The Future of Advanced Stealth - Worth The Cost

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Date Posted: 12-Jul-2006

Jane's Defence Weekly
THE FUTURE OF ADVANCED STEALTH WORTH the COST?

Bill Sweetman considers advances in the world of stealth and counter-stealth technology
* Stealthy aircraft will be no more than a silver-bullet force until well after 2010 when the JSF
enters service
* Non-US countries have taken a different approach to the US in the way that they employ stealth
technology
Stealth technology for aircraft is facing some fundamental changes and challenges. It is no longer
a US monopoly, but even the US is having trouble affording a large force of stealthy aircraft. In
Europe and Russia stealth is being viewed more as an adjunct to electronic warfare, rather than a
stand-alone technology that replaces jamming and deception. Quietly, anti-stealth technology may
be advancing faster than it has in decades.
Airborne stealth technology was invented 30 years ago. It was in March 1976 that the Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) chose Lockheed Martin over Northrop Grumman to
build two Experimental Survivable Testbed (XST) prototypes, under the codename 'Have Blue'.
Fifteen years later, the XST's operational follow-on, the F-117 Nighthawk, became the hero of the
1990-91 Gulf War, doing exactly what it was designed to do: decapitate a Soviet-built integrated
air-defence system and make it possible for the rest of the force to attack in relative safety.
However, US plans to create a stealth-based air force were unravelling even then. The navy's A-12
stealth attack aircraft was cancelled eight days before the first attacks of the Gulf War. The B-2,
designed in the 'cost-no-object' 1980s and suffering technical problems, would be cut back to a
21-aircraft programme in the following year.
Another 15 years on, stealth is as debatable as ever. The US Air Force (USAF) is buying less than
a quarter of the number of F-22s it expected to buy in 1991. Stealthy aircraft will be no more than
a silver-bullet force until well after 2010, when the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) enters service. There
is no argument that stealth is a good thing to have. The question is how much of it is worth
paying for.
The JSF is not significantly more stealthy than the F-117, B-2 or F-22. Its approach to stealth
mirrors that of the F-22 - which in turn is a one-generation advance over the F-117. Many F-22
shaping features, such as curved wing and tail surfaces and soft edges between facets, might
have appeared on the F-117 if the need for that aircraft had not been so urgent. More radical
stealthy shapes have been tested - like the DarkStar unmanned air system (UAS) or the Boeing
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Bird of Prey - but as far as is known none of them has entered service. On the F-22, stealth was
combined with speed and agility; the F-35 is planned to combine all three with affordability.
JSF critics and competitors argue that the JSF's stealth comes at a high price: a weapon load that
is restricted in weight, numbers and variety of weapons carried, unless the JSF gives up its
stealth. The strength of a fighter, they argue, resides in its flexibility.
Another debate is brewing in the US over the importance of stealth for reconnaissance UAS and
for the emerging Long Range Strike (LRS) aircraft. The question is whether the non-stealthy
Global Hawk can replace the U-2 - which is not stealthy but flies much higher, carries a jammer
and can respond to threats - or whether a stealth reconnaissance UAS is needed. For LRS, the
issue is whether stealth alone can assure survival for the next 30 years.
Finally emerging in the mid-2000s is non-US flying stealth hardware: EADS' Barracuda, Saab's Filur
and BAE Systems' Corax and Raven. All those countries have developed stealth technology and
designed piloted stealth aircraft, but have taken a different direction from the US mainstream. In
manned aircraft, they have deployed stealth measures as an adjunct to electronic-warfare
equipment and tactics. All current non-US very-low-observable (VLO) aircraft programmes are
unmanned.
J-UCAS
The Joint Unmanned Combat Air System (J-UCAS) should have taken stealth to a new level of
capability, but the programme was cancelled early in 2006. J-UCAS would have had to be
stealthier than a B-2 or JSF, being designed for persistent day and night operations against a full
range of air defences, and there were no plans to equip it with any direct defensive measures.
The USAF has acknowledged since the early 2000s that the B-2 and F-117 cannot be safely used
in daylight, and the only reason that the F-22 is different is that it is faster and higher flying.
