Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

VIEGELY SAMELO, represented by Attorney-in-Fact CRISTINA SAMELO,

Petitioner,

- versus -

MANOTOK SERVICES, INC., allegedly represented by PERPETUA BOCANEGRA

(deceased),
Respondent.

G.R. No. 170509

Present:

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

BRION,
PEREZ,
SERENO, and
REYES, JJ.

Promulgated:

June 27, 2012

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

BRION, J.:

Before us is the petition for review on certiorari[1] filed by Viegely Samelo

(petitioner), represented by her attorney-in-fact Cristina Samelo, to challenge the
decision dated June 21, 2005[2] and the resolution dated November 10, 2005[3] of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 85664.

Background Facts

Manotok Services, Inc. (respondent) alleged that it is the administrator of a parcel of

land known as Lot 9-A, Block 2913, situated at 2882 Dagupan Extension, Tondo,
Manila. On January 31, 1997, the respondent entered into a contract with the
petitioner for the lease of a portion of Lot 9-A, Block 2913, described as Lot 4, Block
15 (subject premises). The lease contract was for a period of one (1) year, with a

monthly rental of P3,960.00. After the expiration of the lease contract on December
31, 1997, the petitioner continued occupying the subject premises without paying
the rent.[4] On August 5, 1998, the respondent, thru its President Rosa Manotok,
sent a letter to the petitioner demanding that she vacate the subject premises and
pay compensation for its use and occupancy.[5] The petitioner, however, refused to
heed these demands.

On November 18, 1998, the respondent filed a complaint for unlawful detainer
against the petitioner before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 3, Manila.
[6] The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 161588-CV. The respondent prayed,
among others, that the petitioner and those claiming rights under her be ordered to
vacate the subject premises, and to pay compensation for its use and occupancy.

In her answer, the petitioner alleged that the respondent had no right to
collect rentals because the subject premises are located inside the property of the
Philippine National Railways (PNR). She also added that the respondent had no
certificate of title over the subject premises. The petitioner further claimed that her
signature in the contract of lease was obtained through the respondents
misrepresentation. She likewise maintained that she is now the owner of the subject
premises as she had been in possession since 1944.[7]

The MeTC Ruling

The MeTC, in its judgment[8] of March 28, 2002, decided in favor of the respondent,
and ordered the petitioner to vacate the subject premises and to deliver their
peaceful possession to the respondent. The MeTC held that the only issue to be
resolved in an unlawful detainer case is physical possession or possession de facto,
and that the respondent had established its right of possession over the subject
premises. It added that the petitioners right under the lease contract already
ceased upon the expiration of the said contract. It further ruled that the petitioner is
already estopped from questioning the right of the respondent over the subject
premises when she entered into a contract of lease with the respondent. The
dispositive portion of the MeTC judgment reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered for the plaintiff and
against defendant, ordering the latter and all persons claiming rights under her:

1.
To vacate the premises located at 2882 Dagupan Extension, Tondo, Manila,
and deliver the peaceful possession thereof to the plaintiff[;]

2.
To pay plaintiff the sum of P40,075.20 as compensation for the use and
occupancy of the premises from January 1, 1998 to August 30, 1998, plus P4,554.00
a month starting September 1, 1998, until defendant and all person[s] claiming
rights under her to finally vacate the premises[;]

3.

To pay plaintiff the sum of P5,000.00 for and as attorneys fees; and

4.

To pay the cost of suit.[9]

The RTC Decision

The petitioner filed an appeal[10] with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 50,
Manila. The RTC, in its decision[11] of July 1, 2004, set aside the MeTCs decision,
and dismissed the complaint for unlawful detainer. The RTC held, among others, that
the respondent had no right to collect rentals as it failed to show that it had
authority to administer the subject premises and to enter into a contract of lease
with the petitioner. It also ruled that the subject premises, which were formerly
owned by the PNR, are now owned by the petitioner by virtue of her possession and
stay in the premises since 1944.

The CA Decision

Aggrieved by the reversal, the respondent filed a petition for review with the CA,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 85664.[12] The CA, in its decision of June 21, 2005,
reversed and set aside the RTC decision, and reinstated the MeTC judgment. The CA
held that the petitioner is now estopped from questioning the right of the
respondent over the subject property. It explained that in an action involving the
possession of the subject premises, a tenant cannot controvert the title of his

landlord or assert any rights adverse to that title, without first delivering to the
landlord the premises acquired by virtue of the agreement between themselves.
The appellate court added that the petitioner cannot claim that she repudiated the
lease contract, in the absence of any unequivocal acts of repudiation.

The CA further held that the only issue in an ejectment suit is physical or material
possession, although the trial courts may provisionally resolve the issue of
ownership for the sole purpose of determining the issue of possession. It explained
that the issue of ownership is not required to determine the issue of possession
since the petitioner tacitly admitted that she is a lessee of the subject premises.[13]

The petitioner moved to reconsider this decision, but the CA denied her motion in its
resolution dated November 10, 2005.[14]

In presenting her case before this Court, the petitioner argued that the CA erred in
ruling that a tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord. She maintained
that the respondent is not the owner or administrator of the subject premises, and
insisted that she had been in possession of the land in question since 1944. She
further added that she repudiated the lease contract by filing a case for fraudulent
misrepresentation, intimidation, annulment of lease contract, and quieting of title
with injunction before another court.[15]

The Courts Ruling

We find the petition unmeritorious.

Respondent has a better right of possession over the subject premises

An action for unlawful detainer exists when a person unlawfully withholds

possession of any land or building against or from a lessor, vendor, vendee or other
persons, after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue
of any contract, express or implied.[16] The only issue to be resolved in an
unlawful detainer case is physical or material possession of the property involved,

independent of any claim of ownership by any of the parties involved.[17] Thus,

when the relationship of lessor and lessee is established in an unlawful detainer
case, any attempt of the parties to inject the question of ownership into the case is
futile, except insofar as it might throw light on the right of possession.[18]

In the present case, it is undisputed that the petitioner and the respondent entered
into a contract of lease. We note in this regard that in her answer with affirmative
defenses and counterclaim before the MeTC, the petitioner did not deny that she
signed the lease contract (although she maintained that her signature was obtained
through the respondents misrepresentations). Under the lease contract, the
petitioner obligated herself to pay a monthly rental to the respondent in the amount
of P3,960.00. The lease period was for one year, commencing on January 1, 1997
and expiring on December 31, 1997. It bears emphasis that the respondent did not
give the petitioner a notice to vacate upon the expiration of the lease contract in
December 1997 (the notice to vacate was sent only on August 5, 1998), and the
latter continued enjoying the subject premises for more than 15 days, without
objection from the respondent. By the inaction of the respondent as lessor, there
can be no inference that it intended to discontinue the lease contract.[19] An
implied new lease was therefore created pursuant to Article 1670 of the Civil Code,
which expressly provides:

Article 1670. If at the end of the contract the lessee should continue enjoying the
thing leased for fifteen days with the acquiescence of the lessor, and unless a notice
to the contrary by either party has previously been given, it is understood that there
is an implied new lease, not for the period of the original contract, but for the time
established in Articles 1682 and 1687. The other terms of the original contract shall
be revived.

An implied new lease or tacita reconduccion will set in when the following
requisites are found to exist: a) the term of the original contract of lease has
expired; b) the lessor has not given the lessee a notice to vacate; and c) the lessee
continued enjoying the thing leased for fifteen days with the acquiescence of the
lessor.[20] As earlier discussed, all these requisites have been fulfilled in the
present case.

