Free Press and Good Governance Southern Africa - Feustel

CONSULTANCY REPORT
Free Press and Good Governance in Southern Africa

“Media assistance and free press advocacy in member states of the
Southern African Development Community: mapping roles and relationships”.
Authors
Marc Feustel
Olivier Germain
Lauren Matus
Philip Reuchlin
Belinda Ridley
Client
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
BIDOC Openbare Bibliotheek

CBF Central Bureau Fonsdwerving
CBU Commonwealth Broadcasting Union
CCJPZ Catholic Committee for Justice and Peace
CJA Commonwealth Journalists Association
CPA Commonwealth Parliamentary Association
CPU Commonwealth Press Union
GDLN Global Development Learning Network
H-EMM Hoeuf-Eijk Mann Media
IFEX International Freedom of Expression Exchange
IGD Institute for Global Dialogue
MISA Media Institute of Southern Africa
MMPZ Media Monitoring Project Zimbabwe
NCDO Nationale Commissie voor Duurzame Ontwikkeling
NIZA Nederlands Instituut Zuid Afrika
NOVIB Oxfam Nederland
SABA South African Broadcasting Association
SADC Southern African Development Community
SADCC SADC Conference
SADCPF SADC Parliamentary Forum
SAMTRAN Southern Africa Media Trainers Network
UNIFEM United Nations Development Fund for Women
WBI World Bank Institute
WDR World Development Report
ZAMCOM Zambia's Institute of Mass Communication
ZANU-PF Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front
ZMMT Zimbabwe Mass Media Trust
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ....................................................................................................................5

A. RATIONALE FOR CONSULTANCY.................................................................................................. 5
B. OBJECTIVES OF CONSULTANCY ................................................................................................... 5
C. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK ......................................................................................................... 5
D. ORGANISATIONS CONSIDERED .................................................................................................... 6
E. RESPECTIVE APPROACHES TO PROMOTING PRESS FREEDOM ........................................................ 6
F. CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................................................................. 9
I/ INTRODUCTION.......................................................................................................................10
II/ PRESS FREEDOM IN ZIMBABWE........................................................................................10
III/ CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK.............................................................................................11

A. THE CONCEPT OF PRESS FREEDOM ............................................................................................. 11
B. DEFINING GOOD GOVERNANCE ................................................................................................. 12
C. AN IDEAL LINK BETWEEN PRESS FREEDOM AND GOOD GOVERNANCE?...................................... 14
1. How does press freedom promote good governance? ......................................................... 14
2. Relevance to the African context ......................................................................................... 15
D. REASSESSING THE LINK ............................................................................................................. 15
1. Bias of assumptions ............................................................................................................. 15
2. Problems of development communication ........................................................................... 15
IV/ ANALYSIS OF DIFFERENT ORGANISATIONAL APPROACHES ................................16
A. MEDIA INSTITUTE OF SOUTHERN AFRICA (MISA).................................................................... 17
B. ARTICLE 19............................................................................................................................... 18
1. Organisational overview ..................................................................................................... 18
2. Strategy, activities, and funding of Article 19 ..................................................................... 18
3. Contributions to the promotion of press freedom................................................................ 20
4. Relationship with MISA....................................................................................................... 21
5. Evaluation of Article 19 approach to press freedom........................................................... 22
C. COMMONWEALTH PARLIAMENTARY ASSOCIATION (CPA)....................................................... 23
2. Strategy, activities, and funding of CPA.............................................................................. 24
5. Evaluation of CPA approach to press freedom ................................................................... 27
D. NETHERLANDS INSTITUTE FOR SOUTHERN AFRICA (NIZA)...................................................... 28
2. Strategy, activities, and funding of NIZA............................................................................. 28
5. Evaluation of NIZA approach to press freedom .................................................................. 31
E. SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY (SADC)..................................................... 33
2. Strategy, activities, and funding of SADC ..............................Error! Bookmark not defined.
3. Contributions to the promotion of press freedom...................Error! Bookmark not defined.
4. Relationship with MISA..........................................................Error! Bookmark not defined.
5. Evaluation of SADC approach to press freedom....................Error! Bookmark not defined.
F. WORLD BANK INSTITUTE (WBI) .............................................................................................. 41
2. Strategy, activities, and funding of WBI .............................................................................. 42
3
5. Evaluation of WBI approach to press freedom.................................................................... 46
V/ CONCLUSION ...........................................................................................................................47
BIBLIOGRAPHY.................................................................................................................................49
INTERNET REFERENCES ...............................................................................................................49

APPENDIX I: WINDHOEK DECLARATION ON PROMOTING AN INDEPENDENT AND PLURALISTIC
AFRICAN PRESS .................................................................................................................................. 50
APPENDIX II: FREEDOM HOUSE MAP 2002......................................................................................... 53
APPENDIX III: FREEDOM HOUSE GLOBAL SURVEY OF MEDIA INDEPENDENCE, 2003 ........................ 54
APPENDIX IV: ARTICLE 19 DRAFT ACCOUNTS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2000............................................... 64
APPENDIX V : SADC ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE ......................................................................... 65
APPENDIX VI: WBI BUDGET FOR FISCAL YEAR 2001 AND 2002 (US$ MILLIONS) ............................ 67
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
A. Rationale for consultancy
The current political crisis in Zimbabwe, in particular the ruling party’s (ZANU PF)
aggressive treatment of journalists, has raised particular concern amongst press
freedom advocacy organisations. In the eyes of the international community, by
manipulating the constitution to its own ends in elections, the regime has violated
fundamental human rights, including that to freedom of expression. In doing so, it has
challenged the international consensus on developmental conditions conducive to
good governance.
In response to this, MISA is lobbying the Southern African Development Community

(SADC) to exert pressure on the Zimbabwean government to comply more fully with
the directives outlined in the SADC protocols signed in 2001 by all member states,
including Zimbabwe. MISA have consulted Stanhope Centre on improving the
effectiveness of their approach to lobbying SADC and promoting press freedom in the
region. Stanhope then approached LSE students to assist them with research on
potential for inter-organisational co-operation in the field of press advocacy, to
facilitate MISA’s task.
B. Objectives of consultancy
1. To provide a conceptual framework from which to consider the link between

press freedom and good governance
2. Examine 5 organisations in order to illustrate a broad spectrum of approaches to
media assistance
3. Consider the different organisations’ roles and relationships with MISA and
outline further potential avenues of co-operation
C. Conceptual framework
Here the relationships between the key concepts of press freedom and good
governance are explored. Having considered some accepted definitions of these
concepts, the link between them is then problematised. We explore first the
normative association which views press freedom as a prerequisite for democracy,
and as such a significant causal factor in achieving good governance. An alternative
perspective is then provided, which points to the potentially destabilising influence of
a free press on the state. Both discussions focus specifically on the African context.
5
D. Organisations considered
Article 19 International freedom of expression

advocacy NGO
Commonwealth Associations of Commonwealth

Parliamentary and parliamentarians and media
Media Organisations representatives
Netherlands Institute Bi-lateral development aid agency

of Southern Africa
Southern African Regional integration and

Development development organisation
Community
World Bank Institute Multi-lateral policy research body
E. Respective approaches to promoting press freedom
1) Article 19
Article 19 combines a variety of strategies to promote freedom of expression:

• Acting worldwide to raise awareness about the right for expression
• Combating censorship to encourage good governance practices
• Attempting to ensure the access to official information for all individuals
• Strengthening local capacity to monitor and protest institutional and informal
censorship
Article 19 is one MISA’s main partners. They have common strategies, but a
different scope and scale (international versus pan-regional). The two organisations
collaborate in many ways including:
• A monitoring project providing a check on both public and private media
• Putting together a regular bulletin designed to inform on developments in
Southern Africa on media law and freedom of expression
• Organising a series of conferences dealing with media law and practice in SADC
member states
Article 19 is now a well established international NGO, with a renowned reputation in

the field of freedom of expression. It has successfully used its power in interacting
with and influencing governments, international bodies and in strengthening local
capacity. The success of the two organisations’ collaboration, suggests that it may be
6
worth setting up similar monitoring programmes in other countries of the region,
encouraging local partners to contribute in the process.
2) CPA
The CPA and the Commonwealth Media Organisations (CMOs) first came together
formally in 2000 to devote attention to improving the link between parliaments and
the media throughout the Commonwealth. These organisations identify three main
concerns pertaining to the media and its relationship with parliament:
• Problem of ownership vs. control
• Importance of codes of conduct both among journalists and parliamentarians
• Need for balanced reporting
The CPA has repeatedly brought together parliamentarians and the media to foster
better understandings about how they can mutually benefit from their activities. They
have organised several conferences and produced working papers in this regard.
MISA and the CPA are not, at present, collaborating on any projects. As they share
many of the same priorities concerning media freedom, especially in countries such as
Zimbabwe and Mozambique, combining their efforts could only result in a better
understanding of the issues at hand and enhance both organisations’ results. The
Commonwealth approach could also be useful for Southern Africa in building a
functional and productive relationship between parliament and the media.
3) NIZA
NIZA’s press freedom strategy is conducted through the programme ‘Access to

information: Media and Freedom of Expression’. They aim to enhance freedom of
expression by improving media quality and strengthen the sustainability of the media
sector. This is done through two means that take the form of technical or legal
assistance:
• Enhancing co-operation with local partners in setting goals and unifying efforts
• Linking Northern and Southern media, to deepen respective knowledge of world
affairs
NIZA’s activities include:

• Advocacy and lobbying
• Setting up local radio networks
• Training and exchange with journalists from Southern Africa
• Publications
MISA’s objectives are similar, although not as diverse as NIZA’s. The two
organisations share information and collaborate on setting key priorities for
developing a ‘free and pluralistic media environment’ and cover similar ground with
regard to Zimbabwe. NIZA’s strengths lie in their secure funding sources, their multi-
tiered approach (media, economy and justice) and their participatory philosophy and
emphasis on education. MISA can make good use of NIZA’s involvement in creating
more detailed and concrete proposals about the training of journalists and NIZA can
benefit from MISA’s experience and knowledge of the regional problems and
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perceived needs. MISA can rally much external support and pressure through NIZA’s
international lobby links to the Netherlands and Europe.
4) SADC
SADC functions as a decision making and policy shaping body. Representatives of

its member states meet regularly to co-ordinate and integrate regional development
programmes and objectives. It employs a variety of legal instruments as a means of
achieving co-operation and consensus on issues including pres freedom. The SADC
treaty and protocols for regional integration create an overarching framework for
policy goals for national chapters within the 11 member states.
Within the 2001 SADC Treaty protocols on Culture, Information and Sport, Article
20 declares that: “State parties shall take necessary measures to ensure the freedom
and independence of the media”. “SADC gives due consideration to the cultural and
human dimensions of development and the information needs of a society in a
democratic environment”1. In practice, SADC runs an annual Media Awards
Competition and has joint projects with the South African Broadcasting Association
(SABA). However SADC’s activities in the area of information and specifically press
freedom are relatively limited.
There is scope for co-operation between MISA, SADC-PF and the CPA in improving
government-media relations, with research and information input from WBI and other
advocacy groups such as Article 19. Strengthening current relationships and
interactive links between SADC and civil society groups, by focusing on identifying
mutually advantageous policy goals, may facilitate this kind of co-operation.
However MISA’s continued success in co-operating with partner organisations in free
press advocacy in the region, is likely to be dependent upon a greater degree of
political integration within the SADC. This remains at present, a factor beyond the
influence of NGOs.
5) WBI
WBI’s strategy has four major elements:

• Developing an enabling environment for internal knowledge sharing and for
information and communication technologies
• Building clients’ capacity to benefit from the knowledge economy
• Expanding client access to knowledge through information technology and global
knowledge initiatives
• Promoting the generation and sharing of global knowledge through partnerships
This strategy is implemented in a number of different ways:

• Producing and collecting research related to international development.
• Providing training through a variety of courses and seminars covering a wide
range of issues with participants in over 150 countries including government
officials, academics, business leaders, journalists, and other interested parties.
• Policy consultations.
• Publications
1
www.sadcreview.com/sectoral/cultureinformation&sport.htm
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MISA and the World Bank Institute are not permanent partners but have collaborated
on several workshops and conferences. It appears that the WBI has been successful in
coordinating with a wide variety of organisations, from governmental organisations to
NGOs, to develop civil society under the good governance ‘paradigm’. It has clearly
proved to be very effective in disseminating both internally and externally generated
information. MISA could benefit from collaborating more closely with WBI both
through increased information exchange and in forming links with other WBI partners
and collaborators.
F. Conclusions
The success of press freedom is a function of the domestic political will. Aside from
the primary concern of an enabling political environment, the success of press
freedom hinges on a number of other considerations:
• Simultaneous transformation of different sectors of society, not just political but
infrastructural and social e.g. levels of literacy
• Sufficient technology and infrastructure to disseminate information are necessary
for mass distribution.
Once the political and economic conditions have been satisfied, the way that news is
presented to the public needs to be taken into account. This requires several elements:
• Pluralism in the media
• Assessing the quality of reportage and journalism
• Training of journalists
• Regional standards
These goals can best be met through increasing cooperation between the different
organisations.
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I/ INTRODUCTION
This report was commissioned by Stanhope in relation to its consultancy work for the
free press advocacy organisation, MISA, which focuses on Southern Africa. MISA
approached Stanhope in the context of the Windhoek charter and the protocols for the
promotion of free press in Southern Africa states, more specifically in relation to the
issue of the Zimbabwean government interpreting one of these protocols2 in such a
way as to undermine press freedom in MISA’s eyes.
On this basis this report will consider the relationship between press freedom and
good governance. Section II will provide a brief introduction to the current and
historical context of press freedom in Zimbabwe. Section III will then provide a
conceptual framework exploring the theoretical background and debates surrounding
these concepts and their interaction. Finally Section IV will provide a cross-section of
different organisational approaches to the issue of press freedom and how these
organisations coordinate their activity.
II/ PRESS FREEDOM IN ZIMBABWE
The history of press freedom in Zimbabwe has seen a number of different phases
associated with its political circumstances. Prior to independence, the media catered
to white settlers and ignored news of interest to the African majority. This situation
had changed little by the time the country achieved independence. In 1964, when the
Southern Rhodesia’s white Prime Minister declared his own independence, taking
control of the country with the assistance of the South African military, a pro-
apartheid media regime was implemented. Gag orders were issued and smear
campaigns against presidential candidates were conducted.
Since Rhodesia became independent Zimbabwe in 1980, there has been no direct
censorship but the government runs the country’s television stations, radio stations
and one of the two major daily newspapers. The 1980 Constitution “guarantees
freedom of expression, the right to receive, impart and hold ideas and information
without interference with peoples’ correspondence”3. But this right has been subject
to restrictive conditions. When Robert Mugabe’s government inherited a state of
emergency imposed in 1965 by the rebel Smith regime, it was given potentially
unlimited power to control the media and its citizens. Although, it preserved the
capacity to use similar tactics to the colonial regime, Mugabe’s government tended to
employ more covert forms of media manipulation according to the political climate.
Editors not under direct control of the government have engaged in self-censorship as
a modus operandi for survival. Initially, the governing body of Zimbabwean media,
the Zimbabwe Mass Media Trust (ZMMT), was composed of a cross-section of
Zimbabweans but, as the government has seen fit, the board has been increasingly
composed of members of the ruling party, the ZANU-PF.
Control over the media increased over the course of the 1980s, while the 1990s saw a
huge increase in freedom of the press. For instance, during the 1995 election
independent newspapers were permitted to disseminate opposition candidates’
2
Protocol on Culture, Information, and Sport
3
Zimbabwe Constitution, Chapter 111, p. 24
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messages for the first time. Although newspapers were independently owned and able
to criticise government, presenting a number of different viewpoints, they remained
subject to a certain degree of government influence.
Since 1998, however, the regime has become increasingly repressive. Despite
ratifying the 2001 SADC protocols4, including that on Culture, Information, and
Sport, Mugabe was forced to relinquish control of the organ on politics, defence and
security. This reflected the concern of other leaders that the crisis situation in
Zimbabwe was threatening regional stability. Mugabe has also been accused by the
international community of subverting the electoral process, in an attempt to ensure
his own victory. Morgan Tsvangirai, the leader of the opposition party, is on trial for
alleged treason for an alleged and almost certainly fabricated plot to assassinate
Mugabe.
The media have become increasingly constrained, with abuses against the press
industry and against journalists more prevalent than ever5. The President is, at
present, using any means necessary to prevent opposition viewpoints from reaching
the public. He is forcing journalists to register with the government and to disclose
personal information in order to keep track of their activity. The CPU News has
reported that Mugabe has used September 11th as an excuse to brand journalists who
are unsympathetic to his regime as ‘terrorists’. It is clear that Zimbabwe now finds
itself in the midst of a breakdown in the relationship between the government, the
media and the public.
III/ CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
A. The concept of press freedom
Press freedom and freedom of expression are regarded as unique among liberties, and
part of universally normative rights of individuals. This is best represented in Article
19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights:
“Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right
includes the freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive
and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of
frontiers”.6
This declaration has its roots in the Libertarian principle of freedom. Between the
17th and 19th centuries in England and America, philosophers and intellectuals
“looked upon man as a rational animal with inherent natural rights”, which included
the “rights to protection against the power of the state and support for the right to vote
and the right to expression” (Haule in Dennis et al, 1989, p. 22).
4
These protocols were ratified at the March 2001 Extraordinary Heads of State Summit.
5
Accordingly, during a four day mission to Harare, Zimbabwe, the World Press Freedom Committee
found “further evidence of the government’s attempts to restrict reporting and control the news
reaching Zimbabwe’s citizens” (www.wpfc.org)
6
www.article19.org.uk
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These philosophies gave birth to the idea of a free press grounded in “the freedom to
disseminate information and ideas through mass media without government
restriction” (Ansah, 1991, p. 3). In this light the press can be seen as a medium for
informing the electorate and protecting its rights, by providing a forum for analysis
and clarification of the goals and values of society, and for the exchange of comments
and criticism of the nations’ affairs and its political system (Ansah, 1991, p. 3).
This idea is echoed in many definitions of press freedom where it is seen not only as
contingent on autonomy and freedom from government control. The press is seen
here serving as a kind of Fourth Estate, in Asante’s words “that checks the three
official branches of government” (in Gunaratne, 2002), namely the executive, the
legislative and the judiciary
There have been a number of attempts to provide a quantitative measurement of press

