving the charges of
carnapping and kidnapping for ransom which resulted in the death of the victim were
automatically appealed to this Court. The RTC held that mere denials and alibis of appellants
cannot prevail over the positive declarations of the prosecutions witnesses. It found the

prosecutions witnesses more credible than appellants, whose self-serving statements were
obviously intended to exculpate themselves from criminal liability. The RTC did not give
credence to the claims of appellants that their extra judicial confessions were procured through
torture as these were belied by the testimony of Atty. Mallare and appellants medical certificates
which were issued during their incarceration and after the execution of their statements. And the
RTC noted that even without appellants extra judicial confessions, there was still sufficient
evidence on record to hold them guilty. In a resolution dated 17 January 2006, the Court
referred the case to the Court of Appeals for intermediate review.[18]The Court of Appeals in a
decision[19] dated 31 August 2007 affirmed the decision of the RTC.[20] The appellate court
held that the RTC was correct in convicting appellants for kidnapping and carnapping. The
prosecution was able to prove through Ferraer that appellants conspired with one another in the
planning and execution of their plan to kidnap the victim. Moreover, appellants executed extra
judicial confessions, duly assisted by their counsels, detailing their participation in the
kidnapping. As for Muit, other than his extra judicial confession, he was also positively identified
during the kidnapping by eyewitnesses Seraspe and Chavez. Appellants filed their notices of
appeal with the Court of Appeals. Before this Court, appellants opted not to file supplemental
briefs, and instead adopted the assignment of errors in their respective original briefs.[21] Taken
together, appellants claim that: (i) the RTC erred in finding them guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the charges against them; (ii) the RTC erred in its finding that they acted in conspiracy in the
commission of the crimes charged against them; and (iii) the RTC erred in giving credence to
the extra-judicial confessions of Pancho, Jr. and Dequillo, and to the sworn statement and
testimony of Ferraer in convicting them.[22] The appeals are bereft of merit.
The
elements of the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention[23] are the following: (a) the
accused is a private individual; (b) the accused kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner
deprives the latter of his liberty; (c) the act of detention or kidnapping is illegal; and (d) in the
commission of the offense, any of the four circumstances mentioned in Article 267 is present.
The essence of the crime of kidnapping is the actual deprivation of the victims liberty, coupled
with indubitable proof of intent of the accused to effect the same.[24] The totality of the
prosecutions evidence in this case established the commission of kidnapping for ransom with
homicide. On the other hand, Republic Act No. 6539, or the Anti-Carnapping Act, as amended,
defines carnapping as the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another
without the latters consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by
using force upon things.[25] The crime was committed in this case when the victims Pajero
was forcibly taken away from him contemporaneously with his kidnapping at the construction
site. The kidnapping for ransom with homicide and the carnapping were established by the
direct testimony of Ferraer, Seraspe and Chavez. Ferraer testified on how the group
approached and convinced him to let them use his house to keep the victim they planned to
kidnap. They planned the crime in Ferraers house and waited for the call from Romeo to inform
them when the victim would be at the construction site. The group received a call from Romeo
on 2 December 1997 informing them that the victim was already at the construction site, and so
they went there to carry out their plan. At the construction site, as testified to by Seraspe and
Chavez, Muit and the other members of the group pointed their guns at the victim and his
companion and ordered them to lie prostrate on the ground. After getting the keys to the Pajero
from Seraspe, they forced the victim to board the vehicle with Muit driving it. They immediately

reported the kidnapping of the victim to the police and the kidnappers were intercepted by the
group led by Supt. Mission. Supt. Mission testified that the kidnappers refused to surrender and
engaged the police in a shoot out in which the victim was among the casualties. Muit was one of
the two persons who survived the shoot out, but was apprehended by the police. Pancho, Jr.
returned to the house of Ferraer alone when the group did not arrive at their meeting place.
Ferraer, Pancho, Jr., and Pancho, Sr. learned from the news that the group engaged the police
in a shoot out and most of them were killed, and that Muit was arrested by the police. After
investigation, the police were able to apprehend appellants Pancho, Jr., Romeo, and Dequillo
who all took part in the botched criminal conspiracy to kidnap the victim. During the
investigation, Pancho, Jr., Dequillo, and Muit, with the assistance of their counsels and family
members, executed extra judical confessions divulging their respective roles in the planning and
execution of the crimes. Even though Pancho, Jr., Dequillo and Romeo did not participate in
the actual abduction of the victim, they should still be held liable, as the courts below did,
because of the existence of conspiracy. Conspiracy is a unity of purpose and intention in the
commission of a crime.[26] Where conspiracy is established, the precise modality or extent of
participation of each individual conspirator becomes secondary since the act of one is the act of
all.[27] The degree of actual participation in the commission of the crime is immaterial. The
conspiracy to kidnap the victim was proven through circumstantial evidence. The group
thoroughly planned the kidnapping in Ferraers house and patiently waited for the day when the
victim would be at the construction site. Then on 2 December 1997, the group received a call
from Romeo so they proceeded to the construction site and carried out their plan. All the
appellants took active part in the criminal conspiracy and performed different roles to
consummate their common plan. The roles which Muit and his other companions played in the
actual abduction were described earlier. As for Dequillo, he was the one who procured the guns
used by the group. Pancho, Jr. served as the driver of the back-up vehicle, and Romeo was the
groups informant.Section 4, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Evidence states that
circumstantial evidence is sufficient if: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts
from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.The extra judicial
confessions of Pancho, Jr., Dequillo, and Muit strengthened the case against them. There is
nothing on record to support appellants claim that they were coerced and tortured into
executing their extra judicial confessions. One of the indicia of voluntariness in the execution of
appellants extra judicial statements is that each contains many details and facts which the
investigating officers could not have known and could not have supplied, without the knowledge
and information given by appellants. Moreover, the appellants were assisted by their lawyers
when they executed their statements. Atty. Mallare testified that Pancho, Jr. and Dequillo
executed their statements voluntarily and affixed their signatures after he talked with them alone
and informed them of their constitutional rights.[28] Muit, on the other hand, was assisted by
counsels in each instance when he executed his two extra judicial confessions; his second
statement was even witnessed by his uncle, Bonifacio, and his brother, Dominador. Muit cannot
just conveniently disclaim any knowledge of the contents of his extra judicial confession.
Nevertheless, in Muits case, he was also positively identified by Seraspe and Chavez as the
one who pointed a gun at them during the kidnapping and ordered them to lay prostrate on the
ground.[29]Appellants claims of torture are not supported by medical certificates from the

physical examinations done on them.[30] These claims of torture were mere afterthoughts as
they were raised for the first time during trial; appellants did not even inform their family
members who visited them while they were imprisoned about the alleged tortures.[31] Dequillo,
for his part, also had the opportunity to complain of the alleged torture done to him to the
Department of Justice when he was brought there.[32] Claims of torture are easily concocted,
and cannot be given credence unless substantiated by competent and independent
corroborating evidence.[33]
The extra judicial confessions of Pancho, Jr., Dequillo, and Muit
also strengthened the prosecutions case against Romeo. The rule that an extra judicial
confession is evidence only against the person making it recognizes various exceptions. One
such exception is where several extra judicial statements had been made by several persons
charged with an offense and there could have been no collusion with reference to said several
confessions, the fact that the statements are in all material respects identical is confirmatory of
the confession of the co-defendants and is admissible against other persons implicated therein.
They are also admissible as circumstantial evidence against the person implicated therein to
show the probability of the latters actual participation in the commission of the crime and may
likewise serve as corroborative evidence if it is clear from other facts and circumstances
that other persons had participated in the perpetration of the crime charged and proved. These
are known as interlocking confessions.[34] Nonetheless, the RTC, in convicting Romeo, relied
not only on the aforesaid extra judicial statements but also on Ferraers testimony that Romeo
was introduced to him in his house as the informant when they were planning the kidnapping.
As for the penalty, the RTC did not err in imposing the penalty of death since the kidnapping
was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person. Neither
actual demand for nor payment of ransom is necessary for the consummation of the felony. It is
sufficient that the deprivation of liberty was for the purpose of extorting ransom even if none of
the four circumstances mentioned in Article 267 were present in its perpetration.[35] The death
of the victim as a result of the kidnapping only serves as a generic aggravating circumstance for
the rule is that when more than one qualifying circumstances are proven, the others must be
considered as generic aggravating circumstances.[36]
The imposition of death penalty is
also proper in the carnapping of the victims Pajero because it was committed by a band,
which serves as a generic aggravating circumstance, without any mitigatingcircumstance.
[37] There is band whenever more than three armed malefactors shall have acted together in
the commission of the offense.[38] As planned, Muit and three other armed men kidnapped the
victim and drove away with the latters Pajero while two more persons waiting near the Pag-asa
road boarded the Pajero. However, pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346 which prohibits the
imposition of the death penalty, the penalties imposed are commuted to reclusion perpetua with
all its accessory penalties and without eligibility for parole under Act No. 4103.[39]
As to
damages, the RTC erred in awarding compensation for loss of earning capacity. Pursuant to
jurisprudence, the Court precludes an award for loss of earning capacity without adequate proof
as it partakes of the nature of actual damages.[40] The bare testimony of the father of the
deceased that, at the time of his death, the victim was earningP5,000.00 per month as an
engineer is not sufficient proof.[41] But pursuant to the Courts ruling in People v. Abrazaldo[42]
wherein we deemed it proper to award temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.00 in
cases where evidence confirms the heirs entitlement to actual damages but the amount of
actual damages cannot be determined because of the absence of supporting and duly

presented receipts, the Court awards P25,000.00 temperate damages to the heirs of the victim
in the present case. The civil indemnity should be increased to P75,000.00.[43] The award of
civil indemnity may be granted without any need of proof other than the death of the victim.[44]
In line with jurisprudence, the moral damages should also be increased to P 500,000.00.[45]
Moreover, exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.00 for the crime of kidnapping
for ransom with homicide[46] and P25,000.00 for the crime of carnapping should be awarded.
The law allows exemplary damages in criminal cases as part of the civil liability of the
malefactors when the crime is attended by one or more aggravating circumstances.[47]
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 02044 which
commuted the death penalties imposed in Criminal Case Nos. P-521 and P-607 to reclusion
perpetua without eligibility for parole is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS that the
compensation for loss of earning capacity be deleted while the civil indemnity be increased to
P75,000.00 and the moral damages to P500,000.00, and that appellants shall also pay the heirs
of Ignacio Earl Ong, Jr. temperate damages of P25,000.00 and exemplary damages of
P100,000.00 for the crime of kidnapping for ransom with homicide and P25,000.00 for the crime
of carnapping. Costs against appellants.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------38. THE HONORABLE JUDGE SIXTO A. DOMONDON, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
PANGASINAN, SAN CARLOS CITY (PANGASINAN) BRANCH, FILOMENA GABRIEL, JOSE
C. ARENAS, AND ESTELA MACAM-NICANOR,
G.R. No. L-29836
February 29, 1972
VILLAMOR, J.:
This is an original action of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for preliminary
injunction, filed in the name of the People by State Prosecutor Alejandro C. Siazon of the
Department of Justice.The three private respondents, Filomena Gabriel, Jose C. Arenas and
Estela Macam-Nicanor, are accused in Criminal Cases Nos. SCC-128, 129 and 130,
respectively, of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, San Carlos City (Pangasinan) Branch,
of violating the Anti-Graft And Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3019). The charges arose
in connection with the alleged leakage of test questions in the Teachers' Selective Examination,
given on June 18, 1966, in Lingayen, Pangasinan, and in Tarlac, Tarlac. The three cases are
being tried jointly, it being alleged in the informations that there was conspiracy among the
defendants. All three defendants are out on bail. Originally, there was a fourth information filed
with the same court (docketed as Criminal Case No. SCC-131), against another defendant,
Jessie S. Siapno; but upon the People's motion, on the ground that the said defendant would be
utilized as a state witness, the trial court ordered her discharge as a defendant and dismissed
the case against her.According to petitioner, the only reason why the four defendants were not
charged in a single information is that two of them (Estela Macam-Nicanor and Jessie S.
Siapno) were private individuals at the time of the alleged commission of the crime, while the
conspiracy insofar as the two other defendants (Filomena Gabriel and Jose C. Arenas, public
school teachers in Bayambang, Pangasinan) are concerned, is with the said two private
individuals separately and/or between the two of them. Incidentally, although Jessie S. Siapno
was not in the government service when the examination was held on June 18, 1966, she is

now a public school teacher in Manaoag, Pangasinan, having been appointed as such on July
25, 1966.Three of the defendants, namely Filomena Gabriel, Jose C. Arenas and Jessie S.
Siapno (the discharged defendant) have each signed a sworn extrajudicial confession before
agents of the National Bureau of Investigation. Only Estela Macam-Nicanor did not execute an
extrajudicial confession. So far, the State has presented ten witnesses.It is alleged in the
present petition that during the continuation of the joint trial of the three cases on November 18
and 19, 1968, discharged defendant Jessie S. Siapno, who was then on the witness stand,
confirmed as hers the extrajudicial confession which was allowed by the court to be marked as
Exhibit "V" for the prosecution, with submarkings from "V-1" to "V-6"; that when the said witness
was asked by the prosecutor to identify her signature on each of the pages of Exhibit "V", the
defense objected on the ground that the answer to the question would tend to incriminate the
witness, she being now a public school teacher; that respondent Judge then asked the witness
if she had been previously informed that her testimony might be used as basis for an
administrative case against her, and the answer was in the affirmative; and that although the
prosecutor reminded the court that witness Siapno had been discharged by order of the court
itself, after her counsel had affirmed in open court that he had no objection to her being
discharged to be utilized as a state witness, respondent Judge sustained the objection.
Petitioner also alleges that when discharged defendant Siapno was asked by the prosecution to
describe the test booklet which she had stated in her extrajudicial confession to have been
purchased by her from defendant Estela Macam-Nicanor, the defense objected on the ground
that the best evidence was the booklet itself, which objection was sustained by respondent
Judge. It appears that page 8 was presented as evidence in court as Exhibit "W", and that a
prosecution witness, Minas Gabertan, had testified on the witness stand that the same was part
of the test booklet.In this petition it is prayed, among others, that a preliminary injunction be
issued to restrain respondent Judge from proceeding with the case until after the admissibility of
Siapno's extrajudicial confession has been ruled upon; that respondent Judge be ordered to
allow Siapno to identify her extrajudicial confession, and to admit the same as evidence against
the private respondents when and if formally presented by the prosecution; and that respondent
Judge be ordered to allow Siapno to describe the test booklet alleged by her in her extrajudicial
confession to have been bought by her from respondent Estela Macam-Nicanor.Shortly after the
present petition was filed, respondent Judge Domondon was appointed to the Mangaldan
Branch of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan; another judge was appointed to the San
Carlos City Branch of the court, formerly presided over by Judge Domondon. The appointments
of the two judges were confirmed by the Commission on Appointments; and soon thereafter
both of them began discharging their functions in their respective branches. A supplemental
petition has been filed by petitioner with this Court alleging that respondent Judge Domondon
did not include Criminal Cases Nos. SCC-128 to 130 among the cases which he turned over to
the new presiding judge of the San Carlos City Branch, so that, unless the said cases are
ordered turned over to the latter, respondent Judge Domondon would continue to try them.
Petitioner accordingly prays this Court to declare that Criminal Cases Nos. SCC-128 to 130 fall
within the exclusive authority of the judge permanently appointed to the San Carlos City
(Pangasinan) Branch, and to prohibit respondent Judge from continuing the hearing thereof.We
vote to grant the petition.1. The right against self-incrimination guaranteed by Section 1 (18),
Article III of the Constitution, is a personal right which may be invoked by the witness. The

privilege not to give self-incriminating evidence, while absolute when claimed, may be waived by
any one entitled to invoke it (Beltran v. Samson, etc., et al., 53 Phil. 570, 578). In the present
cases, witness Jessie S. Siapno has chosen to waive her right even after being reminded of it.
The defendants' objection, therefore, on the ground of self-incrimination, to the prosecutor's
question addressed to the said witness, as to whether or not the signatures on the extrajudicial
confession Exhibit "V" belong to her, should have been overruled by respondent Judge.Witness
Siapno's waiver is understandable. Having been discharged as a defendant to be a witness for
the State, she finds herself in a peculiar situation, for the order of discharge amounts to an
acquittal and is a bar to future prosecution for the same offense unless she fails or refuses to
testify against the other defendants (Section 11, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court).2. The
extrajudicial confession (Exhibit "V") of discharged defendant Siapno is admissible. Although as
a general rule an extrajudicial confession is evidence only against the person making it, the
same may be taken into consideration as a circumstance in assessing and passing upon the
weight and credibility of the testimony of an accomplice (People v. Narciso, et al., L-24484, May
28, 1968, 23 SCRA 844, 853) as well as of those of the witnesses of the opposing parties
(People v. Raiz, 93 Phil. 94, 99). It may likewise serve as a corroborative evidence if it is clear
from other facts and circumstances that other persons had participated in the perpetration of the
crime charged and proved (People v. Sta. Maria, et al., L-19929, October 30, 1965, 15 SCRA
222, 232).Moreover, two of the three defendants in the court below, Filomena Gabriel and Jose
C. Arenas, have also executed extrajudicial confessions, which in all probability will be
presented in evidence in due time. Their confessions, as well as that of discharged defendant
Siapno, are identical on material points, and are corroborated by the testimony of prosecution
witness Minas Gabertan. Unless, therefore, it is shown that there was collusion in making the
confessions, they are admissible as circumstantial evidence against the persons implicated to
show the probability of their criminal participation.Extra-judicial confessions independently made
without collusion which are identical with each other in their essential details and are
corroborated by other evidence on record, are admissible as circumstantial evidence against the
person implicated to show the probability of the latter's actual participation in the commission of
the crime." (People v. Provo, et al., L-28347, January 20, 1971, 37 SCRA 19, 33, citing People
v. Condemena, L-22426, May 29, 1968.)3. Discharged defendant Jessie S. Siapno should be
allowed to describe the test booklet which she mentioned in her extrajudicial confession as
having been bought by her from respondent Estela Macam-Nicanor.Section 3, Rule 133 of the
Rules of Court, provides: .SEC. 3. Extrajudicial confession, not sufficient ground for
conviction. An extra-judicial confession made by an accused, shall not be sufficient ground
for conviction, unless corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti." .Proof of corpus delicti means
introduction of sufficient evidence to establish fact that a crime was committed, and proof of
defendant's connection therewith is not part of corpus delicti. (9 Words and Phrases, p. 759,
Perm. Ed.) .Any testimony which discharged defendant Siapno may make describing the test
booklet mentioned by her in her extrajudicial confession is admissible to provide proof of corpus
delicti; such testimony is apart from her confession, and she may be cross-examined thereon by
Private respondents.Private respondents also object to a description of the test booklet by
witness Siapno on the ground that the same will be violation of the best evidence rule. But
another witness, Minas Gabertan, has already testified that the test booklet (consisting of 26
pages) with the exception of page 8 (presented in evidence as Exhibit "W"), was burned by her.

In the circumstances the contents of the test booklet may be proven by the recollection of
witnesses (Section 2 and 4, Rule 130).4. The failure of respondent Judge to turn over the
records of Criminal Cases Nos. SCC-128 to 130 to the present presiding judge of the San
Carlos City (Pangasinan) Branch, to which they properly belong, should be frown upon as not
conducive to the orderly administration of justice.In Luque v. Kayanan, etc., L-26826, August 29,
1969 (29 SCRA 165, 183), we said: .... It surely is not in keeping with the sound administration
of justice for a judge of a branch of a court to take for himself a case belonging to another
branch of the same court without justifiable reason therefor. Such a procedure breeds
confusion. It could even be suspect. It opens up a charge such as here presented that
respondent has demonstrated "unusual interest" in this case and refused to return it to Branch I
in spite of petitioner's move for the purpose.We there accordingly directed the return of the case
from Branch IV to Branch I of the Court of First Instance of Quezon. The principle was reiterated
in Ella, et al. v. Salanga, etc., et al., L- 23826, September 28, 1970 (35 SCRA 86, 93).True it is
that the present cases have already been heard in part by respondent Judge; but then the
normal procedure would be to first obtain the permission of the Supreme Court before he may
continue hearing the cases.WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. Respondent Judge is hereby
directed to turn over the records of Criminal Cases Nos. SCC-128, 129 and 130 to the presiding
judge of the San Carlos City Branch of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, who is
likewise hereby directed to proceed in the premises accordingly.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------4. PREVIOUS CONDUCT AS EVIDENCE
Sec. 34 - Similar acts as evidence
39.ELIZARDO DITCHE y DELA CERNA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS (2nd Division)
and NONITO TAM, respondents.
G.R. No. 110899. March 7, 2000D E C I S I O N
DE LEON, JR., J.:Before us is a petition for review[1] of the Decision[2] dated January 14, 1993,
as well as the Resolution[3] dated June 10, 1993 of the Court of Appeals which modified the
judgment[4] of conviction rendered by the Regional Trial Court (RTC)[5] from frustrated to
attempted murder.On December 15, 1986, Asst. Provincial Fiscal Bernardo G. Delfin filed with
the Regional Trial Court an Information[6] for Frustrated Murder against petitioner Elizardo
Ditche and one Rene Espaa. It reads:"That on the 3rd day of April, 1983, at or about 6:00
oclock in the afternoon, along the national highway in Barangay San Roque, Municipality of
Asturias, Province of Cebu, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, together with two other persons whose identities are still unknown, the
latter two to be prosecuted separately as soon as procedural requirements shall have been
complied with upon their identification, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping each
other, all armed with high-powered firearms, with evident premeditation and treachery and intent
to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously ambush, shoot and fire their firearms
at the direction of NONITO TAM, MRS. ANNABELLA TAM, CEDRIC TAM AND EMELITO
TINGAL who were riding on a motorcycle on the way to Poblacion Asturias, Cebu from
Tubigagmanok, Asturias, Cebu, hitting Nonito Tam and Emelito Tingal and the said victim
suffered gunshot wounds, thus performing all the acts of execution which would have produced

the crime of Murder as a consequence but nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes
independent of the will of the accused, that is, the frantic maneuver of the motorcycle to make it
run in zigzag and the timely medical attendance extended to the victims at the Cebu (Velez)
General Hospital."Contrary to law."Duly arraigned on May 25, 1984, petitioner Elizardo Ditche
and Rene Espaa pleaded "Not Guilty" to the charge.[7] In the course of the trial, however,
Rene Espaa died on February 13, 1990.[8]In due time, the trial court rendered its decision[9]
convicting petitioner Ditche of Frustrated Murder, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, considering that the quantum of evidence in the case at bar has satisfied the
moral certainty required in the criminal case, it is therefore the findings of this court to hold the
accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of frustrated murder in Article 248, in relation to Art.
50 of the Revised Penal Code. It is hereby sentenced [sic] of this court for the accused after
applying the indeterminate sentence law to suffer the penalty of six (6) years, one (1) month and
eleven (11) days to ten (10) years and to pay the amount of P1,500.00 as hospitalization
expenses and Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) as moral damages and to pay the cost."SO
ORDERED."Petitioner appealed from the decision to the Court of Appeals.On January 14, 1993,
the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision affirming the guilt of petitioner, but at the same
time agreeing with the recommendation of the Solicitor General that since the wound inflicted on
the complainant was not of such serious nature as would have produced death, petitioner
should only be guilty of Attempted and not Frustrated Murder.[10]On February 17, 1993,
petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration[11] of the decision. He also filed a Motion for New
Trial[12] on March 19, 1993, praying that the case be remanded to the lower court for the
reception of the testimonies of new witnesses Marcelo Remis and Angela Nemenzo.On June
10, 1993, the Court of Appeals denied both Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for New Trial
on the grounds that first, the former is a mere reiteration or repetition of the arguments already
ventilated in his brief and second, the latter was filed beyond the reglementary period.[13]
Hence, this petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals.The pertinent facts are:
Sometime on March 30, 1983 at around 5:30 in the afternoon, Nonito Tam,[14] went to the
house of Dr. Noel at Ginabasa, Tubigagmanok, Asturias, Cebu to inform Dr. Noel about the theft
of coconuts in his plantation. A minute later, petitioner arrived.[15] In the course of their
conversation, a verbal quarrel ensued between petitioner and Nonito Tam. Petitioner challenged
the latter to a fist fight. But Dr. Noel intervened and pacified them. Having calmed down, both
petitioner and Tam left for home.[16]On April 3, 1983, at around 6:00 oclock in the evening,
Tam, his wife Annabella, son, Cedric and a farm helper, Emelito Tingal were on their way home
from their farm at Barangay Tubigagmanok, Asturias, Cebu. While riding a motorcycle driven by
Tam they were ambushed at Barangay San Roque.[17] Shortly before reaching the site of the
ambush, Tam had already sighted two (2) men half-naked from the waist, sitting on a sack of
copra placed along the right side of the road going to Asturias, Cebu. When Tam and company
were four (4) meters away from the said sack of copra, the two (2) men stood up and began
firing at them using a revolver. Tam continued to negotiate the road amid the gunfire. Ten (10)
meters away from the ambush site, Tam looked back and this time he saw four (4) men firing
and chasing them. He positively identified two (2) of the four (4) men as petitioner Ditche and
the now deceased Rene Espaa.[18]Upon reaching their house at Poblacion, Asturias, Cebu,
Tam told his neighbor, Lucy Dumdum, to report the incident to the police authorities.[19] Lucy
Dumdum was also the one who asked permission from the Mayor to lend them his car to

transport the injured to the Cebu (Velez) General Hospital for medical treatment. The car was
driven by one Carlo Magno Alao, brother of Lucy Dumdum.[20] Dr. Reynaldo Baclig was the
physician who treated the injured at the said hospital.[21]During cross-examination, Tam
admitted that he filed a case for Grave Threats against the late Rene Espaa with the office of
petitioner Ditche who was, at that time, the barangay captain. But petitioner Ditche did not
entertain his complaint, so he filed a case with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal. For this
reason, petitioner allegedly got irritated and plotted his revenge.[22]On re-direct examination,
Tam declared that he realized that he was hit only after driving one (1) kilometer away from the
ambush site when he felt numbness on his right knee.[23] His helper, Emelito Tingal, was also
hit on the back of his left knee.Although the shooting incident was reported by Lucy Dumdum on
April 3, 1983, police authorities did not make any record. According to them Dumdums report
was an informal report, hence, no investigation was ever conducted on that day.[24]Once
discharged from the hospital on April 7, 1983, Tam reported the incident to the police authorities
and had the same entered in the police blotter. However, to his surprise, the certification of the
police stated that the attackers were unidentified. Tam called the attention of Pat. Tomas
Tundag, the policeman on duty, but the latter did not rectify the erroneous report. Pat. Tundag
did not bother to change the certification.[25] Thus, Tam reported the incident to the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) hoping that from the NBI he could obtain justice and protection.
[26]Annabella Rojo Tam, wife of Tam, gave corroborative testimony. She positively identified
petitioner Ditche and the deceased Espaa as two (2) of the four (4) men who fired at them at
Barrio San Roque, on April 3, 1983 at around 6:00 oclock in the evening.[27]Leticia Quijano
Noel, another prosecution witness, also corroborated the testimony of Tam. She declared that
on March 30, 1983, Tam went to their house to report the theft that happened in their coconut
plantation. She asked his son to invite and fetch petitioner Ditche, their Barangay Captain, to
come over to their house. In the course of their conversation,[28] a heated argument ensued
between petitioner and Tam. Petitioner challenged Tam to a fight. But Dr. Noel pacified both of
them and when both calmed down, Dr. and Mrs. Noel invited the two (2) to join them for dinner.
Thereafter, both left for home.[29]Petitioners defense is basically alibi. His testimony was
corroborated by defense witness Venpelubio Gilbuena, his Barangay Secretary. He claimed that
on April 3, 1983 at around 4:00 oclock in the afternoon, he was at his residence at Ginabasan,
Tubigagmanok, together with Gilbuena. Witness Gilbuena helped him prepare the minutes of
the meeting of the Association of Barangay Council of Asturias of which petitioner was the
Secretary. Both left the petitioners house at around 7:00 oclock in the evening. Gilbuena
returned to his own house while petitioner reported for work at the White Cement Factory.[30]On
cross-examination, witness Gilbuena admitted that petitioner Ditche requested him to testify on
his behalf.[31]Petitioner raises the following assignment of errors:"I. THE RESPONDENT
COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING THE PETITIONERS MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
DESPITE ITS HAVING BEEN FILED SEASONABLY IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 14,
RULE 124 OF THE REVISED RULES ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE."II. THE RESPONDENT
COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND ERRED WHEN IT
AFFIRMED THE CONVICTION OF THE PETITIONER ON THE BASIS OF AN ILLOGICAL AND
IMPOSSIBLE CONCLUSION OF POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION OF PETITIONER AS THE
ALLEGED ASSAILANT, IN UTTER DISREGARD OF NUMEREOUS CIRCUMSTANCES
AND/OR FACTS ESTABLISHED BY EVIDENCE EXTANT ON THE RECORDS WHICH

NEGATE SUCH IDENTIFICATION AND GROSSLY IGNORING THE PRONOUNCEMENTS OF

THE SUPREME COURT WHICH ARE CONSIDERED AS THE APPLICABLE LAW ON SUCH
CIRCUMSTANCES."III. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
MAKING CONCLUSIONS IN ITS DECISION THAT ARE GROUNDED ENTIRELY ON
SURMISES OR CONJECTURES AND IN MAKING INFERENCES WHICH ARE MANIFESTLY
MISTAKEN AND WITHOUT ANY SPECIFIC EVIDENTIARY BASIS."[32]The petition is devoid of
merit.Petitioner contends that respondent Court of Appeals erred in denying his motion for new
trial on the ground that the same was filed beyond the period for perfecting an appeal. He
maintained that he received the Court of Appeal's decision on January 22, 1993. On February
17, 1993, he filed his motion for reconsideration. Pending resolution of said motion, petitioner
filed a motion for new trial on March 19, 1993 claiming newly discovered evidence which would
result in the reversal of his conviction.While it is true that petitioners motion for new trial was
seasonably filed, in order for the said motion to be granted, the same must be based on newly
discovered evidence material to his defense.[33]Petitioner's allegedly newly discovered
evidence consists of the testimonies of Marcelo Remis and Angela Nemenzo to the effect that at
the time relevant to this case, they were residing within the vicinity of the ambush site and that
when the shooting incident took place, it was already dark as it was already, in their estimate,
7:00 o'clock and not 6:00 o'clock in the evening as declared by the prosecution witnesses.
However, not only is such allegedly newly discovered evidence necessarily predicated on the
alleged incredulousness of the prosecution witness, whose credibility has in fact already been
determined by the trial court, but more importantly, it merely attempts to corroborate the earlier
defense of the petitioner on the alleged impossibility of positive identification. Hence, the
additional evidence sought to be presented by the defense is not really a newly discovered
evidence as contemplated by law and therefore will not change the result of the case.The judge
who penned the assailed decision was not the only one who heard and received the evidence
presented by the parties. The case was heard by two (2) judges, namely, Judge Melchor C.
Arboleda, in whose court the Information was filed and who heard the testimonies of three (3)
out of the four (4) prosecution witnesses while Judge Jose P. Burgos heard the case from the
cross-examination of the third prosecution witness onward. This fact, however, does not
diminish the veracity and correctness of the factual findings of the trial court. In any event, we
have gone over the records, including the transcript of stenographic notes, and we found no
reason to disturb the factual findings and conclusion of the trial court.The findings of the trial
court on the credibility of witnesses deserve great weight, given the clear advantage of a trial
judge over an appellate court in the appreciation of testimonial evidence. This is the rule. The
trial court is in the best position to assess the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies
because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses, their demeanor, conduct and
attitude on the witness stand. These are the most significant factors in evaluating the sincerity of
witnesses and in unearthing the truth.[34] Although the rule admits of certain exceptions, none
obtains in this case.Petitioner equates his alleged non-identification with the fact that the
victims[35] of the ambush initially failed to mention the name of their assailants or attackers to
the parents-in-law of Tam[36], the Asturias Police[37], Lucy Dumdum,[38] the Municipal
Mayor[39] and Carlomagno Alao.[40] Petitioner likewise maintains that Tams testimony as
corroborated by his wife, smacks of fabrication considering that it took him nine (9) days to
reveal the names of the assailants to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), where he

sought assistance. Petitioner also insists that the crime scene was dark; thus, it was impossible
for Tam and his wife to identify their attackers.But as gleaned from the findings of both the trial
court and the Court of Appeals, petitioners identity as the culprit has been sufficiently
established. Tam and his wife could not have been mistaken in pointing petitioner and the late
Espaa as their attackers considering that both were familiar to them; petitioner Ditche was their
Barangay Chairman while Espaa was earlier charged by Tam for grave threats.Moreover, the
non-disclosure by witnesses to the police officers of the identity of the assailants immediately
after the occurrence of the crime is not entirely against human experience.[41] The natural
reticence of most people to get involved in criminal prosecution against immediate neighbors, as
in this case,[42] is of judicial notice.[43]Anent petitioners insistance that the alleged darkness of
the evening of the ambush obviates any credible and true identification of the assailants, the
records show that when the incident took place, respondent was not yet even using his
motorcycles headlight,[44] hence, it cannot be said that it was already dark. At any rate, the
prosecution witnesses testified that visibility was fair. If petitioner recognized his intended
victims, there was no reason why the survivors from the ambush could not have also recognized
him aside from the fact that prosecution witness Annabella Tam testified that the nearest the
four (4) assailants came close to their motorcycle was about five (5) meters.[45]In other words,
prosecution witnesses Nonito and Annabella Tam were consistent in positively identifying
petitioner and Espaa as the assailants. Tam testified, thus:"FISCAL DELFIN:"Q
You said
that you were ambushed at Barangay San Roque on your way home from Tubigagmanok. Will
you please tell this Honorable Court what happened actually in that ambush?"A
While we
were going to San Roque I saw two men half naked from the waist up sitting on a sack of copra
along the road on the right towards the poblacion."Q
Aside from those two men, did they
have other companions?"A
It was only afterwards that I saw Elizardo Ditche and Rene
Espaa."Q
Where did you see them?"A
Along the road, right side."[46]"x x x"FISCAL
DELFIN:"Q
What happened when you saw them?"A
Four (4) meters before I reach the
two men, they stood up and fired at us."Q
What did they use in firing?"A
Revolver, sir."Q
When they fired at you were you or any of your companion hit?"A
I was hit on my right knee
and my farm helper was also hit at the back of his left knee."Q
How about this Elizardo
Ditche and Rene Eapaa, what did he do?"A
They also helped in firing at us because ten
(10) meters away from them when I looked back the four (4) of them were shooting at us."[47]x
x x"Q
You said that during the ambush those persons were half naked up to the waist who
fired at you first. Do you know those persons?"A
We do not know them."Q
How about the
two (2) others, do you know them?"A
Yes, sir."Q
What are their names?"A
Barangay
Captain Elizardo Ditche and Rene Espaa."Q
Why do you know them?"A
Because
before the ambush I knew already these Elizardo Ditche and Rene Espaa. This Rene Espaa,
I knew him because I even charged him with grave threats in Asturias."[48]Witness Annabella
Tam gave a more detailed account of the incident in this wise:"ATTY. POGADO"Q
What was
the unusual incident that took place upon reaching San Roque, Asturias, Cebu, if any."A
We
were ambushed."Q
How were you ambushed?"A
By people firing at us using short arms.
"COURT"Q
What do you mean short arms?"A
Revolver, sir."ATTY. POLGADO"Q
What was your distance at the time you were first fired upon?"A
About four (4) meters from
the persons"Q
Of what side of the road were the persons firing at you that time you were
proceeding to Poblacion, Asturias, Cebu?"A
At the right side of the road."Q
At that

distance of four (4) meters away when the persons first fired at you, did you recognize the
persons who fired at you at that time?"A
I did not actually saw the persons who fired at us. I
was not able to recognize them."Q
You remember how may times you were fired at?"A
Many times."Q
After the first burst of fire at you, what did your husband do, if any?"A
He
continued driving the motor."Q
When you told this Court that several shots were fired at you,
how far were you at that time the second firing of shots?"A
Five (5) or six (6) meters."Q
At that distance of five (5) or six (6) meters away from the persons firing at you, you can now
recognize the persons who were firing at you?"A
Yes, sir. I saw two (2) persons."Q
Who
were these two (2) persons you were able to identify?"A
They were Elizardo Ditche and
Rene Espaa."Q
The accused in this case?"A
Yes, sir."[49]Annabella Rojo Tam was so
firm during her cross-examination that she did not falter when the trial court asked her some
clarificatory questions. Rather, her additional declarations served to strengthen the credibility of
her version of the incident:"COURT TO THE WITNESS"Q
Let us make this clear again. You
were passing directly opposite these two person sitting on the sack when you were directly
opposite, you were fired upon. And this firing and even flashes began, you saw from these two
person you told your husband to speed up, when you speed up, you look back, and you already
saw four persons."A
Yes, your Honor."COURT"Q
In other words, the moment you saw
these two persons firing at you, you did not continuously looked at them?"A
I looked back
and they are continuously firing, so I looked back again."COURTContinue"ATTY. FAJARDO"Q
When you looked back, you saw four persons already?"A
Yes, sir."Q
When you looked
back, and saw these four persons they were about ten (10) meters away from you?"A
Yes,
sir."Q
There was no moment at all that any of these four persons were able to undertake or
come near you at a distance of a close distance of one meter?"A
None of them."Q
As
these four persons were not able to overtake you or come near you, will you tell the honorable
court how far were these persons about to come to you or to be near you in terms of distance?
"COURT TO THE WITNESS"Q
Let us put it this way, you told your husband to speed up, you
already saw person running after you, were these people running fast?"A
Yes, they were
running fast."Q
And you were continuously looking at them running after you?"A
Yes,
your Honor."Q
Since they were running fast, was there any moment that anyone of them
came almost near your motorcycle."A
Yes, your Honor."x x x"ATTY. FAJARDO"Q
How
close has this accused got themselves to you?"A
At this juncture, the witness pointed to the
second seat (long bench) in the courtroom which measures five (5) meters."[50]Considering that
the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were straightforward, consistent and replete with
details,[51] aside from the fact that there is nothing in the record which shows that the witnesses
were moved by any improper motive, the presumption is that the witnesses were not biased and
their testimonies are entitled to full faith and credence.[52]Finally, We reject the alibi of petitioner
that he was in his house at Ginabasan, Tubigagmanok, Asturias, together with his Secretary,
Gilbuena on April 3, 1983, at around 4:00 oclock in the afternoon, preparing the minutes of the
Association of Barangay Council of Asturias.When averring alibi, two requirements must be
strictly met in order that the same may be of value to the defense, namely, (1) that the accused
was not present at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission, and (2) that it was
physically impossible for him to be there at the time. Without said essential requisites having
been established, reliance on alibi, all the more becomes a liability.[53] Hence, for the defense
of alibi to prosper, it is not enough to prove that accused was somewhere else when the offense

was committed; it must likewise be demonstrated that he was so far away that it was not
possible for him to have been physically present at the place of the crime or its immediate
vicinity at the time of its commission.[54]In this case, as testified to by petitioner himself, he was
in his house which is only four (4) kilometers from the ambush site. Petitioner failed to show that
it was physically impossible for him to be present at the place of the commission of the offense,
and so we perforce apply the well settled doctrine that alibi is inherently a weak defense which
should be rejected where the accused was positively identified by an eyewitness to the
commission of the offense.Manifest in the attack employed by the offenders was treachery.
Article 14, (16) of the Revised Penal Code provides that treachery is committed when the
offender employs means or methods in the execution of the crime which tend directly and
specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the
offended party might make.From the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, it was clear that
petitioner and his cohorts deliberately waited for Tam and his group ready to spray them with
bullets. All the four (4) attackers were armed while the victims were not. The attack was
undisputedly sudden and unexpected. This suddenness and unexpectedness of the assault
without the slightest provocation on the part of the persons attacked, is the essence of
treachery.[55]In the light of these considerations, we find no reason to reverse or modify the
ruling of the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals correctly convicted petitioner Ditche, his
guilt having been proven beyond reasonable doubt, more particularly for attempted murder
inasmuch the injury sustained by the victim, Nonito Tam, was not of such serious nature as
would have produced death.WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED and the assailed
Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------40. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ANTONIO "TONY" SALONGA,
ALFREDO "FRED" DANGANAN AND EDUARDO "EDDIE" DANGANAN, defendantsappellants.
G.R. No. 128647. March 31, 2000
D E C I S I O NPER CURIAM:The frailty of human flesh gives no excuse for the transgression of
a woman's purity especially when rape was coupled with the taking of the victim's life. Such act
is testament to a debased, perverted and savage minds which deserves a penalty no less than
death.For automatic review is the decision 'of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 65, Tarlac, Tarlac
finding Antonio "Tony" Salonga, Alfredo "Fred" Danganan, and Eduardo "Eddie" Danganan,
guilty of rape with homicide under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act No. 7659[1] and imposing upon each of them the supreme penalty of death, in
addition to ordering them to pay the heirs of the victim the amount of P50,000.00 as death
indemnity, P100,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages, P83,900.00 as actual damages,
P15,000.00 as attorney's fees, and the costs of the suit.The amended information alleged -"That
on or about November 10, 1994, in the Municipality of Tarlac, Province of Tarlac, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with the use of a
bladed instrument and other hard object, conspiring, confederating and helping with one
another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously by means of force, threat and
intimidation succeeded in having carnal knowledge with Babylyn Garcia, 13 years old, single
and virgin against her will, that on the occasion thereof, the above-named accused with the use

of a bladed weapon and a hard object stab several times and hit her with hard object on her
head inflicting skull fracture on her head and stab wound on the different parts of her body
which cause her immediate death at the scene of the crime.CONTRARY TO LAW."[2]Upon
arraignment the accused-appellants pleaded "not guilty" to the charge.We quote with approval
the facts of the case as summarized by the trial court, as such facts are supported by the
evidence on record:"xxx.......................................xxx.......................................xxx"Prosecution
evidence shows that in the morning of November 10, 1994, Babylyn Garcia, a 13-year old
comely girl, 5 ft. 4 inches in height, left their house in Barangay Sta. Maria in Tarlac, Tarlac to
attend her classes as a First Year High School in the Gerona Tarlac, about 14 km. from the
capital town of Tarlac. Babylyn walked from their house to Sitio Maligaya in Barangay Sinait,
Tarlac, Tarlac, then a kilometer away. From Sitio Maligaya, she stepped down the dike and
crossed the almost 500-meter-wide Tarlac River, which becomes passable by foot during the dry
season, to reach Barangay Sta. Cruz Tarlac, where she took a ride to Gerona. She expected to
be home as usual between 5:00 to 6:00 o' clock in the afternoon of that day. On that fateful day
of November 10, 1994, her father Pablito Garcia, failed to go and meet her as he was wont to
do [sic] at Brgy. Sta. Cruz and Babylyn must have decided to go home alone, walking along the
same beaten path that she and some residents thereabouts usually take in crossing the river.
Babylyn failed to come home at the expected time and her parents became worried. Her father
then decided to look for her in her school, in the houses of some relatives in Brgy. Sinait and
along the usual path that he and Babylyn used to take in crossing the river but did not find her.
Between 5:20 and 5:30 o' clock in the afternoon of November 10, 1994, Maximo Tabag, a
resident of Brgy. Sinait went to gather firewood at the dry portion of the Tarlac River, some 150
meters from the river embankment in Sitio Maligaya where cogon grass and bamboos had
already grown in clusters and a few kakawati and acacia had taken root. While in the process of
gathering firewood, Tabag heard voices and peering through the tall cogon grasses, he saw
three men about 12 to 15 meters away dragging an unconscious woman, whose head was
bloody and her dress stained with blood. (TSN, March 6, 1995 p.7). As Tabag watched furtively
behind tall cogon grasses, the three men whom he recognized as Antonio Salonga, Alfredo
Danganan and Eduardo Danganan, who appeared unaware of his presence then dumped the
unconscious woman, whom he also recognized as Babylyn Garcia amidst cogon grasses near
an acacia tree. Moments thereafter, he saw them leaving together in a hurry towards Brgy. Sta.
Cruz where Alfredo and his family reside.Tabag did not attempt to approach the unconscious girl
because he was afraid the three men might see him and decide to go after him. He instead went
home about four minutes after they left and kept silent about what he saw because he feared
the accused (TSN, March 15, 1995). Tabag personally knows accused Alfredo Danganan and
his brother, Eduardo, because they are his barangay mates in Brgy. Sinait since they were yet
young boys and their half-brother, accused Antonio Salonga, was his barangay mate in Brgy.
Aguso where he (Tabag) once resided for sometime. At the time he saw them in the river,
Antonio Salonga was wearing a brown hat made of bamboo and a sky-blue, long sleeved polo
shirt, Alfredo Danganan was in white shorts and white T-shirt and Eduardo Danganan was in
maong pants and naked from the waist up (TSN, March 6, 1995, pp. 27-28).Romeo Garcia, a
kagawad of Barangay Sta. Maria and an uncle of Babylyn, together with a barangay tanod,
launched a search for his missing niece. They scoured out the pathway across the Tarlac River
between Sitio Maligaya and Brgy. Sta. Cruz. At about 2:00 o clock in the early morning of

November 11, 1994, Kgd. Garcia and his companion found the lifeless body of Babylyn
concealed amidst cogon grasses near an acacia tree about 150 meters from the river
embankment in Sitio Maligaya. Aside from human footprints, the school identification card of the
victim and a woman shoe were found near the place where the body was dumped. Kgd. Garcia
then notified the police that the body of his niece had already been found. SPO4 Conrado
Duenas of Tarlac PNP, together with the two policemen and some members of the Kababayan
Center No. 9 in San Isidro, Tarlac, which has jurisdiction over Brgy. Sta. Maria and Sinait, went
to the place. They were told that the victim's body which was already removed by relatives, was
found in a cogonal area. At about 7:00 a.m., November 11, 1994, the cadaver was brought to
the Enriquez funeral parlor in Tarlac for autopsy. Tabag, bothered by his conscience, decided to
see Kgd. Garcia at about 6:00 p.m. of that day and informed him of what he saw and asked him
to cause the investigation of the brothers Antonio, Alfredo and Eduardo in connection with the
slaying of Babylyn. Kgd. Garcia brought Tabag to the police but Tabag did not reveal all the
details of what he saw the three accused did, not until they were arrested and detained.
Thereafter, SPO4 Oscar Mayor, a member of the Tarlac PNP, conducted an investigation of the
death of Babylyn Garcia. He conferred with the members of the Kababayan Center in Brgy.
Sinait, who had earlier made an ocular inspection of the crime scene. They furnished Mayor the
names of Antonio Salonga, Alfredo Danganan, Eduardo Danganan Ronald Salvador and Cirilo
Ibanez as possible suspects in the killing. Ronald Salvador and Cirilo Ibanez later were
excluded from the list of suspects for lack of evidence against them, SPO4 Mayor, with SPO2
Estabillo, went to the house of Antonio Salonga in Brgy. Aguso on November 19, 1994, to
inquire about his whereabouts and what he had used on November 10, 1994, but Antonio was
not at home then. Antonio's wife, however, told Mayor, that her husband was wearing a brown
hat made of bamboo when he and Alfredo went to Brgy. Sinait in the morning of November 10,
1994. When shown the hat, Mayor noticed what he suspected to be a bloodstain on the hat.
Mayor then asked Antonios wife if he could have the hat and the latter in the presence of Danilo
Bulanditan and Kgd. Conrado Capitulo as witness voluntarily gave it to him after he issued a
receipt dated November 10, 1994 (Exhibit C). Mayor then submitted the hat, together with the
blood-stained handkerchief and a piece of cloth of the victim, to the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) in Manila for laboratory examination. Based on the NBI Biology Report No.
E-94-1423 (Exhibit 'D') the contents of which were admitted by the defense (TSN, March 13,
1995, p.61), test results disclosed that 'the above specimen all gave positive results for human
blood showing the same reaction of Group A'.
..........................xxx.......................................xxx.......................................xxx"[3]After the trial on
the merits, the trial court rendered judgment on February 27, 1996 convicting all the accused"WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused Antonio "Tony" Salonga, Alfredo "Fred" Danganan
and Eduardo "Eddie" Danganan GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape with
Homicide defined and penalized in Article 335, as amended, of the Revised Penal Code, and
hereby sentences each of them to suffer the penalty of death, and to jointly and severally pay
the heirs of Babylyn Garcia the amount of P50,000.00 as death indemnity, the amount of
P100,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages, the amount of P83,900.00 as actual damages
and the amount of P15,000.00 as attorney's fees and to pay the costs.SO ORDERED."[4]On
account of the penalty imposed, the records were elevated to this Court for automatic review.[5]
Accused-appellants seek the reversal of the judgment of conviction insisting that the

circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution against them is insufficient to prove their
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. They denied the charge and claimed that they could not have
committed the crime of rape with homicide and interposed the defense of alibi. Their testimonies
are summarized in the following portion of the decision of the trial court:
"xxx.......................................xxx .......................................xxx."Accused Alfredo Danganan
testified that he and his half-brother, Antonio Salonga, went to Sitio Maligaya, Brgy. Sinait,
Tarlac, to visit their father, Benito Danganan, in the morning of November 10, 1994. He was then
wearing white shorts and white boxer (TSN, Feb. 28, 1996, p.11). He left Antonio at the house of
their father and went to collect the debts of his borrowers in Brgy. Sinait and Brgy. Maria. He
returned at 1:00 o' clock in the afternoon. At 4:15 p.m., he and Antonio returned to Brgy. Sta.
Cruz because he had to attend the 6:00 p.m. 'prayer and worship service' at the Iglesia Ni Cristo
chapel in Brgy. Aguso where he also served as a deacon. In going home they took the 'short cut'
route from Sitio Maligaya towards Alfredo's house in Brgy. Sta. Cruz. While crossing the river,
Antonio heard the voices of two women quarrelling. He told Antonio the voices seemed to come
from Brgy. Sinait. They arrived at his (Alfredo's) house at 4:45 p.m. by his watch. After taking a
bath, he dressed up and proceeded to the chapel with his wife, Yolanda, at 5:30 p.m. and
arrived their at 5:38 p.m. using his passenger jeep. After signing his name on a loose left
purporting to be an attendance sheet, he performed his duties as a deacon. After the services,
he and his wife proceeded to the 'big chapel' of the INC in San Roque, Tarlac, at 10:00 p.m. and
went home at 11:00 p.m. The following morning, November 11, 1994, when he returned to Brgy.
Sinait to collect the debts of his other borrowers, he learned from Kgd. Garcia, the uncle of
Babylyn, that the latter, the daughter of Pablito Garcia, was killed. He informed Kgd. Garcia and
the policemen who were with him that when he and Antonio were crossing the river on their way
home the previous afternoon, his brother heard the voices of two women quarrelling and he told
him they appeared to be in Brgy. Sinait. Alfredo Danganan testified on the witness stand in a
manner as if he already knew just what his counsel would ask and immediately gave his
answer. At times, he seemed hesitant in answering questions propounded on cross
examination. His countenance on the witness stand appeared troubled.Accused Antonio
Salonga testified that he and his brother, Alfredo Danganan, went to Sitio Maligaya in Brgy.
Sinait at about 8:00 o' clock in the morning of November 10, 1994. After taking their launch (sic)
in the house of their father, Benito, he and Alfredo went home at about 4:15 p.m. of that day,
based on his calculation. As they were crossing the river, he heard the voices of two women
who were quarreling and Alfredo told him they seemed to be in Brgy. Sinait. They reached the
house of Alfredo at around 4:45 p.m., again based on his calculation. Later, his brother and his
wife, Yolanda, went to the INC chapel. He stayed at their house up to the time when they
returned at 11:00 o' clock in the evening. Then he went home in Brgy. Aguso. At about 6:00 o'
clock in the morning of November 11, 1994, he drove Alfredo's passenger jeep to earn some
money to Camiling, Tarlac where according to him, a couple, Cenon Ibanez and Fanny Limos,
who managed a store in that town, stopped him and told him that the daughter of Pedro Garcia
was 'raped and killed' (TSN, March 7, 1996, p.5). As closely observed by the Court, he
appeared listless as he answered questions propounded to him by his counsel or by the
prosecution, making the Court feel that he was not telling the truth. He admitted, however, that
the brown hat made of bamboo given by his wife to SPO4 Mayor belonged to him.Accused
Eduardo Danganan testified that in the morning of November 10, 1994, his brothers Antonio and

Alfredo came to their house in Sitio Maligaya, Brgy. Sinait. While Antonio stayed in the house,
Alfredo went out to collect the debts of his borrowers and returned at about 1:00 p.m. of the
same day. At about 2:00 p.m., he went to the house of Remegio Manoloto and helped his
brother, Arcadio, pile up about 60 cavans of palay in Manoloto's house up to 6:00 p.m.
Thereafter, he went home and slept. The following day November 11, 1994, Kgd. Garcia and the
Brgy. Captain of Sinait passed by their house and asked him if he noticed a man who may have
passed by their place and told him that the daughter of Pabling Garcia was killed. Together with
Bong Dela Cruz and Ronald Dela Cruz, he went to the house of the victim but the body had not
as yet been brought home. On November 12, 1994, he, Antonio Salonga and Alfredo Danganan
were brought to the police station for investigation. Before he was made to talk, SPO2 Versoza
punched him, hit him with a stick on his chest and kicked his feet. He then gave a statement and
signed it. He claimed he does not know the victim (TSN, March 12, 1996, p.12). He said he was
not also familiar with the place where they found the body of the victim, which is only about 200
meters away from their house. His source of income was farming and sometimes catching birds
in the swamp near where the incident occurred. In giving his testimony, Eduardo appeared as if
he knew what questions his counsel would asked and gave his answers as if he didn't care. The
Court could not but feel insincerity in his voice. Although the Court could not describe it, still it
could recognize if from his demeanor (sic) that the accused himself did not believe that his
version would be accepted as true. In short he lacked conviction in the manner he testified.
Yolanda Danganan, Alfredos wife, corroborated Alfredos allegation that he and Antonio were
already in their house at Brgy. Sta. Cruz at around 4:45 p.m. She was sure of the time because
she was watching TV and had seen the time on the wall clock when Antonio and Alfredo arrived.
Later, she and her husband went to attend the service at the chapel of the INC in Brgy. Aguso,
and came home at about 11:00 in the evening. Salvacion Magallanes, who was at the house of
Yolanda in the afternoon of November 10, 1994 to help a friend borrow some money from
Yolanda, corroborated Yolanda's testimony that Antonio Salonga and Alfredo Danganan arrived
at the latter's house at 4:45 p.m. because she was watching Channel 9 and happened to look
also at the wall clock. Rolando dela Cruz, who appeared hesitant in testifying, alleged that he
and Eduardo went to the house of the victim in the morning of November 11, 1994 and
'magosyoso' (to learn about the incident). Leopoldo Taberna, who appeared defensive, testified
that Alfredo Danganan and his father, Benito, attended the funeral of Babylyn Garcia. Arcadio
Danganan, brother of the accused, corroborated the testimony of Eduardo that he helped him
carry palay from 4:00 to 6:00 p.m. in the house of Remigio Manoloto. Jeremias del Mar, and INC
deacon, claimed he saw Alfredo Danganan at the INC chapel in Aguso at 5:45 p.m., November
10, 1994 and even signed the Lagda sa Pulong. It appears, however, that the signatures,
including that of accused Alfredo Danganan, were written on November 6, 1994.
..........................xxx.......................................xxx .......................................xxx"[6]Accusedappellants harp on the alleged inconsistencies in the witness' testimonies. To bolster their
defense, attention is drawn to the following alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of the
prosecution witness-(1) They contend that the trial court failed to consider the serious
discrepancies in Maximo Tabag's Sinumpaang Salaysay given on January 18, 1995 and his
testimony in open court considering that in the Sinumpaang Salaysay he never mentioned that
he saw the accused-appellants dragging the dead and bloodied body of Babylyn Garcia to the
cogonal area as testified to in open court but merely stated therein that he saw the accused-

appellants leaving the place where the dead body of the victim was found.(2) From the date of
the occurrence of the incident- November 10, 1994 up to the execution of the Sinumpaang
Salaysay on January 18, 1995, a period of 69 days had elapsed and Maximo Tabag failed to
mention this very important part in his Sinumpaang Salaysay.(3) If Maximo Tabag saw the three
(3) accused dragged the dead and bloodied body of the victim he would have done what a man
should have normally done under the circumstances. Yet, he did not go to the place where the
accused came from; he did not attempt to see whether the victim was still alive or not; he did not
help the victim; he did not report to the police; he did not report to the barangay officials; and, he
did not report to the parents of the victim.[7](4) When Jesusa Bartolome testified during the
preliminary examination she declared that she could not identify the man he saw sitting on the
river but in open court she said that if she could see the man again she could recognize him and
pointed to accused-appellant Antonio Salonga.We are not persuaded by the submissions of the
accused-appellants. Accused-appellants assail the testimonies of prosecution witness Maximo
Tabag when he failed to mention in his sworn statement, dated January 18, 1995 that he saw
the accused-appellants dragging the lifeless body of the victim. There is no real discrepancy in
the two statements made by Tabag. In his Sinumpaang Salaysay, he stated that he saw the
accused-appellants leaving the cogonal area near the scene of the crime where the body of the
victim was found[8] but Tabag was able to sufficiently explain in court that he did not reveal the
details of the incident to the police when he gave the Sinumpaang Salaysay since he was afraid
for his life, but revealed to the fiscal what had happened-"Atty QuiaoitQ: And these (sic)sworn
statement of yours was taken on January 18, 1995 and which statement is identified as exhibit 1
for the defense, do you agree with me Mr. Witness that you never state here that you saw the
three persons dragging Babylyn Garcia to the Cogonal area on November 10, 1994?Fiscal
Capulong"May we allow the witness to see the sworn statement?A: I did not state in my
statement but I told the matter to Fiscal Cerezo, sir.Q: But your purpose in going to the police
station on January 18, 1995 is to give a statement on what you saw on November 10, 1994, is
that correct?A: Yes sir, I told them what I saw but I did not tell all what I saw sir.Q: You did not
tell all despite the fact that you were given the opportunity by SPO4 Oscar Mayor.A:.....because
it was not asked of me of what I saw in the place of the incident?Q:.....I will read to you question
no. 3 : Maari mo bang ilahad and buong pangyayari hingil sa nalalaman..."Q:.....this is your
answer to that question?A : Yes sir.Q:.....Now, in this question you were asked to tell the whole
incident of what you know and said you did not tell the police what you saw three persons
dragged Babylyn Garcia to the cogonal area, is that correct?A: I did not tell them sir.Q:.....Now,
you did not tell the police that you saw three (3) dragged Babylyn Garcia to the cogonal area
and even to the policeman who were your relatives, to the Brgy. Officials in Brgy. Sinait because
you did not actually see three (3) persons dragging a woman?FISCAL CAPULONGThe question
is misleading, as to how he told him to the policeman, as a matter of fact, he did not.JUDGE:
The question is very clear.You did not tell because you did not see three persons dragging a
woman?A:.....I saw them sir but I did not tell the police but I told this to Fiscal Cerezo because I
am trying to protect myself."[9]Accused-appellants insist that the testimony of Maximo Tabag is
contrary to human nature or ordinary course of things because he never helped the victim;
never reported it to the relatives or barangay officials of Sinait; and he never went to the place
where the victim was dragged despite opportunity to do the same. Tabag did not attempt to go
to the place where the victim was dragged nor immediately report to the authorities the

horrifying experience he had witnessed because he was afraid that accused-appellants will
harm him had they known that he was the one who saw them. Besides, there is no standard
form of the human behavioral response to a startling or frightful experience[10] and the delay in
bringing up the matter to the authorities do not destroy the veracity and credibility of the
testimony offered. The court takes judicial notice of some people's reluctance to be involved in
criminal trials. Failure to volunteer what one knows to law enforcement officials does not
necessarily impair a witness' credibility.[11]Accused-appellants assail the credibility of
prosecution witness Jesusa Bartolome, a school principal, on the ground of being inconsistent.
We emphasize that she has no interest in the case and it is inconceivable on her part to impute
to innocent persons the commission of the crime, when she has no compelling reason to do so.
Moreover, she was able to satisfactorily explain in court the reason why she stated in the
preliminary investigation of the case that should the man whom she saw near the scene of the
crime within a distance of ten (10) meters be presented to her, she would not be able to identify
the same, for what she only distinctly remembered was the polo shirt and the hat he was
wearing vis-a-vis her positive identification of accused-appellant Antonio Salonga, as the man
she saw near the crime scene, as follows:"Q: Another question on that preliminary investigation
on page 2 TSNQ: If you see him again could you identify this man?A:.....I have not seen his face
only the polo and hat made me identify him.Q: Were you asked this question and you gave that
answer?A: Yes sir.Q: In your testimony a while ago you stated that you saw the face of the man
sitting on the water but your testimony in the Municipal Trial Court, Tarlac in that preliminary
investigation, you did not see the face, you only saw the polo and the hat?A: That was made sir
because of fear, because I was not then so serious with the statement given by me because of
fear, I still have that fear that I felt when I saw the man it was right after the event when the
police came and told me that somebody was raped and killed so I was not able to give the right
answer.Q: When you testified before the Municipal Trial Court of Tarlac in the preliminary
investigation you were not serious in your statement?A: Not so serious sir but the fear that come
to my body then so I made myself confuse with the statement given."[12]Notably, her statement
given to the police on December 12, 1994 did not fully negate the possibility of her capacity to
identify the man seated on the edge of the river when she testified that:Q: In your statement
before the police dated December 12, 1994 already marked as Exhibit"J", you were asked this
question and you made this answer: "Kung kayo po ay mabibigyan ng pagkakataon na makita
pa and taong inyong binabanggit, makilala o maituro mo ba ninyo? Sagot: Maari po siguro." Do
you remember having stated that?A: Yes, sir."[13]In fine, the issue boils down to the credibility of
witnesses. Settled is the rule that the trial court's assessment thereon is accorded great respect
because it heard the witnesses and observed their behavior and manner of testifying[14] unless
it overlooked or misapplied some facts which could have affected the result of the case.[15] The
proximate contact of the trial court with those who take the witness stand places them in a more
competent position to discriminate between a true and false testimony.Absence of direct proof
relative to the commission of the crime does not negate any possibility of conviction on the part
of the accused-appellants. While there is no direct evidence relative to the commission of the
crime for which they were prosecuted, the circumstantial evidence proven in contrast with the
excuse offered by the defense, are sufficient to sustain their conviction beyond reasonable
doubt. Circumstantial evidence may alone be sufficient to prove elements of the crime so long
as the following requisites concur:[16]1. there is more than one circumstance;2. the facts from

which the inferences are derived are proven; and3. the combination of all the circumstances is
such as to produce a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt.In other words, the circumstances
themselves, or a combination thereof, should point to overt acts of the accused that would
logically point to the conclusion, and no other, that the accused is guilty of the crime charged
and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that they are innocent.[17]After thorough
review of the evidence, we find the following circumstantial evidence established by the
prosecution, to have successfully overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence and
established the guilt of the accused-appellants beyond reasonable doubt: that Eduardo
Danganan, on two occasions uttered to the victim sometime prior to the brutal crime "Karagul
mo na Lyn-lyn, apanaya da ka mo rin" (You are already a young woman, Lyn-Lyn, I have not
tired waiting for you);[18] on the day of the bestial killing, November 10, 1994, at about 5:00 to
5:30 p.m., Jesusa Bartolome saw Antonio Salonga sitting in the shallow portion of the Tarlac
river wearing a brownish hat made of bamboo and a sky-blue, long-sleeved polo shirt;[19] on
the same day, between 5:20 to 5:30 in the afternoon, Maximo Tabag saw Antonio Salonga,
Alfredo Danganan and Eduardo Danganan together dragging the body of the victim to the
cogonal area near the Tarlac river;[20] when Maximo Tabag saw Antonio Salonga, the latter was
wearing a brownish hat made of bamboo and a skyblue colored, long-sleeved polo shirt Alfredo
Danganan was wearing white shorts and t-shirt and Eduardo Danganan was wearing maong
pants and naked from the waist-up;[21] the wife of Antonio Salonga attests that the hat with
suspected bloodstain belongs to her husband and the same was used on November 10, 1994
when Antonio Salonga and Alfredo Danganan went to Sitio Maligaya, Brgy. Sinait, Tarlac, Tarlac;
[22] Alfredo Danganan corroborated Tabag's description of his attire on November 10, 1994;[23]
the NBI Biology Report revealed that the bloodstained hat of Antonio Salonga together with the
bloodstained handkerchief and a piece of cloth belonging to the victim, all gave positive results
for human blood showing reactions to Group "A";[24] the autopsy report on the cadaver of the
victim revealed that the victim sustained cracked skull, injuries in neck and in thorax, multiple
lacerated wounds, hematoma on labia majora and laceration of the hymen.[25]Evidence is
weighed not counted. When facts or circumstances which are proved are not only consistent
with the guilt of the accused, but also inconsistent with his innocence, such evidence, in its
weight and probative force, may surpass direct evidence in its effect upon the court.[26] In the
case at bar, we give credence to the foregoing circumstantial evidence which clearly established
the crime of rape with homicide defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Section 11, R.A. 7659 which took effect on December 31, 1993 as
follows:[27]"When and how rape is committed - Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge
of a woman under any of the following circumstances.1.) By using force or intimidation;2.) When
the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and3.) When the woman is under
twelve years of age or is demented.The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of deadly weapon or by two or more
persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.When by reason or on the occasion of
the rape, the victim has become insane, the penalty shall be death.When the rape is attempted
or frustrated and a homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion thereof, the penalty
shall be reclusion perpetua to death.When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide
is committed, the penalty shall be death.The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of
rape is committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:1.) When the victim is

under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian,
relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of
parent of the victim.2.) When the victim is under the custody of the police or military authorities.
3.) When the rape is committed in full view of the husband, parent, any of the children or other
relatives within the third degree of consanguinity.4.) When the victim is a religious or a child
below seven (7) years old.5.) When the offender knows that he is afflicted with Acquired
Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) disease.6.) When committed by any member of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines or Philippine National Police or any law enforcement agency.7.)
When by reason or on occasion of the rape, the victim has suffered permanent physical
mutilation.Rape is perpetrated when the accused has carnal knowledge of the victim by force
and without consent.[28] It is not essential that there be complete penetration of the female
organ, it is enough that the labia of the female organ was penetrated.[29] Based on the
evidence on record, sexual intercourse with the victim was sufficiently established, as shown in
the testimony of the medical doctor who conducted the post mortem[30] examination on the
child's body:"Q:.....On your page 2 exhibit a-1, you mentioned genitalia-hematoma, mas pubishematoma on labia majora, what do you mean by these doctor?A : There is a slight laceration at
10:00 o'clock of the hymen sir.Q:.....In your examination, you stated to this Honorable Court also
at a certain degree of certainty whether in your opinion Babylyn Garcia was raped?A:.....It is
possible sir.Q:.....Did you see any sign of rape in the body of Babylyn Garcia at the time of the
examination?A:.....Those injuries found at the thorax with multiple lacerated wound and these
are signs of force violence.Q:.....Now maybe you are in a position to state what cause the
laceration at the ten o'clock of the hymen?A:.....Maybe due to any penetration that may cause
the hymen to be lacerated at ten o-clock sir.Q:.....It maybe cause by any instrument or anything
that maybe inserted in sir.Q:.....And these laceration could be caused deliberately or
intentionally?A:.....It is possible sir that they were done intentionally.Q:.....Now, how about the
hematoma in the genitalia?A: .....It is due to bite because this was a sign of kissmark sir.
Q:.....Also this hematoma?A:.....Yes sir.Q:.....For a clearer understanding of your medical term,
what do you mean by mona (sic) pubis hematoma on labia majora?A:.....Hematoma of the
mona(sic) pubis will be due to socking and biting, labia majora due to biting-socking tension in
the skin that cover the sex organ sir.Q:.....Following your line of answer what cause these
injuries?A: .....Due to biting and socking sir."[31]The injuries, laceration of the hymen,
contusions on labia majora and abrasions suffered by the victim clearly demonstrate that force
was employed upon her to satisfy the prurient desires of the accused-appellants.Coming now to
the penalty, the trial court correctly imposed the penalty of death since Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 7659 provides that "when by reason or occasion of
the rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death." Being a single indivisible penalty,
the Court mandatorily applies the same in the light of Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code[32]
and "regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance that may have attended the
commission of the crime."[33]Four members of the Court maintain their position that Republic
Act No. 7659, insofar as it prescribes the death penalty, is unconstitutional; nevertheless they
submit to the ruling of the Court, by majority vote, that the law is constitutional and the death
penalty should be accordingly imposed.As to damages, the trial court awarded the heirs of the
victim the sum of P50,000.00 as death indemnity, P100,000.00 as moral damages and
exemplary damages, P83,900.00 as actual damages and P15,000.00 as attorney's fees plus

costs of suit. In rape with homicide, the death indemnity was increased to P100,000.00 because
the prevailing jurisprudence is that P50,000.00 for death and P50,000.00 for rape.[34] However,
the award of moral damages is reduced to P50,000.00[35] while the exemplary damages and
attorney's fees are deleted for lack of legal basis and the award of actual damages is likewise
reduced to P18,000.00.[36]WHEREFORE, the Decision of the trial court finding the accusedappellant Antonio Salonga alias Tony, Alfredo Danganan alias Fred, and Eduardo Danganan
alias Eddie, guilty of rape with homicide under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Section 11 of R.A. 7659 and imposing upon each of them the supreme penalty of
DEATH and to suffer the accessory penalties provided by law is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that the accused shall indemnify the heirs of the victim, P100,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, P18,000.00 as actual damages.In accordance with
Section 25 of the RA 7659, amending Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, upon the finality of
this Decision, let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded to the Office of the President for
the possible exercise of executive clemency or pardoning power.SO ORDERED.Davide, Jr.,
C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima,
Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------41. G.R. No. 126351Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaSECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 126351
February 18, 2000PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.RAUL ACOSTA Y LAYGO, accused-appellant.QUISUMBING, J.:This is an appeal from the
decision1 dated August 25, 1996, of the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City, Branch 127,
convicting accused-appellant of the crime of Arson, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua and to indemnify private complainant the amount of P100,000.00 as actual
damages without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.Appellant
Raul Acosta y Laygo was a 38-year old mason, married, and a resident of Barrio Makatipo,
Kalookan City, at the time of the offense charged. He used to be a good friend of Almanzor
"Elmer" Montesclaros, the grandson of private complainant, Filomena M. Marigomen.2 On
February 27, 1996, a few hours before the fire, Montesclaros, in the belief that appellant and his
wife were the ones hiding his live-in partner from him, stormed the house of appellant and
burned their clothes, furniture, and appliances.3 Montesclaros lived in the house owned by said
complainant and located at Banahaw St., Mountain Heights Subdivision, Barrio Makatipo,
Kalookan City. It was this house allegedly set on fire by appellant.The pertinent facts in this
case, as summarized by the Solicitor General, which we find supported by the records, are as
follows:At about 4:00 to 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of February 27, 1996, the nephew of
prosecution witness Mona Aquino called the latter, simultaneously shouting that appellant Raul
Acosta, their neighbor, was carrying a stove and a kitchen knife (TSN, May 22, 1996, pp. 3-4,
7). She went out of her house and approached appellant who, when asked why he was carrying
a stove and a knife, replied that he would burn the house of complainant Filomena M.
Marigomen. (Ibid., pp. 3-4).Complainant's house is situated at Banahaw Street, Mountain
Heights Subdivision, Kalookan City and adjacent to the house of prosecution witness Aquino.
(Ibid., pp. 2, 18). Only a wall fence divides her property from that of the complainant. (Ibid., p.
18).Owing to the fearsome answer of appellant to witness Aquino's query, she returned
immediately to her house (Ibid., p. 7). A few minutes after closing the door, she heard the sound
of broken bottles and the throwing of chair inside the house of complainant (Ibid., p. 8). When

she peeped through her kitchen door, she saw appellant inside complainant's house, which was
unoccupied at that time. (Ibid., p. 8). Thereafter, appellant poured kerosene on the bed (papag)
and lighted it with cigarette lighter (Ibid., p. 10). The fire was easily put off by appellant's wife
who arrived at the place. (Ibid., p. 10).At around 1:00 o'clock in the morning of February 28,
1996, prosecution witness Lina Videa, likewise a resident of Mountain Heights Subdivision,
was roused from her sleep by the barking of their dogs at the back portion of her house. (TSN,
May 20, 1996, pp. 3-4). When she went out of her house, she saw complainant's house situated
at the adjacent lot near the back portion of her garage burning. (Ibid., p. 4). When she peeped
through the holes of the GI sheets separating her lot from the adjacent lot, she noticed the
presence of appellant standing alone in front of the burning house. (Ibid., p. 5) Appellant was
just watching the blaze and not doing anything to contain it. (Ibid.)Witness Videa immediately
rushed back to her house and informed her husband about the fire at the nearby lot. (Ibid., p. 5).
They called up the police detachment and alerted other members of her family to be ready for
any contingency. (Ibid., p. 6). The fire truck arrived at around 2:00 o'clock in the morning, when
the house was already razed to the ground. (TSN, May 20, 1996, p. 6; TSN, May 22, 1996, p.
11).An on-the-spot investigation was conducted by Fire Investigator Raymundo Savare of the
Kalookan Fire Department (TSN, May 27, 1996, p. 2). After the conduct of the investigation, the
investigator did not find any incendiary device; hence, the cause of fire remained undetermined.
(TSN, May 27, 1996, p. 5). In his Report, the investigator did not rule out the possibility of
intentional burning, since there is no other source of ignition, unless otherwise somebody lighted
an illuminating object and left it unattended. (TSN, May 17, 1996, p. 8).x x x
xxx
x
x x4On March 11, 1996, appellant was charged with the crime of Arson under the following
Information:That on or about the 28th day of February, 1996 in Kal. City, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without any justifiable
cause, did then and there wilfully (sic), unlawfully and feloniously burn the house of one,
FILOMENA MONTESCLAROS VDA. DE MARIGOMEN, located at Banahaw St., Mountain
Heights Subdivision., Bo. Makatipo, this city, said accused knowing the same to be prohibited,
by then and there setting fire to the said house thereby causing the same to be totally burned, to
the damage and prejudice of herein complainant in the estimated amount of P100,000.00.
Contrary to Law.5On April 22, 1996, appellant, duly assisted by counsel de oficio Atty. Juanito
Crisostomo, was arraigned and entered a plea of not guilty.During trial, the prosecution
presented the following witnesses (1) Mrs. Lina Videa, (2) Mrs. Mona Aquino, both neighbors
of appellant; and (3) Fire Investigator Raymundo Savare. When the defense agreed to the
proposed stipulation that the value of the burned property was P100,000.00, the State
Prosecutor dispensed with the testimony of private complainant,6 the owner of the house.The
defense presented the appellant himself, Ernesto Riolloraza and Marieta Acosta as witnesses.
Appellant claimed that at the time of the alleged arson he was sleeping at his mother's home,
some five houses away from the burned house.7 Ernesto Riolloraza testified he lived in the
house behind the home of appellant's mother; that at around 9:00 in the evening, he saw
appellant and his family transferring their belongings to the house of appellant's mother; that at
around 11:00 in the evening, he saw appellant watching TV; and that at around 1:00 AM, he was
awakened by the sound of fire sirens; and that he and appellant stood by the roadside and
watched the fire.8 Marieta Acosta, common-law wife of appellant, corroborated appellant's
testimony that they were sleeping in the home of appellant's mother at the time of the incident.9