Article 1687 of the Civil Code on implied new lease provides:

Article 1687. If the period for the lease has not been fixed, it is understood to be
from year to year, if the rent agreed upon is annual; from month to month, if it is
monthly; from week to week, if the rent is weekly; and from day to day, if the rent is
to be paid daily.

Since the rent was paid on a monthly basis, the period of lease is considered to be
from month to month, in accordance with Article 1687 of the Civil Code. [A] lease
from month to month is considered to be one with a definite period which expires at
the end of each month upon a demand to vacate by the lessor.[21] When the
respondent sent a notice to vacate to the petitioner on August 5, 1998, the tacita
reconduccion was aborted, and the contract is deemed to have expired at the end
of that month. [A] notice to vacate constitutes an express act on the part of the
lessor that it no longer consents to the continued occupation by the lessee of its
property.[22] After such notice, the lessees right to continue in possession ceases
and her possession becomes one of detainer.[23]

Estoppel of tenant

We find no merit in the petitioners allegation that the respondent had no authority
to lease the subject premises because the latter failed to prove that it is its owner or
administrator.

The Rules of Court protects the respondent, as lessor, from being questioned by the
petitioner, as lessee, regarding its title or better right of possession over the subject
premises. Section 2(b), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court states that the tenant is not
permitted to deny the title of his landlord at the time of the commencement of the
relation of landlord and tenant between them. Article 1436 of the Civil Code likewise
states that a lessee or a bailee is estopped from asserting title to the thing leased or
received, as against the lessor or bailor.

These provisions bar the petitioner from contesting the respondents title over the
subject premises. The juridical relationship between x x x [a] lessor and x x x [a

lessee] carries with it a recognition of the lessor's title. As [lessee, the petitioner is]
estopped [from denying the] landlord's title, or to assert a better title not only in
[herself], but also in some third person while [she remains] in possession of the
subject premises and until [she surrenders] possession to the landlord. This
estoppel applies even though the lessor had no title at the time the relation of [the]
lessor and [the] lessee was created, and may be asserted not only by the original
lessor, but also by those who succeed to his title.[24] Once a contact of lease is
shown to exist between the parties, the lessee cannot by any proof, however strong,
overturn the conclusive presumption that the lessor has a valid title to or a better
right of possession to the subject premises than the lessee.

The Court thus explained in Tamio v. Ticson:[25]

Indeed, the relation of lessor and lessee does not depend on the formers title but
on the agreement between the parties, followed by the possession of the premises
by the lessee under such agreement. As long as the latter remains in undisturbed
possession, it is immaterial whether the lessor has a valid title or any title at all
at the time the relationship was entered into. [citations omitted]

The issue of ownership

We are likewise unpersuaded by the petitioners claim that she has acquired
possessory rights leading to ownership[26] over the subject premises, having been
in possession thereof since 1944. We emphasize that aside from her self-serving
allegation, the petitioner did not present any documentary evidence to substantiate
her claim that she stayed on the subject premises since 1944. That the petitioner
presented certificates of title of the Manila Railroad Company over certain
properties in Tondo, Manila, which allegedly cover the subject premises, is of no
moment. One cannot recognize the right of another, and at the same time claim
adverse possession which can ripen to ownership, thru acquisitive prescription. For
prescription to set in, the possession must be adverse, continuous, public, and to
the exclusion of [others].[27] Significantly, the RTC decision failed to state its basis
for concluding that the petitioner stayed in the subject premises since 1944.

At any rate, we hold that no need exists to resolve the issue of ownership in this
case, since it is not required to determine the issue of possession; the execution of
the lease contract between the petitioner, as lessee, and the respondent, as lessor,
belies the formers claim of ownership. We reiterate that the fact of the lease and
the expiration of its term are the only elements in an action for unlawful detainer.
The defense of ownership does not change the summary nature of [this] action. x x
x. Although a wrongful possessor may at times be upheld by the courts, this is
merely temporary and solely for the maintenance of public order. The question of
ownership is to be settled in the proper court and in a proper action.[28]

Interest on rentals due

Additionally, the petitioner is liable to pay interest by way of damages for her
failure to pay the rentals due for the use of the subject premises.[29] We reiterate
that the respondents extrajudicial demand on the petitioner was made on August 5,
1998. Thus, from this date, the rentals due from the petitioner shall earn interest at
6% per annum, until the judgment in this case becomes final and executory. After
the finality of judgment, and until full payment of the rentals and interests due, the
legal rate of interest to be imposed shall be 12%.

WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, we DENY the petition. The decision
and the resolution of the Court of Appeals dated June 21, 2005 and November 10,
2005, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 85664 are AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION
that the unpaid rentals shall earn a corresponding interest of six percent (6%) per
annum, to be computed from August 5, 1998 until the finality of this decision. After
this decision becomes final and executory, the rate of legal interest shall be
computed at twelve percent (12%) per annum from such finality until its
satisfaction.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, both

represented by the PRIVATIZATION MANAGEMENT OFFICE,
Petitioners,

- versus -

SUNVAR REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,

Respondent.

G.R. No. 194880

Present:

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

BRION,
PEREZ,
SERENO, and
REYES, JJ.

Promulgated:

June 20, 2012

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

SERENO, J.:

This is a Rule 45 Petition questioning the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Makati City, which ordered the dismissal of the Complaint for unlawful detainer filed
by petitioners herein with the Metropolitan Trial Court.
Petitioners Republic of the Philippines (Republic) and National Power Corporation
(NPC) are registered co-owners of several parcels of land located along Pasong Tamo
Extension and Vito Cruz in Makati City, and covered by four Transfer Certificates of
Title (TCTs).[1] The main subject matter of the instant Petition is one of these four
parcels of land covered by TCT No. 458365, with an area of approximately 22,294
square meters (hereinafter, the subject property). Eighty percent (80%) of the
subject property is owned by petitioner Republic, while the remaining twenty
percent (20%) belongs to petitioner NPC.[2] Petitioners are being represented in this
case by the Privatization Management Office (PMO), which is the agency tasked with
the administration and disposal of government assets.[3] Meanwhile, respondent
Sunvar Realty Development Corporation (Sunvar) occupied the subject property by
virtue of sublease agreements, which had in the meantime expired.
The factual antecedents of the case are straightforward. On 26 December 1977,[4]
petitioners leased the four parcels of land, including the subject property, to the
Technology Resource Center Foundation, Inc., (TRCFI) for a period of 25 years
beginning 01 January 1978 and ending on 31 December 2002.[5] Under the
Contract of Lease (the main lease contract), petitioners granted TRCFI the right to
sublease any portion of the four parcels of land.[6]
Exercising its right, TRCFI consequently subleased a majority of the subject property
to respondent Sunvar through several sublease agreements (the sublease

