TEST OF

CONSTITUTIONALITY
Santos v. Mallare
Facts: Eduardo de los Santos was appointed City Engineer of Baguio on July 16,
1946 by the President of the Philippines. His appointment was confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments on August 6, and on the 23rd, he qualified for and
began to exercise the duties and functions of the position. On June 1, 1950, Gil R.
Mallare was extended an ad interim appointment by the President to the same
position, after which, on June 3, the Undersecretary of the Department of Public
Works and Communications directed Santos to report to the Bureau of Public
Works for another assignment. Santos refused to vacate the office. The City Mayor
and the other city officials ignored him and paid Mallare the salary corresponding to
the position. Santos filed this quo warranto to question the legality of the
appointment of respondent Gil R. Mallare to the office of city engineer for the City of
Baguio which the petitioner occupied and claims to be still occupying.
Issue: WON the removal of Santos as city engineer as he was appointment,
confirmed and started to exercise his duties as such was legal
Held: No. It is illegal and he should remain as city engineer. The position of City
Engineer of Baguio belongs to the category of unclassified service. In Lacson v.
Romero, the Court held that officers or employees in the unclassified as well as
those in the classified service are protected by Article XII, Sec. 4 of the 1935
Constitution which states that no officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be
removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law. However, Section
2545 of the Revised Administrative Code, which falls under Chapter 61 entitled
"City of Baguio," authorizes the Governor General (now the President) to remove at
pleasure any of the officers enumerated therein, one of whom is the city engineer. It
is obvious that the aforequoted constitutional provision is contrary to the provision
of the RAC. And Sec. 2 of Article XVI of the Constitution declares that all laws of
the Philippine Islands shall continue in force until the inauguration of the

Commonwealth of the Philippines; thereafter, such laws shall remain operative,

unless inconsistent with this Constitution, until amended, altered, modified, or
repealed by the Congress of the Philippines. The Constitution leaves it to the
Congress to provide for the cause of removal, and it is suggested that the
President's pleasure is itself a cause. The phrase "for cause" in connection with the
removals of public officers has acquired a well-defined concept. It means for
reasons which the law and sound public policy recognized as sufficient warrant for
removal, that is, legal cause, and not merely causes which the appointing power in
the exercise of discretion may deem sufficient. It is implied that officers may not be
removed at the mere will of those vested with the power of removal, or without any
cause. Moreover, the cause must relate to and affect the administration of the
office, and must be restricted to something of a substantial nature directly affecting
the rights and interests of the public. Sec. 1 of Art. XII of the Constitution states that
a Civil Service embracing all branches and subdivisions of the Government shall
be provided by law. Appointments in the Civil Service, except as those which are
policy-determining, primarily confidential or highly technical in nature, shall be made
only according to merit and fitness, to be determined as far as practicable by
competitive examination. The first clause is a definition of the scope of Civil
Service, the men and women which section 4 protects. It seems obvious from that
definition that the entire Civil Service is contemplated, except positions "which are
policy-determining, primarily confidential or highly technical in nature. Hence, the
existing provisions at the time of the adoption of the Constitution. Civil Service as
embracing both classes of officers and employees possessed definite legal and
statutory meaning when the Constitution was approved. Section 670 of the Revised
Administrative Code already provided that "Persons in the Philippine civil service
pertain either to the classified service," and went on to say that "The classified
service embraces all not expressly declared to be in the unclassified service."
Then section 671 described persons in the unclassified service as "officers, other
than the provincial treasurers and assistant directors of bureaus or offices,
appointed by the President of the Philippines, with the consent of the Commission
on

Appointments of the National Assembly, and all other officers of the government
whose appointments are by law vested in the President of the Philippines alone.
The office of city engineer is neither primarily confidential, policy-determining, nor
highly technical. Every appointment implies confidence, but much more than
ordinary confidence is reposed in the occupant of a position that is primarily
confidential. The latter phrase denotes not only confidence in the aptitude of the
appointee for the duties of the office but primarily close intimacy which insures
freedom of intercourse without embarrassment or freedom from misgivings of
betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters of state. Nor is the position of city

engineer policy-determining. A city engineer does not formulate a method of action

for the government or any its subdivisions. His job is to execute policy, not to make
it. With specific reference to the City Engineer of Baguio, his powers and duties are
carefully laid down for him be section 2557 of the Revised Administrative Code and
are essentially ministerial in character. Finally, the position of city engineer is
technical but not highly so. A city engineer is not required nor is he supposed to
possess a technical skill or training in the supreme or superior degree, which is the
sense in which "highly technical" is, we believe, employed in the Constitution. There
are hundreds of technical men in the classified civil service whose technical
competence is not lower than that of a city engineer. As a matter of fact, the duties
of a city engineer are eminently administrative in character and could very well be
discharged by non-technical men possessing executive ability.