J-UCAS Programme Director Mike Francis made it clear that the combat drone - a tailless vehicle
with small dimensions and sharply canted surfaces - would have had a lower radar cross-section
(RCS) than the F-22 or JSF. Since the F-22 was designed, the US has closed down a number of
RCS test ranges, mainly due to the consolidation of the industry. However, those that remain have
been modernised, reducing noise and increasing sensitivity to the point where small-insect-sized
RCS numbers as low as -70 dB have been seriously discussed. The USAF has acquired a more
modern airborne RCS measurement platform, the 737-based Radar Test Bed (RTB), flown in 2001.
J-UCAS would probably have incorporated visual stealth. Micro-electronic and nanotechnology
programmes point the way to active coatings that can change colour and luminance to match their
background. The theory is not new - in 1942, the US Navy's Project Yehudi showed that highintensity lamps could make an aircraft less visible against a dark sky. 'Have Blue' was intended to
demonstrate a counter-illumination system, but both prototypes crashed before it could be
installed. New technology - from high-brightness, low-power LEDs to better computer control
systems and visual simulators - will make these devices practical and more effective.
The Boeing Bird of Prey prototype was designed with visual stealth in mind - the paint scheme
included a counter-shaded inlet. BAE Systems is reported to have developed a Yehudi-type system
and tested it on a Hawk. Researchers at New Mexico State University and Wake Forest University
received USAF funding in 2005 to work on nanotechnology coatings that would change colour or
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deflect light around the edges of an object. Reducing contrast at the edge makes objects much
harder for the eye to detect.
Similarly low RCS numbers can be expected for the stealth UAS that is being developed by
Lockheed Martin under a classified programme. The Skunk Works has been working since the late
1990s on designs for a large UAS and daylight stealth and very low RCS would be essential. In the
case of this aircraft, it seems most likely that the solution to the visual detection problem would be
to operate at a very high altitude - above 70,000 feet, where near-night-time lighting conditions
prevail and no fighters operate.
Skunk Works Advanced Development Programmes Vice President Neil Kacena, talking about LRDS
argues the need for high altitude. "The longer you spend in bad-guy country, the more survivable
you need to be. You're talking about daylight and you need very high altitude," Kacena said.
UK experience
Outside the US, BAE Systems has used its stealth experience in the design of two relatively small
UAS demonstrators - Raven, with a typical UCAS configuration, and Corax, with a longer-span
layout more typical of a reconnaissance UAS. Raven, described as the forerunner of a "strategic
UAV" - the UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) prefers not to talk about unmanned combat vehicles made its first flight in December 2003 and the Corax flew in January 2005.
The actual dimensions of the demonstrators are classified, but the wing span of Corax is described
as "bigger than a Hawk" (9.4 m). The two designs are related - like Northrop Grumman's 'kite'
family of configurations, BAE Systems is producing a family of shapes that can be adapted to
different missions. The flight demonstrators themselves are not stealthy, but their configurations
are representative of stealth vehicles. Development of stealth materials and treatments has been
carried out separately under the Nightjar programme, at BAE Systems' outdoor RCS range located
at Warton, UK.
The Corax and Raven programmes cover more than stealth. BAE Systems has put a great deal of
work into two key areas: ensuring that the UAS can operate with other aircraft and reducing the
bandwidth required for the system to be controlled and to communicate. Kestrel, a non-stealthy
flying wing built by BAE and Cranfield University that preceded Raven and Corax, was the first jet
UAS to fly with approval from the UK Civil Aviation Authority.
Raven supports BAE Systems' share in the MoD's Strategic Unmanned Air Vehicle Experiment
(SUAVE), aimed at developing UCAS technology. BAE, Rolls-Royce, QinetiQ and Smiths are
teamed in the next phase of SUAVE, expected to start in 2006. By 2009-10, SUAVE is expected to
have reached the point where the UK can decide whether to proceed with a UCAS for LRS
missions.
Barracuda
EADS performed the first flight of its Barracuda test vehicle on 2 April. The first views of the
aircraft were surprising: rather than being a small test vehicle like Saab's Filur, Barracuda is a 3tonne aircraft powered by a real engine - a Pratt & Whitney Canada JT15D-5C - with space,
