Marcos vs. Manglapus, G.R. no.

88211, September
15, 1989
Facts : In February 1986, Ferdinand E. Marcos was
deposed from presidency via people power and forced
into exile in Hawaii. Nearly three years after, in his
deathbed seeks return to the Philippines to die.
Thus, this petition for mandamus and prohibition asks
the Court to order the respondent to issue travel
documents to Mr. Marcos and the immediate members of
his family and to enjoin the the implementation of
President Aquinos decision to bar their return to the
Philippines.
Petitioners contend that the right of the Marcoses to
return to the Philippines is guaranteed under the Bill of
Rights. That the President is without power to impair the
liberty of abode of the Marcoses because only the court
may do so within the limits prescribed by law. The
President has enumerated powers and what is not
enumerated is impliedly denied to her.
Issues : Whether or not the President has the power
under the Constitution, to bar Marcoses from returning
to the Philippines
Whether or not the President acted arbitrarily or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction upon determining that the Marcosess return
poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare
and decided to bar their return
Held : The executive power of the President under the
Constitution is more than the sum of specific powers
enumerated under the Constitution. In balancing the
general welfare and the common good against the
exercise of rights of certain individuals, the power
involved is the Presidents residual power to protect the
general welfare of the people. Presidential power is a
wide discretion, within the bounds of laws and
extraordinary in times of emergency.
The President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse
of discretion in determining that the return of former
President Marcos and his family poses a serious threat to
national interest and welfare. There exist factual bases
in the Presidents decision in the pleadings, oral
arguments and facts filed by the parties during the
briefing in chambers by the Chief of Staff of the Armed
of the Philppines and National Security Adviser.
That the President has the power under the Constitution
to bar the Macroses from returning has been recognized
by the members of the Legislature. Through a Resolution
proposed in the House of Representative, signed by 103
members urging the President to allow Mr. Marcos to
return to the Philippines an act of true national
reconciliation. The Resolution does not question the
Presidents power but was an appeal to allow a man to
come home and to die in his country. Such request
submit to the exercise of a broader discretion on the
part of the President to determine whether it must be
granted or not.
The case is not a political question and for such, the
court exercised its judicial power involving the
determination whether there has been a grave abuse of
discretion on the part of any branch or instrumnetality of
the government.
ROMULO
L.
NERI,
petitioner
vs.
SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC
OFFICERS
AND
INVESTIGATIONS,
SENATE
COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND COMMERCE, AND
SENATE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENSE AND
SECURITY G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008

FACTS: On April 21, 2007, the Department of

Transportation and Communication (DOTC) entered into
a contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications
Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment and
services for the National Broadband Network (NBN)
Project in the amount of U.S. $ 329,481,290
(approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to be
financed by the Peoples Republic of China.
The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the
NBN deal. In the September 18, 2007 hearing Jose de
Venecia III testified that several high executive officials
and power brokers were using their influence to push
the approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA.
Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify
before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He appeared in one
hearing wherein he was interrogated for 11 hrs and
during which he admitted that Abalos of COMELEC tried
to bribe him with P200M in exchange for his approval of
the NBN project. He further narrated that he informed
President Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she
instructed him not to accept the bribe.
However, when probed further on what they discussed
about the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer,
invoking executive privilege. In particular, he refused
to answer the questions on:
(a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN
Project,
(b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and
(c) whether or not she directed him to approve.
He later refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita
sent a letter to the senate averring that the
communications between GMA and Neri are privileged
and that the jurisprudence laid down in Senate vs Ermita
be applied. He was cited in contempt of respondent
committees and an order for his arrest and detention
until such time that he would appear and give his
testimony.
ISSUE:
Are the communications elicited by the subject three (3)
questions covered by executive privilege?
HELD:
The communications are covered by executive privilege
The revocation of EO 464 (advised executive officials
and employees to follow and abide by the Constitution,
existing laws and jurisprudence, including, among
others, the case of Senate v. Ermita when they are
invited to legislative inquiries in aid of legislation.), does
not in any way diminish the concept of executive
privilege. This is because this concept has Constitutional
underpinnings.
The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in
cases where the subject of inquiry relates to a power
textually committed by the Constitution to the President,
such as the area of military and foreign relations. Under
our Constitution, the President is the repository of the
commander-in-chief,
appointing,
pardoning,
and
diplomatic powers. Consistent with the doctrine of
separation of powers, the information relating to these
powers may enjoy greater confidentiality than others.
Several jurisprudence cited provide the elements of
presidential communications privilege:
1) The protected communication must relate to a
quintessential and non-delegable presidential power.
2) The communication must be authored or solicited
and received by a close advisor of the President or the
President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor
must be in operational proximity with the President.
3) The presidential communications privilege remains a
qualified privilege that may be overcome by a showing
of adequate need, such that the information sought
likely contains important evidence and by the