freedom. Notably, Freedom House global survey constructs an international ranking
of press freedom according to four criteria (see Appendices II and III): (i) the
structure of the news-delivery system; (ii) the degree of political influence or control
over news content; (iii) outside economic influences on news content; and (iv) actual
violations against the media.
The notion of freedom is of course problematic and it is important to question

normative assumptions about its inherent value and uniformity across cultures and
contexts. This idea applies equally to the concept of freedom of the press and as we
will suggest below, hints at the need for caution in assuming the existence of
simplistic causal relationships between press freedom, democracy and accordingly,
good governance.
For instance the Hutchins Commission on Freedom of Press has stressed that
“freedom of press is not a fixed and isolated value, the same in every society in all
times. It is a function within a society and must vary within the social context”
(1947). In addition to considering the specific social and cultural context, we must
also recognise the existence of different types of freedom. One form of differentiation
separates ‘positive’ from ‘negative’ freedoms. ‘Positive’ freedoms can be conceived
of as enabling, whereas negative freedoms involve protection from potentially
harmful forces. Asante supports this notion in his assertion that “no country has
absolute freedom, but we can talk about the levels or degrees of freedom, which (…)
vary from country to country and are dictated largely by the laws of libel, sedition,
obscenity and invasion of privacy” (1997, p. 12). The different elements which
contribute to the nature of a country’s press ‘regime’ are determined or influenced by
its system of governance.
B. Defining good governance
In the 1990s the term governance has grown to occupy a focal position in
international policy discourse. Although the term is frequently used, it is employed in
ways which invest it with very different definitions. In academic circles ‘governance’
is used in relation to a “complex set of structures and processes” (Weiss, 2000, p. 795)
while in more popular literature it is often used as a synonym for government. For the
purposes of this report we will be focusing on the academic use of the term.
However, even within the field of development research no consensus has been
12
reached on a definition. To illustrate the different interpretations that are possible, let
us consider some of the following definitions:
• World Bank. Governance is defined as the manner in which power is exercised
in the management of a country’s economic and social resources. The World
Bank has identified three distinct aspects of governance: (i) the form of
political regime; (ii) the process by which authority is exercised in the
management of a country’s economic and social resources for development;
and (iii) the capacity of governments to design, formulate, and implement
policies and discharge functions.
• UNDP. Governance is viewed as “the exercise of economic, political and
administrative authority to manage a country’s affairs” (Rondinelli, 1997).
• Commission on Global Governance. Governance is the sum of the many ways
individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their common affairs.
One can see from these few definitions that governance encompasses a large range of
concepts. While reaching a single definition of governance seems unrealistic, there
are certain key elements associated with the term as it is commonly used. Firstly, it
should be noted that governance should not be equated with government: it includes
government but goes further to include other actors in the public realm. Nonetheless,
the main focus of governance remains on the state.
Secondly, governance is mainly used in reference to the ‘good governance’ paradigm.

In a historical analysis of the evolution of the term, Weiss argues that it emerged as a
reaction to two negative characteristics of national systems in past decades: “the
unrepresentative character of governments and the inefficiency of non-market
systems” (Weiss, 2000, p. 801). Rita Abrahamsen (2000) has argued that the World
Bank’s model of good governance is based on the rejection of what it considers to be
bad development.
Once again, it is far from clear what specific attributes are designated by the concept
of ‘good governance’. The Commonwealth Secretariat appears to define it negatively
by describing corruption “as an outcome and a symptom of poor governance” (2000,
p. 5). The UN’s Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific
(UNESCAP) has attempted to sum up the good governance paradigm through 8 major
characteristics: “participatory, consensus oriented, accountable, transparent,
responsive, effective and efficient, equitable and inclusive and follows the rule of
law”7.
However, a significant debate remains about what needs to be included within the
concept of good governance. The UN is one of the most progressive organisations in
this area and it has been particularly concerned with clarifying the ‘good governance’
idea in three areas. Firstly, there is a need to perceive good governance not simply as
a move towards multiparty democracy, and the creation of a judiciary and parliament,
but as a wide range of other policies. Secondly, it should be noted that the good
governance paradigm is no longer about the minimisation of the role of the state. The
UN’s efforts have led to a more widespread recognition of the need to strike a balance
between the public and private sectors. Finally, the UN is attempting to put an end to
the use of democratisation as a surrogate for good governance. While democracy is a
7
www.unescap.org/huset/gg/governance.htm
13
key contributing factor to this goal, it has now been placed in the context of a wider
package of economic and social rights.
The advent of the concept of ‘good governance’ has been a key stage in a move away
from a focus on economic efficiency towards the promotion of greater freedom,
genuine participation and sustainable human development. Again these shifts suggest
that causal relationships between press freedom and good governance must be
questioned in order to avoid oversimplification.
C. An ideal link between press freedom and good governance?
In much of development discourse a positive causal link from free press to good
governance is assumed. The existence of a free press is seen to be the only guarantee
for both the advent and maintenance of genuine freedom and democratic governance.
This view sees free press as able to fulfil the ideal of promoting and spreading the free
exchange of ideas and opinions and is therefore a prerequisite for democracy.
(Kasoma, 1995, p. 538). It has been argued that the advent of democracy has been
slower in countries where the press has been quiescent. In relation to Africa, Kasoma
mentions the examples of Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia. Free press is
therefore thought to be a fundamental factor in promoting good governance, because
of its crucial role in fostering democracy.
1. How does press freedom promote good governance?
A free press provides people with the information they require to make informed
democratic decisions. Ideally good governance requires that a heterogeneous and
dispersed citizenry be kept informed by the media about news and opinions in the
body politic. This perspective sees an informed population as necessary for
democratic participation.
In relation to the provision of information, new forms of media, such as internet and
satellite TV, will contribute to the pluralism of the press. People will have a wider
selection of information sources to choose and helps to overcome problems of access
to information related to traditional media. These new forms will both allow mass
media to become more decentralised and are more difficult for government to control.
It is media’s independence from government control that enables the press to fulfil its
democratic duty of acting as a watchdog against government thereby making it
transparent and accountable to the people (Kasoma, 1995, p. 359). Ultimately, with
credible information provided by a free press, the citizen is enabled to increase
oversight of government activities and therefore enhance his/her participation in
decentralized decision-making (Ningo, 2000, p. 14). A primary instance of this can
be seen during elections: the “system of popular government could not effectively
operate unless the press discharged its obligations to the electorate by judging
officeholders and candidates for office” (Levy, 1985, p. xii). The press is seen as the
only actor that is able to exercise regular scrutiny on the activities of the government
in between elections to see how performance matches promises or how programmes
are being implemented (Ansah in Kasoma, 1995, p. 540).
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2. Relevance to the African context
In relation to Africa, it is argued that press freedom has a role in bringing about the
fall of one-party or military-ruled states and the establishment of democratic
governance (Ronning, 1994, p. 2). In many cases, following independence from
colonial rule leaders hoped that a national press would promote national integration,
development, and ideological mobilization and contribute to education regarding
basic economic needs. Kasoma (1995) claims that multiparty democracy would not
have come to Africa in the 1990s and certainly could not last without the enabling role
of the independent media. It enables the people to choose between alternatives, and
makes governments publicly accountable for their actions or the lack of them.
D. Reassessing the link
1. Bias of assumptions
The argument that free press can, and should contribute to good governance rests on
two major assumptions:
(i) That good governance, leads to modernisation, seen in the Bretton Woods
Institutions’ rhetoric on ‘getting institutions right’. There are several studies8
showing that democracy and good governance may not lead to modernisation
but, rather that authoritarian regimes have often been the ones to modernise the
fastest.
(ii) Modernisation is the goal of development for all countries. As Beltran has
argued, development discourses are still based on alien Western conceptual
models. There is a need to recognise the potential for alternative conceptions.
Even if we do assume that modernisation is a viable goal for development, problems

still exist as to how to mobilise people and resources to reverse the general decline in
many sub-Saharan African countries. The media may be a solution, but it may do
more harm than good.
2. Problems of development communication
Media undermining democracy in unstable, late-developing countries

Striving to meet standards defined by the western concept of press freedom - unbiased
news and a marketplace of ideas- may not necessarily serve the needs of Southern
African society. A study by Paul Siu-Nam Lee of four former British colonies
(Nigeria, Guyana, Singapore and Hong Kong) found that at the present stage, the
press is playing a contributory role to the goal of nation building through a de-
emphasis of the socially disruptive issues of class and ethnicity. However, this
process could be inverted i.e. socially disruptive issues may be emphasised, for
commercial or other reasons, in a way that is harmful to the goal of nation building.
As Asante points out, “many leaders and spokespersons in the developing world
believe strongly that the Western concept of freedom of the press is a luxury that they
8
See for instance Wade, R. (1990) Governing the market: economic theory and the role of government
in East Asian industrialization, Princeton: Princeton University Press; Khan, M. (2000) Rents, rent-
seeking and economic development: theory and evidence in Asia, New York: Cambridge University
Press.
15
cannot afford while they go through the difficult task of nation-building after years of
colonial exploitation” (1997, p. 29). In the face of political instability and corruption,
the free media often becomes overtly critical and cynical towards politicians and
consistently questions their motivation, credibility and sincerity (Ette, 2000). Graham
Mytton highlights the way in which investigative journalism can be used as tool of
factional politics by those hungry for power (Asante, 1997). This may result in a
weakening of public support for the existing democracy in place and undermines the
general democratization process.
Causality versus correlation

There is also a problem of confusing correlation and causality. Press freedom
advocates generally assume causality between press freedom and democracy.
However, the direction of this causal link has yet to be firmly established and requires
further analysis.
Effects on the public

The so-called hypodermic needle view of the media assumes that people’s behaviour
is easily changed through exposure to new ways and ideas through mass media. In
Africa, mass campaigns using radio and printed material have been markedly
successful in mobilizing a large number of people to take concerted action in, for
example, areas of health (e.g. large scale vaccination programs). However this
argument has been challenged by ‘limited effect theory’. Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and
Gaudet have argued that the media generally has a minimal direct effect on their
audiences. In a sense media serves to reinforce existing attitudes and behaviours of a
society since people selectively expose themselves to information in a selective
fashion. These theories serve to show the divergence of opinion concerning the
power and importance of the press in conveying information to the public.
New forms of media

Despite contributing to the pluralism and independence of the media, new forms of
media (satellite, fibre optics and the internet) are open to abuse. There is the potential,
through these new forms for the facilitation of the dissemination of anti-state
propaganda or defamation acts that can no longer be traced back to their author. In
volatile and impoverished political and economic contexts this may pose a more
significant threat than in stable, wealthy nations. This can be exacerbated by what has
been described as media imperialism, whereby the ownership, structure, distribution
or content of media in any country is subject to substantial external pressure by
another country. Both the invasion of capitalistic world views infringing upon the
indigenous ways of life (Lee in Asante, REFERENCE), and ‘unfair’ economic and
administrative control of major international media channels by the industrialized
West are potential dangers arising from this tendency towards media imperialism.
IV/ ANALYSIS OF DIFFERENT ORGANISATIONAL APPROACHES
We will examine the following organisations and their roles in enabling the conditions
for establishing a link between a free press and good governance. We consider these
organisations specifically in terms of their relationship to the Media Institute of
Southern Africa; MISA, and their contributions to its work in advocating Press
Freedom and Democracy. We chose a cross section of organisations to illustrate a
diverse range of approaches to promoting press freedom. They differ across functions
16
(economic, political, social), scope (national, regional, international) and control
system (competitive, hierarchical, solidary).
A. Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA)
Fig. 1: Inter-organisational diagram
CPA
WBI MISA
SADC NIZA
Funding
Knowledge / Information Exchange
Evaluation / Monitoring
Project Collaboration
Lobbying
MISA is a non-governmental organisation with members in 11 of the Southern

African Development Community (SADC) countries. It was launched in 1992 and
bases its activities around promoting the aims of the 1991 Windhoek Charter (see
Appendix I).
MISA sees its aims as promoting “free, independent and pluralistic media”, “the free
flow of information and co-operation between media workers as a principle means of
nurturing democracy and human rights in southern Africa” (MISA Charter).
This organisation sees its role as that of a “co-ordinator, facilitator and communicator,
and for this reason MISA aims to work together with all like-minded organisations
and individuals to achieve a genuinely free and pluralistic media in southern Africa”.
17
In practical terms, MISA is an advocacy organisation working toward the
implementation of the Windhoek Declaration and the SADC protocols by the member
states who signed them, in the spirit in which they were meant.
Fig. 1 provides an overview of the relationships and the organisations that are
analysed in the following section.
B. Article 19
1. Organisational overview
Type of organisation
Article 19 is an international human rights NGO registered as a charity in the UK
(No. 327421). It is named after Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights:
“Everyone has the right to the freedom of opinion and expression; this right
includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and
impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.”
History and objectives