agreements).[7] Although these agreements commenced on different dates, all of

them contained common provisions on the terms of the sublease and were
altogether set to expire on 31 December 2002, the expiration date of TRCFIs main
lease contract with petitioners, but subject to renewal at the option of respondent:
[8]
The term of the sublease shall be for an initial period of [variable] years and
[variable] months commencing on [variable], renewable for another twenty-five (25)
years at SUNVARs exclusive option.[9]
According to petitioners, in all the sublease agreements, respondent Sunvar agreed
to return or surrender the subleased land, without any delay whatsoever upon the
termination or expiration of the sublease contract or any renewal or extension
thereof.[10]
During the period of its sublease, respondent Sunvar introduced useful
improvements, consisting of several commercial buildings, and leased out the
spaces therein.[11] It also profitably utilized the other open spaces on the subject
property as parking areas for customers and guests.[12]
In 1987, following a reorganization of the government, TRCFI was dissolved. In its
stead, the Philippine Development Alternatives Foundation (PDAF) was created,
assuming the functions previously performed by TRCFI.[13]
On 26 April 2002, less than a year before the expiration of the main lease contract
and the sublease agreements, respondent Sunvar wrote to PDAF as successor of
TRCFI. Respondent expressed its desire to exercise the option to renew the sublease
over the subject property and proposed an increased rental rate and a renewal
period of another 25 years.[14] On even date, it also wrote to the Office of the
President, Department of Environment and Natural Resources and petitioner NPC.
The letters expressed the same desire to renew the lease over the subject property
under the new rental rate and renewal period.[15]
On 10 May 2002, PDAF informed respondent that the notice of renewal of the lease
had already been sent to petitioners, but that it had yet to receive a response.[16] It
further explained that the proposal of respondent for the renewal of the sublease
could not yet be acted upon, and neither could the proposed rental payments be
accepted.[17] Respondent acknowledged receipt of the letter and requested PDAF
to apprise the former of any specific actions undertaken with respect to the said
lease arrangement over the subject property.[18]
On 03 June 2002, six months before the main contract of lease was to expire,
petitioner NPC through Atty. Rainer B. Butalid, Vice-President and General Counsel
notified PDAF of the formers decision not to renew the contract of lease.[19] In
turn, PDAF notified respondent of NPCs decision.[20]

On the other hand, petitioner Republic through then Senior Deputy Executive
Secretary Waldo Q. Flores likewise notified PDAF of the formers decision not to
renew the lease contract.[21] The Republic reasoned that the parties had earlier
agreed to shorten the corporate life of PDAF and to transfer the latters assets to
the former for the purpose of selling them to raise funds.[22] On 25 June 2002,
PDAF duly informed respondent Sunvar of petitioner Republics decision not to
renew the lease and quoted the Memorandum of Senior Deputy Executive Secretary
Flores.[23]
On 31 December 2002, the main lease contract with PDAF, as well as its sublease
agreements with respondent Sunvar, all expired. Hence, petitioners recovered from
PDAF all the rights over the subject property and the three other parcels of land.
Thereafter, petitioner Republic transferred the subject property to the PMO for
disposition. Nevertheless, respondent Sunvar continued to occupy the property.
On 22 February 2008, or six years after the main lease contract expired, petitioner
Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), advised respondent
Sunvar to completely vacate the subject property within thirty (30) days.[24] The
latter duly received the Notice from the OSG through registered mail,[25] but failed
to vacate and remained on the property.[26]
On 03 February 2009, respondent Sunvar received from respondent OSG a final
notice to vacate within 15 days.[27] When the period lapsed, respondent Sunvar
again refused to vacate the property and continued to occupy it.
On 02 April 2009, the PMO issued an Inspection and Appraisal Report to determine
the fair rental value of the subject property and petitioners lost income a loss
arising from the refusal of respondent Sunvar to vacate the property after the
expiration of the main lease contract and sublease agreements.[28] Using the
market comparison approach, the PMO determined that the fair rental value of the
subject property was 10,364,000 per month, and that respondent Sunvar owed
petitioners a total of 630,123,700 from 01 January 2002 to 31 March 2009.[29]
On 23 July 2009, petitioners filed the Complaint dated 26 May 2009 for unlawful
detainer with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Makati City. Petitioners prayed
that respondent Sunvar be ordered to vacate the subject property and to pay
damages for the illegal use and lost income owing to them:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is most respectfully prayed that after
proper proceedings, judgment be rendered:

1.
Ordering defendant SUNVAR REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and all
persons, natural and juridical, claiming rights under it, to vacate the subject

property and peacefully surrender the same, with the useful improvements therein,
to the plaintiffs or to their authorized representative; and

2.
Ordering defendant SUNVAR REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION to pay
plaintiffs damages in the amount of SIX HUNDRED THIRTY MILLION ONE HUNDRED
TWENTY THREE THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED PESOS (630,123,700.00) for the
illegal and unauthorized use and occupation of the subject property from January 1,
2003 to March 31, 2009, and the amount of TEN MILLION THREE HUNDRED SIXTYFOUR THOUSAND PESOS (10,364,000.00) per month from April 1, 2008 until the
subject property, together with its improvements, are completely vacated and
peacefully surrendered to the plaintiffs or to their authorized representative.[30]

Respondent Sunvar moved to dismiss the Complaint and argued that the allegations
of petitioners in the Complaint did not constitute an action for unlawful detainer,
since no privity of contract existed between them.[31] In the alternative, it also
argued that petitioners cause of action was more properly an accion publiciana,
which fell within the jurisdiction of the RTC, and not the MeTC, considering that the
petitioners supposed dispossession of the subject property by respondent had
already lasted for more than one year.
In its Order dated 16 September 2009, the MeTC denied the Motion to Dismiss and
directed respondent Sunvar to file an answer to petitioners Complaint.[32] The
lower court likewise denied the Motion for Reconsideration[33] filed by respondent.
[34] Respondent later on filed its Answer[35] to the Complaint.[36]
Despite the filing of its Answer in the summary proceedings for ejectment,
respondent Sunvar filed a Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari with the RTC of Makati City
to assail the denial by the MeTC of respondents Motion to Dismiss.[37]
In answer to the Rule 65 Petition of respondent, petitioners placed in issue the
jurisdiction of the RTC and reasoned that the Rules on Summary Procedure expressly
prohibited the filing of a petition for certiorari against the interlocutory orders of the
MeTC.[38] Hence, they prayed for the outright dismissal of the certiorari Petition of
respondent Sunvar.
The RTC denied the motion for dismissal and ruled that extraordinary circumstances
called for an exception to the general rule on summary proceedings.[39] Petitioners
filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[40] which was subsequently denied by the RTC.
[41] Hence, the hearing on the certiorari Petition of respondent proceeded, and the
parties filed their respective Memoranda.[42]
In the assailed Order dated 01 December 2010, which discussed the merits of the
certiorari Petition, the RTC granted the Rule 65 Petition and directed the MeTC to

dismiss the Complaint for unlawful detainer for lack of jurisdiction.[43] The RTC
reasoned that the one-year period for the filing of an unlawful detainer case was
reckoned from the expiration of the main lease contract and the sublease
agreements on 31 December 2002. Petitioners should have then filed an accion
publiciana with the RTC in 2009, instead of an unlawful detainer suit.
Hence, the instant Rule 45 Petition filed by petitioners.[44]
I
Petitioners Resort to a Rule 45 Petition
Before the Court proceeds with the legal questions in this case, there are procedural
issues that merit preliminary attention.
Respondent Sunvar argued that petitioners resort to a Rule 45 Petition for Review
on Certiorari before this Court is an improper mode of review of the assailed RTC
Decision. Allegedly, petitioners should have availed themselves of a Rule 65 Petition
instead, since the RTC Decision was an order of dismissal of the Complaint, from
which no appeal can be taken except by a certiorari petition.
The Court is unconvinced of the arguments of respondent Sunvar and holds that the
resort by petitioners to the present Rule 45 Petition is perfectly within the bounds of
our procedural rules.
As respondent Sunvar explained, no appeal may be taken from an order of the RTC
dismissing an action without prejudice,[45] but the aggrieved party may file a
certiorari petition under Rule 65.[46] Nevertheless, the Rules do not prohibit any of
the parties from filing a Rule 45 Petition with this Court, in case only questions of
law are raised or involved.[47] This latter situation was one that petitioners found
themselves in when they filed the instant Petition to raise only questions of law.
In Republic v. Malabanan,[48] the Court clarified the three modes of appeal from
decisions of the RTC, to wit: (1) by ordinary appeal or appeal by writ of error under
Rule 41, whereby judgment was rendered in a civil or criminal action by the RTC in
the exercise of its original jurisdiction; (2) by a petition for review under Rule 42,
whereby judgment was rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction; and (3) by a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court
under Rule 45. The first mode of appeal is taken to the [Court of Appeals] on
questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law. The second mode of appeal is
brought to the CA on questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law.
The third mode of appeal is elevated to the Supreme Court only on questions of
law.[49] (Emphasis supplied.)
There is a question of law when the issue does not call for an examination of the
probative value of the evidence presented or of the truth or falsehood of the facts
being admitted, and the doubt concerns the correct application of law and