unavailability of the information

appropriate investigating authority.

elsewhere

by

an

In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita premised

his claim of executive privilege on the ground that the
communications elicited by the three (3) questions fall
under conversation and correspondence between the
President and public officials necessary in her
executive and policy decision-making process and, that
the information sought to be disclosed might impair our
diplomatic as well as economic relations with the
Peoples Republic of China. Simply put, the bases are
presidential communications privilege and executive
privilege on matters relating to diplomacy or foreign
relations.
Using the above elements, we are convinced that,
indeed, the communications elicited by the three (3)
questions
are
covered
by
the
presidential
communications privilege. First, the communications
relate to a quintessential and non-delegable power of
the President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive
agreement with other countries. This authority of the
President to enter into executive agreements without the
concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been
recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. Second, the
communications are received by a close advisor of the
President. Under the operational proximity test,
petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a
member of President Arroyos cabinet. And third, there is
no adequate showing of a compelling need that would
justify the limitation of the privilege and of the
unavailability of the information elsewhere by an
appropriate investigating authority.
Respondent Committees further contend that the grant
of petitioners claim of executive privilege violates the
constitutional provisions on the right of the people to
information on matters of public concern.50 We might
have agreed with such contention if petitioner did not
appear before them at all. But petitioner made himself
available to them during the September 26 hearing,
where he was questioned for eleven (11) hours. Not only
that, he expressly manifested his willingness to answer
more questions from the Senators, with the exception
only of those covered by his claim of executive privilege.
The right to public information, like any other right, is
subject to limitation. Section 7 of Article III provides:
The right of the people to information on matters of
public concern shall be recognized. Access to official
records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to
official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to
government research data used as basis for policy
development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to
such limitations as may be provided by law.
Almonte vs. Vasquez G.R. No. 93567, May 23 1995
Petitioners: Nerio Rogado, Chief Accountant; Elisa
Rivera, Chief of the Records; Jose T. Almonte, EIIB
Commissioner; Villamor Perez, Budget and Fiscal
Management Division Chief; Respondent: Honorable
Conrado M. Vasquez
FACTS:
Ombudsman Vasquez required Rogado and Rivera of
Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB) to
produce all documents relating to Personal Service
Funds yr. 1988 and all evidence for the whole plantilla of
EIIB for 1988. The subpoena duces tecum was issued in
connection with the investigation of funds representing
savings from unfilled positions in the EIIB which were
legally disbursed. Almonte and Perez
denied the
anomalous activities that circulate around the EIIB
office.
They moved to quash the subpoena duces
tecum. They claim privilege of an agency of the
Government.