weight and power provisions for sensors and even weapons.
Funded by EADS and its supplier team, Barracuda is partly a design exercise and partly a
demonstrator that could form the basis of an operational UCAS. While the prototype itself is not
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stealthy - for example, it has a plain round exhaust nozzle - it is an aerodynamic testbed for a
configuration that combines stealth with functionality.
The stealth technology behind Barracuda originated with MBB in Germany. MBB's Lampyridae
project for a supersonic stealth aircraft reached the stage of a full-scale mock-up in the 1980s, but
was cancelled after the US became aware of its existence and of its resemblance to the thensecret F-117.
Much of EADS' focus is on reducing the RCS of conventional aircraft. The company has built a
facility, RaSigma-3: an outdoor RCS range, which can test real aircraft rather than models. It
comprises three heavy-duty elevating pylons, that attach to the landing gear of the aircraft. Pitch
angle is variable by 28 and the support is mounted on a 360 turntable. RaSigma-3 can support
aircraft weighing up to 75 tonnes - the size of an empty A400M transport aircraft.
EADS regards RCS reduction as a complement to electronic warfare and other survivability
measures. Reducing RCS has a direct effect on the radiated power required to achieve effective
jamming, for example, so the combination of reduced RCS with stand-off jamming can provide
excellent protection. The argument is also economic: RCS-reduction measures are inexpensive to
install and very cheap to maintain. According to Jurgen Kruse, head of signature technology at
EADS military aircraft, a towed radar decoy costs 20 times more than a set of RCS-reduction
modifications that achieve a similar improvement in survivability. Other survivability measures,
such as provisions for automatic terrain avoidance for low-level flight, can cost 60 times as much.
RaSigma-3 measurements identify the aircraft's RCS hot-spots - the maximum local signature that
determines detection range - including features such as material transitions, stores, access doors
and the radome - in order of their RCS contribution. This makes it possible to design a customised
package of RCS-reduction measures to achieve the desired cut in detection range, including
thermoplastic-matrix radar absorbent material (RAM) boots for pylons or inlets, coatings on inlet
ducts and reflective indium tin oxide canopy coatings, gap treatments and bandpass radomes.
Overall, says Kruse, it is possible to reduce the RCS of a typical fighter by 10 dB on a low budget
and by 20 dB on an "extended" budget.
Similar measures have been applied to the F-16 (under the Have Glass and Have Glass II
programmes) and are reflected in the design of the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet.
In fact, Boeing engineers have claimed that the low observability capability of the Super Hornet
has been consistently underestimated, and the company has studied a Block 3 version with further
RCS reduction measures.
Russian researchers have applied the same techniques to the Su-27/30 series and at least 100
aircraft have been retrofitted. Research was conducted by the Institute for Theoretical and Applied
Electromagnetics (ITAE) at the Russian Academy of Sciences in Moscow.
The dominant contributors to the Su-35's head-on RCS are the inlets, which the ITAE researchers
call "a huge problem". ITAE has developed a high-performance ferro-magnetic RAM for the
compressor face and duct walls. The material has to be thin - because it cannot constrict airflow
or impede the operation of anti-icing systems - and must withstand high-speed airflows and
temperatures up to 200C. The ITAE team has developed and tested coating materials, that meet
these standards. A layer of RAM between 0.7 mm and 1.4 mm thick is applied to the ducts and a
0.5 mm coating is applied to the front stages of the low-pressure compressor using a robotic spray
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system. The result is a 10-15 dB reduction in the RCS contribution from the inlets - more than
halving the RCS.
Like the Have Glass F-16, the modified Su-35 has a treated cockpit canopy that reflects radar
waves. ITAE has developed a plasma-deposition process to deposit alternating layers of metallic
and polymer materials, creating a durable coating that blocks radio-frequency (RF) waves and,
does not trap solar heat in the cockpit.
ITAE and its partners use plasma technology for applying ceramic coatings to the exhaust and
afterburner. Multilayer coatings formed from microparticles of dielectric, metal or semi-conductor
material are deposited by an arc discharge plasma under atmospheric pressure. Engines treated
with ceramic RAM had been flight-tested by late 2003.