Article 19, also known as the International Centre Against Censorship, was founded
in 1986 to campaign for the promotion and protection of freedom of expression. The
NGO exists as an actor within the wider movement of the Global Campaign for
Freedom of Expression. Broadly speaking they work to “combat censorship by
promoting freedom of expression and access to official information”. Article 19 has
always argued that freedom of expression is not a luxury, but a fundamental human
right which underpins all other rights, including the right to life. For this reason,
Article 19 strongly believes freedom of expression is central to development — both
human and democratic, and there work should therefore be understood in the broader
aim of achieving development, democracy and good governance.
Geographical coverage
Article 19 is an organisation which operates worldwide, with partners in over 30
countries. They are now firmly established as an international NGO with regional
programmes in Africa, Asia, Europe and the Middle East. We shall here specifically
focus on the organisation’s work in Africa. Article 19 is currently working on
projects in the following African countries: Cameroon, the Democratic Republic of
Congo, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Tanzania and Zanzibar, and Zimbabwe. Article 19’s
headquarters are in London, but they also have a regional office in Johannesburg,
South Africa.
2. Strategy, activities, and funding of Article 19
Strategy
In aiming to promote freedom of expression, Article 19 has a multi-approach strategy.
It actively acts worldwide to raise awareness about the human right for expression by
exposing violations of Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
throughout the world. In addition it sets out to combat censorship in the fight towards
achieving democracy and ultimately encourage good governance practices. The
18
organisation also works towards the access to official information by all individuals
and citizens, via campaigns for the free flow of information. Finally Article 19 works
to strengthen local capacity to monitor and protest institutional and informal
censorship, with the aim of strengthening civil society in the countries it operates.
Ultimately its strategy is to build a consensus around a global freedom of information

standard, bringing together their partners from different regions to ensure that they are
incorporating all the best ideas from their collective experience and putting together a
document which can also be adopted by or applied to multilateral institutions and
corporate actors.
Activities
Article 19 has a vast array of programmes and activities to promote freedom of
expression and effectively implement their strategy. Their main activities include
monitoring, researching, publishing, lobbying, campaigning and litigating on behalf of
freedom of expression wherever it is threatened, in an attempt to develop standards to
advance media freedom.
The NGO produces press releases and campaigning letters on a regular basis, their
main focus being on media law and practice, in specific countries. For example
Article 19 recently released a report on the current legal framework for freedom of
expression in Ethiopia, seeking to provide guidance and recommendations for
consideration by the government of Ethiopia and other concerned parties with a view
to prospective law reform. Other article publications include analyses of country
situations, legal briefs, regional overviews and thematic reports, which they submit to
international bodies. To increase their scope of impact, many of the organisation’s
publications are available in translation, including Arabic, Swahili, Hebrew and most
European languages.
Another of their major activities is contained within the organisations comprehensive

law programme. The Law Programme addresses the need for the highest international
legal standards to be developed and implemented. This is done by analysing draft and
extant laws and making recommendations for improvement through the Media Law
Analysis Unit, by litigating in precedent-setting cases in international forums, such as
the UN Human Rights Committee and the European Court of Human Rights, and in
national courts. This programme is one of their main instruments in their drive
towards international standard-setting through international human rights
mechanisms, including convening seminars of experts and publication of discussion
papers.
Article 19 also has programmes for educating judges, lawyers and journalists on
international freedom of expression standards, contributing to the professionalisation
process of journalists throughout the world.
Relating to the Africa programme

Africa publications range from short updates on country situations to full reports on
the freedom of expression situation in the region. The Africa Programme's events
have recently included discussions on Constitutional Reform in Kenya, truth
commissions in Sierra Leone and media law reform in Nigeria. Article 19 website has
19
a 'Links' area for non-governmental and inter-governmental sites which may be of
interest, as well as publications with a specific Africa focus.
Funding
Box 1 provides a list of the bodies which have supported Article 19's work during
2000. These are the organisations and individuals who provide the financial means
for the organisation to undertake its core activities and projects.
Box 1: Article 19 funding partners
Governmental agencies
British Council, DANIDA, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade,
Canada (DFAIT), Development UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Embassy of
Norway (Sierra Leone), Embassy of the Republic of Ireland (Maputo), Netherlands
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norwegian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, SIDA, UK
Department for International (DfID), USAID OTI, US Development Foundation
NGOs, funds and charities
Ford Foundation, Comic Relief, Carnegie Foundation of New York, Joseph Rowntree
Charitable Foundation, Open Society Foundation for South Africa, The Scott Trust,
Open Society Institute, Joyce Mertz-Gilmore Foundation, Institut Fritt Ord,
Westminster Foundation for Democracy, Community Fund, HIVOS, Press Now,
Interfund, Friedrich Ebert Stichtung, OSISA, NOVIB, Trocaire Stichting Het Parool
Multi-lateral agencies
Commonwealth Press Union, Council of Europe, European Human Rights
Foundation, European Union, UNESCO, Inter-Ministerial Committee on Human
Rights and Democracy – Malawi
See Appendix IV for Article 19’s latest draft accounts.
3. Contributions to the promotion of press freedom
Article 19 has been most successful when working in countries in transition and,
naturally, have shown the greatest success in states where governments are keen to
implement the highest international standards and are sincerely interested in
promoting good governance practices. They have also found that they can have an
impact in countries where change is being resisted, but where there is a vested interest
in improving international appearances.
Networking, training and building NGO capacity

Article 19 has been particularly successful in its efforts of networking, training and
building NGO capacity. Their strong belief in strengthening civil society as a major
factor in promoting press freedom, has convinced them to undertake most projects in
conjunction with local partners. Making materials available in local languages and
providing both training and expertise in international human rights law has allowed
grassroots organisations to challenge, bypass and overturn restrictions on freedom of
expression and of the press. Moreover, Article 19 is one of the founding members of
the International Freedom of Expression Exchange (IFEX), an electronic alerts and
action network which facilitates speedy information transfer between local and
international campaigning organisations.
20
Achieving justice for individuals
Secondly they have made some ground-breaking work in their efforts to achieve
justice for individuals. Notable examples include their successful 10-year campaign
to free writer Salman Rushdie from the Iranian government’s support for the fatwa
imposing a death sentence on him; the organisation’s representation to the UN Human
Rights Committee on behalf of Albert Mukong, who received compensation of
$140,000 from the Cameroonian Government in May 2001; and their litigation in the
European Court of Human Rights, which judged in favour of Ibrahim Incal in his suit
against the Republic of Turkey.
Influencing governments, intergovernmental bodies and national courts

Article 19’s considerable contribution to the promotion to press freedom is well
illustrated in their power to influence governments and national courts, by advising
governments across the world, including those of Indonesia, Jordan, Macedonia and
Mongolia. One of their most praise-worthy endeavours in this area was their
instrumental role in the adoption of the Harare Declaration by the Commonwealth
Heads of Government and in the creation of the Commonwealth Ministerial Action
Group, as well as the adoption of freedom of information principles by the
Commonwealth Law Ministers. Article 19 is also consulted regularly by the
European Commission, the Council of Europe and UNESCO.
Publications
Influential Article 19 publications include the Freedom of Expression Handbook and
The Johannesburg Principles, with recommendations on national security, freedom of
expression and access to information.
4. Relationship with MISA
Article 19’s work in Southern Africa, is carried out within the framework of its Africa
programme, conducted from its regional office in Johannesburg, South Africa. As
part of its strategy, it works in close cooperation with a number of local organisations
to promote press freedom in the area. One of its major links in Africa is MISA, who
considers Article 19 as its main partner. The two organisations are in close contact
and regularly exchange, compile and publish information relating to Africa and press
freedom abuses.
Southern Africa media law briefings

Since 1996, Article 19 and MISA, have collaborated in putting together a regular
bulletin designed to inform lawyers and interested parties in Southern Africa on
developments on media law and freedom of expression, both within and outside the
region. The newsletter is jointly published by the two NGOs, together with the
Freedom of Expression Institute (FXI). Part of the initiative is the joint organisation
of conferences by MISA and Article 19 reviewing the state of media law in Southern
Africa. The outcome is then published in the form of this newsletter, which appears
quarterly as a means of exchanging examples of "good law" throughout the region and
beyond. It is designed to report cases which provide positive precedents for the
defence of freedom of expression and the independence of the media, as well as
looking at important developments in constitutional and statute law.
21
Media Monitoring Project Zimbabwe
Article 19’s main recent partnership with MISA has been their work in Zimbabwe.
As a joint initiative, together with the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in
Zimbabwe (CCJPZ), the Zimbabwe chapter of MISA and Article 19 set up the Media
Monitoring Project Zimbabwe (MMPZ). The project focuses specifically on those
sections of the media that are financed out of public funds, since these have an
obligation to serve the needs of the entire community. However, the privately owned
media are now also subject to scrutiny.
The MMPZ began operations in January 1999, monitoring all news and current affairs
coverage in the publicly owned media - the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation and
Zimbabwe Newspapers (1980) Ltd. From June 1999 it extended full monitoring to the
private media. From the beginning of January 2000 until after the referendum the
MMPZ's work focused almost exclusively on coverage of the constitutional debate
and referendum. The project had a similar focus on the June 2000 parliamentary
election.
The MMPZ publishes weekly reports of its findings, which are available free of
charge by e-mail or in hard copy. During the parliamentary elections, MMPZ
produced daily reports on the coverage of the electoral process. When necessary,
MMPZ produces alerts to complement its findings on media performance on relevant
issues.
Freedom in Southern Africa

As part of a series dealing with media law and practice in countries belonging to the
Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), MISA and Article 19 held a
conference addressing this theme in Zanzibar in October 1995. It is hoped that the
series will contribute to greater awareness of issues affecting media freedom in this
fast-changing region and will provide an invaluable resource for individuals and
organizations working in this field. More recently the two organisations, published a
report entitled “Freedom in Southern Africa”, reviewing media law and press freedom
issues, with case studies on Botswana, Malawi and Zimbabwe.
Windhoek Declaration in Namibia

The tenth anniversary of the Windhoek Declaration on the Development of an
Independent and Pluralistic African Press was celebrated in Namibia on 3 May 2001,
World Press Freedom Day. ARTICLE 19 was an active participant in the conference,
organised by MISA and UNESCO to review progress on the Declaration and look to
the future. The result was an updated set of recommendations on media freedom
issues, including a Charter on Broadcasting in Africa (see Appendix I).
5. Evaluation of Article 19 approach to press freedom
Article 19 is now a well established international NGO, with a renowned reputation in

the field of freedom of expression. As an experienced NGO, it has successfully used
its power in interacting with and influencing both governments and international
bodies. However the organisation has also importantly realised that to achieve
freedom of expression and of the press, change also needs to come from below. For
22
this reason article 19 has chosen to work with local partner organisations, to build
their capacity as well as focus on specific goals – thus producing a ‘multiplier effect’.
This has proved to be a significant contribution towards strengthening civil society.
As we have previously seen, Article 19 has been most successful when working in
countries in transition and in states where governments were willing to cooperate in
implementing the highest international standards in terms of freedom of expression.
However, in other instances, the NGO has not always generated as much influence.
Indeed, as expressed in one of their reports: “What to do with countries that are
standing still or, indeed, moving backwards is a more difficult question”.
In these situations, Article 19 has sought to monitor, report and lobby on freedom of
expression abuses, by helping build the capacity of local civil society organisations to
campaign for change and by supporting them in that work. In certain contexts, trying
to build internal pressure to bear upon authoritarian governments, may prove to be
more fruitful and effective in the long-run, than external demands for change.
As Article 19 believe freedom of expression and subsequently press freedom to be

necessary to the implementation of democracy, it may be useful for the organisation
to collaborate with the World Bank Institute in integrating their own work in the good
governance paradigm.
Relating to Article 19’s work with MISA, both organisations have so far combined
their efforts to produce some comprehensive publications on media law and practice
in Southern Africa, organised and held some thought-provoking conferences together,
and successfully shared and exchanged information. However, their most significant
partnership contribution to date has been the Media Monitoring Project Zimbabwe
(MMPZ).
In view of this project’s current impact and potential, it may be worth setting up
similar monitoring programmes in other countries of the region, encouraging local
partners such as the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe to
contribute in the process. Furthermore, considering Article 19’s experience
worldwide and its international panel of lawyers, journalists and civil rights activists,
MISA could potentially gain from interacting with and learning from article 19’s
researchers in programmes outside Africa. Inviting press freedom activists from
around the world to their conferences and travelling to meetings outside Africa might
open up new perspectives.
C. Commonwealth Parliamentary Association (CPA)
This section considers organisations operating within a trans-national community. In

particular, they are an association of three Commonwealth Media Organisations
(CMOs), operating under the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association (CPA).
Commonwealth Press Union (CPU)

The CPU’s mission statement claims that “through quiet diplomacy and a network of
members and friends including publishers, managers, senior editors, and human rights
23
organisations the CPU has played an effective role in the intervention of abuse against
journalists and press freedom.”9 The CPU sees its main roles as ensuring the physical
safety of journalists, combating legal constraints of freedom of expression, upholding
journalistic ethics, advocating self-regulation by the media, focusing on elections and
election reporting, and organising training for journalists.
Commonwealth Broadcasting Association (CBA)

The CBA, in addition to publishing the Commonwealth Broadcaster, aims to “secure
funds for training in developing Commonwealth countries for management and
broadcasting skills; foster freedom of expression and the right to communicate; extend
the Association's database about members; further the concept of public service
broadcasting; and provide a point of contact and a forum for discussion. The
organization is funded mostly by subscriptions.”10
Commonwealth Journalists Association (CJA)

The CJA, founded in Canada in 1978, “exists to bring journalists closer together
whether they are working in print, broadcasting, or on-line journalism, and to help
raise their status and quality.”11
Commonwealth Parliamentary Association (CPA)

The CPA, known as the Empire Parliamentary Association from its founding in 1911
until 1948, is an Association of Commonwealth Parliamentarians who, united by
community of interest, respect for the rule of law and individual rights and freedoms.
The Association is a registered charity in the UK and its mission is to “promote
knowledge and understanding of the constitutional, legislative, economic, social and
cultural systems within a parliamentary democratic framework. It undertakes this
mission with particular reference to the countries of the Commonwealth of Nations
and to countries having close historical and parliamentary associations with it.”12 The
main roles of the CPA are to provide a means of consultation among members of
Commonwealth parliaments; foster co-operation and understanding among them; and
promote the study of and respect for parliament.
The original member branches of the CPA were Australia, Canada, Newfoundland,
New Zealand, South Africa and the United Kingdom and association branches now
exist in more than 165 national, state, provincial and territorial parliaments, with a
total membership of over 14,000 parliamentarians. The monitoring of media
activities by both it and the CMOs extends throughout this list.
2. Strategy, activities, and funding of CPA
The CPA and the CMOs first came together formally in 2000 to devote attention and
policy consideration to improving the link between parliaments and the media
throughout the Commonwealth. To this end they have convened for study groups and
conferences since then. The CPU and the CBA both produce publications (the CPU
News and the Commonwealth Broadcaster), as the CPA and CPU jointly have
9
www.cpu.org.uk
10
www.cba.org.uk
11
www.commonwealthjournalists.org
12
www.cpahq.org
24
organised a Media Monitoring Mission to Zimbabwe in 2002 to assess coverage of the
election campaigns.
Strategy
The CMOs, in various conference papers and reports, stress the importance of three
main concerns pertaining to the media and its relationship with parliament: the
problem of ownership vs. control; the importance of codes of conduct both among
journalists and parliamentarians; and the need for balanced reporting.
Ownership vs. control

