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G.R. No.

L-28078, Intestate Estate of


Domingo. Lopez v. Aquino, Yusay
Aquino and CA, 38 SCRA 472
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
DECISION
April 29, 1971
G.R. No. L-28078
INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED LUIS C. DOMINGO, SR.,
CONSUELO DOMINGO DE LOPEZ, administratrix-petitioner,
vs.
PEDRO A. AQUINO, deceased, substituted by SALVACION
YUSAY AQUINO, ETC., and the HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
Teodoro P. Regino for petitioner. Angel Sanchez for respondent.
Teehankee, J.:
An original action for certiorari challenging a judgment of the Court
of Appeals as null and void for having been allegedly entered in
excess of jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion.
On August 7, 1961, the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan
rendered judgment approving the money claim of respondent Pedro
A. Aquino against the petitioner estate by ordering the then special
administratrix, Asuncion Domingo Sta. Maria, "to pay from the
available funds of the estate the sum of P20,000.00 with 12%
interest per annum from June 10, 1954 to Pedro A. Aquino."

Both parties appealed from the said judgment to the Court of


Appeals, insofar as it was adverse to them, and on January 20, 1967,
the appellate court in an extended nineteen-page decision penned
by Justice Ruperto C. Martin, which dealt mainly and exhaustively
with the contentions of appellant estate, found for respondent as
appellant, and affirmed the lower court's judgment with
modifications in favor of respondent, as follows: "IN VIEW OF THE
FOREGOING, except with the modification of the order as to the
payment of the corresponding interest stipulated in the promissory
note (Exhibit C) the claim of Atty. Pedro A. Aquino is hereby
approved and allowed, and the administratrix ordered to pay, from
the available funds of the estate, the sum of P20,000.00 with
compound interest at the rate of 12% per annum from July 27, 1953,
plus P500.00 as attorney's fees, to Pedro A. Aquino."
According to the present petition itself, the estate's counsel of
record in the appellate court, Atty. Jose A. Unson, did not receive the
notice and copy of the appellate court's judgment sent to him by
registered mail; but the estate's attorneys in the intestate
proceedings pending in the lower court, Attys. Primicias, Del Castillo
and Macaraeg, were verbally informed by respondent's counsel of
the judgment rendered on appeal by the appellate court. 1
Pursuant to said information, petitioner caused to be filed on March
9, 1967, with the appellate court an "Appearance with Motions for
Substitution and to be served with a copy of the Judgment,"
stating inter alia, that the former special administratrix, Asuncion
Domingo Sta. Maria had long resigned as such with the permission
of the intestate court, that the other co-special administrator, Atty.
Luis Domingo, Jr. (who had caused the prosecution of the appeal)
was removed from his trust by the intestate court's order dated May
21, 1963, for having squandered cash funds of the estate, and that
as a consequence, Mrs. Consuelo Domingo de Lopez was appointed

judicial administratrix and has since been administering the estate


alone; that Mrs. Lopez as judicial administratrix wished to file a
motion for reconsideration of the appellate court's judgment and
that the clerk of court be directed to serve copy of said judgment on
her counsel instead of on Atty. Unson as the former special
administrator's counsel "for purposes of starting of time to move for
re-hearing or reconsideration;" and praying that as present judicial
administratrix, she be substituted in lieu of the former joint
administrators and that her counsel be served with copy of the
appellate court's decision.
Upon due opposition of respondent on the ground of finality of the
judgment, the appellate court denied the petitioner's motion for
reconsideration per its resolution of April 27, 1967.
No further move was made by petitioner thereafter until almost five
months later when on September 23, 1967, after respondent had
filed in the intestate court a motion for execution of the judgment,
as affirmed in his favor by the appellate court, it filed the present
petition. Upon the representations - contrary to the records - that
the appellate court had granted "new or further relief" in favor of
respondent by awarding compound interest on the sum due
respondent and that Atty. Unson has ceased to be the estate's
lawyer since May 21, 1963 with the removal of the former
administrator, Luis Domingo, Jr. as such, the Court issued on October
3, 1967, the corresponding summons and required respondents to
answer the petition.
The Court, upon urgent supplemental petition of petitioner, further
issued on November 7, 1967, upon a P1,000.00 bond, a writ of
preliminary injunction enjoining enforcement, through sale of the
estate's properties, of the appellate court's judgment.
The court finds no merit in the petition.