On August 25, 1996, the trial court rendered its decision,10 disposing as follows:WHEREFORE,
the prosecution having established the guilt of the accused with moral certainty, this Court
hereby sentences the accused to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of Reclusion Perpetua and
to indemnify the offended party the amount of P100,000.00 as actual damages without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.The period of the Accused's
preventive imprisonment shall be credited in the service of his sentence if qualified under Art. 29
of the Revised Penal Code.SO ORDERED.Appellant seasonably interposed the present appeal
assigning the following errors:1. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANT GUILTY BASED MERELY ON CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.2. THE TRIAL
COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING WEIGHT TO THE DEFENSE OF DENIAL AND ALIBI OF THE
ACCUSED.Appellant centers his appeal on the insufficiency of the circumstantial evidence
against him. He maintains that the fact that Montesclaros lived in the house which was razed to
the ground was not duly proved by the Prosecutor, and that even the Fire Investigator could not
determine the true cause of the fire. Appellant further assails the credibility of the prosecution
witnesses Mona Aquino and Lina Videa since their respective testimonies as to his presence in
the locus criminis before and after the incident remain uncorroborated, and therefore, wholly
unreliable and insufficient to sustain his conviction.For the State, the Solicitor General rebutted
the factual submissions of appellant. First, appellant himself testified that he knew that Elmer
Montesclaros lived in the house of private complainant.11 Second, the testimony of prosecution
witness Mona Aquino though uncorroborated does not impair her credibility since no ill-motive
was ascribed to her to testify falsely against appellant. Third, any inconsistency in Lina Videa's
testimony that she did not see appellant at the locus criminis could be explained by a reading of
her entire testimony. She saw appellant inside the yard of the burning house during the fire, not
after the fire. Further, the Solicitor General stressed that the determination of credibility of
witnesses remains within the province of the trial court, whose finding is accorded due respect
on appeal, absent any substantial circumstance which could have been overlooked in the
decision.Arson is defined as the malicious destruction of property by fire.12 In this case, the
alleged crime was committed on February 28, 1996, after R.A. 7659 already took effect. The
trial court found appellant herein liable under Article 320, No. 1 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Section 10 of R.A. No. 7659, which provides as follows:Art. 320. Destructive Arson.
The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed upon any person who shall burn:
1. One (1) or more buildings or edifices, consequent to one single act of burning, or as a result
of simultaneous burnings, or committed on several or different occasions.x x x
xxx
x x xAppellant's conviction rests on circumstantial evidence. Pertinently, Section 4 of Rule 133
of the Rules of Court provides:Sec. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient.
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:(a) There is more than one circumstance;(b)
The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven;(c) The combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.In order to justify a
conviction upon circumstantial evidence, the combination of circumstances must be such as to
leave no reasonable doubt in the mind as to the criminal responsibility of the accused.13 But no
greater degree of certainty is required when the evidence is circumstantial than when it is
direct.14In this case, we find the trial court correctly held that the following circumstances taken
together constitute an unbroken chain of events pointing to one fair and logical conclusion, that
accused started the fire which gutted the house of private complainant. Although there is no

direct evidence linking appellant to the arson, we agree with the trial court holding him guilty
thereof in the light of the following circumstances duly proved and on record:First, appellant had
the motive to commit the arson. It is not absolutely necessary, and it is frequently impossible for
the prosecution to prove the motive of the accused for the commission of the crime charged,
nevertheless in a case of arson like the present, the existence or non-existence of a sufficient
motive is a fact affecting the credibility of the witnesses.15 It was duly proved that at around
4:30 in the afternoon of February 27, 1996, private complainant's grandson, Elmer
Montesclaros, stormed the house of appellant and his wife and burned their clothes, household
furniture and appliances, like TV and karaoke.16 When appellant arrived home at around 5:00
in the afternoon and was informed of the incident, he got mad, and as his common-law wife
testified, appellant threw a tantrum ("nagdadabog").17 Appellant had every reason to feel
aggrieved about the incident and to retaliate in kind against Montesclaros and his grandmother.
Second, appellant's intent to commit the arson was established by his previous attempt to set
on fire a bed ("papag") inside the same house (private complainant's) which was burned later in
the night. Prosecution witness Mona Aquino testified that at around 5:00 in the afternoon of the
same day, she saw appellant carrying a gas stove and knife. When she asked him what he was
going to do with the stove, he answered that he was going to burn the house of private
complainant.18 Later, she heard the sound of somebody throwing a chair and breaking bottles
next door. When she peeped in the kitchen, she saw that appellant entered the house of private
complainant and started pouring gas on a bed ("papag") and then lighted a fire with a
disposable lighter. Appellant's wife rushed in and extinguished the fire with a broomstick. The
two later left the house at around 6:00 in the evening.19While it is true that "evidence that one
did or did not do a certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he did or did not do
the same or similar thing at another time," it may be received "to prove a specific intent or
knowledge, identity, plan system, scheme, habit, custom or usage, and the like." In People v.
Dadles, 278 SCRA 393 (1947), we held that:In the early case of United States v. Evangelista,
[24 Phil. 453 (1913)] the accused was convicted of arson after the trial court admitted evidence
that he had earlier attempted to set fire to the same premises. Ruling on the admissibility of the
said evidence, we said that:. . . While it was not the fire charged in the information, and does not
by any means amount to direct evidence against the accused, it was competent to prove the
intent of the accused in setting the fire which was charged in the information.x x x
xxx
x x x. . . Where a person is charged with the commission of a specific crime, testimony may be
received of other similar acts, committed about the same time, for the purpose only of
establishing the criminal intent of the accused.Shortly thereafter, at around 9:00 in the evening,
defense witness Ernesto Riolloraza who lived behind the house of appellant's mother, saw
appellant and his family transferring their belongings to said house of appellant's mother.20
Third, appellant was not only present at the locus criminis before the incident, he was seen
inside the yard of the burning house during the height of the fire. At around 1:00 in the morning
of February 28, 1996, prosecution witness Lina Videa was awakened by the barking of their
dog, so she went to the back of their house to investigate.21 Through the holes of the GI
sheets, she saw appellant standing alone inside private complainant's yard watching the house
burning.22 Appellant even looked happy with a canine smile and crazy-looking expression.
("Siya para bang ang mukha niya ay natutuwa na hindi naman humahalakhak, . . . para bang
ngiting aso at mukhang nakakaluko, your honor").23Fourth, appellant's actions subsequent to

the incident further point to his culpability. At around 12:00 noon of the same day, private
complainant went with prosecution witness Lina Videa to the place of Kagawad Tecson. They
were about to leave when appellant arrived. Private complainant asked him why he burned her
house and appellant answered, "So what if I burned your house?" Then appellant stared meanly
at private complainant, who got nervous and had to take medications.24 The following day,
appellant threatened prosecution witness Mona Aquino, saying that if she would testify against
him, he would also bum her house.25All the foregoing circumstances were duly established by
the evidence on record. Inseparably linked with one another, they point to no other conclusion
than appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. While nobody actually saw appellant light the
match which set the house on fire, the facts and circumstances proved make a complete chain
strongly leading, to the conclusion that it was the appellant who perpetrated the crime.26In
prosecutions for arson, proof of the crime charged is complete where the evidence establishes
(1) the corpus delicti, that is, a fire because of criminal agency; and (2) the identity of the
defendants as the one responsible for the crime.27 Corpus delicti means the substance of the
crime, it is the fact that a crime has actually been committed. In arson, the corpus delicti rule is
generally satisfied by proof of the bare occurrence of the fire and of its having been intentionally
caused. Even the uncorroborated testimony of a single witness, if credible, may be enough to
prove the corpus delicti and to warrant conviction.28Appellant interposes the defense of all in
his bid for acquittal. For the defense of alibi to prosper, it is axiomatic that the appellant must
prove not only that he was at some other place at the time the crime was committed, but that it
was likewise physically impossible for him to be at the locus criminis at the time of the alleged
crime.29 In this case, appellant himself testified that the house of his mother where he was
staying on that fateful night was merely five (5) houses away from the locus criminis, hence
considering the distance, it was not physically impossible for him to have perpetrated the crime
and then gone home to his mother's home, appearing as innocent as a lamb.Lastly, it would not
be amiss here to point out that "[i]n the crime of arson, the enormity of the offense is not
measured by the value of the property that may be destroyed but rather by the human lives
exposed to destruction."30 It is indeed a heinous crime that the law wisely seeks to suppress
with the most serious penalty because of its grave anti-social character.WHEREFORE, the
decision of the Regional Trial Court finding appellant Raul Acosta y Laygo guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Arson and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua and to
indemnify private complainant, Filomena M. Marigomen, in the amount of P100,000.00 as actual
damages, without subsidiary imprisonment, is AFFIRMED. Costs against appellant.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------42.FRANCISCO ENRIQUEZ y CRUZ, petitioner, vs PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and
SANDIGANBAYAN, respondents.
G.R. No. 119239
May 9, 2000
G.R. No. 119285
May 9, 2000 - CARMENCITA G. ESPINOSA, petitioner, vs. The
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:The instant petitions for review on certiorari seek the reversal of the
Sandiganbayan's decision of February 28, 1995, in Criminal Case No. 14385, convicting herein
petitioners Francisco C. Enriquez (ENRIQUEZ) and Carmencita G. Espinosa (ESPINOSA) of
the crime of malversation of public funds, defined in Article 217(4) of the Revised Penal Code.
The essential antecedents as can be gathered from the documentary and testimonial evidence

are the following:ENRIQUEZ was Municipal Treasurer, while ESPINOSA was Administrative
Officer and acting Municipal Cashier of the Office of the Municipal Treasurer of Pasig (Pasig
Treasury). By virtue of Local Government Audit Order No. 88-01-3, an audit team headed by
Carmencita Antasuda as team leader conducted an audit examination of the cash and accounts
of the Pasig Treasury covering the period from May 4, 1987 to November 30, 1987. The audit
disclosed, among other things, "accused Enriquez's accounts contained a shortage amounting
to P3,178,777.41, which shortage was mainly due to a dishonored China Banking Check No.
303100 dated October 7, 1987 in the amount of P3,267,911.10." Said check was deposited with
the Quezon City District Treasury Office (Quezon City Treasury) as part of the collections of the
Pasig Treasury. The check was dishonored for the following reasons: (a) it was not received in
payment of any tax; (b) it was not acknowledged by an official receipt; (c) the account against
which it was drawn was under garnishment; (d) the signatory therein was not authorized to sign;
and (e) it was drawn against insufficient funds.On December 3, 1987, a letter of demand was
sent to ENRIQUEZ by the Commission on Audit (COA) to restitute the value of the dishonored
check. In a reply dated December 5, 1987, ENRIQUEZ denied responsibility for the shortage
and pointed to ESPINOSA as the one to whom the letter of demand should be addressed as the
custodian of said check.China Banking Check No. 303100 dated October 7, 1987 in the amount
of P3,267,911.10 was payable to the Municipal Treasurer of Pasig and was drawn by one "D.
Noble". The check bears ENRIQUEZ's indorsement at the back and was accompanied by a
statement of checks also bearing the initials of ENRIQUEZ. The subject check was transmitted
from the Pasig Treasury to the Quezon City Treasury as the official district treasury for municipal
deposits. According to Benito Buenviaje, a casual janitor of the Pasig Treasury, on October 15,
1987, ENRIQUEZ instructed him to get the bundled checks from his table and to deliver them to
the Quezon City Treasury. He could not recall how many checks were taken from the table of
the municipal treasurer because they were already bundled. Benito Buenviaje was issued two
official receipts, one of which, O.R. No. 279451, was in the amount of P3,308,774.44, and
included the amount of the dishonored check.Several days after, the Quezon City Treasury
informed the Pasig Treasury of the dishonor of CBC Check No. 303100. The check was
deposited by the Quezon City Treasury under Account No. 6 with the PNB, Cubao Branch, for
credit to the Pasig Treasury but it was dishonored and returned on October 21, 1987 for the
reasons above-mentioned.The then Mayor Mario Raymundo of Pasig sent a letter-request to
the NBI to conduct an investigation of the alleged shortage and Atty. Federico Opinion, Jr., Chief
of the Special Action Unit of the NBI was designated, together with two (2) other agents to
conduct the investigation. As found by the NBI, the drawer of subject check was a certain "D.
Noble", with the account (CBC No. 0026813-6) registered in the name of one Leonora Reyes of
EDSA Home Improvement Center, Inc. In the course of the investigation, Atty. Opinion furnished
Eliodoro Constantino, Senior Document Examiner of the NBI, the initials of accused Enriquez
appearing in the subject check and the statement of checks, together with standards of
comparison consisting of several documents. A comparative examination by the NBI Questioned
Document Expert of the specimens submitted revealed that the questioned and standard
sample specimen initials of ENRIQUEZ were not written by one and the same person.It appears
that less than a month before the dishonor of the subject check or on September 23, 1987,
ESPINOSA herself had gone to the Quezon City Treasury to make a deposit of checks and
statement of checks. Felisa Cervantes, Computer Operator of the Quezon City Treasury,

accepted the checks and the corresponding statements and issued Official Receipt No. 279339
in the amount of P3,583,084.18. ESPINOSA later returned to Felisa Cervantes and requested
her to cross-out the first figure "3" on the official receipt to conform with the actual amount of
P583,084.18 deposited therein.In an Information dated February 5, 1990, ENRIQUEZ together
with ESPINOSA were charged with Malversation of Public Funds committed as follows:That
during the period from May 4, 1987 to November 30, 1987, or on dates subsequent thereto, in
the Municipality of Pasig, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused Francisco C. Enriquez being then the Municipal Treasurer of Pasig,
Metro Manila, Carmencita Espinosa then the Administrative Officer I and designated as Cashier
in the Office of the Municipal Treasurer of Pasig, Metro Manila and Belinda Santos1, a Clerk in
the Realty Tax Section and designated as Asst. Cashier in the Treasurer's Office of Pasig, Metro
Manila, duly appointed/designated and qualified as such, hence, all accountable officers by
reason of the duties of their respective offices, accountable for the funds and properties
received by them in their official positions as such, conspiring and confederating with each other
and taking advantage of their official positions with wanton disregard of auditing laws, rules and
regulations, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and with grave abuse of
confidence, misappropriate, misapply and convert to their own personal use and benefit the
amount of THREE MILLION ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT THOUSAND SEVEN
HUNDRED SEVENTY-SEVEN AND 41/100 (P3,178,777.41), Philippine currency, from the said
public funds received by them in their respective official positions aforementioned in the Office
of the Municipal Treasurer of Pasig, Metro Manila, to the damage and prejudice of the
government.CONTRARY TO LAW.2When arraigned, on April 23, 1990, ENRIQUEZ and
ESPINOSA pleaded not guilty to the charge. After trial, the Sandiganbayan rendered its
judgment, promulgated on February 28, 1995, convicting ENRIQUEZ and ESPINOSA, thusly:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding both accused Francisco Enriquez y Cruz
and Carmencita Espinosa y Gonzales GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as co-principals in the
offense of Malversation of Public Funds, as defined and penalized under Article 217, paragraph
4 of the Revised Penal Code and crediting each of them with the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender, without any aggravating circumstance in offset, and applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, each of them is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty ranging from TEN (10) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor, as the minimum, to
SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal, as the
maximum; to further suffer perpetual special disqualification; to pay, jointly and severally, the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines in the same amount of P3,178,177.41, and to pay
their proportional share of the costs of the action.SO ORDERED.3Accused ENRIQUEZ and
ESPINOSA blamed each other for the shortage. ENRIQUEZ tried to show that he is not the
custodian of the funds of the municipality and that it is ESPINOSA and the deceased coaccused Belinda Santos who had custody and safekeeping over the funds and the keys to the
vault. For her part, ESPINOSA claimed that it was accused ENRIQUEZ and Imelda San
Agustin, the duly appointed cashier who are the ones responsible for the alleged shortage. The
Sandiganbayan found that ENRIQUEZ and ESPINOSA in conspiracy with each other
misappropriated public funds in their custody and sought to cover up the shortages already
existing in the municipal treasury's collections by depositing the subject China Banking
Corporation check in the amount of P3,178,777.41. The Sandiganbayan, in its assailed

decision, ratiocinated thus:xxx xxx xxxFrom the narration of the evidence, testimonial and
documentary, adduced by both accused Enriquez and Espinosa in their defense, it appears that
certain circumstances of paramount importance have been ignored or overlooked by the
defense, considering the foregoing admitted facts on record, which are, that the instant
prosecution is for Malversation of Public funds and that once a shortage in said funds had been
established, it is the accountable officer (or officers) who bear(s) the obligation to submit a
satisfactory explanation as to why he (or they) should not be held accountable therefor (Article
217, Revised Penal Code).These circumstances have not been thoroughly nor diligently delved
into by either of the accused, who were apparently more concentrated in pointing to each other
and shifting the blame for the appearance and/or introduction into the municipal treasurer's
accounts of a check in the amount of P3,267,911.10 drawn against the China Banking
Corporation, dated October 7, 1987 (Exhibit E). As testified to by prosecution witness Auditor
Carmelita Antasuda, said check was made to form part of the collections of the municipal
treasurer, sometime in October 1987, despite the fact that there was no official receipt
appearing to have been issued for it and neither does it appear to have been issued in payment
of taxes or obligations due to the municipality of Pasig. Afterwards, said check, bearing accused
Enriquez' indorsement at the back, was included in a statement of checks (Exhibit P) prepared
in the Pasig Municipal Treasurer's Office for transmittal to, and deposit with, the Quezon City
Treasurer's Office, the latter being the official district treasury for municipal deposits.The
statement of the checks (Exhibit P), together with the check in question (Exhibit E), and another
statement of checks (Exhibit 7-Espinosa) was admittedly brought by Benito Buenviaje, a casual
janitor in the municipal treasurer's office, upon the instruction of accused Enriquez to the
Quezon City Treasurer's Office and received thereat on October 15, 1987. Buenviaje was
issued two official receipts, one of which, O.R. No. 279451 (Exhibit 7-b-Enriquez), was in the
amount of P3,308,774.44, which included the dishonored check (Exhibit M-1, Page 2 par. 3).
The check was deposited by the Quezon City Treasury Office under Account No. 6 with the
PNB, Cubao, Branch, for credit to the Pasig municipal treasury but it was dishonored and
returned on October 21, 1987 because the account was under garnishment and the check had
an unauthorized signatory (Exhibit E-2). As found by the NBI, the drawer of the said check was
a certain "D. Noble", with the account (CBC No. 0026813) being in the name of one Leonora
Reyes of EDSA Home Improvement Center, Inc. (Exhibit M-1, page 3, par. 5).Hence, as of
October 15, 1987, the municipal collections had a virus fatally imbedded within it, a wayward
private check which cannot lawfully be credited to the municipal treasury or to the accountability
of either of the accused herein, as primary and secondary accountable officers. Worse, on
September 23, 1987, accused Espinosa had tried to foist a similar scam by personally bringing
to the District Treasury in Quezon City bundles of checks listed in three (3) statements of
checks, dated September 15, 1987 and signed by accused Enriquez, totaling P583,084.18
(Exhibits 22, 22-a and 22-b-Espinosa). While the total amount on the adding machine tapes
when presented, was P3,583,084.18, as testified to by Maria Felisa Cervantes (TSN, pp. 6-31,
May 21, 1991), with accused Espinosa being issued Official Receipt No. 279339 (Exhibits 11-to
11-d-Enriquez), she later returned to Cervantes and said she had committed a mistake and had
Cervantes cross out the figure "3" in said receipt to conform with the actual amount of the
checks which was P583,084.18 only.Coupled with the same scenario that transpired on October
15, 1987 with respect to the dishonored CBC Check in the amount of P3,267,911.10 (Exhibit E),

which likewise reached the Quezon City Treasurer's Office thru a statement of checks signed by
accused Enriquez (Exhibit P), then it can logically be presumed that during the months of
September and October, 1987, both accused Enriquez and Espinosa were already aware of an
impending shortage in their accountabilities in the neighborhood of P3-million and were
attempting to conceal or cover-up this shortage through the same modus operandi.The audit
examination which was conducted on December 1, 1987 (Exhibit D) covered the period from
May 4, 1987 to November 30, 1987. The shortage of P3,178,777.41 was arrived at as follows:
Accountability:Beginning Balance, May 4, 1987
P17,843,0007.26Add: Collections and
Withdrawals 184,065.858.18Total P201,908,865.44Less: Disbursements and
Deposits
194,433,214.14Balance of Accountability
P7,475,651.30Cash and Valid Cash
Items 4,296,873.89Shortage
P3,178,177.41The shortage is accounted
for as follows:Disallowed cash item CBCCheck #303100 P3,267,911.10Overrecording of
withdrawals (
100,018.10)Underrecording of withdrawals 10,001.18Underremittance of
collections
1,410.55Overremittance of collections
(
539.00)Overrecording of
deposits
10.40Overfooting of expenditures
.53Overfooting of collections (
.04)
Underfooting of collections (
.80Total
P3,178,777.42It would
appear probable, therefore, that even as early as May and prior to October 15, 1987, the
shortage had already existed in the municipal accounts, traceable to and aggravated by overrecording/under-recording of withdrawals, under-remittance/over-remittance or collections, overrecording of deposits, over-footing of expenditures, over-footing/underfooting of collections and,
most importantly, the dishonored CBC Check for P3,267,911.10 (Exhibit E). Since the total
accountability of P7,475,651.30, as found by the audit team less cash and valid cash items
amount to P4,296,873.89 still resulted in a shortage of P3,178,777.42 then the only logical and
plausible conclusion to be arrived at is that collections were, indeed, short between May 4, 1987
and November 30, 1987 and, consequently, efforts had to be exerted by accused Enriquez and
Espinosa, even including resort to extra-legal measures, to conceal and/or cover-up the missing
public funds. Naturally, such measures can only be resorted to and utilized by the personnel
therein who would be held responsible for any shortage that would ultimately be found. They are
accused Enriquez, the primary accountable officer, being the municipal treasurer, and accused
Espinosa and the late accused Belinda Tuao-Santos, whom he had designated as Cashier and
Assistant Cashier as early as December 3, 1984 (Exhibit C-1), and who performed the duties
appurtenant thereto despite the appointment of Imelda San Agustin as Cashier on July 1, 1987
(Exhibit 1-Espinosa). As to why accused Enriquez still allowed accused Espinosa, and the late
accused Santos, whose actual appointments were those of Administrative Officer I and
Revenue Collection Clerk, respectively (Exhibits C and A), to continue discharging the duties
and functions of Cashier and Asst. Cashier after July 1, 1987, only he can explain. The burden,
likewise, is on him to explain why he allowed all three of them (San Agustin, Espinosa and
Santos) to perform over-lapping work and permitted a situation to arise where accountability
could not be pin-pointed for collections, cash-counts and remittances.xxx xxx xxxAs reflected on
the record, accused Enriquez and Espinosa were engaged in mutual recriminations, with the
former pointing to the latter, and the latter pointing to the former and Imelda San Agustin, as the
ones responsible for the irregular entry and receipt of the dishonored CBC Check for
P3,278,161.10 (Exhibit E) as part of the municipal collections, with accused Enriquez even
denying his signatures/initials on the check itself and the statement of check (Exhibit P), through

which said dishonored check was remitted to the Quezon City Treasurer's Office. But, as We
have previously pointed out, for purposes of the instant prosecution, it is completely and entirely
immaterial and irrelevant as to who received said CBC check and who remitted the same as
part of the municipal collections. What should be explained is why no official receipt was issued
therefor and wherein will be seen the nature and purpose for the issuance of the check and why
it had to be utilized for covering up shortages already existing in the municipal treasury's
collections.There being no evidence on record to the contrary, then We can logically presume
that the dishonored check (Exhibit E) had been utilized for either of these objectives, to wit: (a) it
was surreptitiously encashed with the municipal treasury through a revenue collection clerk or
someone performing collection tasks, most probably accused Santos, and after which the check
was included in the Daily Statements of Collections, or (b) it was borrowed from the account
holder, Leonora Reyes, or from one D. Noble who was in possession thereof, for the specific
purpose of covering-up missing collections in the municipal treasury. Either way, the transaction
was irregular and improper, as were other transactions in said office. As pointed out by Auditor
Antasuda in her Memorandum for the Chairman, COA, dated July 15, 1988 (Exhibit F-1), the
audit examination revealed that not all the checks in the municipal treasury were deposited
intact; there were delayed deposits of collections; it took one month or more for collections to be
deposited with the District Treasurer; the cash balances always exceeded the cash reserve limit;
cash was transferred from one fund to another with check collections being used to replace the
transferred cash; there were loose controls and no control records in the handling of dishonored
checks, and delayed issuance of receipts on check payments, among many other defects and
deficiencies (Exhibit F-1 a).4xxx xxx xxxThrough their separate petitions for review, ENRIQUEZ
and ESPINOSA come to this Court for relief respectively raising numerous and lengthy assigned
errors which we shall summarize herein. For ENRIQUEZ, that the Sandiganbayan erred in
convicting him: 1. despite absence of proof of the missing funds; 2. despite the overwhelming
and unrebutted evidence that he had no participation in the negotiation of the subject check;
and 3. despite the inherent weakness of the prosecution evidence. For ESPINOSA, that the
Sandiganbayan erred in convicting her: 1. considering she was not an accountable officer at the
time the alleged shortage was incurred; 2. there was no proof that she tried to conceal or coverup the missing public funds; 3. there was no proof that she collected, misappropriated or spent
the missing funds for her own personal benefit; and 4. the prosecution failed to prove her guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.The arguments boil down to whether or not ENRIQUEZ and
ESPINOSA had incurred a shortage in their accounts as Municipal Treasurer and Administrative
Officer/designated as Acting Cashier, respectively, which they had attempted to conceal through
a bad check.In Diaz vs. Sandiganbayan,5 this Court held:Generally, the factual findings of the
Sandiganbayan are conclusive upon this Court but there are established exceptions to that rule,
such as, sans preclusion:, when (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation,
surmise and conjecture; (2) the inference made is manifestly an error or founded on a mistake;
(3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts;
and (5) the findings of fact are premised on a want of evidence and/or contradicted by evidence
on record. In these instances, this Court is bound to review the facts in order to avoid a
miscarriage of justice. 6We could do no less than to re-examine the evidence on record
considering that the decision of the Sandiganbayan, pertinent portions of which we have quoted
earlier, appears to be grounded on probabilities and conjecture.After an assiduous scrutiny of

the pleadings and the evidence, testimonial and documentary, the Court is convinced that the
acquittal of ENRIQUEZ and ESPINOSA must be decreed.The crime of malversation for which
ENRIQUEZ and ESPINOSA had been charged is defined under Article 217 of the Revised
Penal Code, its pertinent provisions read:Art. 217. Malversation of public funds or property
Presumption of malversation. Any public officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is
accountable for public funds or property, shall appropriate the same, or shall take or
misappropriate or shall consent, or through abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other
person to take such public funds or property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be guilty of
the misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property, . . . .xxx xxx xxxThe failure of the
public officer to have duly forthcoming such public funds or property, upon demand by a duly
authorized officer, "shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property
to personal use."The elements of malversation under the above penal provision are:(a) That
the offender is a public officer.(b)
That he has the custody or control of funds or property by
reason of the duties of his office.(c) That those funds or property are public funds or property
for which he is accountable.(d)
That he appropriated, took, misappropriated or consented
or, through abandonment or negligence, permitted another person to take them.7Verily, the first
two elements are present in this case. The findings of the Sandiganbayan that ENRIQUEZ and
ESPINOSA are public officers who have the custody or control of funds or property by reason of
the duties of their office are duly supported by the evidence. It is the last two elements, i.e.,
whether or not the amount represented in the dishonored check constituted public funds and
whether ENRIQUEZ and/or ESPINOSA really misappropriated said public funds, where the
instant petitions focus themselves. We are constrained to conclude that the prosecution, upon
whose burden was laden the task of establishing proof beyond reasonable doubt that petitioners
had committed the offense charged, failed to discharge this obligation. The Sandiganbayan
found the denials of the accused and their acts of shifting the blame and passing the
responsibility for the dishonored check to each other as unacceptable and indicative of their
guilt. However, it must be emphasized that although the evidence for the defense may be
characterized as weak, criminal conviction must come from the strength of the prosecution's
evidence and not from the weakness of the defense.8 We are not convinced that the evidence
in this case has proven beyond reasonable doubt that the accused are guilty of the crime
charged for reasons stated hereunder:First. There is no evidence to prove that the Pasig
Treasury incurred a cash shortage in the amount of P3,178,777.41, which amount, incidentally,
is even less than the amount of the dishonored check. As per report of the audit team, the
alleged shortage was computed and based on the value of the dishonored check. We reproduce
again the pertinent portion of the audit examination relied upon by the Sandiganbayan to
establish the shortage:The shortage is accounted for as follows:Disallowed cash item CBC
Check #303100
P3,267,911.10Overrecording of withdrawals (
100,018.10)
Underrecording of withdrawals
10,001.18Underremittance of collections
1,410.55
Overremittance of collections (
539.00)Overrecording of deposits
10.40Overfooting of
expenditures .53Overfooting of collections (
.04)Underfooting of collections
(
.80Total
P3,178,777.429As stated in the assailed decision, it was
only the drawn check, based on the audit examination that brought about the shortage. It was
palpable error for the Sandiganbayan to conclude that the check which the audit team had
pinpointed as the shortage due to its dishonor was at the same time, intended and used by

ENRIQUEZ and ESPINOSA to "cover up" shortages in the funds allegedly in their custody. The
shortage must be clearly established as a fact, i.e., that over and above the funds found by the
auditor in the actual possession of the accountable officers, there is an additional amount of
P3,178.777.42 which could no longer be produced or accounted for at the time of audit.
Evidence of shortage is necessary before there could be any taking, appropriation, conversion,
or loss of public funds that would amount to malversation. It makes no sense for any bogus
check to be produced to "cover up" an inexistent malversation. 10Indeed, no less than the sole
witness for the prosecution, audit team leader, Carmelita Antasuda, who conducted the cash
count and cash examination of the Pasig Treasury, testified that based on their audit
examination, it was only the subject check that brought about the shortage. Her testimony on
this point goes:Q:
Now, your examination covered the months from May to November, 1987,
were you able to determine whether in May there were already missing funds from the Treasury
of Pasig?A: In our examination we cannot determine if there were missing funds prior to our
cut-off date.Q: In other words from the months of May, June, July, August and September, there
was not shown or you were not able to discover whether there had been losses already during
those months?A:
No sir.Q:
In your testimony last Friday you related to us that only
checks were remitted from Pasig to Quezon City Treasury and the cash collections were
retained in Pasig to take care of payments for local obligations, is that right?A:
Yes sir.Q:
Now, you also stated that you were not able to determine whether checks or cash or
whether just cash was supposed to have been lost; is that right?A: Yes sir.Q:
Now, if a
check, as you also said is payable always to the Municipal Treasury of Pasig, is that right?A:
Yes sir.Q:
If a check was lost, the record of the Municipal Treasurer of Pasig would
record the payment as record the obligations of the payee as unpaid; is that right?A:
When
was the check was lost.Q:
Supposing a check was paid to the Municipal Treasurer of Pasig
was lost or was not encashed?JUSTICE ESCAREAL:Q: While in the possession of?ATTY.
SANCHEZ:Q: Of the Treasurer of Pasig, meaning it did not enter the cash collections, the
encashment of the checks did not enter the treasurer of Pasig would not the obligation for which
that amount in check was paid be recorded as still unpaid?A:
I would like to clear that.
When payments are made in the Municipal Treasurer of Pasig through checks it is automatically
issued an official receipt for that payment and the check and and the fact that it is already
issued an official receipt it follows that the taxpayer had already paid the amount of his tax.
JUSTICE ESCAREAL:Q:
In this particular case, did you find any official receipt issued for
the check?A: None, Your Honor. There has been no official receipt issued to that particular
check.Q:
In the name of the drawer Dean Noble you did not find any official receipt?A:
No sir.Q:
There was no receipt for Mr. Noble in the record of the Treasury of Pasig?
A:
None, Your Honor.JUSTICE ESCAREAL:You may now proceed.ATTY. SANCHEZ:Q:
Now, if these cash collections were lost where the object of whatever manipulation that
was done according to the charge in this case only cash collections is not the basis of your
statement in your recommendation number 1 in Exhibit F, your report is not the basis of that
recommendation of yours the fact that these cash collections were lost?A: In our examination,
sir the result that the shortage was on a check corresponding to the amount of the check and it
is that check which we disallowed so we do not know if it was cash or it was that check that was
cashed that was taken only that we know that it was that check that we disallowed in audit and it
is that check that resulted in the shortage. 11Equally revealing from the above-quoted testimony

of Carmelita Antasuda is her declaration that they could not identify whether it was cash or
check that was lost. This admission by the audit team leader necessarily weakens the reliability
of the audit findings. The respondent court itself gathered from Antasuda's cross-examination as
follows:The cashbook that they examined covered the months of May to November 1987 and
they conduct cash examinations twice a year. Based on their review, Auditor Diche conducted
two cash counts from May to November 1987, one in September 23, 1987 and another on
October 9, 1987 but she does not know what were the results of her cash counts. They were not
able to find out as to when the check (Exhibit E) was actually entered in the municipal treasury
because the collection voucher does not bear any collection pertaining to said check. Neither
were they able to discover whether there had been losses during the months from May to
September 1987. In fact, there has been no official receipt issued for the said check. They did
not find anything irregular in the statements of checks turned over to them by Imelda
Augustin. . . . 12Evidently, the audit examination lacked the thoroughness and completeness
required by the Manual of Instructions to Treasurers and Auditors and Other Guidelines. 1 In
People vs. Tinga 14, the Court had occasion to state:At this juncture, it may not be amiss to
state that considering the gravity of the offense of Malversation of Public Funds, just as
government treasurers are held to strict accountability as regards funds entrusted to them in a
fiduciary capacity, so also should examining COA auditors act with greater care and caution in
the audit of the accounts of such accountable officers to avoid the perpetration of any injustice.
Accounts should be examined carefully and thoroughly "to the last detail," "with absolute
certainty" in strict compliance with the Manual of Instructions. . . . ."Apparently, the
Sandiganbayan relied on the statutory presumption that the "[f]ailure of a public officer to have
duly forthcoming any public funds with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly
authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property
to personal uses." It must be emphasized that the prima facie presumption arises only if there is
no issue as to the accuracy, correctness, and regularity of the audit findings and if the fact that
funds are missing is indubitably established. 15 In the instant case, audit team leader Carmelita
Antasuda could not even equivocally state whether it was cash or check that was lost, if at all
there was any, belying the accuracy and correctness of the team's audit report.Second. There is
no evidence that ENRIQUEZ or ESPINOSA had received such an amount which they could no
longer produce or account for at the time of the audit. The Sandiganbayan merely speculated
that it was "surreptitiously encashed with the municipal treasury through a revenue collection
clerk or someone performing collection tasks" or "it was borrowed from the account holder for
the purpose of covering-up missing collections." In its own words the subject check was a
"wayward private check which cannot lawfully be credited to the municipal treasury or to the
accountability of either of the accused herein, as primary and secondary accountable officers."
16 For this reason, the Sandiganbayan had to rely on its cover-up theory which is not plausible
from the evidence on record.Third. There is no showing that the subject check was received by
the Pasig Treasury in an official capacity; that there was a duty to receive or collect the said
amount; and that there was an obligation to account for the same. The evidence submitted, just
to the contrary, would point out that the subject check was not issued in payment of taxes or
obligations due to the municipality and consequently no official receipt was issued for it. Indeed,
the subject check never formed a portion of the public funds of the municipality for which either
ENRIQUEZ or ESPINOSA are accountable for.Fourth. The Sandiganbayan clearly erred in

inferring from the incident that transpired on September 23, 1987, wherein ESPINOSA
deposited checks with the Quezon City Treasury for which she was issued an official receipt in
the amount of P3,583,084.18, but which she later corrected to conform to the actual amount of
the checks as P583,084.18, as indicative of a modus operandi to cover-up a shortage in the
amount of P3 million. ESPINOSA has explained, and her testimony remains unrebutted, that
she requested that the correction be made because she discovered 15 minutes after she was
issued the official receipt that the checks and the accompanying statements of checks 17 had
not been endorsed and signed by ENRIQUEZ. Moreover, the general rule is that the law will not
consider evidence that a person has done a certain act at a particular time as probative of a
contention that he has done a similar act at another time. This is the rule of res inter alios acta
18 found in Section 34, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, as amended. 19 Said incident could not
even sufficiently establish a plan or scheme between ENRIQUEZ and ESPINOSA to cover-up a
shortage that has never been proven.In view of the foregoing, the presumption is that
ENRIQUEZ and ESPINOSA are innocent, and the presumption continues up to the moment
their guilt is proved beyond reasonable doubt. To justify their conviction of the offense charged,
the evidence must establish their guilt to a moral certainty. In the instant case, the proofs on
record fall short of that required criterion. Consequently, the degree of moral certainty required
to justify conviction for this particular offense is sorely wanting and petitioners' acquittal thereof
must be adjudged.To repeat, the only facts established by the evidence against ENRIQUEZ is
that he instructed Benito Buenviaje to deliver the bundled checks placed on his desk which
apparently included the bogus check. His intials appearing thereon were found to be forged by
the NBI. On the other hand, the acts established against ESPINOSA consisted of what
transpired at the Quezon City Treasury on September 23, 1987. We cannot, however, derive
from these circumstances, without more, a conclusion that ENRIQUEZ and ESPINOSA
pocketed an amount of more than 3 million pesos from the funds in their capacity as
accountable public officers and, to prevent discovery, had caused the issuance of the bogus
check to cover up the shortage.There would appear to have been lapses or deficiencies in the
observance of auditing rules and regulations in the handling of the funds of the municipal
treasury e.g. delay in deposits of collections, cash balances exceeding cash reserve limit, loose
controls and no control records, etc. as pointed out by the audit team, and questions as to how
a private check was bundled together with legitimate collections of the Pasig Treasury for
transmittal to the Quezon City Treasury, but the same do not warrant a finding of criminal
culpability, which requires proof beyond reasonable doubt on the part of ENRIQUEZ and
ESPINOSA. However, the Chairman of the Commission on Audit should be apprised of this
decision for whatever action he may deem appropriate.WHEREFORE, the decision of the
Sandiganbayan (Second Division) promulgated on February 28, 1995 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE, and the petitioners Francisco C. Enriquez and Carmencita G. Espinosa are
ACQUITTED of the charge of malversation of public funds under Article 217(4) of the Revised
Penal Code. The Division Clerk of Court is directed to furnish the Chairman of the Commission
on Audit copies of this decision.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Sec. 35 - Unaccepted offer
43. FRANCISCO CAPALUNGAN, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FULGENCIO MEDRANO,
defendant-appellant.

G.R. No. L-13783

May 18, 1960GUTIERREZ DAVID, J.:This is an appeal by defendant
Fulgencio Medrano from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte.On May 3,
1931, Francisco Capalungan executed in favor of Fulgencio Medrano a deed denominated
"compraventa con pacto de retro" whereby he transferred to the latter for P1,200.00 a parcel of
land in San Laureano, No. 18, Dingras, Ilocos Norte, with the right to repurchase within ten
years from the sale. The contract provided further that the vendee a retro shall have no right to
dispose of the land while the contract was in force but would only have the right to enjoy
possession thereof. On January 31, 1933, Francisco Capalungan executed in favor of Pedro
Medrano a deed over another parcel of land in the same sitio, which deed was similarly
denominated and contained substantially the same provisions as the first mentioned contract.
On May 22, 1944, Francisco Capalungan paid and delivered to Pedro Medrano the total sum of
P1,800.00 for the redemption and/or repurchase of the two parcels of land subject matter of the
two deeds.Fulgencio and Pedro Medrano then filed in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte
a suit against Francisco and Paciano Capalungan to annul the repurchase of the lands made
from Pedro Medrano and to secure judgment declaring that Francisco Capalungan has lost the
right to repurchase said lands, and the ownership over them have been consolidated in the
plaintiffs. The trial court, after finding the two contracts to be equitable mortgages, declared valid
the redemption of the land mortgaged to Pedro Medrano and invalid the redemption of the land
mortgaged to Fulgencio Medrano, ordered the defendants to receive from the clerk of court the
redemption price of P1,200.00 deposited there by Fulgencio Medrano and ordered Pedro
Medrano to receive from the clerk of court the redemption price of P600.00 he had deposited
there, and to deliver to defendants possession of the land redeemed from him. On appeal, the
Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision.On June 23, 1954, Francisco Capalungan
filed in the same court, Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte, the present action against
Fulgencio Medrano, alleging substantially the facts outlined above, and further averring that he
tried to redeem the land from defendant by tendering the sum of P1,200.00 but defendant
refused to accept it and to execute the corresponding deed of redemption; and therefore prayed
that defendant be ordered to receive said amount from plaintiff and to execute the proper deed
of release; to deliver to plaintiff the palay he received for the agricultural year 1953-1954 and all
other palay he may have received from that time until actual execution of the deed of release;
and to pay plaintiff P2,500.00 as actual and moral damages resulting from his unwarranted
refusal. After trial, the lower court ordered defendant to give plaintiff 10 1/2 uyones of palay or
their total value in the amount of P577.50; and to pay moral damages of P100.00 and the costs.
The court subsequently amended its decision by ordering plaintiff "to ask for the issuance of the
corresponding writ of execution for the satisfaction of the decision of the Court of Appeals
rendered in Civil Case No. 235".Defendant Fulgencio Medrano appealed to this Court, alleging
that the lower court erred (1) in ordering appellee to ask for the issuance of a writ of execution
for the satisfaction of the decision of the Court of Appeals in Civil Case No. 235; (2) in
concluding that appellant was not justified in refusing the offer of payment; (3) in not finding that
the redemption price should be P1,205.50 and not P1,200.00 only; and (4) in ordering appellant
to deliver to appellee 10 1/2 uyones of palay and moral damages in the amount of P100.00.As
declared in the appellate court's decision in Civil Case No. 235, the contract between the parties
is an equitable mortgage. Appellee still owes appellant the sum of P1,200.00, which
indebtedness is secured by the mortgage on the property of appellee located in San Laureano,

No. 18, Dingras, Ilocos Norte. The decision of the Court of Appeals did not order appellant to do
anything for or to pay any amount to appellee. It merely specified the nature of the contract
between the parties and defined their rights thereunder. Consequently, there was nothing to be
executed under said decision, and the lower court erred in directing appellee to ask for
execution thereof.Under the contract, appellee is still under obligation to pay the indebtedness
of P1,200.00. One of the modes by which an obligation is extinguished is tender to payment and
consignation. This is a kind of payment. In May, 1953, appellee personally approached appellant
and offered to pay him the sum of P1,200.00, but the latter refused to accept the money. If the
creditor to whom tender of payment has been made refused without just cause to accept it, the
debtor shall be released from responsibility by the consignation of the thing due (Article 1256,
N.C.C.).Inasmuch as appellee never consigned the sum due with the court, payment was never
effected.The contract expressly provided that the mortgage creditor, the appellant, has the right
to possess the land and to enjoy the fruits thereof, as long as the sum of P1,200.00 has not
been paid to him. Consignation not having been made, the indebtedness was not discharged
and the effects of payment cannot take place. Hence appellant still has the right to enjoy the
property, and he cannot be made liable to appellee for the fruits he may have received from the
time tender of payment was made. Neither can he be made liable for other kinds of damages
which may have resulted from his non-acceptance of the proffer of payment. He would have
been liable only from the moment valid consignation had been made.We have to distinguish the
case of a mortgage debtor attempting to redeem the mortgaged property, from the cases of the
legal redemptioner and the vendor a retro trying to repurchase the property. In the first case, the
mortgage debtor is discharging an obligation. In the latter two cases, the legal redemptioner and
the vendor a retro are exercising a privilege. So, in order to preserve their right, all they have to
do is to tender payment within the prescribed period. Should the repurchase price be refused,
they do not have to effectuate consignation. [De Jesus vs. Garcia(CA), 47 Off. Gaz. 2406;
Rosales vs. Reyes, 25 Phil. 495], whereas with respect to debts, tender of payment without
consignation does not constitute valid payment (Paez vs. Magno, 83 Phil., 104, 46 Off. Gaz.
5425).There is no basis for appellant's contention that appellee should pay him P1,205.50, the
P5.50 representing the expenses incurred by the reason of the execution of the deed. The
contract indeed provides that appellee should pay for such expenses. And it is also true that the
record discloses that said amount of P5.50 was spent for registering the document in the
registry of deeds. However, there is no showing that it was appellant who paid for the same, so
we cannot order appellee to reimburse him therefore.Wherefore, the appealed decision is
hereby modified. Appellant does not have to pay damages nor does he have to deliver to
appellee the products he received from the time payment was tendered. He is ordered,
however, to accept payment and to execute the proper release paper upon payment to him by
appellee of the sum of P1,200.00. Without costs.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------44. PAZ TORRES DE CONEJERO and ENRIQUE CONEJERO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, VISITACION A. DE RAFFIAN and ENRIQUE TORRES, respondents.
G.R. No. L-21812
April 29, 1966REYES, J.B.L., J.:Petitioners, spouses Paz Torres and
Enrique Conejero, petitioned for the review and setting aside a decision rendered by the Court
of Appeals, in its Case CA-G.R. No. 19634-R, dismissing their action to compel respondents

Miguel Raffian and his wife, Visitacion A. de Raffian, to permit redemption of an undivided half
interest in a property in Cebu City which had been sold to said respondents by their corespondent, Enrique Torres, brother and co-owner of petitioner Paz Torres de Conejero.Shorn of
unessentials, the facts found by the Court of Appeals, in its decision under review, are that Paz
Torres and Enrique Torres were co-owners pro indiviso of a lot and building in Cebu City,
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 197-A1230 (T-3827), that both had inherited from
their deceased parents. As of September 15, 1949, Enrique Torres sold his half interest to the
Raffian spouses for P13,000, with right to repurchase within one year. Subsequent advances
by the vendees a retro increased their claims against Enrique Torres, and finally, on April 3,
1951 (six months after the expiration of the right to repurchase), said Enrique executed a deed
of absolute sale of the same half interest in the property in favor of the Raffians for P28,000.
This deed of absolute sale (Exhibit "3-A") had not been brought to the attention of Enrique's
sister and co-owner, Paz Torres de Conejero, nor of her husband, until August 19, 1952, when
Enrique Torres showed his brother-in-law, Enrique Conejero1, a copy of the deed of absolute
sale (Exhibit "C") of his share of the property in favor of the Raffians. Conejero forthwith went
to the buyers, offering to redeem his brother-in-law's share, which offer he latter raised to
P29,000.00 and afterwards to P34,000.Amicable settlement not having been attained, the
Conejeros filed, on October 4, 1952, a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Cebu, seeking
to be declared entitled to redeem the half interest of Enrique Torres; to which the Raffians
made answer, claiming absolute title to the property in dispute and pleading that plaintiffs lost
their right of redemption because they failed to exercise it within the statutory period.The court
of first instance found the deed of sale to be an equitable mortgage, and declared the plaintiffs
Conejero entitled to redeem Enrique's half interest for P34,000. Upon appeal by the defendants,
the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the court of first instance, found that the deed in
favor of the Raffians was a true sale, and declared as follows:The pertinent provision of the law
reads:"The right of legal re-emption or redemption shall not be exercised except within thirty
days from the notice in writing by the prospective vendor, or by the vendor, as the case may be.
The deed of sale shall not be recorded in the Registry of Property, unless accompanied by an
affidavit of the vendor that he has given written notice thereof to all possible redemptioners."The
right of redemption of co-owners excludes that of adjoining owners" (Art. 1623).Appellants claim
appellees denying that a written notice of the sale had been sent to the latter. We will
concede that the evidence does not sufficiently show that a written notice was in fact given to
the appellees; but this point is not decisive for the reason that ultimately, according to appellees,
themselves, they came to know of the sale on August 19, 1952, on which date they immediately
made an offer to redeem the property. Appellees argue that their offer to redeem the property on
the first day they came to know of the sale on August 19, 1952, and subsequently on September
7 and 8, 1952, has preserved their right of legal redemption as the 30-day period provided for by
law had not lapsed. On the other hand, the appellants claim that as early as April 3, 1951, the
date of the absolute sale of the property by Enrique Torres in favor of the Raffians, the
appellees already know of the sale, so that when the offer to redeem was made on August 19,
1952, the 30-day period provided by law had already lapsed. Taken together, all the
circumstances we find in the case indeed will guide us into forming the conclusion that while
appellees might not have received a written notice they could not have failed to have actual and
personal knowledge of the sale much earlier than August 19, 1952. But in view of our opinion

directed at another phase of the question involved, we will not rule on their respective claims as
to whether or not there was notice within the 30-day period. To us, this point is inconsequential.
Under the circumstances, what is more substantial and decisive is was there a valid and
effective offer to redeem? The law grants unto the co-owner of a property the right of
redemption. But in so granting that right, the law intended that the offer must be valid and
effective, accompanied by an actual tender of an acceptable redemption price. In the case at
bar, the evidence shows that the appellees had offered only P10,000.00 in check with which to
redeem the property with a promise to pay the balance by means of a loan which they would
apply for and obtain from the bank. We hold that the offer was not in pursuance of a legal and
effective exercise of the right of redemption as contemplated by law; hence, refusal of the offer
on the part of the appellants is justified. The conditions precedent for the valid exercise of the
right do not exist.We are now asked by petitioners Conejero to reverse and set aside the
foregoing decision of the Court of Appeals, on the basis of two propositions advanced by them,
to wit: (a) that no written notice of the sale to the Raffians having been given by Enrique Torres
to his sister and co-owner, Paz T. de Conejero, the latter's light to exercise legal redemption has
not expired, in fact, it has not even started to run; and (b) that in legal redemption no tender of
the redemption price is required, mere demand to allow redemption being sufficient to preserve
the redemptioner's right.With regard to the written notice, we agree with petitioners that such
notice is indispensable, and that, in view of the terms in which Article of the Philippine Civil Code
is couched, mere knowledge of the sale, acquired in some other manner by the redemptioner,
does not satisfy the statute. The written notice was obviously exacted by the Code to remove all
uncertainty as to the sale, its terms and its validity, and to quiet any doubts that the alienation is
not definitive. The statute not having provided for any alternative, the method of notification
prescribed remains exclusive.Upon the other hand, Article 1623 does not prescribe any
particular form of notice, nor any distinctive method for notifying the redemptioner. So long,
therefore, as the latter is informed in writing of the sale and the particulars thereof, the 30 days
for redemption start running, and the redemptioner has no real cause to complain. In the case at
bar, the redemptioners (now petitioners) admit that on August 19, 1952 the co-owner-vendor,
Enrique Torres, showed and gave Enrique Conejero (who was acting for and on behalf of his
wife, Paz Torres) a copy of the 1951 deed of sale in favor of respondents Raffian. The
furnishing of this copy was equivalent to the giving of written notice required by law: it came
from the vendor and made available in writing the details and finality of the sale. In fact, as
argued for the respondents at bar, it served all the purposes of the written notice, in a more
authentic manner than any other writing could have done. As a necessary consequence, the 30day period for the legal redemption by co-owner Paz Torres (retracto de comuneros) began to
run its coursed from and after August 19, 1952, ending on September 18, of the same year.The
next query is: did petitioners effectuate all the steps required for the redemption? We agree with
the Court of Appeals that they did not, for they failed to make a valid tender of the price of the
sale paid by the Raffians within the period fixed by law. Conejero merely offered a check for
P10,000, which was not even legal tender and which the Raffians rejected, in lieu of the price
of P28,000 recited by the deed of sale. The factual finding of the Court of Appeals to this effect
is final and conclusive. Nor were the vendees obligated to accept Conejero's promise to pay the
balance by means of a loan to be obtained in future from a bank. Bona fide redemption
necessarily imports a seasonable and valid tender of the entire repurchase price, and this was

not done. There is no cogent reason for requiring the vendee to accept payment by installments
from a redemptioner, as it would ultimately result in an indefinite extension of the 30-day
redemption period, when the purpose of the law in fixing a short and definite term is clearly to
avoid prolonged and anti-economic uncertainty as to ownership of the thing sold (Cf. Torrijos vs.
Crisologo, et al., G.R. No. L-1773, Sept. 29, 1962).Petitioners Conejero urge that, under the
provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines, a valid tender of the redemption (or repurchase)
price is not required, citing De la Cruz vs. Marcelino, 84 Phil. 709, and Torio vs. Rosario, 93 Phil.
800. Close scrutiny of these cases reveals that the Supreme Court held therein that a judicial
demand, by action filed within the redemption period and accompanied by consignation in Court
of the redemption price, can take the place of a personal tender to the vendee of the redemption
money under the Civil Code of 1889, because the nine-day redemption period allowed
thereunder was so short as to render it impractical that in every case the redemptioner should
be required to seek out and offer the redemption price personally to the buyer. Under the
present Civil Code, the urgency is greatly lessened by the prolongation of the redemption period
to 30 days, instead of the 9 previously allowed; and the petitioners herein have neither filed suit
within the 30-day redemption period nor made consignation of the price. While they received
copy of the deed of sale on August 19, 1952, complaint was only filed on October 4, 1952.It is,
likewise, argued that tender of the price is excused because Article 1620 of the new Civil Code
allows the redemptioner to pay only a reasonable price if the price of alienation is grossly
excessive, and that the reasonableness of the price to be paid can only be determined by the
courts. We think that the right of a redemptioner to pay a reasonable price under Article 1620
does not excuse him from the duty to make proper tender of the price that can be honestly
deemed reasonable under the circumstances, without prejudice to final arbitration by the courts;
nor does it authorize said redemptioner to demand that the vendee accept payment by
installments, as petitioners have sought to do. At any rate, the petitioners, in making their offer
to redeem, never contested the reasonableness of the price recited in the deed of sale. In fact,
they even offered more, and were willing to pay as much as P34,000.It is not difficult to discern
why the redemption price should either be fully offered in legal tender or else validly consigned
in court. Only by such means can the buyer become certain that the offer to redeem is one
made seriously and in good faith. A buyer can not be expected to entertain an offer of
redemption without attendant evidence that the redemptioner can, and is willing to accomplish
the repurchase immediately. A different rule would leave the buyer open to harassment by
speculators or crackpots, as well as to unnecessary prolongation of the redemption period,
contrary to the policy of the law. While consignation of the tendered price is not always
necessary because legal redemption is not made to discharge a pre-existing debt (Asturias
Sugar Central vs. Cane Molasses Co., 60 Phil. 253), a valid tender is indispensable, for the
reasons already stated. Of course, consignation of the price would remove all controversy as to
the redemptioner's ability to pay at the proper time.1wph1.tWe find no substantial error in
the decision appealed from, and the same is hereby affirmed. Petitioners Conejero shall pay the
costs.R E S O L U T I O NJune 30, 1966.REYES, J.B.L., J.:Petitioners, Paz Torres and Enrique
Conejero, by motion of June 4, 1966, have asked this Court to reconsider and set aside its
decision April 29, 1966, upon various grounds.1. It is argued that this Court committed error in
that it "considered the 30-day period provided for in Article 1623 of the new Civil Code" as a
period of prescription. This assertion is gratuitous and unfounded. Nowhere in its decision has

this court expressed or implied that the loss of petitioners' right of redemption was due to the
bar of the Statute of Limitation, or that it was a result of their failure to commence action within
the 30-day periods. If on page 7 of the main decision reference was made to petitioners' failure
to file action it was merely to show that, unlike in the case cited by them. (Cruz vs. Marcelino, 84
PHIL. 709; Torio vs. Rosario, 93 Phil. 800), they has failed to take the action therein considered
as equivalent to the timely tender of the entire redemption price. This is readily apparent form a
reading of paragraph 2 in said page 7 of the decision.What was repeatedly asserted and ruled
in our main decision is that the petitioners' right of redemption was lost because they failed to
make a valid tender of the entire redemption money within the period allotted by law; hence, the
invoked doctrine in Sempio vs. Del Rosario, 44 Phil. 1, while correct law, is totally inapplicable. A
decent regard for the Court on the part of counsel requires that the latter should not attempt to
distort this Court's rulings.2. While the co-owner's right of legal redemption (retracto legal de
comuneras) is a substantial right, it is exceptional in nature, limited in its duration and subject to
strict compliance with the legal requirements. One of theses is that the redemptioner should
tender payment of the redemption money within 30 days from written notice of the sale by the
co-owner, and, as we have ruled, the buyer of the co-owner's share can not be compelled, nor
is he obligated, to accept payment in installments. Otherwise, the 30-day limitation fixed by law
for the exercise of the right to redeem would be nullified, or be indefinitely evaded. If a partial
payment can bind the purchaser, by what rule can the payment of the balance be determined?3.
Whether or not the petitioners exercised diligence in asserting their willingness to pay is
irrelevant. Redemption by the co-owners of the vendor within 30 days is not a matter of intent,
but is effectuated only by payment, or valid tender, of the price within said period. How the
redemptioners raise the money is immaterial; timeliness and completeness of payment or
tender are the things that matter.4. The offer of the redemption price is not bona fide where it is
shown that the offerer could not have made payment in due time if the offer had been accepted.
Note that the co-owner's right to redeem, being granted by law, is binding on the purchaser of
the undivided share by operation of law, and the latter's consent or acceptance is not required
for the existence of the right of redemption. The only matter to be investigated by the courts,
therefore, is the timely of the right, and the only way to exercise it is by a valid payment or
tender within the 30 days prefixed by the Civil Code.Wherefore, the motion for reconsideration is
denied..
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------5. TESTIMONIAL KNOWLEDGE
Sec. 36 - Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge; hearsay excluded
45. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ARMANDO ALICANTE y DAVID,
accused-appellant.
G.R. Nos. 127026-27. May 31, 2000D E C I S I O NPER CURIAM:We are again faced with the
arduous task of determining whether the accused-appellant is guilty of a crime for which the law
mandates the imposition of the extreme penalty of death.The records reveal that fifteen (15)
informations for the crime of rape were filed against accused-appellant Armando Alicante y
David for having carnal knowledge of his minor daughter Richelle. These cases were filed on 17
July 1995 and raffled to Branch 273 of the Regional Trial Court of Marikina.[1] The information in
Criminal Case No. 95-546-MK reads as follows:The undersigned Assistant Provincial

Prosecutor upon prior sworn statement of the complainant to form part of the Information
charges ARMANDO ALICANTE Y DAVID with the crime of Rape, committed as follows:That on
or about the month of August 1994 in the Municipality of Marikina, Metro Manila, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a
kitchen knife, with lewd designs and by means of force, threats and intimidation, did, then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with Richelle C. Alicante, a 13
year old girl, who is his own daughter against the latter's will and consent.[2]The other fourteen
informations are virtual reproductions of the above-quoted information; they only differ as to the
dates.[3]On 23 August 1995, accused-appellant was arraigned and entered a plea of not guilty
to all the charges.[4] On 20 May 1996, the case was transferred to Branch 272 of the Regional
Trial Court of Marikina, as said court was designated as a special court to try cases classified as
heinous crimes.[5]Joint trial on the merits then ensued.The Office of the Solicitor General's
summary of the evidence for the prosecution,[6] with references to the pages of the
stenographic notes and exhibits deleted, is as follows:Sometime in August 1994, noontime,
Richelle had just finished taking a bath outside their house. Her brother Richard and sister
Racquel were still in school at that time. As she entered the house to change her clothes, her
father Armando grabbed her breasts. She slapped him. He got a knife, pointed it to her neck,
and pushed her down on the bed. He removed her shorts and panty, laid on top of her and
inserted his penis into her vagina. She felt pain and saw something whitish coming out of his
penis which he later placed on top of her stomach. He threatened to kill her and the other
members of her family should she tell anyone of the incident. After ordering her to wash her
vagina, he went out of the house. Left alone, she cried in one corner. She did not attend her
class at Barangka Elementary School because of the excruciating pain in her sex organ and her
headache.Three (3) days thereafter, the incident was repeated. She was outside their house
when he called her. After coming in, he locked the door and pushed her against the wall. He
took a knife and pointed it to her face. He said: "before anyone else, I should be first." He
removed her shorts and panty as he pressed her against the wall. Armando masturbated and
inserted his penis into her vagina. She felt pain in her sex organ. After the act, he repeated his
threat to kill her and her family. She could not do anything but cry.Within the same month, her
ordeal continued. One day, while leaving for school to play softball, she was ordered by
Armando to stay. Sensing that he was going to rape her again, she started crying. He slapped
her. She ran towards the door but he closed it. While he was looking for a knife, Richelle tried to
open the door. He then grabbed and pressed her against the wall. While pinning her, he pulled
her shorts down and took out his penis. He masturbated and mashed her breasts. A whitish
substance came out of his penis which he again placed on her stomach.She was thereafter
raped by her father once a week in September 1994. During the first week, she was lying on
bed together with her siblings, Richard and Racquel. She was at the edge. Her father was on
another bed. Her mother was not home. He then approached her and laid on top of her. He
inserted his penis into her vagina. She was frightened and nervous, her body shaking. She tried
to shout for help but he covered her mouth and slapped her. He started pushing and pulling and
she saw a white substance oozing from his penis. She felt pain in her vagina and was
nauseated at the act.In the second week, he summoned her inside the house to wash the
dishes. She did not obey. He then humiliated her and she was forced to go inside. He took a
knife and pointed it to her. While so doing, he pulled her dress and removed her shorts. He then

inserted his penis into her vagina. She felt weak and lost all her strength. Her head was
throbbing.During the third and fourth weeks, she was raped again.In October 1994, she was
raped three times. In all these instances, he threatened to kill her. She was prevented from
shouting because he covered her mouth. She kept these incidents a secret because she feared
his threat.In November 1994, she was again raped. Her brother and sister were playing outside
the house while her mother was at work. As she was preparing for school, her father called her
to their house. She did not obey him. He berated her and forced her to get inside. He locked the
door. He started hitting her head with his fists. She fought back. He slapped her twice and
grabbed her clothes. While she was being undressed, she pleaded "tama na po!" He ignored
her plea and continued removing her shorts and panty. He laid her on the "papag." He then
mashed her breasts, kissed her lips, masturbated and inserted his penis into her vagina. She
felt pain in her breasts and in her sex organ. Her head was aching. After the act, he put on his
shorts and laid down on the bed. Due to shame, she did not inform anyone of the incident.She
was raped three times by her father in January 1995. One Thursday morning, he ordered her
brother and sister to go outside while she was preparing for school. He then closed the door. He
hit her on the nape, pulled her hair and warned her not to scream. Threatening her with a knife,
he caressed her and ordered her to undress. She could only cry.She graduated from Barangka
Elementary School on March 24, 1995. As she was attending the commencement exercises,
Richelle felt dizzy and fainted. In May of the same year, she and her family transferred
residence to No. 16, Blk. 37, Lot 1, Phase 2-A, Katatagan St., Karangalan Village, Pasig City.
She was enrolled in secondary school in Pasig City. While attending her classes, Ms. Presto,
her teacher noticed her bulging abdomen. When Ms. Presto asked her about it, she told her
what her father did to her.She was physically examined on July 6, 1995. Per Medico-Legal
Report No. M-846-95, she was found to be on the 26th-27th week of pregnancy. On the same
day, she and her mother gave their respective sworn and signed statements to the Criminal
Investigation Division of the Eastern Police District.Subsequently, on July 11, 1995, Pacita
Alicante executed her "Salaysay ng Pag-uurong ng Demanda." On July 24, 1995, she gave birth
to twin boys who later died.The defense put up by accused-appellant is one of denial. Appellant
insists that such charges are mere fabrications and that his wife and daughter filed said charges
in order to get him out of their lives:xxx that his daughter could have filed the charges against
him because they wanted him out of their lives; that this is so because his wife Pacita, has
another man in her life whom he only know by the name "Bangkil"; that his wife admitted to him
their relationship when he was already detained; that he was so confused when he learned
about it; that his wife Pacita and his daughter Richelle visited him in jail on December 25 and
January 1 and told him they are withdrawing the case.[7]After trial, the court a quo, applying
Section 11 of R.A. No. 7659 which imposes the penalty of death when the victim is under
eighteen years of age, and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative
by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or common-law spouse of the parent of
the victim, rendered judgment against accused-appellant, to wit:WHEREFORE, in the light of
the foregoing, accused ARMANDO ALICANTE Y DAVID is found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt for seven (7) counts of the crime of rape defined and penalized under Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 7659 and is sentenced to suffer the extreme penalty
of DEATH in each of the case abovementioned.The accused is further ordered to pay the
private complainant Richelle Alicante the amount of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P100,00.00)

PESOS as moral damages and the amount of TWENTY FIVE THOUSAND (P25,000.00)
PESOS as exemplary damages and the costs of the suit.SO ORDERED.[8]Hence, this
automatic review, where the accused-appellant through counsel raises the following assignment
of errors:FIRST ASSIGNED ERROR: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING THE
TESTIMONY OF THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT WHEN IT WAS NEVER OFFERED IN
EVIDENCE BY THE PROSECUTION. ASSUMING ARGUENDO NO REVERSIBLE ERROR
WAS COMMITTED, STILL THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED ON
THE BASIS OF THE UNCORROBORATED TESTIMONY OF THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT
WHICH WAS HIGHLY INCONSISTENT, DUBIOUS, DONE BY ROTE, APPEARED TO BE
COACHED.SECOND ASSIGNED ERROR: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN APPLYING THE
PRESUMPTIONS THAT (1) A YOUNG FILIPINA WILL NOT CHARGE HER FATHER WITH
RAPE IF IT IS NOT TRUE AND (2) THAT A MOTHER WILL NOT SACRIFICE HER DAUGHTER
TO TELL A STORY OF DEFLORATION AND IN HOLDING THAT THESE PRESUMPTIONS
OUTWEIGHED THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRESUMPTIONS OF INNOCENCE.THIRD
ASSIGNED ERROR: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REJECTING THE COMPLAINANT'S
AFFIDAVITS OF DESISTANCE AS NOT AMOUNTING TO AN EXPRESS PARDON MADE
BEFORE THE FILING OF THE INFORMATIONS IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 344 OF THE
REVISED PENAL CODE.FOURTH ASSIGNED ERROR: THE LACK OF A DEFINITE
ALLEGATION OF THE DATE OF THE COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE IN THE COMPLAINT
AND INFORMATIONS FILED, AND THROUGHOUT THE TRIAL, PREVENTED THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT FROM PREPARING AN ADEQUATE DEFENSE AND VIOLATED HIS
RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL AND TO BE INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF THE
ACCUSATION AGAINST HIM.FIFTH ASSIGNED ERROR: THE FAILURE OF THE TRIAL
COURT TO RULE ON THE OFFERS OF EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION AND THE
DEFENSE SUBSTANTIALLY IMPAIRED THE RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT TO A
FAIR TRIAL SINCE IT ALLOWED THE COURT TO CONSIDER BOTH ADMISSIBLE AND
INADMISSIBLE FACTS IN ARRIVING AT ITS DECISION.SIXTH ASSIGNED ERROR: THE
DEATH PENALTY LAW, INSOFAR AS IT ORDERS THE AUTOMATIC AND MANDATORY
JUDICIAL KILLING OF APPELLANT AND OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, AS
PUNISHMENTS FOR ACTS WHICH DO NOT INCLUDE THE TAKING OF ANOTHER
PERSON'S LIFE, IS REPUGNANT TO THE CONSTITUTION AND AMOUNTS TO A
BARBARIC, EXCESSIVE, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT.[9]We will deal with these
issues in seriatim.Accused-appellant assails the trial court's reliance on the testimony of the
private complainant on two grounds: (1) failure on the part of the prosecution to formally offer it
in evidence in accord with Rule 132, Sections 34 and 35 of the Revised Rules of Evidence; and
(2) said testimony is full of inconsistencies and appears to be coached.[10]On the issue of the
prosecution's failure to formally offer in evidence the testimony of the victim, the applicable
provisions are Sections 34 and 35 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Evidence:SEC. 34. Offer
of evidence. - The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The
purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified.SEC. 35. When to make offer. - As
regards the testimony of a witness, the offer must be made at the time the witness is called to
testify.The above-quoted requirement is explained in Vicente J. Francisco's book on Evidence:
[11]xxx The introduction of evidence is intended to inform the court what the party making the
offer intends to prove, so that the court may rule intelligently upon the objections to questions

which have been asked, and may be necessary in order to preserve an exception to a ruling of
the trial court excluding evidence. As a general rule, a party offering evidence must show its
relevancy, materiality, and competency, and when he seeks to introduce evidence which does
not appear to be relevant or competent, or propounds to his witness an interrogatory which
appears to call for an irrelevant or incompetent answer, he should make a formal offer of proof
showing what testimony he proposes to adduce, and when necessary, his intention to prove
other facts which will render the evidence relevant or competent; the purpose for which
apparently irrelevant or incompetent evidence is offered should be disclosed.The Supreme
Court has held that any evidence which a party desires to submit for the consideration of the
court must formally be offered by him. Such a formal offer is necessary because it is the duty of
the judge to rest his findings of facts and his judgment only and strictly upon the evidence
offered by the parties at the trial. The offer may be made in any form sufficient to show that the
party is ready and willing to submit the evidence to the court.Admittedly, the transcripts of the
testimonies reveal that the prosecution failed to declare the purpose for which the testimony of
Richelle Alicante was being offered. However, this error will not prevent said testimony from
being appreciated and made part of the evidence for the prosecution. This is so because
counsel for the accused-appellant failed to seasonably raise an objection thereto. Said objection
could have been done at the time when the victim was called to the witness stand, without
proper explanation thereof or at anytime before the prosecution rested its case. Thus, this Court
has ruled:In People vs. Java, this Court ruled that the testimony of a witness, although not
formally offered in evidence, may still be admitted by the courts, if the other party does not
object to its presentation. The Court explained: "Section 36 of [Rule 132] requires that an
objection in the course of the oral examination of a witness should be made as soon as the
grounds therefor shall become reasonably apparent. Since no objection to the admissibility of
evidence was made in the court below, an objection raised for the first time on appeal will not be
considered. In the present case, a cursory reading of the stenographic notes reveals that the
counsel for the appellants did not raise any objection when said witnesses testified on the
matters now being impugned. Moreover, they repeatedly cross-examined the witnesses, which
shows that they had waived their objections to the said testimonies of such witnesses.[12]
Moreover, it should be noted that the witness whose testimony is sought by the accusedappellant to be disregarded is that of the victim herself. As explained earlier, the purpose of a
formal offer is to enable the trial judge to know the purpose or purposes for which the proponent
is presenting the evidence. As it is the victim herself who testified, to state the reason for the
presentation of said witness is to state the obvious. Hence, even without the formal offer, the
judge was assumed to already know the purpose of her testimony.Accused-appellant argues
that Richelle's testimony should be rejected since it is highly inconsistent, dubious and appears
to be coached as shown by the following inconsistencies:(a) While Richelle Alicante testified
that at least seven rapes occurred from August 1994 to April 1995, she only mentioned two in
her sworn statement [Exh. "F", par. 6] - once in August 1994 and once in April 1995;(b) While
Richelle said on direct examination that she was raped twice in August 1994 [TSN, 7/2/96, pp.
7-8, 18], she only mentioned one incident in her statement, Exh, "F";(c) While Richelle testified
that she was raped four times in September 1994 [TSN, 7/3/96, p. 8], she made no mention of
such rapes in her statement, Exh. "F"; and later changed her statement regarding the fourth
incident in September when she claimed that actual penetration took place [TSN, 7/9/96, p. 17];

(d) While Richelle testified at one point that she was raped four times in September 1994 [id.],
she later changed her testimony and said she was raped only three times [TSN, 7/3/96, p. 12];
and at another point in her testimony alleged that her father did not do anything wrong to her in
September 1994 [TSN, 7/2/96, p. 19];(e) While Richelle claimed when she testified on July 15,
1996 that she did not read the affidavit of desistance that she signed [Exh. "3" , TSN, 7/15/96,
pp. 15-16], she said the exact opposite when she testified as a hostile witness for the defense
on September 9, 1996 [see TSN, 9/9/96, p. 6];(f) While Richelle testified on direct that the
consequences of signing the affidavit of desistance were not explained to her [TSN, 7/15/96, pp.
15-16, 19], when she testified as a hostile witness for the defense she admitted that a lawyer
who prepared the affidavit of desistance talked to her in private and explained the
consequences of her signing the affidavit [TSN, 9/9/96, p. 7];(g) While Richelle said that
physical violence was repeatedly inflicted on her by appellant, the medico-legal report (Exh. "I"]
concluded that no external signs of application of any form of violence were found on Richelle;
(h) While Richelle testified that all the rapes occurred while their family was residing in Marikina,
she told SPO2 Balitao (as related by the latter on the stand) that she was only raped once in
Marikina and the rest of the rapes took place in their new residence Pasig [TSN, 7/30/96, p. 37];
(i) While Richelle said on her first day on the witness stand that after the second rape she could
no longer remember the other incidents [TSN, 7/2/96, p. 30], when she took the stand on the
subsequent days she was suddenly able to remember the other incidents;(j) While Richelle
claimed that she told the police on July 6, 1996 that she was raped in August, September,
October, November and December 1994 [TSN, 7/15/96, pp. 10-11], her statement, Exh. "F",
only mentioned a rape which allegedly occurred in August 1994 and no others for remainder of
1994; and(k) While Richelle alleged on initial direct that she was raped a total of five times
(twice in August 1994, twice in September, 1994 and once around all Saints Day of 1994), when
Richelle testified a few days later she said she was also raped thrice in October 1994, thrice in
January 1995; and once in February 1995 [TSN, 7/9/96, pp. 20-32].[13]Basically, accusedappellant attacks Richelle's testimony on the ground that in her sworn statement, the young girl
only mentioned a single rape incident that occurred in the month of August, 1994. Such claim is
baseless for it is clear in the narration of Richelle in her sworn statement that she was raped by
her father several times: "Bandang alas 12:00 ng Tanghali ng nangyari na nasundan pa ng
maraming beses sa loob ng dati naming bahay x x x."[14]The other inconsistencies refer to
minor details such as how many times she was raped during a certain month. These do not
create a reasonable doubt as to whether or not accused-appellant raped his daughter. It must
be remembered that the victim is a girl of tender age who was sexually attacked by her father
several times during a period of less than a year. It is not expected that Richelle would
remember every single detail of every single rape. It is understandable, even anticipated, that
there would be minor lapses and inaccuracies when a young girl is made to recount, detail by
detail her frightful ordeal under the hands of her father.[15] Considering the age of the victim,
she is more prone to error than an adult person.[16] The grueling experience of testifying in
public, face to face with her perpetrator and being questioned by hostile lawyers would
undoubtedly intimidate and confuse a young girl. Despite these circumstances, Richelle
remained steadfast in her claim that her father raped her.In any case, these inconsistencies go
into the credibility of Richelle as a witness. Well-settled is the rule that this Court will not disturb
the findings of the trial court as to the credibility of a witness. This is so because the trial court

has a better vantage point in observing the candor and behavior of the witness. Hence, the trial
court's characterization of Richelle as a witness:x x xDuring the trial, the court observed that the
complainant, as a witness, possessed the necessary competence and intelligence of making
known her perceptions and had narrated it with sincerity and truthfulness, though interrupted
with some temporary emotional breakdowns. Her categorical, spontaneous, candid and
straightforward testimonies have sufficiently established her credibility. It is noted, however, that
there were inconsistencies and discrepancies, like on the occasions of the commissions of the
rapes and on the circumstances as to how they were committed but such would have been
caused by the natural fickleness of memory due to the tender age of the complainant-witness
which tends to strengthen rather than to weaken her credibility as it erases suspicion of
rehearsed testimony. Besides, the precise date when the complainant was sexually abused is
not an element of the crime. x x x.[17]The fact that Richelle's testimony is uncorroborated is of
no moment. As this Court has held, the accused may be convicted on the basis of the lone
uncorroborated testimony of the rape victim, provided that her testimony is clear, positive,
convincing and otherwise consistent with human nature and the normal course of things.[18] We
agree with the trial court that Richelle's testimony meets this criterion.Accused-appellant,
likewise, has failed to come out with any plausible reason why Richelle would fabricate a story
of rape. As we have so held in the past, a young girl would not publicly disclose a humiliating
and shameful experience of being sexually abused by her father if such were not the truth,[19]
especially so in this case where there has been no showing of bad blood between father and
daughter prior to the charges of rape.[20]Accused-appellant, however, argues that the
application of the presumption by the trial court that a young Filipina will not charge a person
with rape if it is not true goes against the constitutional presumption of innocence. In People vs.
Godoy,[21] this Court explained the proper approach of courts when confronted by this situation:
The trial court, in holding for conviction, relied on the presumptio hominis that a young filipina
will not charge a person with rape if it is not true. In the process, however, it totally disregarded
the more paramount constitutional presumption that an accused is deemed innocent until
proven otherwise.It frequently happens that in a particular case two or more presumptions are
involved. Sometimes the presumption of conflict, one tending to demonstrate the guilt of the
accused and the other his innocence. In such case, it is necessary to examine the basis for
each presumption and determine what logical or social basis exists for each presumption, and
then determine which should be regarded as the more important and entitled to prevail over the
other. It must, however, be remembered that the existence of a presumption indicating guilt
does not destroy the presumption against innocence unless the inculpating evidence, together
with all of the evidence, or the lack of any evidence or explanation, is sufficient to overcome the
presumption of innocence by proving the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt until the
defendant is shown in this manner, the presumption of innocence continues.xxxIn rape cases,
especially much credence is accorded the testimony of the complaining witness, on the theory
that she will not choose to accuse her attacker at all and subject herself to the stigma and the
indignities her accusation will entail unless she is telling the truth. The rape victim who decides
to speak up exposes herself as a woman whose virtue has not been not only violated but also
irreparably sullied. In the eyes of a narrow-minded society, she becomes a cheapened woman,
never mind that she did not submit to her humiliation and has in fact denounced her assailant.
At the trial, she will be the object of lascivious curiosity People will want to be titillated by the

intimate details of her violation. She will squirm through her testimony as she described how her
honor was defiled, relating every embarrassing movement of the intrusion upon the most private
parts of her body. Most frequently, the defense will argue that she was not forced to submit but
freely conjoined in the sexual act. Her motives will be impugned. Her chastity will be challenged
and maligned. Whatever the outcome of the case, she will remain a tainted woman, a pariah
because her purity has been lost, albeit through no fault of hers. This is why in many a rape
victim chooses instead to keep quiet, suppressing her helpless indignation rather than
denouncing her attacker. This is also the reason why, if a woman decides instead to come out
openly and point to her assailant, courts are prone to believe that she is telling the truth
regardless of its consequences. xxx[22]The presumption that a young Filipina will not charge a
person with rape if it is not true vis-a-vis the application of the presumption of innocence has
been explained in this wise:The presumption of innocence, on the otherhand, is founded upon
the first principle of justice, and is not a mere form but a substantial part of the law. It is not
overcome by mere suspicion or conjecture; a probability that the defendant committed the
crime; nor by the fact that he had the opportunity to do so. Its purpose is to balance the scales
in what would otherwise be an uneven contest between the lone individual pitted against the
People and all the resources at their command. Its inexorable mandate is that, for all the
authority and influence of the prosecution, the accused must be acquitted and set free if his guilt
cannot be proved beyond the whisper of a doubt. This is in consonance with the rule that
conflicts in evidence must be resolved upon the theory of innocence rather than upon a theory
of guilt when it is possible to do so.[23]Further, as elaborated by Father Joaquin Bernas, one of
the framers of the 1987 Constitution, under the principle of presumption of innocence, it is
merely required of the State to establish a prima facie case, after which the burden of proof
shifts to the accused.[24] In U.S. v. Luling,[25] the Court said:xxxNo rule has been better
established in criminal law than that every man is presumed to be innocent until his guilt is
proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In a criminal prosecution, therefore, the burden is upon the
State to prove every fact and circumstance constituting the crime charged, for the purpose of
showing the guilt of the accused.While that is the rule, many of the States have established a
different rule and have provided that certain facts only shall constitute prima facie evidence, and
that then the burden is put upon the defendant to show or to explain that such facts or acts are
not criminal.It has been frequently decided, in case of statutory crimes, that no constitutional
provision is violated by a statute providing that proof by the State of some material fact or facts
shall constitute prima facie evidence of guilt, and that then the burden is shifted to the defendant
for the purpose of showing that such act or acts are innocent and are committed without
unlawful intention.xxx The State having the right to declare what acts are criminal, within certain
well defined limitations, has a right to specify what act or acts shall constitute a crime, as well as
what proof shall constitute prima facie evidence of guilt, and then to put upon the defendant the
burden of showing that such act or acts are innocent and are not committed with any criminal
intent or intention.[26]In like manner, this Court can adjudge certain evidence, such as a young
Filipina's statement that she was raped, in addition to the fact that she gave a premature birth to
a twins six or seven months after the commission of one of the rapes, as prima facie proof of the
guilt of the accused, as in the case at bar, and if unrebutted is enough to warrant a conviction,
without going against the constitutional presumption of innocence.Accused-appellant's assertion
that the trial court erred in applying the presumption that a mother will not sacrifice her daughter

to tell a story of defloration deserves no consideration. A careful examination of the assailed

decision reveals that the trial court never applied this presumption.The third assignment of error
raised by the accused-appellant is the rejection by the trial court of the affidavit of desistance
executed by the victim and her mother allegedly constitutes an express pardon. The
document[27] referred to reads as follows:Salaysay ng Pag-uurong ng DemandaAKO, si
PACITA ALICANTE, may sapat na gulang, may asawa at sa kasalukuyan ay naninirahan sa No.
16 Katatagan St., Karangalan Village, Pasig City, matapos manumpa ng ayon sa batas ay
malayang nagsasabi ng mga sumusunod:1. Na ako ang nagdidimanda ng salang "rape" laban
sa aking asawa na si ARMANDO ALICANTE dahil sa panggagahasa niya sa aming anak na si
RICHELLE ALICANTE, 13 taong gulang na ngayon ay iniimbestigahan sa Piskalya ng Pasig
City na may IS. NO. 95-4739;2. Na matapos kaming mag-usap-usap ay napagkasunduan
naming iurong na ang demanda at patawarin siya sa nagawa niyang kasalanan...ginawa namin
ang paguurong na ito upang mabuhay kami ng mapayapa at matiwasay;3. Na ipinaaabot ko sa
may kapangyarihan na hindi ko na nais pang ipagpatuloy ang reklamo ko laban sa kanya at
iyon ay iniaatras ko na sa pamamagitan ng salaysay na ito at hindi na kami tetestigo sa kasong
ito;4. Na ginawa ko ang salaysay na ito upang patotohanan ang lahat ng nasasaad dito sa itaas.
PASIG CITY, July 11, 1995(sgd)RICHELLE ALICANTE(sgd.)PACITA ALICANTENagsasalaysay
In order to determine the legal effect of the above-quoted document an examination of the
following provisions of the Revised Penal Code and the Rules of Court is necessary. Article 344
of the Revised Penal Code states:x x xART. 344. Prosecution of the crimes of adultery,
concubinage, seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness. - The offended party
cannot institute criminal prosecution without including both the guilty parties, if they are both
alive, nor, in any case, if he shall have consented or pardoned the offenders.The offenses of
seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness, shall not be prosecuted except upon a
complaint filed by the offended party or her parents, grandparents, or guardian, nor, in any case,
if the offender has been expressly pardoned by the above-named persons, as the case may be.
In cases of seduction, abduction, acts of lasciviousness and rape, the marriage of the offender
with the offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or remit the penalty already imposed
upon him. The provisions of this paragraph shall also be applicable to the co-principals,
accomplices and accessories after the fact of the abovementioned crimes.Section 5, Rule 110
of the Rules of Court expounds on the application of Article 344 of Revised Penal Code:Sec. 5.
Who must prosecute criminal actions. xxxThe offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of
lasciviousness, shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended party or
her parents, grandparents, or guardian, nor in any case, if the offender has been expressly
pardoned by the above-named persons, as the case may be. xxxThe offended party, even if she
were a minor, has the right to initiate the prosecution for the above offenses, independently of
her parents, grandparents or guardians, unless she is incompetent or incapable of doing so
upon grounds other than her minority. Where the offended party who is a minor fails to file the
complaint, her parents, grandparents, or guardian may file the same. The right to file the action
granted to the parents, grandparents or guardian shall be exclusive of all other persons and
shall be exercised successively in the order herein provided, except as stated in the
immediately preceeding paragraph.As pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General, a
careful scrutiny of the Salaysay ng Pag-uurong ng Denanda reveals that while the victim
Richelle signed the said document, the intent to pardon the accused-appellant was only on the

part of Pacita, the victim's mother and not the victim herself. The actor in the document, as so
worded, was Pacita. It involved the sole person of Pacita. This is demonstrated by the personal
pronouns she used, pointing to herself as the one who was extending the pardon. Thus, the first
paragraph starts with "Na ako ang nagdidimanda x x x." The second paragraph says, "Na
matapos kaming nag-usap-usap x x x" indicates that only Pacita and her husband talked,
excluding the victim who, at thirteen, could not have intelligently participated in her parents'
conversation. The third paragraph of the Salaysay opens with the words "Na ipinaabot ko sa
may kapangyarihan, x x x," signifies her personal involvement, not that of her daughter. Finally,
the last paragraph goes "Na ginawa ko ang salaysay x x x," demonstrating that it was only
Pacita alone that executed the affidavit.Besides, this Court looks with disfavor on affidavits of
desistance. The reason for this is enunciated in the case of People vs. Junio:[28]The appellant's
submission that the execution of an Affidavit of Desistance by complainant who was assisted by
her mother supported the 'inherent incredibility of prosecution's evidence' is specious. We have
said in so many cases that retractions are generally unreliable and are looked upon with
disfavor by the courts. The unreliable character of this document is shown by the fact that it is
quite incredible that after going through the process of having the accused-appellant arrested by
the police, positively identifying him as the person who raped her, enduring the humiliation of a
physical examination of her private parts, and then repeating her accusations in open court by
recounting her anguish, Maryjane would suddenly turn around and declare that [a]fter a careful
deliberation over the case, (she) find(s) that the same does not merit or warrant criminal
prosecution.Thus, we have declared that at most the retraction is an afterthought which should
not be given probative value. It would be a dangerous rule to reject the testimony taken before
the court of justice simply because the witness who gave it later on changed his mind for one
reason or another. Such a rule would make a solemn trial a mockery and place the investigation
at the mercy of unscrupulous witnesses. Because affidavits of retraction can easily be secured
from poor and ignorant witnesses, usually for monetary consideration, the Court has invariably
regarded such affidavits as exceedingly unreliable.This was reiterated by the Court of late in the
case of Alonte vs. Savellano, Jr.[29] where we further ruled that an affidavit of desistance by
itself, even when construed as pardon in so-called "private crimes," is not a ground for the
dismissal of the criminal case once the action has been instituted. The affidavit, nevertheless,
may, as so earlier intimated, possibly constitute evidence whose weight or probative value, like
any other piece of evidence, would be up to the court for proper evaluation.In any case, when
asked on the witness stand whether or not she wanted the case dismissed, Richelle answered
in the negative. She explained that she did not read the contents of the document and only
signed it because her aunt, Virginia Alicante, forced her to do so. She further stated in her
testimony that she intended to pursue the present case against her father.[30] Thus:It must be
stressed that during the trial proceedings of the rape case against the accused-appellant, it
appeared that despite the admission made by the victim herself in open court that she had
signed the Affidavit of Desistance, she, nevertheless, "strongly pointed out that she is not
withdrawing the charge against the accused because the latter might do the same sexual
assaults to other women." Thus, this is one occasion where an affidavit of desistance must be
regarded with disfavor inasmuch as the victim, in her tender age, manifested in court that she
was pursuing the rape charges against the accused-appellant.[31]As to when the pardon is to
be made, this Court had long ruled that the pardon must be granted before the criminal case

has been instituted:In People vs. Infante, G.R. No. 36270, an adultery case, the first division of
this court, interpreting article 344 with reference to that crime, declared in a decision rendered
by Justice Malcolm, promulgated on August 31, 1932, that in order that the pardon of the
aggrieved party may prevent the prosecution of the adulterers, it must be granted before and
not after the penal action has been instituted.In view of the foregoing considerations, we are of
the opinion and so hold, that the offended party's pardon of the offender in a seduction case
after the criminal action has been instituted does not extinguish said action according to
paragraph 3, article 344, of the Revised Penal Code. x x x.[32]Likewise in the Junio case, we
held:While "[t]he offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness, shall not be
prosecuted, except upon a complaint filed by the offended party or her parents, grandparents, or
guardian, nor in any case, if the offender has been expressly pardoned by the above named
persons, as the case may be," the pardon to justify the dismissal of the complaint should have
been made prior to the institution of the criminal action. Hence the motion to dismiss to which
the affidavit of desistance is attached was filed after the institution of the criminal case. And the
affiant did not appear to be serious in "signifying (her) intention to refrain from testifying" since
she still completed her testimony notwithstanding her earlier affidavit of desistance.[33]
Accordingly, the prosecution of the case continues even if the offended party pardons the
offender after the case has been instituted. While the second affidavit of desistance was signed
by Richelle, this was executed only on 5 December 1995,[34] after the criminal information had
already been filed in the trial court. No error can then be imputed to the trial court, for continuing
on with the trial despite the presentation of these two so-called affidavits of desistance.Accusedappellant also attacks the alleged lack of a definite allegation of the dates of the commission of
the offense not only in the complaint and informations filed but also throughout the trial. He
argues that this deficiency prevented him from preparing an adequate defense and violated his
right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.In addition, accusedappellant questions the basis of the informations. According to him, a review of the records will
show that the only document in the possession of the investigating prosecutor when he filed the
information was the sworn complaint of Richelle Alicante. Nowhere in her sworn complaint did
Richelle allege the number of times she was raped except for her declaration that she had been
raped "(m)any times." Hence, the filing of fifteen (15) separate Informations was mere
speculation on the part of the prosecution without any factual basis. Further, while the offended
party could not recall the exact dates of each and every alleged rape, it was incumbent upon the
prosecution to file charges only for those rapes in which they were fairly certain of the dates
when these sexual assaults occurred.We are not persuaded.Section 11, Rule 110 of the Rules
of Court is in point:SEC. 11. Time of the commission of the offense. - It is not necessary to state
in the complaint or information the precise time at which the offense was committed except
when time is a material ingredient of the offense, but the act may be alleged to have been
committed at any time near the actual date at which the offense was committed as the
information or complaint will permit.On numerous occasions, this Court has pronounced that the
precise time of the commission of the crime is not an essential element of rape:It is settled that
even a variance of a few months between the time set out in the indictment and that established
by the evidence during trial has been held not to constitute an error so serious as to warrant a
reversal of a conviction solely on that score. The failure of the complainant to state the exact
date and time of the commission of rape is a minor matter and can be expected when the

witness is recounting the details of a humiliating experience which are painful and difficult to
recall in open court and in the presence of other people. Moreover, the date of the commission
of the rape is not an essential element of the crime.[35]The Court finds that the informations
filed against herein accused-appellant state all the facts and ingredients that would, with
sufficient definiteness and clarity, fully apprise him of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him in compliance with his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and the
charges against him.As to the factual basis of the informations, while the records of the
prosecution[36] may be sketchy as bases of the other thirteen informations except for those
charging rapes for the months of August 1994 and April 1995, it is too late in the day to question
such. Accused-appellant had adequate remedies during the investigation and trial but he failed
to avail of them. In any case, such seeming defect is not fatal because as has been mentioned
earlier, the informations filed comply with the constitutional mandate.We agree with the
accused-appellant that there was failure on the part of the trial court judge to rule on the formal
offer of evidence and the objections thereto. It should be noted that this failure pertains to the
documentary and object evidence only, for as earlier discussed, testimonial evidence is offered,
objected to and admissibility ruled on when the witness is called to the stand. However, this
deficiency will not result in the reversal of accused-appellant's conviction. The purpose of the
requirement is to ensure that the judge will not consider inadmissible evidence in making his
decision. After a careful scrutiny of the decision and the records, it is our view that the judge did
not consider any inadmissible evidence. As pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General,
the testimony of Richelle, which, as has been discussed, is deemed formally offered without any
objections thereto, has been accepted as admissible by the trial court. Said testimony alone, to
the mind of this Court, is sufficient to sustain the conviction of the accused-appellant.In a last
ditch effort to escape the imposition of the death penalty, accused-appellant asks this Court to
re-examine its ruling on the constitutionality of the appreciation of such an extreme penalty. In
People v. Echegaray,[37] we have affirmed the constitutionality of the imposition of the death
penalty for crimes which are not attended by the circumstance of death on the part of the victim:
xxx We have already demonstrated earlier in our discussion of heinous crimes that the forfeiture
of life simply because life was taken, never was a defining essence of the death penalty in the
context of our legal history and cultural experience; rather, the death penalty is imposed in
heinous crimes because the perpetrators thereof have committed unforgivably execrable acts
that have so deeply dehumanized a person or criminal acts with severely destructive effects on
the national efforts to lift the masses from abject poverty through organized governmental
strategies based on a disciplined and honest citizenry, and because they have so caused
irreparable and substantial injury to both their victim and the society and a repetition of their acts
would pose actual threat to the safety of individuals and the survival of government, they must
be permanently prevented from doing so. At any rate, this Court has no doubts as to the innate
heinousness of the crime of rape, as we have held in the case of People v. Cristobal:"Rape is
the forcible violation of the sexual intimacy of another person. It does injury to justice and
chastity. Rape deeply wounds the respect, freedom, and physical and moral integrity to which
every person has a right. It causes grave damage that can mark the victim for life. It is always
an intrinsically evil act x x x an outrage upon decency and dignity that hurts not only the victim
but the society itself."[38]We find no cogent reason to reverse our stand on the heinousness of
the crime of rape when the perpetrator of such bestial act is the father of the victim. To say that

the crime of incestuous rape is not heinous simply because the victim did not die is to ignore the
lifelong trauma and stigma of the victim brought about by rape. In this particular case, the
psychiatrist who conducted and evaluated the test on Richelle observed that she consistently
showed signs of post traumatic stress disorder common to persons who have undergone
unusual traumatic events in their lives caused by natural or man-made catastrophes. The social
worker from the Department of Social Welfare and Development, likewise, noted that Richelle
was a greatly traumatized and emotionally injured individual.[39] These findings are consistent
with studies on the general effects of rape on a victim:The experience of rape creates a
disruption in lifestyle that realistically could last a lifetime. The physical trauma - that which is
visibly noted and treated - quickly heals, creating the illusion of recovery. Unfortunately, the real
trauma, because it is not of physical origin, frequently goes unnoticed and unattended.The
common pattern of public blame and skepticism encourages the victim to harbor emotional
injury and pain. This process results in longterm psychological and emotional symptoms xxx xxx
Previously common, comfortable situations may become fearful and phobic experiences
following an assault. Certain phobias may appear to be very logical, while other may appear to
the nonvictim to present little or no association. Some frequently associated phobias include:
association with crowds, being left alone, previously ignored sound, poorly lit areas, seeing a
man who may even vaguely resemble the rapist, odors associated with the attack, such as the
smell of alcohol and gasoline, the feeling that a crowd of people knows of the rape and is talking
about it, the occurrence of another disruptive experience, although unrelated, a general fear of
people, the thought of sexual relations. It must be remembered that to the victim these phobias
are very real and frightening.[40]In sum, we agree with the following findings of the trial court
that accused-appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of seven counts of rape since the
same is ably supported by the evidence:The record shows that the complainant took the witness
stand for three (3) times on July 2, July 3 and July 9, 1996 and each and all of these trials, she
consistently testified that the first time she was raped by her father was in August 1994 and the
same was repeated three (3) days thereafter. There had been allegations that she was still
repeatedly abused by her father but the circumstances as to how they were committed bears
repetitious contentions of general tenor which created doubt except those committed in October
1994, near the all Saint's Day and those three (3) rapes committed in January 1995, due to the
fact that she gave birth to a 6 to 7 months prematurely born twin baby boys in July 24, 1995, as
evidenced by the clinical records of the attending physicians which were taken cognizance as
judicial notice by the Court as the same was capable of unquestionable demonstration. The last
memorable occasion of the series of incest was in April 1995 just before they transferred to
another house from Bonifacio St., Dela Pena, Marikina, to Pasig, Metro Manila. Considerably,
therefore, in holding the accused to be liable for the two crimes of rapes in August 1994 which
were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 95-546-MK and 95-547-MK, respectively; once in the last
week of October 1994; docketed as Criminal Case No. 95-554-MK; three rapes committed in
January 1995, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 95-555-MK, 95-556-MK, and 95-557
respectively; and the rape committed in April 1995 and docketed as Crim. Case No. 95-560-MK;
the Court notes the well settled rule in this jurisdiction in crimes against chastity, that the
exacting standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt acquires more relevance in these cases
because such accusation is easily fabricated but hard to prove and harder still to defend on the
part of the accused, though innocent. Such that the testimony of the complainant should be

scrutinized with extreme caution and the evidence of the prosecution must fall or stand on its
own merit and should not draw any strength from the weakness of the evidence of the defense.
[41]As the relationship between the accused-appellant and the victim has in the same wise
been proven beyond reasonable doubt, the Court affirms the imposition of the death penalty in
accordance with Republic Act No. 7659 amending Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code which
provides:x x xThe death penalty shall be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of
the following attendant circumstances:1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age
and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or
affinity within the third civil degree, or the commonlaw spouse of the parent of the victim. x x xIn
line with prevailing jurisprudence, the civil indemnity ex delicto for the victim shall be in the
amount of P75,000.00 for each count of rape and moral damages of P50,000.00, likewise for
each count of rape without the need of pleading or proof of the basis thereof.[42]Four members
of the Court maintain their position that Republic Act No. 7659, insofar as it prescribes the death
penalty, is unconstitutional; nevertheless, they submit to the ruling of the Court, by a majority
vote, that the law is constitutional and that the death penalty should be accordingly imposed.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby AFFIRMS the appealed decision
sentencing the accused-appellant ARMANDO ALCANTE y DAVID to the extreme penalty of
death with the MODIFICATION that the accused-appellant shall be ordered to indemnify the
victim Richelle Alicante, in the amount of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00,
respectively, as moral damages for each count of the offense proved.In accordance with Section
25 of Republic Act No. 7659 amending Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, upon finality of this
decision, let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded to the Office of the President for
possible exercise of his pardoning power.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------46. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EUSEBIO TRAYA Y QUEMADA,
accused-appellant.
G.R. No. 129052. May 31, 2000D E C I S I O NPUNO, J.:Before us for automatic review is a
death sentence meted by the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 33 to accusedappellant Eusebio Traya y Quemada in Criminal Case No. 38,094-96 for the crime of raping his
own daughter. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:"WHEREFORE, finding the accused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the
maximum penalty of DEATH, including its accessory penalties, and to indemnify the offended
party in the amount of P50,000.00."[1]The victim is accused-appellant's 16-year old daughter,
Eulyn Traya. At the time of the offense, she and her 12-year old sister Liezl were living with the
accused, a fruit vendor, in a one-room hut in Sirib, Calinan, Davao City. Their mother, the
common-law wife of the accused, died in 1973.In August 1995, while Eulyn was sleeping beside
Liezl and the accused, the latter crawled towards her, removed her dress, panty and bra and
forced himself upon her. She resisted but he pinned her hands down. She tried to kick him but
to no avail. She could only cry. After the sexual act was consummated, her father warned her
not to tell anyone. Liezl saw her father ravishing Eulyn. She, however, did not help Eulyn for she
feared her father.The sexual abuse against Eulyn was repeated several times. The accused
would carry out his beastly act twice or thrice a week between 9:00 o'clock and 10:00 o'clock in
the evening. Since then, he became suspicious whenever Eulyn would leave the house. He kept
on warning her not to tell anyone about his dastardly act.In September 1996, Eulyn discovered