The CPU highlights the issues of conflict arising from the distinction between
ownership and control of the media. While an independently owned media is
preferable, in many developing countries the only body with enough resources to fund
a functioning and reliable media is the government. The CPU emphasises that it is
crucial that the media, however funded, operates under regulatory bodies that are
totally independent of the government. Members, and especially the director should
be appointed transparently and should be politically unaffiliated. Not only should the
government stay out of editorial decisions but out of the Governing Board as well.
Codes of conduct
The CPU says that media should be self-regulating with regard to editorial policy,
showing sensitivity to privacy, and the cultural and human aspects of news. The CPU
presents the position that the media need to set and adhere to rigorous ethical
standards to negate the need for government to have to pass legislation toward a code
of conduct. The CMOs identify a need for the internal regulation by the domestic
media of foreign content, concentrating only on the content of the news media, as
opposed to entertainment.
The CMOs believe that codes of conduct in relation to media should not apply simply
to journalists – they should also convey some responsibility to the sources of news.
The CPU places great emphasis on parliament as the starting point for media coverage
and states that “the increasing practice of Ministers and party leaders making major
policy statements outside parliament has contributed to the declining importance of
parliament as a source of news for the media…In order that parliament is given
adequate coverage, the media should necessarily be provided with news”13.
Parliament must allow itself to be criticised by the media and should only take action
against media in instances of gross misconduct. This responsibility of politicians to
provide journalists with the news extends to leaked documents which are the
responsibility (as far as culpability is concerned) of the leaker, not the journalist who
reports on the basis of the information received in this manner.
Balanced reporting
The CMOs particularly stress the importance of balance in reporting. The media have
an obligation of present a multiplicity of views. There is a great deal of emphasis
placed on making sure that the media take into account more positions than just the
dominant one. The CMOs take the view that the media should not just cover
parliament, but also parliamentary committees which should be often open to the
media. It should be publicly decided which meetings are to be held in private. South
13
ND, 7
25
Africa is an example of this process being put into practice.14 There is also a need to
give media voice to opposition party views in order to ensure a balanced coverage of
political perspectives. Journalists should look beyond official news releases and do
some investigation so that reports do not just consist of the information the media is
provided with by the government. In this vein, the media are obligated to publish
rebuttals to material carried, as well as appropriate letters concerning former subject
matter if it is deemed by editorial standards to be a reflection of public opinion on the
topic. Such rebuttals should also be included in the public records if what it is
responding to was originally presented in Parliament. In order to “better avert
polarisation in times of political conflict…news should be balanced; both in terms of
reporting, both sides use of appropriate and unthreatening language, with more facts
and numbers and avoiding editorialising comments.” The media must “resist the
temptation to carry one side of the story when the immediate other side is not readily
available”.15 The Zimbabwe Report recommends that the “rules governing contempt
of Parliament would provide excellent guidelines to avert the distasteful practice of
editorialising after reporting a resented statement from a negatively appreciated
politician”.16 However, stressing the need for balance is not meant to imply that
government and the media should conduct a perfectly harmonious relationship. The
CMOs believe that elements of suspicion and tension are needed for an effective
relationship between the media and the government. Perfect harmony between them
means that they are not in a position to criticise each other but one of embittered
conflict means that they will not work together for effective disclosure of the facts.
Another point stressed by the CMOs is the importance of reporting positive

developments as well as just faults. The media must avoid making investigative
reporting simply a fault-finding exercise. “Rather than demonising politicians,
independent newspapers should seek to identify…those commitments to public
interest and a better life for the community that need to be encouraged and
publicised”.17
The stress on balance has also included a discussion about technology. Balanced
reporting should be embodied by a balance of media, and the CPU identifies a need to
keep track of, and regulate new technologies as they emerge (eg. the Internet). A
portion of each Commonwealth Broadcaster, the official publication of the CBA, is
devoted to new media technologies.
Funding
The CBA is funded by subscriptions.
The CJA is funded by the Commonwealth Media Fund.
The CPU is funded by subscriptions and the World Bank Institute.
The most prominent contribution has certainly been the repeated bringing together of
the parliamentarians and the media themselves to foster better understandings about
how they can mutually benefit from their activities. The CPA website features two
14
Perth, 6
15
ZR, 8
16
ZR, 12
17
ZR, 14
26
lists formulated at the New Delhi conference detailing “What Parliaments and
Parliamentarians Can Do” and What the Media and Journalists Can Do” to ensure that
the public receives the most comprehensive and informative coverage possible.
The main ‘events’ for the CPA/CMOs are as follows:
• New Delhi Conference, 2000 (ND)

• CPU Report on Press Freedom in Zimbabwe in the run-up to the election,
Feb/March 2002 (ZR)
• CPU working paper: Imperfect Freedom the Case for Self Regulation in the
Media. 2002
• Cape Town Paper, April 2002
• Perth Conference, 2003
Katira Kanjii, MISA Regional Programme Manager, in a telephone interview, noted

that that MISA are aware of the CPA’s efforts in overlapping countries but that the
two organisations are not, at present, working on any projects together. As, I believe
is evident MISA and the Commonwealth Parliament Association share many of the
same priorities concerning media freedom and, especially in countries such as
Zimbabwe and Mozambique, the combined efforts of MISA and the CPA could only
result in a better understanding of the issues at hand, and a combined front could only
achieve better results.
5. Evaluation of CPA approach to press freedom
The partnership between the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association and the

Commonwealth Media Organisations has been a groundbreaking exercise in bringing
governments and the press into direct contact. A mutual, yet flexible agreement
between them, as well as continued contact has facilitated the creation of a useful set
of guidelines under which to operate. Building a working and respectful relationship
between government and the media has allowed for the creation of a forum for
working out and disagreements that may arise concerning practice, instead of
misunderstandings causing relations between the tow to break down, as is often the
case. The Commonwealth approach could be useful for other areas of the world
(Southern Africa, for example) in building a functional and productive relationship
between parliament and the media.
Even though the joint effort between the CPA/CMOs has yielded mostly positive
results, there are a number of issues arising from their reports which warrant attention.
For example, their work includes no discussion of the media as an industry, analyzing
it simply as a public service. Perhaps the fact that newspapers, for example, are
judged both on the quality of their reporting and the number of papers they sell should
be taken into account, noting that the former is often not the reason for the latter.
The Zimbabwe Report recommends that, in order to run a free and fair election, daily
tabulated statistics on violence and government activity should be published. This
assumes that such statistics will be available and that the media will be able to
discover, for example, levels of violence perpetrated by the government, or the fates
of those taken into police custody (ZR, 14). This is symptomatic of the unrealistic
27
position the report takes concerning the possibility for action in Zimbabwe. The
report specifically requests that journalists perform duties and report in such a way
that is obviously dangerous in the current political climate. The members of the
Media Monitoring Mission team identify problematic practices by the media in the
run-up to the last election in 2002 but their solutions are not tenable in the context of
the reasons these problems have arisen in the first place. The report briefly
acknowledges the danger in following journalistic practices that may evoke the
government’s disapproval, but does not address this danger when giving its
recommendations. More useful would have been to formulate guidelines on the
extent to which journalists could report honestly without endangering their own
safety.
D. Netherlands Institute for Southern Africa (NIZA)
Historical background and geographical coverage

NIZA is the product of the dissolution and merger of three separate Dutch anti-
apartheid organisations dating back to the 1960’s: the Holland Committee for
Southern Africa, the Dutch Anti-Apartheid Movement and the Eduardo Mondlane
Foundation. It was set up in 1997 as a ‘politically independent organisation’ to assist
in strengthening southern Africa’s democratic social foundations and enable good
governance.
Its areas of activity are: Angola, Botswana, DRC, Lesotho, Namibia, Malawi,
Mozambique, Swaziland, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The
headquarters are in Amsterdam and members frequently travel to Southern Africa.
Objectives
It assumes democracy to be a pre-condition for poverty reduction. Thus, its goal is to
‘deepen democracy’ in Southern Africa and strengthen civil society. Towards this end
they aim to provide technical and personnel assistance, disseminate relevant
knowledge, host networking functions and give positive interest support, i.e. lobby.
Within these means an important facet of their co-operation with southern African
organisations is their intention to grant ownership over the various agenda’s. With
regard to press freedom their target is to create a free, pluralistic and objective media
environment that is of a high quality and of local relevance.
2. Strategy, activities, and funding of NIZA
Strategy
To achieve a deepening of democracy NIZA has three programs:
• Access to information: Media and Freedom of Expression
• Access to justice: Human Rights and Peace Building
• Economic Development
As this consultancy is based around press freedom, only the first program will be
considered here. Nevertheless, this diversified approach to democracy and good
28
governance clearly constitutes an awareness of the complexities around the issue and
thus forms part of the strengths, as mentioned below.18
NIZA’s focus with regard to the media is to improve the media diversity and the
access for citizens to make their voice heard and receive information. They aim to
enhance freedom of expression by improving media quality and strengthen the
sustainability of the media sector. This is done through two means: 1. enhancing co-
operation with local partners in setting goals and unifying efforts and 2. linking
Northern and Southern media, to deepen knowledge of world affairs for southern
Africa and vice versa, enabling southern Africa to share its views with the world.
These two usually takes the form of technical or legal assistance on the basis of
locally identified necessities. They also try to raise awareness and create public
support within the Netherlands for the needs of southern Africa.
Activities
Advocacy and lobbying
Government decision making processes in southern Africa are still dubious in their
granting of broadcast licences and the freedom of expression of non-governmental
media is poor, even perilous to critical journalists. Thus, NIZA lobbies for the
liberalisation of (colonial) press laws and the improvement of legislation on the
protection for journalists.
Broadcasting
Since radio is the most important source of information, but often focuses on the
urban elite, NIZA supports efforts to increase the relevance and interest of radio
broadcasting for those in rural and underdeveloped communities. Together with
NCRF in South Africa and Radio Ecclesia they are attempting to set up local
networks of radios.
Training
Most media in southern Africa is of tabloid nature, lacking in quality and ethical
standards. Young and independent media face high start up costs, falling advertising
revenues and a chronic lack of committed staff. Thus NIZA trains journalists from
Southern Africa by funding their masters programs in Holland, Denmark or Wales
and works together with Dutch universities to provide Dutch students with internships
at NIZA’s local partners.
Although training programs do exist in southern Africa, they are fragmented and with
limited specialisation possibilities, due to a lack of regional standards. In light of this,
the NSJ Trust, with the funding of NIZA and PSO and in collaboration with MISA,
ZAMCOM and the Institute for the Advancement of Journalism, compiled a report –
The Media Training Needs Assessment Report for Southern Africa (C. Lowe Morna
and Z. Khan). It is aimed at giving a homogenous picture of what media trainers can
offer journalists and where the gaps are.
Funding
Under Dutch fundraising law, within this type of organisation there is an upper ceiling
of 25 % of total income set to limit the amount of cash flow arising from fundraising
18
See section E
29
for the past three years. In 2001 alone this amounted to roughly 1 million guilders.
Thus NIZA, to account for the remaining 75%, is forced to rely on government
subsidies and other contracts. The government has provided 4.5 million guilders in
2001. The city of Amsterdam has given a subsidy of hfl. 500.000 in relation to one of
their twin-partner city programs. Also in relation to other campaigns, where NIZA has
co-operated with other organisations, they have received subsidies to cover the costs
of their operations as initiators and organisers. Thus, in 2001 NOVIB (Oxfam NL)
gave NIZA a subsidy of hfl. 500.000 in their collaboration on Fatal Transactions. The
Dutch Sustainability Research Institute (NCDO) has granted them hfl.200.000 to aid
in their information dissemination programs, as has the EU granted them hfl.300.000
to assist in consciousness raising activities. Thus in total they have around 7 million
guilders to fund their activities of which nearly 70% goes to media related activities.
Of these 7 million guilders, a minimum limit for reserve funds has been put in place to
guarantee the future operations of NIZA. Control of expenditures has been tightened
and the financial administration has been improved so that signs of deficit can be
signalled early enough, following speculative losses in 2001. 19
BIDOC
Located in Amsterdam, BIDOC is an information and documentation centre that
collects all kind of information relevant to southern Africa. Its relevance is the
dissemination of knowledge through books and reports and the maintenance of a
website called Zimbabwe Watch. Zimbabwe Watch is a collective lobby effort of
various Dutch NGO’s aimed at establishing free and fair elections in Zimbabwe
through monitoring of government activities and co-ordination of lobby efforts. It has
recently pressured the UN to again condemn the government of Mugabe’s
infringement upon human rights, such as freedom of expression. It also supports the
setting up semi-legal short wave broadcast stations within Zimbabwe to facilitate the
ailing correspondents there.
Publications
NIZA is involved in the production and distribution of numerous publications:
• NIZA information booklets on recent NIZA activities
• Southern Africa Magazine [in Dutch] presenting information and opinions
pertaining to southern Africa
• BIDOC dossiers with selected articles and indexes of source materials on topical
issues
• Media News, an email quarterly on the state of media in southern Africa and
NIZA’s involvement.
In the area of information dissemination and lobbying, they also organise public
meetings both in southern Africa and the Netherlands on topical issues. Their website,
www.niza.nl, is also a good source for further networking possibilities with many
organisations and links to advocacy campaigns.
19
See section E, weaknesses
30
Prizes
NIZA gives out two prizes: Thesis Prize and Manyarara Prize. The first is designed to
encourage students to undertake research about subjects related to the southern Africa
region, upon which they could win 6000 euros. The second is a prize in investigative
journalism (2000 euro prize and 10000 to complete a scholarship in NL), awarded to
those journalists for choosing an especially risky genre of investigative journalism.
Alliances
NIZA has fostered relationships with national and international organisations. They
have been instrumental in both financial as well as managerial terms in setting up the
following alliances:
• Fatal Transactions - a campaign against the illegal raw materials trade that
perpetuates conflicts
• Amsterdam-Beira City Twinning Project - aimed at facilitating co-operation
between organisations in Amsterdam, NL and Beira, Mozambique
• SANPAD - a collaboration between Southern African and Dutch universities to
enable exchanges and internships
• Zimbabwe Watch
Encouraging hip-hop as a new form of media where political correctness is absent,

NIZA has supported the creation of a campaign by Bush Radio called ‘Headwarmers’.
It considers music a better way to reach young people, where rapping on the dangers
of AIDS drives the message home more effectively than the official safe sex
campaigns.
As mentioned above, NIZA also has been instrumental in realising the Media Training
Needs Assessment Report. Arising from concrete proposals based on this report,
NIZA has declared itself willing to fund projects from training facilities aimed at
improving the quality of training. Equally, NIZA supports the creation of
SAMTRAN, an informal network for media trainers, and will in the future contribute
to its work. Both the Report and SAMTRAN will be the key guidelines in the future
for determining indicators of how media education can be improved.
Being the advocacy organisation it is, MISA’s objectives are similar, although not as
diverse, to NIZA’s. MISA shares information for NIZA’s publications, they give
feedback on what key priorities are for developing a ‘free and pluralistic media
environment’ and cover similar ground with regard to Zimbabwe. They worked
together on the Media Training Needs assessment Report. They co-operate and co-
ordinate on regional conferences where their area’s of activity overlap. However,
they have not been explicit as to what exactly their relationship is, whether they fund
MISA’s activities or simply provide an advocacy platform in the Netherlands for their
cause.
5. Evaluation of NIZA approach to press freedom
Strengths
NIZA’s strengths lie in their secure funding sources, their multi-tiered approach
(media, economy and justice) to strengthening democratisation and their participatory
31
philosophy and emphasis on education. NIZA’s subsidies have increased over the
years as a response to increased project proposals and the government is glad to
delegate their development activities to successful external organisations in the wave
of de-centralisation and streamlining of the aid bureaucracy. Their diversified
approach shows an awareness of the inter-connected problems facing southern Africa
and the need for a simultaneous transformation of various sectors of society- rather
than blindly emphasizing i.e. the media- in order to achieve a functioning democracy
and good governance. Even within their media program, their desire for pluralism,
rather than a strengthening of already established media, shows their commitment to
progressive policies.
Letting local agencies define the priorities as well as handing over control over the
organisational process enables NIZA to fully capture the perceived needs of southern
Africa and promotes true demand-driven growth as opposed to imperialist supply-
driven growth. This is especially reflected in their emphasis on radio and hip-hop as
culturally integrated means of communication that can effectively target the majority
of the people. In the same vein, they aim to strengthen capacities rather than hand
over resources by training local journalists; ‘gifts of material make man dependent
whereas gifts of knowledge make man free’20. The incentives are such that make
people want to learn and be critical about the conditions they live in (Manyarara
Prize). MISA can make good use of NIZA’s involvement in creating more detailed
and concrete proposals about the training of journalists and NIZA can benefit from
MISA’s experience and knowledge of the regional problems and perceived needs.
Finally, NIZA’s approach to strengthening support for issues in southern Africa,

outside of southern Africa, is a significant contribution in the creation of trans-
national advocacy network that strengthens the global social movement for the
universalisation of respect for human rights. MISA can rally much external support
and pressure through NIZA’s international lobby links to the Netherlands and Europe.
Since only unified efforts manage to sustain effects, the possibility of organising
larger events with increasing returns to scale through cost-sharing should be explored
by MISA. Equally, this deepening of co-operation could benefit all three areas of
NIZA’a activities as well as its finished and future contributions to press freedom.
Weaknesses
Clarity/Accountability
Although supporting participation, there are no clear indicators as to how NIZA,
internally, measures its own success of spending on organisations and justifies further
spending on some projects and not others. As such new rents under an un-transparent
funding structure may be created that increase the competition for resources,
destabilising an effective social development. Equally, NIZA has failed to provide
evidence in any of their information bulletins as to what accountability indicators they
place upon recipients of their aid to determine whether or not the money is being
spent purposefully and efficiently.
NIZA has not been co-operative in this report; this hence raises questions as to the
efficacy of their external relations department and their willingness to deal with public
scrutiny.
20
Thomas
32
Concepts
On a conceptual level, despite their awareness for the interconnected problems of
southern Africa, their underpinnings and assumptions are weak. They do not clarify
why democracy is a pre-condition for poverty reduction; in fact, much of the literature
in development points the other way: poverty reduction as the pre-condition for
democracy. Leaving this causal link unexplored and thus promoting democracy
blindly may indeed have many unintended negative consequences.
Finances and impartiality