1. The records at bar amply show that Atty. Jose A. Unson was the
counsel on record of the petitioner estate in the appellate court and
never filed any withdrawal as such counsel. As a matter of fact, even
after the removal on May 21, 1963 of Luis Domingo, Jr. as
administrator of the estate, Atty. Unson filed in the appellate court
his memorandum dated August 17, 1963, for the estate as
appellant. While it may be true that Atty. Unson ceased as counsel
for the estate and for the former administrator sometime on
November 8, 1966, when the intestate court granted his motion
dated November 2, 1966, to withdraw as counsel by virtue of his
appointment to and assumption on February 8, 1966 of the public
office of Assistant Administrator of the Sugar Quota Administration,
2 this was true only insofar as the case in the intestate court was
concerned. He continued on record in the appellate court as counsel
for the estate as appellant therein and did not file therein any
withdrawal as counsel and neither did the petitioner inform said
court of any change of counsel or of party-administrator, as required
by Rule 138, section 26 of the Rules of Court. More so, no
appearance of any new counsel for the estate was ever filed with
the appellate court.
2. Notice and copy of the appellate court's decision of January 20,
1967, were therefore duly served by registered mail on the estate's
counsel of record at his address of record at 307 Trinity Building, San
Luis, Ermita Manila in accordance with Rule 13, section 8 of the
Rules of Court. 3 And in accordance with said Rule, service by
registered mail of the appellate court's decision upon the
petitioner's counsel of record was deemed completed and effected
upon the addressee's failure to claim his mail on the fifth day after
the first notice of the postmaster. 4 This has ever since been the
prevailing rule in the interests of public policy and sound
administration of justice, as most recently affirmed in Fojas vs.
Navarro, 5 citing a long line of applicable precedents.

3. The present administratrix gives no satisfactory explanation as to


her failure to substitute herself vice Luis Domingo, Jr., since the
latter's removal on May 21, 1963, when she became the sole
administrator (which she previously shared with Luis from December
21, 1961), or to then engage new counsel vice Atty. Unson in the
appellate court. Her very motion for substitution filed on March 9,
1967 with the appellate court after its decision of January 20, 1967
recognized the fact that the appellate court had already duly
handed down its adverse decision and merely expressed her wish to
belatedly file a motion for reconsideration on behalf of the petitioner
estate. After the appellate court's denial of her motion on April 27,
1967, she was apparently resigned to the futility of filing any such
motion, in view of the finality of the appellate court's decision - for
such motion was never filed.
4. One vital factor that the present administratrix, Mrs. Lopez, has
obviously failed to appreciate, wittingly or otherwise, is that the
party in the Subject case was the intestate estate of the deceased
Luis C. Domingo, Sr. and that Atty. Unson represented the estate as
counsel in the said case. The fact that his services were engaged by
Luis Domingo, Jr. in his (Luis') official capacity as administrator, did
not make him the personal counsel of Luis. Thus, nothwithstanding
Luis' removal as administrator, Atty. Unson continued to represent
the estate as counsel in the appellate court. He continued to be
authorized to represent the estate as its counsel, until the new
administrator should terminate his services, which she never did.
5. The representations made by the present administrator and her
counsel in the petition at bar - filed almost five months after the
appellate court's denial of her belated motion for substitution and to
be served with copy of its decision - to the effect that the appellate
court had granted respondent "new and further relief" in its decision
by the award of compound interest on the sum due respondent are

deplorable. They failed to set out before the Court the full facts, viz,
that respondent had duly prayed for the award of compound interest
by the intestate court in accordance with the very stipulation of the
promissory note sued upon; that respondent had duly moved the
intestate court to reconsider its decision failing to provide for such
compound interest; that the intestate court, in denying respondent's
motion, merely stated "that the issue may just as well be decided in
the appellate court, since both parties had indicated their intention
to appeal; and that respondent in fact filed his appeal from this
adverse portion of the intestate court's decision, as well as the nonaward of the stipulated attorney's fees of P500.00. The appellate
court therefore properly modified the intestate court's decision by
awarding such compound interest and attorney's fees as prayed for
in the errors assigned in respondent's brief as appellant.
6. It results clearly that the petition, alleging and praying that the
appellate court's decision of January 20, 1967, be declared null and
void for having been rendered and entered in excess of or without
jurisdiction or that this Court send for the records from the appellate
court "for purposes of review and thereafter render its own decision
reversing the judgment [of the appellate court]" notwithstanding its
long having become final and executory, is utterly untenable and
without legal justification.
7. Petitioner's counsel are reminded of this Court's admonition in
Pajares vs. Abad Santos, 6 and other cases cited therein, to wit, that
"the cooperation of litigants and their attorneys is needed so that
needless clogging of the court dockets with unmeritorious cases
may be avoided. There must be more faithful adherence to Rule 7,
section 5 of the Rules of Court which provides that 'the signature of
an attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the
pleading and that to the best of his knowledge, information and
belief, there is good ground to support it; and that it is not

interposed for delay' and expressly admonishes that 'for a willful


violation of this rule, an attorney may be subjected to disciplinary
action.' "
WHEREFORE, the petition is ordered dismissed and petitioner's
counsel shall pay treble costs. The writ of preliminary injunction
issued of November 7, 1967 is hereby dissolved and upon
promulgation of this decision, respondent may proceed immediately
with the enforcement and execution by the intestate court of the
appellate court's judgment of January 20, 1967, in his favor. This
decision shall be noted in the personal record of the counsel for
petitioner and of their associate attorney, Teodoro P. Regino, who
signed and verified the petition. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro,.
Fernando, Barredo, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur.
Footnotes