she was pregnant. Her condition was noticed by her half-sister, Marites Guimlan. When Marites
asked who the father of the baby was, Eulyn only cried. Marites informed the accused that
Eulyn was pregnant but the latter shrugged the matter off. At that rime, Marites suspected that
the accused was sexually abusing Eulyn, but she had no proof.On November 30, 1996, the
accused had sexual intercourse with Eulyn again. Since her womb had already grown big, she
had to lie on her side while the accused was abusing her. At 10:00 o'clock the next morning,
Eulyn, assisted by a "hilot",[2] gave birth to a deformed child.[3] The baby died three days later.
After the death of the baby, Liezl told Marites that the father of Eulyn's baby was their father.
Marites went to the City Social Services Development Office (CSSDO) in Calinan and reported
Eulyn's predicament. On December 5, 1996, CSSDO Officer Gilda Salvana accompanied her to
the Calinan Police Precinct. There, they recounted what the accused had done to Eulyn. At
11:45 a.m., P03 Henry Galledo, the Desk Officer, dispatched P03 Achilles Bargio and Martino
Adtoon to verify the report. At around 4:00 p.m., they returned with the accused who denied that
he raped Eulyn. At around 4:30 p.m., Eulyn arrived at the police station and filed a complaint for
rape against her father.[4]On December 9, 1996, the following information was filed against the
accused by Prosecutor David W. Natividad, to wit:"The undersigned accuses the above-named
accused of the crime of RAPE, under Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Presidential Decree 7659, upon the instance of complainant Eulyn Traya, whose affidavit is
hereto attached and form(s) part of this information, committed as follows:"That on or about
December 1, 1996, in the City of Davao, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-mentioned accused, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with the complainant Eulyn Traya, her
(sic) own daughter against her will."CONTRARY TO LAW."On January 6, 1996, assisted by Atty.
Lope Calio of the Public Attorney's Office, appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge.[5] On
December 6, 1996, a warrant of arrest was issued against him.[6] He was detained at the Ma-i
City Jail.On January 27, 1997, Eulyn submitted to a medical examination conducted by Dr.
Danilo Ledesma. The medical findings revealed that her hymen was reduced to tags because of
multiple lacerations brought about by childbirth.[7]During the trial, the appellant offered no alibi.
And, contrary to his plea, admitted in open court that he sexually abused his own daughter:
"COURT (To defendant):Q: What was the sin against your daughter?A: The truth is that, I took
advantage of my daughter, but it did not happen many times.ATTY. CALIO (Counsel for
defendant):Q: You mean you raped your daughter?A: It is not that I harmed or forced her.
COURT:Q: You mean she consented?A: Yes, your honor just at the time that I was drunk.Q:
What you are saying is that on (sic) you did not have carnal knowledge with your daughter?A:
Yes, your honor.Q: But previous to December 1, 1996, you have carnal knowledge with your
daughter?A: Yes, your honor.Q: How many times; many times?A: I cannot remember, your
Honor.Q: You cannot remember anymore how many times?A: Yes, I cannot remember, your
Honor.ATTY. CALIO:Q: Why did you do it when it is your own daughter?A: The truth is that,
when a person already forgets God, that is possible."[8]After the trial, Judge Wenceslao E.
Ibabao held that even without the admission of the accused, the prosecution had established his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Accused was meted the death penalty.[9]Appellant now in his
lone assignment of error contends that:"THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING
THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF
RAPE."In essence, appellant attacks the credibility of Eulyn's testimony. According to him, if he

abused her, she would have reported it to the police or their relatives. Yet, for a long period of
time, up to the moment that she got pregnant and delivered a baby, she did not expose him. He
also asserts that there was no proof that he forced himself upon her because if it were so, Eulyn
would have resisted. He likewise faults her for not asking Liezl's help when the latter was just
sleeping beside her when the alleged rape took place.We find no merit in appellant's
protestations."Of all so-called heinous crimes, none perhaps more deeply provokes feelings of
outrage, detestation and disgust than incestuous rape."[10] Especially so in this case, where
appellant contends that the victim, his own daughter, consented to his lascivious desires. Such
posturing is not only revolting but goes against established norm. No daughter in her right mind
would consent to having carnal knowledge with her own father. She would not go out in public
and make a false accusation against him if it were not true.[11]In a long line of cases, we ruled
that the failure of the victim to immediately report the rape is not necessarily an indication of a
fabricated charge.[12] In People v. Casil,[13] we said that the failure of the victim to report the
rape committed against her by her stepfather does not cast a doubt on her credibility and does
not mean that the charge is fabricated. In People v. Manuel,[14] we held that one should not
expect a fourteen-year old girl to act like an adult or a mature and experienced woman who
would know what to do under such difficult circumstances and who would have the courage and
intelligence to disregard a threat on her life and complain immediately that she had been forcibly
deflowered. It is not uncommon for young girls to conceal for some time the assault on their
virtues because of the rapist's threat on their lives, more so when the rapist is living with her.
Complainant's delay in reporting the sexual violations is thus understandable and does not
affect her credibility. In the case at bar, Eulyn's attacker is her own father and in whose house
she lived. It is undeniable that the moral ascendancy of a father can lead a daughter to suffer in
silence and not report the crime. Judging from Eulyn's testimony, she could not have reported
her father's depredation considering that he was her sole parent and she was not very close
with her father's relatives. In fact, she considers them as hostile to her and loyal to her father:
"COURT: (To witness.)Q: Now, the following day, did you report to your neighbors or to any of
your neighbors?A: No, sir.Q: Why?A: Because I was afraid of him.Q: Why are you afraid of him?
A: Because he would maul me.Q: Did he ever maul you?A: Yes, sir.Q: How many times?A:
Many times.Q: Why would he maul you?A: Whenever I would go somewhere and even only to
the house of my brother and sisters and whenever I go home late also.Q: Did you ever tell your
sister Leizl about your experience that night?A: No, sir.Q: Do you have any aunties or uncles in
the vicinity or in the neighborhood?A: Only my grandmother.Q: Did you tell this to your
grandmother?A: No, sir.Q: Why?A: I was afraid because my grandmother and my father are
very close.Q: Why did you not also tell to your half brother and half sisters?A: I was also afraid
because they were close to my father."[15]We entertain no doubt that Eulyn was telling the truth.
Her testimony was simple and straightforward. It was unflawed by any inconsistency or
contradiction. A candid and straightforward narration by the victim of how she was abused must
be given full faith and credit for they contain earmarks of credibility. The trial court found these
badges of credibility to be present in her testimony.[16]"Prosecutor Jose A. Garcia, Jr.Q: Now,
where is Eusebio living today?A: In Ma-a City jail.Q: Why is it that he is in jail?A: Because he
was jailed.Q: Do you know why?A: Because he raped me.Q: Now as far as you can recall when
was the first time that your father did this to you?A: In August, I forgot the exact date.Q: What
year.A: 1995.Q: What made you remember that it was in August 1995?A: The fiesta in our bario

at that time was approaching.Q: Eve?A: Yes, sir.Q: Can you recall where this happened?A: In
our house, sir.Q: What were you then doing?A: I was sleeping.Q: Who was with you?A: My
sister Leizl.x x x.Q: While you were sleeping, can you tell us what happened?A: My father
crawled towards me.Q: When your father crawled, what did he do?A: He kissed me, he mashed
my breast, he undressed me and he removed my panty.Q: And next, what happened?A: He
removed my bra, and he had sex with me.Q: Did you resist your father?A: Yes, sir.Q: So, what
happened?A: I was overpowered because he was very strong.Q: And, how did you feel when he
had sex with you?A: I was angry at him (for) what he did to me.Q: And, what else did he do to
you?A: He told me not to tell anybody."[17]Even on cross-examination, she remained consistent
in her testimony:"Atty. Calio (Counsel for the defendant):x x x.Q: You said your father first kissed
you, is that correct?A: Yes, sir.Q: You immediately recognized that the one who kissed you was
your father?A: Yes, I recognized him by his smell.Q: Can you tell us what was the smell that you
can recognize that it was your father?A: He smelled (of) cigarettes and liquor.Q: You mean, your
father was drunk at that time?A: Yes, sir.x x x.Q: Now, when your father kissed you, of course
you were not surprised because you are his daughter?A: I was surprised.x x x.Q: So, because
you were already surprised, you must have done something to your father?A: I resisted.Q:
How?A: I kicked him.Q: You did not tell him, 'Father, why are you doing this?'A: I told him but he
did not say anything.Q: Instead, he mashed your breasts?A: Yes, sir.Q: You did not move wildly
considering that it was already wrong why (sic) your father was doing?A: I moved wildly.Q: And,
you even stood up.A: I could not stand because he held me.Q: You did not shout to your sister,
'Liezl, Liezl, please help me'?A: No, Sir.Q: Leizl at that time was still sleeping at your side?A:
Yes, sir.Q: You did not even kick Leizl, 'Leizl, please wake up'?A: No, sir.Q: Why?A: I could not
say anything because I cried already and I kept on resisting.Q: You did not scratch the face of
your father?A: No, because he held my two hands.Q: You did not kick the penis of your father?
A: I kicked his feet but I did not hit his penis.Q: So, there was a wrangling inside the room?A:
Yes, sir.Q: Yet, Leizl was not able to wake up?A: She was awakened but she did not mind.Q:
You saw Leizl wake up?A: Yes, because she moved.Q: And because she moved you were
thinking that she was awakened?A: Yes, sir.Q: And yet, you did not summon Leizl to please
wake up and report to your grandmother what your father was doing to you?A: No, sir.Q: So, on
that evening, even if Leizl was already awakened, your father was able to undress you, remove
your panty, remove your bra and had sex with you on (sic) that particular room?A: Yes, sir."[18]
Eulyn's accusation against her father is buttressed by the eyewitness account of Leizl:"Pros.
Garcia:Q: Now, why do you say that your father had sex with your sister?A: Because I saw
them.Q: You saw your father on top of your sister?A: Yes, sir.Q: Usually, what time could this
be?A: In the middle of the night.COURT (to witness).Q: Why do you say that he had sex with
your sister?A: Because I personally saw them.Q: What did you see?A: That he was on top of
my sister.PROS. GARCIA:Q: Now, did you see your sister resist?A: Yes, sir.Q: What about you,
did you resist?A: I just kept silent because I was afraid.COURT (to witness)Q: How many times
did you see your father having sex?A: Many times.PROS. GARCIA:Q: Many times in the year
1995?A: Yes, sir.Q: In 1996, did you see them again?A: Yes, sir.Q: You and your sister and
father would sleep in one bed, or in one sala, or can you please describe the place where you
usually sleep?A: I sleep beside my father, then next to me is my sister.x x x.Q: Now, since this
would happen in the middle of the night, how come you could see your father on top of your
sister?A: I was awakened because of the movement.Q: Can you perceive what were these

movements which awakened you?A: Yes, sir.Q: What are these movements?A: At that time, he
would place himself on top of her.Q: Now, is the room lighted whenever your father (is) on top of
your sister?A : Not, sir.Q: How would you know that it was your father who was on top of your
sister?A: Because whenever I was awakened, I groped my father beside me and I could find
him there.Q: Liezl, did it not occur to your mind that you should report to your Lola or aunts
regarding what you saw?A: I would think of it but I am afraid.Q: Why are you afraid of your
fatherA: I am afraid of my father, sir.Q: Why?A: He might kill all of us if I will tell anybody.Q:
Were you ever punished by your father before?A: Yes, sir.Q: What about Eulyn?A: She was
slapped.Q: How many times (was) Eulyn slapped by your father?A: Everytime Eulyn leaves the
house without the permission from my father."[19]On cross-examination, she maintained what
she saw:"Q: Now, you told us that you saw your father on top of your sister Eulyn, is that
correct?A: Yes, sir.Q: You were not sure that it was your father because it was dark?A: I am
sure, sir.Q: Did you see him actually?A: Yes, sir.x x x.Q: Now, when you were awakened , was it
unusual on your part to see your father on top of Eulyn?A: I found it unusual, sir.Q: When your
father was on top of Eulyn, they were just in (sic) your side?A: Yes, sir.Q: You can even touch
them.A: Yes, sir."[20]We again note that Eulyn's father was her sole parent and breadwinner.
She would not, therefore, risk losing the one person who could support her and her younger
sister by purveying a false accusation against him. Her resort to the force of law was necessary
to put an end to her father's sexual abuse.Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code,[21] one
way to commit rape is by having carnal knowledge of a woman using force or intimidation.[22] In
a rape committed by a father against his own daughter, the father's moral ascendancy and
influence over the latter substitutes for violence and intimidation.[23] Thus, the lower court is
correct in convicting accused-appellant of rape since he used his moral ascendancy over his
daughter in repeatedly abusing her. Moreover, the evidence shows that Eulyn resisted the
efforts of the appellant but her resistance proved futile.We now go to the penalty.The trial court
meted accused-appellant the extreme penalty of death under Republic Act 7659 which provides
that the death penalty shall be imposed if the crime of rape is committed by a parent against his
child who was under eighteen years (18) of age at the time of the assault.[24]A reading of the
Information against accused-appellant, however, reveals that he was merely charged with
simple rape punishable by reclusion perpetua. It stated:"The undersigned accuses the abovenamed accused of the crime of RAPE, under Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended
by Presidential Decree 7659, upon the instance of complainant Eulyn Traya, whose affidavit is
hereto attached and form(s) part of this information, committed as follows:That on or about
December 1, 1996, in the City of Davao, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-mentioned accused, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with the complaint Eulyn Traya, her
(sic) own daughter against her will.CONTRARY TO LAW."The fact of the minority of the victim
was not stated in the Information. Only the relationship of the victim as the daughter of the
offender was alleged therein. The rule is that the elements of minority of the victim and her
relationship to the offender must concur. The failure to allege one of these elements precludes
the imposition of the death penalty. We held in the case of People vs. Abella:[25]"The Court
emphasizes anew that in decreeing the death penalty, under the aforequoted law, the
information or complaint must specifically allege the qualifying circumstances that would justify
the imposition of that extreme penalty. In this case, the circumstances that would qualify the

offense are (a) that the accused-appellant is the father of the victim; and (b) that the latter is
under 18 years of age at the time of the rape. While the criminal complaint in this case did state
that the victim is the daughter of the accused-appellant, it, however, has failed to mention her
being under 18 years of age at the time of the commission of the offense. The omission is a
fatal flaw in the imposition of the death penalty."The case of People vs. Calayca[26] also finds
application in this case. We ruled in that case:"There being no allegation of the minority of the
victim in the Information, he cannot be convicted of qualified rape as he was not properly
informed that he is being accused of qualified rape. Appellant's conviction of qualified rape
violates his constitutional right to be properly informed of the nature and cause of accusation
against him. In a criminal prosecution, it is fundamental rule that every element of the crime
charged must be alleged in the Information. The main purpose of this constitutional requirement
is to enable the accused to properly prepare his defense. He is presumed to have no
independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense."Hence, we find that the proper
penalty to be imposed on accused-appellant should be reclusion perpetua.Nonetheless, we
note that the crime committed by the appellant was incestuous rape. The offender was the
victim's own father[27] who exercised sole parental authority over her. In People v. Lao,[28] we
condemned this kind of criminal in lacerating language, viz:"Such a 'father' deserves no place in
society, and more especially in a country like the Philippines whose fundamental law considers
the family as a basic autonomous social institution and the foundation of the nation, recognizes
the sanctity of family life and mandates the State to defend the right of children to special
protection from all the forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation and other conditions
prejudicial to their development."Consequently, we hold that an award of P20,000.00 as
exemplary damages and P50,000.00 as moral damages are in order.IN VIEW WHEREOF, the
judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION reducing the sentence to
reclusion perpetua. Accused-appellant is further ordered to pay the offended party the amount
of P50,000.00 as moral damages and P20,000.00 as exemplary damages.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------47. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MARLON LERIO @ ROMAN,
accused-appellant.
G.R. No. 116729
January 31, 2000
QUISUMBING, J.:On appeal is the decision dated July 7, 1994, of the Regional Trial Court of
Tayug, Pangasinan, Branch 51, convicting accused-appellant of the crime of statutory rape,
imposing upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and ordering him to indemnify the victim
the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages.Appellant Marlon Lerio1 was 19 years old, single,
farmer, and resident of San Macario Norte, Natividad, Pangasinan, while the victim was Jennifer
M. Soriano, 11 years old and a grade five (5) student, at the time of the offense charged.The
facts, as summarized by the Office of the Solicitor General, and which we find to be supported
by the records, are as follows:2At around 7:15 in the evening of January 22, 1992, complainant
Jennifer Soriano, who at that time was only eleven (11) years old, was on her way to watch
television (TV) at the house of Apong Belen Casandig. When she was at the side of the house
of Belen Casandig, she was intercepted by appellant Marlon Lerio alias "Roman". He grabbed
her, covered her mouth in such a way that she cannot shout for help and carried her towards the
place where there were piles of dried cogon (tsn., November 11, 1993, pp. 3-4; January 20,
1994, p. 34).As he carried her, complainant tried to struggle to free herself, but was unable to do

so. Appellant laid her down on the piles of cogon and proceeded to divest her of her underwear.
While doing so, he went on top of complainant and sexually assaulted her. Jennifer Soriano
struggled against his attack but to no avail (tsn., Nov. 11, 1993, pp. 43-45).When they heard her
parents calling her by name, appellant released her and she ran away, carrying her underwear
(tsn., January 20, 1994, pp. 43-45).Floro Volante, the barangay captain of San Macario Norte,
Natividad, Pangasinan testified that on the evening of January 22, 1992, Arsenio Soriano, the
father of complainant, reported that his (Arsenio Soriano) daughter was raped by Marlon Lerio.
He went to complainant's house and later he went to the crime scene together with complainant
and her parents. While there, he saw the disarranged piles of cogon. They likewise discovered a
headband belonging to complainant, which the latter picked up. Still in the course of his
investigation, he went to appellant's house and questioned him in the presence of his parents
(tsn., February 19,1993, pp. 3-6).The barangay captain's testimony was corroborated by
complainant's mother, Estrelita Soriano. She further testified that she examined her daughter's
private parts, which was reddish at the time, and that she saw seminal fluid in her daughter's
private part (tsn., August 11, 1993, pp. 28-30).Dr. Perfecto Tebangin, the Rural Health Officer,
testified that he examined the complainant fourteen (14) days after the incident. Although
Jennifer Soriano told him that she was raped, he did not see any scratch, scar or hematoma on
the latter's body, and that the hymen was still intact (tsn., February 1, 1994, pp. 3-6).On June
10, 1992, appellant was charged with the crime of rape under the following Information:I N F O
R M A T I O NThe undersigned, upon a verified complaint of ESTRELITA M. SORIANO, hereby
accuses MARLON LERIO of the crime of RAPE, committed as follows:That on or about the
22nd day of January, 1992, in the evening, along the pile of harvested cogon at Barangay San
Macario Norte, municipality of Natividad, province of Pangasinan, New Republic of the
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by
means of force and intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
sexual intercourse with JENNIFER SORIANO, a minor 11 years of age, against her will and
consent to her damage and prejudice.CONTRARY to Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code.
Tayug, Pangasinan, April 20, 1992(SGD) CARLOS TRECE R. MAPILIAssistant Prov'l.
ProsecutorAPPROVED:(SGD) JOSE ANTONIO M. GUILLERMOProvincial ProsecutorUpon
arraignment, appellant entered a plea of not guilty.4At the trial, the prosecution presented the
following witnesses: (1) Barangay Captain Floro B. Volante; (2) Estrelita M. Soriano, the mother
of the victim; (3) Jennifer M. Soriano, the victim; and (4) Dr. Perfecto B. Tebangin, Municipal
Health Officer of Natividad, Pangasinan.For the defense, appellant was the sole witness. His
version of the incident is that on the night of January 22, 1992, he was at the house of his
grandfather in San Macario, Natividad, Pangasinan watching television with his aunt and
cousins. The house of his grandfather was located some two (2) meters away from the house of
the victim. At around 7:30 in the evening, he went outside to urinate, and on his way back, he
met the victim beside the house. He asked her to accompany him to get some "komiks" from the
house of his uncle. He held her hands and kissed her on the lips, but did not have sexual
intercourse with her. He claims that the parents of the victim filed the rape charge against him
because they were infuriated when they learned that he kissed their daughter.5On July 7, 1994,
the trial court rendered a decision6 finding appellant guilty of statutory rape under Article 335,
No. 3 of the Revised Penal Code. The dispositive portion of the decision states:WHEREFORE,
the Court, finding the accused GUILTY as charged, hereby sentenses (sic) him to suffer the

penalty of reclusion perpetua, which shall carry with it the accessory penalties of civil interdiction
for life and that of perpetual absolute disqualification, in accordance with Articles 335 and 41 of
the Revised Penal Code.However, and as mandated by Article 29 of the same Code, the
accused is hereby credited in the service of his sentence with four-fifths (4/5) of the time during
which, prior to the finality of this judgment, he shall have undergone preventive imprisonment,
there being no writing on record that shows that he ever voluntarily agreed as a detention
prisoner to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted persons.Additionally,
the accused is hereby ordered to indemnify Jennifer Soriano for moral damages in the amount
of P50,000.00 in accordance with Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code and with Article 2219 of
the Civil Code, and to pay the costs.1wphi1.ntSO ORDERED.Hence, the present appeal.
Appellant makes the following assignment of errors:7I. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED
IN GIVING FULL CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES
WHICH ARE HIGHLY INCREDIBLE, INCONSISTENT AND UNRELIABLE.II. THE TRIAL
COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN DISREGARDING IN EVIDENCE THE MEDICAL CERTIFICATE
ISSUED BY DR. PERFECTO TEBANGIN AND IN NOT GIVING CREDENCE TO THE
DEFENSE INTERPOSED BY THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT.III. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY
ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE
PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT.In his brief,
appellant assails the credibility of the victim and her witnesses arguing that her lurid story is not
borne out by the medical findings. And even granting that he may have tried to force himself on
the victim, the sexual act was never consummated because the victim, per her own testimony,
was constantly struggling to be free.For the State, the Office of the Solicitor General prays for
the affirmance in toto of the trial court's decision, considering that jurisprudence is replete with
rulings that rape may be committed even without vaginal lacerations or rupture of the hymen.
Further, the OSG argues that the victim and her parents would not have made themselves the
butt of barrio gossip by divulging that the victim was raped, if it were not true.In sum, the issues
revolve on the credibility of the prosecution witnesses, the probative value of the medical
certificate that the hymen of the victim was still intact, and the sufficiency of evidence to convict
appellant.Findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect
and will not be disturbed on appeal, absent any showing of palpable mistake or grave abuse of
discretion.8 The records show that the victim was placed on the stand no less than three (3)
times, yet she never wavered under withering cross-examination. Her statements were
categorical, straightforward, candid, and credible. The Court has time and again ruled that the
sole testimony of the victim in a rape case is sufficient to sustain a conviction if such testimony
is credible.9Further, no ill-motive could be imputed against the victim or her parents to
manufacture such an accusation against the appellant, particularly where appellant, by his own
admission, is on good terms with the family of the victim.10 The victim and her family could not
raise such a serious charge against the appellant unless justifiably motivated by a sincere
desire to seek justice for a wrong done, for such a charge if untrue would only expose the victim
and her entire family to humiliation and stigma attendant to a rape trial.11 Moreover, we find that
appellant's defense of denial and alibi could not stand, in the face of his positive identification as
the offender, and in view of the credible testimonies of the victim, her mother and the barangay
captain.It was duly established during trial that the victim was only eleven (11) years old at the
time of the rape. Where the girl is below twelve (12) years of age, violence or intimidation is not

required,12 and the only subject of inquiry is whether "carnal knowledge" took place. In People
v. Quianola, G.R. No. 126148, May 5, 1999, pp. 20-21, we held that In the context it is used
in the Revised Penal Code, "carnal knowledge," unlike its ordinary connotation of sexual
intercourse, does not necessarily require that the vagina be penetrated or that the hymen be
ruptured. (6 WORDS AND PHRASES 273 citing Walker v. State, 273 S.W. 2d 707, 711, 197
Tenn. 452). The crime of rape is deemed consummated even when the man's penis merely
enters the labia or lips of the female organ [People v. Cabebe, G.R. No. 125910, May 21, 1998)
or, as once so said in a case, by the "mere touching of the external genitalia by a penis capable
of consummating the sexual act." (People v. De la Pea, 233 SCRA 573 cited in People v.
Castromero, 280 SCRA 421.)In this case, the victim testified that appellant "inserted his penis
inside her vagina"13 and that she felt "pain at the center."14 Appellant kept on making "push
and pull motion until she felt something spread on the skin of her vagina."15 Clearly, carnal
knowledge took place.Appellant now desperately anchors his appeal on the lack of physical
evidence of rape on the body of the victim. But his arguments are far from convincing. First, it is
well-settled that rupture of the hymen or vaginal lacerations are not necessary for rape to be
consummated.16 Second, a medical examination is not indispensable in the prosecution of a
rape victim.17 Insofar as the evidentiary weight of the medical examination is concerned, we
have already ruled that a medical examination of the victim, as well as the medical certificate, is
merely corroborative in character and is not an indispensable element for conviction in rape.18
What is important is that the testimony of private complainant about the incident is clear,
unequivocal and credible,19 and this we find here to be the case. Moreover, Dr. Tebangin
himself clarified that since he examined the victim some fourteen (14) days after the incident, it
is possible that during examination, there was no longer any evidence of the injuries which she
might have sustained as a result of the rape.20Considering the evidence for the prosecution
and for the defense, we are in accord with the verdict that the appellant is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged.At the time of the commission of the rape, the penalty
therefor under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code21 was reclusion perpetua. Here, no
mitigating or aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the crime. Hence the
penalty imposed by the trial court is appropriate.Pursuant to existing jurisprudence, the amount
of P50,000.00 as indemnity should be awarded to the victim.22 The award to her of P50,000.00
as moral damages should also be affirmed.23WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED.
The decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS as to damages. Appellant
MARLON LERIO is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of statutory rape and sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is also ordered to pay the victim the amount of
P50,000.00 as indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages. Costs against appellant.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------48. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. EMILIO MANCHU alias NONGNONG
MANCHU and JOHN DOES,appellants.
G.R. No. 181901
November 28, 2008D E C I S I O NNACHURA, J.:On appeal is the
March 13, 2007 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00198 which
affirmed the decision2 rendered by Branch 23 of the Regional Trial Court of Allen, Northern
Samar, finding appellant Emilio Manchu guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder.In an
Information3 dated October 1, 1998, Emilio Manchu (appellant) was charged with murder
committed as follows:That on or about the 5th day of August, 1998 at about 10:00 oclock in the

evening, more or less, at Barangay Libertad, Municipality of Lavezares, Province of Northern

Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, armed with deadly weapon locally known as "sundang", conspiring, confederating
together and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill, evident premeditation and
treachery, and without any justifiable cause, did, then and there, wilfully, feloniously, attack,
assault and hack one Roque Cupido with said weapon, which the herein accused had provided
themselves for the purpose thereby inflicting upon said Roque Cupido wounds on his body,
which wounds caused the instantaneous death of the latter.With the aggravating circumstance
that the crime was committed at night time.CONTRARY TO LAW.Manchu pleaded not guilty.
Trial on the merits then ensued.The prosecutions version of the facts, as summarized by the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), follows:Prosecution witness Enerito Cupido, Jr. testified
that he has been a resident of Brgy. Enriqueta, Lavezares, Northern Samar for around 19 years.
(TSN dated June 22, 1999, pp. 2-3). Victim Roque Cupido y Gregorio is his eldest brother (Id.,
p. 3). He and the victim live with their parents, brothers and sisters at their residence in Purok I
of said Brgy. Enriqueta (Id., p. 4). He knows appellant who happens to be the husband of his
sister Salvacion Cupido (Id., p. 4). Appellant and his wife reside at Brgy. Aguada, Rosario,
Northern Samar, which is around 3 kilometers away from Purok I (Id., p. 5). According to the
witness, appellant was very lazy and it was their sister Salvacion who earned a living for the
family (Id., p. 5). This angered the victim, thus, prompting him to fetch her sister and take her
away from appellant while the latter was not at their home (Id., pp. 5-6). When the victim arrived
at their home, the witness heard him saying, "I took Nene because life is hard for her" (Id., p. 7).
Salvacion stayed with her mother and small child at Libertad Proper and sometimes at their
familys farm also located at Libertad (Id., p. 6&9). When appellant tried to fetch his wife, the
victims mother refused and this angered appellant (Id., p. 8). On the night of August 5, 1998, at
around 10:00 o clock in the evening, Enerito, the victim and the appellants 6-year-old child
were at their familys farm located in Brgy. Libertad (Id., p. 10). While Enerito was near a banana
plant located around 5 arms length from their farm house and the victim was resting inside their
farm house, 3 persons arrived and witness hid himself (Id., pp. 10-11) Enerito clearly identified
appellant as he entered the house while the latters two other companions waited outside since
there was a kerosene lamp lighted inside the house, the moon was bright and appellants
companions beamed their flashlights towards appellant (Id., pp. 11-13 & 16-17/TSN dated
September 28, 1999, p. 14). While appellant was inside the farm house, Enerito heard a
knocking sound and appellants companions entered the house (Id., p. 12). Moments later,
Enerito saw the trio go out of the house carrying with them the victim to a distance around 40
meters towards the back of the farm house (Id., pp. 12-13/TSN dated September 28, 1999, p.
15) Appellant did not harm his (appellants) son who was sleeping inside the house (Id., p. 14).
Enerito cried as he was not able to do anything since the trio were (sic) armed with bolos and
thereafter informed his parents (Id., p. 13, TSN dated September 28, 1999, p. 13). They sought
the assistance of their barangay officials at around 2:00 o clock in the morning and they were
advised to wait for the following morning as the victim was already dead (Id., p. 16). The
following morning they found the victims body around 40 meters away from their farm house
(Id., pp. 14-15).4Dr. Ethel Simeon, the Municipal Health Officer of Lavezares, Northern Samar,
autopsied Roque. She found the cause of death to be a hacking wound secondary to
hemorrhage. According to Dr. Simeon, Roque sustained a single wound beginning at the left

portion of the neck almost severing the same, leaving only a portion of the skin located at the
right lateral neck to hold the victims neck in place. Such injury, she added, had been caused by
a "sharp heavy object, like a bolo."5Appellants defense consisted of denial and alibi. He
averred that on August 5, 1998, he was fishing at Barobungdo from 5 oclock in the afternoon
until 4 oclock in the morning the following day. His testimony was corroborated by his alleged
companions Amador Calixto and Rolando Escala.The trial court, however, disbelieved
appellants defense and rendered a judgment of conviction, viz.:WHEREFORE, viewed in the
light of the foregoing, the Court finds accused Emilio Manchu alias Nongnong guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, as defined and penalized under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code. The aggravating circumstance of nighttime being absorbed in treachery,
there is then no modifying circumstances for consideration. Accused Emilio Manchu alias
Nongnong is sentenced to suffer an indivisible penalty of Reclusion Perpetua which is the
medium period of penalty imposable. Likewise, accused Emilio Nongnong Manchu is ordered to
pay the heirs of the victim the following:1. Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as
indemnification for the death of the victim;2. Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) for moral and
exemplary damages, but without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; and3. To pay
the Costs.The recorded detention of Emilio Nongnong Manchu is deductible in full from the
penalty imposed herein.SO ORDERED.6Initially, this case was brought to this Court for review,
docketed as G.R. No. 152828.In his brief, appellant assigned the following errors allegedly
committed by the trial court:ITHE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANT OF THE CRIME CHARGED BASED ON CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.IITHE
TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME
CHARGED DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION.7The Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) also filed its Brief,8 asserting that appellants guilt of murder was
proved beyond reasonable doubt.9However, on November 22, 2004, the Court ordered the
transfer of this case to the Court of Appeals, consistent with the ruling in People v. Mateo.10On
March 13, 2007, the Court of Appeals (CA) promulgated the assailed Decision affirming
appellants conviction. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:WHEREFORE, this appeal
is DENIED and the guilty verdict handed down by the court a quo is UPHELD in its totality.SO
ORDERED.11Appellant is now before the Court reiterating his contention. Both the OSG and
the Public Attorney's Office (PAO), counsel for the accused, replicated the arguments in their
respective briefs filed during the pendency of this case for review and prior to its transfer to the
CA.Appellant insists that both the trial court and the CA erred in convicting him of the crime
charged on the basis of circumstantial evidence. Essentially, he contends that the prosecutions
evidence is entirely circumstantial and does not satisfy the quantum of proof necessary for
conviction.We disagree.At the outset, we may well emphasize that direct evidence of the
commission of a crime is not the only basis from which a court may draw its finding of guilt.
Established facts that form a chain of circumstances can lead the mind intuitively or impel a
conscious process of reasoning towards a conviction.12 Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules on
Evidence recognizes that circumstantial evidence is adequate for conviction, as follows:SEC. 4.
Circumstantial evidence when sufficient. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven; and(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt.In rendering the guilty verdict, the RTC found the following

circumstances as ample proof of appellants guilt:1. The principal motive of the killing of Roque
Cupido as testified to by Enerito Cupido, Jr. that his elder brother Roque Cupido was
instrumental in separating his sister Salvacion from Emilio Nongnong Manchu as husband and
wife. Because of this incident, Emilio Nongnong Manchu has every reason to begrudge or an
axe to grind against Roque Cupido.2. That at about 10:00 oclock in the evening of August 5,
1998, Enerito Cupido, Jr., while he was in their farm in Barangay Libertad, Lavezares, Northern
Samar, [saw that] three (3) persons entered their house where his brother was sleeping. Only
one person entered inside (sic) the house, the other two persons were by the door.3. Then
Enerito Cupido, Jr, heard a knocking sound and he became apprehensive. He recognized the
person who first entered their house as that (sic) of his brother-in-law. He was able to recognize
Nongnong Manchu through the beam of the moon as it was a moonlight (sic) [night]; and further,
the three persons were carrying flashlight at that time.4. After the knocking sound, Enerito
Cupido, Jr,. further testified, the two (2) persons who were staying by the door, entered inside
(sic) the house and carried the dead body of his brother Roque Cupido. He recognized the
object carried by the three malefactors to be that of his brother Roque because he was the only
one left in the house together with his nephew when he tethered his carabaos.5. Enerito
Cupido, Jr. further observed that the cadaver of his brother Roque Cupido, Jr. (sic) was carried
by the three persons behind their house at the lower portion where there was a stream, or at a
distance of about forty (40) meters away from their house.6. Enerito Cupido, Jr. was not seen by
the three (3) persons as he hide (sic) behind the banana plants after tethering his carabaos. He
did not follow the three persons because he was afraid as the three persons were armed with
bolos.7. After the incident, Enerito Cupido, Jr. immediately went to Barangay Enriqueta to inform
his parents regarding the incident. On the following morning of August 6, 1998, he returned back
to Barangay Libertad in company with policemen and barangay officials. They found the dead
body of Roque Cupido in the bushes, about forty (40) meters away from their house.13We are
in full accord with the RTC and the CA that the circumstances enumerated above sufficiently
point to appellant as the author of the crime. All these established circumstances, taken
together, form an unbroken chain of events that point to the culpability of appellant and to no
other conclusion except his guilt.Enerito positively identified appellant as one of the authors of
the crime. Positive identification may be provided not only by a witness actually identifying an
accused as the one who perpetrated the crime but also by one who has seen the accused at the
scene of the crime on or about the time of the alleged incident. As this Court explained in
Baleros, Jr. v. People:14Positive identification pertains essentially to proof of identity and not per
se to that of being an eyewitness to the very act of commission of the crime. There are two
types of positive identification. A witness may identify a suspect or accused as the offender as
an eyewitness to the very act of the commission of the crime. This constitutes direct evidence.
There may, however, be instances where, although a witness may not have actually witnessed
the very act of commission of a crime, he may still be able to positively identify a suspect or
accused as the perpetrator of a crime as when, for instance, the latter is the person or one of
the persons last seen with the victim immediately before and right after the commission of the
crime. This is the second type of positive identification, which forms part of circumstantial
evidence. In the absence of direct evidence, the prosecution may resort to adducing
circumstantial evidence to discharge its burden. Crimes are usually committed in secret and
under condition[s] where concealment is highly probable. If direct evidence is insisted under all

circumstances, the prosecution of vicious felons who committed heinous crimes in secret or
secluded places will be hard, if not well-nigh impossible, to prove. (Emphasis supplied)Appellant
attempts to cast doubt on the identification made by Enerito on the ground of inadequate lighting
at the locus criminis. He contends that the poor illumination at the crime scene made positive
identification impossible or, at best, unreliable; thus, the trial court should not have accepted the
identification of the appellant as one of the malefactors.The argument does not persuade.
Eneritos testimony disproves the poor illumination claim of appellant. As aptly explained by the
CA:He was able to identify accused-appellant because he is familiar with the latters face, being
the common-law husband of [his] sister and there was illumination coming from the flashlights
which the three malefactors carried, kerosene lamp inside the hut and from the moon.15Such
luminosity, together with the familiarity of Enerito with appellant, was more than sufficient to
enable him to identify the felon. When the conditions of visibility are favorable, as in this case,
the eyewitness identification of appellant as the malefactor and the specific acts constituting the
crime should be accepted.16 Likewise, it was not impossible for Enerito to have positively
identified appellant because he was hiding in a place that was a mere five meters away from the
crime scene. Appellants attack on the positive identification by Enerito must, therefore, fail.It
should be emphasized that the testimony of a single witness, if positive and credible, is
sufficient to support a conviction even in the charge of murder.17In this case, both the trial court
and the appellate court found Eneritos testimony credible. It is doctrinal that findings of trial
courts on the credibility of witnesses deserve a high degree of respect and will not be disturbed
on appeal absent a clear showing that the trial court had overlooked, misunderstood or
misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance which could reverse a
judgment of conviction. In fact, in many instances, such findings are even accorded finality. This
is so because the assignment of value to a witness testimony is essentially the domain of the
trial court, not to mention that it is the trial judge who has the direct opportunity to observe the
demeanor of a witness on the stand, which opportunity provides him the unique facility in
determining whether or not to accord credence to the testimony or whether the witness is telling
the truth or not.18Appellants lackluster defenses of denial and alibi fail to cast doubt on the
positive identification made by Enerito and the continuous chain of circumstances established
by the prosecution. We have consistently held that alibi and denial being inherently weak cannot
prevail over the positive identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the crime. They are
facile to fabricate and difficult to disprove, and are thus generally rejected.19Besides, for the
defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not only that he was at some other place at
the time of the commission of the crime but also that it was physically impossible for him to be at
the locus delicti or within its immediate vicinity.20 Apart from testifying that he was fishing at
Barobungdo from 5 oclock in the afternoon until 4 oclock in the morning the following day,
appellant was unable to show that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the
crime.Neither will the testimonies of Amador Calixto and Rolando Escala exculpate appellant
from the charge against him. The testimonies of Calixto and Escala sounded so perfect that
instead of inspiring belief, they become suspect. The perfect congruence in their testimonies
reveals that they are rehearsed witnesses.A witness whose testimony is so perfect in all
aspects, without a flaw and remembering even the minutest details which jibe beautifully with
one another, lays himself or herself open to the suspicion of having been coached or having
memorized statements earlier rehearsed.21Further, being close friends of the appellant, their

credibility is highly suspect.Between the categorical statements of the prosecution witness, on

one hand, and the bare denial of the appellant, on the other, the former must perforce prevail.
An affirmative testimony is far stronger than a negative testimony especially when it comes from
the mouth of a credible witness. Alibi and denial, if not substantiated by clear and convincing
evidence, are negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law. They are
considered with suspicion and always received with caution, not only because they are
inherently weak and unreliable but also because they are easily fabricated and concocted.22
Appellant's challenge of his conviction is starkly puerile.We shall now determine the propriety of
the penalties imposed by the RTC on appellant.Appellant was sentenced to suffer an indivisible
penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, which according to the RTC, is the medium period of the penalty
imposable.The prescribed penalty for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC) is reclusion perpetua to death, which are indivisible penalties that do not provide for a
medium period. It is, therefore, error for the RTC and the CA to declare that reclusion perpetua
is the medium period of the imposable penalty.Article 63 of the RPC provides that when the
penalty is composed of two indivisible penalties, and there are no aggravating or mitigating
circumstances, the lesser penalty shall be applied. Considering that there is no mitigating or
aggravating circumstance in the present case, and treachery cannot be considered as an
aggravating circumstance as it was already considered as a qualifying circumstance, the lesser
penalty of reclusion perpetua should be imposed. Accordingly, the penalty imposed by the RTC
is correct, although for the wrong reason.And now on the award of damages. The RTC and the
CA granted P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages.
We are in accord with the grant of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity. In murder, the grant of civil
indemnity which has been fixed by jurisprudence at P50,000.00, requires no proof other than
the fact of death as a result of the crime and proof of the accuseds responsibility therefor.23
However, the RTC and the CA erred in awarding moral and exemplary damages in one lump
sum since these are distinct from each other and, hence, should be determined separately.
Moral damages are awarded where the claimant experienced physical suffering, mental
anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation, and similar injury as a result of the felonious act.24 The award of exemplary
damages, on the other hand, is warranted when the commission of the offense is attended by
an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying.25Accordingly, the heirs of Roque
Cupido are entitled to moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00. Likewise, the presence of
the qualifying circumstance of treachery in the killing of the deceased justifies the award of
P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CR-HC-No. 00198 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant Emilio Manchu is found
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of murder as defined in Article 284 of the Revised Penal
Code. There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance in the commission of the crime, he
is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The appellant is ordered to pay
the heirs of Roque Cupido the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral
damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------49.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JERRY ABALDE, accusedappellant.

G.R. No. 123113. March 31, 2000

D E C I S I O NPARDO, J.:Accused Jerry Abalde appeals from the decision[1] of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 25, Koronadal, South Cotabato finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of statutory rape[2] and three (3) counts of rape[3] and sentencing him to four (4) terms of
reclusion perpetua, with all accessory penalties provided by law and to pay the costs. The trial
court further ordered accused to pay complainant Ervie Tonelete moral damages in the amount
of P50,000.00, in each case, with legal interest from finality of judgment until full payment.[4]On
August 23, 1991, First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Isaac Alvero V. Moran of South Cotabato
filed eight (8) separate informations[5] with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 25, Koronadal,
South Cotabato, charging Jerry Abalde with rape, as follows:Criminal Case No. 701"That one
day in the month of September, 1990, in the evening thereof, at Barangay Albagan, Municipality
of Tampakan, Province of South Cotabato, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, while being armed with a knife, and by means of force,
violence and intimidation, did then and there wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge of the complainant ERVIE TONELETE, then under twelve (12) years of age, against
her will."CONTRARY TO LAW."[6]Criminal Case No. 702"That on or about the 4th day of March,
1991, at about 11:00 oclock in the evening thereof, at Barangay Albagan, Municipality of
Tampakan, Province of South Cotabato, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused, while being armed with a knife, and by means of force, violence and
intimidation, did then and there wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of
the complainant ERVIE TONELETE, then under 12 years of age, against her will."CONTRARY
TO LAW."[7]Criminal Case No. 708"That on or about the 26th day of April, 1991, in the evening
thereof, at Barangay Albagan, Municipality of Tampakan, Province of South Cotabato,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, while being
armed with a knife, and by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there
wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the complainant ERVIE
TONELETE, against her will."CONTRARY TO LAW."[8]On September 16, 1991, Second
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Florentino B. Tugas of South Cotabato filed another information
for rape[9] with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 25, Koronadal, South Cotabato against
accused Jerry Abalde, committed as follows:Criminal Case No. 714"That in or about the 3rd of
March 1991, in Barangay Albagan, Municipality of Tampakan, Province of South Cotabato,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the honorable Court, the said accused armed with a
knife, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously
have carnal knowledge of ERVIE TONELETE against her will, and in her own house.
"CONTRARY TO LAW."[10]Upon arraignment on October 1, 1992, in all the cases, accused
Jerry Abalde pleaded not guilty. He waived pre-trial. Thereafter, a joint trial of all the nine (9)
cases ensued.The facts are as follows:Complainant Ervie Tonelete, the second child of spouses
Vedala and Ernesto Tonelete, was born on February 17, 1979.[11] Ervie, her parents and two (2)
other siblings, Ervin and Ermie, lived in Barangay Albagan, Tampakan, South Cotabato, a deadend place lying in the mountains, some twenty (20) kilometers away from the town proper of
Tampakan.[12] Her elder brother Ernest stayed with a relative in General Santos City where he
studied.Sometime in June 1989, accused Jerry Abalde, Vedalas nephew by her first cousin,[13]
arrived at the Tonelete household from Manticao, Misamis Oriental to work on a portion of their
land.[14] He lived at the house of the victim, and during the night he slept at the sala while Ervie

and her family slept in the only room of the house.[15] Considering that he was a relative, the
children of Vedala and Ernesto, including Ervie, called him uncle.[16]On weekdays, Ervies
parents worked in the farm while Ervie and her siblings went to school. Every Saturday, her
parents go to the poblacion of Tampakan to sell their produce for the week in time for the market
day the following day, Sunday. Since Albagan is some twenty (20) kilometers away from
Tampakan town proper, and due to the scarcity of public transportation, Vedala and Ernesto
spent Saturday nights at the public market. Ervie and her two (2) younger siblings would be left
alone at the house in Barangay Albagan, Tampakan, South Cotabato. Since the accuseds
arrival in June or July, 1989, the children were left with him.One Saturday evening in September
1990, while Ervies mother was in Tampakan public market selling the weeks produce and her
father was attending a church seminar, also in Tampakan,[17] Ervie was left in the house with
her younger siblings and the accused Jerry Abalde. That evening, Ervie slept on the floor, in
between her younger siblings, while accused slept in the sala. She was awakened, however,
when she noticed somebody crawling towards her. Though their room has a door, it could not be
locked or securely closed from the inside.Ervie recognized the intruder as accused Jerry
because there was a moon that night. She immediately stood up and moved away from the
accused, but did not leave the room. Accused then transferred her sleeping siblings to the other
side of the room.Armed with a knife, accused forced Ervie to lie down on the floor. He held her
by the hand and undressed her, removing her skirt and panty. Ervie tried to move her body to
avoid the sexual assault, but accused overpowered her. Accused was able to spread her legs
apart and insert his penis into her vagina. After the sexual congress, accused left the
complainant crying and her sexual organ painful and bleeding.[18]The following morning, as
was her normal routine, she woke up early and cooked breakfast. When Ervie saw the accused
coming from the farm after grazing the animal, she became afraid. She ate breakfast with him in
silence.[19] When Ervies parents arrived, she did not tell them about what happened to her the
previous night out of fear that accused would kill her if she told them.As of September 1990,
Ervie was eleven (11) years and seven (7) months old, while Ervin was seven (7) years and
eight (8) months and Ermie was four (4) years and five (5) months old.On March 3, 1991,
spouses Vedala and Ernesto left for Manticao, Misamis Oriental to attend the burial of Vedalas
mother. They tagged along with them Ervies youngest sister, Ermie. They returned only in the
afternoon of March 9, 1991.[20] Hence, from March 3 until March 9, 1991, Ervie and her
younger brother Ervin were left with the accused in their house at Barangay Albagan,
Tampakan, South Cotabato.In the evening of March 3, 1991, Ervie was awakened when she
saw accused Jerry crawling towards her. Accused took hold of her arms and threatened to kill
her if she would not submit to his desires, or would tell her mother about it. She noticed that like
the first time accused abused her, her brother was no longer beside her and had been moved
some distance away from her, but still inside the same room.[21]Accused embraced Ervie and
forced her to lie down. He forcibly removed her panty and had sexual intercourse with her
against her will. Though she struggled against accuseds advances, the latter was stronger and
bigger than she was. After satisfying his lust, accused hurriedly left the room.[22]The sexual
assault was repeated, every night thereafter, on March 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9, 1991. The assaults
happened almost under the same circumstance; the victim was asleep in her room with her
younger brother and the accused would creep into the room and sexually abuse her. Accused
would leave the room after every sexual act, and the victim would be left bleeding and crying.

The last sexual assault happened on the night of April 26, 1991 when the victims parents went
to Tampakan town proper to sell vegetables. As usual, the victim was left in the house with the
accused and her younger siblings. That night, accused Jerry took advantage of the absence of
the victims parents and raped the victim.[23]On April 29, 1991, accused Jerry sold his pig for
P600.00, left the Tonelete household, and brought all his clothes with him.[24]The following day,
or on April 30, 1991, Ervie told her mother about her ordeal. It took her this long before she
could tell her mother that accused Jerry raped her because she was threatened by the accused
that he would kill her if he told anyone about it. When Ernesto learned about the rape, he
pursued the accused, with the assistance of the Albagan Brgy. Capt. Rogelio Guadaltiguir.[25]
They caught up with the accused in Tampakan and they turned him over to the police authorities
in Tampakan, South Cotabato.Because of the sexual abuse committed against her, Ervie was
embarrassed and her entire family was put to shame.[26] She denied that accused courted her
or became her boyfriend.[27]For his part, accused Jerry Abalde did not deny that he arrived at
Tampakan, South Cotabato in July 1989 and lived with Ervies family while working on a portion
of their land.However, he denied that he sexually molested Ervie in September 1990. He said
that he courted her in December 1989 and she accepted his offer of love on February 17, 1991.
As regards the incidents between the dates of March 3 to 9, 1991, as well as that of April 26,
1991, accused admitted that he had sexual intercourse with the victim out of mutual love and
desire. He said that everything happened at nighttime while the victims parents were away.
Accused Jerry said that on three (3) occasions he and the victim went out together, with the
knowledge of the victims parents, to attend the festivities in the barangay. Complainant often
visited him in the fields where he worked and brought him food.Remedios Gutana, Jerrys aunt,
corroborated his testimony and said that the two were lovers. On March 4, 1991, she said that in
her presence, the victim and the accused kissed and embraced each other at the balcony of her
house. The three (3) of them were then eating guavas, when Ervie suddenly pulled down the
shorts of the accused. Afterwards, she went to tend her store downstairs, while the victim and
the accused went upstairs and she did not see what happened.[28]On April 28, 1991, after he
sold his pig, Jerry told Ervie that he would leave for Manticao, Misamis Oriental for vacation.
Though Ervie did not agree, accused still went on and brought all his clothes with him.On April
30, 1991, Ervie was physically examined by Dr. Arlene Anayon Cardos in her clinic at
Tampakan, South Cotabato. The examination showed that there were old lacerations in the
victims hymen and her vagina easily admitted two fingers. Dr. Cardos opined that the
lacerations could have been caused by severe physical exercise, masturbation, and possibly, by
sexual intercourse.[29]On May 2, 1994, during the pendency of the criminal cases against him,
accused sent a letter to the mother of the victim and asked for forgiveness for the wrong he
committed.[30]On May 10, 1995, the trial court rendered decision the dispositive portion of
which reads as follows:"ACCORDINGLY, in Criminal Cases Nos. 701, 714, 702, and 708,
accused JERRY ABALDE is hereby declared guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the felony of
rape defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code in each case, as
principal, and there being no aggravating or mitigating circumstances which may affect the
penalty, said accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
imprisonment, to suffer all the accessory penalties provided for by law, ant to pay the costs, in
each of the said cases."The period during which accused has undergone his preventive
imprisonment for failure to post bail for his provisional liberty shall be computed and credited in

his favor conformably to the provisions of Article 29, as amended, of the Revised Penal Code.
"Accused is further adjudged to pay private complainant Ervie Tonelete moral damages
amounting to P50,000.00 in each case, with legal interest thereon reckoned from the finality of
the judgment until fully paid."In Criminal Cases Nos. 703, 704, 705, 706, and 707, accused on
grounds of reasonable doubt is hereby acquitted."SO ORDERED."GIVEN this 10th day of May,
1995 at Koronadal, South Cotabato, Philippines."(s/t) FRANCISCO S. AMPIG, JR."J u d g e"[31]
The trial court said that the sexual intercourse in September 1990 and on March 3 and 4, and
on April 26, 1991, were not consensual, but done through force and intimidation. Considering
the tender age of the victim and the moral ascendancy that accused had over her,[32] Ervie
submitted to the carnal desires of accused. She was cowered into silence by his threat that he
would kill her if she informed her parents about it.With regard to the other complaints for rape,
the trial court absolved accused from criminal liability due to the prosecutions failure to prove
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The trial court noted that the testimony of the victim
regarding the sexual assaults on March 5-9, 1991 lacked the details, which would make her
allegations of force and violence convincing.On August 9, 1995, accused Jerry Abalde filed a
notice of appeal.[33]In his appeal, accused interposed the lone assignment of error that the trial
court gravely erred in finding him guilty of rape in Criminal Cases Nos. 701, 702, 708 and 714
despite the contradicting and improbable testimony of the victim, thereby putting in question the
credibility of the latter. He contends that the trial court failed to take into consideration the fact
the he and Ervie were lovers. Thus, the sexual intercourse that took place on the dates in
question, except the September 1990 incident, were consensual. On the other hand, the
Solicitor General submits that there is no reason to deviate from the findings of the trial court
and prays for an affirmation in toto of the trial courts judgment of conviction for all four (4)
counts of rape committed by accused.Accused admitted that he had sexual intercourse with the
victim on the dates subject of the indictment in Criminal Cases Nos. 702, 708 and 714.
However, accused claimed that they all happened with the consent of the victim Ervie, who had
been his sweetheart since February 17, 1991. With regard to the September 1990 rape, he
denied it and said that this was maliciously filed to ensure his conviction for statutory rape.There
is no merit in the appeal for reasons to be discussed hereunder.In the disposition of rape cases,
the Court is guided by the following principles: "(1) an accusation for rape can be made with
facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to
disprove; (2) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are
usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution,
and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot draw
strength from the weakness of the evidence of the defense."[34]At the outset, accused Jerry put
in issue the credibility of the victim Ervie Tonelete, upon whose testimony he was convicted.
However, "it is well settled that the assessment by a trial court of the credibility of witnesses and
their testimonies is entitled to the highest respect, because it heard the witness and observed
their behavior and manner of testifying. Absent any showing that it overlooked some facts or
circumstances of weight and substance that would affect the result of the case, its factual
findings will not be disturbed on appeal."[35] Considering that "the crime of rape is essentially
one committed in relative isolation or even secrecy, hence it is usually the victim who can testify
with regard to the fact of the forced coitus."[36]We have carefully reviewed the testimony of the
victim and we are convinced that accused raped the victim on the dates subject of the instant

appeal. Accused contends that Ervies testimony was replete with inconsistencies and
contradictions. When initially asked what accused did to her upon entering her room on the
night she was raped, Ervie said that accused immediately raped her. But upon further
questioning, she said that accused first transferred her younger siblings to the other side of the
room and thereafter, went towards her, held her hands and raped her. Because of these alleged
contradictory statements, accused claimed that the victim was a coached witness.The
complainants testimony in a rape case must "be considered and calibrated in its entirety, and
not by truncated portions or isolated passages thereof."[37] "Errorless testimony cannot be
expected of a rape victim for she may not be able to remember and recount every ugly detail of
the harrowing experience and appalling outrage she went through, especially so since she
might in fact be trying to recall the same, as they are too painful to remember."[38] In the instant
case, Ervie testified in a categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and frank manner.The hatred
and anger that the victim felt against accused was very evident in her testimony on September
2, 1992:"PROSECUTOR LECHONSITO:Q: What did he tell you, if he told you anything?A: He
told me that if I will tell my mother, he is going to kill me.Q: And because of this threatening
words, what did you feel?A: I was afraid and I did not know what to do.Q: Did he succeed in
having sexual intercourse with you?x x xA: Yes, sir.PROSECUTOR LECHONSITO:Q: And after
having sexual intercourse with you, what did the accused do?A: He just immediately left the
room and then I remained crying.Q: You were crying because of what?A: I was so worried and I
felt the pain because he had abused me and I am no longer a virgin. I want that person to be
imprisoned. I dont want to see him in our place. He has caused me and my family so much
trouble (Witness crying heartily).COURT:Tomorrow? That is enough Ervie.WITNESS:......When
he was about to leave our place, he even told me that he would bring me along but I did not
want to go. He abused me several times and I felt the pain deeply. (Witness keep on
crying)."[39]"If her story had only been contrived, she would not have been so composed and
consistent throughout her entire testimony in the face of intense and lengthy interrogation."[40]
Accused failed to attribute any ill motive on the part of the victim to testify falsely and impute
against him the commission of a grave offense such as rape. To the contrary, the trial court
observed that the victim lived in place "more rural than most rural villages"[41] in the country,
and was still "unaffected by the worldly ways of urban life."[42] "It is highly inconceivable for a
young barrio lass, inexperienced with the ways of the world, to fabricate a charge of defloration,
undergo a medical examination of her private parts, subject herself to public trial, and tarnish
her familys honor and reputation unless she was motivated by a potent desire to seek justice
for the wrong committed against her."[43]Accused Jerrys defense that he and Ervie were lovers
deserves scant consideration. Other than his self-serving statement, "no documentary evidence
of any sort, like a letter or a photograph or any piece of memento, was presented to confirm a
romantic lia[i]son between accused-appellant and the complainant."[44] Ervie categorically
denied having any relationship with the accused, whom she respected and called uncle.As
regards the vacillation of the victim in reporting to her parents the sexual abuses committed
against her, "it is not uncommon for a young girl of tender age to be intimidated into silence by
the mildest threat against her life."[45] Ervie admitted that she was cowered into silence by the
threats made against her life by the accused. It was easy for accused to fulfill that threat,
considering that they lived under the same roof and her every movement could not escape the
watchful eyes of the accused. Moreover, accused had moral ascendancy over the victim. Upon

cross-examination, the victim said:"Q: Why would you obey him whenever he would send you
for an errand?A: If I will not obey him, my mother would learn about this, so we obey him.
Sometimes he whips us.Q: Who, the accused?A: If we will not respect him, our mother will whip
us.x x xQ: How do you consider the accused? Your elder, as an equal or as a househelp in your
house?A: He was taken by my mother and considered him as a child, so we respected him.
Then he had taken advantage of me.Q: So you considered him as an elder brother?A: Yes Your
Honor.Q; Why do you call him as "Tiyo" when you can call him, "Manong" or "Kuya"?A: Because
he is older and he is the cousin of my mother."[46]The victim was forced to submit to the carnal
desires of the accused through force and intimidation. Not only was the accused armed with a
deadly weapon when he raped the victim; he was far stronger and bigger than she was.
"Intimidation is said to be addressed to the mind of the victim. It is subjective and its presence
cannot be tested by any hard-and-fast rule, but must be viewed in the light of the victims
perception and judgment at the time of the crime. It may be of the moral kind, such as the fear
caused by threatening a woman with a knife. It is enough that it produces fear fear that if the
victim does not yield to the bestial lust of the accused, something would happen to her at the
moment thereafter, as when she is threatened with death if she reports the incident."[47]Ervie
had been paralyzed by fear due to the continuous threat made by the accused against her life
and personal safety. "Though a man lays no hand on a woman, yet if by an array of physical
forces, he so overpowers her mind that she does not resist, or she ceases resistance through
fear of a greater harm, the consummation of the sexual act is recognized in jurisprudence as
rape."[48] "She was too intimidated to offer serious resistance to the advances of appellant."[49]
The fact alone that the victim was raped while her younger siblings were inside the same room
would not make the commission of rape impossible or improbable. "Lust is no respecter of
places. Rape can be committed even in places where people congregate: in parks, along the
roadside, within school premises, inside a house where there are several occupants and even in
the same room where other members of the family are sleeping."[50]As regards the September
1990 rape, there need not be the presence of force or intimidation in the commission of the
crime. It was clearly established that at the time she was raped, Ervie was only eleven (11)
years and seven (7) months old. Hence, accuseds liability for statutory rape is conclusively
proved and his conviction is certain.The evidence having established the commission of one (1)
count of statutory rape and three (3) counts of rape, we find the imposition of reclusion perpetua
to be in accord with Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code.[51] Though it has been proven that
the rape was committed with the use of a deadly weapon, a knife, the penalty of death cannot
be imposed because at the time it was committed, the death penalty had been suspended by
the 1987 Constitution.Likewise, we affirm the award of moral damages in the amount of fifty
thousand (P50,000.00) pesos for each count of rape, or a total of two hundred thousand pesos
(P200,000.00). Consistent with present case law which treats the imposition of civil indemnity as
mandatory upon the finding of rape,[52] accused is ordered to pay the amount of fifty thousand
(P50,000.00) pesos civil indemnity ex delicto for each count of rape, or a total of two hundred
thousand pesos (P200,000.00).WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS with modification the
appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 25, Koronadal, South Cotabato in
Criminal Cases Nos. 701, 702, 708 and 714 finding accused Jerry Abalde guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of one (1) count of statutory rape and three (3) counts of rape and sentencing
him to reclusion perpetua, on each count, with all the accessory penalties of the law, and to pay

the victim, Ervie Tonelete, the amount of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as civil indemnity
and fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages, for each count of rape.With costs in
all instances.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------50. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. VICENTE N. CUSI JR.,
Presiding Judge, Branch I, Court of First Instance of Davao, ARCADIO PUESCA alias Big
Boy, WALTER APA, JOSE GUSTILO alias Peping, FILOMENO MACALINAO, JR. alias
White, RICARDO DAIRO alias Carding, and MAGNO MONTANO alias Edol, respondents.
G.R. No. L-20986
August 14, 1965DIZON, J.:In Criminal Case No. 6813 of the Court of
First Instance of Davao, Arcadio Puesca, Walter Apa, Jose Gustilo, Filomeno Macalinao,
Ricardo Dairo, and Magno Montano were charged with robbery in band with homicide, to which
they pleaded not guilty. During the trial, and while Sgt. Lucio Bano of the Police Force of Digos,
Davao was testifying as a prosecution witness regarding the extrajudicial confession made to
him by the accused Arcadio Puesca, he said that the latter, aside from admitting his participation
in the commission of the offense charged, revealed that other persons conspired with him to to
commit the offense, mentioning the name of each and everyone of them. Following up this
testimony, the prosecuting officer asked the witness to mention in court the names of Puesca's
alleged co-conspirators. Counsel for the accused Macalinao, Gustilo and Dairo objected to this,
upon the ground that whatever the witness would say would be hearsay as far as his clients
were concerned. The respondent judge resolved the objection directing the witness to answer
the question but without mentioning or giving the names of the accused who had interposed the
objection. In other words, the witness was allowed to answer the question and name his coconspirators except those who had raised the objection. The prosecuting officer's motion for
reconsideration of this ruling was denied. Hence the present petition for certiorari praying that
the abovementioned ruling of the respondent judge be declared erroneous and for a further
order directing said respondent judge to allow witness Bano to answer the question in full.The
question involved herein is purely one of evidence. There is no question that hearsay evidence,
if timely objected to, may not be admitted. But while the testimony of a witness regarding a
statement made by another person, if intended to establish the truth of the facts asserted in the
statement, is clearly hearsay evidence, it is otherwise if the purpose of placing the statement in
the record is merely to establish the fact that the statement was made or the tenor of such
statement (People vs. Lew Yon, 97 Cal. 224; VI Wigmore 177-8).In the present case, the
purpose of the prosecuting officer, as manifested by him in the discussions below, is nothing
more than to establish the fact that the accused Puesca had mentioned to Sgt. Bano the names
of those who conspired with him to commit the offense charged, without claiming that Puesca's
statement or the answer to be given by Sgt. Bano would be competent and admissible evidence
to show that the persons so named really conspired with Puesca. For this limited purpose, we
believe that the question propounded to the witness was proper and the latter should have been
allowed to answer it in full, with the understanding, however, that his answer shall not to be
taken as competent evidence to show that the persons named really and actually conspired with
Puesca and later took part in the commission of the offense.On the other hand, the fact which
the prosecuting officer intended to establish would seem to be relevant to explain why the police
force of the place where the offense was committed subsequently questioned and investigated

the persons allegedly named by Puesca.PREMISES CONSIDERED, the writ is granted. The
writ of preliminary injunction issued heretofore is hereby set aside.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------51. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. MARIO S. MARTIN, appellant.
G.R. No. 172069
January 30, 2008D E C I S I O NCORONA, J.:Before us for review is
the January 27, 2006 decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A.-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00105
which affirmed in turn the August 13, 2003 decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig
City, Branch 156 in Criminal Case No. 115477-H. The RTC found appellant Mario Sanggoyo
Martin guilty of rape under Article 335 in relation to Article 266-A and B of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC), as amended by Republic Act (RA) 8353,3 committed against his then ten-year- old
mentally retarded daughter AAA.4 It imposed on him the penalty of death.The information
against appellant read:On or about or prior to January 5, 1999, in San Juan, Metro Manila, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, with lewd designs and by means of
force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have [sexual
intercourse] five (5) times with his daughter, [AAA], a minor (10 years old), who is suffering from
a mental disability, against her will and consent.Contrary to law.5On arraignment, appellant, with
the assistance of counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charge.The prosecution presented the victim
AAA and Dr. James M. Belgira, the medico-legal officer who examined AAA,6 as witnesses.As
established during the trial, AAA was born on March 19, 1988. She is the legitimate daughter of
appellant and ABC. The couple separated in 1997 and AAA remained in the custody of her
mother. In the morning of January 5, 1999, AAA (then ten years old)7 was brought to appellant's
house. When ABC found out in the afternoon that AAA was with her father, she had her fetched.
Three times that night, she noticed AAA scratching her private parts. She took a look at it and
immediately became suspicious. She asked AAA if appellant had something to do with the
redness of her vagina. AAA narrated to her that he had indeed inserted his penis in her vagina
and that he was touching her vagina as he inserted his penis in her mouth. She also told her
that he taped her mouth so she would not make any sound and instructed her not to tell anyone
what happened otherwise he would beat her. He also washed her vagina.8At the trial, AAA
testified thus:Q: [AAA], would you tell the Judge what your Papa [did] to you?A: Hawak
dede.Q: What else aside from holding your breast?COURT:[AAA], where is your "dede"?
INTERPRETER:Witness pointing to her breast.A: Tanggal panty.Q: After removing your
panty, what else did your Papa do?COURT:[AAA], after your Papa removed your panty, what
else did he do?A: Hinulog ang damit.ATTY. AMBROSIO:Whose dress was dropped?A:
[AAA].Q: After that, what did he do to you?A: Hinawak dede ni Papa.xxx xxx xxxQ: Did
he touch your vagina?A: Opo.Q: Aside from touching your vagina, did he also insert
something in your vagina?A: Yes, [ma'am].Q: What did he put inside your vagina?A:
Tete.Q: Could you tell the Court, how many times he did this to you?A: Five times.Q:
Can you show to the Honorable Court the no. 5?Interpreter:Witness raised her left hand and
showed her five fingers.Q: Where were you when your father did this to you?A: In my
fathers house.Q: Do you know what time of the day when this happened to you?A: Gabi
po.Q: [AAA], you know that it is good to tell the truth?A: Opo.Q: Can you tell the
Honorable Judge what you felt when your father did this to you?COURT:You specify whether
touching of the breast or inserting of the penis. Where you hurt when your father inserted his
penis [in] you?A: Opo.On cross examination:Q: Do you love your Papa?A: Hindi [na po].

Q: Why?A: Galit na Papa.Q: Why were you angry with your Papa?A: Hawak dede ko.
Q: Can you tell the first time when your Papa touched your breast?A: Five.INTERPRETER:
Witness raising her left hand and showing her five fingers.xxx xxx xxxCOURT:[AAA], can you
show the Court what part of your body when your Papa inserted his penis [in] you?
INTERPRETER:Witness pointing to her vagina.xxx xxx xxxQ: Can you please point to the
Court who inserted his penis in your vagina?INTERPRETER:Witness pointing to the accused.
xxx xxx xxxQ: Did you see any blood in your panty?A: Opo.COURT:Where did you see the
blood?INTERPRETER:Witness pointing at her vagina.COURT:What did you feel at that time?A:
Masakit dibdib ko.xxx xxx xxxQ: Your Papa did not touch your private parts?A: Hawak po.
Q: How many hands?A: Five hands.9Dr. James Belgira assessed the mental condition of
AAA and concluded that she was mentally deficient. Thereafter, he conducted a physical
examination and found a deep, healed laceration at the 6 o'clock position of her hymen. This, he
explained, could have been caused by a hard blunt object. His report stated that she was in a
non-virgin state physically.10On the direction of the RTC,11 a psychological examination of AAA
was conducted by Felicitas M. Aguilar, the in-house psychiatrist of the Department of Social
Welfare and Development (DSWD).12 AAA was diagnosed as being afflicted with Down
Syndrome.13 She had moderate mental retardation, with an intelligence quotient (IQ) of 41.8,
mental age of 4.6 years and social age of 7 years.For the defense, the appellant and his son
Martin, Jr. took the witness stand.Appellant denied the allegations against him and asserted that
he could not have committed the rape because he slept in the downstairs "sala" in full view of
everyone passing by. He said that 18 people lived in their house. He admitted that AAA is his
legitimate daughter. He stated that the complaint was instigated by his wife because of anger
and extreme jealousy. In response to the question why his daughter would concoct a rape
charge against him, he said that that AAA was mentally deficient and incapable of telling a
(coherent) story.14Martin, Jr. corroborated his father's testimony and stated that the latter could
not have raped AAA because they did not have their own room, just a bed where they both
slept.15In a decision dated August 13, 2003, the RTC found respondent guilty of qualified rape
under Article 335 in relation to Article 266-A and B of the RPC as amended by RA 8353:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused MARIO
MARTIN y SANGGOYO "GUILTY" beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape as defined
and penalized under Article 335 of the [RPC] in relation to Article 266-A and Article 266-B under
[RA] 8353 and hereby imposes upon him the penalty of DEATH.Accused Martin is further
ordered to pay the offended party [AAA], the sum of P75,000 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00
as moral damages.SO ORDERED.16Although the information charged him with five counts of
rape, the RTC found him guilty of only one count since the prosecution failed to prove the other
four counts.17The case was forwarded to this Court on automatic review but we referred it to
the CA in accordance with People v. Mateo.18 The CA affirmed the RTC decision:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED for lack of sufficient merit. The decision
rendered by the [RTC], Branch 156, Pasig in Criminal Case No. 115477-H on 13 August 2003 is
AFFIRMED.SO ORDERED.19In this appeal, appellant argues that his guilt was not proven
beyond reasonable doubt.We disagree.Relevant Documents Were Correctly Admitted As
EvidenceIn resolving rape cases, we have been guided by the following principles:xxx (a) an
accusation for rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but even more difficult for the
accused, though innocent, to disprove; (b) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime where only

two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with
extreme caution; (c) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merit, and
cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense; and (d)
the evaluation of the trial court judges regarding the credibility of witnesses deserves utmost
respect on the ground that they are in the best position to observe the demeanor, act, conduct,
and attitude of the witnesses in court while testifying.20Appellant asserts that the sworn
statements of AAA and ABC, AAA's birth certificate, marriage contract submitted by ABC and
the psychological evaluation report of the DSWD psychiatrist should not have been considered
by the RTC. He claimed these were all hearsay evidence since they were never identified or
testified to by witnesses.21Again, we disagree.While it is true that these documents could have
been considered hearsay if the affiants had not been called to the witness stand to testify on the
truth of the contents thereof,22 this rule is not applicable here for the following reasons.First,
AAA took the witness stand and narrated the abuse she experienced. Hence, her sworn
statement was merely additional evidence.Second, ABC and the local civil registrar of San Juan
testified on the authenticity and due execution of the marriage contract.23Third, during the trial,
the defense admitted the existence of these documents.24 Appellant merely contested the
sworn statements for being self-serving but did not raise any objection on the ground of
hearsay. Therefore, he was deemed to have waived this ground and cannot raise them for the
first time on appeal:The Rules of Court requires that grounds for objection must be specified,
whether orally or in writing. The result of violating this rule has been spelled out by this Court in
a number of cases. In Krohn v. Court of Appeals, the counsel for the petitioner objected to the
testimony of private respondent on the ground that it was privileged but did not question the
testimony as hearsay. We held that "in failing to object to the testimony on the ground that it was
hearsay, counsel waived his right to make such objection and, consequently, the evidence
offered may be admitted." In Tan Machan v. De la Trinidad, the defendant assailed as error the
admission of plaintiff's book of account. We rejected the contention and ruled that an appellate
court will not consider any other ground of objection not made at the time the books were
admitted in evidence. In the case at bar, the respondent did not assail in the trial court the
hearsay character of the documents in question. It is too late in the day to raise the question on
appeal.25AAA's Testimony Was Credible And Sufficiently Established Appellant's GuiltAppellant
questions the credibility of AAA's testimony, contending that it was ambiguous and insufficient to
sustain his conviction.Well-settled is the rule that the lone testimony of the victim in the crime of
rape, if credible, is enough to sustain a conviction. This is because, by the very nature of the
offense, the only evidence that can often be relied upon is the victim's own declaration.26It is
undisputed that AAA is a mental retardate. This was shown in the psychological evaluation
report wherein she was found to have an IQ of 41.8.27 Even appellant admitted his daughters
"handicap" in his testimony.28 However, despite her age and retardation, she was still able to
communicate her experience in a sufficiently coherent and detailed manner. She clearly stated
that appellant touched her breasts, removed her clothes and underwear, touched her vagina
and inserted his penis in her vagina. Her narration was as natural and straightforward as could
be, considering her mental deficiency.29 If there were instances when her answers were
inaccurate or unresponsive, these did not make her testimony any less credible. Even children
of normal intelligence cannot be expected to give a precise account of events considering their
naivet and still undeveloped vocabulary and command of language.30 Yet, despite her

limitations, AAA never wavered in her testimony.Both the RTC and CA correctly gave credence
to her testimony. They found it enough to support the conviction of appellant.Time and again, we
have held that the trial court's assessment as to the credibility of witnesses is to be accorded
great weight. This is so because it had the better opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand
and note their demeanor, conduct and attitude under grueling examination.31Furthermore, the
testimony of an innocent child like AAA should be given full weight and credit. Being young and
guileless, she had no ill-motive to falsely testify and impute such a serious crime against her
own father.Appellant's assertion that ABC induced their daughter to file this rape charge against
him without, however, substantiating his claim, is self-serving and deserves scant consideration.
Finally, appellant avers that Dr. Belgira did not indicate in his testimony that AAA's hymenal
laceration was due to penile penetration since he merely stated that it was caused by the
insertion of a "hard blunt object." Again, appellant is grasping at straws. Obviously, an erect
penis is one such "hard blunt object." This medical finding supported AAA's testimony that
appellant inserted his penis in her vagina.Appellant Is Guilty Of Qualified RapeThe pertinent
provisions of the RPC, as amended by RA 8353, state:Art. 266-A. Rape; When and How
Committed. Rape is committed 1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman
under any of the following circumstances:xxx xxx xxxd) When the offended party is under twelve
(12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be
present;xxx xxx xxxArt. 266-B. Penalties. xxx xxx xxxThe death penalty shall also be imposed
if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant,
step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the
common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.xxx xxx xxxThe qualifying circumstances of
relationship (father and daughter) and minority (the victim was 10 years old when the rape was
committed) were duly alleged in the information, proved during the trial and even admitted by
appellant.32While this Court affirms the finding of guilt of respondent, it can no longer impose
the penalty of death in view of RA 9346.33 Section 2 of RA 9346 mandates that, in lieu of the
death penalty, reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole should instead be imposed.With
regard to the award of damages, the victim was correctly awarded P75,000 as civil indemnity ex
delicto. However, the amount of moral damages should be increased from P50,000 to P75,000
in line with prevailing jurisprudence.34 Exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000 should
also be granted due to the presence of the qualifying circumstances of minority and
relationship.35WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
00105 is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS. Mario S. Martin is sentenced to reclusion
perpetua with no possibility of parole for one count of qualified rape committed against AAA. He
is ORDERED to indemnify AAA in the amount of P75,000 as civil indemnity, P75,000 as moral
damages and P25,000 as exemplary damages.Costs against appellant
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------52. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, - versus -mROGER MENDOZA y
DELA CRUZ, Accused-Appellant.
G.R. No. 180501
December 24, 2008 D E C I S I O N
VELASCO, JR., J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision dated June 29, 2007 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00651, modifying the Decision dated October 27, 2004
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 276 in Muntinlupa City in Criminal Case No. 00-410.