jurisprudence on the matter.[50] The resolution of the issue must rest solely on
what the law provides on the given set of circumstances.[51]
In the instant case, petitioners raise only questions of law with respect to the
jurisdiction of the RTC to entertain a certiorari petition filed against the interlocutory
order of the MeTC in an unlawful detainer suit. At issue in the present case is the
correct application of the Rules on Summary Procedure; or, more specifically,
whether the RTC violated the Rules when it took cognizance and granted the
certiorari petition against the denial by the MeTC of the Motion to Dismiss filed by
respondent Sunvar. This is clearly a question of law that involves the proper
interpretation of the Rules on Summary Procedure. Therefore, the instant Rule 45
Petition has been properly lodged with this Court.
II
Propriety of a Rule 65 Petition in Summary Proceedings
Proceeding now to determine that very question of law, the Court finds that it was
erroneous for the RTC to have taken cognizance of the Rule 65 Petition of
respondent Sunvar, since the Rules on Summary Procedure expressly prohibit this
relief for unfavorable interlocutory orders of the MeTC. Consequently, the assailed
RTC Decision is annulled.
Under the Rules on Summary Procedure, a certiorari petition under Rule 65 against
an interlocutory order issued by the court in a summary proceeding is a prohibited
pleading.[52] The prohibition is plain enough, and its further exposition is
unnecessary verbiage.[53] The RTC should have dismissed outright respondent
Sunvars Rule 65 Petition, considering that it is a prohibited pleading. Petitioners
have already alerted the RTC of this legal bar and immediately prayed for the
dismissal of the certiorari Petition.[54] Yet, the RTC not only refused to dismiss the
certiorari Petition,[55] but even proceeded to hear the Rule 65 Petition on the
merits.
Respondent Sunvars reliance on Bayog v. Natino[56] and Go v. Court of
Appeals[57] to justify a certiorari review by the RTC owing to extraordinary
circumstances is misplaced. In both cases, there were peculiar and specific
circumstances that justified the filing of the mentioned prohibited pleadings under
the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure conditions that are not availing in the
case of respondent Sunvar.
In Bayog, Alejandro Bayog filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of
Patnongon-Bugasong-Valderama, Antique an ejectment case against Alberto
Magdato, an agricultural tenant-lessee who had built a house over his property.
When Magdato, an illiterate farmer, received the Summons from the MCTC to file his
answer within 10 days, he was stricken with pulmonary tuberculosis and was able to
consult a lawyer in San Jose, Antique only after the reglementary period. Hence,

when the Answer of Magdato was filed three days after the lapse of the 10-day
period, the MCTC ruled that it could no longer take cognizance of his Answer and,
hence, ordered his ejectment from Bayogs land. When his house was demolished in
January 1994, Magdato filed a Petition for Relief with the RTC-San Jose, Antique,
claiming that he was a duly instituted tenant in the agricultural property, and that
he was deprived of due process. Bayog, the landowner, moved to dismiss the
Petition on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC, since a petition
for relief from judgment covering a summary proceeding was a prohibited pleading.
The RTC, however, denied his Motion to Dismiss and remanded the case to the
MCTC for proper disposal.
In resolving the Rule 65 Petition, we ruled that although a petition for relief from
judgment was a prohibited pleading under the Revised Rules on Summary
Procedure, the Court nevertheless allowed the filing of the Petition pro hac vice,
since Magdato would otherwise suffer grave injustice and irreparable injury:
We disagree with the RTCs holding that a petition for relief from judgment (Civil
Case No. 2708) is not prohibited under the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, in
light of the Jakihaca ruling. When Section 19 of the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure bars a petition for relief from judgment, or a petition for certiorari,
mandamus, or prohibition against any interlocutory order issued by the court, it has
in mind no other than Section 1, Rule 38 regarding petitions for relief from
judgment, and Rule 65 regarding petitions for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition,
of the Rules of Court, respectively. These petitions are cognizable by Regional Trial
Courts, and not by Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, or Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts. If Section 19 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure and
Rules 38 and 65 of the Rules of Court are juxtaposed, the conclusion is inevitable
that no petition for relief from judgment nor a special civil action of certiorari,
prohibition, or mandamus arising from cases covered by the Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure may be filed with a superior court. This is but consistent with
the mandate of Section 36 of B.P. Blg. 129 to achieve an expeditious and
inexpensive determination of the cases subject of summary procedure.

Nevertheless, in view of the unusual and peculiar circumstances of this case, unless
some form of relief is made available to MAGDATO, the grave injustice and
irreparable injury that visited him through no fault or negligence on his part will only
be perpetuated. Thus, the petition for relief from judgment which he filed may be
allowed or treated, pro hac vice, either as an exception to the rule, or a regular
appeal to the RTC, or even an action to annul the order (decision) of the MCTC of 20
September 1993. As an exception, the RTC correctly held that the circumstances
alleged therein and the justification pleaded worked in favor of MAGDATO, and that
the motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 2708 was without merit. xxx [58] (Emphasis
supplied.)

On the other hand, in Go v. Court of Appeals, the Court was confronted with a
procedural void in the Revised Rules of Summary Procedure that justified the resort
to a Rule 65 Petition in the RTC. In that case, the preliminary conference in the
subject ejectment suit was held in abeyance by the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC) of Iloilo City until after the case for specific performance involving the same
parties shall have been finally decided by the RTC. The affected party appealed the
suspension order to the RTC. In response, the adverse party moved to dismiss the
appeal on the ground that it concerned an interlocutory order in a summary
proceeding that was not the subject of an appeal. The RTC denied the Motion to
Dismiss and subsequently directed the MTCC to proceed with the hearing of the
ejectment suit, a ruling that was upheld by the appellate court.
In affirming the Decisions of the RTC and CA, the Supreme Court allowed the filing of
a petition for certiorari against an interlocutory order in an ejectment suit,
considering that the affected party was deprived of any recourse to the MTCCs
erroneous suspension of a summary proceeding. Retired Chief Justice Artemio V.
Panganiban eloquently explained the procedural void in this wise:
Indisputably, the appealed [suspension] order is interlocutory, for it does not
dispose of the case but leaves something else to be done by the trial court on the
merits of the case. It is axiomatic that an interlocutory order cannot be challenged
by an appeal. Thus, it has been held that the proper remedy in such cases is an
ordinary appeal from an adverse judgment on the merits incorporating in said
appeal the grounds for assailing the interlocutory order. Allowing appeals from
interlocutory orders would result in the sorry spectacle of a case being subject of a
counterproductive ping-pong to and from the appellate court as often as a trial
court is perceived to have made an error in any of its interlocutory rulings. However,
where the assailed interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the remedy of
appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief, the Court may allow
certiorari as a mode of redress.