DOMINGO VS. AQUINO


FACTS
Asuncion Domingo Sta. Maria and Atty. Luis Domingo, Jr. were appointed co-special administrators of the estate of Luis
Domingo, Sr. Pedro Aquino filed a money claim on the estate. CFI approved the money claim of Aquino. Both parties appealed to
the CA. CA affirmed CFI judgment with modifications in favor of Aquino (allowed compounded interest). The estate's counsel in
the CA, Atty. Jose A. Unson, did not receive the notice and copy of the judgment sent to him by registered mail; but the estate's
attorneys in the intestate proceedings pending in the lower court, Attys. Primicias, Del Castillo and Macaraeg, were verbally
informed by respondent's counsel of the judgment. Consuelo Domingo de Lopez filed on March 9, 1967, with the CA an
"Appearance with Motions for Substitution and to be served with a copy of the Judgment," stating that Asuncion Domingo Sta.
Maria had long resigned as special administratrix with the permission of the intestate court, that Atty. Luis Domingo, Jr. (who had
caused the prosecution of the appeal) was removed from his trust by the intestate court, for having squandered cash funds of the
estate, that, as a consequence, she was appointed judicial administratrix and has since been administering the estate alone; that
as judicial administratrix, she wished to file a motion for reconsideration and that the clerk of court be directed to serve copy of
said judgment on her counsel instead of on Atty. Unson and praying that as present judicial administratrix, she be substituted in
lieu of the former joint administrators and that her counsel be served with copy of the CAs decision. CA denied motion for
reconsideration. After almost 5 mos. and after respondent had filed in the intestate court a motion for execution of the judgment,
petitioner filed this petition alleging that CA decision was entered in excess of jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion.
This was opposed by Aquino on the ground of finality.

ISSUE
WON CAs decision has become final

HELD
YES
Ratio CA decision has become final and executory in accordance with the Rules of Court and since no appeal was filed.
Reasoning Motion for reconsideration was filed out of time and delay was without legal basis. Petitioners motion for substitution
filed with the appellate court after its decision recognized the fact that the appellate court had already duly handed down its
adverse decision and petitioner merely expressed her wish to belatedly file a motion for reconsideration on behalf of the
petitioner estate. She was apparently resigned to the futility of filing any such motion, in view of the finality of the appellate court's
decision for such motion was never filed. She cannot use as an excuse the substitution of administrators/counsels. The
records at bar amply show that Atty. Jose A. Unson was the counsel on record of the petitioner estate in the appellate court and
never filed any withdrawal as such counsel. He was representing the estate and not the administrator, Luis Domingo, Jr., so that
even after latters removal, the former remains to be counsel of estate. No withdrawal as counsel or petition for change of
counsel was filed in accordance with the Rules of Court. Notice and copy of the CA's decision were duly served by registered
mail on the estate's counsel of record at his address of record in accordance with Rule 13, section 8 of the Rules of Court. And in
accordance with said Rule, service by registered mail of the appellate court's decision upon the petitioner's counsel of record
was deemed completed and effected upon the addressee's failure to claim his mail on the fifth day after the first notice of the
postmaster. The present administratrix gives no satisfactory explanation as to her failure to substitute herself vice Luis Domingo,
Jr., since the latter's removal or to then engage new counsel vice Atty. Unson in the appellate court.
Disposition Petition dismissed; petitioners counsel shall pay treble costs for falsely representing to the SC that the CA had
granted new and further relief to Aquino when, in fact, he had duly prayed for the relief awarded and for filing unmeritorious
cases that clog the court dockets; writ of preliminary injunction issued on Nov. 7, 1967 is dissolved.

FELICISIMO M. MONTANO, complainant, vs. INTEGRATED BAR of the


PHILIPPINES AND Atty. JUAN S. DEALCA, respondents.
R E S O LUTIO N
KAPUNAN, J.:

In a verified complaint filed before this Court on March 9, 1994, complainant Felicisimo M.
Montano charged Atty. Juan Dealca with misconduct and prays that he be sternly dealt wit
administratively. The complaint[1] is summarized as follows:
1. On November 14, 1992, the complainant hired the services of Atty. Juan S. Dealca as his
counsel in collaboration with Atty. Ronando L. Gerona in a case pending before the Court of
Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 37467 wherein the complainant was the plaintiffappellant.
2. The parties agreed upon attorneys fees in the amount of P15,000.00, fifty percent (50%)
of which was payable upon acceptance of the case and the remaining balance upon the

termination of the case. Accordingly, complainant paid respondent the amount of P7,500.00
representing 50% of the attorneys fee.
3.
Thereafter, even before the respondent counsel had prepared the appellants brief
and contrary to their agreement that the remaining balance be payable after the termination of the
case, Atty. Dealca demanded an additional payment from complainant. Complainant obliged by
paying the amount of P4,000.00.
4. Prior to the filing of the appellants brief, respondent counsel again demand payment of
the remaining balance of 3,500.00. When complainant was unable to do so, respondent lawyer
withdrew his appearance as complainants counsel without his prior knowledge and/or
conformity. Returning the case folder to the complainant, respondent counsel attached a Note
dated February 28, 1993,[2] stating:

28 February 1994
Pepe and Del Montano,
For breaking your promise, since you do not want to fulfill your end of the bargain,
heres your reward:
Henceforth, you lawyer for yourselves. Here are your papers.
Johnny
Complainant claimed that such conduct by respondent counsel exceeded the ethical
standards of the law profession and prays that the latter be sternly dealt with
administratively. Complainant later on filed motions praying for the imposition of the maximum
penalty of disbarment.
After respondent counsel filed his comment on the complaint, the Court in the Resolution of
August 1, 1994, referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report and recommendation.
The Investigating Commissioner found respondent counsel guilty of unprofessional conduct
and recommended that he be severely reprimanded. However, in a Resolution [3] by the IBP
Board of Governors on July 26, 1997, it was resolved that the penalty recommended by the
Investigating Commissioner meted to respondent by amended to three (3) months suspension
from the practice of law for having been found guilty of misconduct, which eroded the public
confidence regarding his duty as a lawyer.