The RTC adjudged accused-appellant Roger Mendoza guilty of rape. The Facts
On April
28, 2000, accused-appellant was charged with rape in an Information which reads as follows:
That on or about the 25th day of April 2000, in the city of Muntinlupa, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd design, with force,
intimidation and grave abuse of confidence, accused being employed as a driver in the business
of the father of [AAA],[1] a six (6) year old minor, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously insert his finger inside the latters vagina against the will and consent of the said
complainant.
Contrary to law.[2]
When arraigned, accused-appellant entered a
plea of not guilty. During trial, the prosecution presented AAA and both her parents as
witnesses. Accused-appellant appeared as the lone witness for the defense.
The gist of
AAAs account of the incident is as follows: It occurred in the early afternoon of April 25, 2000
after her parents had left for work. She was then six (6) years old. At home with her on that day
was the maid and accused-appellant, who was reapplying as family driver. As she was playing
with the water hose in the garage, her dress got wet forcing her to repair to her room to change.
Accused-appellant followed. Once inside the room, accused-appellant tried to undress her,
tightly held her hands, and told her to lie in the bed. He thereupon pulled her panties down. In
reaction, she pulled it up but accused-appellant quickly pulled it down again. It was at this
moment when, according to AAA, accused-appellant touched her vagina with his fingers and
kissed her on the left cheek. All the while, he repeatedly assured her of being her friend and that
they were just playing the mother-and-father roles. Shortly after, she ran to her parents room
and locked the door. Accused-appellant followed but left after AAA ignored his insistence to
continue with the father-mother game.
Later in the evening, AAA told her parents about
her ordeal, after which they reported the matter to barangay officials and the police. AAA was
then asked to undergo a medical examination.[3]
In the course of her direct examination,
AAA was presented a sketch of a female body to assist her pinpoint what part of her body
accused-appellant touched. In response, she shaded the area in between the legs of the female
figure.[4] AAAs father testified that accused-appellant first applied as a driver in 1995. He came
back to reapply on April 24, 2000, was asked to drive on that day, and stayed for the night. The
following morning, her father left early for work leaving the still sleeping applicant behind. The
father narrated what his daughter disclosed when he arrived home from work, adding that, when
he routinely called the house at about 3:00 in the afternoon, the answering AAA called accusedappellant bastos and explained why so. AAAs mother corroborated for the most part her
husbands testimony. She attested that AAA was only six years old when it happened.
Testifying in his defense, accused-appellant admitted to being at AAAs family home on April 24,
2000 and staying overnight. He remained in the house the following day waiting for AAAs father
to return so he could collect what he earned for a days work. To while his time away, he went
outside to watch and talk to persons doing road repair work. And while outside, he suddenly felt
water falling upon him. As it turned out, AAA was playing in the yard with the water hose aimed
at him, which he did not mind.[5] She continued to play with the hose and ended up flooding the
garage. Thereafter, he asked the road workers about the possibility of working with them only to
be told he would need a barangay clearance. He then left, returning a few days later to submit
his clearance to the workers foreperson and to collect his one-day salary. According to
accused-appellant, AAAs father was so angry at him for not waiting last April 25, 2000 that he
pushed accused-appellant and banged his head against the garage wall. After AAAs mother

pacified her irate husband, barangay officials arrived and brought accused-appellant to the
police station. Once there, accused-appellant was charged with molesting AAA, who, however,
did not say anything at the police station; it was her mother who answered all the questions of
the police investigator. He was charged with fingering the sexual organ of AAA. He denied the
accusation, asserting that he did not touch the child, being outside their house on the day in
question watching men doing road repair work.[6]
On October 27, 2004, the RTC
rendered judgment finding accused-appellant guilty of rape. The dispositive portion of the
RTCs decision reads:
Under these declarations and these statutes, the Court is
convinced that the crime of Rape has been committed by accused ROGER MENDOZA Y DELA
CRUZ as defined and penalized by the aforesaid laws. He is therefore sentenced to suffer
imprisonment for all of his natural life or to life imprisonment. This sentence will be served at the
New Bilibid Prison, pending appeal should he desire to so appeal. The Jail Warden is therefore
directed to commit the said Accused, to the said prison.
It is SO ORDERED.[7]
Accused-appellant appealed the RTC decision to the CA. Before the appellate court, accusedappellant raised the following errors allegedly committed by the trial court: (1) in not dismissing
the case on account of the violation of his right to speedy trial; (2) in considering the
prosecutions testimonial evidence which was not formally offered; and (3) in convicting him for
rape without the prosecution presenting proof of his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. As
preliminarily indicated, the CA modified the RTCs decision, the modification consisting of
downgrading the crime to and finding accused-appellant guilty of acts of lasciviousness, a crime
which is necessarily included in the offense charged in the underlying Information. The fallo of
the CA decision dated June 29, 2007 reads, as follows: WHEREFORE, in light of all the
foregoing, the October 27, 2004 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City, Branch
276 in Criminal Case No. 00-410 finding accused-appellant guilty of the crime of rape and
sentencing him to life imprisonment, is hereby MODIFIED. Accused-appellant Roger Mendoza y
De La Cruz is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of acts of lasciviousness, as
defined and penalized under article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Article III,
Section 5 (b), of Republic Act No. 7610, and is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
12 years and 1 day of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to 15 years, 6 [months] and 20 days of
reclusion temporal as maximum and to pay the victim the amount of P30,000.00.
SO
ORDERED.[8] The CA predicated its modificatory disposition on the interplay of the following
premises: The RTC hastily concluded that rape was committed because there was insertion by
accused-appellants finger into the private part of AAA.[9] The records, however, show that
accused-appellant merely stroked the external surface of AAAs vagina.[10] The medical
findings also showed that there was no physical manifestation of insertion into AAAs vagina,
bolstering the inference that no insertion took place.[11] On July 12, 2007, accused-appellant
filed his Notice of Appeal of the CA decision.
On February 18, 2008, the Court required
the parties to submit supplemental briefs if they so desired. They, however, manifested
willingness to submit the case on the basis of available records, logically suggesting that they
are, in the main, reiterating the very same arguments they raised before the CA.
Thus, the issues tendered in this appeal may be formulated, as follows: 1)
whether
or not accused-appellants right to speedy trial was violated below; 2)
whether or not
the trial court erred in considering the testimonial evidence of the prosecution not formally
offered; 3)
whether or not the CA erred in convicting accused-appellant for the crime

of acts of lasciviousness on the basis of the evidence presented. The Courts Ruling Right to
Speedy Trial Not Violated
Accused-appellant states that while he has been detained
since April 26, 2000, his arraignment came only on March 2, 2001 and the prosecution started
to present its evidence only on May 9, 2001. To compound matters, the prosecution was not
deemed to have terminated its presentation of evidence until April 14, 2004.[12] Accusedappellant thus argues that the delays attending his case should have been enough for the trial
court to have dismissed it. The Court is not convinced. The right to speedy trial, as an adjunct to
the right of all persons to a speedy disposition of their cases before judicial and quasi-judicial
bodies, requires that court proceedings should be conducted according to fixed rules and must
be free from vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays.[13] The same right may also be
considered violated when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured; or
when without cause or justifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the
parties having their case tried.[14] None of these circumstances are, to us, present in the
instant case. While perhaps there might have been delays, accused-appellant does not state in
some detail what or who caused the delays, or whether these are of the vexatious or oppressive
kind. What is more, accused-appellant belatedly invoked his right to speedy trial only before the
CA. The proceedings cannot now be claimed to be attended by vexatious, capricious, and
oppressive delays. Accused-appellant cannot plausibly seek the protection of the law to benefit
from the adverse effects of his failure to assert his right at the first instance.[15] As the CA
correctly and judiciously observed:
As can be gleaned from the records, accusedappellant never invoked in the RTC that he has been deprived of his right to speedy trial and
speedy disposition of case. As it is, any allegation of violations of rights should first be ventilated
with the RTC concomitant with the prayer to dismiss the case with prejudice. It is a bit too late in
the day for herein accused-appellant to invoke now his right to speedy trial (People vs. Tee, 395
SCRA 443 [2003]). By raising this point belatedly with the [CA], accused-appellant has thus
waived his objection and accordingly forfeits his right to the aforesaid constitutional guarantees.
[16] x x x Objection to Prosecutions Defective Offer of Evidence Waived
Accusedappellant next questions the manner in which AAAs testimonial evidence was offered. He
claims that her testimony was only offered for the purpose of establishing her minority,[17] not to
establish the fact of molestation. The trial court, he says, supposedly erred in considering
evidence which did not conform to the purpose specified in the offer, in accordance with Section
34 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.[18] Accused-appellant posture is valid to a point. But
despite the improper formal offer of AAAs testimony, the defense failed to make a timely
objection to the presentation of such testimonial evidence. Accused-appellant in fact proceeded
with the trial of the case and, as the CA noted, even subjected the witness to a rigorous crossexamination.[19] The unyielding rule is that evidence not objected to may be deemed admitted
and be validly considered by the court in arriving at its judgment.[20] In point is People v.
Sanchez,[21] in which the prosecution called several persons to testify. No formal offer of
testimonial evidence was made prior to or after their testimonies. The trial court, nonetheless,
considered the testimonies owing to the adverse partys failure to object to the presentation of
such testimonial evidence. The Court sustained the trial court, reproducing what it earlier said
in People v. Java: x x x Section 36 [of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court[22]] requires that an
objection in the course of the oral examination of a witness should be made as soon as the
grounds [therefor] shall become reasonably apparent. Since no objection to the admissibility of

evidence was made in the court below, an objection raised for the first time on appeal shall not
be considered.[23] Accused-appellants belated invocation of the strict application of the rules
on evidence to suit his purpose is quite misplaced, for evidence not objected to, AAAs testimony
in this case, becomes the property of the case, and all the parties to the case are considered
amenable to any favorable or unfavorable effects resulting from the evidence.[24] The
Prosecution Presented Sufficient Proof of Accused-Appellants Guilt
In a bid to escape
liability owing to insufficiency of evidence, accused-appellant avers, in context, that the medical
findings presented in court do not support the conclusion made by the trial court that accusedappellant inserted his fingers into AAAs sexual organ, causing it to hurt. He likewise insists that
the testimonies of AAAs parents were hearsay.[25] The direct examination of AAA yields the
following: Q
And where did he touch you after he pulled down your shorts and
panties? A
Here. Q
What do you call that here? ATTY GARCIA
Witness
pointing to the private part. You just say, what do you call that? What do you call that? When
you pointed to this, what do you call that? x x x x COURT
What part of your body did he
touch? You stand and point. ATTY GARCIA
You just point. May I request, Your Honor
that the witness be made to draw in her own capacity to identify this. You draw a female. Draw a
woman. COURT
We are going to put that on record. The part of the body that she
pointed. ATTY. GARCIA Q
Where did Roger touch you? Which part is this? Is this your
belly or is this your stomach or is this your vagina? COURT
Where did she [point] to?
ATTY. GARCIA
The vagina. Q
That is put in between your legs, the Judge is
asking? A
Yes, Maam. Q
Aside from touching your private part, that part between
your legs. Where else did Roger touch you? A
No more. Q
And aside from touching
you, what else did he do? COURT:
No answer? ATTY. GARCIA:
There was an
answer, Your Honor. A
He was over the window. He was telling me that we were friends. I
did not listen to him and he already went out of our house. He was already out. Q
Lets go
back to touching first, [AAA]. So after he touched you, what else did he do to you? Did he kiss
you [AAA]? A
Yes, Maam. Q
Where did he kiss you? A
On the cheek. Q
Which part of your cheek if you recall? A
Left. Q
Did he kiss your private part, [AAA]?
(No answer) COURT
Aside from your cheek, did he kiss also your neck, your ears,
breast, the private part in between your legs?
A
No, Your Honor.
COURT
How about your breast, did he kiss your breast? Did he touch your breast, [AAA]? Do you
remember[?] You do not have to be ashamed, we are all women. A
I dont remember.
ATTY. GARCIA
I would like to manifest at this point, Your Honor please, to reiterate what
I mean is really shaking, Your Honor. I just got the right word now. COURT
You mean he
did not kiss your breast? What about the portion of your body in between your legs. Did he also
kiss it?
A
No, Maam. Q
Where did he put his fingers, [AAA?] You said he used
his fingers. Where did he use his fingers, [AAA?] Please answer and when you said he touched
you on your private part, [AAA] did he? COURT
After he touched you[,] you said
he went out of your room. When did he [put] your dry panty [back on,] after he [touched] you[?]
You said he went out of the room. How about your dry panty? A
After he touched me.
COURT
He removed your wet panties and then he put on the dry one. When did that
happen[?] After he touched you or before? Because you said he went out. ATTY. GARCIA
The answer was before, Your Honor. COURT
You said that he pulled down your
shirt. Then he pulled down your wet panties and then you said that he touched your part in

between your legs and then he put on your dry panties. Was it before he touched your private
part or after you were touched? A
Before. COURT
So you mean when he touched
you in between the legs you already [had] the dry panties or no panties yet? A
No panties
yet.[26]
The Court need not belabor the issue of whether or not accused-appellant is
guilty of rape which in turn resolves itself into the question of whether or not he inserted his
fingers into AAAs sexual organ. The issue has been peremptorily answered in the negative by
the CA, basing its resolution on the relevant finding of the examining doctor and on the
testimony of AAA, who, at best, was tentative in her response when queried about the fingerinsertion aspect of the incident. Also, the People does not challenge the determination. And
precisely because of the fact of non-insertion that the appellate court was impelled, and rightly
so, to downgrade the criminal act to acts of lasciviousness. The records appear to support the
appellate courts modificatory action. Consider the following answer given by AAA to the
prosecutions question: Where did Roger touch you? AAA pointed to the vagina of a female
figure she had drawn.[27] The following exchanges subsequently between the trial court and
AAA, however, while proving in a convincing way malicious touching, provoke doubts whether
indeed accused-appellant inserted his finger into the childs vagina. Q
[AAA], when you
said he [touched] the things between your legs[,] did he use his fingers?
COURT
Did he use anything in touching you that he used other than his hands. Did he use anything in
touching you? Did he use his fingers, his hands?
A
Yes, Your Honor, fingers. Q
Did he insert it inside your private part the thing between your legs, [AAA]? A
No.[28]
We, thus, sustain the finding of the CA, viz: Absent any showing of the actual insertion of the
finger in the private part of the child, there can be no consummated rape. Thus, the failure of the
prosecution to establish accused-appellants guilt for rape notwithstanding, this Court finds him
liable for the lesser crime of acts of lasciviousness. This latter crime is considered an offense
included or subsumed in the rape charge. Thus in Dulla v. Court of Appeals and People v. Bon,
the Supreme Court convicted the accused with the crime of acts of lasciviousness even though
the information charged the crime of rape.[29] (Citations omitted.) The touching of a females
sexual organ, standing alone, is not equivalent to rape, not even an attempted one. With regard
to penile rape, People v. Campuhan explains:
x x x Thus, touching when applied to rape
cases does not simply mean mere epidermal contact, stroking or grazing of organs, a slight
brush or a scrape of the penis on the external layer of the victims vagina, or the mons pubis, as
in this case. There must be sufficient and convincing proof that the penis indeed touched the
labias or slid into the female organ, and not merely stroked the external surface thereof, for an
accused to be convicted of consummated rape. x x x
x x x Jurisprudence dictates that
the labia majora must be entered for rape to be consummated, and not merely for the penis to
stroke the surface of the female organ. Thus, a grazing of the surface of the female organ or
touching the mons pubis of the pudendum is not sufficient to constitute consummated rape.
Absent any showing of the slightest penetration of the female organ, i.e., touching of either labia
of the pudendum by the penis, there can be no consummated rape; at most, it can only be
attempted rape, if not acts of lasciviousness.[30] (Citations omitted.)
By analogy, we hold
that for a charge for rape by sexual assault (with the use of ones fingers as the assaulting
object, as here) to prosper, there should be evidence of at least the slightest penetration of the
sexual organ and not merely a brush or graze of its surface. This is in consonance with Article
266-A, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353, which

provides: Art. 266-A. Rape; when and how committed.Rape is committed 1)

By a man
who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat or intimidation;
b)When the offended party is deprived of reason
or otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of
authority; and
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is
demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present. 2) By any
person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an
act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another persons mouth or anal orifice, or any
instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person.(Emphasis supplied.)
Rape through sexual assault, thus, requires that the assault be specifically done through
insertion into the genital or anal orifices of the victim, a circumstance absent in this case, or at
least not established by the required quantum of evidence.
Accused-appellants virtual
contention that his guilt for acts of lasciviousness has not been proved by proof beyond
reasonable doubt deserves scant consideration. While the RTC and the CA had disagreed as
to what crime was committed, the disagreement stemming from their differing findings on
whether or not accused-appellant inserted his fingers into AAAs vagina, both the courts were
one in saying that accused-appellant indeed kissed AAA on the face and fondled her most
private part, or, in fine, that he committed lascivious acts on a six-year girl.[31] The Court
loathes to disturb the ensuing findings of the CA, confirmatory of that of the RTC:
The
prosecutions evidence introduced during the entire trial established the presence of all the
elements of the crime of acts of lasciviousness. The testimony of the victim shows that accusedappellant committed lewd acts against her when he pulled down her panties, kissed her on her
left cheek, touched her private part and then squeezing her arm causing her extreme pain.[32]
x x x As the CA observed, AAAs telling testimony deserves full faith and credit, given as it were
in a categorical manner by a young and an immature girl who had no motiveand none was
ascribed by the defenseto falsely impute the commission of a serious crime against the
accused.[33] And if we may add, in cases of acts of lasciviousness, the lone testimony of the
offended party, if credible, is sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused.[34] The Court, thus,
need not dwell into the probative value of the corroborative testimony on the molestation
incident of AAAs parents which accused-appellant assails as hearsay. Finally, we also sustain
the award of moral damages in the amount of PhP 30,000 in accordance with prevailing
jurisprudence.[35]
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The CA Decision dated June
29, 2007 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00651 finding accused-appellant Roger Mendoza y Dela Cruz
guilty of acts of lasciviousness and imposing upon him the penalty defined therein is
AFFIRMED.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------53. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. DOMINGO VALDEZ Y DULAY,
accused-appellant.
G.R. No. 127753. December 11, 2000
DECISION
BUENA, J.:For automatic review is the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 45,
Anonas, Urdaneta, Pangasinan convicting appellant Domingo Valdez y Dulay guilty of two
crimes: (1) murder for which he was sentenced to suffer the death penalty and (2) illegal

possession of Firearms and Ammunition under Presidential Decree No. 1866 for which he was
sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua based on the following criminal indictments:CRIMINAL
CASE NO. U-8719That on or about 31st day of October, 1995 at barangay San Roque,
Municipality of San Manuel, Province of Pangasinan, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused with intent to kill and with treachery and evident
premeditation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack and shot one
Labrador Valdez y Madrid, hitting the latters chest and the gunshot wounds inflicted being
mortal, caused the direct and immediate death of the said victim, to the damage and prejudice
of his heirs.Contrary to Article 248, Revised Penal Code.[1]CRIMINAL CASE NO. U-8720That
on or about the 31st day of October, 1995 at barangay San Roque, Municipality of San Manuel,
Province of Pangasinan, and within the jurisdiction of this honorable Court, the said accused did
then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously have in his possession, control and custody a
firearm of an unknown caliber, make and brand without authority of law, and which he used in
shooting to death Labrador Valdez y Madrid.Contrary to Presidential Decree No. 1866.[2]On
October 31, 1995, at around 9:00 oclock in the evening at Sitio Laclac, Barangay San Roque,
San Manuel, Pangasinan, Marcelo Valdez was under his nipa house talking with his son
Labrador Valdez. At that time, Marcelos other housemates his wife, son Rolando Valdez,
daughter-in-law Imelda Umagtang and an eight-year-old boy named Christopher Centeno
were staying upstairs preparing to sleep. In the course of their conversation, Labrador was lying
sideways on a carabao sled, placed under the family nipa house. He was facing his father at
the eastern side of the house, at a distance of about less than two (2) meters from each other.
[3] TSN, June 13, 1996, pp. 14 and 17. 3 Suddenly, two consecutive gunshots were fired
coming from the western side of the house by an assailant.[4] The first shot landed on the left
forefinger and thumb of Labrador, while the second shot hit him two (2) inches from the left
shoulder, below the neck which exited at the right side just below his breast.[5] After firing, the
assailant immediately ran away towards the west direction.[6]Marcelo Valdez who was talking to
his son, immediately called for help while the victim managed to walk upstairs towards the
kitchen. The stunning sound of the two gunfire and Marcelos cry for help alerted Imelda
Umagtang and her common-law husband Rolando Valdez, who were both lying on bed, to verge
upon the kitchen where they saw the victim bathed in his own blood. When Rolando inquired
from the victim who shot him, the latter replied that it was the appellant. At this time, the victims
brother and in-laws arrived. They also asked the victim what happened and the latter once
more said that it was appellant who shot him. At such time, the search for the passenger jeep
that will transport the victim to the hospital continued. After an hour, they were able to find a
passenger jeep but the victim already succumbed to death prior to his transport to the hospital.
The next day, on November 1, 1995, Dr. Asuncion Tuvera of San Manuel Rural Health Unit
conducted the autopsy on the cadaver of the deceased in the latters house. The medical
examination revealed the following gunshot wounds-A. External findings:Chest - gunshot
wound at the left sternal line 2 inches below the left clavicle, 2 cm in diameter penetratinggunshot wound at the right enterior axillary line at the level of the lumbar area.Extremities
lacuated wound on the left thumb and index finger with fracture of the phalanges.B. Internal
findings:Chest fracture of the 3rd enterior left rib.Abdomen placuated wound of the liver.
Cause of death:Cardio respiratory arrest secondary to severe hemorrhage secondary to
gunshot wound on the chest and lumbar area. (Exhibit E; records, p. 7)Thereafter, appellant

was charged before the trial court with two separate information for murder and illegal
possession of firearms to which he pleaded not guilty. After trial, judgment was rendered
convicting appellant as earlier mentioned. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Court finds:IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. U-8719:
The accused DOMINGO VALDEZ Y DULAY GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
MURDER defined and penalized under republic Act No. 7659 otherwise known as the Heinous
Crime Law, the offense having been committed with the attendant aggravating circumstances of
evident premeditation, abuse of superior strength and nighttime, hereby sentences him the
ultimum supplicium of DEATH to be executed pursuant to Republic Act No. 8177 known as the
Lethal Injection Law, to pay the heirs of the victim LABRADOR VALDEZ in the amount of
P50,000.00 as indemnity; P23,500.00 as actual damages; P200,000.00 as moral damages; and
to pay the costs.IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. U-8720:The accused DOMINGO VALDEZ Y DULAY,
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition
penalized under Presidential Decree No. 1866 and hereby sentences him to suffer
imprisonment of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to pay the costs.Finally, it is said: Dura lex,
sed lex, translated as The law is harsh, but that is the law.SO ORDERED.[7]Appellant
questions his conviction arguing that the court a quo erred -I. in convicting the accused of
murder notwithstanding the failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.II. in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of treachery and the aggravating
circumstances of evident premeditation, abuse of superior strength and nighttime on the
assumption that indeed accused appellant shot the victim.III. in not applying the provision of
R.A. 8294, amending P.D. 1866IV. in convicting the accused for two separate offensesV.
finding the accused guilty of violating P.D. 1866[8]After a careful examination of the records,
appellants conviction should be upheld. The elements of murder concur in this case. Appellant
shot the victim twice. The wounds sustained by the deceased at the left thumb, index finger and
at the left shoulder below the neck exiting to the right side just below the breast were caused by
bullets. As a result of these gunshot wounds, the victim suffered Cardio respiratory arrest
secondary to severe hemorrhage secondary to gunshot wound on the chest and lumbar area
which was described in the medico-legal report as the proximate cause resulting to his death.
Appellants defense is premised primarily on denial and alibi. He argues that on the day of the
incident he was hauling and transporting 27 cavans of palay with Reymante and Conrado
Centino[9] from 6 to 9 oclock in the evening of October 31, 1995, to the house of Mrs. Juanita
Centino. Thereafter, they took supper at Conrados house and drank wine and went home
around 11 oclock in the evening. His version was corroborated by Reymante and Conrado and
the latters mother, Mrs. Centino, a sexagenarian. Such defenses, however, aside from being
inherently weak, cannot prevail against a positive and explicit identification of him not only by
Marcelo Valdez but also by the victim himself. To exculpate himself, appellant must not only
show that it was impossible for him to be at the place where the crime was committed, but it
must likewise be demonstrated that he was so far away that he could not have been physically
present at the place of the crime or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission.[10] The
distance between the place where the crime happened, to the Centinos house where appellant
claimed he was, is more or less one (1) kilometer, which could be negotiated by walking for
thirty (30) minutes, and twenty (20) minutes by riding a vehicle.[11] Appellants whereabouts at
the time of the incident was insufficient to foreclose any possibility for him to be present at the

scene of the crime, given the proximity of the two places.Appellant further contends that witness
Marcelo Valdez could not have positively identified him because there was only a single
kerosene lamp lighting the area and the witness was already seventy years old, who, at such
age, would have a nebulous identification of the assailant. Appellants assertion of impossibility
of identification in a period of a few seconds look at the time of the second shot, which was
fired successively, was negated by the fact that appellant shot the victim at a distance of around
two meters from the kerosene lamp. The distance of the appellant from the kerosene lamp
does not preclude the possibility of identification since the place was properly illumined
capacitating the witness to identify the assailant. In fact, both Marcelo and the deceased were
able to identify appellant.Appellant capitalizes on the alleged failure of Lilia Valdez (wife of the
deceased) to mention to the officer who investigated the killing, that she heard her husband say
that the appellant was his assailant. He argues that her testimony in court that she heard her
husband say that it was appellant who shot him, was merely an afterthought. In support thereof,
appellant quotes the following answers of Lilia Valdez during cross-examination -ATTY. VIRAYQ: Now, in the sworn statement Madam witness which you gave to the police authorities of
San Manuel, Pangasinan, you never mentioned that your husband told you that he was
allegedly shot by the accused, is this correct?A: Yes, sir.ATTY. VIRAY:
The answer is not
responsive, we request the question to be read back.COURT: She said, she did not tell that
to the police.ATTY. VIRAY:Q: Why did you not tell to the police authorities that your husband
told you that your husband was shot by Domingo Valdez?A: I forgot, sir. [TSN, July 3, 1996,
pp. 24-25]We have thoroughly reviewed the records and studied the alleged contradiction
between the court testimony and the sworn statement of Lilia Valdez only to find that appellant
is misleading the court. In her sworn statement Lilia Valdez stated -15. Q:
Was you (sic)
husband able to identify his assailant?A: Yes, sir. He identified Domingo Valdez as his
assailant when asked by brother-in-law Rolando Valdez before he was brought down to kitchen
on the way to the hospital, sir. [Exhibit D, Folder II, Records, p. 3]It is also clear from the
records that as early as November 1, 1995, the day after the killing, the principal prosecution
witness Marcelo Valdez (father of the deceased), along with Lilia Valdez (wife of the deceased),
Imelda Umagtang (sister-in-law of the deceased) alluded to appellant as the killer before police
officer Avelino Sandi, Jr. who conducted the investigation. Their respective sworn statements
were reduced into writing denouncing and identifying appellant as responsible for the death of
Labrador Valdez. Imelda Umagtang[12] testified to these utterances of the deceased in court.
The victims septuagenarian father Marcelo Valdez likewise affirmed the identity of the appellant
as the assailant. He testified in court that he recognized the assailant with the lighting coming
from the kerosene lamp hanging on the wall, which illuminated the whole ground of the nipa hut.
[13] He claimed that he recognized appellant at the second shot[14] at a distance of around
three meters (3) away from him.[15] At the time appellant fired the second shot, appellant was
less than a meter away from the victim[16] and around two meters from the kerosene lamp.[17]
Lilia Valdez, the victims wife, recounting that fateful day, similarly attested appellants culpability
in court. She testified that when her husband was shot she was in her house with her children,
about 25 to 30 meters[18] from the victims location. When she heard the gunfire and the
summons of her parents-in-law that her husband was shot, she rushed to her husband and saw
him bloodied, lying prostrate in the kitchen. She asked the victim what happened and the latter
answered that appellant shot him.Appellant likewise debunks the probative value given to

Imelda Umagtangs testimony that she heard the victim say that it was appellant who shot him
because such statement was not directed to her by the victim but to Rolando Valdez.[19] This
according to appellant finds support in the following testimony of Imelda ATTY. VIRAYQ: So
it is very clear from your statement that it was your live-in boyfriend, Rolando Valdez, who asked
question from the victim not you, is this correct?A: Yes, sir.Q: You never asked questions
from the victim, is this correct?A: No, sir. I heard what he revealed to my live-in boyfriend,
sir.[20]There is no rule that a person who hears something cannot testify on what she heard. A
dying declaration need not be particularly directed only to the person inquiring from the
declarant. Anyone who has knowledge of the fact of what the declarant said, whether it was
directed to him or not, or whether he had made inquiries from the declarant or not, can testify
thereto.Hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, possesses no probative value unless the
proponent can show that the same falls within the exception to the hearsay rule.[21] The
statement of the deceased uttered shortly after being wounded by the gunfire is a dying
declaration, which falls under the exception to the hearsay rule.[22] It may be proved by the
testimony of the witness who heard the same or to whom it was made.[23] Appellant contends
that the identification by the deceased of his assailant, which was admitted as a dying
declaration under Section 37, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, cannot be admitted because
when the said statements were uttered the declarant was not conscious of his imminent
death,[24] relying on the following testimony of Imelda Umagtang and Lilia Valdez, thus Q:
What was your observation when he was lying down waiting for the ride to come?A: He was
already very weak, sir.Q: Did somebody ask of his physical condition at that time?A: Yes, sir.
Q: Who?A: Lago Valdez, sir.Q: What did he ask?A: He asked if he can still manage, sir.
Q: What did Labrador Valdez answer?A: He said, no more, sir.Q: What do you mean by
he cannot manage anymore?A: He was already very weak at that time, sir.Q: And?A: And
he was dying, sir.Q: He said he was dying?A: No, sir.Q: But he was feeling weak already?
A: Yes, sir.[25]andQ: When you were there near your husband lying in the kitchen in the
house of your father-in-law, what was your observation regarding his physical condition?A: He
was shot, Your Honor.Q: Did you ask him what was he feeling at that time?A: Yes, sir.Q:
What did he answer?A: He said, he was weak, Your Honor.Q: Did he tell you that he is
going to die?A: No, Your Honor.[26]The victims statements prior to his death identifying
appellant as his assailant have the vestiges of a dying declaration, the elements for its
admissibility are: (1) the declaration was made by the deceased under consciousness of his
impending death; (2) the deceased was at time competent as a witness; (3) the declaration
concerns the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarants death; and (4) it offered in
a criminal case wherein the declarants death is subject of inquiry.[27]These requirements are
present in this case. The deceased made, before his death, more than one statement, naming
the person who shot him. The statements uttered by the deceased were in response to the
queries about the identity of the assailant. Such utterances are admissible as a declaration of
the surrounding circumstances of the victims death, which were uttered under the
consciousness of an impending death. That the victim was conscious of his impending death is
shown by the extent and seriousness of the wounds inflicted upon the victim. The victim, prior
to his death, was competent to be a witness in court and such dying declaration is offered in a
criminal prosecution for murder where he was himself a victim.In a further but futile attempt to
exculpate himself from liability, appellant contends that he has no motive to kill the victim. While

he admitted that the victim eloped with his wife, he was not the only suspect having a motive to
kill the victim. Suffice it to say that the evidence on motive is inconsequential when the identity
of the culprit has been positively established[28] as in this case.Ultimately, the issues raised by
appellant fall within the sphere of credibility of witnesses which, the reviewing court on appeal,
ordinarily gives deference to the assessments and conclusion of the trial court provided it is
supported by the evidence on record. Findings of facts by the trial court are usually not
disturbed on appeal on the proposition that the lower court had the unique opportunity of having
observed the elusive and incommunicable evidence of the witnesses deportment on the stand
while testifying.The killing was attended by treachery when the deceased was shot at his back
while lying on a carabao sledge conversing with his father, in a sudden and unexpected manner
giving him no opportunity to repel it or defend himself against such attack,[29] and without any
provocation on his part. With respect to the other aggravating circumstances of evident
premeditation, abuse of superior strength, and nighttime, this Court cannot appreciate the same
against the appellant for lack of factual basis. There is no evidence on record that appellant
contemplated and took some time of cool reflection before performing his evil act for evident
premeditation to set in. The abuse of superior strength, assuming there is any, is already
absorbed in treachery. Nighttime as an aggravating circumstance was not established for lack
of proof that appellant specifically sought the darkness of night to perpetuate his deed. In the
absence of any evidence that nocturnity was specifically sought for by the offender in the
commission of the crime, such aggravating circumstance may not be validly appreciated.In
criminal prosecutions, the accused is entitled to an acquittal, unless his guilt is shown beyond a
reasonable doubt. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof as,
excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or
that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.[30] The prosecution
ably discharged its duty by establishing its case against appellant through the required quantum
of proof.In Criminal Case No. U-8720, appellant was found guilty of the crime of Illegal
Possession of Firearms and Ammunition punished under P.D. 1866 and was sentenced to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the costs. His separate indictment was on account
of the unlicensed firearm used in the killing. Under Section 1 of Republic Act No. 8294,[31] if
homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an
unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance. Although the crime in
this case was committed in 1995, the amendatory law (R.A. No. 8294) which became effective
on July 6, 1997, fifteen (15) days after its publication in Malaya and Philippine Journal on June
21, 1997, since it is favorable to appellant,[32] shall be given a retroactive effect. Therefore, the
illegal possession or use of the unlicensed firearm may no longer be separately charged[33] and
only one offense should be punished, viz., murder in this case, and the use of unlicensed
firearm should only be considered as an aggravating circumstance.[34] Considering that
appellant is liable for murder, the illegal possession case can no longer be pursued because it is
merely treated as an aggravating circumstance.Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code penalizes
murder with reclusion perpetua to death. Since the killing was committed with the use of an
unlicensed firearm, such circumstance will be treated merely as an aggravating circumstance
under R.A. 8294. Pursuant to Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, when the law prescribes a
penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, such as reclusion perpetua to death, there being
one aggravating circumstance, the greater penalty (death) shall be applied. However, the

aggravating circumstance of use of an unlicensed firearm cannot be appreciated in this case

because its retroactive application would be unfavorable to the accused, since the higher
penalty of death would necessarily be imposed. Thus, we could only impose the penalty of
reclusion perpetua in line with the ruling in People vs. Nepomuceno, Jr.[35] -It must be
underscored that although R.A. No. 7659 had already taken effect at the time the violation of
P.D. No. 1866 was allegedly committed x x x there is nothing in R. A. No. 7659 which
specifically reimposed the death penalty in P.D. No. 1866. Without such reimposition, the death
penalty imposed in Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 for aggravated illegal possession of firearm shall
remain suspended pursuant to Section 19(1) of Article III of the Constitution. Conformably
therewith, what the trial court could impose was reclusion perpetua.WHEREFORE, the assailed
judgment is hereby MODIFIED as follows:1. In Criminal Case No. U-8719 for MURDER, the
penalty imposed on accused-appellant DOMINGO VALDEZ Y DULAY is reduced to reclusion
perpetua. In addition to the death indemnity of P50,000.00, the P200,000.00 moral damages
awarded by the trial court to the heirs of Labrador Valdez y Madrid is reduced to P50,000.00,
and the P23,500.00 awarded as actual damages is likewise reduced to P19,000.00, the amount
actually proved.2. In Criminal Case No. U-8720 for ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS,
the sentence imposed on accused-appelant DOMINGO VALDEZ y DULAY is SET ASIDE and
ANNULLED and the case is DISMISSED, the act charged therein being considered merely as
an aggravating circumstance pursuant to P.D. 1866, as amended by Rep. Act No. 8294.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------54. RUFINA LUY LIM, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, AUTO TRUCK TBA
CORPORATION, SPEED DISTRIBUTING, INC., ACTIVE DISTRIBUTORS, ALLIANCE
MARKETING CORPORATION, ACTION COMPANY, INC. respondents.
G.R. No. 124715
January 24, 2000BUENA, J.:May a corporation, in its universality, be the
proper subject of and be included in the inventory of the estate of a deceased person?Petitioner
disputes before us through the instant petition for review on certiorari, the decision1 of the Court
of Appeals promulgated on 18 April 1996, in CA-GR SP No. 38617, which nullified and set aside
the orders dated 04 July 19952, 12 September 19953 and 15 September 19954 of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 93, sitting as a probate court.Petitioner Rufina Luy Lim is the
surviving spouse of late Pastor Y. Lim whose estate is the subject of probate proceedings in
Special Proceedings Q-95-23334, entitled, "In Re: Intestate Estate of Pastor Y. Lim Rufina Luy
Lim, represented by George Luy, Petitioner".1wphi1.ntPrivate respondents Auto Truck
Corporation, Alliance Marketing Corporation, Speed Distributing, Inc., Active Distributing, Inc.
and Action Company are corporations formed, organized and existing under Philippine laws and
which owned real properties covered under the Torrens system.On 11 June 1994, Pastor Y. Lim
died intestate. Herein petitioner, as surviving spouse and duly represented by her nephew
George Luy, fried on 17 March 1995, a joint petition5 for the administration of the estate of
Pastor Y. Lim before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.Private respondent corporations,
whose properties were included in the inventory of the estate of Pastor Y. Lim, then filed a
motion6 for the lifting of lis pendens and motion7 for exclusion of certain properties from the
estate of the decedent.In an order8 dated 08 June 1995, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 93, sitting as a probate court, granted the private respondents' twin motions, in this
wise:Wherefore, the Register of Deeds of Quezon City is hereby ordered to lift, expunge or
delete the annotation of lis pendens on Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 116716, 116717,

116718, 116719 and 5182 and it is hereby further ordered that the properties covered by the
same titles as well as those properties by (sic) Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 613494, 363123,
236236 and 263236 are excluded from these proceedings.SO ORDERED.Subsequently, Rufina
Luy Lim filed a verified amended petition9 which contained the following averments:3. The late
Pastor Y. Lim personally owned during his lifetime the following business entities, to wit:
Business Entity
Address:x x x
xxx
x x xAlliance Marketing, Inc.
Block 3, Lot 6, Dacca BF Homes, Paraaque, Metro Manila.x x x
xxx
x x xSpeed Distributing Inc.
910 Barrio Niog, Aguinaldo Highway, Bacoor, Cavite.x x x
xxx
x x xAuto Truck TBA Corp.
2251 Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City.x x x
xxx
x x xActive Distributors, Inc.
Block 3, Lot 6, Dacca BF Homes,
Paraaque, Metro Manila.x x x
xxx
x x xAction Company
100 20th
Avenue Murphy, Quezon City or 92-D Mc-Arthur Highway Valenzuela Bulacan.3.1 Although the
above business entities dealt and engaged in business with the public as corporations, all their
capital, assets and equity were however, personally owned by the late Pastor Y Lim. Hence the
alleged stockholders and officers appearing in the respective articles of incorporation of the
above business entities were mere dummies of Pastor Y. Lim, and they were listed therein only
for purposes of registration with the Securities and Exchange Commission.4. Pastor Lim,
likewise, had Time, Savings and Current Deposits with the following banks: (a) Metrobank,
Grace Park, Caloocan City and Quezon Avenue, Quezon City Branches and (b) First Intestate
Bank (formerly Producers Bank), Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation and in other banks
whose identities are yet to be determined.5. That the following real properties, although
registered in the name of the above entities, were actually acquired by Pastor Y. Lim during his
marriage with petitioner, to wit:Corporation Title Locationx x x
xxx
x x xk. Auto
Truck TCT No. 617726
Sto. Domingo TBA Corporation Cainta, Rizalq. Alliance Marketing
TCT No. 27896
Prance, Metro ManilaCopies of the above-mentioned Transfer
Certificate of Title and/or Tax Declarations are hereto attached as Annexes "C" to "W".x x x
xxx
x x x7. The aforementioned properties and/or real interests left by the late Pastor Y.
Lim, are all conjugal in nature, having been acquired by him during the existence of his marriage
with petitioner.8. There are other real and personal properties owned by Pastor Y. Lim which
petitioner could not as yet identify. Petitioner, however will submit to this Honorable Court the
identities thereof and the necessary documents covering the same as soon as possible.On 04
July 1995, the Regional Trial Court acting on petitioner's motion issued an order10, thus:
Wherefore, the order dated 08 June 1995 is hereby set aside and the Registry of Deeds of
Quezon City is hereby directed to reinstate the annotation of lis pendens in case said annotation
had already been deleted and/or cancelled said TCT Nos. 116716, 116717, 116718, 116719 and
51282.Further more (sic), said properties covered by TCT Nos. 613494, 365123, 236256 and
236237 by virtue of the petitioner are included in the instant petition.SO ORDERED.On 04
September 1995, the probate court appointed Rufina Lim as special administrator11 and Miguel
Lim and Lawyer Donald Lee, as co-special administrators of the estate of Pastor Y. Lim, after
which letters of administration were accordingly issued.In an order12 dated 12 September 1995,
the probate court denied anew private respondents' motion for exclusion, in this wise:The issue
precisely raised by the petitioner in her petition is whether the corporations are the mere alter
egos or instrumentalities of Pastor Lim, Otherwise (sic) stated, the issue involves the piercing of
the corporate veil, a matter that is clearly within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court and not

the Securities and Exchange Commission. Thus, in the case of Cease vs. Court of Appeals, 93
SCRA 483, the crucial issue decided by the regular court was whether the corporation involved
therein was the mere extension of the decedent. After finding in the affirmative, the Court ruled
that the assets of the corporation are also assets of the estate.A reading of P.D. 902, the law
relied upon by oppositors, shows that the SEC's exclusive (sic) applies only to intra-corporate
controversy. It is simply a suit to settle the intestate estate of a deceased person who, during his
lifetime, acquired several properties and put up corporations as his instrumentalities.SO
ORDERED.On 15 September 1995, the probate court acting on an ex parte motion filed by
petitioner, issued an order13 the dispositive portion of which reads:Wherefore, the parties and
the following banks concerned herein under enumerated are hereby ordered to comply strictly
with this order and to produce and submit to the special administrators, through this Honorable
Court within (5) five days from receipt of this order their respective records of the
savings/current accounts/time deposits and other deposits in the names of Pastor Lim and/or
corporations above-mentioned, showing all the transactions made or done concerning
savings/current accounts from January 1994 up to their receipt of this court order.x x x
xx
x
x x xSO ORDERED.Private respondent filed a special civil action for certiorari14, with
an urgent prayer for a restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction, before the Court of
Appeals questioning the orders of the Regional Trial Court, sitting as a probate court.On 18 April
1996, the Court of Appeals, finding in favor of herein private respondents, rendered the assailed
decision15, the decretal portion of which declares:Wherefore, premises considered, the instant
special civil action for certiorari is hereby granted, The impugned orders issued by respondent
court on July 4, 1995 and September 12, 1995 are hereby nullified and set aside. The impugned
order issued by respondent on September 15, 1995 is nullified insofar as petitioner
corporations" bank accounts and records are concerned.SO ORDERED.Through the
expediency of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, herein petitioner Rufina Luy Lim now comes before
us with a lone assignment oferror16:The respondent Court of Appeals erred in reversing the
orders of the lower court which merely allowed the preliminary or provisional inclusion of the
private respondents as part of the estate of the late deceased (sic) Pastor Y. Lim with the
respondent Court of Appeals arrogating unto itself the power to repeal, to disobey or to ignore
the clear and explicit provisions of Rules 81,83,84 and 87 of the Rules of Court and thereby
preventing the petitioner, from performing her duty as special administrator of the estate as
expressly provided in the said Rules.Petitioner's contentions tread on perilous grounds.In the
instant petition for review, petitioner prays that we affirm the orders issued by the probate court
which were subsequently set aside by the Court of Appeals.Yet, before we delve into the merits
of the case, a review of the rules on jurisdiction over probate proceedings is indeed in order.The
provisions of Republic Act 769117, which introduced amendments to Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,
are pertinent:Sec. 1. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the
"Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980", is hereby amended to read as follows:Sec. 19.
Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction:x x x
x
xx
x x x(4) In all matters of probate, both testate and intestate, where the gross value of
the estate exceeds One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000) or, in probate matters in Metro
Manila, where such gross value exceeds Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000);x x x
xxx
x x xSec. 3. Section 33 of the same law is hereby amended to read as follows:Sec.
33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial

Courts in Civil Cases. Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts shall exercise:1. Exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions and probate
proceedings, testate and intestate, including the grant of provisional remedies in proper cases,
where the value of the personal property, estate or amount of the demand does not exceed One
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000) or, in Metro Manila where such personal property, estate
or amount of the demand does not exceed Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000),
exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs,
the amount of which must be specifically alleged, Provided, that interest, damages of whatever
kind, attorney's, litigation expenses and costs shall be included in the determination of the filing
fees, Provided further, that where there are several claims or causes of actions between the
same or different parties, embodied in the same complaint, the amount of the demand shall be
the totality of the claims in all the causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes of action
arose out of the same or different transactions;x x x
xxx
x x xSimply put, the
determination of which court exercises jurisdiction over matters of probate depends upon the
gross value of the estate of the decedent.As to the power and authority of the probate court,
petitioner relies heavily on the principle that a probate court may pass upon title to certain
properties, albeit provisionally, for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should
or should not be included in the inventory.In a litany of cases, We defined the parameters by
which the court may extend its probing arms in the determination of the question of title in
probate proceedings.This Court, in PASTOR, JR. vs. COURT OF APPEALS,18 held:. . . As a
rule, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the probate court cannot resolve
with finality. Thus, for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should
not be included in the inventory of estate properties, the Probate Court may pass upon the title
thereto, but such determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision
in a separate action to resolve title.We reiterated the rule in PEREIRA vs. COURT OF
APPEALS19:. . . The function of resolving whether or not a certain property should be included
in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the administrator is one clearly within
the competence of the probate court. However, the court's determination is only provisional in
character, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action which may be
instituted by the parties.Further, in MORALES vs. CFI OF CAVITE20 citing CUIZON vs.
RAMOLETE21, We made an exposition on the probate court's limited jurisdiction:It is a wellsettled rule that a probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate
cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which
are equally claimed to belong to outside parties. All that the said court could do as regards said
properties is to determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list
of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute, well and good; but if
there is, then the parties, the administrator and the opposing parties have to resort to an
ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate
court cannot do so.Again, in VALERA vs. INSERTO22, We had occasion to elucidate, through
Mr. Justice Andres Narvasa23:Settled is the rule that a Court of First Instance (now Regional
Trial Court), acting as a probate court, exercises but limited jurisdiction, and thus has no power
to take cognizance of and determine the issue of title to property claimed by a third person
adversely to the decedent, unless the claimant and all other parties having legal interest in the
property consent, expressly or impliedly, to the submission of the question to the probate court

for adjudgment, or the interests of third persons are not thereby prejudiced, the reason for the
exception being that the question of whether or not a particular matter should be resolved by the
court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or of its limited jurisdiction as a special court (e.g.
probate, land registration, etc.), is in reality not a jurisdictional but in essence of procedural one,
involving a mode of practice which may be waived. . . .. . . . These considerations assume
greater cogency where, as here, the Torrens title is not in the decedent's name but in others, a
situation on which this Court has already had occasion to rule . . . . (emphasis Ours)Petitioner,
in the present case, argues that the parcels of land covered under the Torrens system and
registered in the name of private respondent corporations should be included in the inventory of
the estate of the decedent Pastor Y. Lim, alleging that after all the determination by the probate
court of whether these properties should be included or not is merely provisional in nature, thus,
not conclusive and subject to a final determination in a separate action brought for the purpose
of adjudging once and for all the issue of title.Yet, under the peculiar circumstances, where the
parcels of land are registered in the name of private respondent corporations, the jurisprudence
pronounced in BOLISAY vs., ALCID 24 is of great essence and finds applicability, thus:It does
not matter that respondent-administratrix has evidence purporting to support her claim of
ownership, for, on the other hand, petitioners have a Torrens title in their favor, which under the
law is endowed with incontestability until after it has been set aside in the manner indicated in
the law itself, which of course, does not include, bringing up the matter as a mere incident in
special proceedings for the settlement of the estate of deceased persons. . . .. . . . In regard to
such incident of inclusion or exclusion, We hold that if a property covered by Torrens title is
involved, the presumptive conclusiveness of such title should be given due weight, and in the
absence of strong compelling evidence to the contrary, the holder thereof should be considered
as the owner of the property in controversy until his title is nullified or modified in an appropriate
ordinary action, particularly, when as in the case at bar, possession of the property itself is in the
persons named in the title. . . .A perusal of the records would reveal that no strong compelling
evidence was ever presented by petitioner to bolster her bare assertions as to the title of the
deceased Pastor Y. Lim over the properties. Even so, P.D. 1529, otherwise known as, "The
Property Registration Decree", proscribes collateral attack on Torrens Title, hence:x x x
x
xx
x x xSec. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. A certificate of title shall not
be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified or cancelled except in a direct
proceeding in accordance with law.In CUIZON vs. RAMOLETE, where similarly as in the case at
bar, the property subject of the controversy was duly registered under the Torrens system, We
categorically stated:. . . Having been apprised of the fact that the property in question was in the
possession of third parties and more important, covered by a transfer certificate of title issued in
the name of such third parties, the respondent court should have denied the motion of the
respondent administrator and excluded the property in question from the inventory of the
property of the estate. It had no authority to deprive such third persons of their possession and
ownership of the property. . . .Inasmuch as the real properties included in the inventory of the
estate of the Late Pastor Y. Lim are in the possession of and are registered in the name of
private respondent corporations, which under the law possess a personality separate and
distinct from their stockholders, and in the absence of any cogency to shred the veil of corporate
fiction, the presumption of conclusiveness of said titles in favor of private respondents should
stand undisturbed.Accordingly, the probate court was remiss in denying private respondents'

motion for exclusion. While it may be true that the Regional Trial Court, acting in a restricted
capacity and exercising limited jurisdiction as a probate court, is competent to issue orders
involving inclusion or exclusion of certain properties in the inventory of the estate of the
decedent, and to adjudge, albeit, provisionally the question of title over properties, it is no less
true that such authority conferred upon by law and reinforced by jurisprudence, should be
exercised judiciously, with due regard and caution to the peculiar circumstances of each
individual case.Notwithstanding that the real properties were duly registered under the Torrens
system in the name of private respondents, and as such were to be afforded the presumptive
conclusiveness of title, the probate court obviously opted to shut its eyes to this gleamy fact and
still proceeded to issue the impugned orders.By its denial of the motion for exclusion, the
probate court in effect acted in utter disregard of the presumption of conclusiveness of title in
favor of private respondents. Certainly, the probate court through such brazen act transgressed
the clear provisions of law and infringed settled jurisprudence on this matter.Moreover, petitioner
urges that not only the properties of private respondent corporations are properly part of the
decedent's estate but also the private respondent corporations themselves. To rivet such flimsy
contention, petitioner cited that the late Pastor Y. Lim during his lifetime, organized and whollyowned the five corporations, which are the private respondents in the instant case.25 Petitioner
thus attached as Annexes "F"26 and "G"27 of the petition for review affidavits executed by
Teresa Lim and Lani Wenceslao which among others, contained averments that the
incorporators of Uniwide Distributing, Inc. included on the list had no actual and participation in
the organization and incorporation of the said corporation. The affiants added that the persons
whose names appeared on the articles of incorporation of Uniwide Distributing, Inc., as
incorporators thereof, are mere dummies since they have not actually contributed any amount to
the capital stock of the corporation and have been merely asked by the late Pastor Y. Lim to
affix their respective signatures thereon.It is settled that a corporation is clothed with personality
separate and distinct from that of the persons composing it. It may not generally be held liable
for that of the persons composing it. It may not be held liable for the personal indebtedness of
its stockholders or those of the entities connected with it.28Rudimentary is the rule that a
corporation is invested by law with a personality distinct and separate from its stockholders or
members. In the same vein, a corporation by legal fiction and convenience is an entity shielded
by a protective mantle and imbued by law with a character alien to the persons comprising it.
Nonetheless, the shield is not at all times invincible. Thus, in FIRST PHILIPPINE
INTERNATIONAL BANK vs. COURT OF APPEALS29, We enunciated:. . . When the fiction is
urged as a means of perpetrating a fraud or an illegal act or as a vehicle for the evasion of an
existing obligation, the circumvention of statutes, the achievement or perfection of a monopoly
or generally the perpetration of knavery or crime, the veil with which the law covers and isolates
the corporation from the members or stockholders who compose it will be lifted to allow for its
consideration merely as an aggregation of individuals. . . .Piercing the veil of corporate entity
requires the court to see through the protective shroud which exempts its stockholders from
liabilities that ordinarily, they could be subject to, or distinguishes one corporation from a
seemingly separate one, were it not for the existing corporate fiction.30The corporate mask may
be lifted and the corporate veil may be pierced when a corporation is just but the alter ego of a
person or of another corporation. Where badges of fraud exist, where public convenience is
defeated; where a wrong is sought to be justified thereby, the corporate fiction or the notion of

legal entity should come to naught.31Further, the test in determining the applicability of the
doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction is as follows: 1) Control, not mere majority or
complete stock control, but complete domination, not only of finances but of policy and business
practice in respect to the transaction attacked so that the corporate entity as to this transaction
had at the time no separate mind, will or existence of its own; (2) Such control must have been
used by the defendant to commit fraud or wrong, to perpetuate the violation of a statutory or
other positive legal duty, or dishonest and unjust act in contravention of plaintiffs legal right; and
(3) The aforesaid control and breach of duty must proximately cause the injury or unjust loss
complained of. The absence of any of these elements prevent "piercing the corporate veil".32
Mere ownership by a single stockholder or by another corporation of all or nearly all of the
capital stock of a corporation is not of itself a sufficient reason for disregarding the fiction of
separate corporate personalities.33Moreover, to disregard the separate juridical personality of a
corporation, the wrong-doing must be clearly and convincingly established. It cannot be
presumed.34Granting arguendo that the Regional Trial Court in this case was not merely acting
in a limited capacity as a probate court, petitioner nonetheless failed to adduce competent
evidence that would have justified the court to impale the veil of corporate fiction. Truly, the
reliance reposed by petitioner on the affidavits executed by Teresa Lim and Lani Wenceslao is
unavailing considering that the aforementioned documents possess no weighty probative value
pursuant to the hearsay rule. Besides it is imperative for us to stress that such affidavits are
inadmissible in evidence inasmuch as the affiants were not at all presented during the course of
the proceedings in the lower court. To put it differently, for this Court to uphold the admissibility
of said documents would be to relegate from Our duty to apply such basic rule of evidence in a
manner consistent with the law and jurisprudence.Our pronouncement in PEOPLE BANK AND
TRUST COMPANY vs. LEONIDAS35 finds pertinence:Affidavits are classified as hearsay
evidence since they are not generally prepared by the affiant but by another who uses his own
language in writing the affiant's statements, which may thus be either omitted or misunderstood
by the one writing them. Moreover, the adverse party is deprived of the opportunity to crossexamine the affiants. For this reason, affidavits are generally rejected for being hearsay, unless
the affiant themselves are placed on the witness stand to testify thereon.As to the order36 of the
lower court, dated 15 September 1995, the Court of Appeals correctly observed that the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 93 acted without jurisdiction in issuing said order; The probate
court had no authority to demand the production of bank accounts in the name of the private
respondent corporations.WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing disquisitions, the instant
petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit and the decision of the Court of Appeals which
nullified and set aside the orders issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 93, acting as a
probate court, dated 04 July 1995 and 12 September 1995 is AFFIRMED.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------55. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ALMA GARALDE Y TAN and KIL
PATRICK IBERO accused-appellants.
G.R. No. 128622. December 14, 2000
DECISION
PER CURIAM.:This is an automatic review of the Joint Judgment, dated 27 December 1996, of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 79 of Quezon City in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-94-58657 and Q-

94-58658, finding accused-appellants Kil Patrick Ibero and Alma Tan Garalde guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom and Serious Illegal Detention, as
principal an accomplice, respectively. The trial court sentences accused-appellant Ibero to
suffer the maximum penalty of death and accused-appellant Garalde to suffer the penalty to
reclusion perpetua.The Information in Criminal Case No. Q-94-58657 charged accusedappellant Garalde and her husband Roque Garalde with violation of Presidential Decree No.
1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition), as amended, as follows:That on or
about the 20th day of August 1994, in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping
one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in their possession and
under their custody and control the following, to wit: 1) two (2) M16 rifles, one of which bearing
serial no. RP146697 and other has a defaced serial number; 2) two (2) rifle Grenades; and 3)
one hundred twenty five (125) rounds of ammunitions of M16 rifle, without first having obtained
the proper license therefore.Contrary to law.[1]The Information in Criminal Case No. Q-9458658 charged accused-appellants, together with Roque Garalde and several unidentified John
does, with Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention defined and penalized under Article 267 of
the revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, as follows:That on or about
August 9, 1994 in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, conspiring together, confederating and mutually helping one
another, did then and there by means of force, violence against and intimidation of person and a
gunpoint, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap, carry away an detain Paolo Bellosillo (13
years old), John Bellosillo (8 years old), and Nio Bellosillo (11 years old), who are minors, and
Dianita Bebita, Janidy Dumagpi and Antonio Paquera against their will an consent, thus
depriving them of their liberty, for the purpose of extorting ransom for their release, which, after
payment thereof in the amount of P410,000.00 and two sets of jewelry, the kidnapped victims
were released, and the accused divided the ransom money among themselves, to the damage
and prejudice of the afore-named victims.Contrary to law.[2]Among those charged, only
accused-appellants were arraigned and both entered a plea of not guilty. A joint trial of the two
cases ensued. The prosecution presented as its witnesses Kathryn Kata Bellosillo, Dianita
Bebita, Paolo Bellosillo and C/Insp. Michael Ray Aquino. As culled from their testimonies, the
facts of the case are as follows:On 9 August 1994, at about 6:45 in the morning, Paolo Bellosillo
(13 years old), his brother John Bellosillo (8 years old) and their cousin Nio Bellosillo (11 years
old), all grade school students at the Ateneo de Manila University, were on board a Toyota Lite
Ace van driven by Antonio Paquera, the family driver. The boys were on their way to school.
With them were their yayas, Dianita Bebita and Janidy Dumagpi. When they were near the
corner of Scouts Limbaga and Ybardolaza Streets in Quezon City, a taxi suddenly bumped the
right portion of the van. As a result of the impact, the van stopped. Three (3) men hurriedly
alighted from the taxi and approached the van. One of them poked his gun at Dianita and
ordered her not to make a scene. They then forced their way inside the van and blindfolded all
the passengers. Dianita, who was seated in the front seat beside the driver, and Antonio, the
driver, were instructed to move to the back of the van. One of the men then took the wheel and
drove the van. After being on the road for a considerable length of time, they stopped and the
kidnap victims were brought to a house where they were kept inside a room.[3]At around 7:45 in
the morning of the same day, Mrs. Kathryn Bellosillo, mother of Paolo and John, who was then

in the hospital watching over her sick daughter, received a call from Sonny Boy, her brother-inlaw and father of Nio. He told Kathryn the he just received a call from a stranger who told him
that Paolo, John and Nio were kidnapped. The caller demanded ten million pesos
(P10,000,00.00) in exchange for the release of the boys. Kathryn forthwith called up the Ateneo
to check if the boys attended their classes. Kathryn talked to Father Cuerquis, the grade school
principal, who confirmed that the boys were not in their respective classrooms. The Bellosillo
family then sought the help of General Panfilo Lacson of the Presidential Anti-Crime
Commission (PACC).[4]In the evening of the same day, Kathryn received another call from one
of the kidnappers. The man on the line spoke sternly an told Kathryn, makinig kang mabuti.
Pera lang ang kailangan namin. Maghanda kayo ng P10 million. Pag hindi ninyo naibigay,
sasampulan naming kayo. Patay ang driver, tapos ang dalawang yaya, tapos young tatlong
bata. During the following days, the kidnappers, through a man who identified himself as Mang
Ernesto, contacted Kathryn several times by telephone. Mang Ernesto asked Kathryn if they
already have the money. On 12 August 1994, upon her plea, Kathryn was able to speak to
Paolo on the phone. Paolo begged his mother to give the kidnappers the money so that they
could go home. Kathryn told her son that they were trying their best to raise the amount
demanded by the kidnappers. Kathryn tried to prolong her conversation with her son in order
that the PACC men would be able to trace where the call was being made.[5]Meanwhile, as
soon as he was informed about the kidnapping, General Lacson dispatched C/Insp. Michael
Ray Aquino to conduct an investigation, At about 10:00 in the morning of 9 August 1994,
Aquino, Sr. Insp. Paul G. Tucay and Insp. Milo B. Pagtalunan, with their respective teams,
immediately went to Scout Limbaga. They learned from the ambulant vendors and bystanders
in the area that the Lite Ace van carrying the Bellosillo children was cut by a taxi and a blue
Toyota Corolla car with the commemorative plate number ALMA in front. Following a procedure
called back-tracking, the PACC men divided themselves into three teams to track the possible
routes taken by the kidnappers after the abduction. Aquino and his team sighted a blue Toyota
Corolla with plate number TCJ 185 along Commonwealth Avenue. There were at least four
suspicious looking passengers in said car. Aquino and his followed the Toyota Corolla. Aquino
then contacted the other teams to ask for their assistance in tailing the car. Aquinos team was
joined by the team of Pagtalunan in the Quezon City Elliptical Circle and by the team of Tucay in
Philcoa. They followed the blue Toyota Corolla until it stopped in front of a house in Evangeline
Pascual St., B.F. Resort Village, Las Pias. The house was owned by a certain Atty. Manzano.
[6]Thereafter, Aquino and his team went back to Camp Crame. Aquino, however, instructed the
team of Tucay to stay behind and keep an eye on the Toyota Corolla. Aquino then contacted
the LTO to ask about the ownership of the Toyota Corolla with plate number TCJ-185. He was
informed that the car was registered under the name of accused-appellant Alma Garalde with
address at U.P. BLISS, Quezon City. It was learned that Alma Garalde is married to co-accused
Roque Garlade. It was further discovered that accused-appellant Garalde no longer resided in
U.P. BLISS but in Frankville Subdivision, Novaliches, Quezon City.[7]7 Id., at 12-13.7As earlier
mentioned, Kathryn was able to talk to Paolo by phone on 12 August 1994. The call was traced
to the house of Atty. Manzano in Las Pias. At around this time, the PACC men who manned
said house confirmed that they saw the Toyota Corolla arrive with four (4) men and a boy who
was presumably Paolo.[8] After a series of negotiations over the phone, the Kidnappers agreed
to reduce the ransom from P10,000,000.00 to P410,000.00 in cash and several pieces of

jewelry valued at P80,000.00.[9]At dawn of 16 August 1994, the kidnappers released Dianita.
They allowed her to go home and talk to Kathryn about he payment of the ransom. When
Dianita arrived at the Bellosillo residence, she was crying. She told Kathryn that the kidnappers
directed her to go home in order to get the ransom money and deliver it to them.[10]
Subsequently, Kathryn received a call from Mang Ernesto who gave the instructions on how the
payment of the ransom was to be made.[11]As per instructions of the kidnappers, Dianita
herself drove the Lite Ace van to the east Avenue Medical center at around 7:30 to 8:30 in the
morning of that same day. She brought with her the P410,000.00 in cash plus the jewelry.
Again, as instructed, she parked the van at the parking lot but left the engine running. She went
to the back of the van, blindfolded herself and covered her head with a sweater. A few minutes
later, she felt somebody opening the door of the van. The person who entered the van asked if
the money was with her. Dianita answered in the affirmative. The van moved and they traveled
for a time. They stopped at some place where another man asked if the money was already
there. The man in the van replied in the affirmative. The van moved again. Dianita was
informed that they were taking her to the children. The van eventually stopped and the
kidnappers left. Sensing that she was already alone, Dianita removed her blindfold. Se
recognized the place to be Novaliches. She waited for the children until 1:00 in the afternoon
but they never came. She called up Kathryn an told the latter about what happened. The family
driver fetched Dianita in Novaliches without the children.[12]Earlier, Kathryn contacted the
PACC about the pay off which was to take place at the east Avenue Medical Center. Several
PACC men were dispatched by Aquino to monitor the pay off. The men observed that the
Toyota Corolla with plate number TCJ-185 was at said hospital. They (PACC men) tailed the
van and the Toyota Corolla when these two vehicles left the hospital. The surveillance lasted for
about three (3) hours but the authorities lost the subject vehicles at around 11:30 in the morning
in Congressional Avenue, Quezon City.[13]The following day, the PACC men conducted an
intensive investigation at Frankville Subdivision in Novaliches, Quezon City. Upon discreet
inquiries in said neighborhood, they were able to locate the Toyota Corolla with plate number
TCJ-185 in No. 45 Frankville Subdivision, Novaliches, Quezon City. The car was parked in the
garage of a two-storey house. Aquino and his team saw several men coming in and out of the
house. One man was later identified as Roque Garalde, husband of accused-appellant
Garalde. The PACC, however, decided to refrain from taking any action as yet so as not to
compromise the safety of the kidnap victims.[14]At around 4:00 in the morning of 18 August
1994, after nine (9) days in captivity, Paolo, John and Nio, together with the family driver,
Antonio Paquera, were released. They were blindfolded and told to board the car. They rode
the car which seemed to drive around in circles. Finally, it stopped and they were directed to
get off. The kidnappers gave them P100 for their fare and instructed them to count from 1 to 20
before they remove their blindfolds. They did as told. After taking off their blindfolds, the boys
and Antonio hailed a taxi. When they finally got home, their families were already waiting for
them. They had a tearful but joyous reunion.[15]On 19 August 1994, the PACC, through P/Insp.
Brimar Rodica, applied for and was issued search warrants by Judge Pablito M. Rojas, RTC,
Branch 160 of Pasig City.[16] The warrants authorized the search of the residence of Roque and
Alma Garalde in No. 45 Frankville Subdivision, Novaliches, Quezon City, in connection with the
crimes of kidnapping with ransom and illegal possession of firearms. Armed with these
warrants, on 20 August 1994, Aquino together with SPO4 Roberto Lancaon, SPO2 Rolando

Jimenez, SPO1 Guillermo Ramos, SPO2 Virgilio Baragan and SPO1 Wilfredo Cuartel,
conducted a search of the said house which resulted in the recovery of, among others, the
Toyota Corolla with plate number TCJ-185, firearms, various kinds of ammunition and cellular
phones.[17] The firearms and ammunition were found in one of the rooms in the second floor of
the house. Several photographs were also recovered. For record purposes, the search was
taped on video by the PACC operatives. Upon verification with the Firearms and Explosives
Unit in Camp Crame, it was learned that neither Roque nor accused-appellant Garalde was a
licensed firearms holder.[18]Present during the search were the children of Roque Garalde and
a certain Serapio Moresca. Moresca was brought to the Task Force Habagat headquarters for
investigation. He voluntarily gave a statement and was subsequently released. The
photographs recovered from the house of the Garaldes were then shown to the kidnap victims
for identification. They identified accused-appellant Ibero as one of their abductors form these
photographs.[19]Thereafter, the PACC operatives went back to B.F. Resort, Las Pias and
showed the photographs to the security guards of said subdivision. The guards stated that they
recognize one of the men in the photographs to be accused-appellant Ibero. On 22 August
1994, the police authorities arrested accused-appellant Ibero in Paraaque at the back of a
church. The following day, he was made to stand in a police line-up together with other men.
Accused-appellant Ibero was singled out by the kidnap victims as one of their abductors.[20]
During their respective testimonies, Dianita and Paolo again positively identified accusedappellant Ibero as one of the three men who abducted them on 9 August 1994.[21] they
narrated that it was accused-appellant Ibero who blindfolded the family driver and ordered him
to move to the back of the van.[22] It was likewise accused-appellant Ibero who blindfolded
Paolo in the van.[23] Dianita further positively identified accused-appellant Garalde. Dianita
testified that on the fifth day of their abduction, her blindfold was removed. She then saw
accused-appellant Garalde peep through the door of the room where they were kept. Dianita
heard accused-appellant Garalde, itali ninyong mabuti iyan at baka makawala. Accusedappellant Garalde was referring to the driver, Antonio, who was then blindfolded and tied.[24]
Moreover, Paolo narrated that sometime during their abduction, he was brought to a different
house. It was there where he was able to talk to his mother on the phone.[25] After his
telephone conversation with his mother, he was brought back to the house where the other
kidnap victims were kept. He also testified that on the fifth day of their abduction he heard a
woman say talian nyo iyan ng mabuti at baka makawala pa yan. He did not see the woman
because he was blindfolded at that time. When he viewed the videotape taken by the PACC
operatives during the search, Paolo recognized one of the rooms shown there as the same
room where they were kept.According to Paolo, he recognized the room because there were
times when their blindfolds were removed.[26]As his defense, accused-appellant Ibero
interposed the defense of alibi. He averred that in the evening of 8 August 1994, he was in the
house of his sister in 3196 Quirino Avenue, Tambo, Paraaque. They were celebrating the
birthday of their aunt. Accused-appellant Ibero and his friends, Edward Abel and Clynt Magos,
had a drinking spree until 2:00 in the morning of the following day. They did not go home any
more but just slept in the sala. Accused-appellant Ibero woke up at around 9:00 in the morning
of 9 August 1994. He drank coffee and cleaned the house until 12:00 in the morning.[27]On 22
august 1994, accused-appellant Ibero was still in his sisters house. At 4:00 in the afternoon,
Noemi, an acquaintance of his and housemaid of Atty. Manzano, arrived. She asked him if he

knew someone who could drive. Apparently, she and her friends were going on an outing and
they needed a driver. He told her that he did not know how to drive. A few minutes after their
conversation, several men in civilian clothes arrived. They were looking for him. When they
ascertained his identity, they immediately poked a gun at him. Afraid, accused-appellant Ibero
instinctively raised both his arms. The men forthwith handcuffed him. He was brought to Camp
Crame where they showed him several photographs. One photograph showed accusedappellant Ibero with his friends. Said picture was taken on 28 July 1994 during the birthday
treat of Noemi at Pizza Hut inside Manuela Complex in Las Pias.[28] This was the photograph
used by the prosecution to identify him. Accused-appellant Ibero was directed to give the
names of the other persons in the photographs as well as their addresses.[29]To further
exculpate himself from any participation in the abduction of the Bellosillo children, accusedappellant Ibero claimed that he first saw Dianita and Paolo only some time in September 1994
at the Department of Justice. He allegedly never saw them previous thereto.[30]In support of
accused-appellant Iberos defense of alibi, the defense presented Edward Abel and Ruth
Catague. Their testimonies substantially corroborated accused-appellant Iberos claim the he
was in Tambo, Paraaque the entire morning of 9 August 1994.[31]Accused-appellant Garalde,
on the other hand, denied any involvement in the kidnapping. She averred that she is engaged
in the garment business as well as the door-to-door delivery services to and from Japan. Aside
from these businesses, she derives income from renting out a room in their two-storey house to
her townmates whenever they are in Manila. Sometime in August 1994, two (2) men rented one
of the rooms in the second floor. She did not know these men but her husband knew them.
The other room in the second floor was occupied by the children. The masters bedroom is in
the groundfloor.[32]Accused-appellant Garalde tried to show that during the time that the
kidnapping happened, she was busy attending to the family business. She recounted that in the
morning of 9 August 1994, she was in the house and did her usual work. She observed that
there was a van parked outside the house between 8:00 to 9:00 in the morning but she did not
see its passengers. Her husband was also in the house. After she finished cleaning the house,
they went to the pier in South Harbor to get the package which was arriving from Japan. The
following day, after the couple had eaten their lunch, they went to the Department of finance to
pick up some documents in connection with the shipment they were expecting from Japan. The
shipment arrived on 18 August 1994.[33]At around 2:00 in the morning of 20 August 1994,
accused-appellant Garalde, while waiting for her husband to arrive, was watching a videotape.
She heard the dogs bark and there was persistent knocking on the door. She opened the front
window and looked outside. She saw several armed men. Someone suddenly grabbed her
neck and ordered her to open the door. A long gun was aimed at her. She opened the door an
the men immediately entered the house. They went to the kitchen and to the rooms in the
second floor. Accused-appellant Garalde could not do anything because she was being held.
The children who were sleeping in the second floor were awakened by the commotion. They
cried. Accused-appellant Garalde pleaded that she be allowed to go to the children. The men
who were holding her obliged and so accused-appellant Garalde went upstairs to comfort the
children. She assured them that these men were visitors. This seemed to assuage the fear of
the children because they went back to sleep. Accused-appellant Garalde saw the men ransack
the house. The other rooms in the second floor were in disarray.[34]The men later on brought
accused-appellant Garalde to the living room downstairs. They showed her photographs and

asked her to identify her husband, Roque, in these photographs. She told them that he was not
in those photographs. Aquino then slapped her. They brought her to the masters bedroom an
when she asked them what they wanted, the men answered that they were looking for money
and pieces of jewelry. Accused-appellant Garalde uttered that she did not know anything about
it. She was again slapped on the face. They repeatedly questioned her regarding the
whereabouts of her husband. She was then blindfolded and her hands were tied at the back.
[35]Accused-appellant Garalde averred that the men who raided her house had no search
warrant. When asked about the receipt purportedly listing the items seized from the house with
her signature, accused-appellant Garalde claimed that she was made to sign a blank paper.
Thereafter, she was brought to camp Crame. She saw her car parked outside the office of one
Major Reyes. Later in the afternoon, she talked to the father of Paolo and John. He asked her
if she knew the mastermind of the kidnapping. She replied that she did not.[36]The following
day, Dianita approached accused-appellant Garalde and told the latter that she looked familiar.
Dianita thought accused-appellant Garalde worked for a realty firm. Accused-appellant Garalde
told Dianita that she was mistaken because she (accused-appellant Garalde) just came back
from Japan where she worked as a janitress at the Embassy of Peru. She stayed there for ten
(10) years and came back to the Philippines only on September 1992.[37]During the early part
of the criminal investigation, accused-appellant Garalde was initially represented by Atty.
Manzano, her brother-in-law (husband of her sister), She replaced Atty. Manzano, however,
because there was a misunderstanding between him and Roque. According to accusedappellant Garalde, all her relatives are against Roque.[38]In support of accused-appellant
Garaldes defense of denial, the defense presented her son Joselito Gile and Evelyn Palijo.
Evelyn testified that accused-appellant Garalde is her aunt. Evelyn owns a sari-sari store where
she sells potholders and doormats, among other goods. She gets these items from accusedappellant Garalde on consignment basis. From 9 to 18 August 1994, she was in the house of
accused-appellant Garalde almost every day to get the goods from her. Eveyln did not observe
any unusual activities in the house. On one occasion, she heard voices of men coming from the
second floor. They were talking and laughing. She did not hear voices of children. On 18
August 1994, Evelyns daughter told her that there was a man in their sari-sari store earlier who
asked the address of accused-appellant Garalde.[39]Joselito testified that at dawn of 20 August
1994, he heard somebody knock at the door of his house calling his name. When he opened
the door, he saw Jun Moresca, his mothers houseboy, with several unidentified armed men.
The men forcibly entered his house and proceeded to ransack the house. They informed him
that they were looking for money and pieces of jewelry. When they did not find anything, they
ordered Joselito to go with them to his mothers (accused-appellants Garaldes) house. When
they reached the house of his mother, Joselito was surprised to find it in disarray. He was
brought to the room and he found his mother there but they were not allowed to speak to each
other. The men showed him photographs of people unknown to him. When questioned,
Joselito informed them that he did not know the other people staying in said house because he
goes there only to see his mother. He and his stepfather, Roque, are not in good terms with
each other. Joselito observed that one of the men wore jacket with PACC printed on it.[40]
Joselito intimated that there was an attempt to extort money from his family. The men even
knew that he has sisters abroad and suggested that he ask money from them to pay the ransom
money. On 21 August 1994, he was fetched by the PACC. They brought him to a store near his

mother's house. They encouraged him to cooperate with them as they assured him that they
were not after his mother but that they were only after his stepfather.[41]After consideration of
the evidence adduced by both the prosecution and defense, the trial court rendered judgment
convicting accused-appellants Ibero and Garalde of kidnapping for ransom and serious illegal
detention as principal and accomplice, respectively. Accused-appellant Garalde was, however,
acquitted of the charge of illegal possession of firearms. The dispositive portion of the Joint
Judgment reads:WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in Crim. Case No. Q-94-58657,
acquitting accused Alma Tan Garalde of the crime of Violation of P.D. 1866 (Illegal Possession
of Firearms and Ammunitions) for failure of the prosecution to prove her guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.In Crim. Case No. Q-94-58658, judgment is rendered finding accused Kil Patrick Ibero
and Alma Tan Garalde guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom
and Serious Illegal Detention, as principal and accomplice, respectively, penalized under Article
267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No.7659. Accused Kil Patrick
Ibero is hereby sentenced to suffer the maximum penalty of DEATH. Accused Alma Tan
Garalde is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, the penalty one degree
lower than that prescribed for kidnapping for ransom pursuant to Article 52 in relation to Article
61 (1) of the Revised Penal Code.Accused Alma Tan Garalde shall be credited in full of her
preventive imprisonment by reason of this case.SO ORDERED.[42]In his appeal brief, accusedappellant Ibero alleged that the trial court erroneously convicted him. He raised the following
issues:IWHETHER OR NOT THE PROSECUTION WAS ABLE TO PROVE BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT THE POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION OF APPELLANT IBERO
NOTWITHSTANDING THE EVIDENCE ON THE CONTRARY, TO WIT:A) THE ALLEGED EYEWITNESSES OF THE PROSECUTION WERE ALL IN A STATE OF SHOCK, NERVOUS,
FRIGHTENED, CONFUSED, AND VERY MUCH AFRAID THAT THEY MIGHT BE KILLED BY
THE KIDNAPPERS;B) THE PROSECUTION'S EYEWITNESS ONLY SAW THE ACCUSED
ONCE I.E. ON THE VERY SHORT MOMENT WHEN THEY WERE SUDDENLY ABDUCTED
BY THE KIDNAPPERS. IN FACT, BOTH OF THEM TESTIFIED THAT THEY NEVER SAW
APPELLANT IBERO DURING THEIR NINE (9) DAYS OF CAPTIVITY ALBEIT THEIR
BLINDFOLD WAS REMOVED ONCE IN A WHILE;C) THE HARROWING INCIDENT
HAPPENED VERY FAST; ANDD) THEY WERE IMMEDIATELY BLINDFOLDED AND
SIMULTANEOUS THEREWITH SPRA YED WITH AN UNKNOWN SUBSTANCE CAUSING
THEM TO FEEL DIZZY.IIWHETHER OR NOT THE TESTIMONY OF THE ALLEGED
MASTERMIND ROQUE IS BENEFICIAL TO THE PARTICIPATION OF THE DEFENDANTAPPELLANT OF THE ALLEGED CRIME.[43]In her appeal brief, accused-appellant Garalde
made the following assignment of errors:First Assignment of ErrorTHE TRIAL COURT ERRED
IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO
POSITIVELY IDENTIFY HER.Second Assignment of ErrorTHE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT
FINDING THAT DELAY IN MAKING A CRIMINAL COMPLAINT SERIOUSLY IMPAIRS THE
CREDIBILITY OF PROSECUTION'S EVIDENCE.Third Assignment of ErrorTHE TRIAL COURT
ERRED IN GIVING UNDUE CREDENCE TO THE EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION
DESPITE ITS BEING FRAUGHT WITH MATERIAL INCONSISTENCIES AND
IMPROBABILITIES.Fourth Assignment of ErrorTHE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING
WEIGHT TO THE DENIAL OF THE ACCUSED DESPITE ITS BEING SUBSTANTIATED BY
CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE.Fifth Assignment of ErrorTHE TRIAL COURT ERRED

IN NOT CONSIDERING THE NON-FLIGHT OF THE APPELLANT DESPITE AMPLE

OPPORTUNITY TO DO SO AS AN INDICATION OF HER INNOCENCE.Sixth Assignment of
ErrorTHE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE APPELLANT DESPITE FAILURE OF
THE PROSECUTION TO OVERCOME THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRESUMPTION OF
INNOCENCE IN HER FAVOR.[44]The respective appeals of accused-appellants Ibero and
Garalde must fail.Both appeals hinge on accused-appellants' contention that the prosecution
failed to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt to warrant conviction for the crime of
kidnapping for ransom and serious illegal detention. They vigorously assail Paolo's and
Dianita's positive identification of accused-appellants in relation to their participation in the
commission of the crime.Accused-appellant Ibero contends that under the circumstances that
they were in at the time of the abduction, i.e., in state of shock, nervous, frightened and dizzy,
not to mention that the incident happened very fast, Paolo and Dianita could not have seen the
faces of the kidnappers. It was thus allegedly highly improbable for Paolo and Dianita to
positively identify accused-appellant Ibero as one of those who abducted them. This contention
deserves scant consideration. The Court seriously doubts that the vision of Paolo and Dianita
was even slightly impaired by their fear or shock at the time.On the contrary, there is no reason
to disbelieve Paolo and Dianita's claim that they saw the faces of their abductors considering
that the kidnappers brazenly perpetrated the crime in broad daylight without even bothering to
hide their faces by donning masks. Moreover, there was clearly ample opportunity for Paolo
and Dianita, as well as the other kidnap victims, to see the faces of their abductors from the time
they (abductors) alighted from the taxi, approached the van, forced their way inside the van until
they blindfolded the passengers therein.The kidnap victims, namely, Paolo, John, Nio, Janidy,
Dianita and Antonio, all identified accused-appellant Ibero as one of their abductors at the police
line-up conducted during the criminal investigation of the case.[45] More significantly, the
testimonies of Paolo and Dianita during the trial identifying accused-appellants and describing
their respective participation in the kidnapping were consistent, straightforward and categorical.
Dianita incriminated accused-appellant Ibero in this wise:xxxAtty. Cruz:
Now, Ms. Witness,
will you please tell the Hon. Court what unusual thing happened at 6:45 a.m. of August 9, 1994?
A- A vehicle bumped our vehicle, sir, and we were blocked.Q- Do you recall what kind of vehicle
this was which bumped your Light Ace that morning?A- It was a taxi, sir.Q- Do you recall, Ms.
Witness, who were riding that taxicab when it bumped your vehicle?A- Yes, sir, three (3) male
persons.Q- Now, Ms. Witness, if you were to see those three (3) men again today, will you be
able to recognize them?A- Yes, sir.Q- Is there any among the three (3) men who got off the
taxicab that morning who is present in this courtroom today?A- Yes, sir.Q- Would you kindly
point to that person present in the courtroom today if you can see him?A- That man in blue Tshirt, sir.Q- May I make it of record that the witness pointed to a man wearing a blue shirt.
May I request, Your Honor, that the man identify himself? May I make it of record that the
witness pointed to Mr. Kil Patrick Ibero one of the accused in this case.[46]xxxAtty. Cruz:
Thank you, Your Honor.
So, at that point, Ms. Witness, all six (6) of you were at the back.
Would you know, Ms. Witness, what happened to the third man who approached the front
portion of the vehicle?A- He took the driver's seat, sir.Q- And again, Ms. Witness, will you please
tell the Court who actually blindfolded the driver Antonio Paquero?A- Patrick Ibero, sir.Atty.
Cruz:
The accused Ibero?AnswerYes, sir.[47]Even during cross-examination, Dianita
remained firm in her declaration that accused-appellant Ibero was one of the malefactors who

kidnapped them:xxxAtty. Tuazon:

That is the absolute right of the accused to confer with
the counsel.
Dianita, let us go back now to August 9, 1994 when on board the van and
according to you the van where you were boarded was bumped by a taxi and three (3 ) men
alighted therefrom, two of them seated at your right in the front seat which we identified as
person No.1, the one seated immediately at your right and person No.2, at your farther right and
the third person, the one seated at the driver's seat. Was Patrick Kil Ibero one of these three
men or persons you are referring to on that August 9, 1994?AnswerYes, sir.[48]Again, on
re-direct examination, Dianita testified thus:xxxQ- During your cross you stated that the PACC
operatives showed to you pictures of the accused Kil Patrick Ibero, was that the first time Miss
Witness, that you got to see Ibero, thru these pictures that were shown to you at the PACC?ANo, sir.Q- When was the first time that you actually saw accused Kil Patrick Ibero?A- August 9
at 6:45 a.m., sir.Q- For purposes of clarification, you are referring to the date and time of the
kidnapping, Miss Witness? A- Yes, sir.Q- Earlier counsel for the accused Ibero asked you if
after the blindfold was installed on your face to cover eyes, whether or not you see at all. Miss
Witness, for the record, during those five days that you were blindfolded were you totally
sightless or were you not able to see anything at all?A- No, sir, I was able to peep thru the
lower portion of the tape when I would stretch my face upward.Q- Miss Witness, will you
please tell the Court why you back to the PACC on August 23 when you made your second
statement dated August 23, 1994 which I am showing to you now marked as Exh. C?ABecause they said that they were able to arrest some persons and I was asked to identify, sir.QAnd were you able to identify these persons who were arrested by the PACC operatives?A- Yes,
sir.Q- Is any of those persons present in this courtroom this afternoon?A- Yes, sir.Q- Will you
please point to him or he if they are present?A- That one, sir. (Witness pointing to a person
seated at the second row of courtroom bench wearing yellow T-shirt who when asked his
identity declared that he is Kil Patrick Ibero.)Q- Is that the same person Miss Witness, that you
earlier declared as the one who blindfolded you on August 9?A- Yes, sir.[49]Paolo was equally
certain as Dianita about accused-appellant Ibero:xxxATTY. CRUZ:
It was around after 6:30
you were on your way to school, the taxi cab hit the right front portion of the van that you were
riding, what happened if anything happened after the taxi cab hit the right front portion of the
van?A- Three (3) men got off the taxi cab, sir.Q- Did anything transpired after they got off the
taxi cab?A- They approached the van and forced their way in, sir.Q- They forced their way into
where, Mr. Witness?A- Inside the van, sir.Q- At that time, Mr. Witness, where were you seated
inside the van?A- Middle portion, sir.Q- Who were seated in the front portion of the van?A The
driver Antonio Paquera and our yaya Dianita Bebita, sir.Q- And who were seated at the back
portion of your van?A- The maid Janidy Dumagpi, sir.Q- Who was seated beside you in the
middle portion of the van?A- My brother John and cousin Nio, sir.Q- You testified that these
three (3) men who alighted from the taxi cab and forced their way into the van, were they
successful in entering the van, Mr. Witness?A- Yes, sir.Q- Do you recall, Mr. Witness, what
transpired after they had gone inside your van?A- Yes, Sir.Q- Will you please tell the Court what
transpired after they found themselves inside the van, these three (3) men?A- They told my
companions to transfer to the middle portion of the van and they said that it was a kidnapped.
Then, they blind-folded us and they sprayed something which made us feel really dizzy, Sir.QThese three (3) men who got off the taxi cab and forced their way in to your van, Mr. Witness,
would you be able to recognize or identify them again if you are to see them today?A- Yes, sir.

