G.R. No. 138322.

October 2, 2001]

GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner, vs.

REDERICK A. RECIO, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such
decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. However, the divorce decree and
the governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven. Our
courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgments; hence, like any other facts, both
the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven according to our
law on evidence.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify the
January 7, 1999 Decisioni[1] and the March 24, 1999 Orderii[2] of the Regional Trial Court of
Cabanatuan City, Branch 28, in Civil Case No. 3026AF. The assailed Decision disposed as
follows:
WHEREFORE, this Court declares the marriage between Grace J. Garcia and Rederick A. Recio
solemnized on January 12, 1994 at Cabanatuan City as dissolved and both parties can now remarry under
existing and applicable laws to any and/or both parties. iii[3]

The assailed Order denied reconsideration of the above-quoted Decision.

The Facts
Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in
Malabon, Rizal, on March 1, 1987.iv[4] They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. On
May 18, 1989, v[5] a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an
Australian family court.
On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen, as shown by a Certificate of
Australian Citizenship issued by the Australian government. vi[6] Petitioner -- a Filipina -- and
respondent were married on January 12, 1994 in Our Lady of Perpetual Help Church in
Cabanatuan City.vii[7] In their application for a marriage license, respondent was declared as
single and Filipino.viii[8]

Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior judicial
dissolution of their marriage. While the two were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were
divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in Australia.ix[9]
On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage x[10] in
the court a quo, on the ground of bigamy -- respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage
at the time he married her on January 12, 1994. She claimed that she learned of respondents
marriage to Editha Samson only in November, 1997.
In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far back as 1993, he had revealed to petitioner his
prior marriage and its subsequent dissolution.xi[11] He contended that his first marriage to an
Australian citizen had been validly dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in Australia in 1989; xii
[12]
thus, he was legally capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994.
On July 7, 1998 -- or about five years after the couples wedding and while the suit for the
declaration of nullity was pending -- respondent was able to secure a divorce decree from a
family court in Sydney, Australia because the marriage ha[d] irretrievably broken down.xiii[13]
Respondent prayed in his Answer that the Complaint be dismissed on the ground that it
stated no cause of action.xiv[14] The Office of the Solicitor General agreed with respondent.xv[15] The
court marked and admitted the documentary evidence of both parties. xvi[16] After they submitted
their respective memoranda, the case was submitted for resolution.xvii[17]
Thereafter, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision and Order.
Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court declared the marriage dissolved on the ground that the divorce issued in
Australia was valid and recognized in the Philippines. It deemed the marriage ended, but not on
the basis of any defect in an essential element of the marriage; that is, respondents alleged lack
of legal capacity to remarry. Rather, it based its Decision on the divorce decree obtained by
respondent. The Australian divorce had ended the marriage; thus, there was no more marital
union to nullify or annul.
Hence, this Petition.xviii[18]
Issues
Petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:
1

The trial court gravely erred in finding that the divorce decree obtained in Australia by the
respondent ipso facto terminated his first marriage to Editha Samson thereby capacitating him to contract
a second marriage with the petitioner.
2

The failure of the respondent, who is now a naturalized Australian, to present a certificate of legal

capacity to marry constitutes absence of a substantial requisite voiding the petitioners marriage to the
respondent
3

The trial court seriously erred in the application of Art. 26 of the Family Code in this case.
4

The trial court patently and grievously erred in disregarding Arts. 11, 13, 21, 35, 40, 52 and 53 of the
Family Code as the applicable provisions in this case.
5

The trial court gravely erred in pronouncing that the divorce decree obtained by the respondent in
Australia ipso facto capacitated the parties to remarry, without first securing a recognition of the judgment
granting the divorce decree before our courts. xix[19]

The Petition raises five issues, but for purposes of this Decision, we shall concentrate on two
pivotal ones: (1) whether the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was proven,
and (2) whether respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to marry petitioner.
Because of our ruling on these two, there is no more necessity to take up the rest.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is partly meritorious.
First Issue:
Proving the Divorce Between Respondent and Editha Samson
Petitioner assails the trial courts recognition of the divorce between respondent and Editha
Samson. Citing Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,xx[20] petitioner argues that the divorce decree, like
any other foreign judgment, may be given recognition in this jurisdiction only upon proof of the
existence of (1) the foreign law allowing absolute divorce and (2) the alleged divorce decree
itself. She adds that respondent miserably failed to establish these elements.
Petitioner adds that, based on the first paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, marriages
solemnized abroad are governed by the law of the place where they were celebrated (the lex loci
celebrationis). In effect, the Code requires the presentation of the foreign law to show the
conformity of the marriage in question to the legal requirements of the place where the marriage
was performed.
At the outset, we lay the following basic legal principles as the take-off points for our
discussion. Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant
it.xxi[21] A marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a divorce obtained abroad,
because of Articles 15xxii[22] and 17xxiii[23] of the Civil Code.xxiv[24] In mixed marriages involving a
Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26xxv[25] of the Family Code allows the former to contract a
subsequent marriage in case the divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry. xxvi[26] A divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both

aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective
national laws.xxvii[27]
A comparison between marriage and divorce, as far as pleading and proof are concerned,
can be made. Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr. decrees that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which
may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national
law.xxviii[28] Therefore, before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party
pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law
allowing it.xxix[29] Presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient.
Divorce as a Question of Fact
Petitioner insists that before a divorce decree can be admitted in evidence, it must first
comply with the registration requirements under Articles 11, 13 and 52 of the Family Code.
These articles read as follows:
ART. 11. Where a marriage license is required, each of the contracting parties shall file separately a
sworn application for such license with the proper local civil registrar which shall specify the following:

xxx
(5)
annulled;

xxx

xxx

If previously married, how, when and where the previous marriage was dissolved or

xxx

xxx

x x x

ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been previously married, the applicant shall
be required to
ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been previously married, the applicant shall
be required to furnish, instead of the birth or baptismal certificate required in the last preceding article, the
death certificate of the deceased spouse or the judicial decree of the absolute divorce, or the judicial
decree of annulment or declaration of nullity of his or her previous marriage. x x x.
ART. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses, and the delivery of the childrens presumptive legitimes shall
be recorded in the appropriate civil registry and registries of property; otherwise, the same shall not affect
their persons.

Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Australian divorce decree is a public
document -- a written official act of an Australian family court. Therefore, it requires no further
proof of its authenticity and due execution.
Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive
evidentiary value, the document must first be presented and admitted in evidence. xxx[30] A divorce
obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a
judgment is the judgment itself.xxxi[31] The decree purports to be a written act or record of an act of
an official body or tribunal of a foreign country.xxxii[32]
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be
proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or
(2) a copy thereof attestedxxxiii[33] by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record
is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the
proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign

country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office. xxxiv[34]
The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic
one issued by an Australian family court. xxxv[35] However, appearance is not sufficient;
compliance with the aforementioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated.
Fortunately for respondents cause, when the divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was submitted
in evidence, counsel for petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but only to the fact that it had
not been registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City. xxxvi[36] The trial court ruled that
it was admissible, subject to petitioners qualification. xxxvii[37] Hence, it was admitted in evidence
and accorded weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioners failure to object properly rendered the
divorce decree admissible as a written act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia.xxxviii[38]
Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not necessary;
respondent was no longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian
citizenship in 1992.xxxix[39] Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him
with the political and civil rights belonging to a citizen. xl[40] Naturalized citizens, freed from the
protective cloak of their former states, don the attires of their adoptive countries. By becoming
an Australian, respondent severed his allegiance to the Philippines and the vinculum juris that
had tied him to Philippine personal laws.
Burden of Proving Australian Law
Respondent contends that the burden to prove Australian divorce law falls upon petitioner,
because she is the party challenging the validity of a foreign judgment. He contends that
petitioner was satisfied with the original of the divorce decree and was cognizant of the marital
laws of Australia, because she had lived and worked in that country for quite a long time.
Besides, the Australian divorce law is allegedly known by Philippine courts; thus, judges may
take judicial notice of foreign laws in the exercise of sound discretion.
We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with the party who alleges the existence of
a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action. xli[41] In civil cases, plaintiffs
have the burden of proving the material allegations of the complaint when those are denied by
the answer; and defendants have the burden of proving the material allegations in their answer
when they introduce new matters.xlii[42] Since the divorce was a defense raised by respondent, the
burden of proving the pertinent Australian law validating it falls squarely upon him.
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign
laws.xliii[43] Like any other facts, they must be alleged and proved. Australian marital laws are not
among those matters that judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial function. xliv[44]
The power of judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon
the subject should be resolved in the negative.
Second Issue: Respondents Legal Capacity to Remarry
Petitioner contends that, in view of the insufficient proof of the divorce, respondent was
legally incapacitated to marry her in 1994. Hence, she concludes that their marriage was void ab
initio.