MANILA MOTORS Co. INC. vs. FLORES

FACTS:
May 1 9 5 4 , Man ila Mo to rs Co . In c. fi led a co mp lain t b efo re th e mu n .
co u rt o f man ila to reco v er th e a m o u n t o f P 1 , 0 4 7 . 9 8 f r o m M A N U E L
T. FLO RES a s c h a tte l m o rtg a g e in s ta llm e n ts w /c is d u e in
September 1941.
Flo res plead ed fo r prescrip tio n : 1 9 4 1 -1 9 5 4 an d th e co mp lain t was
dismissed.
On ap p eal b efore the CFI, the co u rt saw th e p lain tiffs su stain in g
co n ten tio n th at th e mo rato riu m laws h ad in terru p ted th e ru n n in g o f th e
prescrip tiv e p eriod & th at ded u ctin g th e time d u rin g wh ich said l a w s
were in operation- 3 yrs. And 8 months- the 10 yr. term
h a d n o t y e t e l a p s e d w h e n t h e complainant sued for collection in 1954.
CFI ordered the return of the case to the mun. judge for trial on the merits.
ISSUE/S:
Wh eth er o r n o t th e mo rato riu m laws d id n o t h av e th e effect o f
s u s p e n d i n g t h e p e r i o d d u e t o unconstitutionality as declared in the Rutter vs.
Esteban case.

RULING:
1. In Mo ntilla v s. Pacifi c Co mmercial3 we h eld th at th e mo rato riu m laws
suspended the period of prescription. That was rendered after the Rutter-Esteban
decision. It should be stated however, in fairness to appellant, that the Montilla
decision came down after he had submitted his brief. And in answer to his main
contention, the following portion is quoted from a resolution of this Court4
2. Rutter vs. Esteban (93 Phil. 68) may be construed to mean that at the of the
decision the Moratorium law could no longer be validly applied because of the
prevailing circumstances. At any rate, although the general rule is that an
unconstitutional statute "confers no right, create no office, affords no protection
and justifies no acts performed under it." (11 Am. Jur., pp. 828, 829.)
Judgment affirmed, without costs.

Magtajas vs Pryce Properties, Inc. [234

SCRA255]
(Municipal Corporation Tests of a Valid Ordinance)
Facts: The Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) is a
corporation created directly by P.D. 1869 to help centralize and regulate all games
of chance, including casinos on land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the
Philippines. InBasco v. Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation,this
Court sustained the constitutionality of the decree and even cited the benefits of the
entity to the national economy as the third highest revenue-earner in the
government.
PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City by leasing a
portion of a building belonging to Pryce Properties Corporation Inc. for its casino.
On December 7, 1992, Sangguniang Panlungsod of CDO enacted ordinance 3353,
prohibiting the issuance of business permit and cancelling existing business permit
to any establishment for the using and allowing to be used its premises or portion
thereof for the operation of a casino.

On January 4, 1993, it enacted Ordinance 3375-93, prohibiting the operation of

casino and providing penalty for violation therefore.
Pryce assailed the ordinances before the CA, where it was joined by PAGCOR as
intervenor.
The Court found the ordinances invalid and issued the writ prayed for to prohibit
their enforcement. CDO City and its mayor filed a petition for review under Rules of
Court with the Supreme Court.
Issue: WON the Sangguniang Panlungsod can prohibit the establishment of casino
operated by PAGCOR through an ordinance or resolution.
Held: No. Gambling is not illegal per se. While it is generally considered inimical to
the interests of the people, there is nothing in the Constitution categorically
proscribing or penalizing gambling or, for that matter, even mentioning it at all. In the
exercise of its own discretion, the Congress may prohibit gambling altogether or
allow it without limitation or it may prohibit some forms of gambling and allow others
for whatever reasons it may consider sufficient.
Under Sec. 458 of the Local Government Code, local government units are
authorized to prevent or suppress, among others, gambling andotherprohibited
games of chance.
Ordinances should not contravene a statue as municipal governments are only
agents of the national government. Local councils exercise only delegated powers
conferred on them by Congress as the national lawmaking body. The delegate
cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the
latter.
The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisionshas held
that to be valid, an ordinance must conform to the following substantive
requirements:
1) It must not contravene the constitution or any statute.
2) It must not be unfair or oppressive.
3) It must not be partial or discriminatory.
4) It must not prohibit but may regulate trade.
5) It must be general and consistent with public policy.