Q- Mr. Witness, I ask you to please look around this courtroom and tell this Honorable Court
whether or not those three (3) men or any of those three (3) men who entered your van that
morning is or are present?A- Yes, sir.Q- Are the three (3) men present in this court room?A- One
of them, sir.Q- Will you please point out to the Honorable Court who this person is who is among
the three (3) men who entered forcibly your van on August 9, 1994?A- Yes, sir.Q- Will you
please point him out? Will you describe what he is wearing?A- He is wearing a yellow t-shirt,
sir.Q- What row?A- First row, sir.Q- Will you please point to him?A- (Witness pointing to the
person of the accused who gave his name as Kil Patrick Ibero.)[50]xxxQ- Do you remember
who among the three (3) persons who entered your van blind-folded you?A- Yes, sir.Q- Is that
person who blind-folded you that morning present in this court room this afternoon?A- Yes, sir.
Q- Will you point to that person who blind-folded you that morning of August 9, 1994? Is he the
same person pointed out earlier?A- Yes, sir.ATTY. CRUZ:
May we make it of record, your
Honor, that the witness pointed to accused Kil Patrick Ibero.Q- Are you very certain, Mr.
Witness, that it was accused Ibero who blind-folded you?A- Already answered.[51]xxxQ- Will
you tell the Honorable Court what was your participation or what was the extent of your
involvement in this investigation conducted by the PACC?A- There was a photograph shown to
me by the PACC AND I pointed out to the accused Kil Patrick Ibero in that photograph. Second,
there were around four (4) men that there were lined-up together and I pointed to the accused
again.Q- Which accused did you point out from that line-up, Mr. Witness?A- Kil Patrick Ibero, sir.
Q- When was this line-up in relation to the showing to you of the photograph? Which came first,
the line-up or the photograph?A- The line-up, sir.Q- Who did you point out in this line-up again?
A- Kil Patrick Ibero, sir.Q- The same you pointed out earlier?A- Yes, sir.Q- Was there any other
involvement or participation on your part in this investigation?A- Yes, sir.Q- What video tape is
this?A- It was shown to us by the PACC, sir, and I pointed out to them that this was the same
house where we were kept in captivity for nine (9) days.Q- Was there any other involvement on
your part in this investigation, Mr. Witness?A- Yes, sir.Q- Will you tell the Honorable Court what
is your involvement or participation?A- I gave them my sworn statement, sir.Q- Mr. Witness,
earlier you mentioned that you were shown a photograph depicting the portrait of Mr. Kil Patrick
Ibero, I am showing to you this previously marked as Exhibit O, is this the reproduction of that
photograph that you saw?A- Yes, sir.Q- There is a person marked as Exhibit 0-1, do you
recognize that person?A- Yes, sir.Q- Who is this person?A- Kil Patrick Ibero, sir.Q- The one who
blind-folded you?A- Yes, sir.[52]During cross-examination, counsel for accused-appellant Ibero
tried, but failed, to elicit from Paolo an admission that he did not actually see accused-appellant
Ibero but that he was merely incriminating the latter upon instructions of the PACC. Paolo
unequivocally declared that he personally identified accused-appellant Ibero as one of their
abductors without help from any one. He testified on cross-examination thus: xxxQ- And in fact
you were only able to identify him in the picture that was shown to you because one of the
investigators pointed to you? Is it not a fact Paulo that you were only able to identify the
accused Ibero because he was pointed by one of those investigators that he is one of those
kidnappers?A- Sir, I was able to identify him by myself.Q- But those police investigators also
helped you in identifying the picture of accused Ibero?A- No, I did it by myself. I pointed out
that he was the man who blind-folded me.[53]With respect to accused-appellant Garalde, she
was likewise positively identified by Dianita as follows:Q- During your detention, Mr. Witness, did
you get to recognize any of your kidnappers apart from accused Ibero?ATTY MANZANO-

The question is leading, Your Honor, because he Mentioned something like apart from the
accused Ibero which she already identified so he assumes that there is another one.COURTThere was already a preliminary. All right, answer.A- Yes, sir.ATTY CRUZWill you please
point to this person, Ms. Witness?AnswerThat woman sir, sir.Q- May I make it of record,
Your Honor, that the witness pointed to a lady wearing a black and white checkered blouse.
COURTWitness pointed to a woman who gave her name as Alma Garalde.ATTY. CRUZWill you please tell the Hon. Court, Ms. Witness, the circumstances leading toward your
recognition of the accused Garalde as one of your kidnappers?A- Because on August 10, 1994,
I heard a voice of a woman at 45 Franksville St., Novaliches, Quezon City in a room and said,
"Italing mabuti baka makawala."Q- Did you actually see this person who uttered these words,
Ms. Witness?ATTY. MANZANOObjection, Your Honor, she said she heard a voice.ATTY
CRUZWhat is the objection, Your Honor? My next question is did you actually see?ATTY.
MANZANOThe objection will be it is leading because it can be answered with yes or no.
ATTY CRUZYour Honor please, earlier she testified that she recognized. We would like
to know the extent of that recognition, Your Honor.COURT But she will be incompetent
because according to her she was still blindfolded. The blindfold was removed five (5) days
after August 9.ATTY CRUZYes, Your Honor, but if she will be allowed to explain how she
recognized, she would be able to explain, Your Honor.ATTY. MANZANOThat is precisely
why I am objecting, Your Honor. She will be incompetent. On August 10, one day after the
alleged kidnap, she was still blindfolded.COURTAt this point of time, the question has no
basis.ATTY CRUZYour Honor please, if I may proceed.
Will you please clarify, Ms.
Witness, exactly how you came to recognize the accused Garalde?A- Because on August 14,
1994, on my fifth day in that room, they removed by blindfold, sir.Q- And how did that lead to
your recognition of the accused Garalde, Ms. Witness?A- I saw a woman peeped through the
door and said, "Itali ninyong mabuti iyan at baka makawala". She was referring to our driver
Antonio Paquero who was still blindfolded and tied, sir.Q- Now, Ms. Witness, this lady whom you
saw and heard on August 14, was she the same lady you heard on August 10?A- Yes, sir.Q- Is
this the same lady you just identified earlier in the courtroom today, the accused Garalde?AYes, sir.[54]All throughout her testimony, Dianita never vacillated about the identity of accusedappellant Garalde and her participation in the commission of the crime. Counsel for accusedappellant Garalde cross-examined Dianita, thus:Atty. ManzanoTell us, Madam Witness,
when for the first time did you see or meet the accused Garalde?A- It was on August 14, sir, at
their house.Q- According to your affidavit dated September 5, 1994 you saw a woman peep at
the door, by peeping you mean she only showed half of her face or half of her body, is that
correct?A- Has that affidavit been marked?Atty. CruzAs Exhibit D, Your Honor. Counsel is
referring to paragraph 3 of the affidavit.AnswerYes, sir.Atty. CruzIf Your Honor
please, may we make it of record that the witness made motions that what was shown was the
upper half of the body. She made this motion from the breast upwards.Atty. ManzanoNow, On August 20 when you first gave your sworn statement, is it not a fact that the PACC
investigators informed you that one of the suspects was a woman, is that correct?AnswerNo, sir.Q- But is it not a fact that on August 23 while you were in the office of the PACC at Camp
Crame, you were introduced to a certain woman by the name of Alma?A- Yes, sir.Q- And that
despite the fact that you met that woman you did not tell the investigators about what you saw
or heard about her, is that not correct?A- No, sir.Q- So much so that in your three (3) sworn

statements even after you had met the suspect Alma Tan Garalde, you failed to specify that in
your affidavit, is that correct?A- Yes, I told Mrs. Bellosillo that she was the one I saw and I
heard.[55]On re-direct examination, Dianita, without any trace of hesitation, definitively
inculpated accused-appellant Garalde thus:xxxAtty. CruzMiss Witness, from the time
when the Lite Ace stopped on August 9, 1994 at the place where you were held-up to your
release, how many female voices did you hear as far as you can remember?A- One (1), sir.QMiss Witness, did you get to know whose female voice this was?A- At first I do not know, sir, but
later I came to know when we went to the PACC.Atty. Cruz:Q- Earlier on cross-examination you
testified that you saw the accused Garalde for the first time in the place where you were
detained. Do you recall what accused Garalde was doing at that time when you saw her for the
first time at the place where you were detained together with the children?A- Yes, sir.Q- When
you saw her for the first time do you recall what accused Garalde was saying or doing at the
time you saw her?A- Yes, sir.Q- Will you please tell us what accused Garalde did and said at
that time?A- She peeped thru the door and gave instruction to tie them very well because they
might escape, sir, she was referring to our driver who was still tied and blindfolded at that time.
Q- Miss Witness, to foreclose any doubt as to the identity of this woman that you saw whose
voice you recognized when the Lite Ace stopped at Novaliches at that time, is that female you
saw that time present in the courtroom this afternoon?Atty. Fajardo:
Your Honor please,
there is nothing in the record that would say that the voice was heard on August 9, at the time
the parties arrived at Novaliches, Your Honor. Her testimony is that - we heard a voice on
August 10, the following day, so on that basis the question propounded by the private
prosecutor is objectionable, Your Honor.Atty. Cruz:
I invoke the records, Your Honor, the
witness testified that when the Lite Ace arrived she heard a female voice. In fact one of the
cross-examination questions of Atty. Manzano on that point is, whether or not she was sure that
it was a voice of a female. I can take a time to search from the transcript, Your Honor. What I
am establishing Your Honor, is whether or not she can identify again that woman whom she saw
peeping thru the door to give an instruction to tie the driver so the question is for her to tell us
now whether or not that woman whom she saw peeped thru the door to give the instruction to
tie up the driver tightly is present in the courtroom.COURT:
She already identified the
accused.Atty. Cruz:
Yes, Your Honor, she already identified. I am asking only her to reaffirm as to the identity of the person whom she saw peeped thru the door.Atty. FAJARDO:
We submit, Your Honor.COURT:
Answer.WITNESS:
A- Yes, sir.Atty. CRUZ:Q- Will you
please point to her, Miss Witness?Atty. CRUZ:
Make it of record that the witness stepped
down the witness stand and approached a person wearing green and black stripe blouse who
when asked identified herself as Alma Garalde.[56]In light of this positive identification by Paolo
and Dianita, accused-appellants' defenses of alibi and denial cannot be given credence.
Indeed, alibi is the weakest defense, being easy to fabricate and difficult to disprove. A positive
identification of the accused, where categorical and consistent and without any showing of ill
motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter prevails over the alibi and denial.
When there is no evidence to show any dubious reason or improper motive why a prosecution
witness would testify falsely against an accused or falsely implicate in a heinous crime, the
testimony is worthy of full faith and credit.[57]To buttress his claim of innocence, accusedappellant Ibero attached to his appeal brief newspaper accounts relating to the arrest of Roque
Garalde.[58] In these news articles, Roque Garalde purportedly revealed the names of those

involved in the kidnapping as: "Jimmy (the mastermind), Dante, James, Jun, Antoy, Morris and
Wendel." Accused-appellant Ibero's name was not mentioned; hence, this is allegedly sufficient
proof of his innocence. This contention is untenable.These newspaper reports are incompetent
and inadmissible for being hearsay.[59] Besides, these newspaper accounts cannot prevail over
the positive identification of accused-appellants.For her part, accused-appellant Garalde harps
on the fact that the sworn statements of the kidnap victims, specifically that of Dianita, did not
contain any inculpatory facts and circumstances linking her to the kidnapping. This omission is
not fatal to the prosecution's case against accused-appellant Garalde. As explained by Dianita,
she only answered the questions that were asked of her. And the questions propounded to her
during the early stages of the criminal investigation mainly related to the identity of the persons
who actually abducted them on 9 August 1994. In any case, ex-parte statements are almost
invariably incomplete and oftentimes inaccurate.[60] Indeed, the infirmity of the affidavits as
evidence is much a matter of judicial cxperience.[61]Accused-appellant Garalde also makes
much of the alleged inconsistencies between the testimonies of Paolo and Dianita relative to the
circumstances leading to the identification of accused-appellant Garalde. Among others, the
inconsistencies pointed out by accused-appellant Garalde are:1. While Dianita claimed that she
saw accused-appellant Garalde peep through the door; Paolo testified that they were all
blindfolded at the time;2. Paolo averred that he heard the female voice for the first time on 9
August 1994 when they were still inside the van. Dianita stated that she first heard the female
voice when they were being led to the second floor of the house;3. Only Dianita heard a female
voice saying "Itali ninyong mabuti iyan at baka makawala" when all the kidnap victims were kept
in the same room;4. In contrast with the testimonies of the PACC, the kidnap victims never
mentioned about the Toyota Corolla with the commemorative plate ALMA;5. When they
conducted surveillance at the BF Resort, Las Pias, the PACC did not take a photograph of the
Toyota Corolla;6. The PACC described accused-appellant Garalde's car as a blue Toyota
Corolla. Kathryn mentioned a white car; and7. There was discrepancy in the dates mentioned
by the PACC operatives on when they discovered the "safehouse."[62]These purported
inconsistencies and discrepancies are too minor to warrant the reversal of the judgment of
conviction. They do not affect the truth of the testimonies of witnesses, e.g., Paolo and Dianita,
nor do they discredit their positive identification of accused-appellants. On the contrary, such
trivial inconsistencies strengthen rather than diminish the prosecution's case as they erase
suspicion of a rehearsed testimony and negate any suspicion that the same was merely
perjured.[63]Further, accused-appellant Garalde's postulation that her non-flight proves her
innocence cannot hold water. There is no established doctrine to the effect that, in every
instance, non-flight is an indication of innocence.[64] As correctly observed by the Office of the
Solicitor General in its appellee's brief, accused-appellant Garalde did not flee because she
erroneously believed that, after the payment of the ransom and the kidnap victims were
released, everything went smoothly as planned. Her non-flight was thus due to complacency
and not because she is innocent.Accused-appellants were charged with and convicted of the
crime of kidnapping for ransom and serious illegal detention. Article 267 of the Revised Penal
Code reads:Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention.- Any private individual who shall
kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of liberty, shall suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death;1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three
days.2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.3. If any serious physical

injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained; or if threats to kill him
shall have been made.4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the
accused is any of the parents, female or a public officer.The penalty shall be death where the
kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or
any other person, even if none of the circumstances above mentioned were present in the
commission of the offense.When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention
or is raped, or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be
imposed.The elements of the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention are: (a) the
accused is a private individual; (b) the accused kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner
deprives the latter of his liberty; (c) the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (d) in
the commission of the offense, any of the four (4) circumstances mentioned above is present.
[65] Moreover, if the kidnapping was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom, the
imposition of death penalty is mandatory. This qualifying circumstance, i.e., demand for the
payment of ransom, was specifically alleged in the Information filed against accused-appellants
in Criminal Case No. Q-94-58658.Based on the evidence on record, the following facts have
been indisputably established:1. Paolo, John and Nio, all minors, together with Dianita, Janidy
and Antonio, were abducted on 9 August 1994 by three (3) men including accused-appellant
Ibero;2. The kidnap victims were detained inside the house against their will and, except for
Dianita and Janidy who were released earlier, were deprived of their liberty for nine (9) days;3.
The kidnappers demanded payment of ransom initially in the amount of P10,000,000.00 for the
release of the victims. Upon the plea of Kathryn, mother of Paolo and John, the said amount
was reduced to P410,000.00 and several pieces of jewelry valued at P90,000.00. This amount
was actually delivered to the kidnappers by Dianita in the morning of 16 August 1994;4. At one
time during their captivity, Dianita saw accused-appellant Garalde peep through the door and
heard her say, "Itali ninyong mabuti iyan at baka makawala," referring to the driver, Antonio.
Clearly, all the elements and qualifying circumstance to warrant conviction for the crime of
kidnapping for ransom and serious illegal detention in this case have been established beyond
reasonable doubt.With respect to accused-appellants' respective participation in the
commission of the crime, the Court fully agrees with the findings of the trial court that accusedappellants Ibero and Garalde are liable as principal and accomplice, respectively. Accusedappellant Ibero was held liable as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy. A conspiracy exists
when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and
decided to commit it. The proof of the agreement need not rest on direct evidence; the
agreement itself may be inferred from the conduct of the parties disclosing a common
understanding between them relative to the commission of the offense. Jurisprudential account
tells us consistently that the conduct of the accused before, during, and after the commission of
the crime may be considered to show an extant conspiracy.[66] Accused-appellant Ibero's overt
acts of participating in the actual abduction of the victims and blindfolding them on 9 August
1994 incontrovertibly showed that he conspired with the other kidnappers in pursuance of their
common felonious purpose.On the other hand, Article 18 of the Revised Penal Code penalizes
as accomplices those persons who cooperate in the execution of the offense by previous or
simultaneous acts not indispensable to the consummation of the offense. Accomplices
cooperate in the execution of the crime by previous or simultaneous acts, by means of which
they aid, facilitate or protect the execution of the crime, without, however, taking any direct part

in such execution, or forcing or inducing others to execute it, or contributing to its

accomplishment by any indispensable act.[67]As testified by Dianita, accused-appellant
Garalde's participation consisted in her act of peeping through the door at one time during the
victims' captivity and uttering, "itali ninyong mabuti iyan at baka makawala," referring to the
driver, Antonio. This participation was simultaneous with the commission of the crime. This
circumstance alone, however, was not indispensable to the commission of the crime.
Accordingly, the trial court rightfully convicted accused-appellant Garalde as an accomplice.In
fine, the Court affirms the conviction of accused-appellants Ibero and Garalde as principal and
accomplice, respectively, for the crime of kidnapping for ransom and serious illegal detention.
The Court is constrained to impose the supreme penalty of death on accused-appellant Ibero as
said penalty is mandated by Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic
Act No. 7659. The penalty imposable on accused-appellant Garalde, as accomplice, is
reclusion perpetua, the penalty one degree lower than that prescribed for the said crime
pursuant to Article 52 in relation to Article 61 (1) of the Revised Penal Code.Four (4) Justices of
the Court maintain their position that Republic Act No.7659 is unconstitutional insofar as it
prescribes the death penalty; nevertheless, they submit to the ruling of the majority that the law
is constitutional and the death penalty can be lawfully imposed in the case at bar.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 79 of Quezon City in Criminal
Case No. Q-94-58658 finding accused-appellants Kil Patrick Ibero and Alma Tan Garalde guilty
of kidnapping for ransom and serious and illegal detention as principal and accomplice,
respectively, and imposing upon accused-appellant Ibero the maximum penalty of DEATH and
upon accused-appellant Garalde the penalty of reclusion perpetua is AFFIRMED in toto.In
accordance with Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of RA
No.7659, upon the finality of this decision let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded to
His Excellency, the President, for the possible exercise of his pardoning power.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------6. EXCEPTIONS TO THE HEARSAY RULE
Sec. 37 - Dying Declaration
56. JESUS GERALDO and AMADO ARIATE, Petitioners, - versus - PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 173608
November 20, 2008 D E C I S I O N
CARPIO MORALES, J.: Petitioners Jesus Geraldo and Amado Ariate were, by Information
dated December 23, 2002 filed on December 27, 2002 before the Regional Trial Court of
Surigao del Sur, charged with Homicide allegedly committed as follows: x x x [O]n the 1st day of
July, 2002 at about 3:00 oclock early morning, more or less, at Sitio Tinago, Barangay Bunga,
municipality of Lanuza, province of Surigao del Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and mutually helping one another,
armed with xxx handguns and with intent to kill, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously sho[o]t one ARTHUR U.[1] RONQUILLO, thereby hitting and inflicting upon the latter
wounds described hereunder: POINT OF ENTRY:1.
Right lumbar area2.
Right iliac area
POINT OF EXIT1.
Left lateral area of abdomen2.
Right hypogastric area which wounds
have caused the instantaneous death of said ARTHUR U. RONQUILLO, to the damage and
prejudice of his heirs in the following amount: P50,000.00 as life indemnity of the victim;

10,000.00 as moral damages; 10,000.00 as exemplary damages; and 40,000.00 as

actual damages. CONTRARY TO LAW.[2] At 3:00 a.m. of July 1, 2002, his wife, daughter
Mirasol, and son Arnel, among other persons, on being informed of the shooting of Arthur
Ronquillo (the victim), repaired to where he was, not far from his residence, and found him lying
on his side and wounded. Although gasping for breath, he was able to utter to Mirasol, within
the hearing distance of Arnel, that he was shot by Badjing[3] and Amado. Petitioners who were
suspected to be the Badjing and Amado responsible for the shooting of the victim were
subjected to paraffin tests at the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory in Butuan
City. In the PNP Chemistry Report No. C-002-2002-SDS,[4] the following data are reflected: x x
x x TIME AND DATE RECEIVED
: 1105H 03 July 2002 REQUESTING PARTY/UNIT
: Chief of Police
Lanuza Police Station
Lanuza, Surigao del Sur SPECIMEN SUBMITTED
:
Paraffin casts taken from
the left and the right hands of the following named living persons:
A = Jesus Geraldo Jr.
alias Bajing
B = Amado Ariate /x/x/x/
/x/x/x/ PURPOSE OF
LABORATORY EXAMINATION
To determine the presence of gunpowder residue,
Nitrates. /x/x/x/ FINDINGS:
Qualitative examination conducted on specimens A and B
gave NEGATIVE results for powder residue, Nitrates. /x/x/x/ CONCLUSION: Specimens A and B
do not reveal the presence of gunpowder residue, Nitrates. /x/x/x/ REMARKS:
The
original copy of this report is retained in this laboratory for future reference. TIME AND DATE
COMPLETED:
1700H 03 July 2002 x x x x (Underscoring supplied)
In a
document dated July 1, 2002 and denominated as Affidavit[5] which was subscribed and
sworn to before Clerk of Court II Manuel A. Balasa, Sr. on July 26, 2002, the victims son Arnel
gave a statement in a question and answer style that herein petitioners Jesus Geraldo and
Amado Ariate were the ones who shot his father. In another document dated July 4, 2002 also
denominated as Affidavit[6] which was subscribed and sworn to also before the same Clerk of
Court II Balasa on July 26, 2002, Mirasol also gave a statement in a question and answer style
that her father uttered that herein petitioners shot him. At the witness stand, Mirasol echoed her
fathers declaration that Badjing and Amado shot him. Arnel substantially corroborated
Mirasols statement.[7] Upon the other hand, petitioners gave their side of the case as follows:
Petitioner Ariate, a barangay tanod of Bunga, declared that Barangay Kagawad Omboy Roz
(Roz) woke him up at 3:00 a.m. of July 1, 2002 and informed him that the victim was shot. He
and Roz thus borrowed a tricycle, proceeded to the crime scene and, along with others, brought
the victim to the hospital where he was pronounced dead on arrival. Ariate submitted himself to
a paraffin test and tested negative for gunpowder residue/nitrates.[8] Petitioner Geraldo
declared that he slept in his house located also in Barangay Bunga, Lanuza at 9:30 p.m. of June
30, 2002 and woke up at 4:00 a.m. the following day. At 6:30 a.m., on seeing many people in
the vicinity of the 45-meter away house of one Josita Bongabong where the victims body was
found, he inquired and learned that the victim was shot. Policemen subsequently went to his
house and advised him to take a paraffin test. He obliged and was tested at the PNP Crime
Laboratory and was found negative for gunpowder residue/nitrates.[9] In the course of the
testimony of Ariate, his counsel presented the PNP Chemistry Report reflecting the negative
results of the paraffin test on him and Geraldo. The trial court restrained the presentation of the
document, however, as reflected in the following transcript of stenographic notes taken on
March 21, 2003:x x x x Q
I am showing to you [Ariate] a copy of the result of the paraffin

test attached to the record of this case. COURT

Is it covered in the Pre-trial Order? You
cannot do that. That is why I told you; lay your cards on the table. ATTY. AUZA
May I
ask for the courts reconsideration. COURT
Denied. I am warning you, all of you. ATTY.
AUZA
With the denial of our motion for reconsideration, I move to tender exclusive
evidence. He would have identified this result. The paraffin test, which [forms] part of the
affidavit of this witness attached to the record of this case on page 29. May I ask that this will
be marked as Exhibit 3 for the defense. COURT
Mark it. (Marked).[10] (Underscoring
supplied) As shown from the above-quoted transcript of the proceedings, the trial court
restrained the presentation of the result of the paraffin tests because the same was not covered
in the Pre-trial Order. In the Pre-trial Order,[11] the trial court noted the parties agreement that
witnesses not listed in this Pre-trial Order shall not be allowed to testify as additional witnesses.
Significantly, there was no agreement to disallow the presentation of documents which were not
reflected in the Pre-trial Orders. At all events, oddly, the trial court allowed the marking of the
PNP Chemistry Report as Exhibit 3.[12] When petitioner Geraldos turn to present the same
PNP Chemistry Report came, the trial court ruled: COURT
That is the problem in the
Pre-Trial Brief if the exhibits are not stated. I will set aside that Order and in the interest of
justice I will allow the accused to submit, next time I will not any more consider exhibits not
listed in the Pre-trial Order.[13] (Underscoring supplied) The version of the defense was in part
corroborated by witnesses. The trial court, passing on the demeanor of prosecution witness-the
victims eight-year old daughter Mirasol, observed: . . . She talks straightforward, coherent and
clear, very intelligent, with child mannerism[s]. While testifying she was criss-crossing her
hands, touching anything within her reach, innocent and simple, pressing of[f] and on her
stomach but she talks with correct grammar. No doubt, this Court was convinced of her
testimony which was corroborated by her brother Arnel Ronquillo.[14] On the nature and weight
of the dying declaration of the victim, the trial court observed: A dying declaration may be xxx
oral or in writing. As a general rule, a dying declaration to be admissible must be made by the
declarant while he is conscious of his impending death. However, even if a declarant did not
make a statement that he was on the brink of death, the degree and seriousness of the wound
and the fact that death supervened shortly afterwards may be considered as substantial
evidence that the declaration was made by the victim with full realization that he was in a dying
condition; People vs. Ebrada, 296 SCRA 353. Even assuming that the declaration is not
admissible as a dying declaration, it is still admissible as part of the res gestae since it was
made shortly after the startling occurrence and under the influence thereof, hence, under the
circumstances, the victim evidently had no opportunity to contrive.[15] (Underscoring supplied)
Finding for the prosecution, the trial court convicted petitioners, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused JESUS GERALDO y CUBERO and AMADO ARIATE y
DIONALDO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide penalized under Article
249 of the Revised Penal Code and with the presence of one (1) aggravating circumstance of
night time and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term of which could be
properly imposed under the rules of said code and the minimum which shall be within the range
of the penalty next lower to that prescribe[d] by the code for the offense, hereby sentences each
to suffer the penalty of TEN (10) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of Prision Mayor minimum to
SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of Reclusion Temporal
maximum as maximum, with all the accessory penalties provided for by law. To pay the heirs of

the victim the amount of P50,000.00 as life indemnity, P100,000.00 as moral damages and
P20,000.00 as exemplary damages. The claim for actual damages is denied, there being no
evidence to support the same. The bail bond put up by the accused Jesus Geraldo and Amado
Ariate are ordered cancelled and to pay the cost. SO ORDERED.[16] (Underscoring supplied)
The Court of Appeals, by Decision of June 30, 2006,[17] affirmed with modification the trial
courts decision. It found that the trial court erred in appreciating nocturnity as an aggravating
circumstance. And it reduced the award of moral damages[18] to P50,000, and deleted the
award of exemplary damages. Thus the Court of Appeals disposed: WHEREFORE, in view of
the foregoing, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED save for the modification of the
penalty imposed. Accordingly, accused-appellants are each hereby sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of Eight (8) years, Five (5) Months and One (1) Day of prision mayor
medium as minimum, to Seventeen (17) Years and Four (4) Months of reclusion temporal
medium as maximum, with all accessory penalties provided by law, and to jointly and solidarily
pay the heirs of the victim the amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral
damages. SO ORDERED.[19] (Italics in the original) Hence, the present Petition[20] raising the
following issues:I WHETHER OR NOT THE IDENTIT[IES] OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS
AS THE ALLEGED ASSAILANT HAS BEEN ADEQUATELY ESTABLISHED AS PER
EVIDENCE ON RECORD? II WHETHER OR NOT THE IDENTIT[IES] OF THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANTS HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED BY PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT?[21]
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Petitioners argue: With due respect, herein petitioners
disagree with the holding of the Honorable Court of Appeals that It is not necessary that the
victim further identify that Badjing was in fact Jesus Geraldo or that Amado was Amado
Ariate because, [so petitioners contend], it is the obligation of the prosecution to establish with
moral certainty that indeed the persons they identified as the as the assailant of Arthur O.
Ronquillo were really the ones who perpetrated the crime. Admittedly, prosecution witnesses
were able to identify positively herein petitioners as the alleged assailant[s] of Arthur O.
Ronquillo. But said identification is based on the assumption that they were the very same
BADJING AMADO and/or BADJING AND AMADO referred to by their deceased father in his
dying declaration. What the Honorable Court of Appeals failed to consider is that, just because
the victim declared that it was BADJING AMADO and/or BADJING AND AMADO who shot
him does not necessarily follow that herein petitioners were really the perpetrators in the
absence of proof that the BADJING referred to by him is Jesus Geraldo and that the AMADO
is Amado Ariate. It would have been a different story had the prosecution witnesses [been]
eyewitnesses because proof that the BADJING AMADO and/or BADJING AND AMADO
referred to by the victim and the persons identified by the prosecution witnesses are the same is
unnecessary. Herein petitioners believe, that even assuming that there are no other BADJING
or AMADO in the barangay, still it does not follow that the person[s] referred to by the dying
declarant as his assailant were Jesus Geraldo alias BADJING and Amado Ariate alias
AMADO. Although, it is inconceivable how the Honorable Court of Appeals arrived at the said
conclusion that there are no other BADJING AMADO and/or BADJING AND AMADO in the
barangay absent any proof to that effect from the prosecution.[22] (Underscoring in the original)
The petition is impressed with merit.The trial court relied on the dying declaration of the
victim as recounted by his daughter Mirasol and corroborated by his son Arnel. A dying
declaration is admissible as evidence if the following circumstances are present: (a) it concerns

the cause and the surrounding circumstances of the declarants death; (b) it is made when
death appears to be imminent and the declarant is under a consciousness of impending death;
(c) the declarant would have been competent to testify had he or she survived; and (d) the dying
declaration is offered in a case in which the subject of inquiry involves the declarants death.[23]
There is no dispute that the victims utterance to his children related to the identities of his
assailants. As for the victims consciousness of impending death, it is not necessary to prove
that he stated that he was at the brink of death; it suffices that, judging from the nature and
extent of his injuries, the seriousness of his condition was so apparent to him that it may safely
be inferred that such ante mortem declaration was made under consciousness of an impending
death.[24] The location of the victims two gunshot wounds, his gasping for breath, and his
eventual death before arriving at the hospital meet this requirement.[25] It has not been
established, however, that the victim would have been competent to testify had he survived the
attack. There is no showing that he had the opportunity to see his assailant. Among other
things, there is no indication whether he was shot in front, the post-mortem examination report
having merely stated that the points of entry of the wounds were at the right lumbar area and
the right iliac area.[26] Lumbar may refer to the loins or the group of vertebrae lying
between the thoracic vertebrae and the sacrum,[27] or to the region of the abdomen lying on
either side of the umbilical region and above the corresponding iguinal.[28] Iliac relates to the
ilium, which is one of the three bones composing either lateral half of the pelvis being in man
broad and expanded above and narrower below where it joins with the ischium and pubis to
form part of the actabulum.[29] At all events, even if the victims dying declaration were
admissible in evidence, it must identify the assailant with certainty; otherwise it loses its
significance.[30] In convicting petitioners, the trial court, as stated earlier, relied on the testimony
of the victims daughter Mirasol, which was corroborated by her brother Arnel, that the Badjing
and Amado mentioned by the victim as his assailants are herein petitioners whom they
claimed to know because they live in the same barangay.[31] The Court of Appeals believed too
the siblings testimonies, holding that It is not necessary that the victim further identify that
Badjing was in fact Jesus Geraldo or that Amado was Amado Ariate. There was never an
issue as to the identity of the accused. There was no other person known as Badjing or
Amado in their neighborhood or in their barangay. Accused-appellants never presented any
proof that a person in their locality had the same aliases or names as they. It is not uncommon
that even an eight-year-old child can identify that Jesus Geraldo was known as Badjing and
that Amado Ariate was Amado.[32] (Underscoring supplied) Contrary, however, to the
immediately-quoted ruling of the appellate court, it is the prosecution, not petitioners, which had
the burden of proving that petitioners were, at the material time, the only ones in the barangay
who bore such nicknames or aliases. This, the prosecution failed to discharge. When there is
doubt on the identity of the malefactors, motive is essential for their conviction.[33] The Court
notes that in their affidavits supporting the criminal complaint, the victims wife and children
Mirasol and Arnel proffered not knowing any possible motive for petitioners to shoot the victim.
[34] At the trial, no evidence of any motive was presented by the prosecution. Petitioners
defense of denial and alibi thus assumes importance. Specifically with respect to petitioner
Ariate, the victims wife admitted that Ariate accompanied her family in bringing the victim to the
hospital.[35] While non-flight does not necessarily indicate innocence, under the circumstances
obtaining in the present case, Ariates spontaneous gesture of immediately extending

assistance to the victim after he was advised by the Barangay Kagawad of the victims fate
raises reasonable doubt as to his guilt of the crime charged.[36] WHEREFORE, the petition is
GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 30, 2006 affirming with
modification the Decision of Branch 41 of the Surigao del Sur Regional Trial Court is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioners Jesus Geraldo and Amado Ariate are ACQUITTED of
the charge of Homicide for failure of the prosecution to establish their guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Director of the Bureau of Corrections,
Muntinlupa City who is directed to cause the immediate release of petitioners unless they are
being lawfully held for another cause, and to inform this Court of action taken within ten (10)
days from notice hereof.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------57. [G.R. No. 133579. May 31, 2000]PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
ROGELIO CONTEGA Y FLORENDO, accused-appellant.D E C I S I O NBELLOSILLO, J.:
SdaadscROGELIO CONTEGA Y FLORENDO was charged before the Regional Trial Court of
Iloilo City with robbery with homicide committed on 27 April 1994 against one Isauro Barba after
the accused in conspiracy with another unlawfully took away from his victim P1,500.00 and on
the same occasion inflicted upon him serious physical injuries which caused his death.[1]On 12
December 1997 the trial court found Rogelio Contega guilty as charged and sentenced him to
reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties provided by law. In addition, it ordered him to
pay the heirs of Isauro Barba civil indemnity of P50,000.00, unearned income of P132,000.00,
actual and compensatory damages of P30,000.00, and to pay the costs.[2]Isauro, Alberto and
Alex, all surnamed Barba, owned the Los Pescadores Restaurant located at the second floor of
a two (2)-storey building in A. Reyes Avenue, Estancia, Iloilo. Isauro occupied the mezzanine
floor. At around 9:00 in the evening of 27 April 1994 Jose Navarro, a waiter at the restaurant,
noticed that Isauro Barba did not show up for his dinner. It was his routine to be there at about
7:00 in the evening. Finding his absence a little strange, Jose went to Isauro's room which was
lighted but did not find him there so Jose returned to the restaurant, took a flashlight and went to
the bodega at the ground floor managed by Isauro. The bodega was dark. Before he could
reach the switches near the door his flashlight illumined the figure of Isauro lying face down on
the cement floor. He immediately turned on the lights, shook Isauros shoulders and asked him
what happened. Isauro could only mutter that he was "bumped" by two (2) men.At that juncture,
Jose noted that Isauros neck was covered with blood which dripped to the floor. He asked
Isauro who his assailant was, and Isauro answered, it was "Rogelio," former pakyaw (piecemeal worker) in the bodega/restaurant. Then Jose recalled a certain Rogelio Contega who was
fired a month before on suspicion of having stolen rice from the warehouse.Forthwith, Jose went
back to the restaurant and informed Chief Cook Rolly, Assistant Cook Jose Patwigas and
Secretary Melody Duran of the misfortune of Isauro. Jose requested Melody to make the
necessary phone calls, i.e., to the Barba family, to the police and to the doctor. Together with the
Chief and Assistant Cooks, Jose went down to the bodega. They tried to bring Isauro to the
main gate of the bodega but they could not find the keys to the gate which Isauro always
brought with him. Aside from the keys, they noticed that Isauros wallet was also missing.In the
meantime, at around 10:30 in the evening, PO3 Armando Robles received a telephone call
concerning the incident at the Los Pescadores Restaurant. Accompanied by SPO3 Leopoldo
Soldevilla, PO3 Robles hurried to the site. Informed that Isauro was in the warehouse, they

proceeded there and met Jose, the Chief Cook, the Assistant Cook and the Secretary. They
were all on their way up carrying the body of Isauro. PO3 Robles observed that Isauros
physical condition was critical so they brought him inside the eatery and placed him on top of a
table.A certain Dr. Arellano rushed to the restaurant. He cleaned Isauros neck that was full of
blood, examined the gushing wounds thereof and gave him emergency medical treatment. PO3
Robles asked Isauro about the identity of his assailant and he simply replied it was "Rogelio," a
former piece-meal worker in the place. Thereafter, Isauro was brought to the Jesus Colmenares
District Hospital in Iloilo where he died at about 2:35 in the afternoon of 28 April 1994.[3]
Eventually his keys were found but not his wallet. RtcsppedThe post-mortem examination of the
body of Isauro however was conducted by Dr. Ricardo Jaboneta of the National Bureau of
Investigation. His autopsy yielded the following findings:x x x x Abrasions, linear, 5.3 cms.
Oriented medially downwards, subcostal arch, left side along parasternal line.Contused
abrasion; (1) 1.3 x 0.7 cms., right temple; (2) 8.5 x. 3.5 cms., right zygomatic area; (3) 1.3 x 1.0
cms., elbow, right side, medial aspect; (4) 2.0 x 1.5 cms., knee, right side.Hematoma; (1) 9.0 x.
7.0 cms., left mandibular area; (2) 7.0 x 2.7 cms., upper eyelid, left side; (3) 5.0 x 8.0 cms.,
penna., left ear.Wound, punctured; (1) 0.5 cm., forehead, left side, just above lateral end of left
eyebrow, directed backwards medially downwards, penetrating subcutaneous tissues and make
an approximate depth of 1.0 cm., (2) 0.3 x 0.4 cm., tempore-parietal area, left side, involving
third layer of the scalp; (3) 0.2 x 0.2 cm., left pre-auricular area, left side, involving soft tissues
only; (4) 0.3 x 0.2 cm., thru and thru, left penna; (5) Triangular, 0.3 x. 0.5 cm., left upper lip
involving, soft tissues and make an approximate depth of 1.0 cm., (6) multiple, sixteen (16) in
number, sizes vary from 0.3 x. 0.5 to 0.4 x. 0.4 cm., nape, over an area of 13.0 x 9.0 cms., the
average depth is 1.0 cm., (7) Triangular in shape, 0.4 x 0.4 x 0.4 cm., subcostal arch, left side,
19.0 cm., from anterior midline, directed upwards, medially backwards, penetrating abdominal
wall thru 9th intercostal space into abdominal cavity, grazing spleen; (8) Triangular in shape, 0.3
x 0.3 x 0.3 cm., back left side along posterior axillary line, 13.0 cms. From posterior midline,
level of 10th rib, penetrating abdominal wall thru 20th intercostal space into abdominal cavity,
perforating left kidney and left renal artery; (9) Triangular in shape, 0.4 x 0.4 x 0.4 cm. Lumber
region along midline, bone depth; (10) Thru and thru, triangular in shape, 1.0 x 1.5 cms.,
forearm, right side, dorso-ulnar aspect, 13.0 cms. Below elbow penetrating soft tissues and
make an EXIT, triangular in shape 0.3 x 0.2 cm., forearm, right-side, antero-lunar aspect, 5.0
cm., below elbow (11) 0.3 x 0.5 cm., forearm, left side, antero-ulnar aspect, 6.5 crms., below
elbow, penetrating soft tissues and make an EXIT, 0.5 cm., forearm, left side, anterior aspect,
3.0 cms., below elbow; (12) triangular in shape, 0.3 x 0.3 cm., forearm, left side, antero-ulnar
aspect, 13.5 cms. Below elbow, penetrating soft tissues and make an approximate depth of 3.0
cms x x x x KortexCAUSE OF DEATH: Hemorrhagic shock secondary to multiple punctured
wounds.[4]According to Dr. Jaboneta, among the twelve (12) punctured wounds suffered by
Isauro, wounds 7 and 8 which were caused by a triangular pointed instrument were the most
fatal having penetrated the vital organs of the victim.Meanwhile, at around 5:00 in the morning
of 28 April 1994, Rogelio Contega was apprehended at his residence in Barangay Pa-on,
Estancia, Iloilo, about three (3) kilometers from the Los Pescadores Restaurant.Eduardo Barba,
Isauros nephew, stated that Isauro was receiving a salary of P3,000.00 per month. He also
stated that the Barba family incurred hospitalization expenses of P10,000.00, expenses for
embalming services of P15,000.00 as borne by a receipt;[5] expenses for the wake for ten (10)

days of P7,000.00; and, expenses for labor and materials for the gravestone of P5,000.00.
Rogelios alibi was that at around 5:30 in the afternoon of 27 April 1994 he was in his house with
his wife Norma, children and his wife's sister-in-law Silma Dominguez. He was melting lead to
be used in catching squid. At 7:00 they had dinner; afterwards, he slept. At 5:00 the following
morning, two (2) members of the Estancia police force arrived in his house and told him that the
Chief of Police wanted to see him. He went with them thinking, according to him, that there was
a job waiting for him. At the police station, he learned that he was a suspect in the killing of
Isauro Barba. Afterwards, he was locked up in jail. His defense was corroborated by
Dominguez.The trial court convicted Rogelio based on Isauros dying declaration that his
assailant was "Rogelio," a former pakyaw in the bodega/restaurant, as told to Jose Navarro and
PO3 Armando Robles. The trial court was not impressed with his alibi because his residence
was only approximately three (3) kilometers away from the Los Pescadores Restaurant and
could be negotiated by foot at a slow pace in thirty (30) minutes. In addition, it found that he had
the motive because he was dismissed from employment for reportedly stealing rice from the
bodega. SclawAccused-appellant now disputes the sufficiency of the dying declaration of Isauro
on the ground that he merely mentioned the name "Rogelio" without further details on the
identity of the suspect.Accused-appellant has a point and it is valid. His conviction indeed rests
on quicksand. While factual findings of the trial court are entitled to great weight and respect,
this case calls for a departure from the general rule. Easily, it can be said that the trial court has
overlooked certain facts of substance and value that if considered would have altered the result
of the case.[6] SclexA dying declaration, made in extremis when the party is at the point of
death and the mind is induced by the most powerful considerations to speak the truth,
occasioned by a situation so solemn and awful, is considered by the law as creating an
obligation equal to that which is created by a positive oath administered in a court of justice. The
idea more succinctly expressed is that "truth sits on the lips of dying men."[7] As an exception to
the hearsay rule, it is defined in Sec. 37, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court as one made by a
dying person under the consciousness of an impending death with respect to the cause and
surrounding circumstances of such death. It may be received in any case wherein his death is
the subject of inquiry and requires the concurrence of the following: (a) the statement or
declaration must concern the crime and the surrounding circumstances of the declarants death;
(b) at the time it was made the declarant was under a consciousness of an impending death; (c)
the declarant was competent as a witness; and, (d) the declaration is offered in a criminal case
for homicide, murder or parricide in which the decedent is the victim.[8]Isauro declared that his
attacker was "Rogelio," a former pakyaw (piece-meal worker) in the bodega/restaurant of Los
Pescadores. On this aspect, Jose Navarro testified -Q: After you switch(ed) all the lights and
you held the shoulder of Isauro Barba, did you notice his appearance x x x xA: His neck was
bloodied and there was also blood on the cement.Q: And when you saw this, what did you do?
A: When I put on the light and I saw him in this situation I asked him what happened to him and
he answered me that it (sic) was bumped by two men, and when I asked him who the men are
(sic), he answered me that it was Rogelio one of his piece-meal workers (pakyaw) in a local
dialect (underscoring supplied).[9]Navarro continued his narration by stating that he did not
know any other person by the name of "Rogelio" who also worked there as pakyaw except
accused-appellant whom he identified in court -Q: You said that on April 27, 1994 you were
already working as a waiter at the Los Pescadores Restaurant. Since when have you been

working there? XlawA: December of 1993.Q: Do you know a person by the name of Rogelio
who was previously working as pakyaw?A: Yes, sir.Q: Do you know where this Rogelio was
residing?A: At Brgy. Pa-on, Estancia, Iloilo x x x xQ: Now, if (sic) this Rogelio whom you said
was working before as a pakyaw at the Los Pescadores Restaurant, is he inside the
Courtroom? Can you point him?INTERPRETER: Witness goes to a person inside the
Courtroom and points to a person who upon being asked identified himself as Rogelio Contega
x x x x[10]Q: Aside from Rogelio Contega who is still working as a pakyaw in the bodega, do
you know if there were any other person(s) by the name of Rogelio who was also working there
as pakyaw?A: No more (underscoring supplied).[11]Aside from having known accused-appellant
as a former piece-meal worker in the bodega/restaurant, Navarro also knew why his
employment was terminated, thus providing the motive for the crime -Q: At the time you found
Isauro Barba at the bodega on April 27, 1994 was this Rogelio Contega still working at the
bodega?A: No more. ScmisQ: Do you know the reason why Rogelio Contega was not working
there?A: As far as I know among (sic) before the incident, this Rogelio Contega was a suspect
in the stealing of rice from the bodega.Q: Do you personally know this Rogelio Contega?A: Yes,
sir.Q: During the time that you were there at the Los Pescadores Restaurant, how often will (sic)
you see him?A: We often see (sic) each other because he catch-up (sic) to eat his breakfast x x
x x[12]Q: As far as you know, how many months did he work as "pakyaw" worker of Isauro
Barba?Q: Since I work (sic) in the Los Pescadores, in December of 1993 up to the time when
the incident happened, this Rogelio Contega was no longer working, and a month before the
incident (underscoring supplied).Q: Why did he no longer work at (sic) Isauro Barba? What
happened?A: Because according to what I heard, and what the late Isauro Barba told us, while
he was still alive and in fact contained in the police blotter, this Rogelio Contega was involved in
the stealing of palay x x x x (underscoring supplied).Q: Is it possible because Rogelio Contega
was involved in the stealing of palay, this prompted Isauro Barba to dismiss Rogelio Contega
from his work?A: Probably that is one of the reasons.Q: Is it possible also that this Rogelio
Contega harboured ill feeling against Isauro Barba?A: It is possible.[13]Isauro also gave the
same name and description of his assailant to P03 Armando Robles -A: When we asked him
what happened to him and who made this thing to him, he answered, it was a certain "Rogelio."
Q: And when he mentioned that it was a certain "Rogelio," what else did you ask from him?
MisscA: When we asked him further about this "Rogelio" and his description, he answered that
this Rogelio was a former worker of the place.Q: As a policeman, do you know if there was such
a worker before at Los Pescadores warehouse named Rogelio?A: Before I know (sic) of a
certain Rogelio who works (sic) there as a "pakyaw" in the place but "Tay Isauro" is definite in
his description that this "Rogelio" was once a "pakyaw" in the place and already left it
(underscoring supplied) x x x x[14]Likewise, P03 Robles identified accused-appellant in
court[15] which Navarro corroborated when he confirmed that Isauro did inform P03 Robles
about the identity of his assailant Q: Mr. Navarro, you said that while Doctor Arellano was
cleaning the wound of Isauro Barba he was asked question who bumped him. Please tell us
who was asking this question?A: Robles.Q: Is this the same Robles the policeman who arrived?
A: Yes, sir.COURT: Was that particular question addressed to the Doctor?A: While the Doctor
was cleaning the injuries, Robles was asking question on why and who bumped him because
he sustained a swelling on the right temple.COURT: The Court was asking you to whom was the
question addressed? Was the question addressed by the Police Officer to the Doctor or to the

victim?A: The victim x x x xATTY. SALAS: What did Isauro Barba answered (sic)?A: His answer
was, Rogelio his piece-meal worker (underscoring supplied).[16]Judging from the nature and
extent of Isauros injuries, the seriousness of his condition was so apparent to him that it could
safely be inferred that such ante-mortem declaration was made under the consciousness of an
impending death. That his demise came swiftly or only a few hours after arrival at the hospital
further emphasized his realization of the hopelessness of his recovery.[17] The records do not
disclose that he was incompetent as a witness. Apparently his declaration was offered to prove
the crime of robbery with homicide where his death was the subject of inquiry. However, the
Court finds that his dying declaration did not sufficiently identify accused-appellant as the
person responsible for his imminent death. MissppedIt is axiomatic that the prosecution bears
not only the onus to show distinctly that a crime has been committed but, just as importantly, to
likewise establish beyond reasonable doubt the identity of the person or persons who should be
held responsible therefor. The latter, i.e., the identification of the accused to be the perpetrator
of the crime, is concededly not an easy task.[18] It has thus once been observed that -x x x x
There are few more difficult subjects with which the administration of justice has to deal. The
carelessness or superficiality of observers, the rarity of powers of graphic description, and the
different force with which peculiarities of form or color or expression strike different persons,
make recognition or identification one of the least reliable of facts testified to even by actual
witnesses who have seen the parties in question.[19]Navarro and P03 Robles may have been in
unison in their testimonies on the declaration of Isauro regarding the identity of his assailant,
i.e., "Rogelio, former pakyaw worker." By themselves the declarations are not enough to identify
with certainty the person responsible for the crime. "Rogelio" is a common name and the
description "former pakyaw worker" provides little help. It is thus necessary to ascertain whether
the "Rogelio" whom Navarro and PO3 Robles knew as a former pakyaw in the
bodega/restaurant was the only such worker in the place.While Navarro testified that accusedappellant was the only former pakyaw in the bodega/restaurant he knew, the problem with his
statement is that it was confined to a limited span of only four (4) months. According to him he
started his employment in the restaurant in December 1993 whereas the incident took place on
27 April 1994. The records do not reveal, much less imply, that the restaurant opened only in
December 1993 or thereabouts. It is thus quite possible that there could be another "Rogelio"
who used to work there as a pakyaw but whom Navarro could not have known before his
employment thereat. Another competent witness should have been presented by the
prosecution on this significant detail.With respect to the testimony of P03 Robles, he said that
he knew of a certain "Rogelio" who worked as a pakyaw in the place. However, he failed to
mention that that "Rogelio" was the only former piece-meal worker in the bodega/restaurant. At
any rate, even if he did so testify, he was not equipped with the required competence to shed
light on the subject. JosppedMoreover, Navarro stated that the person he pinpointed to as the
attacker of Isauro was dismissed a month before the incident. However, his statement was
contradicted by P03 Robles in his affidavit[20] when he said that Isauro had told him that his
assailant "was already separated for quite a long time." Certainly, "quite a long time" cannot be
equated with "a month."While we hesitate to ignore the findings of the trial court we cannot
remove the nagging uncertainty about the identity of the accused Rogelio Contega y Florendo
as the very same pakyaw referred to by Isauro as narrated by witness Jose Navarro. For, there
could be other Rogelios or pakyaws who could have been employed earlier at Los Pescadores

than accused-appellant. In other words, the prosecution has not eliminated the possibility that
another piece-meal worker with the name "Rogelio" was employed by the Barbas without the
prosecution witnesses knowing about it, in which case and in view of such possibility, the
conclusion that accused-appellant Rogelio Contega y Florendo was the same person referred to
by the prosecution has not been established beyond reasonable doubt.Not even the supposed
motive of accused-appellant to commit the crime merits weight. Navarros knowledge of the
matter was hearsay as it was merely supplied by Isauro and other people. Moreover, the
prosecution did not bother to present the police blotter Navarro referred to as containing the
charge of stealing made by Isauro against accused-appellant.But we agree with the trial court
that accused-appellants defense of alibi does not convince. He failed to show that it was
physically impossible for him to have been at the crime scene at the time it happened.[21] He
admitted that his residence was only three (3) kilometers away, which can be negotiated in just
thirty (30) minutes by walking and perhaps a little more than ten (10) minutes by running. And
there is the tricycle that is usually available as the means of transportation.[22] On these
accounts, the corroboration provided by Silma Dominguez does not assume importance. Alibi is
a weak defense because it is easy to fabricate and concoct between relatives, friends and even
those not related to the offender.[23] Yet, while the alibi of accused-appellant may be weak, the
rule that "alibi must be satisfactorily proved was never intended to change the burden of proof in
criminal cases; otherwise, we will see the absurdity of an accused being put in a more difficult
position where the prosecutions evidence is vague and weak than where it is strong."[24] The
prosecution cannot profit from the weakness of the alibi of the accused. It must rely on the
strength of its own evidence and establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. It failed to do so in
this case.[25] SppedxAs in all criminal cases, speculation and probabilities cannot take the
place of proof required to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt.[26] We conclude that the
evidence presented by the prosecution did not pass the test of moral certainty to warrant the
conviction of accused-appellant for the death of Isauro.Neither can we uphold accusedappellants conviction for robbery based on the finding of the trial court that "the accused by
means of violence or intimidation took away the wallet of the victim containing the amount of
P1,500.00 according to Jose Barba, brother of the deceased."[27] Jose Barba did not testify but
merely executed an affidavit which was not even submitted in evidence. More importantly,
although there was evidence that Isauros wallet was missing, there was no proof that Isauro
had his wallet with him prior to the incident.[28] In order to sustain a conviction for robbery with
homicide, it is necessary that the robbery itself be established as conclusively as any other
essential element of the crime.[29]In sum, we reiterate that the dying declaration of the victim
Isauro Barba failed to categorically identify accused-appellant as his assailant, and the
prosecution did not conclusively establish that robbery was committed upon the person of
Isauro. In the absence of other evidence showing accused-appellants guilt for the crime
charged, it is not only his right to be set free; it is even more his constitutional right to be
acquitted.WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from finding accused-appellant Rogelio
Contega y Florendo guilty as charged is REVERSED and SET ASIDE for insufficiency of
evidence and on reasonable doubt; consequently, he is ACQUITTED of the crime charged and
ordered immediately released from custody unless held for some other lawful cause.The
Director of Prisons is DIRECTED forthwith to implement this Decision immediately and to inform

this Court within five (5) days from receipt hereof of the date accused-appellant shall have
actually been released from confinement. Costs de oficio.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Sec. 38 - Declaration Against Interest
(no case)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Sec. 39 - Act or declaration about pedigree
(no case)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Sec. 40 - Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree
(no case)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Sec. 41 - Common reputation
(no case)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Sec. 42 - Part of res gestae
58. JUANITO TALIDANO, Petitioner, - versus - FALCON MARITIME & ALLIED SERVICES,
INC., SPECIAL EIGHTH DIVISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, AND LABOR ARBITER
ERMITA C. CUYUGA, Respondents.
G.R. No. 172031
July 14, 2008 D E C I S I O N TINGA, J.: This Petition for
Certiorari[1] under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeks to annul the Decision[2] and
Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals, dated 16 November 2005 and 2 February 2006,
respectively, which upheld the validity of the dismissal of Juanito Talidano (petitioner). The
challenged decision reversed and set aside the Decision[4] of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) and reinstated that of the Labor Arbiter.[5] Petitioner was employed as a
second marine officer by Falcon Maritime and Allied Services, Inc. (private respondent) and was
assigned to M/V Phoenix Seven, a vessel owned and operated by Hansu Corporation (Hansu)
which is based in Korea. His one (1)-year contract of employment commenced on 15 October
1996 and stipulated the monthly wage at $900.00 with a fixed overtime pay of $270.00 and
leave pay of $75.00.[6] Petitioner claimed that his chief officer, a Korean, always discriminated
against and maltreated the vessels Filipino crew. This prompted him to send a letter-complaint
to the officer-in-charge of the International Transport Federation (ITF) in London, a measure that
allegedly was resented by the chief officer. Consequently, petitioner was dismissed on 21
January 1997. He filed a complaint for illegal dismissal on 27 October 1999.[7] Private
respondent countered that petitioner had voluntarily disembarked the vessel after having been
warned several times of dismissal from service for his incompetence, insubordination,
disrespect and insulting attitude toward his superiors. It cited an incident involving petitioners
incompetence wherein the vessel invaded a different route at the Osaka Port in Japan due to
the absence of petitioner who was then supposed to be on watch duty. As proof, it presented a
copy of a fax message, sent to it on the date of incident, reporting the vessels deviation from its
course due to petitioners neglect of duty at the bridge,[8] as well as a copy of the report of crew
discharge issued by the master of M/V Phoenix Seven two days after the incident.[9] Private

respondent stated that since petitioner lodged the complaint before the Labor Arbiter two (2)
years and nine (9) months after his repatriation, prescription had already set in by virtue of
Revised POEA Memorandum Circular No. 55, series of 1996 which provides for a one-year
prescriptive period for the institution of seafarers claims arising from employment contract.[10]
On 5 November 2001, the Labor Arbiter rendered judgment dismissing petitioners complaint,
holding that he was validly dismissed for gross neglect of duties. The Labor Arbiter relied on the
fax messages presented by private respondent to prove petitioners neglect of his duties, thus: x
x x The fax message said that the Master of M/V Phoenix Seven received an emergency
warning call from Japan Sisan Sebo Naika Radio Authority calling attention to the Master of the
vessel M/V Phoenix Seven that his vessel is invading other route [sic]. When the Master
checked the Bridge, he found out that the Second Officer (complainant) did not carry out his
duty wathch. There was a confrontation between the Master and the Complainant but the latter
insisted that he was right. The argument of the Complainant asserting that he was right cannot
be sustained by this Arbitration Branch. The fact that there was an emergency call from the
Japanese port authority that M/V Phoenix Seven was invading other route simply means that
Complainant neglected his duty. The fax message stating that Complainant was not at the
bridge at the time of the emergency call was likewise not denied nor refuted by the
Complainant. Under our jurisprudence, any material allegation and/or document which is not
denied specifically is deemed admitted. If not of the timely call [sic] from the port authority that
M/V Phoenix Seven invaded other route, the safety of the vessel, her crew and cargo may be
endangered. She could have collided with other vessels because of complainants failure to
render watch duty.[11] On appeal, the NLRC reversed the ruling of the Labor Arbiter and
declared the dismissal as illegal. The dispositive portion of the NLRCs decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and set
aside and a new one entered declaring the dismissal of the complainant as illegal.
Respondents Falcon Maritime & Allied Services, Inc. and Hansu Corporation are hereby
ordered to jointly and severally pay complainant the amount equivalent to his three (3) months
salary as a result thereof.[12] The NLRC held that the fax messages in support of the alleged
misbehavior and neglect of duty by petitioner have no probative value and are self-serving. It
added that the ships logbook should have been submitted in evidence as it is the repository of
all the activities on board the vessel, especially those affecting the performance or attitude of
the officers and crew members, and, more importantly, the procedures preparatory to the
discharge of a crew member. The NLRC also noted that private respondent failed to comply
with due process in terminating petitioners employment.[13] Private respondent moved for
reconsideration,[14] claiming that the complaint was filed beyond the one-year prescriptive
period. The NLRC, however, denied reconsideration in a Resolution dated 30 August 2002.[15]
Rejecting the argument that the complaint had already prescribed, it ruled: Records show that
respondent in this case had filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of prescription before the
Labor Arbiter a quo who denied the same in an Order dated August 1, 2000. Such an Order
being unappealable, the said issue of prescription cannot be raised anew specially in a motion
for reconsideration. (Citations omitted)[16] It appears that respondent received a copy of the
NLRC Resolution[17] on 24 September 2002 and that said resolution became final and
executory on 7 October 2002.[18] Private respondent brought the case to the Court of Appeals
via a Petition for Certiorari[19] on 8 October 2002. The petition, docketed as CA-G.R. Sp. No.

73521, was dismissed on technicality in a Resolution dated 29 October 2002. The pertinent
portion of the resolution reads: (1)
[T]he VERIFICATION AND CERTIFICATION
OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING was signed by one Florida Z. Jose, President of petitioner
Falcon Maritime and Allied Services, Inc., without proof that she is the duly authorized
representative of petitioner-corporation;(2)
[T]here is no affidavit of service of the
petition to the National Labor Relations Commission and to the adverse party;(3)
[T]here is no explanation to justify service by mail in lieu of the required personal service.
(Citations omitted)[20] An entry of judgment was issued by the clerk of court on 23 November
2002 stating that the 29 October 2002 Resolution had already become final and executory.[21]
Meanwhile, on 12 November 2002, private respondent filed another petition before the Court of
Appeals,[22] docketed as CA G.R. SP No. 73790. This is the subject of the present petition.
Petitioner dispensed with the filing of a comment.[23] In his Memorandum,[24] however, he
argued that an entry of judgment having been issued in CA-G.R. SP No. 73521, the filing of the
second petition hinging on the same cause of action after the first petition had been dismissed
violates not only the rule on forum shopping but also the principle of res judicata. He highlighted
the fact that the decision subject of the second petition before the Court of Appeals had twice
become final and executory, with entries of judgment made first by the NLRC and then by the
Court of Appeals. The appellate court ultimately settled the issue of prescription, categorically
declaring that the one-year prescriptive period applies only to employment contracts entered
into as of 1 January 1997 and not those entered prior thereto, thus: x x x The question of
prescription is untenable. Admittedly, POEA Memorandum Circular [No.] 55 prescribing the
standard terms of an employment contract of a seafarer was in effect when the respondent was
repatriated on January 21, 1997. This administrative issuance was released in accordance with
Department Order [No.] 33 of the Secretary of Labor directing the revision of the existing
Standard Employment Contract to be effective by January 1, 1997. Section 28 of this revised
contract states: all claims arising therefrom shall be made within one year from the date of the
seafarers return to the point of hire. It is crystal clear that the one-year period of prescription of
claims in the revised standard contract applies only to employment contracts entered into as of
January 1, 1997. If there is still any doubt about this, it should be removed by the provision of
Circular [No.] 55 which says that the new schedule of benefits to be embodied in the standard
contract will apply to any Filipino seafarer that will be deployed on or after the effectivity of the
circular. The respondent was deployed before January 1, 1997. As acknowledged by the
petitioners, the rule prior to Circular [No.] 55 provided for a prescriptive period of three years.
We cannot avoid the ineluctable conclusion that the claim of the respondent was filed within the
prescriptive period.[25] Despite ruling that prescription had not set in, the appellate court
nonetheless declared petitioners dismissal from employment as valid and reinstated the Labor
Arbiters decision. The appellate court relied on the fax messages issued by the ship master
shortly after petitioner had committed a serious neglect of his duties. It noted that the said fax
messages constitute the res gestae. In defending the non-presentation of the logbook, it stated
that three years had already passed since the incident and Hansu was no longer the principal of
private respondent. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence he filed this
instant petition. Citing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals, petitioner
reiterates his argument that the appellate court should not have accepted the second petition in
view of the fact that a corresponding entry of judgment already has been issued. By filing the

second petition, petitioner believes that private respondent has engaged in forum shopping.[26]
Private respondent, for its part, defends the appellate court in taking cognizance of the second
petition by stressing that there is no law, rule or decision that prohibits the filing of a new petition
for certiorari within the reglementary period after the dismissal of the first petition due to
technicality.[27] It rebuts petitioners charge of forum shopping by pointing out that the dismissal
of the first petition due to technicality has not ripened into res judicata, which is an essential
element of forum shopping.[28] In determining whether a party has violated the rule against
forum shopping, the test to be applied is whether the elements of litis pendentia are present or
whether a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other.[29] This issue has
been thoroughly and extensively discussed and correctly resolved by the Court of Appeals in
this wise: The respondents two arguments essay on certain developments in the case after the
NLRC rendered its decision. He points out with alacrity that an entry of judgment was issued
twice first by the NLRC with respect to its decision and then by the Ninth Division of the Court
of Appeals after it dismissed on technical grounds the first petition for certiorari filed by the
petitioner. Neither event, for sure, militates against the institution of a second petition for
certiorari. A decision of the NLRC is never final for as long as it is the subject of a petition for
certiorari that is pending with a superior court. A contrary view only demeans our certiorari
jurisdiction and will never gain currency under our system of appellate court review. It is more to
the point to ask if a second petition can stand after the first is dismissed, but under the particular
circumstances in which the second was brought, we hold that it can. The theory of res judicata
invoked by the respondent to bar the filing of the second petition does not apply. The judgment
or final resolution in the first petition must be on the merits for res judicata to inhere, and it will
not be on the merits if it is founded on a consideration of only technical or collateral points. Yet
this was exactly how the first petition was disposed of. SP 73521 was dismissed as a result of
the failure of the petitioner to comply with the procedural requirements of a petition for certiorari.
The case never touched base. There was no occasion for the determination of the substantive
rights of the parties and, in this sense, the merits of the case were not involved. The petitioner
had actually the option of either refilling [sic] the case or seeking reconsideration in the original
action. It chose to file SP 73790 after realizing that it still had enough time left of the original
period of 60 days under Rule 65 to do so. Since the dismissal of the first petition did not ripen
into res judicata, it may not be said that there was forum shopping with the filing of the second.
The accepted test for determining whether a party violated the rule against forum shopping
insofar as it is applicable to this setting is whether the judgment or final resolution in the first
case amounts to res judicata in the second. Res judicata is central to the idea of forum
shopping. Without it, forum shopping is non-existent. The dismissal of the first petition,
moreover, if it does not amount to res judicata, need not be mentioned in the certification of nonforum shopping accompanying the second action. The omission will not be fatal to the viability
of the second case. (Citations omitted)[30] Private respondent, in turn, questions the propriety
of the instant certiorari petition and avers that the issues raised by petitioner can only be dealt
with under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.[31] Against this thesis, petitioner submits that the
acceptance of the petition is addressed to the sound discretion of this Court.[32]
The
proper remedy to assail decisions of the Court of Appeals involving final disposition of a case is
through a petition for review under Rule 45. In this case, petitioner filed instead a certiorari
petition under Rule 65. Notwithstanding this procedural lapse, this Court resolves to rule on the

merits of the petition in the interest of substantial justice,[33] the underlying consideration in this
petition being the arbitrary dismissal of petitioner from employment.
Petitioner submits
that the Court of Appeals erred in relying merely on fax messages to support the validity of his
dismissal from employment. He maintains that the first fax message containing the information
that the vessel encroached on a different route was a mere personal observation of the ship
master and should have thus been corroborated by evidence, and that these fax messages
cannot be considered as res gestae because the statement of the ship master embodied therein
is just a report. He also contends that he has not caused any immediate danger to the vessel
and that if he did commit any wrongdoing, the incident would have been recorded in the
logbook. Thus, he posits that the failure to produce the logbook reinforces the theory that the
fax messages have been concocted to justify his unceremonious dismissal from employment.
Hence, he believes that his dismissal from employment stemmed from his filing of the complaint
with the ITF which his superiors resented.[34]
Private respondent insists that the
appellate court is correct in considering the fax messages as res gestae statements. It likewise
emphasizes that non-presentment of the logbook is justified as the same could no longer be
retrieved because Hansu has already ceased to be its principal. Furthermore, it refutes the
allegation of petitioner that he was dismissed because he filed a complaint with the ITF in behalf
of his fellow crew members. It claims that petitioners allegation is a hoax because there is no
showing that the alleged complaint has been received by the ITF and that no action thereon was
ever taken by the ITF.[35]
Private respondent also asserts that petitioner was not
dismissed but that he voluntarily asked for his repatriation. This assertion, however, deserves
scant consideration. It is highly illogical for an employee to voluntarily request for repatriation
and then file a suit for illegal dismissal. As voluntary repatriation is synonymous to resignation,
it is proper to conclude that repatriation is inconsistent with the filing of a complaint for illegal
dismissal.[36] The paramount issue therefore boils down to the validity of petitioners
dismissal, the determination of which generally involves a question of fact. It is not the function
of this Court to assess and evaluate the facts and the evidence again, our jurisdiction being
generally limited to reviewing errors of law that might have been committed by the trial court or
administrative agency. Nevertheless, since the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the
Labor Arbiter are at variance with those of the NLRC, we resolve to evaluate the records and
the evidence presented by the parties.[37]
The validity of an employee's dismissal hinges
on the satisfaction of two substantive requirements, to wit: (1) the dismissal must be for any of
the causes provided for in Article 282 of the Labor Code; and (2) the employee was accorded
due process, basic of which is the opportunity to be heard and to defend himself.[38] The Labor
Arbiter held that petitioners absence during his watch duty when an emergency call was
received from the Japanese port authority that M/V Phoenix Seven was invading other route
constituted neglect of duty, a just cause for terminating an employee. Records reveal that this
information was related to private respondent via two fax messages sent by the captain of M/V
Phoenix Seven. The first fax message dated 18 January 1997 is reproduced below: JUST
RECEIVED PHONE CALL FROM MASTER N C/OFFICER THAT THEY DECIDED TO
DISCHARGE 2/OFFICER AT OSAKA PORT. DUE TO MIS-BEHAVIOUR N RESEST [SIC] TO
OFFICIAL ORDER. CAPT. HAD RECEIVED EMERGENCY WARNING CALL FROM JAPAN
BISAN SETO NAIKAI RADIO AUTHORITY THAT SHIP IS INVADING OTHER ROUTE. SO, HE
WAS SURPRISED N CAME TO BRIDGE N FOUND 2/O NOT CARRY OUT HIS WATCH DUTY.

MASTER SCOLD HIM ABOUT THIS N CORRECT HIS ERROR BUT HE RESIST [SIC] THAT
HE IS RIGHT AND THEN SAID THAT HE WILL COME BACK HOME. FURTHER MORE HE
ASKED MASTER TO PAY HIM I.T.F. WAGE SCALE. MASTER N/CIO STRONGLY ASKED US
HIS REPATRIATION WITH I.E.U. PLS. CONFIRM YOUR OPINION ON THIS HAPPENING.[39]
The second fax message dated 20 January 1997 pertained to a report of crew discharge
essentially containing the same information as the first fax message. The Court of Appeals
treated these fax messages as part of the res gestae proving neglect of duty on the part of
petitioner.
Section 42 of Rule 130[40] of the Rules of Court mentions two acts which form part of the res
gestae, namely: spontaneous statements and verbal acts. In spontaneous exclamations, the
res gestae is the startling occurrence, whereas in verbal acts, the res gestae are the statements
accompanying the equivocal act.[41] We find that the fax messages cannot be deemed part of
the res gestae. To be admissible under the first class of res gestae, it is required that: (1) the
principal act be a startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made before the declarant had
the time to contrive or devise a falsehood; and (3) that the statements must concern the
occurrence in question and its immediate attending circumstances.[42] Assuming that
petitioners negligencewhich allegedly caused the ship to deviate from its courseis the
startling occurrence, there is no showing that the statements contained in the fax messages
were made immediately after the alleged incident. In addition, no dates have been mentioned
to determine if these utterances were made spontaneously or with careful deliberation. Absent
the critical element of spontaneity, the fax messages cannot be admitted as part of the res
gestae of the first kind. Neither will the second kind of res gestae apply. The requisites for its
admissibility are: (1) the principal act to be characterized must be equivocal; (2) the equivocal
act must be material to the issue; (3) the statement must accompany the equivocal act; and (4)
the statements give a legal significance to the equivocal act.[43] Petitioners alleged absence
from watch duty is simply an innocuous act or at least proved to be one. Assuming arguendo
that such absence was the equivocal act, it is nevertheless not accompanied by any statement
more so by the fax statements adverted to as parts of the res gestae. No date or time has been
mentioned to determine whether the fax messages were made simultaneously with the
purported equivocal act. Furthermore, the material contents of the fax messages are unclear.
The matter of route encroachment or invasion is questionable. The ship master, who is the
author of the fax messages, did not witness the incident. He obtained such information only
from the Japanese port authorities. Verily, the messages can be characterized as double
hearsay. In any event, under Article 282 of the Labor Code,[44] an employer may terminate an
employee for gross and habitual neglect of duties. Neglect of duty, to be a ground for
dismissal, must be both gross and habitual. Gross negligence connotes want of care in the
performance of ones duties. Habitual neglect implies repeated failure to perform ones duties
for a period of time, depending upon the circumstances. A single or isolated act of negligence
does not constitute a just cause for the dismissal of the employee.[45]
Petitioners
supposed absence from watch duty in a single isolated instance is neither gross nor habitual
negligence. Without question, the alleged lapse did not result in any untoward incident. If there
was any serious aftermath, the incident should have been recorded in the ships logbook and
presented by private respondent to substantiate its claim. Instead, private respondent belittled
the probative value of the logbook and dismissed it as self-serving. Quite the contrary, the

ships logbook is the repository of all activities and transactions on board a vessel. Had the
route invasion been so serious as to merit petitioners dismissal, then it would have been
recorded in the logbook. Private respondent would have then had all the more reason to
preserve it considering that vital pieces of information are contained therein. In Haverton
Shipping Ltd. v. NLRC,[46] the Court held that the vessels logbook is an official record of entries
made by a person in the performance of a duty required by law.[47] In Abacast Shipping and
Management Agency, Inc. v. NLRC,[48] a case cited by petitioner, the logbook is a respectable
record that can be relied upon to authenticate the charges filed and the procedure taken against
the employees prior to their dismissal.[49] In Wallem Maritime Services, Inc. v. NLRC,[50] the
logbook is a vital evidence as Article 612 of the Code of Commerce requires the ship captain to
keep a record of the decisions he had adopted as the vessel's head.[51] Therefore, the nonpresentation of the logbook raises serious doubts as to whether the incident did happen at all.
In termination cases, the burden of proving just or valid cause for dismissing an employee rests
on the employer.[52] Private respondent miserably failed to discharge this burden.
Consequently, the petitioners dismissal is illegal. We also note that private respondent failed
to comply with the procedural due process requirement for terminating an employee. Such
requirement is not a mere formality that may be dispensed with at will. Its disregard is a matter
of serious concern since it constitutes a safeguard of the highest order in response to man's
innate sense of justice. The Labor Code does not, of course, require a formal or trial type
proceeding before an erring employee may be dismissed. This is especially true in the case of a
vessel on the ocean or in a foreign port. The minimum requirement of due process in
termination proceedings, which must be complied with even with respect to seamen on board a
vessel, consists of notice to the employees intended to be dismissed and the grant to them of
an opportunity to present their own side of the alleged offense or misconduct, which led to the
management's decision to terminate. To meet the requirements of due process, the employer
must furnish the worker sought to be dismissed with two written notices before termination of
employment can be legally effected, i.e., (1) a notice which apprises the employee of the
particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought; and (2) the subsequent notice
after due hearing which informs the employee of the employers decision to dismiss him.[53]
Private respondents sole reliance on the fax messages in dismissing petitioner is clearly
insufficient as these messages were addressed only to itself. No notice was ever given to
petitioner apprising him in writing of the particular acts showing neglect of duty. Neither was he
informed of his dismissal from employment. Petitioner was never given an opportunity to
present his side. The failure to comply with the two-notice rule only aggravated respondents
liability on top of dismissing petitioner without a valid cause. Pursuant to Section 10 of Republic
Act No. 8042[54] or the Migrant Workers Act, employees who are unjustly dismissed from work
are entitled to an amount representing their three (3) months salary considering that their
employment contract has a term of exactly one (1) year plus a full refund of his placement fee,
with interest at 12% per annum.[55] IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is
GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Decision of the NLRC is REINSTATED with the MODIFICATION that in addition to the
payment of the sum equivalent to petitioners three (3) months salary, the full amount of
placement fee with 12% legal interest must be refunded.

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------59. EDGAR GERASTA Y LAPUS, Petitioner, - versus - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondent. G.R. No. 176981 December 24, 2008
D E C I S I O N CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court assails the Decision[1] dated 9 November 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CR No. 21549 which affirmed in toto the Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Cebu, Branch 11, finding petitioner Edgar L. Gerasta (Edgar) guilty of the crime of homicide. On
31 March 1981, Edgar was charged before the RTC with the crime of Homicide under Article
249 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. The accusatory portion of the Information reads:
That on the 9th day of March 1980 at 6:30 oclock in the evening, more or less, in the
Municipality of San Fernando, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with deliberate intent to kill by means of treachery
and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack and
shoot DEOGRACIAS RENDAL, a barangay police, with the use of a firearm, thereby inflicting
upon the latter mortal wounds which caused his death shortly thereafter.[3] It appeared from the
same set of facts Edgar was also separately charged with the crime of Illegal Possession of
Firearms and Ammunitions. Since the homicide and the illegal possession cases arose from the
same alleged incident, the RTC ordered the consolidation of these two cases. During the
arraignment on 28 July 1981, Edgar, with the assistance of counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty.
[4] A joint trial on the merits ensued thereafter. Six witnesses for the prosecution took the
witness stand, namely: (1) Alberto Loquez (Alberto), brother-in-law of the victim Deogracias
Rendal (Deogracias), who allegedly witnessed the shooting incident involving the purported
assailant Edgar and the victim; (2) Teresita Rendal (Teresita), the wife of the late Deogracias,
who also testified that she saw the victim fire at by Edgar who was by the window of his house
pointing a gun at Deogracias on the road below; (3) Modesto Reyes (Modesto), who testified
that he heard a gunshot that prompted him to look out of the window; (4) Patrolman Isidro
Duterte (Patrolman Duterte), one of the responding police officers; (5) Patrolman Adriano
Empacis (Patrolman Empacis), the other responding officer; and (6) Dr. Arturo Llenes (Dr.
Llenes), a physician of Southern Island Hospital, Cebu City, who conducted the autopsy on the
corpse of the victim. The following exhibits were formally offered by the prosecution: (1) Exhibit
A Affidavit of Alberto dated 19 March 1980; (2) Exhibit B Order issued by the Assistant
Provincial Fiscal for the conduct of the Preliminary Investigation; (3) Exhibit C Joint Affidavit
of Patrolmen Duterte and Empacis; (4) Exhibit D the revolver allegedly used in killing the
victim; (5) Exhibit E Autopsy Report issued by Dr. Llenes; (6) Exhibit F Death Certificate
of Deogracias; (6) Exhibit G a photograph of the crime scene; (7) Exhibit H another
photograph of the vicinity of the crime scene; (8) Exhibit I three live bullets taken from the
revolver; (9) Exhibit J Sketch of the staircase of the house of Edgar drawn by patrolman
Duterte, in which the victim was found by the responding police officers; and (10) Exhibit K a
copy of the Police Blotter of the incident. Taken together, the evidence offered by the
prosecution shows that at around 6:30 in the evening of 9 March 1980, Alberto, brother-in-law of
Deogracias, was in the sala of his house when he heard a gunshot.[5] The same sound was
heard by Teresita, who was standing beside the road facing the house of Edgar and Modesto, at
a nearby store buying cigarettes.[6] After hearing the shot, Alberto immediately went to the
window of his house and saw Edgar across the road, by the window of his house pointing a gun

at Deogracias, who was lying beside the road. With the gun pointed at Deogracias, Edgar fired
for the second time.[7] Simultaneously, Teresita looked at the direction of the gunshot and saw
Edgar aiming his gun at Deogracias and shooting the latter.[8] For his part, Modesto went out of
the store following the second shot, and saw Deograciass body lying face down.[9] Both
Alberto and Modesto spotted Quirino Gerasta (Quirino), Edgars brother, emerge from the dark
and approach the victim. Edgar asked his brother, Brod, unsa buhi pa na? (Brother, is he still
alive?) to which Qurino answered in the affirmative.[10] Edgar went down towards the victim.
As the gunshots attracted several people from the neighborhood, Edgar, with his gun in his
hands, shouted at them: Who will complain, I will shoot him next.[11] Then, the two brothers
brought the body to the balcony of Edgars house and dropped the same at the stairs.[12] The
body fell at the foot of the staircase.[13] Having received a report of the incident, Patrolman
Duterte and Patrolman Empacis hastily proceeded to the house of Edgar where they saw the
wounded victim at the foot of the staircase, still breathing but unable to talk.[14] Edgar
approached Patrolman Duterte and surrendered his gun saying, This is the gun I used in
shooting [Deogracias].[15] The policemen also observed bloodstain on the road near the
house of Edgar.[16] The victim was brought to Southern Islands Hospital in Cebu City where he
succumbed to the gunshot wounds he sustained. The following day, Dr. Llenes conducted an
autopsy on the corpse of Deogracias, in which she found two gunshot wounds, one in the left
thigh and the other in the head.[17] He observed that the wound in the head was fatal, as it
severed the brain tissues.[18] He then concluded that the ultimate cause of the victims death
was the destruction of the brain secondary to a gunshot wound.[19] The certificate of death
prepared and signed by Dr. Llenes states: CAUSE OF DEATH x x x. Cardio pulmonary arrest
due toIntracranial Injury due to Gunshot Wound, Head, penetrating, perforating.[20] The
defense, on the other hand, advanced the theory that the death of Deogracias was not through
the fault of Edgar, since the former pointed a gun at the latter, and the two grappled for
possession of the gun when it accidentally fired, hitting the victim in the process. The defense
put up self-defense. To buttress this theory, the defense presented Edgar, Quirino and the
following witnesses: (1) Miriam Gerasta, the wife of the alleged assailant, who corroborated her
husbands testimony that the death of the victim was purely an accident; (2) Ismael Barredo, an
alleged eyewitness to the incident; (3) Dr. Tomas Refe, senior medico-legal officer, National
Bureau of Investigation, Visayas Regional Office, Cebu City. He testified that based on the
trajectory of the wounds of the victim, the assailant was at the right side and obliquely in front of
the victim. On the witness stand, Edgar testified that at around 6:30 p.m. of 9 March 1980, while
he was in the sala of his house, together with his wife, he heard Deogracias by the roadside
challenging him to a fight.[21] Initially, Edgar did not mind it. But when Deogracias got near his
house and was about to go up, Edgar allegedly approached him. There, Deogracias
purportedly pointed a gun at Edgar. Edgar parried Deogracias hand which held the gun. The
two wrestled for possession of the gun. In the course thereof, the gun fired twice. Following the
second burst of gunfire, Deogracias fell on the stairs. Edgar ran inside the house. At once, his
brother Quirino arrived. Quirino asked Edgar why Deogracias challenged him to a fight. Edgar
answered he did not know the reason for Deograciass actuations. He also asked Quirino to call
the police authorities. Patrolmen Duterte and Empacis arrived. Edgar handed over the gun to
patrolman Duterte and told him it was the gun which he had taken from Deogracias, and that the
same fired when they wrestled for its control.[22] Witness Miriam Gerasta confirmed what Edgar

testified to. She added that at one point, Edgar embraced Deogracias to gain control of the gun.
On his part, Ismael Barredo (Ismael) testified that while he was on his way home from the
cockpit, he met Deogracias who was drunk and challenging everybody to a fight. Ismael
allegedly advised Deogracias to go home but the latter, instead of heeding his advice,
threatened the former with a revolver. As Deogracias was walking, Ismael kept an eye on him.
When Deogracias reached the place of Edgar, he challenged the latter to a duel. Deogracias
went up the stairs and reached the porch, where the two battled for the control of the revolver.
He heard two bursts of gunfire and saw Deogracias fall on the stairs. Quirino testified that on
the evening in question, someone informed him that Deogracias was daring his brother Edgar to
a fight. Upon hearing this, he allegedly ran the 150-meter distance that separated his house
from that of Edgar. As he was nearing, he saw his brother and Deogracias wrestling at the
porch. Two gunshots were fired. Deogracias fell down the stairs. He asked his brother why
Deogracias was shot. Edgar answered he shot Deogracias because he came upstairs with a
gun.[23] On the witness stand, Dr. Thomas Refe gave his opinion on the result of the autopsy
on the victim made by Dr. Llenes. He opined that the gunshot wounds could be inflicted within
the span of two seconds if the contesting parties would be grappling for the possession of the
gun. As to the relative position of the victim and the assailant, he also said that the gunshot
wound in the head could have been inflicted by an assailant firing the gun at the right side and
at the back of Deogracias. Dr. Llenes was again presented by the prosecution on rebuttal. He
testified that from the trajectory of the bullet as shown by the gunshot wound in the head, it was
possible that the assailant could have been on an elevated place with the victim below when
fired at.[24] In a decision dated 8 November 1996, the RTC found Edgar guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide. He was, however, acquitted of the charge of illegal
possession. The dispositive portion of the RTC decision convicting Edgar reads: WHEREFORE,
in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by the Court x x x finding the
accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide and, taking into account the
rules on mitigating and aggravating circumstances and applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, hereby sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of eight (8)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as the minimum of it, to fourteen (14) years and eight
(8) months of reclusion temporal, as the maximum thereof. The accused is hereby given full
credit for the preventive imprisonment that he may have suffered. The accused is also hereby
ordered by the Court to indemnify the heirs of Deogracias Rendal in the sum of Fifty Thousand
Pesos (P50,000.00) as death indemnity and the sum of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00)
as reimbursement of the funeral expenses defrayed by them.[25] Edgar appealed the RTC
decision to the Court of Appeals. In a decision dated 9 November 2005, the Court of Appeals
affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC. The judgment provides: WHEREFORE, the instant
appeal is DENIED for lack of merit. The decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City,
Branch 11, in Criminal Case No. CU-9248 is AFFIRMED in toto.[26] Hence, the instant case.
Edgar assails the RTCs and the Court of Appeals findings which gave weight and credence to
the accounts of the incident given by prosecution witnesses Alberto and Teresita. Edgar
contends that said prosecution witnesses never made unequivocal declarations that they
actually witnessed him hitting the victim with a revolver. He points out that the same witnesses
did not categorically state what happened prior to the first burst of gunfire, thereby creating
doubt on his involvement in the slaughter of Deogracias. He also insists that the lower courts

should not have accorded belief to the testimonies of Alberto and Teresita, since they were
closely related to the victim. Furthermore, Edgar questions Albertos belated act of coming
forward as a witness. The elemental question in this case is the credibility of the parties and
their witnesses. Well-entrenched is the rule that the matter of assigning values to declarations
on the witness stand is best and most competently performed by the trial judge who, unlike
appellate magistrates, can weigh such testimony in light of the declarants demeanor, conduct
and position to discriminate between truth and falsehood.[27] This is especially true when the
trial courts findings have been affirmed by the appellate court, because said findings are
generally conclusive and binding upon this Court, unless it be manifestly shown that the latter
court had overlooked or disregarded arbitrarily the facts and circumstances of significance in the
case.[28] The RTC and the Court of Appeals did not overlook any significant facts in the case.
In no uncertain terms, the prosecutions eyewitnesses, Alberto and Teresita, were in unison in
pointing to Edgar as the person who gunned down the victim. They were able to identify Edgar
as the perpetrator, since the crime scene was illuminated by an electric bulb perched on an
electric post. Teresita testified as follows: Q:
And you remember that your attention was
focused on the residence of the accused in this case? A:
At first I did not give attention to
the house of the accused because my purpose of going out was to get the scattered firewood,
but upon hearing the explosion that was the time I focused my attention to the house of the
accused Q:
When your attention was invited by the sudden explosion that you heard at that
time, who was the first person you have seen in the direction where the explosion was? A:
After hearing the explosion, I look back toward the house of the accused and I saw Edgar
Gerasta holding a gun pointing the said gun to my husband who was wounded in front of his
house, that was after the first explosion. Q:
You therefore agree with me that you have
witnessed the particular moment that the accused of theses cases had shot your husband. I am
referring to the first explosion that you made mention? A:
I saw the accused fired the gun
to my husband because the accused was in the window of his house, because upon hearing the
explosion, I look back to the house of the accused, so I saw the accused holding and pointing
the gun to my husband. Q
After hearing the explosion, how many seconds did you turn
your head to the place where the explosion was? A:
More or less five seconds. Q:
And
at that right moment, you have also seen the accused standing at the side of the window of his
residence? A:
Yes, I saw the accused standing by the window of his house still holding the
gun and pointing the said gun to my husband. Q:
At the time you were standing beside the
road fronting the house of the accused? Q:
Yes, I was standing at the place fronting the
house of the accused because I wanted to see what Edgar Gerasta would do to my husband. Q:
Are you familiar with the residence of Edgar Gerasta? A:
Yes, sir, because the house of the
accused to my house is only more or less two meters away.[29] Teresita unmistakably
perceived the incident as it was unfolding, because it happened within her view, unimpeded by
any obstruction. Her house was just across the road from that of the assailant. The electric
light from the electric post located so close to the crime scene adequately lit up the place. Thus,
the incident could not have escaped her attention, because she was just a few meters away
from the assailant. Alberto, who was more or less 10 meters away from where the assailant
was, recalled the incident in this manner: Q:
How far is that house of Edgar Gerasta from
your house? A:
About 10 or 15 meters. x x x x Q:
On March 9, 1980, at about 6:30 in
the evening, where were you if you can recall? A:
I was in the sala of my house. Q:
At

about such time and on such date, could you recall if there was an unusual incident that
happened? A:
At that precise moment, 6:30 in the evening, I heard an explosion which
prompted me to look out of the window and I saw Edgar Gerasta by the window of his house
pointing a gun to the body of Deogracias Rendal lying down on the ground and he fired for the
second time.
x x x x Q:
Will you explain to this Honorable Court how come you were
able to see Edgar Gerasta by his window when it was already dark at that time? A:
I was
able to see Edgar Gerasta holding his gun pointing at the same time to the body of Deogracias
Rendal already lying on the ground because the electric post that was lighted is near the house
of Edgar Gerasta and my house is only a few meters away from his house. Q:
After [Qurino]
Gerasta, as you said, answered his brother Edgar Gerasta, already dead (patay na), what
transpired next? A:
After that Edgar Gerasta went down, got out of his house and went to
the body of Deogracias Rendal still carrying with him his firearm and when he was near the
body of Deogracias Rendal he made announcement, saying: Whoever is aggrieved, I will shoot
him. Then he carried the dead body of Deogracias Rendal to his house.
x x x x Q:
Mr. Witness, could you tell use what happened after that? A:
Not long after that the
policemen arrived so I went down and I saw Edgar Gerasta surrendering his firearm to the
policemen x x x. Q:
You said policemen, how many policemen were there? A:
Two
policemen. Q:
What are their names? A:
Pat. Empacis and Pat. Isidro Duterte.[30]
Although Teresita and Alberto may not have witnessed Edgar pull the trigger for the first time,
they were able to see him pointing the gun at the victim just a second or two following the first
gunfire. This fact alone would have undoubtedly pinned Edgar as the assailant. But there is
more. The two witnesses actually saw him fire the second shot aimed at the victim. Taking pride
in his violent feat, he even challenged and threatened to kill anyone who might disapprove of
what he just did. Moments later when the policemen arrived, Edgar surrendered to the police
officers the gun which he admitted he used in shooting the victim. What further militates against
Edgars claim is that by raising self-defense, he admitted he shot the victim and inflicted on him
the two gunshot wounds. Unfortunately for him, from the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses, it is readily clear that the first requisite of self-defense is wanting. The victim was
standing by the road in front of Edgars house. Edgar was by the window and fired at the victim.
Unlawful aggression on the part of the victim was totally absent. Granting arguendo that the
victim shouted and challenged Edgar to a fight, such act would not have constituted unlawful
aggression so as to justify Edgars taking away the victims life. First, the victim was unarmed.
How could he possibly inflict any harm on Edgar who was armed with a gun? The version of the
defense detailing the manner in which he supposedly defended himself from the assault of the
victim is hard to believe. He claims that he and the victim, whom he claimed to be drunk,
struggled for possession of the gun allegedly owned by the latter. According to him, in the
course of the struggle, the victim who was noticeably of smaller build than Edgar was
accidentally hit by the gunshot and fell from the stairs. What is odd is that if the first shot hit the
victim and caused him to fall down, why did the victim sustain another gunshot wound from a
different bullet? The nature and number of injuries likewise make Edgars defense highly
suspect. If indeed they were wresting control of the gun, it defies logic why the victim suffered
one gunshot wound in the head and another in the thigh. With this frail evidence adduced by
Edgar to support self-defense, juxtaposed with the strong and convincing evidence of the
prosecution, his conviction is ineluctably forthcoming. Edgar is clutching at straws in making an

issue out of the delay on the part of Alberto to report that he witnessed the incident. There is no
standard form of behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange, startling, frightful
or traumatic experience -- some may shout, some may faint, and some may be shocked into
insensibility.[31] Different people react differently to a given stimulus or type of situation.[32]
Edgar had sufficiently explained his delay in reporting the crime: that he was shocked, as it was
his first time to witness an actual killing.[33] The relationship of witnesses Alberto and Teresita to
the victim did not impair the credibility of their testimonies, absent any showing that they had
improper motives. On the contrary, since they were closely related to the victim, their natural
instinct would be to help bring the real culprit to justice. Hence, it would make them more
believable, as it would be unnatural for them, who are interested in vindicating the crime to
impute it to somebody other than the real culprit.[34] To blame an innocent man for the killing of
the victim would serve them no purpose.[35] In fine, this Court defers to the findings of the trial
court, which were affirmed by the Court of Appeals, there being no cogent reason to veer away
from such findings. The mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should be considered in
Edgars favor. The evidence shows that Edgar surrendered to a person in authority on the day
of the incident. This fact was not contested by the prosecution. Under Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code, homicide is punishable by reclusion temporal. Taking into account the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, and the fact that no aggravating circumstance
attended the commission of the crime, the maximum penalty of the Indeterminate Sentence Law
should be imposed in its minimum period pursuant to Article 64(2) of the Revised Penal Code,
which ranges from 12 years and 1 day to 14 years and 8 months. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the minimum of the imposable penalty shall be taken from the full range of the
penalty next lower in degree, i.e, prision mayor or from 6 years and one day to 12 years. The
RTC imposed on Edgar the indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal, as
maximum. The penalty imposed by the trial court was within the prescribed range; hence, we
sustain it. The RTC also awarded P50,000.00 as death indemnity and the amount of Twenty
Thousand Pesos P20,000.00 for funeral expenses. The RTC awarded P20,000.00 for funeral
expenses incurred by the victims heirs. However, in People v. Dela Cruz,[36] it was held that
when actual damages proven by receipts during the trial amount to less than P25,000.00, as in
the present case, the award of temperate damages for P25,000.00 is justified, in lieu of actual
damages for a lesser amount. This Court ratiocinated that it would be anomalous and unfair
that the heirs of a victim who tried and succeeded in proving actual damages amounting to less
than P25,000.00 would be in a worse situation than another who might have presented no
receipts at all but would be entitled to P25,000.00 as temperate damages. Hence, in lieu of the
actual damages, the heirs of the victim are entitled to P25,000.00 as temperate damages. In
addition, the heirs of the victim are also entitled to P50,000.00 as moral damages in line with
recent jurisprudence.[37]
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 9
November 2005, which affirmed the 8 November 1996 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Cebu, Branch 11, finding Edgar L. Gerasta GUILTY of the crime of Homicide, is hereby
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS that Edgar L. Gerasta is also ordered to pay the heirs of the
victim P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as temperate damages, in lieu of the
award of funeral expenses.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sec. 43 - Entries in the course of business

60. VIRGILIO SAPIO, Petitioner, - versus - UNDALOC CONSTRUCTION and/or ENGR.
CIRILO UNDALOC, Respondents.
G.R. No. 155034
May 22, 2008 D E C I S I O N
TINGA, J.: Assailed in this Petition for Review[1] is the Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals[3] in
CA-G.R. SP No. 66449 deleting the award of salary differential and attorneys fees to petitioner
Virgilio Sapio, as well as the Resolution[4] denying his motion for reconsideration. The
controversy started with a complaint filed by petitioner against Undaloc Construction and/or
Engineer Cirilo Undaloc for illegal dismissal, underpayment of wages and nonpayment of
statutory benefits. Respondent Undaloc Construction, a single proprietorship owned by Cirilo
Undaloc, is engaged in road construction business in Cebu City. Petitioner had been employed
as watchman from 1 May 1995 to 30 May 1998 when he was terminated on the ground that the
project he was assigned to was already finished, he being allegedly a project employee.
Petitioner asserted he was a regular employee having been engaged to perform works which
are usually necessary or desirable in respondents business. He claimed that from 1 May to
31 August 1995 and from 1 September to 31 December 1995, his daily wage rate was only
P80.00 and P90.00, respectively, instead of P121.87 as mandated by Wage Order No. ROVII03. From 1 March 1996 to 30 May 1998, his daily rate was P105.00. He further alleged that he
was made to sign two payroll sheets, the first bearing the actual amount he received wherein his
signature was affixed to the last column opposite his name, and the second containing only his
name and signature. To buttress this allegation, petitioner presented the payroll sheet covering
the period from 4 to 10 December 1995 in which the entries were written in pencil. He also
averred that his salary from 18 to 30 May 1998 was withheld by respondents.[5]
For its
part, respondent Cirilo Undaloc maintained that petitioner was hired as a project employee on 1
May 1995 and was assigned as watchman from one project to another until the termination of
the project on 30 May 1998.[6] Refuting the claim of underpayment, respondent presented the
payroll sheets from 2 September to 8 December 1996, 26 May to 15 June 1997, and 12 January
to 31 May 1998.[7]
On 12 July 1999, the Labor Arbiter[8] rendered a decision the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in the [sic] light of the foregoing,
judgment is rendered finding complainant to be a project employee and his termination was for
an authorized cause. However, respondent is found liable to pay complainants salary of
P2,648.45 and 13th month pay of P2,489.00. Respondent is also found liable to pay
complainants salary differential in the amount of P24,902.88. Attorneys fee of P3,000.00 is
also awarded.
All other claims are dismissed for lack of merit.[9]
Respondents appealed the award of salary differential to the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC). In a Decision[10] dated 28 August 2000, the NLRC sustained the findings
of the Labor Arbiter.
Respondents elevated the case to the Court of Appeals which
deleted the award of salary differential and attorneys fees.
Thus, this petition for review.
Petitioner raises two grounds, one procedural and the other substantive. On the procedural
aspect, petitioner contends that the appellate court erred in failing to dismiss respondents
petition for certiorari brought before it on the ground that respondents failed to attach certified
true copies of the NLRCs decision and resolution denying the motion for reconsideration.[11]
In his Comment on the Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Temporary Restraining and/or