Respondent counsel sought reconsideration of the aforementioned resolution of the IBP,


alleging that the latter misapprehended the facts and that, in any case, he did not deserve the
penalty imposed. The true facts, according to him, are the following:
1. Complainant is being represented by Atty. Ronando L. Gerona in his case on appeal;
2. Due to the ailment of Atty. Geronas daughter, he could not prepare and submit complainants
appellants brief on time;
3. Complainant went to the respondent to do just that, i.e., prepare and submit his appellants
brief on time at the agreed fee of P15,000.00, 50% down and 50% upon its completion;
4. Working overtime, respondent was able to finish the appellants brief ahead of its deadline, so
he advised the complainant about its completion with the request that the remaining balance
of P7,500.00 be paid. Complainant paid P4,000.00 only, promising to pay the P3,500.00
tomorrow or on later particular date. Please take note that, at this juncture, there was
already a breach of the agreement on complainants part.
5. When that tomorrow or on a later particular date came, respondent, thru a messenger,
requested the complainant to pay the P3,500.00 as promised but word was sent that he will
again pay tomorrow or on later date. This promise-non-payment cycle went on
repeatedly until the last day of the filing of the brief. Please take note again that it was not
the respondent but the complainant who sets the date when he will pay, yet fails to pay as
promised;
6. Even without being paid completely, respondent, of his own free will and accord, filed
complainants brief on time;
7. After the brief was filed, respondent tried to collect from the complainant the remaining
balance of P3,500.00, but the latter made himself scarce. As the records would show, such
P3,500.00 remains unpaid until now;
8. Sensing that something was amiss, respondent sent the February 28, 1993 note and case
folder to the complainant, hoping that the latter would see personally the former about it to
settle the matter between them;
9. However, instead of seeing the respondent, complainant filed this case;
10. Respondent was constrained to file his withdrawal with the Court of Appeals because of this
case to avoid further misunderstanding since he was the one who signed the appellants brief
although Atty. Gerona was his counsel of record. Such withdrawal was accordingly granted
by the appellate court;

xxx xxx

xxx.[4]

Respondent counsel further averred that complainants refusal to pay the agreed lawyers
fees, measly as it was, was deliberate and in bad faith; hence, his withdrawal as counsel was
just, ethical and proper. Respondent counsel concluded that not only was the penalty of
suspension harsh for his act of merely trying to collect payment for his services rendered, but it
indirectly would punish his family since he was the sole breadwinner with children in school and
his wife terminally ill with cancer.
In its Resolution No. XIII-97-129 dated October 25, 1997, the IBP denied Atty. Dealcas
motion for reconsideration, to wit:
xxx

RESOLVED TO DENY Atty. Dealcas Motion For Reconsideration of the Boards


Decision in the above-entitled case there being no substantive reason to reverse the
finding therein. Moreover, the motion is improperly laid the remedy of the respondent
is to file the appropriate pleading with the Supreme Court within fifteen (15) days
from receipt of notice of said Decision pursuant to Sec. 12 [c] of Rule 139-B. [5]
On December 10, 1997, this Court noted the following pleadings filed in the present
complaint,
(a) notice and a copy of Resolution No. XII-97-154 dated July 26, 1997 of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines amending the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of
reprimand to three (3) months suspension of respondent from the practice of law for having
been found guilty of misconduct which eroded the public confidence regarding his duty as a
lawyer;
(b) complainants motion for praying for the imposition of the maximum penalty of disbarment;
(c) motion dated September 15, 1997 of respondent for reconsideration of the aforesaid
resolution of July 26, 1997;
(d) comment/opposition of respondent praying that the motion for the imposition of the
maximum penalty be denied;
(e) comment of complainant praying that the penalty of three (3) months suspension for the
practice of law as recommended by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines pursuant to
Resolution No. XII-97-154 be raised to a heavier penalty;
(f) comment/manifestation/opposition of complainant praying that the respondent be disbarred;
and
(g) rejoinder of respondent praying that this case be dismissed for being baseless. [6]

and referred the same to the IBP for evaluation and report.