6) It must not be unreasonable.

EFFECTS OF
CONSTITUTIONALITY
MUNICIPALITY OF MALABANG vs. BENITO
Facts: The petitioner Amer Macaorao Balindong is the mayor of Malabang, Lanao del
Sur, while th e resp o n d en t Pan g an d ap u n Bo n ito is th e may o r, an d th e rest o f
th e resp o n d en ts are th e councilors, of the municipality of Balabagan of the same
province. The municipality of Balabagan was created by EO 386 of President Garcia
out of barrios and sitios of Malabang. The petitioners seek to nullify the EO.
Petitioners relied on the Pelaez ruling that the Presidents power to create
municipalities under Sec. 68 of the Administrative Code is unconstitutional.
Respondents argued that the Pelaez ruling is inapplicable because Balabagan is a de
facto corporation, having been organized under color of a statute before this was
declared unconstitutional, its officers having been either elected or appointed, and the
municipality itself having discharged its corporate functions for the past five years
preceding the institution of this action. It is contended that as a de facto corporation,
its existence cannot be collaterally attacked, although it may be inquired into directly
in an action for quo warranto at the instance of the State and not of an individual
like the petitioner.
Issu e: Wh ether the mu nicipality o f Balabag an is a d e facto co rp o ratio n , as
it was o rg an ized before the promulgation of the SC's decision in Pelaez. NO
Held: The following principles may be deduced. (1) The color of authority requisite to
a de facto municipal corporation may be an unconstitutional law, valid on its face,

which has either: (a) Been upheld for a time by the courts; or (b) Not yet been
declared void; provided that a warrant fo r its creatio n can b e fo u n d in so me
oth er valid law o r in th e reco g n itio n o f its p o ten tial ex isten ce in th e
gen eral co nstitution of th e state; (2 ) th ere can b e n o d e facto mu n icip al
corporation unless either directly or potentially, such a de jure corporation is
authorized by some legislative fiat; (3) there can be no color of authority in an
unconstitutional statute alone, the invalidity of which is apparent on its face; (4) there
can be no de facto corporation created to tak e th e p lace o f an ex istin g d e ju re
co rp o ratio n , as su ch o rg an izatio n wo u ld clearly b e a usurper.
In the cases where a de facto municipal corporation was recognized as such despite
the fact that the statute creating it was later invalidated, the decisions could fairly be
made to rest on the consideration that there was some other valid law giving corporate
vitality to the organization. Hen ce, in th e case at b ar, th e mere fact th at
Balab ag an was o rg an ized at a time wh en th e statu te h ad n o t b een
in v alid ated can n o t co n ceiv ab ly mak e it a d e facto co rp o ratio n , as,
independently of the Administrative Code provision in question, there is no other
valid statute to give color of authority to its creation.
Executive Order 386 "created no office." This is not to say, however, that the acts
done by the municipality of Balabagan in the exercise of its corporate
po wers are a nullity b ecau se th e executive order "is, in legal contemplation, as
inoperative as though it had never been passed." The Act of Congress, having
been fo u nd to b e uncon stitu tio n al, was n o t a law; th at it was inoperative,
conferring no rights and imposing no duties, and hence affording no basis for the
challenged decree. It is quite clear, however, that the actual existence of a statute,
prior to such a d etermin atio n , is an o p erativ e fact an d may h av e
co n seq u en ces wh ich can n o t ju stly b e ignored.
There is then no basis for the respondents' apprehension that the invalidation of the
executive order creating Balabagan would have the effect of unsettling many an act
done in reliance upon the validity of the creation of that municipality.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is granted, Executive Ord er 3 8 6 is d eclared v o id ,
an d th e resp o n d en ts are h ereb y p erman en tly restrain ed fro m performing the
duties and functions of their respective offices.