As can be read from their financial statements, in 2001 NIZA lost some of their
reserve money through high risk speculation on the stock market. This policy has
been revised for the better and now only low-risk, low-yield [5%] state bonds will be
bought.
Besides having to revise their financial future, the magazine Zuidelijk Afrika has also
been posting losses and has needed revision. Given that it is unlikely to receive large
numbers of subscribers in the short term, NIZA has decided to enable external
contracting, in the form of specials, with donors who want to see a publication about a
specific topic. This raises concern about the impartiality with which this magazine can
be appreciated in the future and to what extent multi-nationals might make it use it as
an advertising tool for their operations.
Given that NIZA may only receive 25% of their revenue for the past three years from
fundraising, which they almost have already fulfilled; this raises the question of why
NIZA, in its year plan for the coming years has planned more fundraising events if it
sill wants to stay under the favourable tax laws currently applicable under CBF
(Dutch National Fundraising Office) rules?
Manyarara Prize
When hosting the Manyarara prize, are NIZA not promoting potentially life
threatening behaviour while at the same time creating an atmosphere of mistrust
towards politicians? As mentioned in the conceptual framework above, the conditions
for this prize must not be solely based on the riskiness of investigation that exposes
the mal-functioning of democracy, but also on the simultaneous promotion of
democratic values already existing.
E. Southern African Development Community (SADC)
The SADC exists today as a Regional Integration and Development Organisation

representing 11 Southern African member states, co-operating in the promotion of
integrated and harmonious political, economic and social development.
History
The Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference, or SADCC was
established in April 1980 by the Governments of nine Southern African countries of
Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and
Zimbabwe (and since then Democratic Republic of Congo, Mauritius, Seychelles,
South Africa and Namibia). It was the first official engagement by the nations of this
33
sub-Saharan African region in a strategy that has been dubbed ‘Developmental
Regionalism’, promoted by the UN economic commissions for Latin America and
Africa in the 1960s, as a way in which newly independent countries with small
economies could industrialise by combining their resources and markets (Lambrechts,
2001, p. 32). This inter-regional co-ordination and co-operation involves jointly
funding and developing large capital projects across national borders, sharing
resources for researching and developing technology, integrating markets, and
harmonising industrial, financial, macro-economic and social policies.
From conference to community

The conference gave birth in 1992, in Windhoek, Namibia, to what is now known as
the Southern African Development Community, or SADC. This was the result of a
felt need to shift the focus of the organisation from co-ordinating development
projects to the more complex task of integrating the economies of the member states,
for which purpose the organisation would require a more formal and legal status.
Hence the 1992 conference saw the signing by all member states of the Declaration
and Treaty: the blueprint for building a community of Southern African states. In it
they undertook to work more closely together in order to mobilise investment capital,
create a single-regional market, and remove barriers to the free movement of people.
Principles and objectives

The member states are expected to act according to the following principles:
• Sovereign equality of all member States
• Solidarity, peace and security
• Human rights, democracy, and the rule of law
• Peaceful settlement of disputes
The objectives of SADC are to:

• Achieve development and economic growth, alleviate poverty, enhance the
standard and quality of life of the people’s of Southern Africa and support the
socially disadvantaged through regional integration
• Evolve common political values, systems and institutions
• Promote and defend peace and security
• Promote self-sustaining development on the basis of collective self-reliance and
the interdependence of members
• Achieve complementarity between national and regional strategies and
programmes
• Promote and maximise productive employment and utilisation of resources of the
region
• Achieve sustainable utilisation of natural resources and effective protection of the
environment
• Strengthen and consolidate the long - standing historical, social and cultural
affinities and links among the people of the region
Structure
SADC is made up of 11 member states and until 2001, was divided up into 21 sectors
assigned to national governments. These were Entertainment and Tourism,
Environment and Land Management, Water, Mining, Employment and Labour,
Culture, Information and Sport, Transport and Communications, Finance and
34
Investment, Human Resource Development, Agriculture and Natural resources, Legal
Affairs and Health.
Restructuring
Throughout the 1990s a plan to restructure institutions and programmes was top of the
SADC agenda. Restructuring was ‘intended to give the regional integration process,
particularly economic integration, a stronger institutional foundation to allow for more
rapid and effective performance’ (Naidu and Vhuromu, 2001). The SADCC tradition
of decentralised sectoral units proved weak and deficient in capacity, ‘as a result of
inadequate staffing and funding by the co-ordinating countries’ (Peters-Berries, 2000,
p. 73). Sectoral responsibility also led to a narrow sense of ‘ownership’ of certain
issues in some cases.
At the March 2001 Summit in Windhoek, Namibia a decision was hence taken to
collapse the 21 sectors of the SADC into 5 core clusters. The SADC thus currently
operates according to a Special Program of Action (SPA) covering:
• Trade, industry, finance and investment
• Infrastructure and services
• Food, agriculture and natural resources
• Social and human development
• Special projects such as small arms, drug trafficking and natural disasters
“The motivation for restructuring was to address the presently unworkable managerial
structure by moving responsibility for the sectors from individual countries into an
enlarged secretariat, within which directors would be nominated to manage the
clusters” (Naidu and Vhromu, 2001).
See Annex V for a breakdown of the principal institutions of SADC following the
adoption of the ‘Extra-Ordinary Summit of the Report on Restructuring.
2. Strategy, activities, and funding of SADC
SADC functions as a decision making and policy shaping body. Representatives of

its members meet regularly at various different levels – from annual Summit to
administrational secretariat, to co-ordinate and integrate regional development
programmes and objectives. It employs the following legal instruments to achieve co-
operation and consensus on various issues: the treaty, protocols, agreements,
memorandas of understanding, and declarations. The protocols are not ratified by
member states and SADC has no power of enforcement or sanction for them.
The SADC Parliamentary Forum

This is the most active arm of SADC, which runs educational workshops, election
monitoring missions and training for Parliamentarians. Its main areas of work are:
• Election Observation
• Conflict Resolution
• Engendering Parliaments
• Inter-parliamentary Co-operation
• Regional Integration
35
The forum aims to improve the scope for pro-active involvement of Parliamentarians
in implementing integrative development policy, by building on their skills and
knowledge base; particularly in areas such as conflict resolution and in promoting free
and fair democratic election process. The ‘Engendering Parliaments’ workshops
programme for example, seeks to ‘ensure the SADC gender and development
declaration is implemented effectively both at national and regional levels’ (SADCPF
website, 2003).
There exists a similar programme ‘The role of parliamentarians in combating

HIV/AIDS in the SADC region’, which works with parliamentarians on educational
issues surrounding AIDS and the challenges of implementing effective health policy.
SADC’s commitment to freedom of expression and pluralistic media is pledged

according to Article 19 of the UN Declaration on Human Rights, and within both the
1991 Windhoek Declaration on the promotion of a Free African Press, and in the 2001
SADC Treaty protocol on Culture, Information and Sport.
“SADC member states have adopted a declaration on the role of information

and communication in community-building. It stresses and encourages the
freedom of the press, and the right to information of citizens. It also opens up
the region to greater private-sector investment” (IGD guide to the SADC,
2001; 142).
Within the protocols, Article 20 declares that: “State parties shall take necessary
measures to ensure the freedom and independence of the media”.
The Community also identifies within these declarations what we have described
above as the ‘normative’ links between a free press, a fully informed electorate and
free and fair democratic process.
“SADC gives due consideration to the cultural and human dimensions of

development and the information needs of a society in a democratic
environment”21, since “only through an informed constituency can SADC
achieve its objective of enhancing participation by the people of the region in
shaping policies and being active participants in the political and
development processes” 22(2001).
In addition they “believe there cannot be development without peace and security.
Lasting peace is predicated on the existence of democratic institutions and a culture of
democracy; the region has developed a common value system and put in place
institutions in that regard”23.
21
www.sadcreview.com/sectoral/cultureinformation&sport.htm
22
The Information 21: Communicating in the 21st Century’ project will support the constituency
mobilisation campaign”.
23
SADC information website (www.rptc.org.zw/sadc.htm).
36
In practice however the SADC’s activities in the area of information and specifically
press freedom are relatively limited:
The Programme on Culture Information and Sport attests that “All member States are
in the process of reviewing their media policies and legislation in order to promote the
freedom of expression and the development of a pluralistic media” (Culture,
Information and Sport Website, 2001).
Activities concerning media

The legislation review process is ongoing and as yet SADC has not visibly undertaken
any specific activities concerning press freedom. Its programmes on culture,
information and sport, demonstrate attempts to encourage higher standards in media
and integrate the efforts of broadcasting media across the region. For example the
South African Broadcasting Association (SABA) and the SADC secretariat have been
working together on the ‘SADC calling’ programme. The SABA provided national
radio stations with multi-media computer equipment and also commissioned a Talent
Consortium to produce a 26-part television series of TV- magazine programmes,
‘Beyond Our Borders’. Training activities were also undertaken covering 250
broadcasting personnel.
SADC also runs an annual Media Awards Competition to encourage the improvement
of media quality and standards in the region.
In the context of this project and the issue of press freedom, SADC’s relationship with
MISA is very much one of detachment, and is reflective of the Community’s stance
towards civil society organisations in general. SADC in essence creates rules and
directives for member states which should facilitate MISA’s project and yet recent
media alerts and human rights violations in member states of Zimbabwe and
Swaziland, suggest SADC’s overarching and integrative institutional presence is not
having the constraining effect MISA so urgently needs.
• MISA’s main involvement with SADC is through sending lobbying letters and
communications concerning media alerts and violations within member states.
• MISA’s has worked in the past with the SADC Parliamentary forum working in
partnership towards freer and fairer democratic process in member states, through
election monitoring and workshops.
• MISA’s National Chapter representatives sit as key stakeholders on the SADC
National Committees, providing information for policy on media related issues.
• Up until recently the Institute had ‘observer status’ at the SADC annual Heads of
State Summit. In this capacity they had first-hand insight into high level decision
making processes amongst member states and almost reached consultative
position as key civil society stakeholders within SADC. This was withdrawn
however and MISA are now only invited to attend the Summits as representatives
of the media. They feel this is due in part to pressure they have exerted on SADC
through campaigns over media alerts in Zimbabwe and other member states.
In respect of this MISA has described its relationship with SADC as inconsistent and
‘not always fruitful’ (Kandjii, pers.comm., 2003). This demonstrates how the
37
politically contentious nature of MISA’s work, in a climate of relatively weak
political integration within the community can result in occasionally adversarial
relations between them. In a situation of conflict such as this, MISA regains the status
along with other NGO’s of a pressure group or political activist organisation, whose
only effective leverage is in ‘voice’ through petitioning, letter writing and advocacy.
SADC, because of its politically and economically integrative role in the region
should be MISA’s central reference point in the promotion of a region-wide
consensus on Free Press and the associated good governance. As an institution its
fundamental role is in laying down guidelines and directives for policy makers across
the region. Accordingly, the Protocols and articles of the Declaration, unite the 11
member states on paper at least, in mutual development goals, and common social and
political values. As I will elaborate below, however, its capacity to assist civil society
organisations such as MISA in Free Press advocacy is restricted by its limited power
to enforce or sanction non-compliance with these protocols.
Theoretically SADC’s objectives and mission statement do seem to provide strong

ideological foundations upon which to build, for a civil society advocacy organisation
such MISA, but in practice as Berries has argued, many of the protocols amount more
to rhetoric than reality (2000).
SADC therefore fails at many levels to achieve its objectives. MISA publicly
acknowledge this weakness in describing SADC’s role in their work:
“The SADC Culture, Sport and Information Protocol in many respects falls
short of what MISA stands for, which is primarily the promotion of media
freedom in the region through the repealing or amendment of anti-media
legislation, including criminal defamation, the promotion of vibrant and
independent media, the establishment of and sustainable management of
community media, and the promotion of legislation that guarantees access to
information. The Protocol is silent on broadcasting issues, including
regulatory aspects and community broadcasting. Furthermore, critical issues
of media ownership and editorial independence of both the public and private
media do not feature in the Protocol. Since these countries are signatories to
a multitude of international charters and conventions one would hope to be
able to paint a different picture of the press freedom situation in the region.
But it remains to be seen to what extent SADC governments will observe their
responsibility to press freedom”(Kandjii and Titus; 2003)24.
5. Evaluation of SADC approach to press freedom
The SADC’s limitations in its role as a regional integration organisation hinder

MISA’s project of promoting press freedom in the following ways:
Upholding Protocols: problems of decentralisation and sovereignty

Protocols, even when ratified are not it seems a guarantee of any kind of consensus on
the implementation of strategies for regional integration, or that their signatories will
uphold what has been promised. The SADC’s decentralised structure and the strong
nationalisms upon which many African states were built post-independence, may have
been key contributing factors in the consistent failings of member states to co-operate
in times of crisis or to forfeit some degree of sovereignty for the good of the region.
24
So this is Democracy? ‘State of media in the SADC’. MISA website 2003
38
At Windhoek, all member states committed to unifying ideals which are very hard to
achieve in real terms. It is not unusual in the history of international agreements and
geopolitical relations to witness the collapse of regional integration and co-operation
at times when national strategic, economic and political interests are in question. As
recent events in the UN over IRAQ have amply demonstrated, claims to sovereignty
will often prevail.
Decentralisation
Difficulties in achieving smooth transition from Conference to Community and the
resultant undertaking to restructure SADC’s institutions highlight structural and
organisational weaknesses which may partially explain the community’s inability or
to act effectively in response to pressure from civil society organisations like MISA in
situations such as the recent one in Zimbabwe. SADC’s decentralised structure has
hindered it in influencing and implementing policy change in the past. As I have
mentioned above, it is hoped that the newly centralised structure under the secretariat
in Gaborone, Botswana will concentrate capacity and power of member states,
enabling greater leverage and facilitating the co-ordination of a more unified political
stance in the face of disagreements over policy or non-compliance. This increased
political unification will be key for MISA.
Sovereignty
It has been observed that owing to the differences in leadership ideology across
Southern Africa states, political integration is proving particularly difficult to achieve,
not least because of the threat to sovereignty the SADC represents. The primacy of
national sovereignty stands out, Peters-Berries argues, “as the single most important
factor standing in the way of political integration” (2000, p. 80).
“The overwhelming impression of SADC, is that of a slow moving body which

postpones crucial strategic decisions and reforms because of a very low preparedness
to surrender pieces of national sovereignty to a regional level. Although the SADC
documents (Windhoek and Declaration) show that the insight in the necessity of such
a shift of responsibilities exists among the SADC leaders, hardly any country has been
prepared to practically follow up on the verbal commitments” (2000, p. 28).
Hence, Protocols are in Peters-Berries view likely to prove in the future, an

insufficient tool for integration, particularly so long as fundamental differences
remain in member states’ political stances. In this light, he suggests that “as long as
internal conflict management and interest balancing are left to informal procedures
and ad hoc working groups (as for example in the DR Congo conflict) and a
compensation mechanism is not even on the drawing board, SADC must be regarded
as very weakly integrated in political terms” (2000, p. 28).
This has profound implications MISA’s project. Any attempt at advocating Free
Press on a pan-regional scale on the basis that it contributes to democracy building,
and is thus in accord with the 1992 Windhoek protocols, is inevitably flawed.
Without political concord amongst member states, or formal institutional means of
sanctioning non-compliance with protocols, violations of journalists’ rights and
restrictions on the media freedoms will continue unchecked in certain member states
and the advocacy project will continue to be severely undermined. MISA’s key
39
political support framework, SADC, which has enough clout and credible threat to
exert pressure for change in the region, is weakened at its core by its own internal
ideological disparities and structural fragility.
Engaging with civil society
The transition from conference to community involved establishing key new aims
including the realisation that modernisation requires a people-centred approach to
development - leading to significant, though arguably insufficient efforts to consult
workers’ associations, NGOs, businesses and interest groups on designing and
implementing regional processes and projects. 25 E.g. The involvement of civil
society groups and communities in shaping environmental and gender agendas of
SADC. This is embodied by SADC-PF’s ‘Engendering Parliament’ programme.
The SADC’s ability to assist in advocating free press is fundamentally influenced by