Respondent replies that the Australian divorce decree, which was validly admitted in
evidence, adequately established his legal capacity to marry under Australian law.
Respondents contention is untenable. In its strict legal sense, divorce means the legal
dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage. But divorces are of different
types. The two basic ones are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii and (2) limited
divorce or a mensa et thoro. The first kind terminates the marriage, while the second suspends it
and leaves the bond in full force.xlv[45] There is no showing in the case at bar which type of divorce
was procured by respondent.
Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree -- a conditional or provisional
judgment of divorce. It is in effect the same as a separation from bed and board, although an
absolute divorce may follow after the lapse of the prescribed period during which no
reconciliation is effected.xlvi[46]
Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some foreign statutes and
practices, still restrict remarriage. Under some other jurisdictions, remarriage may be limited by
statute; thus, the guilty party in a divorce which was granted on the ground of adultery may be
prohibited from marrying again. The court may allow a remarriage only after proof of good
behavior.xlvii[47]
On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads:
1.A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute (unless
the other party has died) commits the offence of bigamy.xlviii[48]

This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorce obtained by respondent may
have been restricted. It did not absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according
to his national law. Hence, we find no basis for the ruling of the trial court, which erroneously
assumed that the Australian divorce ipso facto restored respondents capacity to remarry despite
the paucity of evidence on this matter.
We also reject the claim of respondent that the divorce decree raises a disputable
presumption or presumptive evidence as to his civil status based on Section 48, Rule 39 xlix[49] of
the Rules of Court, for the simple reason that no proof has been presented on the legal effects of
the divorce decree obtained under Australian laws.
Significance of the Certificate of Legal Capacity
Petitioner argues that the certificate of legal capacity required by Article 21 of the Family
Code was not submitted together with the application for a marriage license. According to her,
its absence is proof that respondent did not have legal capacity to remarry.
We clarify. To repeat, the legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the
national law of the party concerned. The certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the Family
Code would have been sufficient to establish the legal capacity of respondent, had he duly
presented it in court. A duly authenticated and admitted certificate is prima facie evidence of
legal capacity to marry on the part of the alien applicant for a marriage license.l[50]
As it is, however, there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondents legal capacity to
marry petitioner. A review of the records before this Court shows that only the following
exhibits were presented before the lower court: (1) for petitioner: (a) Exhibit A Complaint; li

(b) Exhibit B Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recio (Filipino-Australian)

and Grace J. Garcia (Filipino) on January 12, 1994 in Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija; lii[52] (c)
Exhibit C Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recio (Filipino) and Editha D.
Samson (Australian) on March 1, 1987 in Malabon, Metro Manila; liii[53] (d) Exhibit D Office
of the City Registrar of Cabanatuan City Certification that no information of annulment between
Rederick A. Recio and Editha D. Samson was in its records; liv[54] and (e) Exhibit E Certificate
of Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recio; lv[55] (2) for respondent: (a) Exhibit 1 -Amended Answer;lvi[56] (b) Exhibit 2 Family Law Act 1975 Decree Nisi of Dissolution of
Marriage in the Family Court of Australia; lvii[57] (c) Exhibit 3 Certificate of Australian
Citizenship of Rederick A. Recio;lviii[58] (d) Exhibit 4 Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage
in the Family Court of Australia Certificate; lix[59] and Exhibit 5 -- Statutory Declaration of the
Legal Separation Between Rederick A. Recio and Grace J. Garcia Recio since October 22,
1995.lx[60]
[51]

Based on the above records, we cannot conclude that respondent, who was then a
naturalized Australian citizen, was legally capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12, 1994.
We agree with petitioners contention that the court a quo erred in finding that the divorce decree
ipso facto clothed respondent with the legal capacity to remarry without requiring him to adduce
sufficient evidence to show the Australian personal law governing his status; or at the very least,
to prove his legal capacity to contract the second marriage.
Neither can we grant petitioners prayer to declare her marriage to respondent null
and void on the ground of bigamy. After all, it may turn out that under Australian law, he
was really capacitated to marry petitioner as a direct result of the divorce decree. Hence,
we believe that the most judicious course is to remand this case to the trial court to receive
evidence, if any, which show petitioners legal capacity to marry petitioner. Failing in that,
then the court a quo may declare a nullity of the parties marriage on the ground of bigamy,
there being already in evidence two existing marriage certificates, which were both
obtained in the Philippines, one in Malabon, Metro Manila dated March 1, 1987 and the
other, in Cabanatuan City dated January 12, 1994.
WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and substantial justice, we REMAND
the case to the court a quo for the purpose of receiving evidence which conclusively show
respondents legal capacity to marry petitioner; and failing in that, of declaring the parties
marriage void on the ground of bigamy, as above discussed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

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