ISSUE:
Whether or not an Ombudsman can oblige the
petitioners by virtue of subpoena duces tecum to
provide documents relating to personal service and
salary vouchers of EIIB employers.
RULING:
Yes. A government privilege against disclosure is
recognized with respect to state secrets bearing on
military, diplomatic and similar matters. This privilege is
based upon public interest of such paramount
importance as in and of itself transcending the individual
interests of a private citizen, even though, as a
consequence thereof, the plaintiff cannot enforce his
legal rights.
In the case at bar, there is no claim that military or
diplomatic secrets will be disclosed by the production of
records pertaining to the personnel of the EIIB. EIIB's
function is the gathering and evaluation of intelligence
reports and information regarding "illegal activities
affecting the national economy, such as, but not limited
to, economic sabotage, smuggling, tax evasion, dollar
salting." Consequently while in cases which involve state
secrets it may be sufficient to determine the
circumstances of the case that there is reasonable
danger that compulsion of the evidence will expose
military matters without compelling production, no
similar excuse can be made for privilege resting on other
considerations.
Senate vs. Ermita
In 2005, scandals involving anomalous transactions
about the North Rail Project as well as the Garci tapes
surfaced. This prompted the Senate to conduct a public
hearing to investigate the said anomalies particularly the
alleged overpricing in the NRP. The investigating Senate
committee issued invitations to certain department
heads and military officials to speak before the
committee as resource persons. Ermita submitted that
he and some of the department heads cannot attend the
said hearing due to pressing matters that need
immediate attention. AFP Chief of Staff Senga likewise
sent a similar letter. Drilon, the senate president,
excepted the said requests for they were sent belatedly
and arrangements were already made and scheduled.
Subsequently, GMA issued EO 464 which took effect
immediately.
EO 464 basically prohibited Department heads, Senior
officials of executive departments who in the judgment
of the department heads are covered by the executive
privilege; Generals and flag officers of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines and such other officers who in the
judgment of the Chief of Staff are covered by the
executive privilege; Philippine National Police (PNP)
officers with rank of chief superintendent or higher and
such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of
the PNP are covered by the executive privilege; Senior
national security officials who in the judgment of the
National Security Adviser are covered by the executive
privilege; and Such other officers as may be determined
by the President, from appearing in such hearings
conducted by Congress without first securing the
presidents approval.
The department heads and the military officers who
were invited by the Senate committee then invoked EO
464 to except themselves. Despite EO 464, the
scheduled hearing proceeded with only 2 military
personnel attending. For defying President Arroyos
order barring military personnel from testifying before
legislative inquiries without her approval, Brig. Gen.
Gudani and Col. Balutan were relieved from their
military posts and were made to face court martial
proceedings. EO 464s constitutionality was assailed for

it is alleged that it infringes on the rights and duties of

Congress to conduct investigation in aid of legislation
and conduct oversight functions in the implementation of
laws.

such instances to respect the refusal of the department

head to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of
privilege is subsequently made, either by the President
herself or by the Executive Secretary.

ISSUE: Whether or not EO 464 is constitutional.

When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how

department heads are implementing the statutes which
it has issued, its right to such information is not as
imperative as that of the President to whom, as Chief
Executive, such department heads must give a report of
their performance as a matter of duty. In such
instances, Section 22, in keeping with the separation of
powers, states that Congress may only request their
appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry in which
Congress requires their appearance is in aid of
legislation under Section 21, the appearance is
mandatory for the same reasons stated in Arnault.

HELD: The SC ruled that EO 464 is constitutional in part.

To determine the validity of the provisions of EO 464,
the SC sought to distinguish Section 21 from Section 22
of Art 6 of the 1987 Constitution. The Congress power
of inquiry is expressly recognized in Section 21 of Article
VI of the Constitution. Although there is no provision in
the Constitution expressly investing either House of
Congress with power to make investigations and exact
testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative
functions advisedly and effectively, such power is so far
incidental to the legislative function as to be implied. In
other words, the power of inquiry with process to
enforce it is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to
the legislative function.
A legislative body cannot
legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of
information respecting the conditions which the
legislation is intended to affect or change; and where
the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite
information which is not infrequently true recourse
must be had to others who do possess it.

Clinton v. Jones 142 F.3d 496, 330 U.S. App. D.C.