Preliminary Injunction[12] filed with the Court of Appeals on 22 November 2001, petitioner did
not raise this procedural issue. Neither did he do so when he moved for reconsideration of the 8
May 2002 Decision of the Court of Appeals. It is only now before this Court that petitioner
proffered the same. This belated submission spells doom for petitioner. More fundamentally, an
examination of the Court of Appeals rollo belies petitioner as it confirms that the alleged missing
documents were in fact attached to the petition. [13]
That petitioner was a project
employee became a non-issue beginning with the decision of the Labor Arbiter. Contested still
is his entitlement to salary differential, apart from attorneys fees.
Petitioner avers that he
was paid a daily salary way below the minimum wage provided for by law.[14] His claim of
salary differential represents the difference between the daily wage he actually received and the
statutory minimum wage, which he presented as follows: Actual Daily Wage Received (for 8
hours worked Minimum Daily Wage Provided by Law (for 8 hours worked)5-1-95 to 8-31-95
Place of Assignment:P80.00 plus 3 hrs. OTM.J. Cuenco-Imus Road LinkP121.87
9-1-95 to 12-31-95Place of Assignment:P90.00 plus 3 hrs. OTP121.87
1-1-96 to 2-28-96Place of Assignment:P90.00 plus 3 hrs. OTP131.00
3-1-96 to 6-30-96Place of Assignment:P105.00 plus 3 hrs. OTP131.00
7-1-96 to 9-30-96Place of Assignment:P105.00 plus 3 hrs. OTP136.00
10-1-96 to 3-14-97Place of Assignment:P105.00 plus 3 hrs. OTP141.00
3-15-97 to 6-30-97Place of Assignment:P105.00 plus 3 hrs. OTP141.00
7-1-97 to 9-30-97Place of Assignment:P105.00 plus 3 hrs. OTP150.00
10-1-97 to 3-31-98Place of Assignment:P105.00 plus 3 hrs. OTP150.00
4-1-98 to 5-17-98Place of Assignment:P105.00 plus 3 hrs. OTP155.00
5-18-98 to 5-30-98Place of Assignment:P105.00 plus 3 hrs. OTP160.00
To counter
petitioners assertions, respondents submitted typewritten and signed payroll sheets from 2
September to 8 December 1996, from 26 May to 15 June 1997, and from 12 January to 31 May
1998.[15] These payroll sheets clearly indicate that petitioner did receive a daily salary of
P141.00.
In turn, petitioner presented the December 1995 payroll sheet written in
pencil[16] in tandem with the assertion that he, together with his co-employees, was required to
sign two sets of payroll sheets in different colors: white, which bears the actual amount he
received with his signature affixed in the last column opposite his name, and yellow, where only
his name appears thereon with his signature also affixed in the last column opposite his name.
[17] In the December 1995 payroll sheet, petitioner appears to have received P90.00 only as
his daily salary but he did not sign the same.
Banking on the fact that the December
1995 payroll sheet was written in pencil, the Labor Arbiter concluded that the entries were
susceptible to change or erasure and that that susceptibility in turn rendered the other payroll
sheets though typewritten less credible. Thus:
x x x Complainants allegation that he
was made to sign two (2) payrolls, the first page bears the actual amount he received when he
affixed his signature in the last column and the original with entries written in pencil is admitted
by the respondent that it did so. When respondent had his payrolls prepared in pencil, the
tendency is that the entries therein will be erased and changed them so that it would appear that
the salaries of the workers are in conformity with the law.
The explanation given
by the respondent through the affidavit of Jessica Labang that the payrolls were first written in
pencil because of the numerous employees to be paid each Saturday, is not acceptable. The
efforts done in preparing the payroll in pencil is practically the same if it was done in ballpen or

through typewriters. Obviously, the purpose is to circumvent the law. When payrolls are
prepared in pencil, it is so easy for the employer to alter the amounts actually paid to the
workers and make it appear that the amounts paid to the workers are in accord with law. The
probative value of the payrolls submitted by the respondent becomes questionable, thus, cannot
be given weight. It is most likely that the entries in the payrolls are no longer the same entries
when complainant signed them. Complainant is therefore entitled to salary differential as
complainants salary was only P105.00. x x x[18]
Thereupon, the Labor Arbiter
proceeded to grant petitioners salary differential to the tune of P24,902.88.
The Court of
Appeals did not subscribe to the common findings of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC. The
appellate court pointed out that allegations of fraud in the preparation of payroll sheets must be
substantiated by evidence and not by mere suspicions or conjectures, viz:
As a general
rule, factual findings and conclusions drawn by the National Labor Relations Commission are
accorded great weight and respect upon appeal, even finality, as long as they are supported by
substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such
relevant evidence that a reasonable mind would accept as sufficient to support a conclusion. A
suspicion or belief no matter how sincerely felt cannot be a substitute for factual findings
carefully established through an orderly procedure.
The Labor Arbiter merely surmised
and presumed that petitioners had the tendency to alter the entries in the payroll. Albeit the
petitioner admitted that the payrolls were initially made in pencil, the same does not, and must
not be presumed as groundwork for alteration. We find nothing in the proceedings, as well as in
the pleadings submitted, to sustain the Labor Arbiters findings of the alleged tendency to alter
the entries.
It is elementary in this jurisdiction that whoever alleges fraud or mistake
affecting a transaction must substantiate his allegation, since it is presumed that a person takes
ordinary care of his concerns and private transactions have been fair and regular. Persons are
presumed to have taken care of their business.
Absent any indication sufficient enough
to support a conclusion, we cannot uphold the findings of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC.[19]
The conclusion of the Labor Arbiter that entries in the December 1995 payroll sheet could have
been altered is utterly baseless. The claim that the December 1995 payroll sheet was written in
pencil and was thus rendered it prone to alterations or erasures is clearly non sequitur. The
same is true with respect to the typewritten payroll sheets. In fact, neither the Labor Arbiter nor
the NLRC found any alteration or erasure or traces thereat, whether on the pencil-written or
typewritten payroll sheets. Indeed, the most minute examination will not reveal any tampering.
Furthermore, if there is any adverse conclusion as regards the December 1995 payroll sheet, it
must be confined only to it and cannot be applied to the typewritten payroll sheets.
Moreover, absent any evidence to the contrary, good faith must be presumed in this case.
Entries in the payroll, being entries in the course of business, enjoy the presumption of
regularity under Rule 130, Section 43 of the Rules of Court. Hence, while as a general rule, the
burden of proving payment of monetary claims rests on the employer,[20] when fraud is alleged
in the preparation of the payroll, the burden of evidence shifts to the employee and it is
incumbent upon him to adduce clear and convincing evidence in support of his claim.[21]
Unfortunately, petitioners bare assertions of fraud do not suffice to overcome the disputable
presumption of regularity.
While we adhere to the position of the appellate court that
the tendency to alter the entries in the payrolls was not substantiated, we cannot however
subscribe to the total deletion of the award of salary differential and attorneys fees, as it so

ruled.
The Labor Arbiter granted a salary differential of P24,902.88.[22
The
Labor Arbiter erred in his computation. He fixed the daily wage rate actually received by
petitioner at P105.00[23] without taking into consideration the P141.00 rate indicated in the
typewritten payroll sheets submitted by respondents. Moreover, the Labor Arbiter misapplied
the wage orders[24] when he wrongly categorized respondent as falling within the first category.
Based on the stipulated number of employees and audited financial statements,[25]
respondents should have been covered by the second category. To avoid further delay in the
disposition of this case which is not in consonance with the objective of speedy justice, we have
to adjudge the rightful computation of the salary differential based on the applicable wage
orders. After all, the supporting records are complete.
This Court finds that from 1
January to 30 August 1996 and 1 July 1997 to 31 May 1998, petitioner had received a wage
less than the minimum mandated by law. Therefore, he is entitled to a salary differential. For
the periods from 30 May to 31 December 1995 and 2 September 1996 to 30 June 1997,
petitioner had received the correct wages. To illustrate:
Date.
Wage
actually received Statutory Minimum wage Differential30 May 31 December. 1995.
P105.00
P99.00[26]
0
1 January 30 June 1996 (156 days). P105.00. P125.00[27] P20.00/day or P3120.001 July
30 August 1996 (52 days) P105.00 P130.00[28]P25.00/day or P1300.002 30 September 1996
P141.00[29]bP130.00[30 01 October 1996- 15 March 1997 P141.00 P135.00[31] 016 March
30 June 1997 P141.00 P139.00[32] 01 July 30 September 1997 (78 days) P141.00
P144.00[33] P3.00/day or P234.001 October 1997- 31 March 1998 (156
days)P141.00,P149.00[34] P8.00/day or P1248.001 April 31 May 1998 (52 days) P141.00
P154.00[35] P13.00/day or P676.00
The total salary differential that petitioner is lawfully
entitled to amounts to P6,578.00 However, pursuant to Section 12 of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
6727, as amended by R.A. No. 8188. Respondents are required to pay double the amount
owed to petitioner, bringing their total liability to P13,156.00.
Section 12. Any person,
corporation, trust, firm, partnership, association or entity which refuses or fails to pay any of the
prescribed increases or adjustments in the wage rates made in accordance with this Act shall be
punished by a fine not less than Twenty-five thousand pesos (P25,000.00) nor more than One
hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or imprisonment of not less than two (2) years nor more
than four (4) years, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court: Provided,
That any person convicted under this Act shall not be entitled to the benefits provided for under
the Probation Law.
The employer concerned shall be ordered to pay an amount
equivalent to double the unpaid benefits owing to the employees: Provided, That payment of
indemnity shall not absolve the employer from the criminal liability imposable under this Act.
If the violation is committed by a corporation, trust or firm, partnership, association or
any other entity, the penalty of imprisonment shall be imposed upon the entitys responsible
officers, including, but not limited to, the president, vice president, chief executive officer,
general manager, managing director or partner. (Emphasis supplied)
The award of
attorneys fees is warranted under the circumstances of this case. Under Article 2208 of the
New Civil Code, attorney's fees can be recovered in actions for the recovery of wages of
laborers and actions for indemnity under employer's liability laws [36] but shall not exceed 10%
of the amount awarded.[37] The fees may be deducted from the total amount due the winning
party.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. Petitioner is awarded the

salary differential in the reduced amount of P13,156.00 and respondents are directed to pay the
same, as well as ten percent (10%) of the award as attorney's fees.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------61. DONATO C. CRUZ TRADING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS
AND TERESA R. JALANDONI, respondent.
G.R. No. 129189. December 5, 2000
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
seeking to set aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the trial
court dismissing the complaint of petitioner Donato C. Cruz Trading Corp. for lack of sufficient
evidence.On 1 June 1989 private respondent Teresa R. Jalandoni purchased from petitioner
Donato C. Cruz Trading Corporation one hundred (100) bags of Urea Viking Ship fertilizer
valued at P20,800.00. However, despite repeated demands, private respondent failed and
refused to pay her obligation. Consequently, on 8 August 1990 petitioner was constrained to file
a complaint before the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City to collect from private respondent
the amount of her obligation including interests thereon at 14% from June 1, 1989 until fully
paid, plus 25% of the total amount due as and for attorney's fees and liquidated damages.[1]On
7 November 1990, for failure to file her answer, the trial court declared private respondent in
default. Pursuant thereto, petitioner was allowed to present its evidence ex parte consisting of,
among others, the following items: (a) Order Slip dated 31 May 1989, marked as Exh. A; (b)
Charge Invoice No. 0453 dated 1 June 1989, marked as Exh. B; (c) Demand Letter dated 5
March 1990, marked as Exh. C; and, (d) Demand Letter dated 20 July 1990, marked as Exh.
D.[2]On 14 May 1991, the trial court rendered its decision dismissing petitioners complaint for
lack of sufficient evidence.[3] The trial court noted what it perceived to be defects in certain vital
documentary evidence presented by petitioner which justified the dismissal of its complaint.
Pertinent portions of said decision are quoted hereunder:x x x x although there are blank
spaces to indicate who approved and purchased the described articles in this Order Slip, no
names are filled or signed on these spaces except that immediately below the words, five (5)
tons of Urea, the handwritten name of Ma. Teresa R. Jalandoni has been written which was
marked as Exh. A-1 by plaintiff. Added to that, another handwritten words, Payable on June
9th/89 with a purported signature of Manuel Rodriguez and marked Exh. A-2 was appearing
on said space. The Order Slip which had been marked Exh. A did not indicate as to whose
form it belongs except that printed space Charge To, the name of the herein defendant
appears on the Charge Invoice (Exh. B) issued by the plaintiff-corporation. The name of the
defendant as the buyer on credit was handwritten. The blank spaces for the articles had
likewise been handwritten as well as the amount. At the foot thereof, and on the dotted line
under which the word, Authorized Signature is printed, a purported signature of a certain M.
Clavez appears. Furthermore, at the upper immediate right side of the bottom portion and on
top of the printed words, Signature of Customer or representative, an initial of N.S. and an
illegible signature appears. This, the witness for the plaintiff alleged to be a signature of Manuel
Rodriguez. Going further to examine the Registry Return Card for the demand-letter (Exh. C2) addressed to the herein defendant, an illegible signature of the recipient is shown but which
was not identified to be that of the defendant.Correlating this examination to the testimony of Mr.
Cruz in behalf of the plaintiff, there has been no convincing evidence shown that Manuel

Rodriguez was authorized by herein defendant to receive this purchase in her name x x x x
While there may exist a valid unpaid credit account as contended, to impute the indebtedness to
the defendant as testified in this ex-parte presentation of evidence, unfortunately, did not satisfy
the court even to the extent that the herein defendant did not present any evidence to controvert
the same.[4]The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court. It reiterated the
observation of the lower court that petitioner failed to overcome the burden of proof incumbent
upon it in civil cases and to present enough evidence necessary to establish its claim and prove
the obligation of private respondent.[5]Petitioner comes now before us insisting that, contrary to
the finding of respondent court, it has adequately established by a preponderance of evidence
the liability of private respondent. To buttress its stance, petitioner makes a recital in its petition
of the testimonial and documentary evidence which are enumerated hereunder:1) On May 31,
1989, the respondent placed an order with petitioner for five (5) tons of Urea fertilizer, as shown
in the Order Slip made out in her name marked as Exhibit A, bearing her signature marked as
Exhibit A-1, and that of her brother, Manuel Rodriguez, marked as Exhibit A-2. (Pp. 7-11, t.s.n.,
April 25, 1991).2) The Order Slip is in the respondents form. (p. 8, id., id.).3) The signature of
the respondent is familiar to, while the signature of Manuel Rodriguez was made in the
presence of, the witness. (p. 11, id., id).4) On June 1, 1989, the bags of Urea fertilizer valued at
P20,000.00[6] were delivered by the petitioner to the respondent through her said brother,
Manuel Rodriguez, as shown in Charge Invoice No. 0453 made in her name and marked as
Exhibit B and bearing the signature of Manuel Rodriguez marked as Exhibit B-1. (Pp. 11-14, id.,
id.).5) Manuel Rodriguez is the brother of the respondent (pp. 9-10, id., id.), and he was the one
requested by the said respondent to withdraw (p. 10, id., id.) and was the one who withdrew the
100 bags of Urea fertilizer (pp. 11 and 16, id., id.).6) The witness made Manuel Rodriguez sign
the Charge Invoice when he withdrew the 100 bags of fertilizer. (p. 15, id., id.).7) The
respondent failed to pay the value of the respondent. (P. 16, id., id.).8) The petitioner made
telephone calls to the respondent for payment of several occasions and she always promised to
pay but failed to pay. (Id., id., id.).9) On March 5, 1990 and July 20, 1990 demands were made
by the petitioner to the respondent for the payment of the value of the fertilizer purchased by the
respondent as shown in the demand letters sent by the petitioners counsel to her marked as
Exhibits C and D by registered mail as shown by registry receipts marked as Exhibits C-1 and
D-1. (Pp. 16-23, id., id.). 10) The respondent received the demand letter dated March 5, 1990
(Exhibit C) as shown by registry receipt marked and presented as Exhibit C-2. (Pp. 19-20, id.,
id.).11) Despite the letters of demand, the respondent failed to pay for the 100 bags of Urea
fertilizer she purchased from the petitioner (p. 23, id., id.).[7]The sole issue is whether petitioner
by the weight of its evidence has sufficiently established the liability of private respondent to
convince this Court to grant the relief it seeks.As a general rule the findings of fact of the Court
of Appeals are final and conclusive and cannot be reviewed on appeal to the Supreme Court
provided they are amply supported by substantial evidence. Such rule however is not absolute
but is subject to well-established exceptions such as when the Court of Appeals manifestly
overlooked relevant evidence which if considered would probably change the outcome of the
case. We hold that this case falls under such exception.The decision of the trial court as
subsequently affirmed by the Court of Appeals was premised on the supposed failure of the
documentary evidence, particularly the order slip, charge invoice and registry return card for the
demand letter, to either supply material particulars which could establish the identity of the

purchaser of the one hundred (100) bags of fertilizer, or the signatures affixed therein were
unintelligible which cast cloud on the identity of the signatory. For the trial court, this constituted
insufficiency of evidence.We do not agree. Respondent appellate court appears to have
overlooked the fact that business forms, e.g., order slip, delivery charge invoice and the like,
which are issued by the seller in the ordinary course of business are not always fully
accomplished to contain all the necessary information describing in detail the whole business
transaction. In most cases the sales clerk merely indicates a description and the price of each
item sold without bothering to fill up all the available spaces in the receipt or invoice. More often
than not they are accomplished perfunctorily without proper regard to any legal repercussion for
such neglect. Despite their being often incomplete, said business forms are commonly
recognized in ordinary commercial transactions as valid between the parties and at the very
least they serve as an acknowledgment that a business transaction has in fact transpired.
Oftentimes these forms are issued by laymen who, not fully appreciating their legal signification,
prepare them in a slipshod manner. This fact takes more relevance in this case where private
respondent and her husband were long-time clients of petitioner. In the light of the foregoing we
are not inclined to give the forms in question the same standard of construction as formal
documents where the contents are more closely scrutinized and every provision strictly
interpreted.We are not saying that the order slip and the charge invoice are mere scraps of
paper bereft of evidentiary value. By themselves these disputed documents may be inadequate
to establish the case for petitioner. However their probative weight must be evaluated not in
isolation but in conjunction with the other evidence adduced by petitioner, such as the testimony
of Donato Cruz, proprietor of petitioner corporation, and the demand letters. Donato Cruz
testified that on several occasions he called on private respondent demanding payment of the
value of the bags of fertilizer she purchased. Despite her promises, she never performed her
monetary obligation. We believe that the verbal demands coupled with the demand letters
(marked as Exh. C) cannot be ignored in view of the fact that they were never rebutted nor
denied. Neither can we take lightly the testimony of the same witness who averred that he was
familiar with the signature of private respondent who apparently was a long-time client, and that
the signature of Manuel Rodriguez was affixed in his presence. Both the trial court and the
Court of Appeals proffered no reason for disbelieving the aforementioned testimonies.What is
equally telling is the seemingly obdurate resolve by private respondent to altogether disregard
the judicial processes as shown in the following instances: (a) private respondents refusal to
sign the summons as shown by the sheriffs return of service dated 6 September 1990;[8] (b)
her failure to file an answer to the complaint for which reason the lower court declared her in
default; (c) her repeated failure to file a comment on the petition for review which prompted this
Court, through the First Division, to issue several resolutions ordering her to submit the same.
She complied only after the Court declared her guilty of contempt and threatened her with arrest
and imprisonment.This Court cannot countenance the contumacious conduct of private
respondent in trifling with the mandatory processes of the courts. She repeatedly failed to
comply with the order of this Court to file her comment and was prevailed upon to do so only
after her liberty was threatened. There is no question that for continuously disobeying the lawful
orders of the Court private respondent committed indirect contempt which this Court strongly
condemns for it degrades our dignity, wastes our time and abuses the administration of justice.
Lastly, we note that the comment filed by private respondent, after protractedly defying this

Court, failed to raise any defense but merely parroted the arguments of the lower court and for
good measure invoked the general principle that in appeal by certiorari "only questions of law
may be raised."[9] Not making any categorical denial of her liability, private respondent
instead sought refuge in the "haven" of the lower court's findings. We discern a patent design
by private respondent to feign ignorance of petitioner's allegations perhaps in the false hope
that like a bad dream it would just fade away. Such scheme does not sit well with this Court.
Seen in the light of her obstinate refusal to give a satisfactory answer to the complaint despite
many opportunities to do so, we can only interpret her conduct as a feeble attempt to evade the
fulfillment of a just and valid monetary obligation. We cannot give her the satisfaction of a
victory.In view of the foregoing, it is our considered opinion that petitioner has adduced sufficient
amount of evidence to establish its claim and to substantiate and fix the liability of private
respondent.WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated 27 October 1995 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Private respondent Teresa R.
Jalandoni is ordered to pay petitioner Donato C. Cruz Trading Corporation the amount of
P20,800.00 plus interest thereon at 14% per annum from 1 June 1989 until fully paid. She is
likewise ordered to pay 25% of the total amount due as and for attorney's fees and liquidated
damages, and to pay the costs.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Sec. 44 - Entries in official records
62. SR. INSP. JERRY C. VALEROSO, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.G.R. No. 164815
September 3, 2009R E S O L
U T I O NNACHURA, J.:For resolution is the Letter-Appeal1 of Senior Inspector (Sr. Insp.) Jerry
C. Valeroso (Valeroso) praying that our February 22, 2008 Decision2 and June 30, 2008
Resolution3 be set aside and a new one be entered acquitting him of the crime of illegal
possession of firearm and ammunition.The facts are briefly stated as follows:Valeroso was
charged with violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866, committed as follows:That on or about
the 10th day of July, 1996, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused without any authority of
law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his/her possession and under
his/her custody and controlOne (1) cal. 38 "Charter Arms" revolver bearing serial no. 52315 with
five (5) live ammo.without first having secured the necessary license/permit issued by the
proper authorities.CONTRARY TO LAW.4When arraigned, Valeroso pleaded "not guilty."5 Trial
on the merits ensued.During trial, the prosecution presented two witnesses: Senior Police
Officer (SPO)2 Antonio Disuanco (Disuanco) of the Criminal Investigation Division of the Central
Police District Command; and Epifanio Deriquito (Deriquito), Records Verifier of the Firearms
and Explosives Division in Camp Crame. Their testimonies are summarized as follows:On July
10, 1996, at around 9:30 a.m., Disuanco received a Dispatch Order from the desk officer
directing him and three (3) other policemen to serve a Warrant of Arrest, issued by Judge
Ignacio Salvador, against Valeroso for a case of kidnapping with ransom.6After a briefing, the
team conducted the necessary surveillance on Valeroso checking his hideouts in Cavite,
Caloocan, and Bulacan. Eventually, the team members proceeded to the Integrated National
Police (INP) Central Police Station in Culiat, Quezon City, where they saw Valeroso about to
board a tricyle. Disuanco and his team approached Valeroso. They put him under arrest,
informed him of his constitutional rights, and bodily searched him. They found a Charter Arms

revolver, bearing Serial No. 52315, with five (5) pieces of live ammunition, tucked in his waist.7
Valeroso was then brought to the police station for questioning. Upon verification in the Firearms
and Explosives Division in Camp Crame, Deriquito presented a certification8 that the subject
firearm was not issued to Valeroso, but was licensed in the name of a certain Raul Palencia
Salvatierra of Sampaloc, Manila.9On the other hand, Valeroso, SPO3 Agustin R. Timbol, Jr.
(Timbol), and Adrian Yuson testified for the defense. Their testimonies are summarized as
follows:On July 10, 1996, Valeroso was sleeping inside a room in the boarding house of his
children located at Sagana Homes, Barangay New Era, Quezon City. He was awakened by four
(4) heavily armed men in civilian attire who pointed their guns at him and pulled him out of the
room.10 The raiding team tied his hands and placed him near the faucet (outside the room) then
went back inside, searched and ransacked the room. Moments later, an operative came out of
the room and exclaimed, "Hoy, may nakuha akong baril sa loob!"11Disuanco informed Valeroso
that there was a standing warrant for his arrest. However, the raiding team was not armed with a
search warrant.12Timbol testified that he issued to Valeroso a Memorandum Receipt13 dated
July 1, 1993 covering the subject firearm and its ammunition, upon the verbal instruction of Col.
Angelito Moreno.14On May 6, 1998, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 97, Quezon City,
convicted Valeroso as charged and sentenced him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4)
years, two (2) months and one (1) day, as minimum, to six (6) years, as maximum. The gun
subject of the case was further ordered confiscated in favor of the government.15On appeal, the
Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed16 the RTC decision but the minimum term of the indeterminate
penalty was lowered to four (4) years and two (2) months.On petition for review, we affirmed17
in full the CA decision. Valeroso filed a Motion for Reconsideration18 which was denied with
finality19 on June 30, 2008.Valeroso is again before us through this Letter-Appeal20 imploring
this Court to once more take a contemplative reflection and deliberation on the case, focusing
on his breached constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizure.21Meanwhile, as
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) failed to timely file its Comment on Valerosos Motion
for Reconsideration, it instead filed a Manifestation in Lieu of Comment.22In its Manifestation,
the OSG changed its previous position and now recommends Valerosos acquittal. After a
second look at the evidence presented, the OSG considers the testimonies of the witnesses for
the defense more credible and thus concludes that Valeroso was arrested in a boarding house.
More importantly, the OSG agrees with Valeroso that the subject firearm was obtained by the
police officers in violation of Valerosos constitutional right against illegal search and seizure,
and should thus be excluded from the evidence for the prosecution. Lastly, assuming that the
subject firearm was admissible in evidence, still, Valeroso could not be convicted of the crime,
since he was able to establish his authority to possess the gun through the Memorandum
Receipt issued by his superiors.After considering anew Valerosos arguments through his LetterAppeal, together with the OSGs position recommending his acquittal, and keeping in mind that
substantial rights must ultimately reign supreme over technicalities, this Court is swayed to
reconsider.23The Letter-Appeal is actually in the nature of a second motion for reconsideration.
While a second motion for reconsideration is, as a general rule, a prohibited pleading, it is within
the sound discretion of the Court to admit the same, provided it is filed with prior leave
whenever substantive justice may be better served thereby.24This is not the first time that this
Court is suspending its own rules or excepting a particular case from the operation of the rules.
In De Guzman v. Sandiganbayan,25 despite the denial of De Guzmans motion for

reconsideration, we still entertained his Omnibus Motion, which was actually a second motion
for reconsideration. Eventually, we reconsidered our earlier decision and remanded the case to
the Sandiganbayan for reception and appreciation of petitioners evidence. In that case, we said
that if we would not compassionately bend backwards and flex technicalities, petitioner would
surely experience the disgrace and misery of incarceration for a crime which he might not have
committed after all.26 Also in Astorga v. People,27 on a second motion for reconsideration, we
set aside our earlier decision, re-examined the records of the case, then finally acquitted Benito
Astorga of the crime of Arbitrary Detention on the ground of reasonable doubt. And in Sta. Rosa
Realty Development Corporation v. Amante,28 by virtue of the January 13, 2004 En Banc
Resolution, the Court authorized the Special First Division to suspend the Rules, so as to allow
it to consider and resolve respondents second motion for reconsideration after the motion was
heard on oral arguments. After a re-examination of the merits of the case, we granted the
second motion for reconsideration and set aside our earlier decision.Clearly, suspension of the
rules of procedure, to pave the way for the re-examination of the findings of fact and
conclusions of law earlier made, is not without basis.We would like to stress that rules of
procedure are merely tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. They are conceived
and promulgated to effectively aid the courts in the dispensation of justice. Courts are not slaves
to or robots of technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion. In rendering justice, courts have
always been, as they ought to be, conscientiously guided by the norm that, on the balance,
technicalities take a backseat to substantive rights, and not the other way around. Thus, if the
application of the Rules would tend to frustrate rather than to promote justice, it would always be
within our power to suspend the rules or except a particular case from its operation.29Now on
the substantive aspect.The Court notes that the version of the prosecution, as to where
Valeroso was arrested, is different from the version of the defense. The prosecution claims that
Valeroso was arrested near the INP Central Police Station in Culiat, Quezon City, while he was
about to board a tricycle. After placing Valeroso under arrest, the arresting officers bodily
searched him, and they found the subject firearm and ammunition. The defense, on the other
hand, insists that he was arrested inside the boarding house of his children. After serving the
warrant of arrest (allegedly for kidnapping with ransom), some of the police officers searched
the boarding house and forcibly opened a cabinet where they discovered the subject firearm.
After a thorough re-examination of the records and consideration of the joint appeal for acquittal
by Valeroso and the OSG, we find that we must give more credence to the version of the
defense.Valerosos appeal for acquittal focuses on his constitutional right against unreasonable
search and seizure alleged to have been violated by the arresting police officers; and if so,
would render the confiscated firearm and ammunition inadmissible in evidence against him.The
right against unreasonable searches and seizures is secured by Section 2, Article III of the
Constitution which states:SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.From this constitutional
provision, it can readily be gleaned that, as a general rule, the procurement of a warrant is
required before a law enforcer can validly search or seize the person, house, papers, or effects

of any individual.30To underscore the significance the law attaches to the fundamental right of
an individual against unreasonable searches and seizures, the Constitution succinctly declares
in Article III, Section 3(2), that "any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding
section shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding."31The above
proscription is not, however, absolute. The following are the well-recognized instances where
searches and seizures are allowed even without a valid warrant:1. Warrantless search incidental
to a lawful arrest;2. [Seizure] of evidence in "plain view." The elements are: a) a prior valid
intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the
pursuit of their official duties; b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who
have the right to be where they are; c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and d)
"plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further search;3. Search of a moving
vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicles inherent mobility reduces expectation
of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable
suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity;4.
Consented warrantless search;5. Customs search;6. Stop and Frisk;7. Exigent and emergency
circumstances.328. Search of vessels and aircraft; [and]9. Inspection of buildings and other
premises for the enforcement of fire, sanitary and building regulations.33In the exceptional
instances where a warrant is not necessary to effect a valid search or seizure, what constitutes
a reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure is purely a judicial question, determinable from
the uniqueness of the circumstances involved, including the purpose of the search or seizure,
the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was
made, the place or thing searched, and the character of the articles procured.34In light of the
enumerated exceptions, and applying the test of reasonableness laid down above, is the
warrantless search and seizure of the firearm and ammunition valid?We answer in the negative.
For one, the warrantless search could not be justified as an incident to a lawful arrest. Searches
and seizures incident to lawful arrests are governed by Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of
Court, which reads:SEC. 13. Search incident to lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested may
be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute proof
in the commission of an offense without a search warrant.We would like to stress that the scope
of the warrantless search is not without limitations. In People v. Leangsiri,35 People v.
Cubcubin, Jr.,36 and People v. Estella,37 we had the occasion to lay down the parameters of a
valid warrantless search and seizure as an incident to a lawful arrest.When an arrest is made, it
is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person arrested in order to remove any
weapon that the latter might use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape. Otherwise, the
officers safety might well be endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated. In addition, it is entirely
reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestees
person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction.38Moreover, in lawful arrests, it
becomes both the duty and the right of the apprehending officers to conduct a warrantless
search not only on the person of the suspect, but also in the permissible area within the latters
reach.39 Otherwise stated, a valid arrest allows the seizure of evidence or dangerous weapons
either on the person of the one arrested or within the area of his immediate control.40 The
phrase "within the area of his immediate control" means the area from within which he might
gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.41 A gun on a table or in a drawer in front
of one who is arrested can be as dangerous to the arresting officer as one concealed in the

clothing of the person arrested.42In the present case, Valeroso was arrested by virtue of a
warrant of arrest allegedly for kidnapping with ransom. At that time, Valeroso was sleeping
inside the boarding house of his children. He was awakened by the arresting officers who were
heavily armed. They pulled him out of the room, placed him beside the faucet outside the room,
tied his hands, and then put him under the care of Disuanco.43 The other police officers
remained inside the room and ransacked the locked cabinet44 where they found the subject
firearm and ammunition.45 With such discovery, Valeroso was charged with illegal possession
of firearm and ammunition.From the foregoing narration of facts, we can readily conclude that
the arresting officers served the warrant of arrest without any resistance from Valeroso. They
placed him immediately under their control by pulling him out of the bed, and bringing him out of
the room with his hands tied. To be sure, the cabinet which, according to Valeroso, was locked,
could no longer be considered as an "area within his immediate control" because there was no
way for him to take any weapon or to destroy any evidence that could be used against him.The
arresting officers would have been justified in searching the person of Valeroso, as well as the
tables or drawers in front of him, for any concealed weapon that might be used against the
former. But under the circumstances obtaining, there was no comparable justification to search
through all the desk drawers and cabinets or the other closed or concealed areas in that room
itself.46It is worthy to note that the purpose of the exception (warrantless search as an incident
to a lawful arrest) is to protect the arresting officer from being harmed by the person arrested,
who might be armed with a concealed weapon, and to prevent the latter from destroying
evidence within reach. The exception, therefore, should not be strained beyond what is needed
to serve its purpose.47 In the case before us, search was made in the locked cabinet which
cannot be said to have been within Valerosos immediate control. Thus, the search exceeded
the bounds of what may be considered as an incident to a lawful arrest.48Nor can the
warrantless search in this case be justified under the "plain view doctrine."The "plain view
doctrine" may not be used to launch unbridled searches and indiscriminate seizures or to
extend a general exploratory search made solely to find evidence of defendants guilt. The
doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the
accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object.49As enunciated
in People v. Cubcubin, Jr.50 and People v. Leangsiri:51What the "plain view" cases have in
common is that the police officer in each of them had a prior justification for an intrusion in the
course of which[,] he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused.
The doctrine serves to supplement the prior justification whether it be a warrant for another
object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being
present unconnected with a search directed against the accused and permits the warrantless
seizure. Of course, the extension of the original justification is legitimate only where it is
immediately apparent to the police that they have evidence before them; the "plain view"
doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory search from one object to another
until something incriminating at last emerges.52Indeed, the police officers were inside the
boarding house of Valerosos children, because they were supposed to serve a warrant of arrest
issued against Valeroso. In other words, the police officers had a prior justification for the
intrusion. Consequently, any evidence that they would inadvertently discover may be used
against Valeroso. However, in this case, the police officers did not just accidentally discover the
subject firearm and ammunition; they actually searched for evidence against Valeroso.Clearly,

the search made was illegal, a violation of Valerosos right against unreasonable search and
seizure. Consequently, the evidence obtained in violation of said right is inadmissible in
evidence against him.1avvphi1Unreasonable searches and seizures are the menace against
which the constitutional guarantees afford full protection. While the power to search and seize
may at times be necessary for public welfare, still it may be exercised and the law enforced
without transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens, for no enforcement of any statute
is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of government. Those
who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the rights of an individual
in the name of order. Order is too high a price to pay for the loss of liberty.53Because a
warrantless search is in derogation of a constitutional right, peace officers who conduct it cannot
invoke regularity in the performance of official functions.54The Bill of Rights is the bedrock of
constitutional government. If people are stripped naked of their rights as human beings,
democracy cannot survive and government becomes meaningless. This explains why the Bill of
Rights, contained as it is in Article III of the Constitution, occupies a position of primacy in the
fundamental law way above the articles on governmental power.55Without the illegally seized
firearm, Valerosos conviction cannot stand. There is simply no sufficient evidence to convict
him.56 All told, the guilt of Valeroso was not proven beyond reasonable doubt measured by the
required moral certainty for conviction. The evidence presented by the prosecution was not
enough to overcome the presumption of innocence as constitutionally ordained. Indeed, it would
be better to set free ten men who might probably be guilty of the crime charged than to convict
one innocent man for a crime he did not commit.57With the foregoing disquisition, there is no
more need to discuss the other issues raised by Valeroso.One final note. The Court values
liberty and will always insist on the observance of basic constitutional rights as a condition sine
qua non against the awesome investigative and prosecutory powers of the government.58
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the February 22, 2008 Decision and June 30, 2008
Resolution are RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE. Sr. Insp. Jerry Valeroso is hereby
ACQUITTED of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------63. MARLAN YOUNG, complainant, vs. JUDGE HILARIO I. MAPAYO, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 19, Digos, Davao del Sur, respondent.A.M. No. RTJ-00-1552. May 31, 2000
D E C I S I O NPARDO, J.:The case is an administrative complaint for grave misconduct[1] filed
by Marlan Young against Judge Hilario I. Mapayo, Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Digos,
Davao del Sur.The facts are as follows:On September 2, 1998, Marlan Young, an American
national, and a resident of Tibagon, Pantukan, Davao, filed with the Office of the Ombudsman
for Mindanao an affidavit complaint,[2] charging Judge Hilario I. Mapayo with grave misconduct.
His affidavit complaint stated, among others things, that:1. Respondent performed the marriage
between complainant and Virginia Parba on March 15, 1993;2. Respondent demanded and
received from complainant the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) for the ceremony;
3. Respondent asked complainant and all others involved in the ceremony to sign six (6) blank
copies of the marriage contract;4. Respondent at a later date accomplished the forms and
placed therein "Digos" and June 9, 1993 as the place and date of the solemnization of the
marriage, respectively;5. Complainant was allegedly out of the country on said date (June 9,
1993) as his passport would show;6. Complainant sought the help of respondent who provided
him with a lawyer, Atty. Barba, free of charge, and later filed a case for annulment of the

marriage, but the same had dragged on for two (2) years with no favorable development; and7.
Complainant had allegedly good reason to believe that respondent had been part of a
conspiracy since during a confrontation with respondent and Virginia Parba, they threatened
him with deportation.On September 29, 1998, the Ombudsman for Mindanao referred Young's
affidavit-complaint to Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo. On February 12, 1999, Court
Administrator Benipayo referred the complaint to respondent Judge Mapayo for comment.On
March 16, 1999[3], respondent Judge submitted his comment. He denied all the allegations of
the complaint. In support of his denial, respondent attached to the affidavit of complainant's exwife, Virginia Parba, the original copy of the complaint for annulment of marriage filed by
complainant[4] wherein he acknowledged the validity of his marriage to Virginia Parba, as well
as the final decision on the annulment case. However, the marriage of complainant and Virginia
Parba was later annulled.The affidavit of Virginia Parba[5] stated that she was married to the
complainant on June 9, 1993, in Digos, Davao del Sur, with the respondent judge as the
solemnizing officer; that she followed complainant to the United States after a few months of
marriage but had to return to the Philippines with the complainant since she was not
accustomed to the weather conditions in the United States; her union with the complainant bore
them a child; after a few years, complainant engaged in womanizing and started beating and
harming her even over trivial matters and the complainant later abandoned her and their child to
live with another woman in Pantukan, Davao del Norte; that there was no truth to complainant's
claim that respondent made the former sign blank marriage forms; that there was no truth either
to complainant's allegation that he gave respondent judge Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) to
solemnize the marriage; that the amount was part of the amount given to her mother to cover
the expenses of the marriage and her trip to the United States; that her family had known
respondent judge and his wife since 1987 and had often asked for help since her aunt once
worked for respondent's household; and her family had a high respect for respondent judge.On
June 2, 1999, Senior Deputy Court Administrator Reynaldo L. Suarez requested complainant to
send photocopies of his passport showing his exit and entry to this country for the period
starting March 15, 1993 to June 9, 1993[6]. Likewise, in a letter dated June 3, 1999[7], Senior
Deputy Court Administrator Suarez requested Commissioner Rufus B. Rodriguez of the Bureau
of Immigration (BI) for information and photocopies of complainant's passport with his alleged
exit and entrance to the country during the aforesaid period.Respondent sent the Senior Deputy
Court Administrator a copy of his Answer[8], a letter[9], and an Affidavit[10] of complainant
requesting this Court not to pursue the case against respondent, with a personal note to Deputy
Court Administrator Suarez requesting help for the dismissal of his case, the original copies of
the documents[11] were received by the Court Administrator on July 22, 1999.In reply to the
request of Senior Deputy Court Administrator Suarez, Bureau of Immigration Commissioner
Rodriguez sent the travel record/information of the complainant based on their computer
records[12].The Office of the Court Administrator referred the complaint to this Court[13] for
referral to an Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals for investigation report and
recommendation. In a resolution dated September 20, 1999[14], we resolved to refer the case
to Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando for investigation, report and recommendation.In her
Final Report and Recommendation dated February 14, 2000, Justice Salazar-Fernando
recommended that respondent Judge Mapayo be absolved of the charges of grave misconduct
filed against him.We find the recommendation of Justice Salazar-Fernando to be well-taken.

Respondent Judge Mapayo is accused of (1) demanding and receiving the amount of Ten
Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) for the solemnization of the marriage between complainant
Marlan Young and Virginia Parba; and (2) changing the date and place of marriage of
complainant and Parba. The first charge, if proven, would constitute illegal exaction and/or
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; and the second charge would constitute
falsification of public document under the Revised Penal Code.However, complainant later
executed an affidavit withdrawing his complaint against respondent. However, such withdrawal
will not result in the dismissal of the complaint. In Marcelino vs. Judge Singson, Jr.,[15] we
ruled:"The Court has held in a number of instances that mere desistance on the part of
complainant does not warrant the dismissal of administrative complaints against members of the
bench. The withdrawal of complaints cannot divest the Court of its jurisdiction nor strip it of its
power to determine the veracity of the charges made and to discipline, such as the results of its
investigation may warrant, an erring respondent. The Court's interest in the affairs of the
judiciary is a paramount concern that must not know bounds."We agree with the findings of
Justice Salazar-Fernando that the charges against respondent have not been proven. With
respect to the first charge, we quote Justice Salazar-Fernando's report and recommendation as
follows:"With regard to the first charge, the letter-affidavit of private complainant alleged that
respondent demanded and received the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) from him
in consideration of the solemnization of his marriage with Virginia Parba. The same statement
was categorically denied by respondent. Later, the complainant stated that the amount stated
was given to his former wife's aunt during the ceremony, not to the respondent."Virginia Parba,
complainant's former wife, on the other hand, alleged that the amount was given to her mother
to cover the expenses of the wedding and her trip to the United States."Granting arguendo,
complainant failed to prove that the amount of Ten Thousand (P10,000.00) Pesos given to
Parba's aunt or mother which was intended for the respondent was actually received by him. No
evidence was presented that respondent demanded or received the amount. In the absence of
any positive evidence directly pointing to respondent as the person who demanded and
received the amount, the charge must necessarily fail."[16]With respect to complainant's
allegation that he was in the United States when the marriage took place on June 9, 1993, in
Digos, Davao del Sur, the following evidence were presented:"a. Certification from the
Computer Section of the Bureau of Immigration (BI) on the travel of private complainant.[17]
"The certification states that a certain Marlan W. Young departed Manila via Northwest Airlines
on March 16, 1993; arrived in Manila via the same airline on October 6, 1993; departed Manila
via the same airline on October 29, 1993; and arrived in Manila on February 8, 1994 on board
the same airline;"a. Passenger Manifest of Northwest Airlines from the Records Section of the
BI;"The documents contain the same information as letter "a";"b. Photocopy of private
complainant's passport purportedly showing his arrival and departure from the country;[18]"The
photocopy was not authenticated and could hardly be read. The note of the complainant below
states that he arrived in the Philippines on May 19, 1993 and departed June 1, 1993."[19]
However, the above evidence are of dubious value in proving that complainant was indeed out
of the Philippines at the time the marriage was celebrated on June 9, 1993. With respect to the
first piece of evidence, the certification from the Bureau of Immigration, Justice SalazarFernando found:"The first document (a) shows that Marlan W. Young who departed Manila on
March 16, 1993 had a different date of birth as against the Marlan W. Young who arrived in

Manila on October 6, 1993, left Manila on October 29, 1993 and arrived in Manila on February
8, 1994. Could it be typographical error in the entry as the representative of BI assumed it to
be?"The second document (b) does not show details other than the name of the passenger,
flight number, date of entry/departure and airline. Had it included other details like the date of
birth, the probability of a typographical error in the first document (a) could be verified."[20]
Under such circumstances, it cannot be known for certain that the Marlan W. Young, who had a
birth date of 01/20/1942 and who left the Philippines on March 16, 1993 was the same Marlan
W. Young who arrived on October 6, 1993 and who had a birth date of 06/20/1942. The
uncertainty in this regard is compounded by the admission of Manolito Macanas of the Bureau
of Immigration that only the records for the flights coming in and out of the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport (NAIA) and Mactan Airport in Cebu are computerized.[21] It thus cannot be
verified if complainant entered the country through a port other than the above-mentioned
airports.Likewise, the third document is of little value. The alleged entries on the passport could
hardly be read. Also, it cannot be compared with the original passport, considering that
complainant refused to produce the original documents.Another factor that militates against
complainant's cause is the fact that in his petition for annulment of marriage, he stated that the
marriage took place on June 9, 1993, which he belies in his allegation in his complaint against
respondent Judge that he was out of the country at that time. Clearly, he is bound by such
admission.The allegation of complainant that the marriage was actually celebrated on March 15,
1993 is belied by the documents supporting the application for marriage such as the Affidavit in
Lieu of Legal Capacity to Contract Marriage for American Citizens[22] of complainant, issued on
May 19, 1993, and Pre-Marriage Counseling[23] dated May 25, 1993. In particular, the Affidavit
in Lieu of Certificate of Legal Capacity to Contract Marriage for American Citizens was
subscribed and sworn to before the Consul of the United States on May 19, 1993 by
complainant himself. It is difficult to see how a marriage could be celebrated on March 15, 1993
when the documents necessary for its validity were available only months later. It is well-settled
that entries in official records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer of the
Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima
facie evidence of the facts therein stated.[24]We likewise note that, aside from requesting this
Court not to pursue the case against respondent Judge, complainant refused to participate in
the investigation despite due notice.WHEREFORE, the complaint filed by Marlan Young against
Judge Hilario I. Mapayo, Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Digos, Davao del Sur for grave
misconduct is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------64. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RAFAEL DIOPITA y GUZMAN,
accused-appellant.
G.R. No. 130601. December 4, 2000D E C I S I O NBELLOSILLO, J.:RAFAEL DIOPITA y
GUZMAN appeals from the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City finding him guilty
of Robbery with Rape, imposing upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordering him to
pay the victim, Dominga Pikit-pikit, P8,500.00 for actual damages and P50,000.00 for moral
damages.[1]Culled principally from the testimonies of Dominga Pikit-pikit and PO3 Steve dela
Cruz, the inculpatory facts follow: At about 9:00 o'clock in the evening of 16 April 1995
complaining witness Dominga Pikit-pikit, 24 years old, was walking towards Emiville
Subdivision, Diversion Road, Sasa, Davao City, on her way home from work. Suddenly, a man

appeared from behind, looped his arm around her neck and warned her not to shout or else she
would die.[2] The man then dragged her through the banana plantation towards the cornfields
where the plants were ameter high and far apart.[3] When Dominga shouted for help, the man
pushed her to the ground and punched her on the stomach saying, "Leche ka, why are you
shouting? What do you want me to do, make you unconscious?"[4] Dominga Pikit-pikit got a
good look at the man, who turned out to be accused-appellant Rafael Diopita y Guzman, as he
sat on her thighs and proceeded to divest her of her belongings - ladies watch, bracelet, ring
with russian diamonds, wedding ring and P1,000.00 cash. With the full moon shining on his
face, the victim clearly saw Diopita place the items on the right pocket of his shorts.[5]
Thereafter, accused-appellant Diopita announced his desire to have carnal knowledge of
Dominga. Forthwith, he pulled up her t-shirt and unfastened her brassiere. He also loosened
her belt, unzipped her pants and struggled to pull it down, nearly ripping her zipper. Annoyed at
the tightness of her pants, Diopita hit her and ordered her to help him pull them down.[6]
Dominga, fearing for her life and thinking of Diopitas punches, obeyed. She pulled her pants to
her hips. Then accused-appellant forcibly pulled them down further and got irritated in fact
when he was told that she was wearing a girdle and panty. In frustration, he punched her
repeatedly and kept on muttering, "Why is this very tight? What kind of panty is this?" Finally,
he succeeded in pulling the girdle and panty down.[7] Accused-appellant Diopita then took off
his shorts. He kissed the victim, lasciviously caressed her breasts, bit her nipples, and
fornicated with her. As he was sexually assaulting her, Dominga made desperate struggles and
frantic calls for help but her efforts proved futile until he finally satiated his lust. He then warned
Dominga not to tell anyone and that should he hear that she told anybody about the incident he
would shoot her to death. Then he dressed up and left, walking casually to the opposite
direction of the subdivision before disappearing in the darkness.[8]Exhausted, Dominga slowly
stood up, put on her clothes and walked away in the direction of her house. Finding it locked,
she asked help from her neighbors who called the police. Thereafter, Dominga was brought to
Precinct No. 4 of Sasa, Davao City, where SPO1 Stephen Batacan entered her complaint in the
police blotter. Later, she was examined by Dr. Floranne Lam-Vergara at the Davao Medical
Center who found her "positive for spermatocytes."[9]PO3 Steve dela Cruz, who was on duty at
the Intelligence and Investigation Section, made a follow-up on the case. He went to the
victims house and interviewed her between the hours of 1:00 oclock and 3:00 oclock in the
morning of the following day, 17 April 1995. Dominga gave a description of the suspect and his
possible whereabouts.[10] Acting on that information, PO3 dela Cruz went to the scene of the
crime to investigate and there he recovered a colored white/yellow, size ten (10) slipper. Since
the victim earlier disclosed that the suspect headed north after committing the crime, he
proceeded to that direction where he came upon four (4) houses about fifteen (15) to fifty (50)
meters away from the scene of the crime. A back-up team was called and they rounded up all
the residents therein. Afterwards, four (4) men who fitted the description of the suspect were
invited to the police station for questioning. They were Placido Laput, William Silvano, Vicente
Silvano and accused-appellant Rafael Diopita y Guzman.[11]At about 6:00 oclock in the
morning of 17 April 1995, the police invited Dominga to identify the suspect at the police station.
Thereat, Dominga saw the four (4) men in a police line-up and readily pointed at accusedappellant.[12] The police then had him try on the recovered slipper; it easily fitted him.[13] Thus,
Diopita was detained while the others were released.The defense denied the charge and

invoked alibi. Accused-appellant claimed that between 8:30 to 12:00 oclock in the evening of
16 April 1995 he was with his wife Flora, son Ryan and fellow Jehovahs Witnesses Roger
Custorio and Ruben Suarez at the house of Eulalio Nisnisan for an informal Bible session upon
the invitation of Juan Nisnisan.[14] Accused-appellant also claimed that during those hours, he
never left the place. Flora, Roger, Ruben, Eulalio and Juan corroborated his alibi and testified
on his good moral character as a ministerial servant of their faith.On 18 June 1997, the trial
court formally rejected his defense of alibi and convicted him of the crime charged;
consequently, accused-appellant is now before us on appeal. The trial court ruled -Alibi is a
weak defense because it can easily be fabricated that it is so easy for witnesses to get confused
as to dates and time. The precision with which the witnesses for the defense, who are his comembers in the Jehovahs Witnesses, quoted the respective hours when the participants in the
Bible sharing session supposedly arrived is, at best, self-serving and deserves scant
consideration because of the facility with which it may be concocted and fabricated.On the other
hand, private complainant Dominga Pikit-Pikit positively identified Rafael Diopita as the person
who robbed and raped her on April 16, 1995. She testified in a clear, straightforward and
convincing manner and no ill-motive on her part had been shown to have prompted her to testify
falsely. The failure of the defense to attribute any ill-motive on the part of Pikit-Pikit to pin
responsibility on Diopita adds more credence to complainants testimony.In a long line of cases,
it has been held that the defense of alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of the
accused by the victim. Pikit-Pikit testified that she was able to see the face of her attacker
because the moon was shining brightly that evening. This Court takes judicial notice of the fact
that in the month of April 1995 the full moon came out on April 15, 1995, a day before the date
of the crime.We affirm his conviction; the guilt of accused-appellant has been established by the
evidence beyond reasonable doubt.First. Complaining witness Dominga Pikit-pikit positively
and categorically identified accused-appellant as her assailant, first during the police line-up
where she singled him out from among the four (4) suspects and, later during the trial where
she pointed at accused-appellant as the one who robbed and sexually molested her -Q: Where
did you go?A: To the Police Station, there were four persons who lined up for
identification.
Q: And then?A: First, when I arrived, I peeped behind the place where there were four persons
lining up. After that I went to the place where they were receiving visitors and I saw the four
persons who were there already and lined up.Q: And then?A: After that the police told me to
identify the person who
molested me, and I pointed to that person there (witness pointing
to the accused whom she previously identified).[15]From the circumstances of this case, it
cannot be denied that complaining witness Dominga Pikit-pikit had a good look at the face and
physical features of accused-appellant during the commission of the crime. While the robbery
was in progress, the moonlight sufficiently illumined his face and clothes, thus making it possible
for private complainant to identify him.[16] During the rape, private complainant was as close to
accused-appellant as was physically possible, for a man and a woman cannot be more
physically close to each other than during a sexual act.[17] Victims of criminal violence naturally
strive to know the identity of their assailants and observe the manner the crime was perpetrated,
creating a lasting impression which may not be erased easily in their memory.[18] There is
therefore no reason to doubt the accuracy of private complainants visual perception of
accused-appellant as the criminal. Nor is there any reason to doubt her honesty of intention for
there is no showing that she implicated accused-appellant due to an evil or corrupt motive.We

do not subscribe to accused-appellants contentions that the complaining witness hesitated to

point at him during the police line-up, and that she was just forced by the police to choose him
from among the four (4) suspects. The identification was made with such certainty by the
complaining witness that even accused-appellant had to comment on it -Atty. Galicia: What
made you say she was hesitant to point at you? x x x xRafael Diopita: Because during that
time, sir, when we confronted each other in the police station, she was looking at me when there
were four of us there. So, I asked why x x x x[19]The foregoing testimony belied the allegation
of hesitancy on the part of Dominga Pikit-pikit to pinpoint accused-appellant during the line-up.
His very own words project his guilt as well. Only the guilty experiences neurotic fear in the
face of imminent discovery of his malefaction. His paranoia colors his interpretation of the
events during the line-up. Consider accused-appellants assertion that Dominga Pikit-pikit was
forced by the police to point at him, and Prosecutor Esparagoza's objection thereto -Sur-rebuttal
of Atty. Galicia: Mr. Diopita, according to private complainant Dominga Pikit-pikit during her
rebuttal testimony that she was not forced by the police to point at you when you were in the
police station. What can you say to that?Rafael Diopita: That woman hesitated to point at me
but the police said you point at him.Q: What made you say she was hesitant to point at you?
Prosecutor Esparagoza: The witness said ITUDLO! ITUDLO! (YOU POINT! YOU POINT!).
He did not say he was the one pointed to, your Honor.[20]Gleaned from the aforequoted
testimony was the absence of suggestiveness in the identification process. There were four (4)
men in the line-up and the police did not specifically suggest to Dominga to point particularly at
accused-appellant. Not even the shodding of the slipper recovered from the scene of the crime
could provide any suggestiveness to the line-up as it came after accused-appellant was already
identified by Dominga Pikit-pikit.Second. In light of this positive and direct evidence of accusedappellants culpability, the trial court correctly discarded his defense of alibi. It is an elementary
rule that alibi cannot prevail over the clear and positive identification of the accused as the very
person who committed the crime. Moreover, in order to justify an acquittal based on this
defense, the accused must establish by clear and convincing evidence that (a) he was in
another place at the time of the commission of the offense; and, (b) it was physically impossible
for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time it was committed.[21] This, accused-appellant
miserably failed to do.Accused-appellant admitted that at the time in question he was with his
wife, son and fellow members of the Jehovahs Witnesses at the house of one Eulalio Nisnisan
supposedly attending Bible studies, which is merely fifteen (15) to fifty (50) meters away from
the crime scene. Considering the short and insignificant distance, it was not impossible for
accused-appellant to surreptitiously slip away from the house of Nisnisan, commit the
crime and then return without arousing the suspicion of his companions who were then busy
with their Bible session. This is obviously the situation in this case and, taken together with the
preceding considerations, we likewise reject this poor and discredited defense as did the trial
court. Verily, even if the defense of alibi is corroborated by the testimony of the friends of
accused-appellant, it deserves the barest consideration and will not be given weight if it would
not preclude any doubt that he could have been physically present at the locus criminis or its
immediate vecino at the time of its commission.[22]Third. Perhaps aware of the crushing impact
of complainants positive identification of accused-appellant, the defense attacked the supposed
inconsistencies and discrepancies in her testimony in a vain attempt to make it completely
unreliable, claiming that: (a) the victim declared that the culprit wore short pants with a zipper,

and he had no short pants with zipper; (b) the yellow slipper retrieved by the police did not
belong to him as his slippers were colored blue, with his initials inscribed thereon; and, (c) the
description given by complainant in the police blotter did not fit the physical appearance of
accused-appellant.We are not persuaded. Suffice it to say that these are mere trifles which do
not detract from complainants straightforward and consistent identification of accused-appellant
as the one who robbed and raped her. Trivial inconsistencies do not shake the pedestal upon
which the complainants credibility rests. On the contrary, they are taken as badges of truth
rather than as indicia of falsehood for they manifest spontaneity and erase any suspicion of a
rehearsed testimony.[23] Furthermore, entries in police blotters should not be given undue
significance or probative value for they are normally incomplete and inaccurate, sometimes from
either partial suggestion or want of suggestion or inquiry.[24]Fourth. We now deal with the
more substantial arguments raised by accused-appellant in his brief. He tenaciously maintains
that it was impossible for him to have committed the crime charged since he is a person of good
moral character, holding as he does the position of "Ministerial Servant" in the congregation of
Jehovahs Witnesses, and that he is a godly man, a righteous person, a responsible family man
and a good Christian who preaches the word of God.We are not impressed. The fact that
accused-appellant is endowed with such "sterling" qualities hardly justifies the conclusion that
he is innocent of the crime charged. Similarly, his having attained the position of "Ministerial
Servant" in his faith is no guarantee against any sexual perversion and plunderous proclivity on
his part. Indeed, religiosity is not always an emblem of good conduct, and it is not the
unreligious alone who succumbs to the impulse to rob and rape. An accused is not entitled to
an acquittal simply because of his previous good moral character and exemplary conduct. The
affirmance or reversal of his conviction must be resolved on the basic issue of whether the
prosecution had discharged its duty of proving his guilt beyond any peradventure of doubt.
Since the evidence of the crime in the instant case is more than sufficient to convict, the
evidence of good moral character of accused-appellant is unavailing.Accused-appellant likewise
bewails and assigns as reversible error the failure of the trial court to give credence to the
testimonies of the defense witnesses. He argues that these are Jehovahs Witnesses, and as
such, they are God-fearing people who would never lie as to his whereabouts at the time in
question. This argument is as puerile as the first. We quote once more, and with approval, the
pertinent portion of the trial courts ruling on this point -x x x x it is so easy for witnesses to get
confused as to dates and time. The precision with which the witnesses for the defense, who
are his co-members in the Jehovahs Witnesses, quoted the respective hours when the
participants in the Bible sharing session supposedly arrived is, at best, self-serving and
deserves scant consideration because of the facility with which it may be concocted and
fabricated (underscoring supplied).The matter of assigning values to the declarations of
witnesses is best and most competently performed by the trial court who had the unmatched
opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses while testifying, and to assess their credibility
using various indicia available but not reflected in the records.[25] Hence, the court a quo's
appraisal on the matter is entitled to the highest respect, and will not be disturbed on appeal
unless there is a clear showing that it overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or
circumstances of weight and substance that would affect the result of the case.[26] There is no
compelling reason in the present case to depart from this rule.In sum, we find that all the
elements of robbery with rape are present in this case. There was asportation of the jewelry

and cash of the victim by means of force and violence on her person, showing the initial animus
lucrandi of accused-appellant,[27] and then his lecherous intent when he raped his victim.
Accordingly, we hold that the court below did not commit any reversible error in ruling that the
requisite quantum of evidence for a finding of guilt has been sufficiently met by the prosecution
as to call for our affirmance of the judgment of the court a quo.[28] However, in addition to the
actual and moral damages awarded by the trial court in the amounts of P8,500.00 and
P50,000.00, respectively, another amount of P50,000.00 should have also been awarded to the
victim Dominga Pikit-pikit for civil indemnity, as it is mandatory upon a conviction of rape. Such
indemnity is distinct from moral damages and based on different jural foundations.[29]
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, convicting
accused-appellant RAFAEL DIOPITA y GUZMAN of ROBBERY WITH RAPE, sentencing him to
reclusion perpetua, and ordering him to pay DOMINGA PIKIT-PIKIT the sums of P8,500.00 for
actual damages and P50,000.00 for moral damages, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION
that, in addition, civil indemnity of another P50,000.00 is further awarded to her. Costs against
accused-appellant.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Sec. 45 - Commercial lists and the like
(no case)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Sec. 46 - Learned Trearises
(no case)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Sec. 47 - Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding
(no case)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------7. OPINION RULE
Sec. 48 - General Rule
65. AMANDO A. PONTAOE and DR. ALEJANDRO G. PONTAOE, Petitioners,m- versus TEODORA A. PONTAOE and EDUARDO A. PONTAOE, Respondents.
G.R. No. 159585. April 22, 2008 TEODORA A. PONTAOE and EDUARDO A. PONTAOE,
Petitioners, - versus - AMANDO A. PONTAOE and DR. ALEJANDRO G. PONTAOE,
Respondents,
G.R. No. 165318.
DECISION QUISUMBING, J.:
Before us are petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
Decision[1] dated July 31, 2003 and the Resolution[2] dated August 3, 2004 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 52587 which modified the Decision[3] dated October 31, 1995 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City, Branch 42, in Civil Case No. D-10738.The facts
of the case are as follows:
Teodora Pontaoe, Eduardo Pontaoe and Amando Pontaoe are full-blood children of Juan
Pontaoe and his second wife, Tomasa Aquino. Dr. Alejandro Pontaoe is the nephew of Teodora,

Eduardo and Amando. He is the only child of their late half-brother, Norberto, son of Juan and
his first wife. Juan died on March 31, 1971 while Tomasa Aquino died on September 4, 1988.[4]
Juan and Dr. Alejandro were the registered co-owners of a 48,144-square meter parcel of land
covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 139[5] located at Sapang, Sta. Barbara,
Pangasinan. Juan was the registered co-owner of one-half of the eastern portion of the land
while Dr. Alejandro, the other half of the western portion.[6]
On August 31, 1970, the spouses Juan and Tomasa allegedly executed a Deed of
Conveyance[7] over the one-half eastern portion in favor of their son Eduardo. OCT No. 139
was cancelled and replaced by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 92293[8] in the name of
Eduardo as the registered owner. On May 11, 1971, allegedly a Deed of Quitclaim[9] executed
by Dr. Alejandro vested Eduardo with ownership over the one-half western portion. Afterwards,
on June 23, 1980, Eduardo executed a Deed of Absolute Sale[10] over the entire property in
favor of his sister, Teodora. On May 31, 1982, Teodora and Eduardo divided the land into two
equal portions, each with an area of 24,072 square meters resulting in the cancellation of TCT
No. 92293 and the issuance of TCT No. [143491][11] in the name of Eduardo A. Pontaoe and
TCT No. [143492][12] in the name of Teodora A. Pontaoe.[13]
On June 23, 1980, a Deed of Absolute Sale was allegedly executed by Tomasa Aquino also in
favor of Teodora Pontaoe over another parcel of land comprising 17,077 square meters[14] also
located at Sapang, Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan and covered by OCT No. 138.[15] Consequently,
OCT No. 138 was cancelled and TCT No. 134602[16] was issued in Teodoras name.[17]On
September 7, 1993, Teodora filed a Complaint for Quieting of Title, Accounting and
Damages[18] against Amando before the RTC of Dagupan City. Teodora alleged she is the
registered owner of the parcels of land covered by TCT No. 143492 and TCT No. 134602 while
Eduardo, who later on joined as co-plaintiff, is the registered owner of the parcel of land covered
by TCT No. 143491. She alleged that they delivered the parcels of land to their mother,
Tomasa, for her use and enjoyment until she reached the age of 50. However, after their
mother suffered a stroke in May 1986, Amando took possession of the properties. After the
death of their mother on September 4, 1988 and despite repeated demands on Amando to
cease and desist from using and appropriating the fruits of the properties, Amando refused to
vacate the land. His persistent claim of ownership and acts of dominion over the properties
allegedly cast a cloud over the titles and hence, they filed the complaint for quieting of title.[19]
Amando and Dr. Alejandro, on the other hand, claim that the signatures appearing in the Deed
of Conveyance were not Juan and Tomasas signatures. They also claim that the signature
appearing in the Deed of Quitclaim allegedly executed on May 11, 1971 is not the signature of
Dr. Alejandro. Likewise, the signature appearing in the Deed of Absolute Sale allegedly
executed on June 23, 1980 was not the signature of Tomasa.[20] Hence, the Deed of
Conveyance, Deed of Quitclaim and Deed of Absolute Sale are invalid and there was no valid
transfer of ownership to Eduardo and Teodora. The properties should then be co-owned by
Eduardo, Teodora, Amando and Dr. Alejandro as heirs of the late spouses Juan and Tomasa.
After trial, the lower court declared Eduardo, Teodora, Amando and Dr. Alejandro as co-owners
of the parcel of land covered by TCT No. 143491. It found out that the signature of Juan
appearing in the Deed of Conveyance was substantially different from his admittedly genuine
and authentic signatures. The trial court likewise ruled that, with respect to the Deed of
Quitclaim, the signature of Dr. Alejandro had marked differences from the signatures which were

undisputably affixed by him in other documents. Moreover, Dr. Alejandro was in the United
States of America on the date he allegedly affixed his signature on the Deed of Quitclaim. Thus,
the trial court declared the Deed of Quitclaim invalid and Dr. Alejandro as the absolute and
exclusive owner of the parcel of land presently covered by TCT No. 143492. The trial court also
declared the parties as co-owners of the parcel of land covered by TCT No. 134602. Thus, the
trial court ordered the Register of Deeds, Lingayen, Pangasinan to cancel TCT Nos. 134602,
143491 and 143492 and issue new transfer certificates of titles corresponding to the share of
each of the parties.[21]
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC with respect to the parcel of
land covered by TCT No. 134602. It declared that Tomasa as the absolute and exclusive owner
had the right to transfer ownership of the property to Teodora. The Court of Appeals also ruled
that the trial court erred in apportioning the subject properties in favor of Eduardo, Teodora,
Amando and Dr. Alejandro. Since the complaint was for quieting of title, accounting and
damages, the trial court should have limited itself to questions of ownership of the subject
properties and determination of the validity of the Deed of Conveyance, Deed of Quitclaim and
Deed of Absolute Sale. Further, it ruled that the proceedings a quo were not the proper forum to
determine the successional rights of the parties.[22] The dispositive portion of the Court of
Appeals decision reads,
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City
is partially modified as follows:1.
Declaring the Deed of Conveyance dated August 31, 1970
(Exh. 1) null and void and ordering the Register of Deeds, Lingayen, Pangasinan to cancel
Transfer Certificate [of] Title Nos. [143491], [143492] and 92293 and to reinstate Original
Certificate of Title No. 139;2.
Declaring intervenor Dr. Alejandro G. Pontaoe as co-owner of
the eastern portion of the property covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 139;3.
Declaring appellant Teodora A. Pontaoe as the absolute and exclusive owner of the parcel of
land presently covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 134602.SO ORDERED.[23]Teodora
and Eduardo sought reconsideration of the decision but their motion was denied by the Court of
Appeals on August 3, 2004.In their petitions for review before us, the parties submit the
following issues for our consideration:
I.[WHETHER OR NOT] THE COURT OF APPEALS WITH DUE RESPECT ERRED IN
DECLARING APPELLANT TEODORA A. PONTAOE AS THE ABSOLUTE AND EXCLUSIVE
OWNER OF THE PARCEL OF LAND PRESENTLY COVERED BY T[C]T NO. 134602 OF THE
REGISTRY OF DEEDS OF PANGASINAN.[24]
II.[WHETHER OR NOT] THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAD DECIDED CA G.R. CV
NO. 52587 IN A WAY PROBABLY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR WITH THE APPLICABLE
DECISIONS OF THE HONORABLE COURT IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IN CIVIL CASE NO. D-10738 THAT THE LANDS OF JUAN
PONTAOE AND ALEJANDRO PONTAOE WERE NOT VALIDLY CONVEYED TO PETITIONER
EDUARDO PONTAOE, AND DECLARING THE DEED OF CONVEYANCE IN FAVOR OF
EDUARDO PONTAOE . . . NULL AND VOID.[25]
In brief, for our consideration are the following issues: Did the Court of Appeals err in declaring
Teodora absolute owner of the land presently covered by TCT No. 134602? Are the Deeds of
Conveyance and Quitclaim in favor of Eduardo valid?

Petitioners in G.R. No. 159585, Amando and Dr. Alejandro argue that the Court of Appeals erred
when it reversed the trial courts ruling that the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Tomasa in
favor of Teodora was not valid because both parties allegedly admitted that the property
covered by TCT No. 134602 was the sole property of Juan.[26] They stress that the parties
stipulated in the Pre-trial Order[27] dated March 16, 1994 that the properties were originally
owned by Juan. Amando and Dr. Alejandro emphasize that such admission was a declaration
against interest which should be given weight and credence.[28]
For their part, Teodora and Eduardo in their Memorandum[29] dated September 5, 2005,
counter that although the property was originally owned by Juan, it was later on solely owned by
Tomasa when she bought back the property from the Dagupan Rural Bank.
The Court of Appeals, in reversing the trial courts ruling that Tomasa had no right to transfer the
property, noted that the trial court failed to mention that after Juan died in 1971, Tomasa Aquino
bought the subject lot from the Dagupan Rural Bank as shown by Entry No. 388121[30] dated
November 5, 1973 annotated at the back of OCT No. 138. She bought the land after the title
was consolidated in the name of the bank as shown by Entry No. 387094[31] of OCT No. 138.
Thus, the land became her own property. Therefore, according to the appellate court, at the
time Tomasa Aquino executed the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Teodora, Tomasa had full
title to transfer the ownership of the lot to the latter.[32]
Our perusal of the annotations in OCT No. 138 shows that in an Entry No. 316753[33] dated
May 23, 1969, the property was mortgaged to the Dagupan Rural Bank. Another entry shows
that the property was subsequently foreclosed in 1971 and title transferred to the Dagupan
Rural Bank. It was only in 1973 that Tomasa, then already a widow, bought back the property.
Thus, although Juan originally owned the property, Tomasa became the sole owner when she
sold the property to Teodora.
As to the second issue, petitioners in G.R. No. 165318, Teodora and Eduardo contend that the
Court of Appeals and the trial court erred in ruling that the signatures of Juan and Dr. Alejandro
were forgeries. They argue that the courts should have employed handwriting experts and not
merely made their own findings based solely on their examination and comparison of the
signatures.
On the other hand, Amando and Dr. Alejandro contend that the finding of the trial court and the
Court of Appeals that the signatures of Juan and Dr. Alejandro were forged is a finding of fact
which is binding on this Court.
We affirm the appellate courts findings. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals ruled that
the signatures of Juan and Dr. Alejandro were forgeries. Both signatures are on the record and
were made available to the trial court, appellate court and to us for scrutiny and we agree with
these lower courts and are bound by both their findings that the signatures of Juan and Dr.
Alejandro are indeed forgeries.
As to the argument that handwriting experts should have been employed, handwriting experts
are usually helpful in the examination of forged documents because of the technical procedure
involved in analyzing them, but resort to these experts is not mandatory or indispensable to the
examination or the comparison of handwritings. A finding of forgery does not depend entirely on
the testimonies of handwriting experts, because the judge must conduct an examination of the
questioned signature in order to arrive at a reasonable conclusion as to its authenticity.[34] The
opinions of handwriting experts are not binding upon courts, especially when the question

involved is mere handwriting similarity or dissimilarity, which can be determined by a visual

comparison of specimens of the questioned signatures with those of the currently existing ones.
[35] Moreover, Section 22[36] of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court likewise explicitly authorizes
the court, by itself, to make a comparison of the disputed handwriting with writings admitted or
treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine
to the satisfaction of the judge.[37]
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DENIED. The assailed Decision dated July 31, 2003, as well
as the Resolution dated August 3, 2004, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 52587 is
AFFIRMED.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------66. LEAH ALESNA REYES, ROSE NAHDJA, JOHNNY, and minors LLOYD and KRISTINE,
all surnamed REYES, represented by their mother, LEAH ALESNA REYES, petitioners, vs.
SISTERS OF MERCY HOSPITAL, SISTER ROSE PALACIO, DR. MARVIE BLANES, and DR.
MARLYN RICO, respondents.
G.R. No. 130547. October 3, 2000
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:This is a petition for review of the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 36551 affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch IX, Cebu City which
dismissed a complaint for damages filed by petitioners against respondents.The facts are as
follows:Petitioner Leah Alesna Reyes is the wife of the late Jorge Reyes. The other petitioners,
namely, Rose Nahdja, Johnny, Lloyd, and Kristine, all surnamed Reyes, were their children. Five
days before his death on January 8, 1987, Jorge had been suffering from a recurring fever with
chills. After he failed to get relief from some home medication he was taking, which consisted of
analgesic, antipyretic, and antibiotics, he decided to see the doctor.On January 8, 1987, he was
taken to the Mercy Community Clinic by his wife. He was attended to by respondent Dr. Marlyn
Rico, resident physician and admitting physician on duty, who gave Jorge a physical
examination and took his medical history. She noted that at the time of his admission, Jorge was
conscious, ambulatory, oriented, coherent, and with respiratory distress.[2] Typhoid fever was
then prevalent in the locality, as the clinic had been getting from 15 to 20 cases of typhoid per
month.[3] Suspecting that Jorge could be suffering from this disease, Dr. Rico ordered a Widal
Test, a standard test for typhoid fever, to be performed on Jorge. Blood count, routine urinalysis,
stool examination, and malarial smear were also made.[4] After about an hour, the medical
technician submitted the results of the test from which Dr. Rico concluded that Jorge was
positive for typhoid fever. As her shift was only up to 5:00 p.m., Dr. Rico indorsed Jorge to
respondent Dr. Marvie Blanes.Dr. Marvie Blanes attended to Jorge at around six in the evening.
She also took Jorges history and gave him a physical examination. Like Dr. Rico, her
impression was that Jorge had typhoid fever. Antibiotics being the accepted treatment for
typhoid fever, she ordered that a compatibility test with the antibiotic chloromycetin be done on
Jorge. Said test was administered by nurse Josephine Pagente who also gave the patient a
dose of triglobe. As she did not observe any adverse reaction by the patient to chloromycetin,
Dr. Blanes ordered the first five hundred milligrams of said antibiotic to be administered on
Jorge at around 9:00 p.m. A second dose was administered on Jorge about three hours later
just before midnight.At around 1:00 a.m. of January 9, 1987, Dr. Blanes was called as Jorges
temperature rose to 41C. The patient also experienced chills and exhibited respiratory distress,

nausea, vomiting, and convulsions. Dr. Blanes put him under oxygen, used a suction machine,
and administered hydrocortisone, temporarily easing the patients convulsions. When he
regained consciousness, the patient was asked by Dr. Blanes whether he had a previous heart
ailment or had suffered from chest pains in the past. Jorge replied he did not.[5] After about 15
minutes, however, Jorge again started to vomit, showed restlessness, and his convulsions
returned. Dr. Blanes re-applied the emergency measures taken before and, in addition, valium
was administered. Jorge, however, did not respond to the treatment and slipped into cyanosis, a
bluish or purplish discoloration of the skin or mucous membrane due to deficient oxygenation of
the blood. At around 2:00 a.m., Jorge died. He was forty years old. The cause of his death was
Ventricular Arrythemia Secondary to Hyperpyrexia and typhoid fever.On June 3, 1987,
petitioners filed before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City a complaint[6]for damages against
respondents Sisters of Mercy, Sister Rose Palacio, Dr. Marvie Blanes, Dr. Marlyn Rico, and
nurse Josephine Pagente. On September 24, 1987, petitioners amended their complaint to
implead respondent Mercy Community Clinic as additional defendant and to drop the name of
Josephine Pagente as defendant since she was no longer connected with respondent hospital.
Their principal contention was that Jorge did not die of typhoid fever.[7] Instead, his death was
due to the wrongful administration of chloromycetin. They contended that had respondent
doctors exercised due care and diligence, they would not have recommended and rushed the
performance of the Widal Test, hastily concluded that Jorge was suffering from typhoid fever,
and administered chloromycetin without first conducting sufficient tests on the patients
compatibility with said drug. They charged respondent clinic and its directress, Sister Rose
Palacio, with negligence in failing to provide adequate facilities and in hiring negligent doctors
and nurses.[8]Respondents denied the charges. During the pre-trial conference, the parties
agreed to limit the issues on the following: (1) whether the death of Jorge Reyes was due to or
caused by the negligence, carelessness, imprudence, and lack of skill or foresight on the part of
defendants; (2) whether respondent Mercy Community Clinic was negligent in the hiring of its
employees; and (3) whether either party was entitled to damages. The case was then heard by
the trial court during which, in addition to the testimonies of the parties, the testimonies of
doctors as expert witnesses were presented.Petitioners offered the testimony of Dr. Apolinar
Vacalares, Chief Pathologist at the Northern Mindanao Training Hospital, Cagayan de Oro City.
On January 9, 1987, Dr. Vacalares performed an autopsy on Jorge Reyes to determine the
cause of his death. However, he did not open the skull to examine the brain. His findings[9]
showed that the gastro-intestinal tract was normal and without any ulceration or enlargement of
the nodules. Dr. Vacalares testified that Jorge did not die of typhoid fever. He also stated that he
had not seen a patient die of typhoid fever within five days from the onset of the disease.For
their part, respondents offered the testimonies of Dr. Peter Gotiong and Dr. Ibarra Panopio. Dr.
Gotiong is a diplomate in internal medicine whose expertise is microbiology and infectious
diseases. He is also a consultant at the Cebu City Medical Center and an associate professor of
medicine at the South Western University College of Medicine in Cebu City. He had treated over
a thousand cases of typhoid patients. According to Dr. Gotiong, the patients history and positive
Widal Test results ratio of 1:320 would make him suspect that the patient had typhoid fever. As
to Dr. Vacalares observation regarding the absence of ulceration in Jorges gastro-intestinal
tract, Dr. Gotiong said that such hyperplasia in the intestines of a typhoid victim may be
microscopic. He noted that since the toxic effect of typhoid fever may lead to meningitis, Dr.