Clearly, private respondent cannot appeal the order, being interlocutory. But neither
can it file a petition for certiorari, because ejectment suits fall under the Revised
Rules on Summary Procedure, Section 19(g) of which considers petitions for
certiorari prohibited pleadings:

xxx

xxx

xxx

Based on the foregoing, private respondent was literally caught between Scylla
and Charybdis in the procedural void observed by the Court of Appeals and the

RTC. Under these extraordinary circumstances, the Court is constrained to provide it

with a remedy consistent with the objective of speedy resolution of cases.

As correctly held by Respondent Court of Appeals, the purpose of the Rules on

Summary Procedure is to achieve an expeditious and inexpensive determination of
cases without regard to technical rules. (Section 36, Chapter III, BP Blg. 129)
Pursuant to this objective, the Rules prohibit petitions for certiorari, like a number of
other pleadings, in order to prevent unnecessary delays and to expedite the
disposition of cases. In this case, however, private respondent challenged the MTCC
order delaying the ejectment suit, precisely to avoid the mischief envisioned by the
Rules.

Thus, this Court holds that in situations wherein a summary proceeding is

suspended indefinitely, a petition for certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion
may be allowed. Because of the extraordinary circumstances in this case, a petition
for certiorari, in fact, gives spirit and life to the Rules on Summary Procedure. A
contrary ruling would unduly delay the disposition of the case and negate the
rationale of the said Rules.[59] (Emphasis supplied.)
Contrary to the assertion of respondent Sunvar, the factual circumstances in these
two cases are not comparable with respondents situation, and our rulings therein
are inapplicable to its cause of action in the present suit. As this Court explained in
Bayog, the general rule is that no special civil action for certiorari may be filed with
a superior court from cases covered by the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure.
Respondent Sunvar filed a certiorari Petition in an ejectment suit pending before the
MeTC. Worse, the subject matter of the Petition was the denial of respondents
Motion to Dismiss, which was necessarily an interlocutory order, which is generally
not the subject of an appeal. No circumstances similar to the situation of the
agricultural tenant-lessee in Bayog are present to support the relaxation of the
general rule in the instant case. Respondent cannot claim to have been deprived of
reasonable opportunities to argue its case before a summary judicial proceeding.
Moreover, there exists no procedural void akin to that in Go v. Court of Appeals that
would justify respondents resort to a certiorari Petition before the RTC. When
confronted with the MeTCs adverse denial of its Motion to Dismiss in the ejectment
case, the expeditious and proper remedy for respondent should have been to
proceed with the summary hearings and to file its answer. Indeed, its resort to a
certiorari Petition in the RTC over an interlocutory order in a summary ejectment
proceeding was not only prohibited. The certiorari Petition was already a superfluity
on account of respondents having already taken advantage of a speedy and
available remedy by filing an Answer with the MeTC.

Respondent Sunvar failed to substantiate its claim of extraordinary circumstances

that would constrain this Court to apply the exceptions obtaining in Bayog and Go.
The Court hesitates to liberally dispense the benefits of these two judicial
precedents to litigants in summary proceedings, lest these exceptions be regularly
abused and freely availed of to defeat the very goal of an expeditious and
inexpensive determination of an unlawful detainer suit. If the Court were to relax
the interpretation of the prohibition against the filing of certiorari petitions under
the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, the RTCs may be inundated with similar
prayers from adversely affected parties questioning every order of the lower court
and completely dispensing with the goal of summary proceedings in forcible entry
or unlawful detainer suits.
III
Reckoning the One-Year Period in Unlawful Detainer Cases
We now come to another legal issue underlying the present Petition whether the
Complaint filed by petitioners is properly an action for unlawful detainer within the
jurisdiction of the MeTC or an accion publiciana lodged with the RTC. At the heart of
the controversy is the reckoning period of the one-year requirement for unlawful
detainer suits.
Whether or not petitioners action for unlawful detainer was brought within one year
after the unlawful withholding of possession will determine whether it was properly
filed with the MeTC. If, as petitioners argue, the one-year period should be counted
from respondent Sunvars receipt on 03 February 2009 of the Final Notice to Vacate,
then their Complaint was timely filed within the one-year period and appropriately
taken cognizance of by the MeTC. However, if the reckoning period is pegged from
the expiration of the main lease contract and/or sublease agreement, then
petitioners proper remedy should have been an accion publiciana to be filed with
the RTC.
The Court finds that petitioners correctly availed themselves of an action for
unlawful detainer and, hence, reverses the ruling of the RTC.
Under the Rules of Court, lessors against whom possession of any land is unlawfully
withheld after the expiration of the right to hold possession may by virtue of any
express or implied contract, and within one year after the unlawful deprivation
bring an action in the municipal trial court against the person unlawfully withholding
possession, for restitution of possession with damages and costs.[60] Unless
otherwise stipulated, the action of the lessor shall commence only after a demand
to pay or to comply with the conditions of the lease and to vacate is made upon the
lessee; or after a written notice of that demand is served upon the person found on
the premises, and the lessee fails to comply therewith within 15 days in the case of
land or 5 days in the case of buildings.[61]

In Delos Reyes v. Spouses Odenes,[62] the Court recently defined the nature and
scope of an unlawful detainer suit, as follows:
Unlawful detainer is an action to recover possession of real property from one who
illegally withholds possession after the expiration or termination of his right to hold
possession under any contract, express or implied. The possession by the defendant
in unlawful detainer is originally legal but became illegal due to the expiration or
termination of the right to possess. The proceeding is summary in nature,
jurisdiction over which lies with the proper MTC or metropolitan trial court. The
action must be brought up within one year from the date of last demand, and the
issue in the case must be the right to physical possession. (Emphasis supplied.)
Hence, a complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it
states the following elements:
1.
Initially, the possession of the property by the defendant was by contract with
or by tolerance of the plaintiff.

2.
Eventually, the possession became illegal upon the plaintiffs notice to the
defendant of the termination of the latters right of possession.

3.
Thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and
deprived the plaintiff of the latters enjoyment.

4.
Within one year from the making of the last demand on the defendant to
vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the Complaint for ejectment.[63]
On the other hand, accion publiciana is the plenary action to recover the right of
possession which should be brought in the proper regional trial court when
dispossession has lasted for more than one year. It is an ordinary civil proceeding to
determine the better right of possession of realty independently of title. In other
words, if at the time of the filing of the complaint, more than one year had elapsed
since defendant had turned plaintiff out of possession or defendants possession
had become illegal, the action will be, not one of forcible entry or illegal detainer,
but an accion publiciana.[64]
There are no substantial disagreements with respect to the first three requisites for
an action for unlawful detainer. Respondent Sunvar initially derived its right to
possess the subject property from its sublease agreements with TRCFI and later on
with PDAF. However, with the expiration of the lease agreements on 31 December
2002, respondent lost possessory rights over the subject property. Nevertheless, it

continued occupying the property for almost seven years thereafter. It was only on
03 February 2009 that petitioners made a final demand upon respondent Sunvar to
turn over the property. What is disputed, however, is the fourth requisite of an
unlawful detainer suit.
The Court rules that the final requisite is likewise availing in this case, and that the
one-year period should be counted from the final demand made on 03 February
2009.
Contrary to the reasoning of the RTC,[65] the one-year period to file an unlawful
detainer case is not counted from the expiration of the lease contract on 31
December 2002. Indeed, the last demand for petitioners to vacate is the reckoning
period for determining the one-year period in an action for unlawful detainer. Such
one year period should be counted from the date of plaintiffs last demand on
defendant to vacate the real property, because only upon the lapse of that period
does the possession become unlawful.[66]
In case several demands to vacate are made, the period is
reckoned from the
date of the last demand.[67] In Leonin v. Court of
Appeals,[68] the Court,
speaking through Justice Conchita Carpio Morales, reckoned the one-year period to
file the unlawful detainer Complaint filed on 25 February 1997 from the latest
demand letter dated 24 October 1996, and not from the earlier demand letter dated
03 July 1995:
Prospero Leonin (Prospero) and five others were co-owners of a 400-square meter
property located at K-J Street, East Kamias, Quezon City whereon was constructed a
two-storey house and a three-door apartment identified as No. 1-A, B, and C.