48, 26 Med. L. Rptr. 1660 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
Brief Fact Summary. The Respondent, Paula Jones
Corbin (Respondent), filed a complaint containing four
counts against the Petitioner, President Clinton
(Petitioner), alleging the Petitioner made unwanted
sexual advances towards her when he was the Governor
of Arkansas.

Section 22 on the other hand provides for the Question

Hour. The Question Hour is closely related with the
legislative power, and it is precisely as a complement to
or a supplement of the Legislative Inquiry.
The
appearance of the members of Cabinet would be very,
very essential not only in the application of check and
balance but also, in effect, in aid of legislation. Section
22 refers only to Question Hour, whereas, Section 21
would refer specifically to inquiries in aid of legislation,
under which anybody for that matter, may be
summoned and if he refuses, he can be held in contempt
of the House. A distinction was thus made between
inquiries in aid of legislation and the question hour.
While attendance was meant to be discretionary in the
question hour, it was compulsory in inquiries in aid of
legislation. Sections 21 and 22, therefore, while closely
related and complementary to each other, should not be
considered as pertaining to the same power of Congress.
One specifically relates to the power to conduct inquiries
in aid of legislation, the aim of which is to elicit
information that may be used for legislation, while the
other pertains to the power to conduct a question hour,
the objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit
of Congress oversight function. Ultimately, the power of
Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials
under Section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find
their basis in the principle of separation of powers.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. The United States Constitution

(Constitution) does not automatically grant the President
of the United States immunity from civil lawsuits based
upon his private conduct unrelated to his official duties
as President.
Facts. The Respondent filed a complaint against the
Petitioner alleging that the Petitioner made unwanted
sexual advances towards her when he was the Governor
of Arkansas. The Petitioner filed motions asking the
district court to dismiss the case on grounds of
presidential immunity and to prohibit the Respondent
from re-filing the suit until after the end of his
presidency. The district court rejected the presidential
immunity argument, but held that no trial would take
place until the Petitioner was no longer president. Both
parties appealed to the United States Supreme Court
(Supreme Court), which granted certiorari.

While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the

legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of Congress to
legislate by refusing to comply with its demands for
information.
When Congress exercises its power of
inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt
themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege.
They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are
department heads. Only one executive official may be
exempted from this power the President on whom
executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of
Congress except through the power of impeachment. It
is based on her being the highest official of the
executive branch, and the due respect accorded to a coequal branch of government which is sanctioned by a
long-standing custom. The requirement then to secure
presidential consent under Section 1, limited as it is only
to appearances in the question hour, is valid on its face.
For under Section 22, Article VI of the Constitution, the
appearance of department heads in the question hour is
discretionary on their part. Section 1 cannot, however,
be applied to appearances of department heads in
inquiries in aid of legislation. Congress is not bound in

It was an abuse of discretion of the District Court to

order a stay of this lawsuit until after the Presidents
tenure. The District Courts decision to order a stay was
premature and a lengthy and categorical stay takes no
account whatsoever of the Respondents interest in
bringing the suit to trial.

Issue. Whether the President can be involved in a

lawsuit during his presidency for actions that occurred
before the tenure of his presidency and that were not
related to official duties of the presidency?
Held. Affirmed.
The President of the United States can be involved in a
lawsuit during his tenure for actions not related to his
official duties as President.

Concurrence. It is important to recognize that civil

lawsuits could significantly interfere with the public
duties of an official. The concurring judge believed that
ordinary case-management principles were likely to
prove insufficient to deal with private civil lawsuits,
unless supplemented with a constitutionally based
requirement that district courts schedule proceedings so
as to avoid significant interference with the Presidents
ongoing discharge of his official responsibilities.
A sitting President of The United States does not have
immunity from civil lawsuits based on the Presidents
private actions unrelated to his public actions as
President. The doctrine of separation of powers does not
require federal courts to stay all private actions against