In compliance therewith, on March 28, 1998, the IBP issued Resolution No. XIII-98-42
referring the above-entitled case to Commissioner Vibar for evaluation, report and
recommendation in view of the Motion for Reconsideration granted by the Supreme Court.
The Investigating Commissioner, after referring the case, recommended that his original
recommendation of the imposition of the penalty of reprimand be maintained, noting that
respondent counsel had served the IBP well as President of the Sorsogon Chapter.[7] Accordingly,
on February 23, 1999, the IBP Board of Governors, issued the following resolution:
RESOLUTION NO. XIII-99-48

xxx

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED,


the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the aboveentitled case, herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex A; and, finding
the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable
laws and rules, the Motion for Reconsideration be granted and that the penalty
of REPRIMAND earlier recommended by the Investigating Commissioner be
imposed on Atty. Juan S. Dealca.[8]
Complainant asked the IBP to reconsider the foregoing resolution but the motion was
denied.[9]
On April 10, 2000, complainant filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari in
connection with Administrative Case No. 4215 against the IBP and respondent counsel averring
that the IBP Board of Governors committed grave abuse of discretion when it overturned its
earlier resolution and granted respondent counsels motion for reconsideration on February 23,
1999. He claimed that the earlier resolution denying the motion for reconsideration issued on
October 25, 1997 had already become final and executory; hence, any further action or motion
subsequent to such final and executory judgment shall be null and void.
When the Court issued the resolution of December 10, 1997 treating the several pleadings
filed in the present complaint, it should be noted that the IBP resolution denying respondents
motion for reconsideration (Resolution No. XIII-97-129) dated October 25, 1997, for some
reason, had not yet reached this Court. As of that date, the only IBP resolution attached to the
records of the case was Resolution No. XII-97-54 amending the administrative sanction from
reprimand to three months suspension. Hence, at the time the pleadings were referred back to
the IBP in the same resolution, the Court was not aware that the IBP had already disposed of the
motion for reconsideration filed by respondent counsel.
Thus, when the IBP was informed of the said Court resolution, it construed the same as
granting Atty. Dealcas motion for reconsideration and as an order for IBP to conduct a re-

evaluation of the case. The IBP assumed that its resolution of October 25, 1997 was already
considered by this Court when it referred the case back to the IBP. It failed to notice that its
resolution denying the motion for reconsideration was not among those pleadings and resolution
referred back to it.
Hence, on the strength of this Courts resolution which it had inadvertently misconstrued,
the IBP conducted a re-evaluation of the case and came up with the assailed resolution now
sought to be reversed. The Court holds that the error is not attributable to the IBP. It is
regrettable that the procedural infirmity alleged by complainant actually arose from a mere
oversight which was attributable to neither party.
Going into the merits, we affirm the findings made by the IBP that complainant engaged the
services of respondent lawyer only for the preparation and submission of the appellants brief
and the attorneys fees was payable upon the completion and submission of the appellants brief
and not upon the termination of the case.
There is sufficient evidence which indicates complainants willingness to pay the attorneys
fees. As agreed upon, complainant paid half of the fees in the amount of P7,500.00 upon
acceptance of the case. And while the remaining balance was not yet due as it was agreed to be
paid only upon the completion and submission of the brief, complainant nonetheless delivered to
respondent lawyer P4,000.00 as the latter demanded. This, notwithstanding, Atty. Dealca
withdrew his appearance simply because of complainants failure to pay the remaining balance
of P3,500.00, which does not appear to be deliberate. The situation was aggravated by
respondent counsels note to complainant withdrawing as counsel which was couched in impolite
and insulting language.[10]
Given the above circumstances, was Atty. Dealcas conduct just and proper?
We find Atty. Dealcas conduct unbecoming of a member of the legal profession. Under
Canon 22 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, lawyer shall withdraw his services only for
good cause and upon notice appropriate in the circumstances. Although he may withdraw his
services when the client deliberately fails to pay the fees for the services, [11] under the
circumstances of the present case, Atty. Dealcas withdrawal was unjustified as complainant did
not deliberately fail to pay him the attorneys fees. In fact, complainant exerted honest efforts to
fulfill his obligation. Respondents contemptuous conduct does not speak well of a member of
the bar considering that the amount owing to him was only P3,500.00. Rule 20.4 of Canon 20,
mandates that a lawyer shall avoid controversies with clients concerning his compensation and
shall resort to judicial action only to prevent imposition, injustice or fraud. Sadly, for not so
large a sum owed to him by complainant, respondent lawyer failed to act in accordance with the
demands of the Code.
The Court, however, does not agree with complainants contention that the maximum
penalty of disbarment should be imposed on respondent lawyer. The power to disbar must be

exercised with great caution. Only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the
standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and member of the bar will
disbarment be imposed as a penalty. It should never be decreed where a lesser penalty, such as
temporary suspension, would accomplish the end desired. [12] In the present case, reprimand is
deemed sufficient.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Juan S. Dealca is
REPRIMANDED with a warning that repetition of the same act will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman), Puno, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

Montano vs. IBP


FACTS: Atty. Dealca, counsel for Felicisimo Montano withdrew his services for his client upon the latter's
failure to comply with their retainer agreement.
ISSUE: W/NOT DEALCAS CONDUCT VIOLATED THE CPR
HELD: We find Atty Dealcas conduct unbecoming of a member of the legal profession. Under Canon 22
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall withdraw his services only for good cause and
upon notice appropriate in the circumstances. Although he may withdraw his services when client
deliberately fails to pay the fees for the services, under the circumstances of the present case, Atty.
Dealcas withdrawal was unjustified as complainant did not deliberately fail to pay him the attys fees.
Rule 20.4 of Canon 290, mandates that a lawyer shall avoid controversies with clients concerning his
compensation and shall resort to judicial action only to prevent imposition, injustice or fraud. Sadly, for not
so large a sum owed to him by complainant (P 3,500.00), respondent lawyer failed to act in accordance
with the demands of the Code. But, only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing
and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and member of the bar will disbarment be imposed a
s penalty.