Prospero and his co-owners allowed his siblings, herein petitioners, to occupy
Apartment C without paying any rentals.

xxx

xxx

xxx

Petitioners further contend that respondents remedy is accion publiciana because

their possession is not de facto, they having been authorized by the true and lawful
owners of the property; and that one year had elapsed from respondents demand
given on July 3, 1995 when the unlawful detainer complaint was filed.

The petition fails.

Contrary to petitioners contention, the allegations in the complaint make out a case
for unlawful detainer. Thus, respondent alleged, inter alia, that she is the registered
owner of the property and that petitioners, who are tenants by tolerance, refused to
vacate the premises despite the notice to vacate sent to them.

Likewise, contrary to petitioners contention, the one-year period for filing a

complaint for unlawful detainer is reckoned from the date of the last demand, in this
case October 24, 1996, the reason being that the lessor has the right to waive his
right of action based on previous demands and let the lessee remain meanwhile in
the premises. Thus, the filing of the complaint on February 25, 1997 was well within
the one year reglementary period.[69] (Emphasis supplied.)
From the time that the main lease contract and sublease agreements expired (01
January 2003), respondent Sunvar no longer had any possessory right over the
subject property. Absent any express contractual renewal of the sublease
agreement or any separate lease contract, it illegally occupied the land or, at best,
was allowed to do so by mere tolerance of the registered owners petitioners
herein. Thus, respondent Sunvars possession became unlawful upon service of the
final notice on 03 February 2009. Hence, as an unlawful occupant of the land of
petitioners, and without any contract between them, respondent is necessarily
bound by an implied promise that it will vacate upon demand, failing which a
summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against them.[70] Upon
service of the final notice of demand, respondent Sunvar should have vacated the
property and, consequently, petitioners had one year or until 02 February 2010 in
which to resort to the summary action for unlawful detainer. In the instant case,
their Complaint was filed with the MeTC on 23 July 2009, which was well within the
one-year period.
The Court is aware that petitioners had earlier served a Notice to Vacate on 22
February 2008, which could have possibly tolled the one-year period for filing an
unlawful detainer suit. Nevertheless, they can be deemed to have waived their right
of action against respondent Sunvar and continued to tolerate its occupation of the
subject property. That they sent a final Notice to Vacate almost a year later gave
respondent another opportunity to comply with their implied promise as occupants
by mere tolerance. Consequently, the one-year period for filing a summary action
for unlawful detainer with the MeTC must be reckoned from the latest demand to
vacate.
In the past, the Court ruled that subsequent demands that are merely in the nature
of reminders of the original demand do not operate to renew the one-year period
within which to commence an ejectment suit, considering that the period will still be
reckoned from the date of the original demand.[71] If the subsequent demands

were merely in the nature of reminders of the original demand, the one-year period
to commence an ejectment suit would be counted from the first demand.[72]
However, respondent failed to raise in any of the proceedings below this question of
fact as to the nature of the second demand issued by the OSG. It is now too late in
the proceedings for them to argue that the 2009 Notice to Vacate was a mere
reiteration or reminder of the 2008 Notice to Vacate. In any event, this factual
determination is beyond the scope of the present Rule 45 Petition, which is limited
to resolving questions of law.
The Court notes that respondent Sunvar has continued to occupy the subject
property since the expiration of its sublease on 31 December 2002. The factual
issue of whether respondent has paid rentals to petitioners from the expiration of
the sublease to the present was never raised or sufficiently argued before this
Court. Nevertheless, it has not escaped the Courts attention that almost a decade
has passed without any resolution of this controversy regarding respondents
possession of the subject property, contrary to the aim of expeditious proceedings
under the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure. With the grant of the instant
Petition and the remand of the case to the MeTC for continued hearing, the Court
emphasizes the duty of the lower court to speedily resolve this matter once and for
all, especially since this case involves a prime property of the government located
in the countrys business district and the various opportunities for petitioners to
gain public revenues from the property.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Petition for Review on Certiorari dated 14
February 2011, filed by petitioners Republic and National Power Corporation, which
are represented here by the Privatization Management Office. The assailed Decision
dated 01 December 2010 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 134, is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City,
Branch 63, is DIRECTED to proceed with the summary proceedings for the unlawful
detainer case in Civil Case No. 98708.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

DOLORES ADORA MACASLANG,

Petitioner,

-versus -

RENATO AND MELBA ZAMORA,

Respondents.
G.R. No. 156375

Present:

CARPIOMORALES, Chairperson,
BRION,
BERSAMIN,
VILLARAMA, and
SERENO, JJ.

Promulgated:

May 30, 2011

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

D ECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) is not limited in its review of the decision of the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) to the issues assigned by the appellant, but can decide
on the basis of the entire records of the proceedings of the trial court and such
memoranda or briefs as may be submitted by the parties or required by the RTC.

The petitioner appeals the decision promulgated on July 3, 2002,[1] whereby the
Court of Appeals (CA) reversedfor having no basis in fact and in law the decision
rendered on May 18, 2000[2] by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 25, in Danao City
(RTC) thathad dismissed the respondents action
for ejectment against the petitioner, andreinstated the decision dated September
13, 1999 of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of DanaoCity (ordering the
petitioner as defendant to vacate the premises and to pay attorneys fees of
P10,000.00 and monthly rental of P5,000.00 starting December 1997 until they
vacated the premises).[3]

We grant the petition for review and rule that contrary to the CAs conclusion, the
RTCas an appellate court properly considered and resolved issues even if not raised
in the appeal from the decisionrendered in an ejectment case by the MTCC.

ANTECEDENTS

On March 10, 1999, the respondents filed a complaint for unlawful detainer in
the MTCC, alleging that the [petitioner] sold to [respondents] a residential land
located in Sabang, DanaoCity and that the [petitioner] requested to be allowed to
live in the house with a promise to vacate as soon as she would be able to find a
new residence. They further alleged thatdespitetheir demand after a year, the
petitioner failed or refused to vacate the premises.

Despite the due service of the summons and copy of the complaint, the petitioner
did not file heranswer. The MTCC declared her in defaultupon the respondents
motion to declare her in default, and proceeded to receivethe respondentsoral
testimony and documentary evidence. Thereafter, on September 13, 1999, the
MTCC rendered judgment against her, disposing:

WHEREFORE, considering the foregoing, Judgment is hereby rendered in favor [of]

plaintiffs (sic) spouses Renato Zamora and Melba Zamora and against defendant
Dolores AdoraMacaslang, ordering defendant to vacate the properties in question,
to pay to plaintiffs Attorneys Fees in the sum of P10,000.00 and monthly rental of
P5,000.00 starting December, 1997 until the time the defendant shall have vacated
the properties in question.

SO ORDERED.[4]

The petitioner appealed to the RTC, averring the following as reversible errors,
namely:

1.
Extrinsic Fraud was practiced upon defendant-appellant which ordinary
prudence could not have guarded against and by reason of which she has been
impaired of her rights.