the President until he leaves office. The doctrine of

separation of powers is concerned with the allocation of
official power among the three co-equal branches of
government
David vs. Arroyo
In February 2006, due to the escape of some Magdalo
members and the discovery of a plan (Oplan Hackle I) to
assassinate the president, then president Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo
(GMA)
issued
Presidential
Proclamation 1017 (PP1017) and is to be implemented
by General Order No. 5 (GO 5). The said law was aimed
to suppress lawlessness and the connivance of
extremists to bring down the government.
Pursuant to such PP, GMA cancelled all plans to celebrate
EDSA I and at the same time revoked all permits issued
for rallies and other public organization/meeting.
Notwithstanding the cancellation of their rally permit,
Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) head Randolf David proceeded
to rally which led to his arrest.
Later that day, the Daily Tribune, which Cacho-Olivares
is the editor, was raided by the CIDG and they seized
and confiscated anti-GMA articles and write ups. Later
still, another known anti-GMA news agency (Malaya)
was raided and seized. On the same day, Beltran of
Anakpawis, was also arrested. His arrest was however
grounded on a warrant of arrest issued way back in
1985 for his actions against Marcos. His supporters
cannot visit him in jail because of the current imposition
of PP 1017 and GO 5.
In March, GMA issued PP 1021 which declared that the
state of national emergency ceased to exist. David and
some opposition Congressmen averred that PP1017 is
unconstitutional for it has no factual basis and it cannot
be validly declared by the president for such power is
reposed in Congress. Also such declaration is actually a
declaration of martial law. Olivares-Cacho also averred
that the emergency contemplated in the Constitution are
those of natural calamities and that such is an
overbreadth. Petitioners claim that PP 1017 is an
overbreadth because it encroaches upon protected and
unprotected rights. The Sol-Gen argued that the issue
has become moot and academic by reason of the lifting
of PP 1017 by virtue of the declaration of PP 1021. The
Sol-Gen averred that PP 1017 is within the presidents
calling out power, take care power and take over power.
ISSUE: Whether
constitutional.

or

not

PP

1017

and

GO

is

HELD: PP 1017 and its implementing GO are partly

constitutional and partly unconstitutional.
The issue cannot be considered as moot and academic
by reason of the lifting of the questioned PP. It is still in
fact operative because there are parties still affected due
to the alleged violation of the said PP. Hence, the SC can
take cognition of the case at bar. The SC ruled that PP
1017 is constitutional in part and at the same time some
provisions of which are unconstitutional. The SC ruled in
the following way;
Resolution by the SC
declaration

on the Factual Basis of its

The petitioners were not able to prove that GMA has no

factual basis in issuing PP 1017 and GO 5. A reading of
the Solicitor Generals Consolidated Comment and
Memorandum shows a detailed narration of the events
leading to the issuance of PP 1017, with supporting
reports forming part of the records. Mentioned are the
escape of the Magdalo Group, their audacious threat of
the Magdalo D-Day, the defections in the military,
particularly in the Philippine Marines, and the reproving