The case of Serrano de

Agbayani v PNB, 38
SCRA 429 (1971) is in
point.
In 1939, Agbayani borrowed P450 from PNB secured by a realty mortgage. In 1944,
the lo an matu red b u t PNB co u ld n o t co llect b ecau se it was at th is time o f
th e war. In 1 9 4 5 , Pres. Osmen a issu ed th e Deb t Mo rato riu m Law (EO
#3 2 ), su sp en din g the paymen t o f lo an s fo r fo u ryears due to the ravages of
war. In 1948, RA 342 extended the Debt Moratorium Law for anothereight years (up
to 1956). In 1953, however, the SC declared RA 342 as unconstitutional in the case
of Ru tter v Esteban. In 19 59 , PNB fi led a su it fo r p ay men t o f th e lo an . Has
th e actio n prescribed?
If we take the orthodox view, the action has prescribed, since the declaration of RA
342 as unconstitutional retroacted to 1945 when EO 32 was first issued. Between
1944 when the loan matured and 1959, when PNB collected the loan, 15 years had
elapsed. [Th e o rth o dox view was an n o u n ced b y Mr. J. Field , in th e case o f
Norto n vs. Shelby County where the court held that: "xxx. An unconstitutional
act is n o t a law; it co n fers n o rig h ts; it imp o ses n o d u t i e s ; i t a f f o r d s n o
p r o t e c t i o n ; i t c r e a t e s n o o f fi c e ; i t i s , i n l e g a l c o n t e m p l a t i o n ,
inoperative, as if it had not been passed.]
Bu t if we tak e th e u n o rth o d o x v iew, as th e SC d id , th e actio n co u ld still
pro sper. Th e period from 1945 when the law was promulgated, to 1953 when it was
declared unconstitutional should not be counted for the purpose of
prescrip tio n sin ce the Deb t Mo rato riu m Law was operative during this time. In
effect, only 7 years had elapsed (1944-45, 1953-59).
Ind eed , it wo uld be u nju st to p un ish th e cred ito r wh o co u ld n o t co llect

prio r to 1 953 because th e Deb t Mo rato riu m Law was effectiv e, o n ly to b e

to ld later th at h is resp ect fo r an apparently valid law made him lose his right to
collect.
Art. 7 o f th e Civ il Co d e wh ich p ro v id es th at, "Wh en th e co u rts
d e c l a r e a l a w t o b e inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void
and the latter shall govern." seems to be the orthodox view on the matter.

INVALIDITY DUE TO
CHANGE OF
CONDITIONS
RUTTER VS. ESTEBAN [93 PHIL 68; NO.L-3708;
18 MAY 1953]

Facts:

On August 20,1941 Rutter sold to Esteban two parcels

of land situated in the Manila for P9,600 of which P4,800 were
paid outright, and the balance was made payable as follows:
P2,400 on or before August 7, 1942, and P2,400 on or before
August 27, 1943, with interest at the rate of 7 percent per
annum. To secure the payment of said balance of P4,800, a first

mortgage has been constituted in favor of the plaintiff. Esteban

failed to pay the two installments as agreed upon, as well as the
interest that had accrued and so Rutter instituted an action to
recover the balance due, the interest due and the attorney's fees.
The complaint also contains a prayer for sale of the properties
mortgaged in accordance with law. Esteban claims that this is a
prewar obligation contracted and that he is a war sufferer, having
filed his claim with the Philippine War Damage Commission for the
losses he had suffered as a consequence of the last war; and that
under section 2 of RA 342(moratorium law), payment of his
obligation cannot be enforced until after the lapse of eight years.
The complaint was dismissed. A motion for recon was made which
assails the constitutionality of RA 342.

Issue:

Whether or Not RA 342 unconstitutional on nonimpairment clause grounds.

Held:

Yes. The moratorium is postponement of fulfillment of

obligations decreed by the state through the medium of the
courts or the legislature. Its essence is the application of police
power. The economic interests of the State may justify the
exercise of its continuing and dominant protective power
notwithstanding interference with contracts. The question is not
whether the legislative action affects contracts incidentally, or
directly or indirectly, but whether the legislation is addressed to a
legitimate end and the measures taken are reasonable and
appropriate to that end.
However based on the Presidents general SONA and consistent
with what the Court believes to be as the only course dictated by
justice, fairness and righteousness, declared that the continued
operation and enforcement of RA 342 at the present time is
unreasonable and oppressive, and should not be prolonged should
be declared null and void and without effect. This holds true as
regards Executive Orders Nos. 25 and 32, with greater force and
reason considering that said Orders contain no limitation
whatsoever in point of time as regards the suspension of the
enforcement and effectivity of monetary obligations.

PARTIAL INVALIDITY
10 Barrameda v. Moir
*take note of the following: (1) Use of the word all and exclusive (2) Statute void and
valid in part
Petitioner: Juan Barameda Respondent : Percy M. Moir et.al (Judge of First Instance)
FACTS:
1.Orig inal case: Petition er was a d efen d an t in a su it b ro u g h t b efo re a
Justice of Peace to try a title to a parcel of land, he lost.
2.Appeal: Petitioner appealed to the Court of First Instance. The case was dismissed
with directions to the justice ofpeace to execute judgment.
3.Curren t case: Original ap plicatio n for a writ o f man d amu s. Petitio n er
also req u ested fo r a p relimin ary in ju n ctio n b e issued to stay the execution of
judgment and that Moir be ordered to proceed the case on appeal.
ISSUE:
Was Moir correct in dismissing Barramedas case?
ARGUMENTS
Resp o n d en t (Ju d g e Mo ir) Complaint did not state facts sufficient to constitute a
cause of action
Petitio n er (Baramed a) The basis of the demurrer is that Acts no. 2041 and 2131,
conferring original jurisdiction upon justices of the peace to try title to real estate,are
inconsistent with and repugnant to the Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902 therefore there
was no basis in dismissing the case.
Act No. 2041 Sec 3 Justice of Peace shall have
ex clu siv e ju risd ictio n to adjudicate questions of title to real estate or any
interest therein when the value of the property in litigation does not exceed two