2.
Defendant-Appellant has a meritorious defense in that there was no actual
sale considering that the absolute deed of sale relied upon by the plaintiffappell[ees] is a patent-nullity as her signature therein was procured through fraud
and trickery.[5]

and praying through her appeal memorandum as follows:

Wherefore, in view of the foregoing, it is most respectfully prayed for that

judgment be rendered in favor of defendant-appellant ordering that this case be
remanded back to the Court of Origin, Municipal Trial Court of Danao City, for further
proceedings to allow the defendant to present her evidence, and thereafter, to
render a judgment anew.[6]

On May 18, 2000, the RTC resolved the appeal, to wit:[7]

WHEREFORE,judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the complaint for failure to

state a cause of action.

The same may, however, be refiled in the same Court, by alleging plaintiffs cause
of action, if any.

Plaintiffs Motion for Execution of Judgment of the lower court is rendered moot by
this judgment.

SO ORDERED.

The respondents appealed to the CA, assailing the RTCs decision for
disregarding the allegations in the complaint in determining the existence or nonexistence of a cause of action.

On July 3, 2002, the CA reversed and set aside the RTCs decision and reinstated the
MTCCs decision in favor of the respondents, disposing:

WHEREFORE,foregoing premises considered, the Petition is hereby GIVEN DUE

COURSE. Resultantly, the impugned decision of the Regional Trial Court is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE for having no basis in fact and in law, and the Decision of
the Municipal Trial Court in Cities REINSTATED and AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.[8]

The petitionersmotion for reconsideration was denied onNovember 19, 2002.

ISSUES

Hence, the petitioner appeals the CAs adverse decision, submitting legal
issues, as follows:

1.
Whether or not the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its Appellate
Jurisdiction is limited to the assigned errors in the Memorandum or brief filed before
it or whether it can decide the case based on the entire records of the case, as
provided for in Rule 40, Sec. 7. This is a novel issue which, we respectfully submit,
deserves a definitive ruling by this Honorable Supreme Court since it involves the
application of a new provision, specifically underlined now under the 1997 Revised
Rules on Civil procedure.

2.
Whether or not in an action for unlawful detainer, where there was no prior
demand to vacate and comply with the conditions of the lease made, a valid cause
of action exists?

3.
Whether or not in reversing the Regional Trial Court Decision and reinstating
and affirming the decision of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, which was tried and
decided by the MCTC in violation of the Rules on Summary Procedure, the Court of
Appeals sanctioned a gross departure from the usual course of judicial proceedings?
[9]

The issues that this Court has to resolve are stated thuswise:

1.
Whether or not the CA correctly found that the RTC committed reversible error
in ruling on issues not raised by the petitioner in her appeal;

2.
Whether or not the CA correctly found that the complaint stated a valid cause
of action;

3.
Whether or not the CA erred in finding that there was a valid demand to vacate
made by the respondents on the petitioner; and

4.

Whether or not the petitioners defense of ownership was meritorious.

RULING

We grant the petition for review.

A.
As an appellate court, RTC may rule
upon an issue notraised on appeal

In its decision, the CA ruled that the RTC could not resolve issues that were not
assigned by the petitioner in her appeal memorandum, explaining:

Indeed(,) We are rather perplexed why the Regional Trial Court, in arriving at
its decision, discussed and ruled on issues or grounds which were never raised,
assigned, or argued on by the Defendant-appellee in her appeal to the former. A

careful reading of the Defendant-appellees appeal memorandum clearly shows that

it only raised two (2) grounds, namely (a) alleged extrinsic fraud, (b) meritorious
defenses based on nullity of the Deed of Sale Instrument. And yet the Trial Court, in
its decision, ruled on issues not raised such as lack of cause of action and no prior
demand to vacate having been made.

Only errors assigned and properly argued on the brief and those necessarily
related thereto, may be considered by the appellate court in resolving an appeal in
a civil case. Based on said clear jurisprudence, the court a quo committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it resolved Defendantappellees appeal based on grounds or issues not raised before it, much less
assigned by Defendant-appellee as an error.

Not only that. It is settled that an issue which was not raised during the Trial in
the court below would not be raised for the first time on appeal as to do so would be
offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process (Victorias Milling Co.,
Inc. vs. CA, 333 SCRA 663). We can therefore appreciate Plaintiffs-appellants
dismay caused by the Regional Trial Courts blatant disregard of a basic and
fundamental right to due process.[10]

The petitioner disagrees with the CA and contends that the RTC as an appellate
courtcould rule on the failure of the complaint to state a cause of action and the
lack of demand to vacate even if not assigned in the appeal.

We concur with the petitioners contention.

The CA might have been correct had the appeal been a first appeal from the RTC to
the CA or another proper superior court, in which instance Section 8 of Rule 51,
which applies to appeals from the RTC to the CA,imposesthe express limitation of
the review to only those specified in the assignment of errorsor closely related to or
dependent on an assigned error and properly argued in the appellants brief, viz:

Section 8. Questions that may be decided. No error which does not affect the
jurisdiction over the subject matter or the validity of the judgment appealed from or
the proceeding therein will be considered unless stated in the assignment of errors,

or closely related to or dependent on an assigned error and properly argued in the

brief, save as the court may pass upon plain errors and clerical errors.

Butthe petitioners appeal herein,being taken from the decision of the MTCC to the
RTC, was governed by a different rule, specifically Section 18 of Rule 70 of the Rules
of Court, to wit:

Section 18. xxx

xxx
The judgment or final order shall be appealable to the appropriate Regional Trial
Court which shall decide the same on the basis of the entire record of the
proceedings had in the court of origin and such memoranda and/or briefs as may be
submitted by the parties or required by the Regional Trial Court. (7a)
As such,the RTC, in exercising appellate jurisdiction,was not limited to the errors
assigned in the petitioners appeal memorandum, but coulddecide on the basis of
the entire record of the proceedingshad in the trial court and such memoranda
and/or briefs as may be submitted by the parties or required by the RTC.

The difference between the procedures for deciding on review is traceable to

Section 22 of Batas PambansaBlg. 129,[11]which provides:

Section 22. Appellate Jurisdiction. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise appellate
jurisdiction over all cases decided by Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in their respective territorial
jurisdictions.Such cases shall be decided on the basis of the entire record of the
proceedings had in the court of origin [and] such memoranda and/or briefs as may
be submitted by the parties or required by the Regional Trial Courts. The decision of
the Regional Trial Courts in such cases shall be appealable by petition for review to
the Court of Appeals which may give it due course only when the petition shows
prima facie that the lower court has committed an error of fact or law that will
warrant a reversal or modification of the decision or judgment sought to be
reviewed.[12]

As its compliance with the requirement of Section 36 of Batas PambansaBlg. 129to

adopt special rules or procedures applicable to such cases in order to achieve an

expeditious and inexpensive determination thereof without regard to technical

rules, the Court promulgated the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure,
whereby it institutionalized the summary procedure for all the first level courts.
Section 21 of the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedurespecifically stated:

Section 21. Appeal. Thejudgment or final order shall be appealable to the

appropriate Regional Trial Court which shall decide the same in accordance with
Section 22 of Batas PambansaBlg. 129. The decision of the Regional Trial Court in
civil cases governed by this Rule, including forcible entry and unlawful detainer shall
be immediately executory, without prejudice to a further appeal that may be taken
therefrom. Section 10 of Rule 70 shall be deemed repealed.

Later on, the Court promulgated the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, effective on July
1, 1997, and incorporated in Section 7 of Rule 40 thereof the directive to the RTC to
decide appealed caseson the basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in
the court of origin and such memoranda as are filed,viz:

Section 7. Procedure in the Regional Trial Court.