Vacalares autopsy should have included an examination of the brain.[10]The other doctor
presented was Dr. Ibarra Panopio, a member of the American Board of Pathology, examiner of
the Philippine Board of Pathology from 1978 to 1991, fellow of the Philippine Society of
Pathologist, associate professor of the Cebu Institute of Medicine, and chief pathologist of the
Andres Soriano Jr. Memorial Hospital in Toledo City. Dr. Panopio stated that although he was
partial to the use of the culture test for its greater reliability in the diagnosis of typhoid fever, the
Widal Test may also be used. Like Dr. Gotiong, he agreed that the 1:320 ratio in Jorges case
was already the maximum by which a conclusion of typhoid fever may be made. No additional
information may be deduced from a higher dilution.[11] He said that Dr. Vacalares autopsy on
Jorge was incomplete and thus inconclusive.On September 12, 1991, the trial court rendered its
decision absolving respondents from the charges of negligence and dismissing petitioners
action for damages. The trial court likewise dismissed respondents counterclaim, holding that,
in seeking damages from respondents, petitioners were impelled by the honest belief that
Jorges death was due to the latters negligence.Petitioners brought the matter to the Court of
Appeals. On July 31, 1997, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.Hence
this petition.Petitioners raise the following assignment of errors:I. THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT THE DOCTRINE
OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR IS NOT APPLICABLE IN THE INSTANT CASE.II. THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT MADE AN
UNFOUNDED ASSUMPTION THAT THE LEVEL OF MEDICAL PRACTICE IS LOWER IN
ILIGAN CITY.III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT
RULED FOR A LESSER STANDARD OF CARE AND DEGREE OF DILIGENCE FOR MEDICAL
PRACTICE IN ILIGAN CITY WHEN IT APPRECIATE[D] NO DOCTORS NEGLIGENCE IN THE
TREATMENT OF JORGE REYES.Petitioners action is for medical malpractice. This is a
particular form of negligence which consists in the failure of a physician or surgeon to apply to
his practice of medicine that degree of care and skill which is ordinarily employed by the
profession generally, under similar conditions, and in like surrounding circumstances.[12] In
order to successfully pursue such a claim, a patient must prove that the physician or surgeon
either failed to do something which a reasonably prudent physician or surgeon would have
done, or that he or she did something that a reasonably prudent physician or surgeon would not
have done, and that the failure or action caused injury to the patient.[13] There are thus four
elements involved in medical negligence cases, namely: duty, breach, injury, and proximate
causation.In the present case, there is no doubt that a physician-patient relationship existed
between respondent doctors and Jorge Reyes. Respondents were thus duty-bound to use at
least the same level of care that any reasonably competent doctor would use to treat a condition
under the same circumstances. It is breach of this duty which constitutes actionable
malpractice.[14] As to this aspect of medical malpractice, the determination of the reasonable
level of care and the breach thereof, expert testimony is essential. Inasmuch as the causes of
the injuries involved in malpractice actions are determinable only in the light of scientific
knowledge, it has been recognized that expert testimony is usually necessary to support the
conclusion as to causation.[15]Res Ipsa LoquiturThere is a case when expert testimony may be
dispensed with, and that is under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. As held in Ramos v. Court of
Appeals:[16]Although generally, expert medical testimony is relied upon in malpractice suits to
prove that a physician has done a negligent act or that he has deviated from the standard

medical procedure, when the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor is availed by the plaintiff, the need for
expert medical testimony is dispensed with because the injury itself provides the proof of
negligence. The reason is that the general rule on the necessity of expert testimony applies only
to such matters clearly within the domain of medical science, and not to matters that are within
the common knowledge of mankind which may be testified to by anyone familiar with the facts.
Ordinarily, only physicians and surgeons of skill and experience are competent to testify as to
whether a patient has been treated or operated upon with a reasonable degree of skill and care.
However, testimony as to the statements and acts of physicians and surgeons, external
appearances, and manifest conditions which are observable by any one may be given by nonexpert witnesses. Hence, in cases where the res ipsa loquitur is applicable, the court is
permitted to find a physician negligent upon proper proof of injury to the patient, without the aid
of expert testimony, where the court from its fund of common knowledge can determine the
proper standard of care. Where common knowledge and experience teach that a resulting injury
would not have occurred to the patient if due care had been exercised, an inference of
negligence may be drawn giving rise to an application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur without
medical evidence, which is ordinarily required to show not only what occurred but how and why
it occurred. When the doctrine is appropriate, all that the patient must do is prove a nexus
between the particular act or omission complained of and the injury sustained while under the
custody and management of the defendant without need to produce expert medical testimony to
establish the standard of care. Resort to res ipsa loquitor is allowed because there is no other
way, under usual and ordinary conditions, by which the patient can obtain redress for injury
suffered by him.Thus, courts of other jurisdictions have applied the doctrine in the following
situations: leaving of a foreign object in the body of the patient after an operation, injuries
sustained on a healthy part of the body which was not under, or in the area, of treatment,
removal of the wrong part of the body when another part was intended, knocking out a tooth
while a patients jaw was under anesthetic for the removal of his tonsils, and loss of an eye
while the patient was under the influence of anesthetic, during or following an operation for
appendicitis, among others.[17]Petitioners asserted in the Court of Appeals that the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur applies to the present case because Jorge Reyes was merely experiencing
fever and chills for five days and was fully conscious, coherent, and ambulant when he went to
the hospital. Yet, he died after only ten hours from the time of his admission.This contention was
rejected by the appellate court.Petitioners now contend that all requisites for the application of
res ipsa loquitur were present, namely: (1) the accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily
occur unless someone is negligent; (2) the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury
was under the exclusive control of the person in charge; and (3) the injury suffered must not
have been due to any voluntary action or contribution of the person injured.[18]The contention is
without merit. We agree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals. In the Ramos case, the question
was whether a surgeon, an anesthesiologist, and a hospital should be made liable for the
comatose condition of a patient scheduled for cholecystectomy.[19] In that case, the patient was
given anesthesia prior to her operation. Noting that the patient was neurologically sound at the
time of her operation, the Court applied the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as mental brain damage
does not normally occur in a gallblader operation in the absence of negligence of the
anesthesiologist. Taking judicial notice that anesthesia procedures had become so common that
even an ordinary person could tell if it was administered properly, we allowed the testimony of a

witness who was not an expert. In this case, while it is true that the patient died just a few hours
after professional medical assistance was rendered, there is really nothing unusual or
extraordinary about his death. Prior to his admission, the patient already had recurring fevers
and chills for five days unrelieved by the analgesic, antipyretic, and antibiotics given him by his
wife. This shows that he had been suffering from a serious illness and professional medical help
came too late for him.Respondents alleged failure to observe due care was not immediately
apparent to a layman so as to justify application of res ipsa loquitur. The question required
expert opinion on the alleged breach by respondents of the standard of care required by the
circumstances. Furthermore, on the issue of the correctness of her diagnosis, no presumption of
negligence can be applied to Dr. Marlyn Rico. As held in Ramos:. . . . Res ipsa loquitur is not a
rigid or ordinary doctrine to be perfunctorily used but a rule to be cautiously applied, depending
upon the circumstances of each case. It is generally restricted to situations in malpractice cases
where a layman is able to say, as a matter of common knowledge and observation, that the
consequences of professional care were not as such as would ordinarily have followed if due
care had been exercised. A distinction must be made between the failure to secure results, and
the occurrence of something more unusual and not ordinarily found if the service or treatment
rendered followed the usual procedure of those skilled in that particular practice. It must be
conceded that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur can have no application in a suit against a
physician or a surgeon which involves the merits of a diagnosis or of a scientific treatment. The
physician or surgeon is not required at his peril to explain why any particular diagnosis was not
correct, or why any particular scientific treatment did not produce the desired result.[20]Specific
Acts of NegligenceWe turn to the question whether petitioners have established specific acts of
negligence allegedly committed by respondent doctors.Petitioners contend that: (1) Dr. Marlyn
Rico hastily and erroneously relied upon the Widal test, diagnosed Jorges illness as typhoid
fever, and immediately prescribed the administration of the antibiotic chloromycetin;[21] and (2)
Dr. Marvie Blanes erred in ordering the administration of the second dose of 500 milligrams of
chloromycetin barely three hours after the first was given.[22] Petitioners presented the
testimony of Dr. Apolinar Vacalares, Chief Pathologist of the Northern Mindanao Training
Hospital, Cagayan de Oro City, who performed an autopsy on the body of Jorge Reyes. Dr.
Vacalares testified that, based on his findings during the autopsy, Jorge Reyes did not die of
typhoid fever but of shock undetermined, which could be due to allergic reaction or
chloromycetin overdose. We are not persuaded.First. While petitioners presented Dr. Apolinar
Vacalares as an expert witness, we do not find him to be so as he is not a specialist on
infectious diseases like typhoid fever. Furthermore, although he may have had extensive
experience in performing autopsies, he admitted that he had yet to do one on the body of a
typhoid victim at the time he conducted the postmortem on Jorge Reyes. It is also plain from his
testimony that he has treated only about three cases of typhoid fever. Thus, he testified that:[23]
ATTY. PASCUAL:Q Why? Have you not testified earlier that you have never seen a patient who
died of typhoid fever?A In autopsy. But, that was when I was a resident physician yet.Q But you
have not performed an autopsy of a patient who died of typhoid fever?A I have not seen one.Q
And you testified that you have never seen a patient who died of typhoid fever within five days?
A I have not seen one.Q How many typhoid fever cases had you seen while you were in the
general practice of medicine?A In our case we had no widal test that time so we cannot
consider that the typhoid fever is like this and like that. And the widal test does not specify the

time of the typhoid fever.Q The question is: how many typhoid fever cases had you seen in your
general practice regardless of the cases now you practice?A I had only seen three cases.Q And
that was way back in 1964?A Way back after my training in UP.Q Clinically?A Way back before
my training.He is thus not qualified to prove that Dr. Marlyn Rico erred in her diagnosis. Both
lower courts were therefore correct in discarding his testimony, which is really inadmissible.In
Ramos, the defendants presented the testimony of a pulmonologist to prove that brain injury
was due to oxygen deprivation after the patient had bronchospasms[24] triggered by her allergic
response to a drug,[25] and not due to faulty intubation by the anesthesiologist. As the issue
was whether the intubation was properly performed by an anesthesiologist, we rejected the
opinion of the pulmonologist on the ground that he was not: (1) an anesthesiologist who could
enlighten the court about anesthesia practice, procedure, and their complications; nor (2) an
allergologist who could properly advance expert opinion on allergic mediated processes; nor (3)
a pharmacologist who could explain the pharmacologic and toxic effects of the drug allegedly
responsible for the bronchospasms.Second. On the other hand, the two doctors presented by
respondents clearly were experts on the subject. They vouched for the correctness of Dr. Marlyn
Ricos diagnosis. Dr. Peter Gotiong, a diplomate whose specialization is infectious diseases and
microbiology and an associate professor at the Southwestern University College of Medicine
and the Gullas College of Medicine, testified that he has already treated over a thousand cases
of typhoid fever.[26] According to him, when a case of typhoid fever is suspected, the Widal test
is normally used,[27] and if the 1:320 results of the Widal test on Jorge Reyes had been
presented to him along with the patients history, his impression would also be that the patient
was suffering from typhoid fever.[28] As to the treatment of the disease, he stated that
chloromycetin was the drug of choice.[29] He also explained that despite the measures taken by
respondent doctors and the intravenous administration of two doses of chloromycetin,
complications of the disease could not be discounted. His testimony is as follows:[30]ATTY.
PASCUAL:Q If with that count with the test of positive for 1 is to 320, what treatment if any
would be given?A If those are the findings that would be presented to me, the first thing I would
consider would be typhoid fever.Q And presently what are the treatments commonly used?A
Drug of choice of chloramphenical.Q Doctor, if given the same patient and after you have
administered chloramphenical about 3 1/2 hours later, the patient associated with chills,
temperature - 41oC, what could possibly come to your mind?A Well, when it is change in the
clinical finding, you have to think of complication.Q And what will you consider on the
complication of typhoid?A One must first understand that typhoid fever is toximia. The problem
is complications are caused by toxins produced by the bacteria . . . whether you have suffered
complications to think of -- heart toxic myocardities; then you can consider a toxic meningitis
and other complications and perforations and bleeding in the ilium.Q Even that 40-year old
married patient who received medication of chloromycetin of 500 milligrams intravenous, after
the skin test, and received a second dose of chloromycetin of 500 miligrams, 3 hours later, the
patient developed chills . . . rise in temperature to 41oC, and then about 40 minutes later the
temperature rose to 100oF, cardiac rate of 150 per minute who appeared to be coherent,
restless, nauseating, with seizures: what significance could you attach to these clinical
changes?A I would then think of toxemia, which was toxic meningitis and probably a toxic
meningitis because of the high cardiac rate.Q Even if the same patient who, after having given
intramuscular valium, became conscious and coherent about 20 minutes later, have seizure and

cyanosis and rolling of eyeballs and vomitting . . . and death: what significance would you attach
to this development?A We are probably dealing with typhoid to meningitis.Q In such case,
Doctor, what finding if any could you expect on the post-mortem examination?A No, the finding
would be more on the meninges or covering of the brain.Q And in order to see those changes
would it require opening the skull?A Yes.As regards Dr. Vacalares finding during the autopsy
that the deceaseds gastro-intestinal tract was normal, Dr. Rico explained that, while
hyperplasia[31] in the payers patches or layers of the small intestines is present in typhoid
fever, the same may not always be grossly visible and a microscope was needed to see the
texture of the cells.[32]Respondents also presented the testimony of Dr. Ibarra T. Panopio who
is a member of the Philippine and American Board of Pathology, an examiner of the Philippine
Board of Pathology, and chief pathologist at the MetroCebu Community Hospital, Perpetual
Succor Hospital, and the Andres Soriano Jr. Memorial Medical Center. He stated that, as a
clinical pathologist, he recognized that the Widal test is used for typhoid patients, although he
did not encourage its use because a single test would only give a presumption necessitating
that the test be repeated, becoming more conclusive at the second and third weeks of the
disease.[33] He corroborated Dr. Gotiongs testimony that the danger with typhoid fever is really
the possible complications which could develop like perforation, hemorrhage, as well as liver
and cerebral complications.[34] As regards the 1:320 results of the Widal test on Jorge Reyes,
Dr. Panopio stated that no additional information could be obtained from a higher ratio.[35] He
also agreed with Dr. Gotiong that hyperplasia in the payers patches may be microscopic.[36]
Indeed, the standard contemplated is not what is actually the average merit among all known
practitioners from the best to the worst and from the most to the least experienced, but the
reasonable average merit among the ordinarily good physicians.[37] Here, Dr. Marlyn Rico did
not depart from the reasonable standard recommended by the experts as she in fact observed
the due care required under the circumstances. Though the Widal test is not conclusive, it
remains a standard diagnostic test for typhoid fever and, in the present case, greater accuracy
through repeated testing was rendered unobtainable by the early death of the patient. The
results of the Widal test and the patients history of fever with chills for five days, taken with the
fact that typhoid fever was then prevalent as indicated by the fact that the clinic had been
getting about 15 to 20 typhoid cases a month, were sufficient to give upon any doctor of
reasonable skill the impression that Jorge Reyes had typhoid fever.Dr. Rico was also justified in
recommending the administration of the drug chloromycetin, the drug of choice for typhoid fever.
The burden of proving that Jorge Reyes was suffering from any other illness rested with the
petitioners. As they failed to present expert opinion on this, preponderant evidence to support
their contention is clearly absent.Third. Petitioners contend that respondent Dr. Marvie Blanes,
who took over from Dr. Rico, was negligent in ordering the intravenous administration of two
doses of 500 milligrams of chloromycetin at an interval of less than three hours. Petitioners
claim that Jorge Reyes died of anaphylactic shock[38] or possibly from overdose as the second
dose should have been administered five to six hours after the first, per instruction of Dr. Marlyn
Rico. As held by the Court of Appeals, however:That chloromycetin was likewise a proper
prescription is best established by medical authority. Wilson, et. al., in Harrisons Principle of
Internal Medicine, 12th ed. write that chlorampenicol (which is the generic of chloromycetin) is
the drug of choice for typhoid fever and that no drug has yet proven better in promoting a
favorable clinical response. Chlorampenicol (Chloromycetin) is specifically indicated for

bacterial meningitis, typhoid fever, rickettsial infections, bacteriodes infections, etc. (PIMS
Annual, 1994, p. 211) The dosage likewise including the first administration of five hundred
milligrams (500 mg.) at around nine oclock in the evening and the second dose at around 11:30
the same night was still within medically acceptable limits, since the recommended dose of
chloromycetin is one (1) gram every six (6) hours. (cf. Pediatric Drug Handbook, 1st Ed.,
Philippine Pediatric Society, Committee on Therapeutics and Toxicology, 1996). The intravenous
route is likewise correct. (Mansser, ONick, Pharmacology and Therapeutics) Even if the test
was not administered by the physician-on-duty, the evidence introduced that it was Dra. Blanes
who interpreted the results remain uncontroverted. (Decision, pp. 16-17) Once more, this Court
rejects any claim of professional negligence in this regard.. . . .As regards anaphylactic shock,
the usual way of guarding against it prior to the administration of a drug, is the skin test of
which, however, it has been observed: Skin testing with haptenic drugs is generally not reliable.
Certain drugs cause nonspecific histamine release, producing a weal-and-flare reaction in
normal individuals. Immunologic activation of mast cells requires a polyvalent allergen, so a
negative skin test to a univalent haptenic drug does not rule out anaphylactic sensitivity to that
drug. (Terr, Anaphylaxis and Urticaria in Basic and Clinical Immunology, p. 349) What all this
means legally is that even if the deceased suffered from an anaphylactic shock, this, of itself,
would not yet establish the negligence of the appellee-physicians for all that the law requires of
them is that they perform the standard tests and perform standard procedures. The law cannot
require them to predict every possible reaction to all drugs administered. The onus probandi
was on the appellants to establish, before the trial court, that the appellee-physicians ignored
standard medical procedure, prescribed and administered medication with recklessness and
exhibited an absence of the competence and skills expected of general practitioners similarly
situated.[39]Fourth. Petitioners correctly observe that the medical profession is one which, like
the business of a common carrier, is affected with public interest. Moreover, they assert that
since the law imposes upon common carriers the duty of observing extraordinary diligence in
the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers,[40] physicians and surgeons
should have the same duty toward their patients.[41] They also contend that the Court of
Appeals erred when it allegedly assumed that the level of medical practice is lower in Iligan City,
thereby reducing the standard of care and degree of diligence required from physicians and
surgeons in Iligan City.The standard of extraordinary diligence is peculiar to common carriers.
The Civil Code provides:Art. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for
reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the
goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by them, according to the circumstances
of each case. . . .The practice of medicine is a profession engaged in only by qualified
individuals. It is a right earned through years of education, training, and by first obtaining a
license from the state through professional board examinations. Such license may, at any time
and for cause, be revoked by the government. In addition to state regulation, the conduct of
doctors is also strictly governed by the Hippocratic Oath, an ancient code of discipline and
ethical rules which doctors have imposed upon themselves in recognition and acceptance of
their great responsibility to society. Given these safeguards, there is no need to expressly
require of doctors the observance of extraordinary diligence. As it is now, the practice of
medicine is already conditioned upon the highest degree of diligence. And, as we have already
noted, the standard contemplated for doctors is simply the reasonable average merit among

ordinarily good physicians. That is reasonable diligence for doctors or, as the Court of Appeals
called it, the reasonable skill and competence . . . that a physician in the same or similar locality
. . . should apply.WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the decision of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------67. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ORLANDO ACURAM, accusedappellant.G.R. No. 117954. April 27, 2000
D E C I S I O NQUISUMBING, J.:On appeal is the decision rendered on August 24, 1994, by the
Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 22, in Criminal Case No. 91-1161, finding
accused-appellant Orlando Acuram guilty of murder. SupremeOn September 30, 1991,
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Benber Apepe charged appellant with the crime of murder,
allegedly committed as follows: Sjcj"On June 29, 1991, at about 7:00 o'clock in the evening, at
Poblacion, El Salvador, Misamis Oriental, which is within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, with intent to kill and treachery did, then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously and with the use of his armalite rifle, shoot at one Orlando[1] Manabat
who was just standing on the highway waiting for a ride towards home, thus, hitting and
wounding the latter on the right leg or thigh, which caused his death the following day.
CONTRARY TO and in violation of Article 248, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code.[2]Upon
arraignment appellant, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of not guilty to the charge.[3]
Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. Subsequently, the trial court rendered judgment,
disposing as follows: Scjj"WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing facts, convincingly proved
by the prosecution, the accused, ORLANDO ACURAM, is hereby found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt, of the crime of MURDER, qualified by treachery, and is meted the penalty of
reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased ROLANDO MANABAT the
jurisprudential sum of fifty thousand (P50,000.00) pesos, without subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency and to pay the cost of the suit.SO ORDERED."[4]The records disclose that
on June 29, 1991, at around seven o'clock in the evening, Rolando Manabat, Oscar Manabat,
Bartolome Nabe, and Peterson Valendres, after the day's work, proceeded to the market in El
Salvador, Misamis Oriental, to buy fish. Since no fish was available at that time, they decided to
head for home instead. They went to the national highway, stood at the right side facing east
towards the direction of Cagayan de Oro City and waited for a ride there. They flagged down an
approaching passenger jeepney which, however, swerved dangerously towards them. At this
juncture, Rolando Manabat shouted at the jeep "Pesteng yawa-a kamo, Manligis man kamo "
(You devils, why did you try to run over us?). A passenger inside the jeepney shouted back,
"Noano man diay, isog mo?" (Why? Are you brave?). Immediately thereafter, two gunshots rang
out in the air, accompanied by sparks coming from the front right side of the jeepney. Then
Rolando shouted, "Agay. I was shot." The vehicle did not stop but instead speeded towards the
direction of Cagayan de Oro City. Wounded on the right knee, Rolando was brought by his
companions to the Cagayan de Oro Medical Center. Later on, they were informed that Rolando
needed blood transfusion and so they transferred him at around 11:25 P.M. to the Northern
Mindanao Regional Hospital in the same city. JjscUpon arrival at the hospital, Rolando was
examined by Dr. Ismael Naypa, Jr. The doctor found the victim's blood pressure to be just forty
over zero (40/0) and the victim's right leg was heavily bandaged. He decided to operate on the
victim when the latter's blood pressure stabilized. At about 5:00 A.M. the following day, the

victim underwent surgery. Unfortunately, the victim died at around 11:00 A.M. Dr. Naypa later
testified that the cause of Rolando's death was "secondary to huddle respiratory syndrome
secondary to blood loss, secondary to gunshot wounds", or briefly, massive loss of blood due to
gunshot wound. He stated that under normal circumstances, the wound would not necessarily
cause death but in this case where the wound transected the major part of the leg, the wound
was fatal. He clarified that the victim sustained only one gunshot wound which entered at the
front portion of the right knee and exited at the back of the right knee, causing two wounds.[5]
The El Salvador police conducted investigation on the incident. It was discovered that appellant
Orlando Acuram, a policeman assigned with the 421st PNP Company based at San Martin,
Villanueva, Misamis Oriental, was among the passengers of the errant jeepney. He was seated
at the front, right side of the jeepney and was the only one among its passengers who was
carrying a firearm. Pending investigation, he was restricted to the camp effective July 1, 1991,
upon orders of his commanding officer, Major Rodolfo De La Piedra.[6] Appellant was later
surrendered by his commanding officer to the custody of the court on the basis of the warrant of
arrest issued by MCTC Judge Evelyn Nery.[7] On motion by the prosecution and without
objection from the defense, the trial court suspended appellant from the service and ordered his
detention at the provincial jail.[8]During the trial, appellant admitted that he was on board the
mentioned jeepney and had a gun at that time but denied firing it. He claimed that it was
impossible for him to fire his rifle during that time since he was sitting at the front seat of the
jeepney, sandwiched between the driver and the latter's father-in-law. Moreover, he said that the
rifle was locked and wrapped by his jacket and its barrel was even pointed towards the driver.[9]
The trial court found the version of the defense weak, self-serving and unreliable. On the basis
of the evidence presented by the prosecution, the court found appellant guilty as charged.
Insisting on his innocence, appellant readily filed his notice of appeal.[10] In his brief, appellant
raises the following errors allegedly committed by the trial court: Edpmis"ITHE TRIAL COURT
GRAVELY ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT ACCUSED APPELLANT TOOK FLIGHT OR
ESCAPED AFTER THE NIGHT OF THE INCIDENT OR IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF VOLUNTARY SURRENDER.IITHE TRIAL COURT ERRED
IN DECLARING THAT THE KILLING WAS ATTENDED BY THE QUALIFYING
CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY, GRANTING ARGUENDO THAT THE ACCUSED
APPELLANT IS GUILTY.IIITHE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT ACCUSEDAPPELLANT IS THE PERPETRATOR OF THE CRIME CHARGED, DESPITE THE FACT THAT
ACCUSED WAS NOT PROPERLY AND CONCLUSIVELY IDENTIFIED, AND THE ALLEGED
WEAPON NOT POSITIVELY TESTED.IVTHAT THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
DISREGARDING EVIDENCE POINTING TO THE INNOCENCE OF THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANT, THAT IS, THE EXISTENCE OF EFFICIENT INTERVENING CAUSE, WHICH IS
THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE DEATH OF THE VICTIM."[11]We shall take up in seriatim
the challenges posed by appellant to the credibility and sufficiency of the evidence for the
prosecution. We shall also consider the weight and credibility of his defense.To begin with, while
appellant denies that he fled and hid after the shooting incident, we find that his behavior proves
otherwise. Appellant admits that he was at the scene of the crime at the time the shooting
happened. Considering that he is a law enforcement officer, the unusual incident should have at
least elicited his curiosity and he should have inquired about it. However, he chose to ignore the
incident and go his way.[12] That a policeman could display such indifference to a crime

committed in his presence is highly incredible. While it was true that he reported for duty the day
after the incident, the following day, he was ordered by his commanding officer restricted within
the camp pending investigation of the case. By this time, appellant must have learned that his
commanding officer had received a radio message and that he was already a suspect. As the
trial court noted, no superior officer will hold back from any of his men involved, such a grave
charge. Despite these, appellant did not present himself before the police in El Salvador,
Misamis Oriental. Instead, he was conveniently nowhere to be found. MisoedpThus, appellant's
first contention that he is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, in our
view, is quite untenable. The essence of voluntary surrender is spontaneity and the intent of the
accused to give himself up and submit himself unconditionally to the authorities either because
he acknowledges his guilt or he wishes to save them the trouble and expense necessarily
incurred in his search and capture.[13] In this case, it was appellant's commanding officer who
surrendered him to the custody of the court. Being restrained by one's superiors to stay within
the camp without submitting to the investigating authorities concerned, is not tantamount to
voluntary surrender as contemplated by law. The trial court is correct in not appreciating the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender in appellant's favor. MisedpOn his second
assignment of error, however, we find convincing merit. Appellant asserts that the trial court
erred in concluding that the killing was qualified by treachery. On this point, we agree. For
treachery to be considered an aggravating circumstance, there must be proof that the accused
consciously adopted a mode of attack to facilitate the perpetration of the killing without risk to
himself.[14] In this case, the shooting was done at the spur of the moment. As observed by the
trial court, the victim had shouted damning curses at the driver and the passengers of the
jeepney. The shooting was on instantaneous response to the cursing, as appellant correctly
claimed.[15] Treachery cannot be appreciated where the accused shot the victim as a result of a
rash and impetuous impulse rather than from a deliberate act of the will.[16]Thirdly, appellant
contends that the trial court erred in ruling that he was the perpetrator of the crime. He claims he
was not conclusively identified and the alleged fatal weapon was not positively tested. True,
prosecution witnesses did not positively identify appellant as the one who fired the gun at the
victim. Nevertheless, direct evidence of the commission of the crime is not the only matrix where
the trial court may draw its conclusions and findings of guilt.[17] It is settled that conviction may
be based on circumstantial evidence provided that the following requisites must concur: (a)
there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt.[18] Circumstantial evidence could be of similar weight and probative
value as direct evidence. From direct evidence of a minor fact or facts, by a chain of
circumstances the mind is led intuitively, or by a conscious process of reasoning, towards a
conviction that from said fact or facts some other facts may be validly inferred.[19] No greater
degree of certainty is required when the evidence is circumstantial than when it is direct. In
either case, what is required is that there be proof beyond reasonable doubt that the crime was
committed and that the accused committed the crime.[20]As noted by the trial court and the
Solicitor General, the evidence for the prosecution is replete with details, duly proven by the
prosecution and to some extent by admissions of the defense, enough to sustain the guilt of
appellant. These are: (1) The appellant was a former member of the Philippine Constabulary
and, during the incident, was a member of the Philippine National Police. He was skilled in

handling firearms. (2) The appellant was issued a firearm (armalite rifle) by his command, which
he was then carrying with him before, during and after the incident. (3) At the particular date,
time and place of the incident, appellant was carrying his duly issued armalite rifle inside the
jeepney from where the gunfire came from. (4) The appellant was sitting on the extreme frontright-side of the jeepney where the sparks of the gunbursts were seen and heard by the
witnesses. (5) There were no other persons with a rifle inside the jeepney except the appellant.
(6) The empty shells of an armalite rifle were recovered at the place where the fatal shooting
occurred. (7) The appellant did not go forward to the authorities to present himself until after a
warrant of arrest was issued and, in fact, until his actual arrest.[21]The aforecited circumstances
taken together constitute an unbroken chain leading to a reasonable conclusion that appellant,
to the exclusion of others, was responsible for the victim's death. They constitute proof beyond
reasonable doubt that appellant was the perpetrator of the offense. It is the height of
desperation on appellant's part to insist that there should be an eyewitness to the precise
moment the shot was fired considering the sudden and completely unexpected shooting of the
victim.[22] Here, circumstantial evidence suffices. EdpAppellant's insistence on his innocence in
view of the absence of paraffin and ballistic tests, in our view, is far from convincing. Suffice it to
state that even negative findings of the paraffin test do not conclusively show that a person did
not fire a gun. The absence of nitrates could be explained if a person discharged a firearm with
gloves on, or if he thoroughly washed his hands thereafter.[23]Lastly, in his attempt to exculpate
himself, appellant blames the death of the victim on the lack of prompt and proper medical
attention given. He insists that the delay in giving proper medical attendance to the victim
constitutes an efficient intervening cause which exempts him from criminal responsibility. This
assertion is disingenuous, to say the least. Appellant never introduced proof to support his
allegation that the attending doctors in this case were negligent in treating the victim. On the
contrary, Dr. Ismael Naypa, Jr., testified that the attending doctor at the Cagayan de Oro
Medical Center tried his best in treating the victim by applying bandage on the injured leg to
prevent hemorrhage. He added that the victim was immediately given blood transfusion at the
Northern Mindanao Regional Hospital when the doctor found out that the victim had a very low
blood pressure. Thereafter, the victim's blood pressure stabilized. Then, the doctor operated the
victim as the main blood vessel of the victim's right leg was cut, thereby causing massive loss of
blood. The surgery was finished in three hours. Unfortunately, the victim died hours later. We
cannot hold the attending doctors liable for the death of the victim. The perceived delay in giving
medical treatment to the victim does not break at all the causal connection between the
wrongful act of the appellant and the injuries sustained by the victim. It does not constitute
efficient intervening cause. The proximate cause of the death of the deceased is the shooting by
the appellant. It is settled that anyone inflicting injuries is responsible for all the consequences of
his criminal act such as death that supervenes in consequence of the injuries. The fact that the
injured did not receive proper medical attendance would not affect appellant's criminal
responsibility. The rule is founded on the practical policy of closing to the wrongdoer a
convenient avenue of escape from the just consequences of his wrongful act. If the rule were
otherwise, many criminals could avoid just accounting for their acts by merely establishing a
doubt as to the immediate cause of death.[24]To conclude, since the qualifying circumstance
was not proved in this case, the crime committed is only homicide, not murder. Under Article
249 of the Revised Penal Code, the applicable penalty for homicide is only reclusion temporal.

As there is neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance found by the trial court or shown
after a review of the records, the penalty in this case shall be fixed in its medium period of
reclusion temporal, which ranges from a minimum of 14 years, 8 months and 1 day to a
maximum of 17 years and 4 months. Further applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
imposable penalty shall be within the range of prision mayor as a minimum to reclusion
temporal in its medium period as the maximum. The range of prision mayor is from 6 years and
1 day to 12 years. The span of reclusion temporal, medium, is from 14 years, 8 months and 1
day to 17 years and 4 months. EdpscWHEREFORE, the assailed DECISION of the Regional
Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 22, in Criminal Case No. 91-1161, is hereby
MODIFIED. Appellant Orlando Acuram is hereby found GUILTY of HOMICIDE and sentenced to
suffer a prison term of 10 years of the medium period of prision mayor, as minimum, to 15 years
and 10 months and 1 day of the medium period of reclusion temporal, as maximum, with
accessory penalties provided by law, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Rolando Manabat
in the amount of P50,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay
the costs.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------68. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. DOMINICO LICANDA y
BOLANTI, accused-appellant.G.R. No. 134084. May 4, 2000D E C I S I O NMENDOZA, J.:
This is an automatic appeal from the decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 129,
Caloocan City, finding accused-appellant guilty of raping his 13-year old daughter and
sentencing him to death and to pay the victim P50,000.00 in damages. CourtThe complaint,
filed by Nelita Mahinay, on August 14, 1997 and adopted by the prosecution as Information,
alleged:That on or about the 11th day of August 1997 in Caloocan City, M.M. and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then the natural father of
the victim, NELITA MAHINAY Y MONTINO, a minor of 13 years old, with lewd design, and by
means of threats and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously lie and
have sexual intercourse with his daughter, NELITA MAHINAY Y MONTINO against her will and
without her consent.[2]To the crime thus charged, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty,
whereupon he was tried. JlexjThe prosecution presented evidence showing the following: Nelita
Mahinay is one of the children of accused-appellant and Dioleta Mahinay. She was born on July
14, 1984 in Samar and reached only up to the third grade in school. In 1997, the family moved
to Manila and, at the time material to this case, stayed in the house of Nelitas grandmother in
Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City.[3]Nelita testified that before her family moved to Manila,
accused-appellant had already raped her on several occasions. The first incident occurred on
September 21, 1996 when she was only 12 years old. With regard to the rape subject of this
case, she testified that it took place in the evening of "August 4 or 5, 1997."[4] That night, she
and a seven-year old cousin slept on the floor of the living room of her grandmothers house,
while her parents slept near the terrace, about a meter from her. When her mother was already
asleep, accused-appellant moved beside her. The following is her narration in open court of
what subsequently took place:[5]Fiscal LomadillaQ What happened after you said your father
transferred near you?A He put off my dress Sir.Q What else?A And then he told me not to make
any noise because if not, he is going to stab me and my mother Sir.Q Why? Was he holding
anything at that time?A No answer. . .Atty. OngtecoThe question is leading your Honor.Court
Because of the low intelligence of the witness, I can allow that. Sige, answer.WitnessA A bladed

weapon your Honor.Fiscal LomadillaQ What did you do, if any?A I cried Sir.Q Why did you cry?
A Because of what he did to me Sir.Q When he said that you should not make any noise, what
did he do next?A "Kinantot po niya ako".(He raped me Sir.)Q How did he rape you?A He placed
h[im]self on my top Sir.Q What happened next after he placed h[im]self on top of you?A He
made sex with me Sir.Fiscal LomadillaQ What was he wearing when he placed h[im]self on top
of you?A A brief Sir.Q When you said he had sex with you, was his brief still on?A No
answer . . .Atty. OngtecoLeading you Honor.CourtAs I said earlier, because of the low
intelligence of this witness, you can ask leading questions . . ., answer.WitnessA Yes your
Honor.Fiscal LomadillaQ How long did he make sex with you?A Less than an hour Sir.Q Then,
what did you feel [after] he had sex with you?A Pain Sir.Q What part of your body did you feel
the pain?A "Sa pekpek ko po."(In my vagina Sir)The following morning, she told her mother
what happened. The latter sought the help of Nelitas uncle who accompanied them to the office
of the Bantay Bata Foundation of the TV station ABS-CBN. There, they were advised that Nelita
should be examined by a doctor.[6]On the same day, Nelita underwent a physical examination
conducted by Dr. Dennis Bellin, a medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation,
who issued the following certification:[7]FINDINGS:GENERAL AND EXTRAGENITAL:Fairly
developed, fairly nourished and coherent female subject. Breasts are conical with dark brown
areola and nipples from which no secretions could be pressed out. Abdomen is flat and soft.
GENITAL:There is scanty growth of pubic hair. Labia majora are full, convex and coaptated with
the pinkish brown labia minora presenting in between. On separating the same disclosed an
elastic, fleshy-type hymen with deep healed lacerations at 4 and 7 oclock and shallow healed
laceration at 9 oclock positions. External vaginal orifice offers moderate resistance to the
introduction of the examining index finger and the virgin-sized vaginal speculum. Vaginal canal
is narrow with prominent rugosities. Cervix is normal in size, color and consistency.
CONCLUSION:Subject is in non-virgin state physically.There are no external signs of
application of any form of violence.REMARKS:Vaginal and peri-urethral smears are negative for
gram-negative diplococci and for spermatozoa.Dr. Bellin testified that in his opinion, the healed
lacerations in Nelitas genitalia were more than three weeks old and had not been inflicted on
the day prior to the examination. He added that these lacerations served as the basis for his
conclusion that complainant is in a "non-virgin state." The lacerations, he continued, were
caused by the introduction of a hard blunt object into the victims genitalia such as an erect
penis or a finger.[8]The prosecution presented Nelitas mother, Dioleta Mahinay. She testified
that at around 11 in the evening of August 11, 1997, she woke up and found her husband on top
of her daughter (nakatumbaw) making some motions (gumagalaw), while her daughter was
crying. She said she could not do anything because she was afraid of her husband who always
carried a knife with him. However, she did confront him later about the incident, but her husband
merely kept quiet. Dioleta corroborated her daughters testimony that the following morning they
sought assistance from the office of the Bantay Bata Foundation of ABS-CBN and that, upon
advice, she had her daughter examined by a doctor that same day. Afterwards, they reported
the incident to the police as a result of which accused-appellant was arrested.[9]Dioleta stated
that when her husband was on top of their daughter, he had his briefs on while her daughter had
on a pair of short pants and blouse. On cross-examination, she added that her husband had a
knife tucked in his waist. The trial court noted the tendency of the witness to laugh whenever
she was embarrassed by questions regarding the details of the rape of her daughter.[10]

Accused-appellant testified in his behalf. After stating that he was 53 years old, married, a
construction worker and a resident of Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City, he only gave the following
testimony:[11]Atty. OngtecoThe witness your Honor will deny the charges filed against him. With
the kind permission of the Honorable Court.Q Mr. Witness, did you rape Ms. Nelita Mahinay?A
No, sir.Atty. Ongteco:No further questions your Honor.On cross-examination, the defense
objected to the questions concerning accused-appellants filiation to Nelita and his relationship
with Dioleta Mahinay, on the ground that this matter was outside the scope of the direct
examination. But as accused-appellant himself stated that he is married, the lower court allowed
the prosecution to question accused-appellant regarding his civil status. He testified that Dioleta
Mahinay is his wife and that he has five children by her. When asked however whether he is
related to, or knew Nelita, he did not answer but remained silent. The trial court took this to
mean that accused-appellant was answering in the negative.[12]On June 10, 1998, the trial
court rendered its decision finding accused-appellant guilty. The dispositive portion of its
decision reads:[13]WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds the accused
DOMINICO LICANDA y BOLANTI guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Rape, as defined and
penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11, paragraph 1
of Republic Act No. 7659. Accordingly, he shall serve the penalty of Death.By way of damages,
and pursuant to Article 2202 of the Civil Code and Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, the
accused shall pay complaining witness Nelita Mahinay the sum of P50,000.00, without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.. . . .In this appeal, accused-appellants sole
assignment of error is that the trial court erred in convicting him despite the alleged failure of the
prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.[14]First. Accused-appellant capitalizes
on Nelitas testimony that her father had his briefs on when he went on top of her and raped her.
He contends that this proves that the rape was not consummated.[15]The contention has no
merit. Admittedly, rape under the first paragraph of Art. 335[16] of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659, is consummated when there is penetration, no matter how
slight, of the victims genitalia[17] under any of the circumstances enumerated therein.[18] It is
also settled that inconsistencies between two statements of a witness should be determined not
by considering words or phrases separately, but by the entire impression or effect of what has
been said or done.[19]In this case, Nelita categorically stated that accused-appellant was able
to have sexual intercourse with her ("Kinantot niya ako") for less than an hour by threatening her
with a bladed weapon, as a result of which she felt pain in her genitalia. This is an assertion that
accused-appellant was able to consummate the rape. Her statement that her father was
wearing briefs should be taken to mean, as the lower court said,[20] that accused-appellant was
wearing briefs but he subsequently removed or lowered it during the sexual act to expose his
penis. It is to be remembered that accused-appellant was sleeping beside his wife about a
meter away from Nelita. It was unlikely then that he would pull down his briefs before moving
over to Nelitas side. Indeed, when a woman in this case, a girl barely in her teens says
she has been raped, she in effect says all that is necessary to show that she has been raped,
provided her testimony is credible.[21]In this case, the trial court noted:[22]. . . . Despite her
tender age and being unlettered, the complaining witness tearfully narrated the harrowing
experiences she went through with her father, starting from the time she was only 12 years of
age in Samar up to the time the family moved to Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City. Complainants
tearful testimony abundantly demonstrated her anguish, even anger. She was emotionally

bruised and scarred for life. For instead of being protected and showered with the loving care of
the very person who brought her into this world, the latter, her very own father, was the one who
wrecked her future and shattered whatever dreams she might still have to survive her immense
poverty . . . .In a clear, direct and categorical manner, the complaining witness testified that her
own father, the accused, raped her not only in Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City which gave rise
to this case but also in Samar where the sexual assaults were "maraming beses na po."
When a woman, more so if she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in effect all
that is necessary to show that the rape was committed. (People vs. Vitor, 245 SCRA 392.)The
trial courts evaluation of Nelitas credibility is entitled to the highest respect for it had the
opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witness on the stand.[23] We have carefully
examined the records of the case, and we find no ground for a reversal of the finding of the trial
court. LexjurisIndeed, no woman, especially one of such tender age as Nelita, would contrive a
rape story, allow an examination of her private parts and permit herself to be subjected to
scrutiny at a public trial if she is not motivated solely by a desire to have the culprit apprehended
and punished.[24] Her tale of sexual abuse is credible in the absence of a showing that she had
cause to falsely implicate accused-appellant.[25]On the other hand, the trial court correctly
dismissed the claim of Nelitas mother that accused-appellants knife was tucked in his waist
while he was having intercourse with the child.[26] This is contrary to Nelitas testimony that
accused-appellant held the knife in his hand and threatened her with it. For the same reason,
Dioleta Mahinays claim that accused-appellant was wearing briefs and that her daughter had a
blouse and a pair of shorts on during the sexual act cannot prevail over Nelitas direct testimony
that accused-appellant removed her clothes and then forcibly had intercourse with her. As Nelita
was the victim, her account of the rape is more credible.Accused-appellant points out alleged
discrepancies in Nelitas testimony with regard to the date when the rape took place and when
she reported it to her mother. JurismisNelita testified that the rape took place on "August 4 or 5,
1997." This is in conflict with the allegation in the Information that accused-appellant committed
the rape on August 11, 1997. It appears, however, that the rape did take place on the latter date
because the certification issued by Dr. Bellin states that complainant was examined by him on
August 12, 1997, and Nelita and her mother had testified that she (Nelita) was examined by Dr.
Bellin the day after the rape. In any event, the mistake in Nelitas testimony does not impair her
credibility, considering the proximity of the dates involved. Indeed, we have held that the failure
of a victim to state the exact date and time of the commission of the rape is a minor matter
which can be expected to happen when the witness is made to recount the details of a traumatic
experience in open court and in the presence of other people.[27] Far from detracting from the
truthfulness of her account, the mistake buttresses, rather than weakens, Nelitas credibility[28]
since it shows that Nelita has not been rehearsed.[29]The same reason applies with regard to
Nelitas testimony that she informed her mother of the rape on July 24, 1997, which is obviously
erroneous, since the rape took place on August 11, 1997. The Solicitor General says that this
error may have been due to the fact that Nelita testified concerning several incidents of rape of
which she was the victim, and/or to the lengthy direct examination on the stand which could
have easily confused her as to the correct dates.[30] The Court agrees. Besides, as already
intimated above, error-free testimonies cannot be expected, especially when a witness is
narrating the details of a harrowing experience.[31] As long as the testimony is consistent on
material points, slightly conflicting statements will not undermine the witness credibility nor the

veracity of the testimony.[32]Second. Accused-appellant makes much of the findings of Dr.

Bellin that the lacerations in the hymen were not inflicted on Nelita on the day prior to the
examination.[33] To be sure, a medical examination is not indispensable for the successful
prosecution of the crime of rape,[34] and the presence of healed hymenal laceration does not
negate the commission of rape,[35] especially if, as in this case, Nelita claims to have been
raped several times by accused-appellant prior to the conduct of a medical examination. If any,
Dr. Bellins findings further bolster Nelitas tale of the prior incidents of rape.Third. The foregoing
notwithstanding, the Court finds merit in accused-appellants contention, to which the Solicitor
General agrees,[36] that the prosecution failed to establish the qualifying circumstance of
filiation between Nelita and accused-appellant as alleged in the Information. JjjurisIn
prosecutions for rape, where the penalty imposable is death by virtue of the presence of the
circumstances[37] mentioned in Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by 11 of
R.A. No. 7659, the pertinent circumstances must be alleged in the Information and proved
during the trial. This is because these circumstances have the effect of increasing the imposable
penalty from reclusion perpetua to death, and partake of the nature of qualifying circumstances
of which the accused must be informed.[38]In this case, the concurrence of the minority of the
victim and her filiation with accused-appellant under 11(1) of R.A. No. 7659, as amended, are
alleged in the Information, which states that accused-appellant is "the natural father of the
victim" and that by means of threats and intimidation, he succeeded in having sexual
intercourse "with his daughter" who was then "a minor . . . 13 years old." However, although
Nelitas minority was established,[39] the filiation between accused-appellant and Nelita was not
satisfactorily proven. The prosecution evidence fails to show that accused-appellant is the
natural father of Nelita. It is noted that Nelita merely stated that accused-appellant is her father
and Dioleta Mahinay her mother,[40] while the latter testified that accused-appellant is her
husband and Nelita her daughter.[41] Accused-appellant, on the other hand, did not admit that
Nelita is his daughter, although he did state that Dioleta Mahinay is his "wife." Considering that
accused-appellants surname is "Licanda" while that of Nelita and her mother is "Mahinay," there
is ground to doubt, as the Solicitor General says,[42] whether appellant is legally married to
Dioleta Mahinay and whether Nelita is their child. In cases of incestuous rape where
complainant is the daughter of the common-law spouse of the accused, the complainant
invariably bears the surname of her mother.[43] In this case, it is curious that Dioleta Mahinay
did not testify that Nelita is her daughter by accused-appellant. On the other hand, although
accused-appellant said that he has five children by Dioleta Mahinay, he did not say that Nelita is
one of them, nor did he answer questions concerning his filiation with complainant. justiceNelita
tried to explain the discrepancy by stating that accused-appellant had two surnames and that
"Mahinay" is accused-appellants other surname.[44] This is highly suspect since her mother
also bears the same surname.[45] In any event, the problem could have been easily remedied
by the prosecution by presenting Nelitas birth certificate or any other documentary evidence
which shows the name of Nelitas father. The failure of the prosecution to do so should be taken
in favor of accused-appellant considering that it has the burden of proving its allegations[46]
especially in a death penalty case where the life of a human being hangs in the balance.[47] In
view of the foregoing, the penalty imposed by the trial court must be reduced to reclusion
perpetua as there is in effect a failure to prove the qualifying circumstance of filiation as alleged
in the Information.[48]Nor can accused-appellants use of a bladed weapon in committing the

rape serve as basis for the imposition of the death penalty. This circumstance, which under Art.
335, increases the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death,[49] must be so alleged in the
Information. This, however, was not done in this case.Neither can accused-appellant be held
liable for the other rapes testified to by Nelita, specifically that committed on September 21,
1996, since no Information covering such crime has been filed against him. Because of the right
of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, he cannot
be convicted of a crime with which he has not been charged even if the evidence shows that he
committed the same.[50]Fourth. In addition to the P50,000.00 civil indemnity awarded by the
trial court, moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 should likewise be given to Nelita ,
which is to be automatically awarded in rape cases without need of proof.[51]WHEREFORE, the
decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 129, Caloocan City, is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that accused-appellants sentence is reduced to reclusion perpetua, and he is
ordered to pay complainant Nelita Mahinay the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages, in
addition to the amount of P50,000.00 civil indemnity awarded by the trial court.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------69. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MARIO DUMANON y
DUMANACAL and RICARDO LABRADOR y SUACILLO, alias RIC-RIC, accusedappellants.
G.R. No. 123096. December 18, 2000
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:Accused-appellants Mario Dumanon y Dumanacal (hereafter MARIO) and
Ricardo Labrador y Suacillo (hereafter RICARDO) appeal from the decision[1] of the Regional
Trial Court of Surigao City, Branch 30, in Criminal Case No. 4247, finding them guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, and to pay the complainant Anacurita Anib (hereafter ANACURITA) the amount of
P20,000 as moral damages and the costs of the suit.On 3 December 1993, Dominga Anib filed
a complaint for rape[2] against MARIO and RICARDO on behalf of her mentally retarded
daughter ANACURITA before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Tagana-an-Sison,
Surigao del Norte. The complaint, docketed as Criminal Case No. 993, alleged that
ANACURITA is a retardate and the crime was committed at midnight of 2 December 1993.
Submitted in support of the complaint was a medical certificate[3] issued by the Surigao
Provincial Hospital and the affidavits[4]of Dominga Anib, Eduardo Diaz and Anita Lisondra.After
conducting a preliminary examination, the MCTC found a prima facie case for rape, confirmed
the arrest and detention of MARIO and RICARDO without bail, and required them to submit
their counter-affidavits. Instead of filing their counter-affidavits, MARIO and RICARDO filed a
joint motion to dismiss the case on the grounds that the crime of rape cannot be prosecuted de
oficio and the complaint was not signed by the offended party, there being no proof that the
latter was incapacitated.In its resolution[5] of 10 January 1994, the MCTC ruled that the
complaint was properly filed by the mother of ANACURITA since the latter is a retarded woman
and stated that by merely looking upon the victim, the Court finds that indeed Anacurita Anib is
a retarded woman. It also found probable cause that MARIO and RICARDO committed the
crime charged and forwarded the case to the Provincial Prosecutor for the filing of the
information.On 24 January 1994, the Provincial Prosecutors Office of Surigao del Norte filed

with the Regional Trial Court of Surigao del Norte a complaint[6] for rape, bearing the thumb
mark of ANACURITA and approved by the Provincial Prosecutor. The complaint, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 4247 and assigned to Branch 30 thereof, alleges as follows:That on or about
the 2nd day of December 1993, at 12:00 oclock [sic] midnight, more or less, at Barangay
Aurora, Tagana-an, Surigao del Norte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, said accused with full freedom and intelligence did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously by means of violence and intimidation, and taking advantage of nighttime drag MISS
ANACURITA ANIB y DUMANACAL inside the vacant house of Jaime Batac and have carnal
knowledge of herein complainant against her will.All contrary to law and with the aggravating
circumstances of nighttime and in an uninhabited place.MARIO and RICARDO sought for a
reinvestigation of the case. They questioned the unsigned complaint for rape and alleged that
ANACURITAs filing of the complaint belied her mental incapacity. Moreover, she never gave a
categorical statement that she was raped. The defense further asserted as hearsay the
statement of Dominga Anib and Anita Lisondra in their affidavits that ANACURITA confessed to
them that she was raped. They also assailed the prosecution for its failure to present any
eyewitness. Finally, they maintained that they were deprived of their right to submit their
counter-affidavits.The prosecution opposed the motion for reinvestigation. It claimed that
MARIO and RICARDO were actually required but failed to submit their counter-affidavits.
Moreover, since it was already resolved that ANACURITA is a retardate, thus mentally
incapacitated, the law recognizes the right of her mother to file the complaint on her behalf.
However, as stated in the decision of the trial court, MARIO and RICARDO abandoned the
motion and instead proceeded with the arraignment wherein they separately entered a plea of
not guilty.[7]Trial on the merits started only on 2 June 1994 and was completed on 22 November
1994. In its decision the trial court attributed the delay to postponements at the instance of
both the prosecution and the defense, especially that the parties, being related, manifested for a
possible settlement of the case. The prosecution presented as witnesses ANACURITA,
Dominga Anib, Eduardo Dizon and Dr. Gregoria Beberino-Comelon.ANACURITA testified in
court seven months after she was raped. She was then thirty-eight years old. According to her
she knew MARIO and RICARDO as they were her friends and townmates. In the early evening
of 2 December 1993, she was in the municipal gymnasium of Tagana-an, Surigao del Norte,
watching a parade of gays. At about 11:00 p.m. she left and headed for her home in barangay
Aurora, Tagana-an. As she was walking, she passed by RICARDO who was then sitting on a
bench, apparently drunk. Suddenly, RICARDO blocked her way. She tried to break free but he
continued to obstruct her way. Then he pulled her and brought her to the deserted house of
Jaime Batac, which was just about nine meters away from her home. Inside the house,
RICARDO stripped off his clothes and immediately removed her underwear. He then placed his
penis inside her vagina. After satisfying his lust, RICARDO ran away. Then she put on her
underwear. After a few minutes, MARIO, who was likewise drunk, entered Jaimes house,
pulled her down and undressed her. Mario inserted his penis inside her vagina and just like
RICARDO ran away after the sexual intercourse. ANACURITA went home and told her mother
what had happened.[8]Dominga Anib testified that MARIO and RICARDO are her neighbors and
that the former is even her relative. In the evening of 2 December 1993, ANACURITA was out
watching a show at the municipal gymnasium. At about midnight she was awakened by her
husband who told her that ANACURITA had not yet arrived. When she turned on the light, she

heard the protesting voice of her daughter coming from the house of Jaime Batac. She went to
the house and dragged ANACURITA home. ANACURITA was holding her underwear and her
hair and dress were soiled. She asked ANACURITA if any man did anything to her.
ANACURITA told her that she had just been raped by RICARDO and MARIO inside Jaimes
house. Accompanied by Eduardo Diaz, Dominga immediately reported the incident to the
barangay captain and then later, to the police. On 4 December 1993, Dominga brought
ANACURITA to the Provincial Hospital of Surigao del Norte for examination. The turn of events
caused Dominga to suffer shame and embarrassment.[9]According to Eduardo Diaz, he knew
MARIO and RICARDO. MARIO is a close friend and relative. He, MARIO and RICARDO and
the Anibs reside along the same street. On 2 December 1993, Eduardo was in the municipal
gymnasium to watch a show. He left for home at 10:00 p.m. Along the way he saw MARIO and
RICARDO. When he arrived home, he learned that there was no more kerosene for the lamps.
He went out to buy kerosene and a cigarette at the store next door. He saw MARIO at the store
who asked a cigarette from him. He obliged and then went back home. He wanted to eat; but
when he found out that there was no more food, he decided to request some viand from
MARIO. On the road he saw MARIO going inside the house of Jaime Batac. So, he returned
home. Later, he heard the voice of Dominga Anib from her house berating her weeping
daughter ANACURITA. He overheard that ANACURITA came from the house of Jaime Batac,
which was near the house of the Anibs. Dominga ordered ANACURITA to stay upstairs while
she went out of their house. It was about midnight.Dominga saw Eduardo and sought his help.
Eduardo accompanied Dominga to the barangay captain, Mr. Jaime Pelarco.[10] The latter
looked for RICARDO and MARIO, who were eventually arrested and detained.Dr. Gregoria
Beberino-Comelon physically examined ANACURITA on 4 December 1993 and issued the
corresponding medical certificate.[11] She noted a fresh hymenal laceration at 6 oclock and a
hematoma on the thigh. The laceration could have been caused by an erect male penis while
the hematoma was probably inflicted by a fist blow. She also found a vaginal discharge of
yellowish and whitish substance. She had the specimen brought to the laboratory for
examination for the presence of sperms. However, she was not informed of the results of the
examination.[12]Only MARIO testified for the defense while RICARDO opted not to take the
witness stand.MARIO claimed that he and ANACURITA, his distant cousin, were lovers. On the
evening of 2 December 1993 he was also at the municipal gymnasium to watch a coronation
event. At about 10:15 p.m. he decided to go home and along the way, he saw ANACURITA and
they talked by the fence of Jaime Batacs house. He confessed his love for her and he
suggested if it was possible for them to have sexual intercourse. ANACURITA nodded her head
in consent and replied that she had yearned to bear a child at her age. They talked for ten
minutes. ANACURITA invited him inside the abandoned house of Jaime so that they would not
be seen by her mother. Inside Jaimes house, he asked her again if he could have sexual
intercourse with her. She consented. ANACURITA had no reaction at all during their sexual
intimacy. After they were done, he escorted her to her house and then he walked toward his
house. He immediately heard Dominga Anib scold ANACURITA. Dominga demanded to know
where she came from and why she arrived late. In the early morning of the following day the
police arrested and detained him.[13]After the defense rested its case the trial court required
both parties to submit their respective memoranda. The parties waived the submission thereof.
The trial court rendered its decision of 21 June 1995. It specifically noted therein the trial

judges personal impression which he entered in his personal notes that ANACURITA is a
mongoloid (physically) and mentally deficient who has difficulty in understanding the questions.
While conceding that ANACURITAs narration of how she was sexually abused by the accusedappellants was not detailed, it nevertheless concluded that it was candidly told by one who is
mentally deficient. She was able to show and convince the Court that she, in fact, was taken
advantage of by the two drunken neighbors. It gave full credence to her testimony, which was
supported by the medical findings. It held that MARIO and RICARDO, especially the former,
who is her cousin, knew of ANACURITAs mental condition. It ruled that (e)vidently,
Anacurita Anib, in her retarded understanding, was overcome with shock, fear and, otherwise,
intimidated by her two drunken neighbors, who accosted her.The trial court characterized
MARIOs version as simply out of this world, and even assuming that it was what has
happened, it only manifests that the victim is, in fact, abnormal, not capacitated to give a valid
consent.The trial court also considered RICARDOs silence as an admission of the charge
against him. The trial court then decreed:WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused, MARIO
DUMANON Y DUMANACAL and RICARDO LABRADOR Y SUACILLO, alias Ric-Ric, GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape, defined and penalized in Article 355, of the
Revised Penal Code, and metes out the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua; to indemnify
complainant-victim Anacurita Anib the sum of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos moral
damages, jointly and severally, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; to suffer
the accessory penalties, provided for by law; and, to pay the costs.On 13 July 1995, MARIO and
RICARDO seasonably appealed from the decision, which the Court accepted on 23 September
1995. However, there was an undue delay in the filing of the Appellants Brief, and counsel for
accused-appellants had to be fined before he finally filed the Appellants Brief on 19 July 1999.In
their Appellants Brief, MARIO and RICARDO allege that:1. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS OF THE CRIME OF RAPE COMMITTED ON A
MENTAL RETARDATE WHEN THE INFORMATION ACCUSES THEM OF RAPE COMMITTED
ON A WOMAN WITH THE USE OF FORCE AND INTIMIDATION.2. THE TRIAL COURT
ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE COMPLAINANT IS A MENTAL RETARDATE IN THE
ABSENCE OF CLEAR MEDICAL OR EXPERT EVIDENCE SHOWING SUCH ABNORMAL
PHYSICAL AND MENTAL CONDITION.3. NO FORCE OR INTIMIDATION ATTENDED THE
SEX ACT BETWEEN THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS AND THE COMPLAINANT.MARIO and
RICARDO underscore the fact that the complaint filed with the court below alleges that the rape
was committed with the use of force and intimidation and hence they cannot be held guilty of
rape committed on a mental retardate since this circumstance was never alleged in the
Complaint. Neither can they be liable for rape committed with the use of force and intimidation
since the same was not sufficiently proven by the evidence for the prosecution.MARIO and
RICARDO emphasize that their conviction was based on the trial courts conclusion that
ANACURITA is a mental retardate. Such a conclusion has no basis since no medical or expert
opinion categorically affirming such condition was offered by the prosecution. Accordingly, they
pray for their acquittal for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
In the Appellees Brief, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) refutes the errors raised by
MARIO and RICARDO. It counters that the trial court did not convict MARIO and RICARDO of
rape of a mental retardate deprived of reason, but of simple rape through force and intimidation,
although not necessarily employed with immense measure but one that was sufficient for the

victim not to resist. The force contemplated by law in the commission of rape is relative,
depending on the age, size and strength of the parties. The only requirement is that force or
intimidation be sufficient to consummate the purpose which the accused had in mind.
Intimidation must be viewed in light of the victims perception and judgment at the time of the
commission of the crime and not by any hard and fast rule.The OSG asserts that in this case
the trial court found that ANACURITA was mentally deficient, as revealed by its personal notes
quoted in its decision, its forbearance in allowing the prosecution to proceed with leading
questions during her direct examination due to her difficulty in comprehending and responsively
answering the questions, and in acknowledging the observation of the MCTC judge in his
Resolution that ANACURITA was different from or less than those of a fully functioning adult.
Hence, the degree of force needed to overwhelm her is less. The force which may not be
sufficient for the rape of a normal person, may be more than enough when employed in the rape
of a mentally deficient person, like ANACURITA.The OSG further asseverates that rape
committed against a feeble-minded victim does not require the use of physical force since the
commission of the sexual act constitutes the force itself. There was thus no need to establish
that ANACURITA is a mental retardate since her rape was attendant with force and intimidation.
It also points out that the attempt of MARIO and RICARDO to settle the case was an implied
admission of their guilt.Finally, the OSG seeks an award of civil indemnity to ANACURITA in the
amount of P50,000 and an increase of the award of moral damages from P20,000 to P50,000.
We sustain the conviction of MARIO and RICARDO.On the issue of whether or not ANACURITA
is a retardate, as correctly pointed out by the defense, no expert testimony was offered to prove
that, indeed ANACURITA is a retardate. But, this matter gains importance if, in fact, the trial
courts conviction for rape was based on a finding that her retardation was of such an extent that
she was deprived of reason or that she had mental age of a child of less than 12 years old. As
will be shown later, such is not the situation obtaining in the case at bar, for we agree with the
trial courts finding that MARIO and RICARDO are guilty of rape by the use of force and
intimidation.It has been held that mental retardation can be proved by evidence other than
medical evidence.[14] Thus, it is our considered opinion that for purposes of determining
whether ANACURITA is mentally normal or does not have the mental capacity of a normal
person, the personal observation of the trial judge would suffice as a measure of determining
the impact on her of the force and intimidation foisted by MARIO and RICARDO vis-a-vis the
legal requirement to prove the commission of the crime of rape.The original complaint,[15] filed
with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Tagana-an-Sison, Surigao del Norte by Dominga Anib on
behalf of ANACURITA, alleged that ANACURITA is a retardate. The translation of the
affidavit[16] of Dominga Anib, which was submitted in support of the original complaint, alleged
that ANACURITA is not mentally normal. During the preliminary examination Dominga testified
that ANACURITA is mentally retarded.[17] The Resolution[18]of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court
of Tagana-an-Sison, Surigao del Norte categorically declared that by merely looking upon the
victim, ANACURITA is indeed a retarded woman.The transcript of stenographic notes is also
replete with particulars on ANACURITAs mental condition. When she first testified, the trial
court ordered to make it on record the physical appearance of the witness [ANACURITA]
having [a] hard time in understanding the question of the interpreter, and that she is mentally
deficient. As she continued with her testimony, it further observed that she had difficulty
answering the questions and, under the circumstances, it allowed leading questions during her

direct examination.[19]The appealed decision likewise bears the trial courts personal
impression that ANACURITA appears to be mongoloid (physically) and mentally deficient who
has difficulty in understanding the questions.[20] We often call a person who is suffering from
mongolism as a mongoloid. Mongolism is a condition characterized by a small,
anteroposteriorly flattened skull, short, flat-bridged nose, epicanthus, short-phalanges, and
widened space between the first and second digits of hands and feet, with moderate to severe
mental retardation and associated with a chromosomal abnormality.[21] It is known as
mongolism because its physiognomic features are suggestive of those normally exhibited by the
Mongolian race.[22] It is also known as Downs Syndrome.[23] Hence, the courts can take
judicial notice of the appearance and features of those suffering from mongolism and based
thereon, conclude that a victim, like ANACURITA, is a mongoloid.Having established that
ANACURITA is a retardate even in the absence of an expert opinion thereon, we shall now
determine if MARIO and RICARDO were properly charged with rape by means of force and
intimidation. A thorough review of the assailed decision supports the findings and conclusion of
the trial court that ANACURITA was indeed raped by means of force and intimidation.
ANACURITA in her testimony declared that while she was on her way home, RICARDO, then
drunk, blocked her way, pulled her toward the uninhabited house of Jaime Batac and once
inside the house he undressed her and took off her panty and inserted his penis into her vagina.
[24] After he was through, RICARDO ran away. Then later MARIO arrived. MARIO pulled
ANACURITA and also inserted his penis into her vagina.[25]The blocking, the holding of the
hand, the pulling towards an uninhabited house, the removal of the panty and the fact that both
MARIO and RICARDO were in a state of drunkenness, were enough force and intimidation
considering the mental state of ANACURITA.The use of force or intimidation was further shown
in the cross-examination of ANACURITA by defense counsel, Atty. Medina, thus:xxxQ Lets
go to that testimony of yours that Ricardo Labrador grab [sic] you to the house of Jaime Batac,
how did Ricardo Labrador grab you?A He pulled me.xxxQ So you went [sic] to tell the
Court that Ric-Ric was just leading you towards the house of Jaime and not dragging you with
the used [sic] of one hand?A He pulled me, sir.Q You did not shout when Ric-Ric Labrador
was pulling you towards the house of Jaime?A No, sir.Q You did not also pulled [sic] back
your hand to free it from the hand of Ricardo Labrador?A No, also sir.Q There was not
even an attempt on your part to free your hand?A I struggle [sic], sir.Q How did you attempt
to free your hand?A (Witness indicating her answer by pulling her hand towards the right side
of her body reaching as far as his palm as her palm towards her right side).Q But you were
not able to free your hand?A I was able to free my hand.Q So when you succeeded in
freeing your hand from the grabs [sic] of Ricardo Labrador you did not make an attempt to run
away?A I was not able to run, it did not occur to my mind.Q Even if you were able to free
your hand from the grab of Ric-Ric still you went with Ric-Ric towards the house of Jaime?A I
try [sic] to run away but he blocked my way.xxxQ And when Mario Dumanon arrived, did he
say anything to you?A None.Q Without talking to you Mario Dumanon removed his pants?
A Yes, sir.xxxQ As a matter of fact when he removed your pantie [sic] you did not resist by
telling him not to do that to me?A He was also drunk.Q And when he pulled you to lie
down with him because he was already lying down, you did not pushed [sic] him away?A He
was drunk.Q You could have run away by pushing his hands but you did not, is it not a fact of
the situation?A Yes, sir.Q Although you knew that you could have run away yet you did not

run away?A The door is too small.Q Whether the door is small or not yet there is [sic] no
attempt on your part to run away?A No, sir.Q You did not even shout for help?A No, sir.
[26]Furthermore, the hematoma found on the victims left thigh as shown by the medical
certificate issued by the examining physician[27] is physical evidence of the use of force in the
consummation of the beastly act.It is a settled rule that force in rape is relative, depending on
the age, size and strength of the parties. In the same manner, intimidation must be viewed in
the light of the victims perception and judgment at the time of the commission of the crime and
not by any hard and fast rule. When the victim is a retardate the force required to overcome her
is of a lesser degree than that used against a normal adult.[28] Thus, the degree of force which
may not suffice when the victim is a normal person, may be more than enough when employed
against an imbecile.[29]With the foregoing disquisition, MARIO and RICARDO were correctly
convicted of rape under the first circumstance of Article 335, i.e. by the use of force or
intimidation. Once the elements of force and intimidation were properly alleged in the
Information and duly proven during the trial, as in this case, the conviction becomes a matter of
course. As correctly assessed by the OSG, the conviction for rape decreed by the trial court
was not based on the fact that ANACURITA is a mental retardate, but on the use of force and
intimidation. The mental retardation of ANACURITA was only a circumstance which the trial
court considered in evaluating the degree and extent of the force and intimidation.We also take
note of the trial courts pronouncement[30] that accused-appellants manifested a possible
settlement of the case. The offer of compromise is an implied admission of guilt pursuant to the
second paragraph of Section 27, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.[31]Finally, as regards the civil
aspects in this case, in accordance with current jurisprudence[32] we grant the award of
P50,000 as civil indemnity for the rape of ANACURITA, and the increase of moral damages from
P20,000 to P50,000 even without proof thereof.[33]WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional
Trial Court, Surigao City, Branch 30, finding accused-appellants MARIO DUMANON y
DUMANCAL and RICARDO LABRADOR y SUACILLO, alias RIC-RIC, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of rape, defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code,
and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua is hereby AFFIRMED, with the
modification that they are further ordered to pay civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000 to the
complainant ANACURITA ANIB, and the amount of moral damages awarded to the latter is
increased from P20,000 to P50,000.Costs against accused-appellants.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Sec. 49 - General Rule
(no case)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Sec. 50 - Opinion of ordinary witness
70. REMIA F. BONCALON, Petitioner, - versus - OMBUDSMAN (VISAYAS) and COA-CITY
AUDITORS OFFICE OF BAGO CITY, NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, Respondents.G.R. No.
171812. nDecember 24, 2008DECISIONQUISUMBING, J.:For review on certiorari are the
Decision[1] dated February 27, 2004 and the Resolution[2] dated February 14, 2006 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 71911, finding petitioner Remia F. Boncalon guilty of
dishonesty and imposing on her the penalty of dismissal from service and perpetual
disqualification to hold office under Section 23,[3] Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules of the Civil

Service Commission (CSC).[4]The antecedent facts are as follows:On November 25, 1997,
Loida C. Arabelo,[5] the State Auditor II of Bago City, Negros Occidental, conducted an audit on
the cash accounts of Boncalon, a Cashier IV at Bago City Treasurers Office. The audit
revealed a cash shortage of P1,023,829.56.[6] The state auditor also discovered, upon
verification from the depository bank, that the entry in Boncalons cashbook pertaining to the
deposit of P1,019,535.21 on October 31, 1997 was false. Deposits totaling said amount were
made only on November 25, 1997 and December 22, 1997, in the amounts of P200,000.00 and
P819,535.21, respectively.In view of the audit findings, Boncalon was administratively charged
with dishonesty before the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas). The case was docketed as
OMB-VIS-ADM-99-0488.Boncalon denied accountability for any cash shortage and averred that
she was informed by the state auditor of the alleged shortage only on October 1, 1998, or after
she had gone on a commuted leave of absence from April 13, 1998 to July 15, 1998, wherein
she was cleared of money and property accountability and paid the corresponding money value
of said leave.[7] She also contended that had the state auditor examined her safe, she would
have found the bundles of money worth P819,535.21, which she had overlooked.[8]Graft
Investigation Officer (GIO) I Alvin Butch E. Caares recommended the dismissal of the case
since the questioned amounts were already accounted for. He also said that the erroneous
entry of deposit in Boncalons cashbook can only be considered as an administrative lapse,
subject only to the admonition of the erring public officer.Upon review, Director Virginia PalancaSantiago, Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas), reversed the recommendation of GIO I Caares.
She ruled that the untimely deposit of the questioned amount only means that Boncalon was in
possession of the money and had made use of it. Further, her act of falsifying an entry of
deposit in her cashbook, which is an official document, signifies want of integrity on her part as
she had the disposition to betray, cheat or defraud the government.[9] Boncalon sought
reconsideration, but to no avail. Thus, she appealed to the Court of Appeals.In the Decision
dated February 27, 2004, the Court of Appeals found Boncalon guilty of dishonesty under
Section 23, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules on Civil Service. Citing the Cash Examination
Manual, the Court of Appeals stressed that entries in the cashbook are the direct and personal
responsibility of every cash accountable officer. And should they be duly permitted to be
assisted by subordinates in case of heavy volume of work, the work of their subordinates still
remains under their close and strict supervision. The Court of Appeals also emphasized that
when Boncalon certified under oath that she produced all her cash, treasury, warrants, checks,
money orders, cash items, paid vouchers, unused accountable forms, etc. to the
Auditor/Examiner on November 25, 1997, she cannot later claim that she simply failed to notice
the bundles of money in her safe.[10] The fallo of the decision reads,
WHEREFORE, the
instant petition is hereby DENIED. Accordingly, the finding of the Office of the Ombudsman
holding petitioner guilty of dishonesty and meting the penalty of dismissal from government
service with forfeiture of all benefits and perpetual disqualification of holding public office is
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.[11]Aggrieved, Boncalon filed this petition contending
that:I.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN UPHOLDING
PETITIONERS DISMISSAL FROM THE SERVICE WITH FORFEITURE OF ALL BENEFITS
AND PERPETUAL DISQUALIFICATION TO HOLD PUBLIC OFFICE ALTHOUGH THE
OMBUDSMAN HAS NO POWER TO DISMISS PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES;II.THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN UPHOLDING PETITIONERS

DISMISSAL FROM THE SERVICE, DESPITE THE FACT THAT SHE HAS NOT INCURRED
ANY SHORTAGE; THAT SHE HAS BEEN CLEARED OF MONEY AND PROPERTY
ACCOUNTABILITY; THAT SHE HAS ACCOUNTED THE FUNDS IN HER CUSTODY AND NO
DAMAGE HAS BEEN CAUSED TO THE CITY OF BAGO; andIII.THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN UPHOLDING PETITIONERS DISMISSAL FROM THE
SERVICE DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF PROOF BUT RELIANCE MERELY ON
PRESUMPTIONS, CONJECTURES AND INFERENCES THAT ARE MISTAKEN.[12]Essentially,
the issues for resolution are: (1) Did the Court of Appeals err in upholding Boncalons dismissal
from service on the ground of dishonesty? and (2) Is the Ombudsman empowered to dismiss
public officials and employees in administrative cases?Petitioner contends that the alleged
shortage was already accounted for in the November 25, 1997 and December 22, 1997 bank
deposits. She explains that the late deposits of the said amounts were due to her failure to
notice the same in her safe, as they were in bundles. She also argues that the posting of
entries in her cashbook was already delegated to her subordinates due to her multifarious
duties and functions as Cashier IV. As such, the entry of deposit dated October 31, 1997 may
only have been an unintended mistake of her subordinates, considering that it was the last day
of the month and holiday season followed.She further avers that for liability to attach, notice and
demand must be made upon her to afford her due process, but to the contrary, the state auditor
informed her only on October 1, 1998 or more than ten months after the audit, and after she had
gone on an approved leave of absence wherein she was cleared of money and property
accountability and paid the money value of said leave. Invoking Madarang v. Sandiganbayan,
[13] she finally contends that mere absence of funds is not sufficient proof of conversion, nor is
her mere failure to turn over the funds at any given time sufficient to make a prima facie case,
for conversion must be affirmatively proved, either by direct evidence or by the production of
facts from which conversion necessarily follows.The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), for
respondent Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas), maintains that the Court of Appeals did not err
in upholding Boncalons dismissal because the cash shortage and false entry of deposit
remained undisputed. Even assuming that it was her subordinates who posted the said entry in
her cashbook, still, she should have taken the necessary precautions to verify the truthfulness of
each entry therein. But she did not. Thus, her explanation, that she overlooked the
P819,535.21 inside her safe as they were in bundles, was purely an alibi, too flimsy to accept.
After a judicious evaluation of the submissions and pieces of evidence of both parties, we are in
agreement that petitioner is, indeed, guilty of dishonesty.First, this Court finds no basis for
Boncalons protestations that she was deprived of due process of law merely because the state
auditor belatedly notified her of the alleged cash shortage. In administrative proceedings, such
as in the case at bar, procedural due process simply means the opportunity to explain ones
side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.[14] Here,
we take note that Boncalon was given every opportunity to explain her side in her letters to the
state auditor dated October 5, 1998,[15] October 19, 1998[16] and December 10, 1998.
[17] She was further heard in person during investigation by the graft investigating officer, as
well as by the Director of the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas), and she was able to
participate in all the stages of the administrative proceedings. Despite all these, she could not
justify the averred cash shortage as of November 25, 1997.
The Court acknowledges
that indeed, as claimed by petitioner, when auditor Arabelo made her demand on October 2,

1998 upon the petitioner to restitute P1,023,829.56[18] the same had already been settled and
as of the said date the discrepancies found in connection with the November 25, 1997 audit had
already been ironed out. Considering that the demand was made at the time when the
amounts had already been produced, then the prima facie evidence that missing funds were put
to personal use, which presumption Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code supplies in
connection with the felony of malversation, did not arise. But the absence of the said prima
facie evidence does not necessarily equate to an absence of administrative liability on the part
of petitioner.
It is undisputed that: 1) Petitioner had the duty to deposit in the bank the
amount of P1,019,535.21 by October 31, 1997; 2) Such amount was not deposited on October
31, 1997; 3) The entry in petitioners cashbook of a deposit on October 31, 1997 in the amount
of P1,019,535.21 is false; 4) The amount was deposited in two tranches P200,000 on
November 25, 1997 and P819,535.21 on December 22, 1997. These circumstances starkly
speak of an irregularity that calls for an explanation on the part of the responsible officer.
Petitioner wants to pass off the matter as an innocent error on her part. Her explanation
however fails to convince us that the subject entry was an honest mistake or innocuous error.
Her claim that the cash of P819,535.21 was in the safe when the audit was conducted on
November 25, 1997, is contradicted by her certification that she produced all her cash items,
which amounted to only P47,106.14 in total, before the state auditor on the said date. Also, her
claim of having overlooked the bundles of money that were just sitting in her safe is far too
incredible to believe. Evidence, to be worthy of credit, must not only proceed from the mouth of
a credible witness but must be credible in itself. Stated otherwise, it must be natural,
reasonable and probable as to make it easy to believe.[19] There is no test of the truth of
human testimony except its conformity to human knowledge, observation, and experience, and
that whatever is repugnant to these belongs to the miraculous and is outside of judicial
cognizance.[20] In the instant case, the subject overlooked sum would comprise, at the very
least, eight bundles of P1,000 peso bills plus other notes and coins. This stash is simply too
bulky and noticeable to be overlooked, especially in the face of an ongoing audit and cash
examination. It is more reasonable to believe the certification which states that the cash items
at the time of the audit amounted to only P47,106.14.
Petitioner, by making or allowing the
making of the subject false entry of deposit, made it appear that the money was already out of
her possession and that it was already in the bank, when the truth was that the money was not
yet in the bank and was actually unaccounted for. The fact that undated deposit slip/s were
used to support the entry of deposit as of October 31, 1997 in the cashbook is already irregular.
The undisputed and totally unexplained odd fact that the total amount was split into two deposits
that were separately made weeks after the entire sum was supposed to have been deposited on
a single day -- October 31, 1997 -- underscores the irregularity. Such acts when connected
together paint a clear picture of deliberateness, not innocent error. The same manifests bad
faith or, at the very least, each of the said acts constitutes gross negligence amounting to bad
faith. The circumstance that the entry of deposit on October 31, 1997 was never corrected to
reflect the fact of non-deposit of the amount on that date and the fact of the corresponding
deposits of P200,000 on November 25, 1997 and P819,535.21 on December 22, 1997 further
underscores the conclusion that the matter was not an innocuous error.
Dishonesty is
defined as the concealment or distortion of truth in a matter of fact relevant to ones office or
connected with the performance of his duty.[21] The unsatisfactorily explained false entry of

deposit in the amount of P1,019,535.21 on October 31, 1997 clearly constitutes dishonesty.
Second, her justification that she did not prepare or post the said entry of deposit deserves
scant consideration because it appears to be a mere feeble attempt to shift the blame to her
subordinates. As explicitly provided in the Cash Examination Manual, entries in her cashbook
are her personal and direct responsibility even in instances when she can delegate the task to a
subordinate due to a heavy volume of work. Moreover, it is highly unacceptable for a public
officer like petitioner to attribute the lack of diligence in work to the day of the month it was
performed, i.e., last day of the month and the fact that holiday season followed. Due diligence
at work should be observed at all times.Third, her liability cannot be mitigated, much less can
she be exonerated, because no pecuniary damage was allegedly incurred by the government
on account of the late deposits of the public money in the depository bank. As a cashaccountable officer, her duty is to immediately deposit the various funds she received with the
authorized government depositories. This duty is clearly set out in Commission on Audit
Circular No. 91-368[22] which states:
Sec. 465. Deposit of Collections. The
treasurer/cashier shall deposit intact all his collections as well as all collections turned over to
him by the collectors/tellers with the authorized depository bank daily or not later than the next
banking day. He shall summarize the collections and deposits accomplishing the
Cashier/Treasurers Report of Daily Collections and Deposits (CTRDCD), Prov. Form No. 213(a)
in three copies. The original and duplicate, together with the original and duplicate copies of the
DSCAFs and the deposit slips and the duplicates of official receipts, shall be submitted daily to
the accountant. The third copies of the CTRDCD and the DSCAFs shall be retained by the
treasurer/cashier.
In the case of municipalities where travel time to the depository bank is
more than one day, deposit of collections shall be made at least once a week, or as soon as the
collections reach P10,000.Clearly, petitioner is not supposed to keep funds in her custody for
longer than a week. A failure to make a timely turnover of the cash received by her constitutes,
not just gross negligence in the performance of her duty, but gross dishonesty, if not
malversation.[23] Lastly, Madarang cannot be considered as precedent in the case at bar
because the former is a criminal case for malversation while the instant case is an
administrative case for dishonesty. It is not amiss to point out that public servants ought to
exhibit at all times the highest sense of honesty and integrity, for no less than the Constitution
mandates that a public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees are accountable to
the people, and must serve with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, as well as
act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.[24] These constitutionally-enshrined
principles, oft-repeated in our decisions, are not mere rhetorical flourishes or idealistic
sentiments, but they are working standards in accord with the States policy of promoting a high
standard of ethics and utmost responsibility in the public service.Apropos the second issue,
petitioner contends in her defense that the power of the Ombudsman concerning penalty after
an investigation of public officials or employees is merely recommendatory. Thus, it cannot
directly impose sanctions against them. On the other hand, the OSG maintains that the
prevailing doctrine, as enunciated by us in Ledesma v. Court of Appeals,[25] is that the power of
the Ombudsman with regard to imposing sanctions is not merely advisory but mandatory.
On this point, we find that the stance of the OSG is correct. We have repeatedly held in a
catena of precedents,[26] aside from Ledesma, that the Ombudsman has the power to directly
impose the penalty of removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of an erring

public official, other than a member of Congress and the Judiciary, within the exercise of its
administrative disciplinary authority as provided for in Section 13(3),[27] Article XI of the 1987
Constitution, and Section 15(3)[28] of Republic Act No. 6770.[29] The clear and precise
discussion of Justice Carpio on the matter in Office of the Ombudsman v. Court of Appeals[30]
is worth repeating here, to wit:
While Section 15(3) of RA 6770 states that the
Ombudsman has the power to recommend x x x removal, suspension, demotion x x x of
government officials and employees, the same Section 15(3) also states that the Ombudsman
in the alternative may enforce its disciplinary authority as provided in Section 21 of RA 6770.
The word or in Section 15(3) before the phrase enforce its disciplinary authority as provided in
Section 21 grants the Ombudsman this alternative power. Section 21[31] of RA 6770 vests in
the Ombudsman disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the
Government, except impeachable officers, members of Congress, and the Judiciary. And
under Section 25 of RA 6770, the Ombudsman may impose in administrative proceedings the
penalty ranging from suspension without pay for one year to dismissal with forfeiture of
benefits or a fine ranging from five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) to twice the amount malversed,
illegally taken or lost, or both at the discretion of the Ombudsman x x x.
Clearly, under
Rep. Act No. 6770 the Ombudsman has the power to directly impose administrative penalty on
public officials or employees.WHEREFORE, the Decision dated February 27, 2004 and
Resolution dated February 14, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 71911, finding
petitioner guilty of DISHONESTY and dismissing her from government service, with forfeiture of
retirement benefits and perpetual disqualification to hold public office, are hereby AFFIRMED.
The Civil Service Commission is ordered to cancel her civil service eligibility, if any, in
accordance with Section 9,[32] Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of
Executive Order No. 292.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------71. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, - versus - SALVADOR SANCHEZ
y ESPIRITU, Accused-Appellant G.R. No. 175832
October 15, 2008D E C I S I O N
BRION, J.:
This case confronts us once more with the buy-bust of a prohibited drug and the
procedural difficulties this type of operation poses for the police as well as for the prosecution.
On appeal is the September 11, 2006 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CRH.C. No. 01095. The CA affirmed the April 14, 2005 Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 103, Quezon City, that found the accused-appellant Salvador Sanchez y Espiritu
(appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 9165 (the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002), meriting him the penalty of
life imprisonment.ANTECEDENT FACTS
The prosecution charged the appellant before
the RTC with violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 under an Information that states:
xxx
That on or about the 6th day of April 2003 in Quezon City, Philippines, the said
accused, not being authorized by law to sell, dispense, deliver, transport or distribute any
dangerous drug, did, then and there, willfully and unlawfully sell,
dispense, deliver, transport,
distribute or act as broker in the said transaction, zero point zero two (0.02) grams of white
crystalline substance containing methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
The appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge.[4] The
prosecution presented its lone witness - SPO2 Levi Sevilla (SPO2 Sevilla) - in the trial on the

merits that followed. The appellant and his witness, Nida Detera (Nida), took the stand for the
defense.
The RTC summarized the material points of the testimony of SPO2 Sevilla as
follows:
x x x while he was on Station 3 duty at Talipapa, Novaliches, Quezon City
on
April 6, 2003 a confidential informant arrived at around 4:30 noon and reported that there is a
person who has been selling shabu. An entrapment team was formed consisting of himself as
poseur buyer, SPO1 Brigido An, PO3 Virgilio Bernardo, PO2 Manny Paulilis and PO1 Cecil
Collado. A pre-operational report was submitted of the undertaking. At 5:00 p.m., the team was
dispatched to the target area at the far end Lualhati Street, Manotok Subd., Baesa, Quezon
City. PO Sevilla put his initial LS on the money given to him to be used at the entrapment.[5]
At the place, which is a squatter's colony located at the edge or side of Lualhati St., PO Sevilla
and his informant walked towards the place pointed by the informant and met the drug pusher.
The informant introduced PO Sevilla to the pusher. The informant and the pusher talked for a
while. Thereafter, PO Sevilla talked to the latter. He told him that he badly needs shabu para
pumayat. x x x PO Sevilla then gave the pusher P100.00 (the marked money) and in return
the pusher gave him a plastic sachet of shabu.[6]
After receiving the plastic sachet, PO
Sevilla scratched his head as a pre-arranged signal to his colleagues who were deployed
nearby. Said other policemen rushed to the crime scene while PO Sevilla grabbed the right
hand of the accused and introduced himself as a cop. The accused was frisked and PO Sevilla
recovered the P100.00 marked money bill (Exh. G) in the right side pants pocket of the accused
who was later brought to Station 3. PO Sevilla identified the transparent plastic sachet on which
he placed his initial LS and the initial SS of the accused (Exh. E).[7]
On cross
examination, PO Sevilla reiterated his testimony adding that whenever he is tasked as a poseur
buyer he always gives as reason that he wanted to be thinner and drug pushers never
questioned him about that. PO Sevilla, who was wearing a crew cut in court said that when he
bought shabu from the accused his hair style was different. It was his first time to entrap at that
place as a poseur buyer. Their marked Anfra van was parked along Quirino Highway, Quezon
City from where he and the informant walked to Lualhati Street for about 10 minutes as the
target scene was about 100 meters away. He reiterated that their Pre-op Report was sent to
PDEA and given a control number.[8] [Italics and footnotes referring to the pertinent parts of the
records supplied]
The RTC dispensed with the testimony of Forensic Chemist John Paul
Puentespina after the parties stipulated that the items allegedly confiscated from the accused
were submitted to the crime laboratory for examination and the findings were put into writing.[9]
In the hearing of December 4, 2003, the prosecution offered the following as exhibits:
Exhibit A - the request for laboratory examination of the specimen confiscated from the
appellant;
Exhibit B - the Initial Laboratory Report prepared by Forensic Chemist Paul
Jerome Puentespina;
Exhibit C - the Confirmatory or Final Chemistry Report No. D-36603 prepared by Forensic Chemist Paul Jerome Puentespina;
Exhibit D - sworn
Certification to show that the Chemistry Report was subscribed and sworn to before an
Administering Officer;
Exhibits E, E-1 and E-2 - the specimen taken from the appellant;
the
initials of Forensic Chemist Puentespina; and the initials of the police officer who
arrested the accused and who received the specimen in exchange for the buy bust money,
respectively;
Exhibit F - the brown envelope where the seized evidence was placed after
it was examined by Forensic Chemist Puentespina;
Exhibits G and G-1 - the buy bust
money and the initials written therein of the poseur buyer, respectively;
Exhibits H and

H-1 - the Joint Affidavit of the entrapment team and the signature therein by SPO2 Sevilla,
respectively.
The defense objected to Exhibits E, E-1, E-2, G and H, contending
that the appellant had nothing to do with the specimen presented before the court, and that the
confiscated specimen resulted from an illegal arrest. On Exhibit G, the defense argued that no
evidence of powder was ever presented by the prosecution witness. The defense likewise
objected to the presentation of Exhibit H on the ground that its contents were self-serving.
The appellant gave a different version of the events in his testimony of January 30, 2005. He
narrated that at around 5:25 in the afternoon of April 6, 2003, he was in his house putting his
children to sleep when three (3) police officers suddenly barged into his house, searched the
premises, frisked him, and forced him to come with them.[10] He recognized one of the
policemen as Sir Levi, a former colleague of his uncle, Sonny Catiis, at the police station. The
police officers then handcuffed him and asked him to get into a police vehicle. He begged them
and shouted, Sir you already frisked me in the house and you did not find anything, you might
just plant evidence in my pocket, please do not do so. The police brought him to Police Station
3, Talipapa, Quezon City, and placed him in a detention cell without an investigation being
conducted.[11]
While inside his cell, the police showed him a plastic sachet and said that it
was the shabu taken from him. SPO2 Sevilla asked him to call his uncle, but he refused to do
so; he feared that his uncle would think that the confiscated shabu was really taken from him.
[12]
Nida testified that she was at the kitchen of the appellant's house doing the laundry
between 2:00-3:00 in the afternoon of April 6, 2003, when she heard loud knocks on the door.
The appellant, who was in bed, stood up and opened the door.[13] A person entered, pushed
the appellant backwards, and handcuffed him. This person then ordered the appellant to sit
down so he (the appellant) could be asked questions. A total of four persons, all male, entered
the house. Afterwards, the appellant and she were frisked; a lighter was taken from her, but
nothing was seized from the appellant.[14]
The RTC primarily considered the
reputation of SPO2 Sevilla in giving weight to his testimony, and held that PO Sevilla has been
a frequent witness in drugs cases and he has already established his credibility before this
court. Its decision of April 14, 2005 found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. It imposed on him the penalty of life
imprisonment and ordered him to pay a fine of P50,000.00.
The appellant
appealed to the CA, with the appeal docketed as CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01095. In its decision of
September 11, 2006, the CA affirmed the RTC decision.
In his brief[15] on appeal, the
appellant contends that the court a quo gravely erred in finding him guilty beyond reasonable
doubt for violation of R.A. No. 9165. He maintains that the courts order of conviction was
merely based on the good reputation SPO2 Sevilla has established with the court based on the
many drug cases he had handled. The trial court, too, wrongly interpreted the appellants
appearance and demeanor because his head was bowed and his eyes were dreamy and
sad.[16]The defense harps, too, on the prosecutions failure to prove that the sachets allegedly
recovered from the appellant were the ones submitted to the forensic chemist for examination,
as well as its failure to follow the proper chain of custody in handling the seized evidence. It
was only the arresting officer who testified that he confiscated the sachet from the accused.
The police officer who conducted the subsequent investigation and to whom the confiscated
sachet was allegedly turned over was not identified nor presented as witness. Hence the
identity of the evidence presented against the appellant is doubtful.[17]The prosecution counters

with the argument that the trial courts findings on the credibility of SPO2 Sevilla and the lack of
it with respect to the appellant and his witness Nida, should be given great weight and respect,
as the trial court had the chance and the prerogative to hear and appreciate these matters at the
trial. SPO2 Sevilla described in a clear and unwavering manner how the police team planned for
and conducted the buy-bust operation, and how he marked the plastic sachet of shabu he
bought from appellant immediately after the latters arrest. Even the statement regarding the
credibility of SPO2 Sevilla, a frequent witness before the trial court in drug cases, does not
mean that the trial court was biased. If at all, it only meant that the trial court had known SPO2
Sevilla and had often observed his demeanor as a witness. The prosecution further argues that
the evidence for the defense is incredible and doubtful judging from the testimonies of the
appellant and his witness Nida. While the appellant testified that his alleged unlawful arrest
transpired at 5:25 p.m. of April 6, 2003, his witness Nida testified with certainty that she
witnessed the arrest take place on the same date between 2:00 p.m. and 3:00 p.m. as she saw
the time on the wall clock. Moreover, the appellant himself admitted that he had no knowledge
of any adverse reason or ill motive that would induce the arresting police officers to falsely
implicate him. To the prosecution, this lack of ill motive supports the view that SPO2 Sevilla
testified to the truth and his acts should enjoy the presumption of regularity. As to the corpus
delicti, the prosecution stresses that it fully proved that the item recovered from the appellant is
positive for shabu. The request for laboratory examination of the specimen confiscated from the
appellant; the initial laboratory report showing that the item bought and/or seized from appellant
is positive for shabu; and the final chemistry report were all formally offered in evidence, without
any objection from the appellant. The defense, in fact, agreed to stipulate on the contents and
the veracity of the forensic examinations made relative to the item recovered from the appellant.
The corpus delicti having been proven and even admitted by the appellant, there was nothing
more for the prosecution to establish; it had proven beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of
the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, specifically - (a) the identity of the buyer and seller, the
object and the consideration; and (b) the delivery of the things sold and the payment therefor.
THE COURT'S RULING
After due consideration, we resolve to acquit the appellant for the
prosecutions failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.Non-observance of the
requirements of Section 21, paragraph 1 of Article II of Republic Act No. 9165
In
considering a criminal case, it is critical to start with the laws own starting perspective on the
status of the accused in all criminal prosecutions, he is presumed innocent of the charge laid
unless the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt.[18] Thus, while the charge was laid
after a preliminary finding that a probable cause existed showing that a crime had been
committed and the accused was probably guilty thereof, the criminal trial itself starts with the
substantive presumption of the innocence on the part of the accused, rebuttable only by proof of
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The burden of such proof rests with the prosecution which
must rely on the strength of its case rather than on the weakness of the case for the defense.
Proof beyond reasonable doubt, or that quantum of proof sufficient to produce a moral certainty
that would convince and satisfy the conscience of those who act in judgment, is indispensable
to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence.[19]
To prove the legitimacy of the
police buy-bust operation, the prosecution presented the following: (a) a pre-operation report
bearing Unit Control Number 0504-03-07 signed by the desk officer, police chief and team
leader of the station drug enforcement unit, which indicated the type, time and general area of

operation, the type of vehicles and firearms to be used, and the respective names of the team
leader, poseur-buyer and members of the buy-bust team; (b) a photocopy of the marked money;
and (c) the joint affidavit of the entrapment team signed by the poseur-buyer, SPO2 Sevilla, and
PO1 Collado. The operation yielded a plastic sachet containing shabu allegedly confiscated
from the appellant.
A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment employed by peace
officers to apprehend prohibited drug law violators in the act of committing a drug-related
offense.[20] Because of the built-in danger for abuse that a buy-bust operation carries, it is
governed by specific procedures on the seizure and custody of drugs, separately from the
general law procedures geared to ensure that the rights of people under criminal
investigation[21] and of the accused facing a criminal charge[22] are safeguarded. We
expressed this concern in People v. Tan,[23] when we recognized that by the very nature of
anti-narcotic operations, the need for entrapment procedures, the use of shady characters as
informants, the ease with which sticks of marijuana or grams of heroin can be planted in the
pockets or hands of unsuspecting provincial hicks, and the secrecy that inevitably shrouds all
drug deals, the possibility of abuse is great. Thus, the courts have been exhorted to be extra
vigilant in trying drug cases lest an innocent person is made to suffer the unusually severe
penalties for drug offenses.
The required procedure on the seizure and custody of drugs
is embodied in Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, which states:
1) The
apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs
shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the
accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice
(DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory
and be given a copy thereof. [Emphasis ours]
This is implemented by Section 21(a),
Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 9165, which reads:
(a)
The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the
drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the
presence of the accused or the person/s from whom
such items were confiscated and/or
seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: x x x Provided, further that non-compliance
with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary
value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not
render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items. [Emphasis supplied]
The records of the present case are bereft of evidence showing that the buy-bust team followed
the outlined procedure despite its mandatory terms, as indicated by the use of shall in its
directives. The deficiency is patent from the following exchanges at the trial:
FISCAL GIBSON ARAULA:
Q:
Now after you received that shabu or
transparent plastic sachet
containing shabu and gave the P100.00
bill to the accused, what
happened next?
SPO2 LEVI
SEVILLA:
A:
After I received [sic] I scratched my head.
Q:
What is the purpose?
A:
Pre-arrange[d] signal.
Q:
After
that what happened?
A:
They swooped down in the scene.
Q:
What happened after that?
A:
I grab [sic] his right hand.
Q:

When you grabbed his right hand what did you tell him?
A:
I introduced
myself as Police Officer.
Q:
Then after that what happened next?
A:
I grabbed the accused and informed him of his constitutional right.
Q:
After informing of his constitutional right what happened Mr.
Witness?
A:
We brought him to our station.
Q:
How about the transparent plastic
sachet, where is it?
A:
It is in my possession.
Q:
How
about the buy-bust money in the amount of P100.00?
A:
I recovered it from
the right pants pocket.
Q:
Now you said that you brought the accused to the
Police Station,
what happened to the Police Station?
A:
We turn [sic] him over to the Desk Officer.
Q:
What did you turn over?
A:
The accused and the evidences, the plastic shabu sir.
Q:
Before you
turn over that plastic sachet Mr. Witness, what did
you put there?
A:
I put my initial and initial of the accused.
Q:
If that transparent plastic sachet
is shown to you, can you identify
that Mr. Witness?
A:
Yes, sir.
Q:
Showing to you this plastic sachet Mr. Witness, what can you say
to that transparent plastic sachet?
A:
This was the one I purchased from the
accused because I have here
my initial and the initial of the accused, sir.
x x x x[24] [Emphasis ours]
Other than the markings that SPO2 Sevilla alleged, it is clear that no physical inventory
and no photograph of the seized items were taken in the presence of the accused or his
counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and an elective
official. Based on the above testimony, SPO2 Sevilla - the prosecutions lone witness - also did
not mark the plastic sachet of shabu immediately upon seizure; it was only marked upon arrival
at the police station. Thus, other than the stipulation regarding the handling and results of the
specimen at the forensic laboratory, SPO2 Sevillas testimony and the evidence he identified
constitute the totality of the evidence for the prosecution on the handling of the allegedly seized
items.
We recognize that the strict compliance with the requirements of Section 21 of R.A.
No. 9165 may not always be possible under field conditions; the police operates under varied
conditions, many of them far from ideal, and cannot at all times attend to all the niceties of the
procedures in the handling of confiscated evidence. The participation of a representative from
the DOJ, the media or an elected official alone can be problematic. For this reason, the last
sentence of the implementing rules provides that non-compliance with these requirements
under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items
are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such
seizures of and custody over said items. Thus, non-compliance with the strict directive of
Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 is not necessarily fatal to the prosecutions case; police procedures
in the handling of confiscated evidence may still have some lapses, as in the present case.
These lapses, however, must be recognized and explained in terms of their justifiable grounds
and the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence seized must be shown to have been
preserved. In the present case, the prosecution apparently did not want to accept that the
police had committed lapses in the handling of the seized materials and thus did not bother to
present any explanation to justify the non-observance of the prescribed procedures. It likewise
failed to prove that the integrity and evidentiary value of the items adduced were not tainted as
the discussions below will show. The non-observance by the police of the required procedure

cannot therefore be excused. The chain of custody over the confiscated items was not proven
Under Section 5, Article II[25] of R.A. No. 9165, the elements necessary in every prosecution for
the illegal sale of shabu are: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and the
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. Implicit in all these
is the need for proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the
presentation in court of evidence of corpus delicti - the body of the crime whose core is the
confiscated illicit drug.[26]
Proof beyond reasonable doubt demands that unwavering
exactitude be observed in establishing the corpus delicti: every fact necessary to constitute the
crime must be established.[27] The chain of custody requirement performs this function in buybust operations as it ensures that doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed.
[28] In a long line of cases, we have considered it fatal for the prosecution to fail to prove that
the specimen submitted for laboratory examination was the same one allegedly seized from the
accused.[29]
Blacks Law Dictionary explains chain of custody in this wise: In evidence,
the one who offers real evidence, such as narcotics in a trial of drug case, must account for the
custody of the evidence from the moment in which it reaches his custody until the moment in
which it is offered in evidence, and such evidence goes to the weight not to admissibility of
evidence. Com. V. White, 353 Mass. 409, 232 N.E.2d 335.
Likewise, Section 1(b) of
Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002[30] which implements R.A. No. 9165
defines chain of custody as follows:
Chain of Custody means the duly recorded
authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of
dangerous
drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of
seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court
for destruction. Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity
and signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time
when such transfer of custody were made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as
evidence, and the final disposition.
Although this regulation took effect on October 18,
2002 (or after the commission of the crime charged), it is nonetheless useful in illustrating how
the process of preserving the integrity of the chain of custody of the seized drugs is ensured and
maintained. That the police failed to approximate these safeguards and the prosecution failed
to prove the identity of the specimen allegedly seized and the specimen submitted as evidence
during the trial is evident from SPO2 Sevilla himself who testified as follows:
FISCAL GIBSON ARAULA: Q:
After informing [the accused] of his constitutional right what
happened Mr.
Witness?
SPO2 LEVI SEVILLA
A:
We brought him to our station.
Q:
How about the transparent plastic
sachet, where is it?
A:
It is in my possession.
Q:
How about the buy-bust money in the amount of P100.00?
A:
I recovered it from the right pants pocket
Q:
Now you said that you
brought the accused to the Police Station,
what happened to the
Police Station?
A:
We turn him over to the Desk Officer.
Q:
What did you turn over?
A:
The accused and the evidences, the plastic
shabu sir.
Q:
Before you turn over that plastic sachet Mr. Witness, what did
you put there?
A:
I put my initial and initial of the accused.
xx
xx
Q:
By the way Mr. Witness after you turned over to the
investigator
the plastic sachet, did you happen to know where the

investigator
brought the plastic sachet?
A:
I
gave that plastic sachet first to the table of the Desk Officer
and the
Desk Officer gave it to the investigator
FISCAL GIBSON ARAULA:
That would be all for the witness.
x x x x[31
Significantly, this was the only
testimony in the case that touched on the chain of custody of the seized evidence. It failed to
disclose the identities of the desk officer and the investigator to whom the custody of the drugs
was given, and how the latter handled these materials. No reference was ever made to the
person who submitted the seized specimen to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination.
Likewise, no one testified on how the specimen was handled after the chemical analysis by the
forensic chemist. While we are aware that the RTC's Order of August 6, 2003 dispensed with
the testimony of the forensic chemist because of the stipulations of the parties, we view the
stipulation to be confined to the handling of the specimen at the forensic laboratory and to the
analytical results obtained. The stipulation does not cover the manner the specimen was
handled before it came to the possession of the forensic chemist and after it left his possession.
To be sure, personnel within the police hierarchy (as SPO2 Sevillas testimony casually
mentions) must have handled the drugs but evidence of how this was done, i.e., how it was
managed, stored, preserved, labeled and recorded from the time of its seizure, to its receipt by
the forensic laboratory, up until it was presented in court and subsequently destroyed is
absent from the evidence adduced during the trial. To repeat an earlier observation, even the
time and place of the initial marking of the alleged evidence are not at all certain as the
testimony on this point varies
The recent case of Lopez v. People[32] is particularly
instructive on how we expect the chain of custody or movement of the seized evidence to be
maintained and why this must be shown by evidence:
As a method of authenticating
evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by
evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims
it to be. It would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item
was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that every person who
touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what
happened to it while in the witness' possession, the condition in which it was received and the
condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then
describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the
item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same
While testimony about a perfect chain is not always the standard because it is almost always
impossible to obtain, an unbroken chain of custody becomes indispensable and essential when
the item of real evidence is not distinctive and is not really identifiable, or when its condition at
the time of testing or trial is critical, or when a witness has failed to observe its uniqueness. The
same standard likewise obtains in case the evidence is susceptible to alteration, tampering,
contamination and even substitution and exchange. In other words, the exhibit's
level of
susceptibility to fungibility, alteration or tampering without regard to whether the same is
advertent or otherwise not dictates the level of strictness in the application of the chain of
custody rule. [Emphasis ours]
That the prosecution offered in evidence the request for
laboratory examination (Exh. A), the initial laboratory report (Exh. B), and final Chemistry
Report No. D-366-03 (Exh. C), to which the defense did not object, has no bearing on the
question of whether the specimen submitted for chemical analysis and subsequently presented

in court was the same as that seized from the appellant. All that these exhibits proved were the
existence and authenticity of the request for laboratory examination and the results of this
examination, not the required chain of custody from the time of seizure of the evidence.
Evidently, the prosecution has not proven beyond reasonable doubt the indispensable element
of corpus delicti of the crime. In People v. Orteza,[33] the Court had the occasion to discuss the
implications of the failure to comply with Section 21, paragraph 1, to wit In People v. Laxa,
where the buy-bust team failed to mark the confiscated marijuana immediately after the
apprehension of the accused, the Court held that the deviation from the standard procedure in
anti-narcotics operations produced doubts as to the origins of the marijuana. Consequently, the
Court concluded that the prosecution failed to establish the identity of the corpus delicti. The
Court made a similar ruling in People v. Kimura, where the Narcom operatives failed to place
markings on the seized marijuana at the time the accused was arrested and to observe the
procedure and take custody of the drug.
More recently, in Zarraga v. People, the Court held that the material inconsistencies with regard
to when and where the markings on the shabu were made and the lack of inventory on the
seized drugs created reasonable doubt as to the identity of the corpus delicti. The Court thus
acquitted the accused due to the prosecution's failure to indubitably show the identity of the
shabu. [Emphasis supplied] We reached the same conclusion in People v. Nazareno[34] and
People v. Santos,[35] where we again stressed the importance of complying with the prescribed
procedure. Physical inventory and photograph requirement under Section 21vis-a-vis marking
of seized evidence While the first sentence of Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of R.A. No. 9165 states that the apprehending officer/team having initial custody
and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory
and photograph the same, the second sentence makes a distinction between warrantless
seizures and seizures by virtue of a warrant, thus:(a) x x x Provided, that the physical inventory
and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the
nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is
practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further that non-compliance with these
requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the
seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and
invalid such seizures of and custody over said items. [Emphasis supplied]Thus, the venues of
the physical inventory and photography of the seized items differ and depend on whether the
seizure was made by virtue of a search warrant or through a warrantless seizure such as a buybust operation.
In seizures covered by search warrants, the physical inventory and
photograph must be conducted in the place where the search warrant was served. On the other
hand, in case of warrantless seizures such as a buy- bust operation, the physical inventory and
photograph shall be conducted at the nearest police station or office of the apprehending
officer/team, whichever is practicable; however, nothing prevents the apprehending officer/team
from immediately conducting the physical inventory and photography of the items at the place
where they were seized, as it is more in keeping with the laws intent of preserving their integrity
and evidentiary value. What Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 and its implementing rule do not
expressly specify is the matter of marking of the seized items in warrantless seizures to ensure
that the evidence seized upon apprehension is the same evidence subjected to inventory and
photography when these activities are undertaken at the police station rather than at the place

of arrest. Consistency with the "chain of custody" rule requires that the marking of the seized
items to truly ensure that they are the same items that enter the chain and are eventually
the ones offered in evidence should be done (1) in the presence of the apprehended violator
(2) immediately upon confiscation. This step initiates the process of protecting innocent
persons from dubious and concocted searches, and of protecting as well the apprehending
officers from harassment suits based on planting of evidence under Section 29[36] and on
allegations of robbery or theft.[37] For greater specificity, marking means the placing by the
apprehending officer or the poseur-buyer of his/her initials and signature on the item/s seized. If
the physical inventory and photograph are made at the nearest police station or office as
allowed by the rules,[38] the inventory and photography of the seized items must be made in
accordance with Sec. 2 of Board Resolution No. 1, Series of 2002,[39] but in every case, the
apprehended violator or counsel must be present. Again, this is in keeping with the desired level
of integrity that the handling process requires. Thereafter, the seized items shall be placed in an
envelope or an evidence bag unless the type and quantity of the seized items require a different
type of handling and/or container. The evidence bag or container shall accordingly be signed by
the handling officer and turned over to the next officer in the chain of custody. Conclusion
The evidentiary gap in identifying the specimen that the forensic laboratory analyzed brings us
back to where we started in analyzing the case to the presumption of innocence that the
Constitution accords the appellant. To reiterate, starting from this point, the prosecution must
proceed to establish the guilt of the accused by proof beyond reasonable doubt. To do this, the
prosecution presented its lone witness, SPO2 Sevilla, whom the lower court believed because
the witness had testified before the court before. Thus, rather than look at the merits of his
testimony, the lower court simply considered his person and past performance, and decided on
this basis that he was a credible witness. This, by itself, is a major error a violation of due
process on the part of the lower court that the appellate court apparently did not fully
appreciate. A court must always decide on the basis of the evidence presented, not on the
basis of any other extraneous consideration not before the court.The court apparently banked
also on the presumption of regularity in the performance that a police officer like SPO2 Sevilla
enjoys in the absence of any taint of irregularity and of ill motive that would induce him to falsify
his testimony. Admittedly, the defense did not adduce any evidence showing that SPO2 Sevilla
had any motive to falsify. The regularity of the performance of his duties, however, leaves much
to be desired given the lapses in his handling of the allegedly confiscated drugs as heretofore
shown. An effect of this lapse, as we held in Lopez v. People,[40] is to negate the presumption
that official duties have been regularly performed by the police officers. Any taint of irregularity
affects the whole performance and should make the presumption unavailable. There can be no
ifs and buts regarding this consequence considering the effect of the evidentiary presumption of
regularity on the constitutional presumption of innocence. People v. Santos[41] instructively
tells us that the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty cannot by itself
overcome the presumption of innocence nor constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt.[42] In
People v. Caete,[43] we also said:
While the Court is mindful that the law
enforcers enjoy the presumption of regularity in the performance of their duties, this
presumption cannot prevail over the constitutional right of the accused to be presumed
innocent and it cannot, by itself constitute proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty cannot be used as basis for

affirming accused-appellants conviction because First, the presumption is precisely just that
a mere presumption. Once challenged by evidence, as in this case, xxx [it] cannot be regarded
as binding truth. Second, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions
cannot preponderate over the presumption of innocence that prevails if not overthrown by proof
beyond reasonable doubt. The presumption also cannot prevail over positive averments
concerning violations of the constitutional rights of the accused. In short, the
presumption
of regularity in the performance of official duty cannot by itself overcome the presumption of
innocence nor constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Without the presumption of
regularity, the evidentiary gap in identifying the seized evidence from its turnover by the poseurbuyer, its handling and custody, until its turnover to the forensic laboratory for analysis, stands
out in bold relief. This gap renders the case for the prosecution less than complete in terms of
proving the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. From the perspective of the defense,
we cannot help but note that the evidence for the defense is far from strong; the appellant
merely denied that a buy-bust operation took place and claimed that the evidence against him
was a planted evidence. In this jurisdiction, the defense of denial or frame-up, like alibi, has
been viewed with disfavor for it can easily be concocted and is a common defense ploy in most
prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.[44] Likewise, the testimony of the other
defense witness, Nida, fails to fully corroborate the appellant's testimony due to inconsistencies
in their respective statements. These weaknesses, however, do not add any strength nor can
they help the prosecutions cause. If the prosecution cannot establish, in the first place, the
appellants guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the need for the defense to adduce evidence in its
behalf in fact never arises. Thus, however weak the defense evidence might be, the
prosecutions whole case still falls. To hark back to the well-entrenched dictum in criminal and
constitution law: the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own weight and
cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the defense. Thus, we return to the
conclusion that we should acquit the accused for failure of the prosecution due the gapinduced weaknesses of its case to prove the appellants guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, the September 11, 2006 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01095 affirming the judgment of conviction of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 103, Quezon City is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant
Salvador Sanchez y Espiritu is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt and is ordered immediately
RELEASED from detention, unless he is confined for any other lawful cause.
The Director
of the Bureau of Corrections is DIRECTED to IMPLEMENT this Decision and to report to this
Court the action taken hereon within five (5) days from receipt.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------72. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, - versus - CESARIO OSIANAS,
PABLITO LARIOSA, JOSE VILLARIN, MARIO PALABRICA, AND VICENTE CUMAWAS,
Accused-Appellants. G.R. No. 182548 September 30, 2008 D E C I S I O N CHICONAZARIO, J.: This is an appeal by Notice of Appeal from the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00511 dated 13 November 2007 affirming with modification the Decision
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kabankalan, Negros Occidental, in Criminal Cases No. 727,
No. 727-A and No. 727-B finding herein accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of murder. INFORMATIONS On 14 February 1998, three Informations for murder
were filed, to wit: CRIMINAL CASE NO. 727 The undersigned Provincial Prosecutor accuses

CESARIO OSIANAS y LAREDO alias EGOY, RODRIGO CUMAWAS y CASTILLO alias

DIGO, VICENTE CUMAWAS y CASTILLO alias ENTENG, JULIETO CUMAWAS y
CASTILLO alias JUDY, FORTUNATO CUMAWAS y CASTILLO alias BUGOY, MARIO
PALABRICA y BULOY, VICTOR CANOY y LUMACANG, JOSE VILLARIN y MANILINGAN alias
OWA, PATRICIO BAYSON y FABRICANTE alias PAT, PABLITO LARIOSA y YUNTING alias
PABLING, ROSALIO BULADO y LARIOSA alias MEMI and DIOSDADO LARIOSA y
BULADO alias KOING of the crime of Murder, committed as follows: That on or about the 20th
day of October, 1989, in the Municipality of Hinoba-an, Province of Negros Occidental,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
armed with assorted firearms of unknown calibers and bladed weapons, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, with evident premeditation and treachery,
taking advantage of their superior strength, and with intent to kill, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab one RONILO CUIZON y MAHUSAY, thereby
inflicting multiple injuries upon the body of the latter, which caused the death of said victim.
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 727-A The undersigned Provincial Prosecutor accuses CESARIO
OSIANAS y LAREDO alias EGOY, RODRIGO CUMAWAS y CASTILLO alias DIGO,
VICENTE CUMAWAS y CASTILLO alias ENTENG, JULIETO CUMAWAS y CASTILLO alias
JUDY, FORTUNATO CUMAWAS y CASTILLO alias BUGOY, MARIO PALABRICA y BULOY,
VICTOR CANOY y LUMACANG, JOSE VILLARIN y MANILINGAN alias OWA, PATRICIO
BAYSON y FABRICANTE alias PAT, PABLITO LARIOSA y YUNTING alias PABLING,
ROSALIO BULADO y LARIOSA alias MEMI and DIOSDADO LARIOSA y BULADO alias
KOING of the crime of Murder, committed as follows: That on or about the 20th day of
October, 1989, in the Municipality of Hinoba-an, Province of Negros Occidental, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with assorted
firearms of unknown calibers and bladed weapons, conspiring, confederating and mutually
helping one another, with evident premeditation and treachery, taking advantage of their
superior strength, and with intent to kill, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and stab one REYMUNDO CUIZON y MAHUSAY, thereby inflicting multiple
injuries upon the body of the latter, which caused the death of said victim. CRIMINAL CASE NO.
727-B The undersigned Provincial Prosecutor accuses CESARIO OSIANAS y LAREDO alias
EGOY, RODRIGO CUMAWAS y CASTILLO alias DIGO, VICENTE CUMAWAS y CASTILLO
alias ENTENG, JULIETO CUMAWAS y CASTILLO alias JUDY, FORTUNATO CUMAWAS y
CASTILLO alias BUGOY, MARIO PALABRICA y BULOY, VICTOR CANOY y LUMACANG,
JOSE VILLARIN y MANILINGAN alias OWA, PATRICIO BAYSON y FABRICANTE alias PAT,
PABLITO LARIOSA y YUNTING alias PABLING, ROSALIO BULADO y LARIOSA alias MEMI
and DIOSDADO LARIOSA y BULADO alias KOING of the crime of Murder, committed as
follows: That on or about the 20th day of October, 1989, in the Municipality of Hinoba-an,
Province of Negros Occidental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, armed with assorted firearms of unknown calibers and bladed
weapons, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with evident
premeditation and treachery, taking advantage of their superior strength, and with intent to kill,
did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab one JOSE
CUIZON y MAHUSAY, thereby inflicting multiple injuries upon the body of the latter, which
caused the death of said victim.[2] On 8 November 1990, accused Vicente Cumawas, Julieto

Cumawas, Mario Palabrica, Victor Canoy, Patricio Bayson and Rosalio Bulado pleaded not
guilty. On 10 December 1990, accused Cesario Osianas, Fortunato Cumawas, Jose Villarin,
Pablito Lariosa and Diosdado Lariosa also pleaded not guilty. Finally, on 15 January 1991,
accused Rodrigo Cumawas likewise pleaded not guilty. On 11 June 1991, the Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor filed a Motion to Dismiss the Information against Rosalio Bulado on the
ground that said accused died on 23 May 1991. On 30 April 1993, Rodrigo Cumawas, Julieto
Cumawas, Victor Canoy, Patricio Bayson and Diosdado Lariosa withdrew their plea of not guilty
and entered a plea of guilty. They were sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six
years, one month and ten days of prision correccional as minimum to twelve years, five months
and ten days of reclusion temporal as maximum. Trial against the remaining accused ensued.
On 25 May 1994, the trial court dismissed the case against Fortunato Cumawas who died on 16
August 1991. PROSECUTIONS VERSION OF THE FACTS On 20 October 1989, at around
6:00 p.m., in Sitio Calapayan, Barangay San Rafael, Hinoba-an, Negros Occidental, Jose
Cuizon, his son Ronilo Cuizon, and his brother Raymundo Cuizon were sleeping in the house of
Joses daughter, Teresita Cuizon-Cuerpo, who was also asleep with her two children. Suddenly,
there was a loud knocking on the door and shouts calling for Jose to rise and come out. When
asked, the persons knocking at the door said they were members of the New Peoples Army
(NPA) and that they will burn the house down if the door was not opened. Jose opened the
door. Teresita then saw accused-appellants, together with the other seven accused who were
all armed with improvised shotguns, short firearms, knives, and double-bladed weapons. They
barged in, hog-tied the hands of Jose, Ronilo and Raymundo and brought them out of the house
allegedly for questioning. In the meantime, Dionisio Palmero was in his house. He was alarmed
by the incessant barking of dogs. When he looked out of the window, he saw Jose, Ronilo and
Raymundo, with their hands bound behind their backs, in the company of twelve persons,
among whom were the accused-appellants. At around 2:00 p.m. of the next day, 21 October
1989, the dead bodies of Jose, Ronilo and Raymundo were found in Sitio Sangke, Talacagay,
around two kilometers away from Barangay Hinoba-an. Ronilos body lay face down on the
ground covered with leaves, with his hands still tied with rope. Joses corpse lay on its back
with the hands still tied behind the body with a belt. Raymundo was found near the river with his
hands also tied, with a piece of red cloth. DEFENSES VERSION OF THE FACTS Accusedappellant Cesario Osianas testified that at 10:00 p.m. on the night of the incident, 20 October
1989, he was asleep inside his house in Sitio Tayoman with his wife and children. Being
exhausted from work, he did not know what happened to the Cuizons whom he knew, for his
house was within the same barangay as theirs. He was suspected of involvement in the
commission of the crime, because Ronilo Cuizon had killed his son sometime in 1984.[3]
Rogelio Dince testified that Cesario Osianas was in his (Rogelios) house at around 9:00 p.m.
on 20 October 1989, and left only when the latters wife called him at daybreak.[4] Accusedappellant Vicente Cumawas testified that on 18 October 1989, he was harvesting palay owned
by a certain Gerry with co-accused-appellants Mario Palabrica, Jose Villarin and Pablito
Lariosa. They threshed the palay on 20 October 1989 and had no chance to leave their work
from 8:00 a.m. of that day until dawn of 21 October 1989. RULINGS BY THE RTC AND THE
COURT OF APPEALS On 26 October 1995, the trial court convicted the herein accusedappellants, Cesario Osianas, Pablito Lariosa, Joel Villarin, Mario Palabrica and Vicente
Cumawas of the crime of murder, to wit: WHEREFORE, the accused CESARIO OSIANAS,

PABLITO LARIOSA, JOEL VILLARIN, MARIO PALABRICA and VICENTE CUMAWAS are
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and are each sentenced to suffer
the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA in Criminal Case No. 727, RECLUSION PERPETUA in
Criminal Case No. 727-A, and RECLUSION PERPETUA in Criminal Case No. 727-B; to
indemnify the heirs of the victims in each case the sum of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs of this suit.[5] The
accused-appellants appealed to this Court. On 13 September 2004, however, we transferred[6]
the appeal to the Court of Appeals in conformity with our decision in People v. Mateo.[7] The
appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00511. On 13 November 2007, the Court of
Appeals promulgated its Decision affirming the Decision of the RTC. The Court of Appeals
disposed of the case as follows: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated
October 26, 1995 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), 6th Judicial Region, Branch 61, in
Kabankalan, Negros Occidental, in Criminal Case Nos. 727, 727-A and 727-B, entitled People
of the Philippines vs. Cesario Osianas y Laredo alias Egoy, et. al., is AFFIRMED with
modification in that appellants are ordered to pay the heirs of each of the victims the amount of
P50,000.00 as moral damages.[8] On 6 December 2007, accused-appellants filed a Notice of
Appeal with the Court of Appeals. THIS COURTS RULING Identification of the Assailants
Accused-appellants argue that since Teresita Cuerpo had not seen the killing of the victims, it
was an error for the lower courts to rule that she had positively identified the accused-appellants
as the perpetrators of the crime. Such conclusion, according to the accused-appellants, was
based on surmises, speculations and conjectures.[9] Accused-appellants likewise point out that
Dionisio Palmero merely testified that he saw the victims passing with the accused-appellants
near his (Dionisios) house. He did not see the killing, either. While accused-appellants are
correct that there was no direct evidence that they killed the victims, circumstantial evidence can
always be resorted to. Hence, we have consistently held that: Direct evidence of the
commission of a crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial court may draw its conclusion and
finding of guilt. The prosecution is not always tasked to present direct evidence to sustain a
judgment of conviction; the absence of direct evidence does not necessarily absolve an
accused from any criminal liability. Even in the absence of direct evidence, conviction can be
had on the basis of circumstantial evidence, provided that the established circumstances
constitute an unbroken chain which leads one to one fair and reasonable conclusion which
points to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person, i.e., the circumstances
proved must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is
guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with any other hypothesis except that of guilty.[10]
(Emphasis supplied.) Circumstantial evidence is defined as that which indirectly proves a fact in
issue through an inference which the fact-finder draws from the evidence established. Such
evidence is founded on experience and observed facts and coincidences establishing a
connection between the known and proven facts and the facts sought to be proved.[11] Section
4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides that circumstantial evidence is sufficient for
conviction if the following requisites are complied with: (1) there is more than one circumstance;
(2) the facts from where the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all
the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. A review of
what has been and has not been proven in the case at bar reminds us of People v. Bionat.[12]
In said case, the Court held that the following proven facts constitute circumstantial evidence

sufficient to prove the guilt of the accused therein beyond reasonable doubt: 1.
Accused
was positively identified by both Myrna and Joseph Romay, the wife and son of the victim, as
one of the five armed men who called on their home and invited her husband to come down as
their commander was waiting for him downstairs. 2.
Her husband was tied-up upon going
downstairs. 3.
Accused was pinpointed by Myrna Romay as the one who pointed a gun at
her and told her to go upstairs and not cry or shout or else her family would be killed as his
other companions searched the house for guns prior to taking her husband away. 4.
The
five men, one of whom was the accused, brought the victim out of the house. That was the last
time Myrna and her family saw the victim alive. 5.
Ernesto Romay was found dead the next
day, 50 meters from the road and 20 meters from his house, bearing stab wounds on different
part of his body. In the case at bar, accused-appellants were identified by Teresita as the
persons with various firearms and weapons who tied the victims and took the victims away,
allegedly to ask them questions. Accused-appellants were seen by yet another witness,
Dionisio Palmero, walking with the victims, who were still hog-tied, on the night prior to the
discovery of their dead bodies.[13] Finally, the victims were found dead the following day, still
hog-tied. Accused-appellants, however, counter that the identification of the accused-appellants
by Teresita and Dionisio was shaky. Accused-appellants underscore the portion of Teresita
Cuerpos testimony wherein she admitted that there was no electricity in their house at the time
the victims were taken away. Accused-appellants quote Teresitas testimony, as follows: Q:
Am I correct to say that in your barangay there is no electricity?A
Not yet. Q
And you
will agree with me that at 10:00 P.M. especially when you put up the light, it is dark?A:
Yes,
sir. x x x x Q
And there was no light in your house during that time?A
No light, sir. Q
So how did you see that Ronillo wanted to jump through the window when there was no light in
your house?A
Because only two of us were left. Q
But there was no light inside?A
There was no light.[14] Accused-appellants also draw attention to Teresitas admission that she
had not seen the accused-appellants clearly: Q
But actually, you had not seen them
clearly?A
Yes, sir.[15] Dionisios testimony allegedly shows the same defect: Q
During that time, at 10:00 oclock in the evening on October 20, 1989, is it not a fact that your
house was already dark because you were preparing to sleep?A
Yes, sir. Q
And there
was electric light around Sangke?A
No, sir. Q
And the street along the way from your
house to the house of Teresita Cuerpo was not lighted with lamp?A
No, sir. Q
And it is
very dark during that evening?A
At that time the moon was on its rising position and its light
reflected on those persons. Q
And you will agree with me that during the rising of the moon,
its light was not so bright?A
Yes, sir.[16] According to accused-appellants, all these
admissions create reasonable doubt as to the identification of the accused-appellants. We are
not convinced. As found by the trial court, Teresita was familiar not only with the appearances,
but also with the voices of the accused-appellants, since she had known them and was familiar
with them since her childhood days. Teresita maintained this fact even through her crossexamination, when she testified: Q
You said that you all know the accused from your
childhood up to the time of the incident, is that correct?A
Yes, sir. Q
And you often see
them in that place?A
Yes, sir. Q
And you also conversed with him?A
Yes, sir. Q
And they also visit your house?A
Yes, sir. Q
In other words, you know them for quite a
time and you can recognize their voice?A
Yes, sir. Q
Now, when private prosecutor
asked you to identify each accused, you were able to identify them because you know them

from the past?A

Yes, sir. Q
Now, when you were able to hear the voice in the evening
of October 20, 1989 calling for your father Tay, bangon, were you able to recognize the voice?
A
Yes, sir. Vicente Cumawas. x x x x Q
In other words, when theres no light, you
could not identify who were you talking to because it is dark?A
From their voice and the
way they appear and their figures I can identify them already.[17] The same is true as regards
Dionisios testimony. Dionisio thus testified in the following manner when asked during crossexamination: ATTY. DITCHING Q
By the way, Mr. Palmero, you said you have known
these persons mentioned a while ago for how long have you known these persons?
WITNESS A
I have known these persons since our childhood days because we were
neighbors. ATTY. DITCHING Q
And because of that you can definitely be sure that you
know them? A
Yes, sir.[18] This Court has held that once a person has gained familiarity
with another, identification becomes quite an easy task.[19] This Court has also ruled that
identification by the sound of a persons voice,[20] as well as the physical build of such person,
[21] is a sufficient and acceptable means of identification, when it is established that the witness
and the accused had known each other personally and closely for a number of years. In the
case at bar, witnesses Teresita and Dionisio had known the accused-appellants since childhood.
Identifying them, even considering the relative darkness of the place, would have surely been
effortless on their part. Neither do we see any ill motive on the part of these witnesses which
could have caused them to testify falsely against accused-appellants. As regards Teresita,
moreover, it would also be unnatural for her, being interested in vindicating the crime against her
father, brother and uncle, to prosecute persons other than the real culprits.[22] Accusedappellants defense of alibi is furthermore unconvincing. Alibi is the plea of having been
elsewhere than at the scene of the crime at the time of the commission of the felony. Aside from
the inherent weakness of alibi in the face of positive identification of the accused, the lack of
corroboration and inconsistency in the defense witnesses statements buries the version of the
defense even more. Accused-appellant Osianas did not present any member of his family to
confirm his presence in his house at the time of the incident. Accused-appellant Vicente
Cumawass testimony that he and co-accused-appellants Mario Palabrica, Jose Villarin and
Pablito Lariosa were threshing palay on 20 October 1989 is self-serving and deserves no
probative value. No corroborative evidence was presented to back up Cumawass statements.
There is also the glaring inconsistency between the testimonies of Rogelio Dince and accusedappellant Osianas. Osianas claims that he was at home sleeping in the evening of 20 October
1989. Rogelio Dince, on the other hand, testified that in that same evening, accused-appellant
Osianas was at his (Rogelios) house and left only at dawn. Besides, the above testimonies do
not even show that it was physically impossible for the accused-appellants to have been at the
scene of the crime at the time when it occurred. As held by the trial court, accused-appellants
Osianas and Cumawas declared they were in a place situated within the barangay where the
incident took place. Accused-appellant Osianas claims to have been asleep, while accusedappellant Cumawas claims to have been threshing palay with the other accused-appellants at
the time of the incident. To be valid for purposes of exoneration from a criminal charge, the
defense of alibi must be such that it would have been physically impossible for the person
charged with the crime to be at the locus criminis at the time of its commission, the reason being
that no person can be in two places at the same time. The excuse must be so airtight that it
would admit of no exception. Where there is the least possibility of accused's presence at the

crime scene, the alibi will not hold water.[23] It is well-entrenched that the findings of the trial
court on the credibility of witness deserve great weight, given the clear advantage of a trial
judge in the appreciation of testimonial evidence. We have recognized that the trial court is in
the best position to assess the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies because of its
unique opportunity to observe the witnesses first-hand; and to note their demeanor, conduct and
attitude under grueling examination. These are significant factors in evaluating the sincerity of
witnesses, in the process of unearthing the truth.[24] The rule finds an even more stringent
application where the said findings are sustained by the Court of Appeals.[25] Thus, except for
compelling reasons, we are doctrinally bound by the trial courts assessment of the credibility of
witnesses.[26] In this case, there was no cogent reason to deviate from the findings of both
lower courts. Qualifying Circumstances The circumstances alleged in the Informations to qualify
the killing to murder are evident premeditation, treachery, and taking advantage of their superior
strength. The only qualifying circumstance discussed by the trial court is that of treachery:
There is no question that the victims bodies, when found, had still their hands tied, with
Reymundo Cuizon having three (3) wounds and a hematoma at the right side of his body
(Exhibits A to A-3); with five (5) stab and hack wounds on Ronilo Cuizon (Exhibits B to B3), and four (4) stab wounds on Jose Cuizon (Exhibits C to C-5). This situation of the victims
when found shows without doubt that they were killed when they were tied, so that, the
qualifying aggravating circumstance of treachery was present.[27] Treachery is defined in
Article 14, No. 16 of the Revised Penal Code: There is treachery when the offender commits
any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution
thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising
from the defense which the offended party might make. We agree with the trial court. While we
are aware of doctrinal pronouncements of this Court that the manner of attack must be proven
in order to appreciate treachery,[28] such is only applicable when it is the suddenness and the
unexpectedness of the attack which were considered as the means used by the assailant to
insure its execution, without risk to assailant arising from the defense which the offended party
might make. In the case at bar, the means used by the accused-appellants to insure the
execution of the killing of the victims so as to afford the victims no opportunity to defend
themselves was the act of tying the hands of the victims. Teresita saw the accused-appellants
hog-tie the victims and take them away with them. Later that night, Dionisio Palmero saw the
victims, still hog-tied, walking with the accused-appellants. The following day, the victims were
found dead, still hog-tied. Thus, no matter how the stab and hack wounds had been inflicted on
the victims in the case at bar, we are sure beyond a reasonable doubt that Jose, Ronilo and
Reymundo Cuizon had no opportunity to defend themselves because the accused-appellants
had earlier tied their hands. The fact that there were twelve persons who took and killed the
Cuizons further assured the attainment of accused-appellants plans without risk to themselves.
The other qualifying circumstances alleged in the Information, evident premeditation and abuse
of superior strength, cannot be appreciated in the case at bar. The following elements must be
established in order that evident premeditation may be appreciated: (1) the time when the
accused decided to commit the crime; (2) an overt act manifestly indicating that he has clung to
his determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time between decision and execution to allow the
accused to reflect upon the consequences of his act.[29] The essence of premeditation is that
the execution of the criminal act was preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the

resolution to carry out the criminal intent during a space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm
judgment.[30] Like any other circumstance that qualifies a killing as murder, evident
premeditation must be established by clear and positive proof; that is, by proof beyond
reasonable doubt.[31] In this case at bar, the record is bereft of any evidence to show evident
premeditation. It was not shown that the accused-appellants meditated and reflected upon their
decision to kill the victim. We have held that the premeditation to kill must be plain, notorious
and sufficiently proven by evidence of outward acts showing the intent to kill.[32] As regards the
qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength, this Court has held that such is already
absorbed in treachery,[33] and therefore cannot be separately considered. Conspiracy
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it.[34] The agreement may be deduced from the
manner in which the offense was committed; or from the acts of the accused before, during and
after the commission of the crime indubitably pointing to and indicating a joint purpose, a
concert of action and a community of interest. It is not essential that there be proof of the
previous agreement to commit the crime. It is sufficient that the form and manner in which the
attack was accomplished clearly indicate unity of action and purpose.[35] As found by the trial
court, the facts of the case at bar clearly show that the accused-appellants conspired in the
commission of the crime. Their gathering together at the house of Teresita, armed with different
kinds of weapons; the tying of the victims by some of the accused in the presence of the others;
and their leaving the place together, bringing with them the victims, clearly show the agreement
among the accused-appellants to commit the crime. Conspiracy having been established in the
case at bar, the act of one is considered the act of all, and all accused-appellants should
therefore be held guilty of three counts of murder. Civil Liability When death occurs due to a
crime, the following damages may be recovered: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of
the victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages;
(5) attorneys fees and expenses of litigation; and (6) interest, in proper cases.[36] Civil
indemnity is mandatory and granted to the heirs of the victims without need of proof other than
the commission of the crime.[37] We affirm the award of civil indemnity given by the trial court
and the Court of Appeals. Under prevailing jurisprudence,[38] the award of P50,000.00 to the
heirs of each of the victims as civil indemnity is proper. Moral damages are also mandatory in
cases of murder and homicide, without need of allegation and proof other than the death of the
victim.[39] The award by the Court of Appeals of P50,000.00 is therefore proper. As to actual
damages, the heirs of the victims are not entitled thereto, because said damages were not duly
proved with reasonable degree of certainty.[40] Similarly, the heirs of the victims are not entitled
to exemplary damages. Exemplary damages may be imposed when the crime was committed
with one or more aggravating circumstances.[41] In the instant case, treachery may no longer
be considered as an aggravating circumstance since it was already taken as a qualifying
circumstance in the murder. The award of P25,000.00 as temperate damages in homicide or
murder cases is proper when no evidence of burial and funeral expenses is presented in the
trial court.[42] Under Article 2224 of the Civil Code, temperate damages may be recovered,
because the heirs of the victims suffered pecuniary loss although the exact amount was not
proved.[43] Thus, this Court awards P25,000.00 as temperate damages to the heirs of the
deceased victims. WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No.
00511 dated 13 November 2007, which affirmed with modification the Decision of the Regional

Trial Court of Kabankalan, Negros Occidental, in Criminal Cases No. 727, No. 727-A and No.
727-B, is hereby AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that accused-appellants are further
ordered to pay the heirs of each of the victims the amount of P25,000.00 as temperate
damages. No costs.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------73. THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. BERNARDINO MANABAT and DOMINGO
SIMEON, defendants. DOMINGO SIMEON, appellant.G.R. No. L-16717December 22, 1921
OSTRAND, J.:On May 23, 1919, the laborers in the car house, machine shop, power plant, and
transportation departments of the Manila Electric Railroad and Light Company, a corporation
operating the Manila street car system, declared a strike against that corporation. The strikers
numbered nearly five hundred and all were members of a society for mutual support called
"Nagsumakit" which consisted exclusively of employees of said corporation, and of which one
Pedro Angeles was president. In the course of the strike several acts of violence were
committed by the strikers culminating on June 20th at about 4:30 p.m., in the explosion on Plaza
Goiti of a quantity of powder contained in a cardboard box placed under one of the seats of a
street car by the defendant, Bernardino Manabat, one of the strikers. In depositing the box,
Managat, by means of a lighted cigarette ignited a fuse connected with the powder, whereupon
he immediately left the car. Before the fuse reached the powder the conductor of the car
discovered the box, with its burning fuse, and threw it out of a window of the car and into the
street. It was there picked up by a newsboy, Leonardo Sacramento, in whose hands it exploded,
inflicting wounds upon him from the effects of which he died the following morning. A number of
other persons were also injured through the explosion. Manabat was recognized by several
persons and was captured a few minutes after the explosion within a short distance of the place
where it occurred. He was at once taken to the headquarters of the Manila secret service where
he at first denied his guilt, but after having been closely examined by several secret service men
"more or less continuously" (see testimony of John W. Green) for about twenty-three hours,
made a confession in which he implicated the defendant, Domingo Simeon, claiming that the
latter had given him the bomb with instructions to take it aboard a street car and there explode
it. Domingo Simeon was thereupon arrested, brought to secret service headquarters and there
confronted with Manabat, who, in his presence, repeated the story that Simeon had furnished
the bomb and given him the instructions mentioned. As some importance has been attached to
the point, we may here mention that while Manabat told his story, Simeon showed no
excitement or emotion, and did not interrupt or even look at him. However, as soon as asked by
the chief of the secret service, Simeon emphatically denied the truth of Manabat's statement.An
information was filed by the prosecuting attorney of the city charging both Manabat and Simeon
with murder and lesiones (physical injuries). The two accused were tried separately. Manabat
pleaded guilty but sentence was withheld until the termination of the trial of Simeon. The latter,
after a lengthy trial, was found guilty of homicide and lesiones, and sentenced to twenty years of
reclusion temporal. Manabat was given the benefit of article 11 of the Penal Code and
sentenced to twelve years and one day of reclusion temporal. The case is now before this court
on appeal taken by Simeon.In addition to the facts above stated, the record shows that the
"Nagsumakit" was affiliated with the Congreso Obrero, a federation of labor associations and of
which Potenciano Salita was president and Domingo Simeon, secretary. When dissatisfaction
arose among the laborers of the Street Car Company, Pedro Angeles, as president of the

"Nagsumakit" and feeling unequal to the task of directing a strike, sought the assistance of the
Congreso Obrero. A petition directed to Mr. Rockwell, vice-president of the Street Car Company,
and containing a number of peremptory demands was thereupon prepared. The petition was
signed by Potenciano Salita, as president of the Congreso Obrero, and countersigned by
Simeon as secretary. The company being unwilling to treat with outsiders in regard to its
relations with its employees, the strike above-mentioned was at once declared."Labor Hall," the
headquarters of the Congreso Obrero also became the headquarters of the strike. Simeon, who
in addition to being secretary of the Congreso Obrero, was also the treasurer of the Printers'
Union, had his office in a room adjoining the assembly room of Labor Hall and separated
therefrom, in the daytime, by swinging halfdoors of wire cloth. In the same room several other
persons had their offices or desks, among them the treasurer and the secretary of the
Cigarmakers' Union.At the beginning of the strike, Salita was a candidate for member of the
Municipal Council and as his time was taken up with the electoral campaign, the management
of the strike devolved upon Simeon until June 8th, when the elections being over, Salita
assumed the management. On that date a meeting of the strikers and their sympathizers was
held at the Zorrilla Theater, which meeting was opened by Simeon and afterwards presided over
by Salita. At the meeting one Crisanto Evangelista made an inflammatory speech in which he
criticized the Government for protecting the "scabs" with Constabulary guards and secret
service men, and stated that in other countries such repressive measure led to violence on the
part of strikers. He finally, however, advised the audience to remain peaceful while justice took
its course.At the same meeting several committees were appointed, among them a committee
on finance of which Simeon was made chairman. As such chairman, he had charged of the
collection of funds from the public for the benefit of the strikers and also of the distribution of
such funds. The greater part of the funds were used for the purchase of food, and meals were
served the strikers daily at the Labor Hall. Among the persons so receiving meals was Manabat,
who sometimes was accompanied by his wife, and Simeon came to know both of them.
Manabat testifies that from the beginning of the strike he went to Labor Hall nearly every day
and that a large number of the other strikers did likewise.The facts here related as to Simeon's
close connection with the strike and his silence when confronted with Manabat in the office of
the chief of the secret service are relied on by the prosecution as corroboration of Manabat's
statements inculpating Simeon. A critical examination of these circumstances will, however,
show that they are of little, if any, corroborative value, and that Simeon's conviction depends
entirely on the credibility of the, on this point, practically uncorroborated testimony of an
accomplice. Such testimony coming, as it does, from a polluted source must be accepted with
extreme caution and its inherent probability must be carefully tested. This is especially so when,
as in the present case, we have only the testimony of one man without any means of comparing
and verifying it with other testimony to the same effect. The cases in which the uncorroborated
testimony of an accomplice has been held sufficient to convict of grave offenses have been very
rare indeed. Upon this subject Bishop, in his new Criminal Procedure, second edition, section
1169, says:1awphil.netSo manifest is the danger of convicting men on evidence from a source
confessedly corrupt and delivered by the witness to shield himself from merited punishment,
that the judges, while explaining to the jury their right to convict on it alone, by way of caution
advise them not to return a verdict of guilty unless it is corroborated by evidence from a purer
source. Yet they are not as of law required to give this advise.And again, in section 1170:. . .

corroborating evidence must tend to prove the defendant's guilt, not merely the credibility of the
accomplice.The rule stated by Bishop is based on wisdom and experience and while it may not
have been formally adopted in our local jurisprudence, it is, nevertheless, of great persuasive
force.Now, what corroboration is there as to Simeon's complicity? That he had his office at
Labor Hall and that Manabat also was presented in the building between the hours of 2 and 3
o'clock in the afternoon of June 20th, as testified to by two secret service men? There is nothing
strange in this; where else would both Simeon and Manabat be more likely to be at that hour?
Neither is Simeon's silence and his failure to show agitation or emotion when first confronted
with Manabat's charge, inconsistent with his entire innocence. He would, perhaps, have been
quite as likely to make a display of resentment if he were guilty and had been betrayed by
Manabat. If this incident proves anything at all, if indicates a degree of self-control which makes
his participation in Manabat's illconsidered and reckless exploit all the more improbable. Neither
can Simeon's participation in the management of the strike be regarded as a corroborating
circumstance of the character required by the rule above quoted; there were many persons
similarly circumstance and who, in addition, had a pecuniary interest in the strike which Simeon
lacked. The record contains ample corroboration of Manabat's confession of his own guilt; as to
Simeon's complicity it is singularly deficient.We therefore have to fall back on the testimony of
Manabat. He testifies that he arrived at Labor Hall at 8 o'clock in the morning of June 20th and
remained there until 4 o'clock in the afternoon; that he, at this later hour, was covering with a
number of other strikers of whom about fourteen were present outside of the door of Simeon's
office, when a person whom he did not know came out of Simeon's office and asked for
Bernardino Manabat; that upon his, Manabat, stepping forward, this person told him that
Simeon wanted to see him; that he thereupon entered the office where he found Simeon alone;
that he asked Simeon what he wanted of him and that Simeon then asked him "Do you see that
thing on the chair?" He further states that he asked Simeon what it was and was told that it was
only a firecracker for the street car. When asked if he was willing to explode it in a car, he
answered that he was afraid on account of his family and was told to have no fear for the family
as he would be protected in the event he was arrested. He further states that the so-called
firecracker was in a white paste-board box about 12 inches long, 4 inches wide, and 4 1/3
inches high; that he was curious to see what was inside the box, but that Simeon told him not to
open it; that after some further discussion, lasting altogether about twenty-five minutes, he put
the box under his left arm and in that manner carried it out of Simeon's office and through the
hall and all the way from there to the corner of Calles Dasmarias and Rosario where he, after
waiting a couple of minutes, boarded a street car bound for Plaza Goiti where the "firecracker"
was exploded. He asserts that he did not think the "fire-cracker" was dangerous but simply
would frighten the public from using the street cars.When it is considered that Labor Hall was a
public place, frequently by many people, that Simeon's desk was visible not only through the
half-doors separating his office from the hall, but also open to public view from the outside
through the windows, and that both Simeon and the strikers knew that Labor Hall was being
watched by the secret service, Manabat's story certainly challenges our credulity. It is highly
improbable that Simeon, an intelligent, and as the record shows, self-possessed man, should,
without any previous conversation have intrusted a man he had known casually only for a few
weeks with such a desperate venture and should have delivered to this man, practically in public
view, such a conspicuous object as the box in question.In addition to its inherent improbability,

Manabat's story is further weakened by being contradicted in important details by the testimony
of fairly credible witnesses. It is, for instance, conclusively proven the instead of being in Labor
Hall during the forenoon of June 20th, he was at the Bureau of Labor as a witness in an
investigation conducted by that Bureau. It must also be regarded as proven that there were at
least two other persons present in Simeon's office at the time of the alleged delivery of the
cardboard box to Manabat. It is hardly likely that the delivery could have been made without
being noticed by them. It is furthermore significant that Manabat did not know any of the men
with whom he was talking when he was called into Simeon's office, and that he, apparently, has
been unable to so describe them as to lead to their identification. It is also remarkable that he
has been unable to give any clue to the identity of the person who called him into the office.It
has been intimated that if Manabat had not been telling the truth he could not have adhered to
his story under cross-examination. To this we may say that the story was relatively simple, the
witness fairly intelligent and the cross-examination was not very searching. There are hints in
the record that the testimony before the court differed materially from the confession made to
the secret service, but as the confession has not been presented in evidence we cannot take
this into consideration.It has also been suggested that Manabat could have had no motive for
implicating Simeon. As to this, we are not left entirely to conjectures. Two witnesses testify that
on one occasion Manabat was highly offended at Simeon's reluctance to lend him a peso out of
the funds collected for the strikers and that he, on leaving Simeon's office, expressed his
dissatisfaction in strong terms. There is also some probability of his having resented the
attentions shown his wife by Simeon. That Simeon on being questioned at the time of his
examination by the secret service failed to recall, on the spur of the moment, any cause for
resentment on Manabat's part is not as strange as it at first blush may seem. Being in charge of
the distribution of the strike funds, he was peculiarly exposed to suspicions of unfairness. The
strikers were numerous and the funds scant; he could not very well satisfy everyone, and,
unwittingly, may have made many enemies. Even if aware of the enmity he might easily forget
individual instances. Manabat being, as the evidence shows, a man of a morose and aggressive
temperament might easily have taken umbrage at comparatively slight incidents. Furthermore,
when it is remembered that he was captured almost in the act of the commission of the crime
and that the evidence against him was overwhelming, it requires no wide stretch of the
imagination to conclude that the lengthy examination by the secret service was directed not so
much towards establishing his guilt as towards ascertaining whether he had any accomplices,
and being a fairly intelligent man (he was a machinist by trade and had studied two years in the
Manila Trade School) it could not have taken him long to realize what was wanted. By governing
himself accordingly and implicating one of the leaders of the strike he succeeded in creating the
impression that he himself was merely the ignorant tool of a more intelligent person. He was
consequently convicted of manslaughter instead of murder and given the benefit of article 11 of
the Penal Code, thereby shortening his term of imprisonment by eighteen years less one day.
Men have committed perjury for less.1awphil.netMuch as we abhor the crime committed, we
cannot convict men on evidence as flimsy as that against the defendant Domingo Simeon in the
present case, and as to him the sentence of the lower court is therefore reversed, and it is
hereby ordered that the complaint against him be dismissed and that he be discharged from the
custody of the law with the costs de oficio. So ordered.Araullo, C.J., Avancea, Villamor, Johns
and Romualdez, JJ., concur.Johnson, J., dissents.Separate OpinionsSTREET, J., dissenting:I

am unable to concur in the judgment of acquittal in this case and an constrained, with some
reluctance, to record my belief that the accused in guilty. To exhibit clearly the reasons for this
belief, it is necessary to show the relation of the appellant to the strike referred to in the opinion
of the court, and which at the time of the commission of the crime, was nearing the stage of
dissolution.In this connection it appears that for sometime prior to the strike an association had
been organized among the company's employees, known as the Nagsumakit. This body was in
turn member of a larger labor organization called the Congreso Obrero, composed of
representatives of working men in all branches of labor. The latter body had as its president at
this time Potenciano Salita, and as its secretary, the present appellant, Domingo Simeon. From
the inception of the trouble between the company and its employees these two personages, as
officials of the Congreso Obrero, had assumed the guidance of the affairs of the employees; but
during the first two or three weeks of the strike, Salita was occupied with his candidacy for the
office of councilman. It thus happened that responsibility for the direction of the strike rested
chiefly on Domingo Simeon, until the night of June 8, when a meeting attended by the strikers
was held and president Salita assumed charge of the management of the strike.Upon this
occasion a committee was appointed to raise funds and means in support of the strikers, and of
this committee Domingo Simeon was made chairman. In this capacity he remained in close and
active relations with the strikers during the continuance of the trouble, and maintained
headquarters of the Labor Hall, a place much frequented in those days by the strikers. From his
hand came the subsistence which was officially supplied for the maintenance of the strikers,
many of whom were in straits for lack of means to support themselves and families.Among the
strikers thus reduced to extremity, and burdened with the petty obligations incurred by reason of
the strike, was Bernardino Manabat, who had known Domingo Simeon from the time the
Nagsumakit had been organized, and who had now become in a measure dependent on
Domingo Simeon for the supplies necessary for the immediate requirements of himself and
family. Moreover, as an idler, or hanger-on, around the Labor Hall during the strike, Manabat
had frequent occasions to see Domingo Simeon and was not infrequently used by the latter to
do errands, such as carrying letters and buying food or periodicals.The narrative of Manabat, so
far as relates to the alleged participation of the appellant in the offense in question, is to the
effect that at about 4 p. m., of June 20, while standing in the precincts of the Labor Hall, he
(Manabat) was called into the office of Simeon, who was at the time alone. Upon entering
Manabat was shown the cardboard box mentioned in the opinion of the court, and was asked by
Simeon if he could explode it on a street car, in which connection he was told that it was nothing
more than a firecracker. Manabat at first objected, saying that he had a family to look after, but
his misgivings were allayed by the assurance that if he would cause an explosion on a car, this
act would instill fear into the people to such an extent that they would not use the cars and the
strikers would triumph.When Manabat's assent had been obtained he was shown a hole in the
bottom of the box through which a short fuse protruded and was told that it could be lighted from
a cigarette. He was then directed to cause the explosion on a car at some point between
Rosario Street and Plaza Goiti for the reason that, as there are always many people in those
limits, information of the occurrence would at once be propagated throughout the city. As
Manabat took the box in his hands to depart, Simeon told him that whatever occurred he would
not be left alone and, if arrested, a way would be devised to get him out. The witness then
departed, made his way to Rosario Street, and boarded the car on which the bomb was later

ignited, as stated in the opinion of the court.The conviction depends on the credibility of
Manabat, and the question is whether his testimony is sufficient, in connection with the
circumstances surrounding the case, to prove the guilt of the appellant beyond a reasonable
doubt. I think it is.In the light of the facts, and especially in view of the position occupied by
Manabat, it is impossible to believe that he planned the stroke, manufactured the bomb, and
carried the affair into execution all by himself. In the nature of things he was a mere tool in the
hands of some more intelligent individual, and in Domingo Simeon is found a person who had a
powerful motive for such an act and intelligence enough to direct its execution, even if he did not
plan it.Of course Bernardino Manabat knows where and from whom he got the box, and the only
question is whether he has actually and truly revealed the knowledge that is within him. A
careful perusal of what he says is, in my opinion, convincing that his story is true. Among minor
features of his testimony, it is clearly revealed that he had no knowledge of the existence of the
box, or its contents, prior to receiving it, as is apparent from his manifestation of curiosity when
he wanted to see into the box in the presence of Simeon, but was told not to open it.His
ignorance of the size, color, and appearance of the bomb is repeatedly and, I think, truly shown
in different parts of his testimony; and his differing statements as to the length of the fuse are
evidently mere guesses founded on casual inspection through the little square hole in the
bottom of the box certainly not on any definite personal knowledge of his own. It is practically
certain that he could not have fabricated the agent of destruction; and I believe that he received
it at the time and place and from the person stated by him.Moreover, it is evident that he had
little or no idea of the death-dealing power of the explosive, and he was in a measure appalled
at the consequences of his act. At most he probably expected a noisy report that would carry
trepidation to passengers on the cars and by-standers, but he did not expect anything like the
tragic consequences that in fact followed. This circumstance supplies, I think, the moral
necessity for his confession, and adds greatly to the probability that he has named in Domingo
Simeon the true author by induction of the crime and the cause of his own undoing.Another
circumstance which in my opinion in some measure accredits the truth of Manabat's narrative is
that no adequate motive is shown which would have led him to implicate the appellant,
supposing the latter to be innocent. On the contrary, the friendly feeling of fellowship and
respect which Manabat must have entertained towards Simeon would have supplied a powerful
incentive to Manabat to shield him; and it is safe to say that if Manabat had designed to
implicate some innocent person in order merely to gratify the importunity of his interrogators at
the police station, he would have been very likely to have named some other person; and if he
had thus implicated an innocent person, he must sooner or later have wavered in his story and
is some way would have revealed the falsity of his testimony.The conditions under which the
confession was finally made by Bernardino Manabat, revealing the complicity of the appellant,
were not in my opinion such as to impair the credibility of the witness. No promise of indulgence
was held out to him, if he would reveal the names of other guilty persons, and no pressure was
imposed upon him which could have operated to induce falsehood. The only instrument that
seems to have been used by the chief of police to extract the truth was the prolongation of the
examination over a period of nearly a full day a process certainly debilitating to the resisting
powers of the human will, but not in itself likely to elicit falsehood. On the contrary, the only relief
of his burdened spirit under such conditions was to reveal the truth. In addition to this it is to be
noted that, after making a full revelation of the facts, as stated in his declaration before the chief

of police, this witness has not faltered in his fidelity to that narrative, and he persisted in it to the
end of the trial both of himself and of his coaccused.Under all the circumstances the accusing
witness is in my opinion entitled to full credit, and I think the conviction should be sustained.
MALCOLM, J., dissenting:With all due consideration for the learned opinion of the majority, yet
duty impels me to register my dissent and to say that in my judgment the court has fallen into a
grave error in acquitting Domingo Simeon of the crime of murder.The main decision stated
nothing new when it relies on the rule announced in Bishop on Criminal Procedure as to the
weight which should be given to the testimony of an accomplice. (U. S. vs. Remigio [1918], 37
Phil., 599; U. S. vs. Ambrosio and Falsario [1910], 37 Phil., 295; U. S. vs. Ocampo [1905] 4
Phil., 400; U. S. vs. Balisacan [1905], 4 Phil. 545; U.S. vs. Ocampo [1905], 5 Phil., 339; U. S. vs.
Bernales [1911], 18 Phil., 525; U.S. vs. Soriano [1913] 25 Phil., 624; U. S. vs. Briones [1914], 28
Phil., 367; U. S. vs. Lazaro [1915], 34 Phil., 871; U. S. vs. Claro [1915], 32 Phil., 413, and other
cases.) In a decision on appeal from this court, the United States Supreme Court laid down the
rule that although the accomplice was a tow type of man, "yet his testimony or confession is not
to be summarily discarded but is to be judged of by confirming or opposing circumstances as
well as by his character and the influences that may invest him." (Valdez vs. U. S. [1917], 244 U.
S., 432.) The decision of the higher court in the case just mentioned is most illuminating. Let us,
therefore, contrast the facts in that case, in which the United States Supreme Court affirmed the
judgment of conviction, with the facts of the instant case in which the Supreme Court of the
Philippines reverses the judgment of conviction.The guilt or innocence of the defendant Valdez
turned solely or principally upon the testimony of the accomplice Juan Gatmaitan. The guilt or
innocence of the instant defendant Simeon turns solely or principally upon the testimony of the
accomplice Bernardino Manabat. Gatmaitan was found by the different courts to be a densely
ignorant man, of a low order of intelligence, lacking in instruction both mental and moral, and a
convicted cattle thief. Manabat is shown to be a laborer of the usual type, of a fair order of
intelligence, who has heretofore been a law-abiding citizen. Gatmaitan first testified in one
manner as to the guilt of the defendant Valdez, subsequently retracted the accusation, and latter
retracted the retraction. Manabat has told only one story connecting Domingo Simeon with the
horrible crime and this story has never been shaken even when confronted with his chief
Simeon, and even when undergoing a grilling by an expert cross-examiner. In the Valdez case
the court thought it possible to conclude that Valdez planned the crime in the crude manner
certain to be detected, described by Gatmaitan. In the Simeone case the court does not believe
that Domingo Simeon, the secretary of Nagsumait, and a prominent leader in the street railway
strike, would issue an order for the explosion of the bomb from his office in the Labor Hall.
Finally, in the Valdez case the judgments of the court of first instance, of the Supreme Court of
the Philippine Islands, and of the Supreme Court of the United States, were based on the
testimony of Gatmaitan; while here the court discredits completely the testimony of Manabat.To
make just one more reference to the opinion of the United States Supreme Court of Valdez vs.
United States, supra, we note that the court there said that "the judgment should not be
reversed upon a mere abstraction." Judgment should here also not be reversed upon a mere
abstraction. A perusal of the testimony of Bernardino Manabat shows a straightforward narration
of events, reasonable in every respect. It is assuming that impossible as a basis for acquittal to
make the assertion that Manabat concocted the story implicating Simeon during the time he was
being examined by the secret service, in order that he might shorten his term of imprisonment.

Acquittal in this case leaves the active head of a various strike against the Manila Electric
Railway and Light Company, and the real perpetrator of a crime which caused the death of an
innocent child and the grave wounding of various other persons, with his liberty, while the
ignorant tool of the strike leader must languish in prison for a long period of years. This is not
justice. I am strongly of the opinion that judgment should be affirmed.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------74. In re will of Marcelo Jocson, deceased, RAFAEL JOCSON, ET AL., petitionersappellees, vs. ROSAURO JOCSON, ET AL., opponents-appellants.G.R. No. L-17627
June 8, 1922VILLAMOR, J.:On June 10, 19120, Rafael Jocson, Cirilo Manlaque, and Filomena
Goza presented a petition in the court below for the probate of the document Exhibit A, as the
last will and testament of the deceased Marcelo Jocson. This petitioner was opposed by
Rosauro, Asuncion, and Dominga Jocson, alleging that: (a) The supposed will was not the last
will of the deceased, and the signatures appearing thereon, and which are said to be of the
testator, are not authentic; (b) the testator, that is, the deceased, was not of sound mind and
was seriously ill at the time of its execution; and (c) the supposed will was not executed in
accordance with the law.After trial the lower court rendered decision finding, among other
things, as follows:For all of the foregoing reasons the court finds that some hours before, during
and one hour after, the execution of his will, Marcelo Jocson was of sound mind; that he dictated
his will in Visaya, his own dialect; that he signed his will in the presence of three witnesses at
the bottom, and on each of the left margins of the three sheets in which it was written; that said
three witnesses signed the will in the presence of the testator and of each other, all of which
requirements make the documents Exhibit A a valid will, in accordance with the provision of
section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2645.By virtue thereof, it is
adjudged and decreed that the document Exhibit A Is the last will and testament of the
deceased Marcelo Jocson, and it is ordered that the same be admitted to probate, and Rafael
Jocson is hereby appointed administrator of the estate left by said deceased, upon the filing of a
bond in the sum of fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000).The appellants allege that the trial court
erred in holding that Exhibit A is the last will and testament of the deceased Marcelo Jocson,
and in ordering and decreeing the probate thereof as his last will.All the arguments advanced by
the appellants tend to show that the testator Marcelo Jocson, at the time of executing the will,
did not have the mental capacity necessary therefor; that said will was not signed b the
witnesses in the presence of the testator; that the witnesses did not sign the will in the presence
of each other; and that the attestation of the supposed will does not state that the witnesses
signed in the presence of the testator.All of these points raised by the appellants were
discussed at length by the trial court upon the evidence introduced by the parties. After an
examination of said evidence, we are of the opinion, and so hold, that the findings made by the
trial court upon the aforesaid point are supported by the preponderance of evidence.We have
noticed certain conflicts between the declarations of the witnesses on some details prior to, and
simultaneous with, the execution of the will, but to our mind such discrepancies are not sufficient
to raise any doubt as to the veracity of their testimony. In the case of Bugnao vs. Ubag (14 Phil.,
163), it was held:While a number of contradictions in the testimony of alleged subscribing
witnesses to a will as to the circumstances under which it was executed, or a single
contradiction as to a particular incident to which the attention of such witnesses must have been
directed, may in certain cases justify the conclusion that the alleged witnesses were not present,

together, at the time when the alleged will was executed, a mere lapse of memory on the part of
one of these witnesses as to the precise details of an unimportant incident, to which his
attention was not directed, does not necessarily put in doubt the truth and veracity of the
testimony in support of the execution of the will.As to the mental capacity of the testator at the
time of executing his will, the finding of the trial court that the testator was of sound mind at the
time of dictating and signing his will is supported by the evidence. This court, in the case of
Bagtas vs. Paguio (22 Phil., 227), held:To constitute a sound mind and disposing memory it is
not necessary that the mind shall be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, and unshattered by disease
or otherwise, or that the testator be in full possession of all his reasoning faculties. Failure of
memory is not sufficient unless it be total or extend to his immediate family or property.And in
Bugnao vs. Ubag, supra, it was declared:Proof of the existence of all the elements in the
following definition of testamentary capacity, which has frequently been adopted in the United
States, held sufficient to establish the existence of such capacity in the absence of proof of very
exceptional circumstances: "Testamentary capacity is the capacity to comprehend the nature of
the transaction in which the testator is engaged at the time, to recollect the property to be
disposed of and the persons who would naturally be supposed to have claims upon the testator,
and to comprehend the manner in which the instrument will distribute his property among the
objects of this bounty."Whether or not the witnesses signed the will in the presence of the
testator and whether or not they signed in the presence of each other, are questions of fact that
must be decided in accordance with the evidence. The trial judge, who tried this case and saw
and heard the witnesses while testifying, held that these solemnities were complied with at the
execution of the will in question and we find no reason for altering his conclusions.The objection
to the attestation of Exhibit A is groundless if the terms thereof are considered, which, translated
from the Visayan dialect, in which the will was written, into English, says:We, witnesses, do
hereby state that the document written on each side of the three sheets of paper was executed,
acknowledged, signed, and published by the testator abovenamed, Marcelo Jocson, who
declared that it was his last will and testament in our presence and, at his request and all of us
being present, we signed our named on the three sheets of paper as witnesses to this will in the
presence of each other. (Translation of Exhibit A, page 18, documentary evidence.)The
judgment appealed from is affirmed with the costs against the appellants. So ordered.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------8. CHARACTER EVIDENCE
Sec. 51- Character evidence not generally admissible; exceptions
75. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROBERTO BANIGUID y
PASSION, accused-appellant.G.R. No. 137714
September 8, 2000D E C I S I O N
MENDOZA, J.:This is an appeal from the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 110,
Pasay City, finding accused-appellant Roberto Baniguid y Passion guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of rape against his minor daughter, Josibelle Baniguid, and sentencing him to death and
to pay complainant the amount of P75,000.00, as civil indemnity, and the costs of the suit.The
information2 against accused-appellant, based on the complaint filed by the offended party,
alleged -That on or about the 4th day of January 1995, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Roberto Baniguid

y Passion, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge of her minor daughter-private complainant Josibelle V.
Baniguid against her will and consent.Contrary to law.Upon arraignment, accused-appellant
entered a plea of not guilty, whereupon trial ensued.The evidence for the prosecution
established that complainant was born on October 28, 1980, the second of four children by
Josefa Victorino and accused-appellant.3 The family was then residing in Sun Valley, Pasay
City, but in 1992 complainants mother left them to live in Bulacan with another man. The family
residence in Pasay City was sold and complainant, her father, and two brothers transferred to a
small house in Cainta, Rizal.On the night of March 23, 1993, while complainant and her brothers
were asleep in their house in Cainta, Rizal, accused-appellant had carnal knowledge of
complainant. Complainant tried to resist, reminding her father that she is his daughter, but her
pleas went unheeded. Complainant could not shout because she was afraid of her father. With
complainants brothers asleep, accused-appellant was able to make her submit to his will.The
next morning, complainant ran away from their house and worked as a domestic helper.
Nonetheless, from time to time, complainant checked on her father. She learned that her father
got so angry after finding that she had run away that he burned her clothes. Later, upon the
advice of her employer, complainant returned home to her father, but not before telling him that
she would leave if he abused her again.On January 8, 1994, complainant, her father, and her
two brothers left Cainta, Rizal to live in San Nicolas. Upon arriving the next day, they did not find
complainants grandmother but stayed in the latters house, together with complainants uncles
who live in the same house. That night, while complainant was sleeping with her two brothers in
the living room, accused-appellant came to her again, and forced himself on her. As before, she
tried to resist his advances and pleaded with him to stop, but her efforts proved futile.
Complainant was afraid of her father because he once hit her with a piece of wood. After her
father finished raping her, she put on her panties and shorts and cried through the night until
she fell asleep. Later, she disclosed her ordeal to her cousin, Juan, but he did nothing to help
her.Meanwhile, her father got her employed as a domestic helper. She was earning P700.00 a
month, but accused-appellant took all her wages. After working for two months, complainant
returned to her family to look after her brothers because she had been informed by them that
they were being maltreated by their father.Accused-appellant again made complainant work as
a housemaid for another family. As before, her monthly salary was P700.00 but she received
only P100.00 because her father took the rest of her money. She never received her fourth
month salary because it was used to pay for her tuition fees. She tried going to school but was
unable to finish the third grade because her father wanted her to go to Manila with him.In the
morning of January 4, 1995, complainant and her father left San Nicolas, Pangasinan to live in
Pasay City again. They arrived at the house of her fathers "kumpare" in Vitales, Pasay City in
the evening. The place was a one-room shanty lit only by a gas lamp. Complainant went to
sleep on the floor while her father engaged in a drinking spree with the neighbors. After a few
moments, she was awakened by her father who again demanded to have sex with her, as she
lay on her right side. Her fathers "kumpare" was sleeping at arms length away from them.
Complainant just covered her eyes with her hands and cried, helpless at what her father was
doing to her.Complainant again ran away from home. She went to the house of Edna Lopez, her
mothers "kumare," at Sun Valley, Pasay City. She told Edna Lopez that she had been raped by
accused-appellant. Edna Lopez told her to stay with her, took care of her, and gave her P50.00

a month as allowance, but did nothing to help her in reporting to the authorities what her father
had done to her.Later, complainants mother came, took complainant from the custody of Edna
Lopez, and brought her to Bulacan to work as a housemaid for a certain Rey (Rick)
Macatangay. Complainants mother took her monthly salary of P700.00. For the four months
she worked with the Macatangay household, complainant only received P300.00. Complainant
also informed her mother that she was raped by accused-appellant but her mother likewise did
nothing to help her report to the proper authorities what she had gone through.After some time,
complainant asked permission from her employer in Bulacan to visit her former employer.
Complainant never returned to Bulacan nor did she join her family in Pasay City. She went to
visit her friend, Mark, in the squatters area near Rivera Village in Pasay City. She spent the
night with her godmother who lived in that place. Thereafter, she stayed with one friend after
another. She also stayed in the house of her boyfriend, Joey, with whom she had sexual
intercourse twice. She admitted that she smoked shabu with Joey for some time. Joey also
gave her some money to spend for herself.Later, while staying in the house of another friend,
complainant learned that a woman and a policeman were looking for her. She fled and hid in a
passenger jeepney then under repair. While she was sleeping inside the vehicle, she was
chanced upon by a barangay official who reported the matter to the barangay captain, Daniel
Detera.4 Detera summoned complainant to his office and asked her why she was sleeping
inside the jeepney. Complainant told him that she had run away from home because her father
had abused her. Detera accompanied her to the Pasay City Police Station where she filed a
complaint against accused-appellant.5At the police headquarters, the station commander,
Senior Inspector Cristeto Escobia, upon learning from complainant that she had been abused,
sent PO3 George Clavo and PO3 Danilo Tabucol to look for accused-appellant. The policemen
and complainant boarded a mobile car and proceeded to Gat. Mendoza St., Sun Valley, Pasay
City, where they found accused-appellant. He was surprised to see her daughter. When asked
by the police to go with them to their station, accused-appellant complied voluntarily.6Accusedappellant was investigated at the police precinct. After informing accused-appellant of his
constitutional rights, SPO3 Milagros Carrasco, the police officer on duty at the precincts
Womens Desk, asked him if he wanted to give a statement regarding his daughters complaint.
Aside from denying the accusations made by his daughter, accused-appellant declined to give
any statement to the police, whereupon SPO3 Carrasco referred complainant to the Philippine
National Police Crime Laboratory for medicolegal examination and prepared the booking and
information sheet for accused-appellant. Accused-appellant was then turned over to the Central
Investigation Division of the same precinct, after which he was ordered detained without bail.
Complainant executed a sworn statement before SPO3 Carrasco. Thereafter, the matter was
referred to the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasay City for indictment.7Accused-appellant
testified in his defense as follows: He denied the allegations against him. He denied he abused
complainant while they were residing in Cainta, Rizal, because, according to him, complainant
stayed in the house of his former employers, spouses Reynaldo and Dina Tanio. Accusedappellant claimed that complainant, accompanied by Dina Tanio, only visited him from time to
time.According to accused-appellant, about the second week of January 1994, accusedappellant and his four children went to San Nicolas, Pangasinan. They stayed in the house of
his brother, Mariano Baniguid, together with his mother, his in-laws, nephews, and nieces.
Accused-appellant averred that on the night of their arrival in San Nicolas, Pangasinan,

complainant slept in another house.On November 1994, accused-appellant and his eldest child,
Gilbert, went to Manila. He let Gilbert stay with his "kumpare," Dominador Reyes. Complainant
was left in Pangasinan, in the care of a certain Atty. Gonzales, who agreed to send complainant
to school in exchange for her taking Atty. Gonzales granddaughter to school. According to
accused-appellant, he was later told by the son-in-law of Atty. Gonzales that complainant had
not been attending school but was only gallivanting with her friends. Accused-appellant was
asked to take complainant with him lest something bad befell her because of her wayward
nature. Accordingly, accused-appellant took complainant with him to Manila, where they stayed
in the house of his "Kumpareng Domeng" (Dominador Reyes) in Gatchalian Extension, MIA,
Pasay City. Accused-appellant claimed that on the night of their arrival, complainant slept with
his "kumare," Edna Lopez, who lived in a place about 20 minutes walking distance from the
house.Accused-appellant stated that, on June 17, 1996, he saw complainant at the house of his
"Kumpareng Domeng" high on drugs so he advised her to go home to his "Kumareng Edna"
(Edna Lopez). According to him, in the evening of that day, he saw complainant on board a
police mobile with policemen who were looking for him because his daughter had complained
that he raped her. When he tried to talk to her daughter, the policemen prevented him from
doing so.At the police station, accused-appellant was unable to explain his side. Accusedappellant testified that complainant did not know what to say regarding his daughters complaint
so police officers coached her on what to indicate in her sworn statement. He claimed that
someone in the police station took complainants hand and made her point to him as the
perpetrator of the rape.8On February 15, 1999, the trial court rendered its decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:9IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is
hereby rendered finding the Accused guilty of the crime of Rape defined in and penalized by
Article 335, as amended by Republic Act 7659 and hereby sentences the said Accused to suffer
the supreme penalty of DEATH.Conformably with the Decision of our Supreme Court in "People
versus Esteban Victor, G.R. No, 127903, July 9, 1998," the Accused is hereby ordered to pay
the private complainant the amount of P75,000.00 by way of actual damages and to pay the
costs.SO ORDERED.In this appeal, accused-appellant argues that the trial court erred in
convicting him of rape. He contends that the trial court blindly believed the testimony of
complainant despite its falsehood. For these reasons, he maintains that his defense of denial
and alibi should be upheld.In cases of rape, this Court has been guided by the following
principles in its review of trial court decisions: (1) an accusation for rape can be made with
facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the person of the accused, though innocent, to
disprove; (2) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are
usually involved, the testimony of the complainant is scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3)
the evidence for the prosecution stands or falls on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw
strength from the weakness of the defense.10Guided by these principles, this Court finds, and
after careful examination of evidence adduced by both parties, that accused-appellant is indeed
guilty of rape of his daughter.First. Accused-appellant points to the inability of complainant to
remember the names of certain people which he contends impairs her credibility. She could not
remember the names of the persons who employed her as a domestic. Nor could she
remember the name of her paternal grandmother with whom they stayed while in San Nicolas,
Pangasinan.Accused-appellants argument has no merit. There are people who have difficulty
remembering names of other people, but their credibility is not necessarily impaired.

Complainant worked for a family in Cainta, Rizal for only a month way back in March 1993. She
worked for another family in Pangasinan for only two months sometime in 1994. When she
testified in 1996, she could hardly be expected to remember their names. It would also be
understandable that complainant could not remember the name of her paternal grandmother
because she never really knew it. Nobody told her what her paternal grandmothers name was.
With respect to the name of complainants paternal uncle, it should be noted that accusedappellant had two brothers and his counsel did not specify who between them was being
alluded to. Indeed, there can be no doubt about complainants testimony that they stayed in the
house of her grandmother in San Nicolas, Pangasinan, because accused-appellant himself said
they stayed there in his brothers house with his mother. Complainant was also unable to
remember the name of her fathers "kumpare," but it is not denied that, from San Nicolas,
Pangasinan, accused-appellant took his family to Pasay City and stayed in the house of his
"Kumpareng Domeng."These persons, whose names complainant could not recall, had no
involvement in the misfortune of complainant.1wphi1 Their names are of minor importance.
That these people actually existed cannot be doubted because accused-appellant himself
mentioned or referred to them in his own defense.Complainants inability to recall the names of
some people did not affect the consistency of her testimony concerning the circumstances
under which she was raped. After all, she remembered the names of other people because
these were the ones to whom she had unburdened herself. These were her friends, Edna
Lopez, Juan (her cousin), her Ate Beng, and her boyfriend, Joey.Second. Accused-appellant
capitalizes on complainants testimony that even after she had run away from her father, she
nevertheless "secretly visited" him. Accused-appellant contends that such admission negates
her claim that she had been abused by him."Secretly visited" is actually a literal translation of
what complainant said. Complainants testimony is as follows:Q After one month with that
woman as your employer, where did you go?A When I was working in that store, I used to visit
my father secretly (sinisilip-silip ko pa rin ang tatay ko).11It is clear what complainant meant was
that, concerned for accused-appellant who, after all, is her father, she checked on him without
making him know she was doing so. But her love and concern for him wore out after he
repeatedly defiled her, so she fled from her father and never returned again. Indeed, unable to
forgive him any longer, she left it to the trial court to decide what penalty to impose on her father
for what he had done to her.Third. Complainant was forced to seek the company of her friends
because of her fathers abuses. She had no one else to turn to. Her mother had already
abandoned them way back in 1992. When complainant told her mother what had happened to
her, the latter did nothing to help her. Complainants mother only got her employed and took
practically all of her salaries.The fact that complainants friends were mostly male is of no
moment. There is nothing peculiar nor extraordinary if a person, like complainant, has more
friends of the opposite sex. It is true complainant admitted that she had sexual intercourse with
her boyfriend and that she had taken shabu. It would seem, however, that this was a choice
forced on her as a result of her misfortune. There is no showing that she is promiscuous by
nature. If at all, complainants admission that she had sexual intercourse with her boyfriend and
that she had taken shabu only proves her candor, which all the more shows that she is telling
the truth.Even assuming that complainant is less than chaste, this fact would not detract from
the fact that accused-appellant violated her on the night of January 4, 1995. As long as the
victims testimony measures up to the standard of credibility, the fact that she had sexual

relations with other men would not destroy or affect her credibility. The moral character of the
victim is immaterial in rape cases. For even a prostitute can be the victim of rape.12Fourth. It
has been held that when a woman says that she has been raped, she says, in effect, all that is
necessary to show that she has been raped.13 In this case, complainant consistently declared
that, on the night of January 4, 1995, when she was 15 years old, accused-appellant abused
her, describing in detail how accused-appellant removed her shorts and panties and succeeded
in having carnal knowledge with her by entering her from behind while she was lying on her right
side. She submitted to her fathers lust because of fear and she could only cry in desperation
and anger. This happened in the shanty of her fathers "kumpare" in which they were
temporarily staying.A daughter, especially one of tender age like complainant, would not just
accuse her own father of a heinous crime had she not really been aggrieved.14 Considering this
fact, accused-appellants contention that complainant only made up her story and was merely
taught what to say during the investigation deserves no consideration. Nor does the refusal of
the people to whom complainant had disclosed her misfortune to help her put in doubt
complainants credibility for reluctance of some people to involve themselves in criminal actions
is a matter of judicial notice.15 Having had the opportunity to observe complainants demeanor,
particularly her scorn and outrage against her own father, the trial court committed no error,
much less abuse of discretion, in believing the testimony of the complainant which, to repeat, is
worthy of absolute credence.16Indubitably, the crime as charged was proven according to the
quantum of evidence required by law. Complainant positively testified that she was raped by
accused-appellant. Notwithstanding the absence of testimony as to the findings on
complainants medical examination, complainants testimony, being credible, is sufficient to
prove accused-appellants guilt. It is well established that a medical examination of the victim,
as well as the medical certificate, is merely corroborative in character and is not indispensable
in proving rape.17The evidence shows that accused-appellant forced complainant to submit to
his will. Complainant feared her father as he once hit her with a piece of wood and even chased
her with a bladed weapon. She saw him beat her mother while the latter was pregnant. It is
settled jurisprudence that physical resistance need not be established when intimidation is
exercised upon the victim and the latter submits herself against her will to the rapists embrace
because of fear for her life and personal safety.18 Furthermore, when rape is committed by a
father against his own daughter, the moral ascendancy of the former over the latter takes the
place of physical violence and intimidation.19Accused-appellants bare and uncorroborated
denial of the crime charged is insufficient to refute the prosecution evidence, especially in the
face of his positive identification by complainant as the malefactor.20Fifth. We agree with
accused-appellant that his warrantless arrest by the police officers was illegal considering that it
was not one of the cases falling under Rule 113, 5 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.
However, for his objection thereto to prosper, he should have interposed it before he entered his
plea during arraignment, otherwise, the same is already waived.21 His belated protest as to his
defective arrest is but an effort reduced to waste.Nevertheless, we hold that it was error for the
trial court to impose the death penalty on accused-appellant. Under Art. 335 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, the death penalty is imposed for the crime of rape if
"the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent . . . of the victim."
For this purpose, the special qualifying circumstances of the victims minority and her
relationship with the offender should be alleged and proved.22 The allegation in the information

that complainant is the "minor daughter" of accused-appellant is insufficient. As held in People v.

Puertollano,23 the information must state the exact age of the victim at the time of the
commission of the crime, thus:A close scrutiny of the information filed in this case shows that all
that is stated therein is that Mary Joy is a minor.1wphi1 No mention was made of her exact
age.We reiterate that due process requires that the acts or omission constitutive of the offense
be stated in the Information to fully apprise the accused of the charge against him. The nature
and the cause of the accusation must be reasonably stated therein.Consequently, the death
penalty imposed by the trial court should be reduced to reclusion perpetua as provided for in the
second paragraph of Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.24Accused-appellants
admission that he is the complainants father and that complainant was born on October 28,
1980 and, hence, that complainant was a minor under 18 years of age at the time of the
commission of the rape, cannot cure the defect in the allegation in the information.In view of the
reduction of the penalty, the amount of P75,000.00 awarded by the trial court to complainant as
civil indemnity should be correspondingly reduced to P50,000.00, in line with our case law that if
the crime is simple rape the indemnity should only be P50,000.00. Aside from the civil
indemnity, complainant should likewise be paid moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00,
pursuant to the ruling of this Court that such is automatically granted in rape cases without need
of proof for it is assumed that the victim has suffered moral injuries entitling her to such an
award.25WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 110, Pasay City,
convicting accused-appellant of rape, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that his sentence
is REDUCED to reclusion perpetua, the award of indemnity to complainant is reduced to
P50,000.00, and accused-appellant is ordered to pay complainant the additional amount of
P50,000.00 as moral damages.
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