ITAE also developed hand-held sprays to apply RAM to R-27 air-to-air missiles; there is no point,
researchers say, in reducing the RCS of the airframe unless the reflectivity of external weapons
can be reduced as well.
ITAE has flight-tested an exotic technology to mask the Su-35's radar antenna: the use of a lowtemperature "plasma-controlled screen". The screen is mounted in front of the antenna and is
transparent to radar when switched off; it may be similar to a plasma TV screen, comprising cells
filled with neon or xenon gas, which is excited by an electrical current (video of the flight tests
shows a clearly defined luminous panel in front of the antenna). When activated, the screen
absorbs some incoming radar energy and scatters the rest in safe directions, over all RF bands
lower than the frequency of the plasma-generation system. The screen switches on and off in tens
of microseconds, according to ITAE, thanks to years of intensive development of the gas mixture
and plasma-generation system.
In principle, this is the same as the "plasma stealth" system that was reportedly developed by the
Keldysh Scientific Research Centre (also part of the Academy) in 1999. At the time, it was claimed
that the system, using a 100 kg generator, could reduce the RCS of any aircraft by two orders of
magnitude, or 20 dB. ITAE has not attempted to develop a whole-aircraft system, which would
use plasma-generating antennas to ionise the air flowing over the aircraft - an artificial version of
St Elmo's fire - but researchers expressed the view that it would be difficult to apply except to a
high-altitude aircraft, because the airstream would dissipate the plasma faster than it could be
generated.
One Western government investigator tellsJane'sthat the Keldysh plasma stealth concept is
certainly feasible - but only for a high-altitude aircraft, since a plasma cannot be formed at highatmospheric pressures at a practical power level - and that the work continues to be seriously
investigated. It is believed that the concept was first developed for the 3M-50 Meteorit highsupersonic strategic cruise missile, developed in the late 1970s and early 1980s.
Active cancellation
Another route to stealth is active cancellation. Active cancellation is a LO technique in which the
aircraft, when painted by a radar, transmits a signal which mimics the echo that the radar will
receive - but one half-wavelength out of phase, so that the radar sees no return at all. The
advantage of this technique is that it uses very low power, compared with conventional electronicwarfare, and provides no clues to the aircraft's presence; the challenge is that it requires very fast
processing and that poorly executed active cancellation could make the target more rather than
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less visible.
Thales is known to have experimented with an active cancellation system for cruise missiles and it
is believed to be a function of Rafale's Spectra EW system. According to some reports, active
cancellation will be part of the F3 Rafale configuration, now under development.
With progress being made on counter-stealth technologies, the question - particularly for a large,
slow unmanned stealth aircraft - is whether stealth will guarantee survivability for the lifetime of
the aircraft and what kind of stealth technology it will be.
While, so far, nobody has confidently announced that they can detect any airborne target, work
continues worldwide on different approaches to detection that are less dependent on high target
RCS.
Other efforts
BAE Systems' Advanced Technology Centre has tested very high-powered radars, including the
Nagira (nanosecond GW radar), acquired from Russia. According to systems design group leader
Robert Pollard, the radar proved successful at detecting small targets, but also generated highenergy clutter and the technology to generate 300 MW pulses was not mature.
'Metric' radars operating in the very high frequency and ultra high frequency bands have some
capability against stealth targets because they exploit scattering based on the target's size rather
than its shape. The drawback is that they require large antennas to achieve a useful degree of
accuracy - an aperture 25 m or larger may be needed.
Bistatic over-the-horizon (OTH) radars - such as Australia's Jindalee Operational Radar Network
(JORN), France's Onera Nostradamus and experimental systems developed by BAE and others combine very large fixed antennas (Jindalee is several kilometres long) and high power with high
frequencies. Most stealth aircraft are not optimised against bistatic radars - a basic design
principle is that radar reflections are deflected away from the source. Also, a sky-wave system like