its ties to civil society. These until very recently these have been extremely weak.
The community’s focus on economic integration and tendency to work through
government channels, predominantly finance ministries, has meant a neglect of
people-centred development; namely institutionalising participatory methods and
engaging with civil society bodies to promote democracy. Lambrechts sees this as due
in part to the frailty of domestic private sectors and semi-authoritarian style of some
southern African governments (2001, p. 41).
As Naidu and Vhromu comment, the SADC’s restructuring exercise does seem to
indicate that the region is making headway towards regional integration through
economic co-operation, but “economic integration does not take place in isolation.
Instead it must be accompanied by good governance, and anchored in consensus on
key political and economic decision amongst regional leaders” (2001-2002, p. 48).
This is particularly relevant for Non-Governmental and civil society organisations
such as MISA, whose work involves stressing the fundamental importance of non-
economic factors; particularly human and socio-political factors in achieving the
conditions of ‘good governance’ and a strong developmental democracy. Freedom of
press and access to information are commonly perceived as essential to this process in
creating an informed electorate and free and fair democratic process.
The kind of commitment the SADC has recently shown to civil society organisations
through its social and health agendas in gender and AIDS programmes would aid
MISA’s work considerably. As they have specified in their communiqué to Stanhope
Centre in November 2002, a greater emphasis and practical focus on issues
concerning media freedom in SADC’s programmes and policies would serve to
legitimate their cause and establish a relationhip between MISA and SADC based
more around reciprocal benefit and co-operation than lobbying as it currently is. A
particular area of focus might be the media workshops with parliamentarians through
the SADC-PF, to build and strengthen relationships of mutual understanding between
SADC member state parliaments and the media, and to facilitate the implementation
of protocols concerning pluralistic media and the accessibility of information. There
is scope here for further inter-organisational co-operation between MISA and
organisations such as CPA and WBI, whose joint programmes are considered above.
25
SADC website; ‘Background – History’.
40
Unfortunately, however, MISA’s continued success in co-operating with partner
organisations in free press advocacy in the region, is likely to be dependent in the long
term upon a greater degree of political integration within the SADC. This remains at
present, a factor beyond the influence NGOs.
F. World Bank Institute (WBI)
Type of organisation
WBI is a multi-lateral research institute which is designed to share development
expertise with policymakers and decisionmakers throughout the developing world.
Essentially WBI is the ‘learning arm’ of the World Bank, and as such it is designed to
provide learning and knowledge services to support the Bank’s development lending.
History
In 1999 the World Bank's Economic Development Institute, the Bank's external
training arm which was founded in 1955, merged with the Bank's Learning and
Leadership Center thereby adding the training of Bank staff to its work program. A
year later the Institute's name was changed to the World Bank Institute (WBI). It still
functions in this form today. WBI is based in Washington, D.C., but also has field
offices in Beijing, Cairo, Moscow, Paris and Tokyo.
Geographical coverage
WBI operates in over 150 countries across the globe. Fig. 2 provides a breakdown of
WBI’s client participants by region for the fiscal year 2002.
Structure
WBI has recently redefined its business model, placing
increased emphasis on responding to country needs and
demand for services. Under the new model, WBI will
refocus its functional units to better leverage its
resources through closer alignment with World Bank
country operations— and with the Bank’s research and
policy implementation groups. Accordingly, WBI’s
programs will be organised around three pillars:
• Country pillar, to ensure alignment with Bank
operations
• Thematic pillar, which is designed to strengthen the
information and expertise offered by the Bank
• Knowledge Pillar which ensures global reach
Fig. 2: Client participants by region (fiscal year 2002)
41
East Asia
& The Worldw ide
Pacific, , 13%
17%
Europe &
South
Central
Asia, 4%
Asia, 9%
Africa, Latin
27% America &
Caribbean,
Middle East
27%
& North
Africa, 3%
Objectives
WBI’s objectives are built upon the Bank’s focus on building government capacity
and, since 1997, the increasing attention that has been given to improving political
governance and enabling citizens to participate in changing their own economic and
social structures. As the Knowledge Bank component of the World Bank, WBI’s
broad objectives are the Millenium Development Goals (Box 2).
In relation to these objectives WBI’s defines its role more specifically in its 2002
Annual Report: “Our vision is to become a Knowledge Bank that spurs the knowledge
revolution in developing countries and acts as a global catalyst for creating, sharing,
and applying the cutting-edge knowledge necessary for poverty reduction and
economic development” (WBI, 2002, p. 4). Because knowledge builds technical and
administrative capacity, and because capacity building leads to growth, security, and
empowerment of the poor, the Bank sees its learning and capacity building programs
as central to poverty reduction.
Box 2: Millenium Development Goals
(i) Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger

(ii) Achieve universal primary education
(iii)Promote gender equality and empower women
(iv) Reduce child mortality
(v) Improve maternal health
(vi) Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases
(vii)Ensure environmental sustainability
(viii) Develop a global partnership for development
2. Strategy, activities, and funding of WBI
Strategy
WBI’s strategy has four major elements:
• Supporting the development of an enabling environment for knowledge sharing
and for information and communication technologies, beginning with better
knowledge capture and sharing within the Bank itself through networks and
communities of practice, and through internal alliances for capturing,
transforming, disseminating, and applying knowledge on the ground.
42
• Building clients’ capacity to benefit from the knowledge economy by promoting
excellence in education at all levels; supporting the Bank’s regions in their efforts
to enhance clients’ capacity to acquire, apply, and manage knowledge; and
helping clients prioritize their needs.
• Expanding client access to knowledge through information technology and global
knowledge initiatives, including basic connectivity, access, and applications.
• Promoting the generation and sharing of global knowledge through partnerships.
Activities
This strategy is implemented in a number of different ways:
• Producing and collecting research related to international economic and social
development, which it then compiles into knowledge networks.
• Providing training through a variety of courses and seminars aimed at reducing
poverty and promoting economic opportunity and growth. These cover a wide
range of issues such as HIV/AIDS, pollution, corruption, press freedom, and water
use. They have also involved a broad range of participants in over 150 countries
including government officials, academics, business leaders, journalists, and other
interested parties. These programmes train World Bank staff and clients together,
allowing the two groups to exchange information and experience.
• Policy consultations through which WBI shares its expertise directly with
policymakers on specific programmes or projects.
Funding
WBI receives approximately 80% of its funding from the World Bank itself. The
remaining 20% of funding originates from donor trust funds. These include more
than 40 bilateral donors, foundations, and private-sector organizations (Box 3).
Partner organizations provide funding in exchange for knowledge and learning
programs. This is seen in turn to boost World Bank lending programmes and to assist
in meeting development objectives.
Box 3: WBI Donor Partners
Governments
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland,
Israel, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
Turkey, United Kingdom, United States
Multilateral Organizations
European Commission, International Fund for Agricultural Development,
International Monetary Fund, United Nations Children’s Fund, United Nations
Development Programme, United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America
and the Caribbean
Private Companies
Daimler-Chrysler, Ford Motor Company, Merck, Renault, Shell, Volvo
Foundations
Eurasia Foundation, Ford Foundation, King Baudouin Foundation, Konrad Adenauer
Stiftung, Rockefeller Foundation, Soros Foundation, The William and Flora Hewlett
Foundation, World Business Council for Sustainable Development
43
On its website the World Bank Institute pledges its support for “the emergence of an
independent and viable media as one means of assuring an informed economy and an
accountable government”26. Thus WBI sees press freedom as being an important
component of good governance. Indeed the WBI media development program falls
under the ambit of its Global Governance program (see Box 4 for a selected list of
WBI partners), which is designed to build and sustain a dynamic and constructive
governance environment. Following from this goal, WBI media development
programs are designed to foster a policy environment hospitable to media activity, as
well as skills and understandings within media organizations. Interestingly it appears
that the program has a particular focus on Africa.
Box 4: Selected partners in the WBI Global Governance program
Southern African organisations

Municipal Development Program, East and Southern Africa – MDPESA (Zimbabwe),
Southern African Development Community Organisation of Supreme Audit
Institutions – SADCOSAI (Mauritius)
Media-related organisation
Commonwealth Broadcasting Association, Commonwealth Press Union, European
Journalism Centre (The Netherlands), Press Development Institute (Moscow), Reuters
Foundation (UK), Transparency International – TI (Kenya, Germany and Latin
America), West African Newsmedia and Development Centre – WANAD (Benin),
World Association of Newspapers (France)
Media development program

The program is designed to strengthen the capacity of the media organizations and
journalists to cover economic, political and social change, and in so doing enhance
government transparency and accountability. The program is tailored according to
the needs in different regions and country groups. For example, in Africa, there
remains considerable demand for journalist training while in Russia, the greatest need
is for improved management skills and viable news organizations. WBI works in
collaboration with local, regional and international partners, and seeks economical
and effective use of distance learning facilities. Media development activities are
closely coordinated with other governance programs. For example, training programs
for journalists in covering budgets is aimed at countries receiving WBI programs for
parliamentary budget oversight and training for auditors general.
The WBI programme on the environment for media is a two-phase process: first, they
collect the relevant data on the laws and policies that constrain the press in priority
countries; second, they provide training for media leaders and media associations that
are in a position to advance an improved environment for the press in their countries.
The programme focuses on a number of different areas:
Media self-regulation
26
http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/journalism/about.html
44
WBI has helped to identify several factors that are likely to determine the success of
self regimes. In particular, WBI has teamed up with the Commonwealth Press Union
and the United Kingdom’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office to facilitate a series of
inter-linked two-day regional seminars throughout the Commonwealth, drawing
together some of the advocates for change within the media environment.
Building a free and independent media

This program is designed to bring together media leaders, government officials,
parliamentarians and advocacy groups in a step-by-step program for improving the
environment for an independent and financially viable media. Participants identify
shortcomings of their country's policy and regulatory framework, analyse the
experiences of countries where the environment for media activity has improved, and
advance a specific program for change. Countries will be brought into the program
when they are involved in programs to improve governance, and are broadly open to
liberalizing information flows.
Access to information
The aim of this component of the media program is to create awareness among
journalists of the need for good governance as a prerequisite for private sector
investment and economic growth (especially of the danger corruption poses to
society) and of their responsibility to investigate and report on governance issues in a
professional and ethical manner. The main focus of this component is for journalists
to develop the reflex of always seeking documents to support their reports, a
secondary focus is to examine how coalition building and collective action can bring
journalists and other leaders together in efforts to persuade their government to enact
a freedom of information laws and increase levels of transparency.
Parliament and the media

This program of activities starts with the premise that freedom of the press should not
be regarded simply as the freedom of journalists, editors or proprietors alone to report
and comment. Rather, it should be regarded as the embodiment of the public’s right
to know and to participate in the free flow of information. Recognizing this, the
Commonwealth Parliamentary Association (CPA) and the World Bank Institute have
developed a set of activities which are designed to encourage Commonwealth
Parliaments to be exponents of the protection of the media as a necessary adjunct to
democracy and good governance. Accordingly CPA and WBI have organised a series
of conferences and study groups on this topic.
Journalist training
For five years WBI has offered training programs for journalists in all regions. The
two core courses, “Investigative Journalism” and “Economics and Business
Journalism,” have been delivered to more than 2,500 reporters and editors in some
fifty countries, mostly in Africa and Eastern Europe. In addition to these core
courses, WBI has assisted with specialized programs on environmental journalism,
reporting on the HIV/AIDS pandemic, ethnic conflict and on financial
regulation. WBI also has worked with partner organizations in designing and
delivering programs on media self-regulation and ethics, on media interaction with
parliaments, and on access to information. The goal of the journalist training program
is to shift primary responsibility for the delivery of the courses to partners, especially
in Africa.
45
Knowledge networks
WBI’s main knowledge network initiative is the Global Development Learning
Network (GDLN). This partnership of public, private, and non-governmental
organizations is a fully interactive, multichannel network with a mandate to serve the
developing world. GDLN partner organizations work together to build local capacity,
share learning and knowledge, and develop a global community dedicated to fighting
poverty. The network’s learning programs fall into three broad categories: Courses
and Seminars, Development Dialogues (short videoconferences), and Web-based
Programs.
Publications
WBI has also produced and published research on the relationship between press
freedom and good governance. The 2002 World Development Report: Building
institutions for markets, carries a chapter on the role of media in development,
documenting ways that the press has acted as catalyst for institutional reform. The
Institute has also recently published, The right to tell: The role of mass media in
economic development, a book exploring the role of the media as a watchdog of
government and the corporate sector and the policies that prevent the media from
exercising that role.
MISA is not one of the World Bank Institute’s permanent partners. However the two
organisations have collaborated on several occasions. In relation to press freedom the
organisations came together at a workshop on ‘The Role of Media in Economic and
Democratic Development’ held at the World Bank conference centre, in Paris in
February, 2002. Prior to this the WBI was a partner of the 1999 African Development
Forum, "The Challenge to Africa of Globalisation and the Information Age" held in
Ethiopia at which presenters from MISA were involved. In relation to the issue of
gender the two organisations collaborated in a formation group which was set up to
prepare for the conference held by the World Summit on the Information Society
(WSIS) Gender Caucus in Mali in May 2002. The Caucus consists of representatives
of organisations that responded to an invitation by UNIFEM to contribute to ensuring
that gender dimensions are included in the process of defining and creating a Global
Information Society that contributes to sustainable development and human security.
MISA could benefit from collaborating more closely with WBI both through
increased information exchange and in forming links with other WBI partners and
collaborators.
5. Evaluation of WBI approach to press freedom
There appears to be some overlap in the practical approach to press freedom between
WBI and MISA. Both have been responsible for organising and collaborating in
workshops and conferences on specific media freedom issues in the Southern African
region.
More broadly, the WBI’s approach to the issue of press freedom and good governance
can be said to be based on the notion of an ‘ideal’ link between the two concepts. The
way in which WBI appears to treat media freedom as an essential component for
46
achieving ‘good governance’ suggests that they have not questioned the ability of a
free press to contribute to the governance structures of a nation. Indeed the WBI
appears to be an advocate of press freedom in almost all countries, in line with its
efforts on governance.
It appears that within its conception of the press freedom-good governance link the
WBI has been successful in its activity. It is clear that an organisation of the
magnitude of the World Bank will find little difficulty in setting up programs across
the globe. WBI has organised many courses, training, seminars, conferences, etc. in
coordination with a wide variety of organisations, from governmental organisations
to NGOs such as MISA, in keeping with the development of civil society under the
good governance ‘paradigm’. As its mission statement is that of a ‘Knowledge Bank’
it is clearly proving to be very effective in disseminating information, both internally
and externally generated, which can be used to move developing countries towards its
conception of good governance.
V/ CONCLUSION
Freedom of expression in Zimbabwe has been increasingly stifled since 1998, and
journalists who broadcast views other than Mugabe’s now face growing fear for their
lives. This situation has highlighted a very serious problem relating to the way
advocacy of press freedom is conceived in Southern Africa. Espousing a need for a
free press to encourage and increase the quality of governance is called into question
when it becomes clear that the specific government (in this case, Zimbabwe) has no
intention of allowing itself to be criticised. The success of press freedom is a function
of the domestic political will. Charters set out by regional organisations such as
SADC are ineffective if there is no effort made by its member states to enforce them.
SADCs lack of sanction against members who do not comply means that while the
Windhoek Declaration sets out very comprehensive guidelines, unless they are
voluntarily implemented, such directives are rendered ineffective.
Aside from the primary concern of an enabling political environment, the success of
press freedom hinges on an number of other considerations. What is needed is a
simultaneous transformation of different sectors of society, not just political but
infrastructural and social. Levels of literacy, for example, are crucial for widespread
reception of written media. Sufficient technology and infrastructure to disseminate
information are necessary for mass distribution. Both of these conditions are
dependent on economic development and access to resources.
Once the political and economic conditions have been satisfied, the way that news is
presented to the public needs to be taken into account. Pluralism in the media is
achieved by both a diverse range of media sources (print media, radio, television, and
eventually the internet), and a number of contrasting viewpoints. This prevents a
proliferation of a dominant perspective and enables the population to make an
informed democratic choice. Quality of reportage and journalism must be assessed.
Even in a free press environment, journalists should be concerned with the quality of
their work. Editorial codes of conduct and ethical considerations are essential in order
to achieve an unbiased and thorough converge. Equally important is the training of
journalists to enhance the quality of investigation and presentation of the news.
Taking such measures to achieve a free and fair coverage of events is important
47
within national boundaries, but it is also important to scale up. In a region attempting
to become more integrated, such as Southern Africa, organisations such as SADC
could be crucial in their role, setting, and encouraging adherence to regional press
standards that would only enhance the quality of integration. As media advocacy
organisations will be only too aware, the a priority for press freedom in Southern
Africa is getting the issue of restrictive media legislation to the forefront of SADC’s
policy reform agenda.
The organisations detailed in this report are committed to the cause of increasing
freedom and quality of the press. A number of the organisations, the CPA in
particular, have worked extensively to expose the need for co-operation between the
press and government. They emphasise the need for a functional understanding where
practices are agreed upon, but analysis is intentionally suspicious and analytical. It
would seem that the achievement of freedom of the press in Southern Africa would be
further facilitated by the organisations working for the cause, establishing new
partnerships and building upon and strengthening current relationships. In this
situation it would not be necessary for these organisations to reach consensus on all
points, but it would be useful for them to have a common basis for criticism, by being
fully aware of each other’s activities and stances.
48
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Abrahamsen, R. (2000) Disciplining democracy: development discourse and good