hundred pesos, and where such value exceeds two hundred pesos but is less
than six hundred pesos thejustice of peace shall have jurisdiction concurrent
with the Court of First instance
Act no. 2131, Sec1, amended Act No. 2041 by substituting exclusive original
jurisdiction for exclusive jurisdiction
Sec 9 of the Philippine Bill on jurisdiction of CFI all civil actions which
involve the title to or possession ofreal property, or of any interest therein
except in forcible entry and detainer cases
*demurrer- a claim by the defendant in a legal action that the plaintiff does not have
sufficient grounds to proceed
*Un d erstan d in g ART 2 04 1 and Sec 9
Sec 9 uses the word ALL
which means that there is no case involving real estate which Courts of First Instance
are not authorized to hear and determine under the Organic Law, and that being
supreme, any Act of the Philippine Legislature which attempts in any manner to
curtail such jurisdiction must be held void.
Art 2041 and 2131 three parts (1) confer original jurisdiction upon justices of the
peace to try title to real estate (2) it shall be ex clu siv e in cases where the value of the
property in litigation does not exceed 200 pesos (3) when more than two hundred but
less than 600 it shall have co n cu rren t ju risd ictio n with Court of First Instance
DECISION:
Writ denied, injunction made permanent The preliminary injunction granted by this court,
staying the execution of the judgment, will be made permanent, and the writ of
mandamus prayed for must be denied.
RATIO:
1 . J u r i s p r u d e n c e : I n Weigall v Shuster it was held that the Jurisdiction
of the SC and the Court of First Instance, as fixed by Section 9 of the Philippines
Bill,may be added to but not diminished by the Philippines Legislature. Therefore,
there will be sufficient reasons for declaring Acts No 2041 and 2131 contrary to the
Philippine Bill and void if they attempt to curtail the jurisdiction of Courts of First
Instance where the title to realty is involved.
2.Acts 2 0 41 and 21 31 deprives CFI o f th eir o rig in al ju risd ictio n to try
cases wh ere th e title to realty v alu e at n o t mo re th an 2 0 0 is in v o lv ed .
Therefore, inconsistent with Sec9, Philippine bill
HOW?

ART 2041 grants Orig inal Ex clu siv e Ju risd ictio n to Justice of Peace.
Exclusivity means that all other courts must be barred from exercising jurisdiction in
such cases. In such a way that hold another court has jurisdiction also in such cases is
to destroy the grantof exclusive jurisdiction given to the other court. It is no longer
exclusive when shared by another court, but merely concurrent.
3 .Th e seco n d p art o f Art 2 0 4 1 is also v o id (th at p art o f
c o n c u r r e n t j u r i s d i c t i o n ) . W h y ? The second part was only supplemental and
ancillary to the exclusive jurisdiction over cases not exceeding P200. It is therefore
inseparable from and absolutely dependent upon the exercise of that exclusive
jurisdiction which has already been declared void. (Based on statcon principle
explained in next number)
4.
STATCON PRINCIPLE: The g eneral ru le is th at wh ere p art o f a statu te is
vo id , as repug nant to Org an ic Law, wh ile an o th er p art is v alid , th e v alid
po rtion , if sep arab le fro m the in v alid , may stan d an d b e en fo rced . But in
order to do this, the valid portion must be so far independent of the invalid portion
that it is fair to presumed that the Legislature would have enacted it by itself if they
had supposed that they could not constitutionally enact the other. Independent means
that enoughmust remain to make a complete, intelligible and valid statute which
carries legislative intent and removal of void would not affect the effectiveness of the
valid part.
5.Th e ju dg ment of the ju stice o f th e p eace wh ich it is d esired to h av e th e
resp o nd entjudg e in this actio n rev iew is an absolute nullity. The respondent
judge acquired jurisdiction of the case only for the purpose of dismissing it and
directing justice of the peace to proceed with execution of the void judgment, Moir
was in error.