FELIZARDO S. OBANDO and the ESTATES of JOSE FIGUERAS and DOA


ALEGRIA STREBEL VDA. DE FIGUERAS, petitioners, vs. EDUARDO F.
FIGUERAS andAMIGO REALTY CORPORATION as represented by
ANTONIO A. KAW, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
In resolving this appeal, the Court invokes the following principles: (1) a lawyers
standing in a case remains, until a substitute takes over pursuant to Section 26, Rule

138 of the Rules of Court; (2) a trial court may act upon a motion to dismiss at any
time a ground therefor becomes available, even after a responsive pleading to the
complaint has already been filed; (3) a civil case initiated by an estate administrator
may be dismissed upon a showing that the said administrators appointment as such
has been revoked by the probate court; and (4) the dismissal of an action may be made
after the ground therefor becomes known, even if the trial court has refused to do so
earlier when that ground was not yet available.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to
annul the July 30, 1998 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR SP No. 47594,
which affirmed the dismissal, without prejudice, of Petitioner Felizardo Obandos
action for annulment of contract and reconveyance earlier ordered by the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 218.
[1]

[2]

The Facts
In 1964, Alegria Strebel Figueras, together with her stepsons, Eduardo and Francisco,
filed a Petition for settlement of the intestate estate of her deceased husband Jose
Figueras. While settlement of the estate was pending, she died and Eduardo assumed
administration of the joint estates of Don Jose and Doa Alegria. Hardly had the
proceedings in both intestacies begun when Eduardo was served a Petition for Probate
of what purported to be Doa Alegrias Last Will and Testament, filed by Felizardo S.
Obando (herein petitioner), a nephew of Doa Alegria.
[3]

[4]

The alleged Will bequeathed to Petitioner Obando and several other members of the
Obando clan properties left by the Figueras couple, including two parcels of land in
Gilmore Avenue, New Manila, Quezon City, covered by TCT Nos. 13741 and 17679.
When the probate case was consolidated with the intestate proceedings, Petitioner
Obando was appointed as Eduardos co-administrator of the joint estates.
[5]

[6]

As Eduardo insisted that the alleged Will was a forgery, the document was submitted
to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for examination and comparison of
Doa Alegrias alleged signature therein with samples which both parties accepted as
authentic. The NBI found that the questioned and the standard signatures were not
made by the same person. This led to the indictment and the conviction of Petitioner
Obando in Criminal Case 90-85819 for estafa through falsification of a public
document.
[7]

[8]

On February 20, 1990, the probate court denied Eduardos Motion for authority to sell
the aforementioned two parcels of land in New Manila. Despite such denial, Eduardo
sold the lots to Amigo Realty Corporation on the strength of an Order issued by the
probate court on May 15, 1991. New titles were issued for these lots in the name of
Amigo Realty.
[9]

[10]

On June 4, 1992, Petitioner Obando, in his capacity as co-administrator and universal


heir of Doa Alegria, filed a Complaint against Eduardo and Amigo Realty
(collectively referred to as the respondents) for the nullification of the sale. The
proceedings were docketed as Civil Case No. Q-92-12384 and raffled to the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 79.
However, in Special Proceeding Nos. 61567 and 123948, the probate court, in its
Order dated December 17, 1997, removed Petitioner Obando from his office as coadministrator of the joint estate of the Figueras spouses. Consequently, in the civil
case, respondents filed a Joint Motion to Dismiss dated January 27, 1998, after
Obando had rested his case. The respondents built their evidence around the loss of
his legal standing to pursue the case. In its Order dated February 11, 1993, the trial
court granted the Motion and dismissed the civil case without prejudice.
[11]

[12]

[13]

Petitioner Obando filed a Motion for Reconsideration to no avail. As earlier stated, the
Court of Appeals likewise dismissed his Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus and
affirmed the dismissal Order of the RTC.
[14]

Ruling of the Court of Appeals


The Court of Appeals rejected the contention of Obando that he did not lose his legal
personality to prosecute the civil case since there was no categorical statement that the
purported will was a forgery and its probate was still pending.
The CA affirmed the dismissal of the action for reconveyance because the probate
courts Order dated February 5, 1998 "alluded" to the fact that the alleged Will was a
forgery. That the probate of the alleged Will had not yet been decided on the merits
did not change the fact that the probate court had removed Petitioner Obando as coadministrator. The dismissal of the civil case was without prejudice, because the trial
judge anticipated that Obando could regain co-administration of the estates on appeal.
Hence, this Petition.