governance in Africa, London: Zed Books.
Asante, C. E. (1997) Press freedom: A research guide and selected bibliography,
London: Greenwood Press.
Commonwealth Secretariat (2000) Fighting corruption: promoting good governance,
London: Commonwealth Secretariat.
Dennis, E. E., D. M. Gillmor and T. L. Glasser (1989) Media freedom and
accountability, London: Greenwood.
Eribo, F. and W. Jong-Ebot (1997) Press freedom and communication in Africa,
Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, Inc.
Evans, D., P. M. Holmes, I. Mandaza and SAPES Trust. (1999) SADC : the cost of
non-integration, Mt. Pleasant, Harare: SAPES Books.
Gunaratne, S. A. (2003) "Freedom of the press: a world system perspective",
Communication Abstracts, Vol. 26, No. 2, 155-298.
Islam, R., S. Djankov and C. McLiesh (2002) The right to tell: the role of mass media
in economic development, Washington, DC: World Bank.
Kasoma, F. P. (1995) “The role of the independent media in Africa's change to
democracy”, Media, Culture & Society, Vol. 17, 537-555.
Kasoma, F. P. (1998) "The independent press and politics in Africa", Communication
Abstracts, Vol. 21, No. 2.
Lambrechts, K. and R. de Villiers (2001) Institute for Global Dialogue Guide to the
SADC, Johannesburg: Institute for Global Dialogue.
Naidu, S. and M. Vhuromu (2001-2002) "Reviewing SADC", SA Yearbook of
International Affairs, Vol. No.
Peters-Berries, C. and M. T. Marx (2000) Monitoring the Process of Regional
Integration in the SADC, Harare: Konrad Adenauer Foundation.
Rondinelli, D. A., P. Blunt and United Nations Development Programme. (1997)
Reconceptualising governance, New York: The Programme.
Ronning, H. (1994) Media and democracy : theories and principles with reference to
an African context, Harare: SAPES Books.
Thomas, A. (1992) “Non-governmental organisation and the limits to empowerment”,
in Marc Wuyts, Maureen Mackintosh and Tom Hewitt (eds.) Development
Policy and Public Action, Oxford: Oxford University Press in association with
The Open University, 117-146.
Weiss, T. G. (2000) "Governance, good governance and global governance:
Conceptual and actual challenges", Third World Quarterly, Vol. 21, 795-814.
INTERNET REFERENCES
Article 19: www.article19.org

CJA : www.commonwealthjournalists.org
CPA: www.cpahq.org
CPU : www.cpu.org.uk
MISA: www.misanet.org
NIZA: www.niza.nl
SADC: www.sadc.int
WBI: www.worldbank.org/wbi
49
Appendix I: Windhoek Declaration on Promoting an Independent and
Pluralistic African Press
Recalling the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the UN General Assembly resolution 59(1) of 14
December 1946 stating that freedom of information is a fundamental human right, the General
Assembly resolution 45/76 A of 11 December 1990 on information in service of humanity, resolution
25C/104 of the General Conference of UNESCO of 1989 in which the main focus is the promotion of
"the free flow of ideas by word and image among nations and within each nation", We declare that:
1. Consistent with Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the establishment,
maintenance and fostering of an independent, pluralistic and free press is essential to the
development and maintenance of democracy in a nation, and for economic development.
2. By an independent press, we mean a press independent from governmental, political or

economic control, or from control of materials and infrastructure essential for the production
and dissemination of newspapers, magazines and periodicals.
3. By a pluralistic press, we mean the end of monopolies of any kind and the existence of the
greatest possible number of newspapers, magazines and periodicals reflecting the widest
possible range of opinion within the community.
4. The welcome changes that an increasing number of African States are now undergoing
towards multiparty democracies provide the climate in which an independent and pluralistic
press can emerge.
5. The world-wide trend towards democracy and freedom of information and expression is a
fundamental contribution to the fulfillment of human aspirations.
6. In Africa today, despite the positive developments in some countries, in many countries
journalists, editors and publishers are victims of repression - they are murdered, arrested,
detained and censored, and are restricted by economic and political pressures such as
restrictions on newsprint, licensing systems which restrict the opportunity to publish, visa
restrictions which prevent the free movement of journalists, restrictions on the exchange of
news and information, and limitations on the circulation of newspapers within countries and
across national borders. In some countries, one-party States control the totality of information.
7. Today, at least 17 journalists, editors or publishers are in African prison, and 48 African
journalists were killed in the exercise of their profession between 1969 and 1990.
8. The General Assembly of the United Nations should include in the agenda of its next session
an item on the declaration of censorship as a grave violation of human rights falling within the
purview of the Commission on Human Rights.
9. African States should be encouraged to provide constitutional guarantees of freedom of the

press and freedom of association.
10. To encourage and consolidate the positive changes taking place in Africa, and to counter the
negative ones, the international community - specifically, international organizations
(governmental as well as non-governmental), development agencies and professional
associations - should as a matter of priority direct funding support towards the development
and establishment of non-governmental newspapers, magazines and periodicals that reflect the
society as a whole and the different points of view within the communities they serve.
11. All funding should aim to encourage pluralism as well as independence. As a consequence,
the public media should be funded only where authorities guarantee a constitutional and
effective freedom of information and expression, and the independence of the press.
12. To assist in the preservation of the freedoms enumerated above, the establishment of truly
independent, representative associations, syndicates or trade unions of journalists, and
50
associations of editors and publishers, is a matter of priority in all the countries of Africa
where such bodies do not now exist.
13. The national media and labour relations laws of African countries should be drafted in such a
way as to ensure that such representative associations can exist and fulfill their important tasks
in defence of press freedom.
14. As a sign of good faith, African Governments that have jailed journalists for their professional
activities should free them immediately. Journalists who have had to leave their countries
should be free to return to resume their professional activities.
15. Cooperation between publishers within Africa, and between publishers of the North and South
(for example through the principle of twinning), should be encouraged and supported.
16. As a matter of urgency, the United Nations, and particularly the International Programme for
the Development of Communication (IPDC), should initiate detailed research, in cooperation
with governmental (especially UNDP) and non-governmental donor agencies, relevant non-
governmental organizations and professional associations, into the following specific areas:
1. Identification of economic barriers to the establishment of news media outlets,

including restrictive import duties, tariffs and quotas for such things as newsprint,
printing equipment, and typesetting and word processing machinery, and taxes on the
sale of newspapers, as a prelude to their removal;
2. training of journalists and managers and the availability of professional training

institutions and courses;
3. legal barriers to the recognition and effective operation of trade unions or association
of journalists, editors and publishers;
4. a register of available funding from development and other agencies, the conditions
attaching to the release of such funds, and the methods of applying for them.
5. the state of press freedom, country by country, in Africa.
17. In view of the importance of radio and television in the field of news and information, the
United Nations and UNESCO are invited to recommend to the General Assembly and the
General Conference the convening of a similar seminar of journalists and managers of radio
and television services in Africa, to explore the possibility of applying similar concepts of
independence and pluralism to these media.
18. The international community should contribute to the achievement and implementation of the
initiatives and projects set out in the annex to this Declaration. 19. This Declaration should be
presented by the Secretary-General of the United Nations General Assembly, and by the
Director-General of UNESCO to the General Conference of UNESCO. ANNEX - Initiatives
and Projects Identified in the Seminar
1. Development of co-operation between private African newspapers:
- to aid them in the mutual exchange of their publications; -to aid them in
the exchange of information;
-to aid them in sharing their experience by the exchange of journalists;
-to organize on their behalf training courses and study trips for their
journalists, managers and technical personnel.
2. Creation of separate, independent national unions for publishers, news editors and
journalists.
3. Creation of regional unions for publishers, editors and independent journalists.
51
4. Development and promotion of non-governmental regulations and codes of ethics in
each country in order to defend more effectively the profession and ensure its
credibility.
5. Financing of a study on the readership of independent newspapers in order to set up

groups of advertising agents.
6. Financing of a feasibility study for the establishment of an independent press aid

foundation and research into identifying capital funds for the foundation.
7. Financing of a feasibility study for the creation of a central board for the purchase of
newsprint and the establishment of such a board.
8. Support and creation of regional African press enterprises.
9. Aid with a view to establishing structures to monitor attacks on freedom of the press
and the independence of journalists following the example of the West African
Journalists' Association.
10. Creation of a data bank for the independent African press for the documentation of
news item essential to newspapers. May 3, 1991
52
Appendix II: Freedom House Map 2002
53
Appendix III: Freedom House Global Survey of Media Independence, 2003
Survey Methodology
This survey of 193 countries expands a process conducted
since 1980 by Freedom House. The findings are widely used
by governments, academics, and the news media in many
countries. The degree to which each country permits the
free flow of information determines the classification of
its media as “ Free,” “ Partly Free,” or “ Not Free.”
Countries scoring 0 to 30 are regarded as having “ Free”
media, 31 to 60, “ Partly Free” media, and 61 to 100,
“ Not Free” media. The criteria for such judgments and
the arithmetic scheme for displaying the judgments are
described below. Assigning numerical points allows for
comparative analysis among the countries surveyed as well
as facilitating an examination of trends over time.
The criteria
This study is based on universal criteria. The starting
point is the smallest, most universal unit of concern:
the individual. We recognize cultural differences,
diverse national interests, and varying levels of
economic development. Yet the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights instructs: Everyone has the right to freedom
of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to
hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive,
and impart information and ideas through any media
regardless of frontiers (Article 19).
The operative word for this survey is everyone. All
states, from the most democratic to the most
authoritarian, are committed to this doctrine through the
United Nations system. To deny that doctrine is to deny
the universality of information freedom— a basic human
right. We recognize that cultural distinctions or
economic underdevelopment may limit the volume of news
flows within a country, but these and other arguments are
not acceptable explanations for outright centralized
control of the content of news and information. Some poor
countries allow for the exchange of diverse views, while
some developed countries restrict content diversity. We
seek to recognize press freedom wherever it exists, in
poor and rich countries, as well as in countries of
various ethnic, religious, and cultural backgrounds.
This survey does not assess the degree to which the press
in any country serves responsibly, reflecting a high
ethical standard. The issue of “ press responsibility” is
often raised to defend governmental control of the press.
Indeed, a truly irresponsible press does a disservice to
its public and diminishes its own credibility. A
governmental effort to rein in the press on the pretext
of making the press “ responsible” has far worse results,
in most cases. This issue is reflected in the degree of
freedom in the flow of information as assessed in the
survey.
Sources
54
Our data come from correspondents overseas, staff travel,
international visitors, the findings of human rights and
press freedom organizations, specialists in geographic
and geopolitical areas, the reports of governments and
multilateral bodies, and a variety of domestic and
international news media. We would particularly like to
thank other members of the International Freedom of
Expression eXchange (IFEX) network for providing detailed
and timely analyses of press freedom violations in a
variety of countries worldwide.
Methodology
Through the years, we have refined and expanded our
methodology. Recent changes to our methodology are
intended to simplify the presentation of information
without altering the comparability of data for a given
country over the 24-year span, or of the comparative
ratings of all countries over that period.
Our examination of the level of press freedom in each

country is divided into three broad categories: the legal
environment, political influences, and economic
pressures. The legal environment encompasses both an
examination of the laws and regulations that could
influence media content as well as the government’s
inclination to use these laws in order to restrict the
media’s ability to operate. We assess the positive impact
of legal and constitutional guarantees for freedom of
expression, as well as the potentially negative aspects
of security legislation, the penal code and other
criminal statutes, penalties for libel and defamation,
and registration requirements for both media outlets and
journalists. Under the category of political influences,
we evaluate the degree of political control over the
content of news media. Issues examined in this category
include access to information and sources, editorial
independence, official censorship and self-censorship,
the ability of the media to operate freely and without
harassment, and the intimidation of journalists by the
state or other actors. Our third category examines
economic pressures on the media, which includes the
structure of media ownership, the costs of establishing
media as well as of production and distribution, the
selective withholding of state advertising or subsidies,
official bias in licensing, and the impact of corruption
on content.
The numbers
Each country is rated in three categories, with the
higher number being the least free. A country’s total
score is based on the total of the three categories: a
score of 0-30 places the country in the free-press group,
31-60 in partly-free, and 61-100 in the not free-press
group.
LEGEND
Legal environment: 0-30 points
55
Political influences: 0-40 points
Economic pressures: 0-30 points
Total Score: 0-100 points
Status: Free (0-30)/Partly Free (31-60)/Not Free (61-100)
SOUTHERN AFRICAN COUNTRIES
Angola
Status: Not Free
Legal environment: 20
Political influences: 30
Economic pressures: 22
Total Score: 72
Following the death of UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi in
February and the signing of a peace accord between the
government and rebel fighters in March, conditions for
the media eased somewhat in 2002. Although the
constitution states that the media cannot be subjected to
censorship, the government does not always respect this
provision in practice. Defamation of the president or his
representatives is a criminal offense punishable by
imprisonment or fines. In January, a court ordered
freelance journalist Rafael Marques to pay $950 as well
as all legal costs pertaining to the trial, after he was
found guilty of defaming President Jose Eduardo dos
Santos in a 1999 article. Reporters continue to face
various forms of official harassment, including the
confiscation of travel documents and limitations on the
right to travel; arbitrary arrest and detention; and
physical attacks. While some journalists practice self-
censorship when reporting on sensitive issues, the
private print and broadcast media are generally free to
scrutinize government policies. However, coverage at
state-owned outlets favors the ruling party. The
government has reportedly paid journalists to publish
complimentary stories and has discouraged advertisers
from buying space in independent newspapers, thus
threatening their financial viability.
Botswana
Status: Free
Total Score: 30
Freedom of expression is provided for in the constitution

and is generally respected, but the government imposes
some limits on the press. Undesirable news stories and
sources are subject to censorship, and several libel
suits have been filed against members of the press in
recent years. In November, an independent, self-
regulatory press council was established. Although the
private press is lively and is generally able to
scrutinize the government, news coverage in the state-
owned media supports official policies and actions. In
56
addition, the opposition has alleged that it receives
insufficient access to government-controlled media
outlets. Several journalists were threatened or attacked
during the year in retaliation for their critical
reporting. In recent years, the government has used
advertising bans in order to punish independent media
outlets.
Congo, Democratic Republic of (Kinshasa)
Status: Not Free
Total Score: 82
Statutes provide for freedom of the press, but the