statements from the communist leaders. There was also

the Minutes of the Intelligence Report and Security
Group of the Philippine Army showing the growing
alliance between the NPA and the military. Petitioners
presented nothing to refute such events. Thus, absent
any contrary allegations, the Court is convinced that the
President was justified in issuing PP 1017 calling for
military aid. Indeed, judging the seriousness of the
incidents, GMA was not expected to simply fold her arms
and do nothing to prevent or suppress what she believed
was lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.
However,
the exercise of such power or duty must not stifle
liberty.
Resolution by the SC on the Overbreadth Theory
First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an
analytical tool developed for testing on their faces
statutes in free speech cases. The 7 consolidated cases
at bar are not primarily freedom of speech cases. Also,
a plain reading of PP 1017 shows that it is not primarily
directed to speech or even speech-related conduct. It is
actually a call upon the AFP to prevent or suppress all
forms of lawless violence. Moreover, the overbreadth
doctrine is not intended for testing the validity of a law
that reflects legitimate state interest in maintaining
comprehensive control over harmful, constitutionally
unprotected conduct. Undoubtedly, lawless violence,
insurrection and rebellion are considered harmful and
constitutionally unprotected conduct. Thus, claims of
facial overbreadth are entertained in cases involving
statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only
spoken words and again, that overbreadth claims, if
entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked
against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be
applied to protected conduct. Here, the incontrovertible
fact remains that PP 1017 pertains to a spectrum of
conduct, not free speech, which is manifestly subject to
state regulation.
Resolution by the SC on the Calling Out Power Doctrine
On the basis of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution, GMA
declared PP 1017. The SC considered the Presidents
calling-out power as a discretionary power solely
vested in his wisdom, it stressed that this does not
prevent an examination of whether such power was
exercised within permissible constitutional limits or
whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave
abuse of discretion. The SC ruled that GMA has validly
declared PP 1017 for the Constitution grants the
President, as Commander-in-Chief, a sequence of
graduated powers. From the most to the least benign,
these are: the calling-out power, the power to suspend
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power
to declare Martial Law. The only criterion for the exercise
of the calling-out power is that whenever it becomes
necessary, the President may call the armed forces to
prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion. And such criterion has been met.
Resolution by the SC on the Take Care Doctrine
Pursuant to the 2nd sentence of Sec 17, Art 7 of the
Constitution (He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully
executed.) the president declared PP 1017. David et al
averred that PP 1017 however violated Sec 1, Art 6 of
the Constitution for it arrogated legislative power to the
President. Such power is vested in Congress. They assail
the clause to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all
decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me
personally or upon my direction. The SC noted that such
provision is similar to the power that granted former
President Marcos legislative powers (as provided in PP
1081). The SC ruled that the assailed PP 1017 is
unconstitutional insofar as it grants GMA the authority to
promulgate decrees. Legislative power is peculiarly
within the province of the Legislature. Sec 1, Article 6

categorically states that [t]he legislative power shall be

vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall
consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives. To
be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor
a state of emergency can justify GMA[s exercise of
legislative power by issuing decrees. The president can
only take care of the carrying out of laws but cannot
create or enact laws.
Resolution by the SC on the Take Over Power Doctrine
The president cannot validly order the taking over of
private corporations or institutions such as the Daily
Tribune without any authority from Congress. On the
other hand, the word emergency contemplated in the
constitution is not limited to natural calamities but
rather it also includes rebellion. The SC made a
distinction; the president can declare the state of
national emergency but her exercise of emergency
powers does not come automatically after it for such
exercise needs authority from Congress. The authority
from Congress must be based on the following:
(1) There must be a war or other emergency.
(2)

The delegation must be for a limited period only.

(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions

as the Congress may prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry
out a national policy declared by Congress.
Resolution by the SC on the Issue that PP 1017 is a
Martial Law Declaration
The SC ruled that PP 1017 is not a Martial Law
declaration and is not tantamount to it. It is a valid
exercise of the calling out power of the president by the
president.
Monsanto vs. Factoran
FACTS:

In a decision by the Sandiganbayan convicted

petitioner Salvacion A. Monsanto was accused of the
crime of estafa thru falsification of public documents and
sentenced them to imprisonment and to indemnify the
government in the sum of P4,892.50 representing the
balance of the amount defrauded and to pay the costs
proportionately.

She was given an absolute pardon by President

Marcos which she accepted.

Petitioner requested that she be restored to her

former post as assistant city treasurer since the same
was still vacant, she also asked for the backpay for the
entire period of her suspension.

Finance Ministry ruled that petitioner may be

reinstated to her position without the necessity of a new
appointment

The Office of the President said that that

acquittal, not absolute pardon, of a former public officer
is the only ground for reinstatement to his former
position and entitlement to payment of his salaries,
benefits and emoluments due to him during the period
of his suspension pendente lite.

In fact, in such a situation, the former public

official must secure a reappointment before he can
reassume his former position. And a pardon shall in no
case exempt the culprit from payment of the civil
indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence.