Jindalee, which exploits refraction in the upper atmosphere, illuminates targets from above, and
most stealth aircraft are designed against co-altitude or lower-hemisphere threats.
BAE Systems has experimented with microwave-frequency bistatic systems, using transmitter and
receiver beams that intersect one another. This can also be expanded into a multistatic system
with more than one transmitter or receiver site. The main purpose of such a radar is to resist
jamming (since the jammer cannot target the passive receiver) but it can also exploit the fact that
stealth aircraft may have higher signatures in a bistatic system.
An extension of this technique is passive coherent location (PCL), which uses transmitters of
opportunity - like TV or radio signals - combined with multiple receiver antennas to locate targets.
Lockheed Martin's Silent Sentry is an example of a PCL system.
Processing and memory have both advanced massively since the invention of stealth, Pollard
notes. This makes it much more practical to pursue options such as "track before detect": instead
of ignoring radar returns below the clutter and noise threshold, the returns are assembled into the
equivalent of a God's-eye picture and scanned for patterns that represent tracks. Another
approach is "multiple hypothesis" in which processors track even weak returns to see whether
they continue from scan to scan.
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One overarching point is that the emphasis is on timely, long-range detection of low-RCS targets,
which can then be used to cue more conventional sensors. Cueing is particularly valuable with
active electronically scanned array (AESA) radars, which can focus power on almost any selected
point in space while continuing to search and track other targets.
The future may look like Australia's surveillance and warning system, which combines the Jindalee
with the Wedgetail AESA airborne warning and control aircraft. While JORN has excellent longrange and low-RCS detection capabilities, it is weak on tracking and location both because its
accuracy is limited and because targets can move into and out of the best detection geometry.
However, the Wedgetail's radar has cued search and dwell modes, which make it possible to
sharply increase the probability of detection if the target is within a defined area.
The same pattern of development is visible in China, which has been working on OTH radar since
the 1960s and tested a sky-wave system similar to JORN in the early 2000s. The country's KJ-200
'Balance Beam' AEW platform (one prototype was lost in an accident in June) has a similar cueand-dwell capability to Wedgetail.
However, it may be today's emphasis on network-centric operations that is the greatest weakness
of stealth - because an aircraft that does not transmit is not part of the network. The Czech
Republic's ERA company has specialised in this area, producing the Vera-E passive surveillance
system. This uses time difference of arrival techniques to accurately and rapidly locate the source
of any electronic signal, whether from a target's radar, its 'identification friend or foe', its jammer
or its datalink. Pollard points out that systems like this are ideal against a net-centric adversary:
"In a netted world, everyone has a radio. In a passive world they are an absolute gift."
Special report: Soaring ambitions - Future of offensive air systems(jdw.janes.com, 15/06/05)
Boeing hedges against JSF delays with stealthier Super Hornet(idr.janes.com, 06/01/05)
First-generation stealth - the urgent need for the F-117 aircraft meant that many stealth
characteristics were not incorporated (Lockheed Martin)
0069259
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The Joint Unmanned Combat Air System was planned to be stealthier than the B-2 or JSF, but
was cancelled earlier in 2006 (Northrop Grumman)
1122575
(Jane's)
1132472
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The Barracuda test vehicle weighs three tonnes (EADS)

1132177
The UK's Corax was first flown in December 2003 (BAE Air Systems)
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Most stealth aircraft are not optimised against bistatic over-the-horizon radars, such as Australia's
Jindalee Operational Radar Network (Lockheed Martin)
0547704
Radar cross-section-reduction measures have been taken into consideration on the F-16 and F/A18 (US DoD)
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Passive systems, like the Vera-E passive surveillance system, are ideal against net-centric
adversaries (ERA)
0580582
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ihs.

Date Posted: 12-Jul-2006

THE FUTURE OF ADVANCED STEALTH WORTH the COST?

The Barracuda test vehicle weighs three tonnes (EADS)

Copyright IHS Global Limited, 2015

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