government continues to sharply restrict the work of
journalists through a variety of means. The 1996 Press
Law prescribes the death penalty for reporters convicted
of disseminating false news, insulting the army,
demoralizing the nation, or betraying the state in time
of war. Harsh criminal libel laws were used to convict,
jail, and fine several journalists during the year. The
number of private newspapers and radio stations— many of
which are associated with and financed by political
parties, military factions, or the Roman Catholic
church— is growing, but the state-controlled broadcasting
network reaches the largest number of citizens.
Meanwhile, in areas under the control of the various
rebel factions, independent media barely exist. Reporters
continue to face frequent threats and intimidation,
physical attacks, and arrest and detention at the hands
of authorities. Rebels and other groups also threaten and
attack journalists. According to the local watchdog group
Journaliste en Danger, 33 journalists were arrested in
2002. Of these, 9 were detained in rebel-held
territories, and 24 in regions under the government’s
control. Some of those detained were allegedly tortured
while in custody. Official harassment also includes the
censoring of sensitive news broadcasts and the seizure of
newspapers. The financial viability of media outlets
remains hampered by high production costs as well as high
mandatory registration fees and broadcasting taxes.
Lesotho
Status: Partly Free
Total Score: 42
The government generally respects freedom of speech and
the press, which is provided for in the constitution.
However, a 1938 proclamation prohibits criticism of the
government and contains liabilities for seditious libel.
Journalists and media organizations are regularly the
targets of defamation lawsuits; in December, a private
57
company sued a weekly tabloid for publishing damaging
information. A number of independent newspapers,
including Christian publications and four English-
language weeklies, freely scrutinize government policies.
However, state-owned print and broadcast media reflect
the views of the ruling party and do not give equal
coverage to opposition parties. Journalists reportedly
have trouble gaining free access to official information.
Media development remains constrained by underfunding and
a lack of resources.
Malawi
Status: Partly Free
Total Score: 57
Freedom of speech and of the press is legally guaranteed
and generally respected in practice. However, the
independent media did face growing restrictions and
harassment at the hands of the government and its
supporters during the year. Defamation charges as well as
charges based on other laws have been used to prosecute
members of the press. As a result, some journalists
practice self-censorship. Although a broad spectrum of
opinion is presented in some two dozen private
newspapers, the state-owned Malawi Broadcasting
Corporation controls television and most radio service,
where coverage favors the ruling party. Reporters and
media outlets faced verbal threats as well as physical
attacks at the hands of police, senior politicians, and
supporters of the ruling party throughout 2002, most
commonly because of their opposition to President Elson
Muluzi’s attempt to run for a third term in office. Other
forms of official intimidation included a threat to
withdraw the broadcasting license of a community radio
station and the impounding of a publishing house’s
assets.
Mauritius
Status: Free
Total Score: 24
Press freedom is guaranteed in the constitution and is

generally observed. Strict libel laws have not been used
to inhibit the media. The Independent Broadcast
Authority, established in 2001 and chaired by a
government appointee, is mandated to regulate and license
all radio and television broadcasting. A small number of
private radio stations have been authorized to operate,
but the state-run media enjoy a monopoly in broadcasting
local news and generally reflect official views. A number
58
of private daily and weekly publications, however, are
often highly critical of both government and opposition
politicians and their policies.
Mozambique
Status: Partly Free
Total Score: 47
The 1990 constitution provides for press freedom, but

limits this right in relation to respect for the
constitution, human dignity, the imperatives of foreign
policy, and national defense. Some journalists have
alleged that the Higher Council of Social Communication,
an enforcement body for the press law dominated by the
ruling party, has attempted to promote self-censorship
among members of the press. Criminal libel laws are
sometimes used to prosecute media outlets for defamation,
which serves as another important deterrent to open
expression. The private media have enjoyed moderate
growth, but publications in Maputo have little influence
on the largely illiterate rural population. The state
owns or influences all of the largest newspapers and also
controls nearly all broadcast media. Although state-owned
media have displayed greater editorial independence in
recent years, the opposition receives inadequate coverage
on national radio and television. Reporters continue to
be subjected to some threats and intimidation at the
hands of officials. In November, the trial of six men
accused of the November 2000 murder of investigative
journalist Carlos Cardoso opened under tight security and
domestic and international scrutiny.
Namibia
Status: Partly Free
Total Score: 37
The constitution guarantees the right to free speech and

a free press, but these rights are not always respected.
In recent years, defamation lawsuits and other forms of
legal action have been filed against several newspapers.
Independent newspapers and radio stations continue to
criticize the government openly. However, journalists at
state-run media outlets have reportedly been subjected to
indirect and direct pressure to avoid reporting on
controversial topics, and they consequently practice
self-censorship. Last year’s official advertising and
purchasing bans on The Namibian, a leading daily
newspaper, remained in place. In August, President Sam
Nujoma appointed himself minister of information and
broadcasting, prompting fears that he intended to assert
59
further official control over the state-owned Namibian
Broadcasting Corporation, which operates most television
and radio services.
Seychelles
Status: Partly Free
Total Score: 50
The constitution provides for freedom of speech, but also

protects the reputation, rights, and privacy of citizens,
as well as the interests of public safety, order,
morality, and health, which could potentially restrict
reporting. Civil libel lawsuits resulting in steep
monetary penalties have been used repeatedly against the
independent media. In February, the weekly Regar was
ordered to pay exorbitant damages in the latest of a
series of lawsuits. Although the private press continues
to criticize the government, some self-censorship
persists. The state retains a near monopoly over the
broadcast media, whose coverage adheres closely to
official policy positions. High licensing fees have
discouraged the development of privately owned broadcast
media.
South Africa
Status: Free
Total Score: 25
Freedom of expression and the press is protected in the
constitution and is generally respected. However, several
apartheid-era laws that remain in effect permit
authorities to restrict the publication of information
about the police, national defense forces, and other
institutions, while the Criminal Procedure Act compels
journalists to reveal sources. A variety of private
newspapers and magazines are sharply critical of the
government, political parties, and other societal actors.
Radio broadcasting has been dramatically liberalized,
with scores of small community radio stations now
operating. The state-owned South African Broadcasting
Corporation (SABC) is today far more independent than
during apartheid, but still suffers from self-censorship.
Press freedom groups expressed concern that provisions in
the proposed Broadcasting Amendment Bill could further
impinge on the editorial independence of the SABC.
Reporters continue to be subjected to occasional
instances of threats and harassment.
Swaziland
Status: Not Free
60
Total Score: 74
Freedom of expression is seriously restricted, especially

regarding political issues or matters concerning the
royal family. Legislation bans the publication of any
criticism of the monarchy, and journalists are
occasionally prosecuted on criminal defamation charges.
As a result, self-censorship is widely practiced.
Journalists at Swaziland’s only independent daily
reported that they have trouble gaining access to
official information. The government controls most
broadcast media and finances a daily newspaper; it
discourages critical news coverage at these outlets.
However, broadcast and print media from South Africa are
available. Reporters continued to be subjected to some
intimidation and physical harassment at the hands of
police and security forces. The government withholds
advertising from the independent press and occasionally
proscribes publications without providing adequate
justification.
Tanzania
Status: Partly Free
Total Score: 47
Although the constitution provides for freedom of speech,

several other laws limit the ability of the media to
function effectively. Authorities are empowered to
register and ban newspapers under the Newspaper
Registration Act, while the Broadcasting Services Act
provides for state regulation of the electronic media and
the National Security Act allows the government to
control the dissemination of information to the public.
In May, independent journalist George Maziku faced
criminal defamation charges after writing an article that
allegedly “ misrepresented” the intentions of parliament.
Under the island of Zanzibar’s separate and more
restrictive media policies, journalists must be licensed
and the state tightly controls the broadcast media.
However, in December, journalists launched the weekly
Dira, Zanzibar’s first private newspaper. Reporters
continue to face some harassment at the hands of
authorities, particularly in Zanzibar, and a number
practice self-censorship. Nevertheless, independent media
outlets as well as the state-owned newspaper criticize
official policies, although the government occasionally
pressures outlets to suppress unfavorable stories.
Despite the high costs associated with establishing new
broadcast media, dozens of private radio stations have
been established in recent years.
61
Zambia
Status: Not Free
Total Score: 63
Freedom of speech is constitutionally guaranteed, but the

government often restricts this right. The Public Order
Act, among other statutes, has at times been used to
harass journalists. In addition, during the year the
ruling party responded to critical coverage by charging
several editors and reporters under harsh criminal libel
laws, which provide for prison terms of up to three
years. The private media supported the introduction of
freedom of information, broadcasting, and independent
broadcasting authority draft laws, which aim,
respectively, to facilitate easier access to information
held by official organs, to transform the state-owned
Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation from a
government propaganda organ to a public broadcaster, and
to establish an independent regulator to regulate
broadcasting. The government currently dominates
broadcasting, although an independent radio station,
Radio Phoenix, presents nongovernmental views. Coverage
at state-owned media outlets is generally supportive of
the government, and as a result of prepublication review
at government-controlled newspapers, journalists commonly
practice self-censorship. Reporters continued to face
threats and physical assault at the hands of police and
ruling party supporters, and newspaper vendors who sell
critical publications were also attacked during the year.
In April, a local press association condemned corruption
and bribe taking, which it alleged were rife in both the
state-owned and private media.
Zimbabwe
Status: Not Free
Total Score: 88
Under President Robert Mugabe, freedom of the press continues to be severely

limited. A range of restrictive legislation—including the Official Secrets Act, the
Public Order and Security Act, and criminal defamation laws—have been broadly
interpreted by authorities in order to prosecute journalists. In addition, the 2002
Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) gives the information
minister sweeping powers to decide who can work as a journalist in Zimbabwe and
requires all journalists to register with a government commission. It also criminalizes
the publication of “inaccurate” information. By the end of the year, the act had been
used to arrest at least a dozen journalists. However, its legality was challenged in
court by a number of professional organizations. There are no privately owned
62
broadcast media outlets, and just one independent daily newspaper, the Daily
News, continues to operate. State-controlled radio, television, and newspapers are all
seen as mouthpieces of the government and cover opposition activities only in a
negative light. Independent media outlets and their staff are subjected to considerable
verbal intimidation, physical attacks, arrest and detention, and financial pressure at the
hands of the police, authorities, and supporters of the ruling party. Foreign
correspondents based in the country, particularly those whose reporting portrayed the
regime in an unfavourable light, were refused accreditation or threatened with
lawsuits.
63
Appendix IV: Article 19 draft accounts for fiscal year 2000
Income £ % Expenditure £ %
Donations and gifts 336,112 30% Management and 259,152 24.2%
Administration
Sales 3,271 0.3% Fundraising and 68,860 6.5%
Publicity
Other Charitable 6,920 0.6%
Expenses
Project Grants £ % Project Expenditure £ %
Africa 287,103 25.5% Africa 344,739 32%
Europe 333,413 29.5% Europe 198,655 19%
MENA 7,500 0.5% MENA 7,622 0.7%
Law 127,652 11.2% Law 114,142 11%
Asia 22,463 2% Asia 39,561 4%
Communications 15,000 1% Communications 21,413 2%
Total Income 1,132,514 Total Expenditure 1,061,064
Income Expenditure
C om m -
unications
C om m - Law 2%
unications 11% D onations
1% A sia M anagem en
and gifts
4% tand
31%
Law A dm inistrati
11% on
Europe 24%
M ENA
30% Sales
1%
0% Fundraising
and
Europe P ublicity
M EN A A frica 19% 7%
1% 26%
O ther
C haritable
A frica Expenses
31% 1%
64
Appendix V : SADC organisational structure
SADC Organogram
• Summit – policy-making institution made up of heads of state and governments:

responsible for overall policy direction of Community; meets once a year.
Chairperson - President Sam Nujoma of Namibia.
• Troika – system of Chair, Incoming Chair and Outgoing Chair of SDAC, effective
since 1999. Enables organisation to execute tasks and implement decisions
expeditiously as well as provide policy direction to SADC institutions.
• Organ on Politics, Defence and Security – functions and operations regulated
according to protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation.
• Council of Ministers – Ministers from each member state, usually from Foreign
Affairs and Economic Planning or Finance. Responsible for overseeing
functioning and implementation of policies. Meets four times a year.
• Integrated Committee of Ministers – new institution aimed at ensuring proper
policy guidance, coordination and harmonisation of cross-cultural activities;
consisting of at least 2 ministers from each member state. Responsible to council.
• Tribunal – will ensure adherence to and proper interpretation of provisions of
SADC treaty, and adjudicate upon disputes referred to it.
• SADC National Committees – composed of key stakeholders notably government,
private sector and civil society of member states. Provide inputs at national level
in formulation of regional policies, strategies and SPA as well as co-ordinating
and overseeing implementation of these programmes at a national level.
65
• Standing Committee of Senior Officials – consists of one permanent and principal
Secretary or an official of equivalent rank from each member state, from
economic planning or finance. Technical advisory committee to the Council.
• Secretariat – principal executive institution of SADC responsible for strategic
planning, co-ordination and management of SADC programmes. Headed by an
Executive Secretary and has headquarters Gabarone, Botswana.
• SADC Parliamentary Forum – The active branch of the SADC. A key objective
of the Forum is to develop into a regional parliamentary structure, for the purpose
of strengthening the capacity of Southern African Development Community by
involving parliamentarians of member states in its (SADC's) activities.
66
Appendix VI: WBI Budget for Fiscal Year 2001 and 2002 (US$ millions)
SOURCES OF FUNDS FY ‘01 FY ‘02

Administrative Budget
Staff Learning 6.0 6.9
Client Learning 50.1 49.7
Co-financing 11.0 12.1
Total Operating Budget 67.0 68.7
Japan/World Bank Graduate Scholarship Fund 13.1 9.4
Total Sources 80.1 78.1
USES OF FUNDS
Program Budget
Staff Learning 5.4 6.4
Client Learning 51.4 52.2
Management and Overhead 10.2 10.1
Subtotal 67.0 68.7
Japan/World Bank Graduate Scholarship Fund 13.1 9.4
Total Uses 80.1 78.1
67

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CONSULTANCY REPORT

Free Press and Good Governance in Southern Africa

BIDOC Openbare Bibliotheek

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ....................................................................................................................5

II/ PRESS FREEDOM IN ZIMBABWE........................................................................................10

III/ CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK.............................................................................................11

INTERNET REFERENCES ...............................................................................................................49

A. Rationale for consultancy

In response to this, MISA is lobbying the Southern African Development Community

1. To provide a conceptual framework from which to consider the link between

Article 19 International freedom of expression

Commonwealth Associations of Commonwealth

Netherlands Institute Bi-lateral development aid agency

Southern African Regional integration and

World Bank Institute Multi-lateral policy research body

E. Respective approaches to promoting press freedom

Article 19 combines a variety of strategies to promote freedom of expression:

Article 19 is now a well established international NGO, with a renowned reputation in

NIZA’s press freedom strategy is conducted through the programme ‘Access to

NIZA’s activities include:

SADC functions as a decision making and policy shaping body. Representatives of

WBI’s strategy has four major elements:

This strategy is implemented in a number of different ways:

II/ PRESS FREEDOM IN ZIMBABWE

III/ CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

A. The concept of press freedom

There have been a number of attempts to provide a quantitative measurement of press

The notion of freedom is of course problematic and it is important to question

B. Defining good governance

Secondly, governance is mainly used in reference to the ‘good governance’ paradigm.

C. An ideal link between press freedom and good governance?

1. How does press freedom promote good governance?

D. Reassessing the link

Even if we do assume that modernisation is a viable goal for development, problems

2. Problems of development communication

Media undermining democracy in unstable, late-developing countries

Causality versus correlation

Effects on the public

New forms of media

IV/ ANALYSIS OF DIFFERENT ORGANISATIONAL APPROACHES

A. Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA)

Fig. 1: Inter-organisational diagram

MISA is a non-governmental organisation with members in 11 of the Southern

History and objectives

2. Strategy, activities, and funding of Article 19

Ultimately its strategy is to build a consensus around a global freedom of information

Another of their major activities is contained within the organisations comprehensive

Relating to the Africa programme

Box 1: Article 19 funding partners

See Appendix IV for Article 19’s latest draft accounts.

3. Contributions to the promotion of press freedom

Networking, training and building NGO capacity

Influencing governments, intergovernmental bodies and national courts

4. Relationship with MISA

Southern Africa media law briefings

Freedom in Southern Africa

Windhoek Declaration in Namibia

5. Evaluation of Article 19 approach to press freedom

Article 19 is now a well established international NGO, with a renowned reputation in

As Article 19 believe freedom of expression and subsequently press freedom to be

C. Commonwealth Parliamentary Association (CPA)

This section considers organisations operating within a trans-national community. In

Commonwealth Press Union (CPU)

Commonwealth Broadcasting Association (CBA)

-to aid them in sharing their experience by the exchange of journalists;