Petitioner argued that general rules on pardon

cannot apply to her case by reason of the fact that she
was extended executive clemency while her conviction
was still pending appeal in this Court. There having been
no final judgment of conviction, her employment
therefore as assistant city treasurer could not be said to
have been terminated or forfeited.

The court viewed that is not material when the

pardon was bestowed, whether before or after
conviction, for the result would still be the same
ISSUE:
(1) Effects of a full and absolute pardon
(2) WON a public officer, who has been granted an
absolute pardon by the Chief Executive, is entitled to
reinstatement to her former position without need of a
new appointment.
HELD:
(1)
A pardon reaches both the punishment
prescribed for the offense and the guilt of the offender;
and when the pardon is full, it releases the punishment
and blots out of existence the guilt, so that in the eye of
the law the offender is as innocent as if he had never
committed the offense. If granted before conviction, it
prevents any of the penalties and disabilities,
consequent upon conviction, from attaching; if granted
after conviction, it removes the penalties and disabilities
and restores him to all his civil rights; it makes him, as
it were, a new man, and gives him a new credit and
capacity. But unless expressly grounded on the persons
innocence (which is rare), it cannot bring back lost
reputation for honesty, integrity and fair dealing.
A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. It
makes no amends for the past. It affords no relief for
what has been suffered by the offender. It does not
impose upon the government any obligation to make
reparation for what has been suffered.
(2)
No. To insist on automatic reinstatement
because of a mistaken notion that the pardon virtually
acquitted one from the offense of estafa would be
grossly untenable. A pardon, albeit full and plenary,
cannot preclude the appointing power from refusing
appointment to anyone deemed to be of bad character, a
poor moral risk, or who is unsuitable by reason of the
pardoned conviction.
The absolute disqualification or ineligibility from public
office forms part of the punishment prescribed by the
Revised Penal Code for estafa thru falsification of public
documents.
The pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in
removing her disqualification from holding public
employment but it cannot go beyond that. To regain her
former post as assistant city treasurer, she must reapply and undergo the usual procedure required for a
new appointment.
VICENTE GARCIA, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE
CHAIRMAN,
COMMISSION
ON
AUDIT,
THE
HONORABLE MINISTER, LAND TRANSPORTATION
AND
COMMUNICATIONS,
THE
REGIONAL
DIRECTOR, TELECOM REGIONAL OFFICE NO. IV,
respondents.
G.R. No. 75025 September 14, 1993
Facts:
Herein petitioner Vicente Garcia was employed as a
Supervising
lineman
at
the
Bureau
of
Telecommunications. He was accused of stealing some
materials in their company. Thus, public respondents
filed a criminal case against him for qualified theft
before a court and on the same ground respondents also
filed an administrative case in which petitioner was
found guilty and was later dismissed from the service.
With respect to the criminal offense, petitioner was
acquitted by the court due to insufficiency of evidence.
Petitioner was then reinstated from his work and is now
claiming before the COA for his back salaries from the
time of his dismissal up to present. But COA on the
other hand reluctantly denied his pleadings. Meanwhile,
petitioner was extended an executive clemency

(absolute pardon) by the President. Still, respondent

COA strongly refused to give due course to petitioners
claim.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent is entitled to the payment of
back wages after having been reinstated pursuant to the
grant of executive clemency.
Holding:
The Court ruled initially by explaining the mandate of
Sec 19 Article VII of the Constitution and further

articulates that the bestowal of executive clemency on

petitioner in effect completely obliterated the adverse
effects of the administrative decision which found him
guilty of dishonesty and ordered his separation from the
service. This can be inferred from the executive
clemency itself exculpating petitioner from the
administrative charge and thereby directing his
reinstatement, which is rendered automatic by the grant
of the pardon. This signifies that petitioner need no
longer apply to be reinstated to his former employment;
he is restored to his office ipso facto upon the issuance
of the clemency.