[15]

Assignment of Errors
In their Memorandum, petitioners raise the following issues:

[16]

"A........WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY


ERRED IN SANCTIONING THE TRIAL COURTS ALLOWANCE
OF RESPONDENTS JOINT MOTION TO DISMISS, DESPITE THE
FACT THAT ONE OF THE LAWYER-MOVANTS THEREIN WAS
NO LONGER THE COUNSEL OF RECORD FOR RESPONDENT
FIGUERAS AT THE TIME THE MOTION WAS FILED.
"B........WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ERRED IN SANCTIONING THE TRIAL COURTS RADICAL
DEPARTURE FROM THE LAW WHEN IT GRANTED A MOTION
TO DISMISS ON LACK OF CAPACITY TO SUE/LEGAL STANDING
AT THE TIME WHEN THE [PETITIONERS] HAVE ALREADY
RESTED THEIR CASE AND THE [RESPONDENTS] HAVE BEGUN
PRESENTATION OF THEIR EVIDENCE.
"C........WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ERRED WHEN IT SANCTIONED THE TRIAL COURTS
DISMISSAL OF THE CASE BASED ON ORDERS OF OTHER
COURTS THAT HAVE NOT YET ATTAINED
FINALITY.
"D........WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ERRED WHEN IT UPHELD THE TRIAL COURTS WHIMSICAL
AND CAPRICIOUS DEPARTURE FROM ITS PREVIOUS RULINGS
DENYING RESPONDENTS MOTION TO DISMISS AND MOTION
TO SUSPEND PROCEEDINGS.
"E........WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ERRED WHEN IT RENDERED ITS 30 JULY 1998 DECISION IN CAG.R. 47594 UPHOLDING THE TRIAL COURTS ORDERS DATED
11 FEBRUARY 1998 AND 12 MARCH 1998."
Simply stated, the following issues are raised by the petitioners: (1) whether the trial
court could act on a motion filed by a lawyer who was allegedly no longer Eduardos
counsel of record; (2) whether a motion to dismiss filed after the responsive pleadings
were already made can still be granted; (3) whether the conviction of Petitioner

Obando for estafa through falsification and the revocation of his appointment as
administrator, both of which are on appeal, constitute sufficient grounds to dismiss the
civil case; and (4) whether there was a conflict between the Order dismissing the civil
case and the previous actions of the trial court.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is devoid of merit.
First Issue:
Counsel of Record
Petitioners claim that when Atty. Joaquin Yuseco filed the Motion to Dismiss, he no
longer represented the respondents, as shown by Eduardos Manifestation and Motion
dated January 8, 1998, dispensing with said counsels services in the proceedings in
view of a Compromise Agreement with Petitioner Obando.
[17]

We disagree. Representation continues until the court dispenses with the services of
counsel in accordance with Section 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. Counsel may
be validly substituted only if the following requisites are complied with: (1) new
counsel files a written application for substitution; (2) the clients written consent is
obtained; and (3) the written consent of the lawyer to be substituted is secured, if it
can still be; if the written consent can no longer be obtained, then the application for
substitution must carry proof that notice of the motion has been served on the attorney
to be substituted in the manner required by the Rules.
[18]

[19]

In this case, we are convinced that Eduardo did not dismiss Attorney Yuseco. In fact,
the former manifested that he had been tricked by Petitioner Obando into signing the
aforesaid Manifestation and Motion and Compromise Agreement. Besides, the filing
of the Motion to Dismiss was not prejudicial but beneficial to the said respondent;
hence, he had no reason to complain. At the discretion of the court, an attorney who
has already been dismissed by the client is allowed to intervene in a case in order to
protect the clients rights. In the present case, had there been any irregularity, it should
have been raised by the respondents, not the petitioners.
Second Issue:
Timeliness of the Motion to Dismiss

The Rules provide that a motion to dismiss may be submitted only before the filing of
a responsive pleading. Thus, petitioners complain that it was already too late for
Respondent Eduardo Figueras to file a Motion to Dismiss after Obando had finished
presenting his evidence.
[20]

This is not so. The period to file a motion to dismiss depends upon the circumstances
of the case. Section 1 of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court requires that, in general, a
motion to dismiss should be filed within the reglementary period for filing a
responsive pleading. Thus, a motion to dismiss alleging improper venue cannot be
entertained unless made within that period.
[21]

However, even after an answer has been filed, the Court has allowed a defendant to
file a motion to dismiss on the following grounds: (1) lack of jurisdiction, (2) litis
pendentia, (3) lack of cause of action, and (4) discovery during trial of evidence
that would constitute a ground for dismissal. Except for lack of cause of action or
lack of jurisdiction, the grounds under Section 1 of Rule 16 may be waived. If a
particular ground for dismissal is not raised or if no motion to dismiss is filed at all
within the reglementary period, it is generally considered waived under Section 1,
Rule 9 of the Rules.
[22]

[23]

[24]

[25]

[26]

Applying this principle to the case at bar, the respondents did not waive their right to
move for the dismissal of the civil case based on Petitioner Obandos lack of legal
capacity. It must be pointed out that it was only after he had been convicted of estafa
through falsification that the probate court divested him of his representation of the
Figueras estates. It was only then that this ground became available to the
respondents. Hence, it could not be said that they waived it by raising it in a Motion to
Dismiss filed after their Answer was submitted. Verily, if the plaintiff loses his
capacity to sue during the pendency of the case, as in the present controversy, the
defendant should be allowed to file a motion to dismiss, even after the lapse of the
reglementary period for filing a responsive pleading.
Third Issue:
Removal from Administration
Petitioners aver that it was premature for the trial court to dismiss the civil case
because Obandos conviction for estafa through falsification was still on appeal.
We disagree. This argument has no bearing at all on the dismissal of the civil case.
Petitioner Obando derived his power to represent the estate of the deceased couple

from his appointment as co-administrator. When the probate court removed him
from office, he lost that authority. Since he lacked the legal capacity to sue on behalf
of the Figueras estates, he could not continue prosecuting the civil case. Thus the
trial court properly granted the Motion to Dismiss on this ground. Whether a final
conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude is necessary to remove him from his
administration is not a proper issue in this Petition. He should raise the matter in his
appeal of the Decision removing him from administration of the Figueras
estates.
[27]

[28]

[29]

The fact that the conviction of Obando and his removal from administration are on
appeal only means that his legal standing could be restored; thus, the civil case was
correctly dismissed without prejudice. If his conviction is reversed and his
appointment restored by the probate court, the case may continue without being
barred by res judicata. The lower courts Decision showed that it was careful in its
action. On the other hand, Obando has yet to show that he has regained administration
of the Figueras estates. Noteworthy also is the fact that his removal from office was
predicated not only on his conviction for a crime, but also on his failure to render an
accounting of the rentals of a property leased to the Community of Learners.
Fourth Issue:
No Conflicting Rulings
Respondent Eduardo Figueras earlier Motion to Dismiss was denied in the trial
courts March 4, 1993 Order which reads:
"x x x [I]t is pertinent to note that the criminal case of Estafa through
Falsification of Public Document filed against [petitioner] and the
Petition to Remove him as co-administrator are still pending
determination. Thus, suffice it to state that while herein [petitioner]
remains as the co-administrator of the estates of the deceased Figueras
the Court will continue to recognize his right to institute the instant case
in his capacity as judicial administrator, unless he be removed as such by
the probate Court pursuant to Rule 82 of the Revised Rules of Court."
[30]

Thus, petitioners allege that the trial court whimsically and capriciously departed from
its previous rulings when, in its Resolution dated February 11, 1993, it granted
Eduardos later Motion to Dismiss.
[31]

We cannot see any conflict between these trial court rulings. Obviously, they were
based on different grounds. The first Motion to Dismiss was denied because, at the
time, Petitioner Obando still had legal capacity to sue as co-administrator of the
Figueras estates. On the other hand, the second Motion was granted because the
probate court had already removed him from his office as co-administrator. The
change in his legal capacity accounts for the difference in the adjudication of the trial
court. We see no reversible error in the appellate courts affirmance of the trial court.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed
Resolution AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.2/29/00 10:57 AM
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.

OBANDO vs. FIGUERAS

FACTS:

Obando was appointed as respondent Eduardos co-administrator of the joint estate of


Jose and Dona Alegria Figueras. Obando and several other members of the Obando clan was
allegedly bequeathed a will of the properties left by the Figueras couple including two parcels of
land in Gilmore Avenue, New Manila, Quezon City. Upon insistence of the respondent that the
alleged will was a forgery, the will was submitted to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
for examination and found that the signatures were not made by the same person which led to
the indictment and conviction of Obando for estafa through falsification of a public document.
Eduardo sold the lots to Amigo Realty Corporation on the strength of an Order issued by the
probate court on May 15, 1991. On June 4, 1992, Petitioner Obando, in his capacity as coadministrator and universal heir of Doa Alegria, filed a Complaint against Eduardo and Amigo
Realty for the nullification of the sale to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 79. In
Special Proceeding Nos. 61567 and 123948, the probate court in its order dated December 17,
1997 removed Obando from his office as co-administrator of the estate. Consequently, on
January 27, 1998 the respondents filed a Joint Motion to Dismiss on the civil case to which the
trial court granted the motion. Obando then filed a Motion for Reconsideration to no avail. Then
his Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus was dismissed and the dismissal order of the RTC was
affirmed. Petitioner then argues before the Supreme Court that the motion to dismiss was
invalid since at the time of the filing, Atty. Yuseco no longer represented the respondents, as
shown by Eduardos Manifestation and Motion dated January 8, 1998, dispensing with said

counsels services in the proceedings in view of a Compromise Agreement with Petitioner


Obando.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Yuseco ceased to be the defendants Counsel.

HELD:

No. Representation continues until the court dispenses with the services of counsel in
accordance with Section 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. Counsel may be validly substituted
only if the following requisites are complied with: (1) new counsel files a written application for
substitution; (2) the clients written consent is obtained; and (3) the written consent of the lawyer
to be substituted is secured, if it can still be; if the written consent can no longer be obtained,
then the application for substitution must carry proof that notice of the motion has been served
on the attorney to be substituted in the manner required by the Rules. In this case, Eduardo did
not dismiss Attorney Yuseco. In fact, the former manifested that he had been tricked by
Petitioner Obando into signing the aforesaid Manifestation and Motion and Compromise
Agreement. Besides, the filing of the Motion to Dismiss was not prejudicial but beneficial to the
said respondent; hence, he had no reason to complain. Therefore, it cannot be said that Atty.
Yuseco has been validly dismissed.

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