(a) Upon receipt of the complete record or the record on appeal, the clerk of court of
the Regional Trial Court shall notify the parties of such fact.

(b) Within fifteen (15) days from such notice, it shall be the duty of the appellant to
submit a memorandum which shall briefly discuss the errors imputed to the lower
court, a copy of which shall be furnished by him to the adverse party. Within fifteen
(15) days from receipt of the appellants memorandum, the appellee may file his
memorandum. Failure of the appellant to file a memorandum shall be a ground for
dismissal of the appeal.

(c) Upon the filing of the memorandum of the appellee, or the expiration of the
period to do so, the case shall be considered submitted for decision. The Regional
Trial Court shall decide the case on the basis of the entire record of the proceedings
had in the court of origin and such memoranda as are filed. (n)

As a result, the RTC presently decides all appeals from the MTC based on the entire
record of the proceedings had in the court of origin and such memoranda or briefs
as are filed in the RTC.

Yet, even withoutthe differentiation in the procedures of deciding appeals,

thelimitation of the review to onlythe errors assigned and properly argued in the
appeal brief or memorandum and the errors necessarily related to such assigned
errorsought not to have obstructed the CA from resolving the unassigned issues by
virtue of their coming under one or several of the following recognized exceptions to
the limitation, namely:

(a) When the question affectsjurisdiction over the subject matter;

(b) Matters that are evidently plain or clerical errors within contemplation of law;

(c) Matters whose consideration is necessary in arriving at a just decision and

complete resolution of the case or in serving the interests of justice or avoiding
dispensing piecemeal justice;

(d) Matters raised in the trial court and are of record having some bearing on the
issue submitted that the parties failed to raise or that the lower court ignored;

(e) Matters closely related to an error assigned; and

(f) Matters upon which the determination of a question properly assigned is

dependent.[13]

Consequently, the CA improperly disallowed the consideration and resolution of the

two errors despite their being: (a)necessary in arriving at a just decision and

acomplete resolution of the case; and (b) matters of record having some bearing on
the issues submitted that the lower court ignored.

B.
CA correctly delved into and determined
whether or not complaint stateda cause of action

The RTC opined that the complaint failed to state a cause of action because the
evidence showed that there was no demand to vacate made upon the petitioner.

The CA disagreed, observingin its appealed decision:

But what is worse is that a careful reading of Plaintiffs-appellants Complaint

would readily reveal that they have sufficiently established (sic) a cause of action
against Defendant-appellee. It is undisputed that as alleged in the complaint and
testified to by Plaintiffs-appellants, a demand to vacate was made before the action
for unlawful detainer was instituted.

A complaint for unlawful detainer is sufficient if it alleges that the withholding

of possession or the refusal is unlawful without necessarily employing the
terminology of the law (Jimenez vs. Patricia, Inc., 340 SCRA 525). In the case at
bench, par. 4 of the Complaint alleges, thus:

4. After a period of one (1) year living in the aforementioned house, Plaintiff
demanded upon defendant to vacate but she failed and refused;

From the foregoing allegation, it cannot be disputed that a demand to vacate

has not only been made but that the same was alleged in the complaint. How the
Regional Trial Court came to the questionable conclusion that Plaintiffs-appellants
had no cause of action is beyond Us.[14]

We concur with the CA.

A complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it states the
following:

(a)Initially, the possession of the property by the defendant was by contract with or
by tolerance of the plaintiff;

(b)Eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by the plaintiff to the
defendant about the termination of the latters right of possession;

(c)Thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived

the plaintiff of its enjoyment; and

(d)Within one year from the making of the last demand to vacate the propertyon the
defendant, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.[15]

In resolving whether the complaint states a cause of actionor not, only the facts
alleged in the complaint are considered. The test is whether the court can render a
valid judgment on the complaint based on the facts alleged and the prayer asked
for.[16] Only ultimate facts, not legal conclusions or evidentiary facts, are
considered for purposes of applying the test.[17]

To resolve the issue, therefore, a look at the respondents complaint is helpful:

2. On September 10, 1997, defendant sold to plaintiffs a residential land located in

Sabang, Danao City, covered by Tax Dec.0312417 RB with an area of 400 square
meters, including a residential house where defendant was then living covered by
Tax Dec. 0312417 RB, a copy of the deed of absolute [sale] of these properties is
hereto attached as Annex A;

3. After the sale, defendant requested to be allowed to live in the house which
plaintiff granted on reliance of defendants promise to vacate as soon as she would
be able to find a new residence;

4. After a period of one (1) year living in the aforementioned house, plaintiffs
demanded upon defendant to vacate but she failed or refused.

5. Plaintiffs sought the aid of the barangay Lupon of Sabang, Danao City for
arbitration but no settlement was reached as shown by a certification to file action
hereto attached as Annex B;

6. Plaintiffs were compelled to file this action and hire counsel for P10,000 by way of
attorneys fee;

7. Defendant agreed to pay plaintiffs a monthly rental of P5,000 for the period of
time that the former continued to live in the said house in question.

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court to render judgment

ordering the defendant to vacate the properties in question, ordering the defendant
to pay plaintiffs attorneys fees in the sum of P10,000, ordering the defendant to
pay the plaintiffs a monthly rental of P5,000 starting in October 1997, until the time
that defendant vacates the properties in question. Plaintiffs pray for such other
refiefs consistent with justice and equity.[18]

Based on its allegations, the complaintsufficiently stated a cause of action for

unlawful detainer. Firstly, it averred that the petitioner possessed the property by
the mere tolerance of the respondents. Secondly, the respondents demanded that
the petitioner vacate the property, thereby rendering her possession illegal.
Thirdly,she remained in possession of the property despite the demand to vacate.
And, fourthly, the respondents instituted the complaint on March 10, 1999,which
was well within a year after the demand to vacate was made around September of
1998 or later.

Yet, even as we rule that the respondents complaint stated a cause of action, we
must find and hold that both the RTC and the CA erroneously appreciatedthe real
issue to be about the complaints failure to state a cause of action. It certainly was
not so, butthe respondents lack of cause of action. Their erroneous
appreciationexpectedly prevented the correct resolution of the action.

Failure to state a cause of action and lack of cause of action are really different from
each other.On the one hand, failure to state a cause of actionrefers to the
insufficiency of the pleading, and is a ground for dismissal under Rule 16 of the
Rules of Court. On the other hand, lack of cause action refers to a situation where
the evidence does not prove the cause of action alleged in the pleading. Justice
Regalado, a recognized commentator on remedial law, has explained the distinction:
[19]

xxx What is contemplated, therefore, is a failure to state a cause of action which is

provided in Sec. 1(g) of Rule 16. This is a matter of insufficiency of the pleading.
Sec. 5 of Rule 10, which was also included as the last mode for raising the issue to
the court, refers to the situation where the evidence does not prove a cause of
action. This is, therefore, a matter of insufficiency of evidence. Failure to state a
cause of action is different from failure to prove a cause of action. The remedy in
the first is to move for dismissal of the pleading, while the remedy in the second is
to demur to the evidence, hence reference to Sec. 5 of Rule 10 has been eliminated
in this section. The procedure would consequently be to require the pleading to
state a cause of action, by timely objection to its deficiency; or, at the trial, to file a
demurrer to evidence, if such motion is warranted.

A complaint states a cause of action if it avers the existence of the three essential
elements of a cause of action, namely:

(a) The legal right of the plaintiff;

(b) The correlative obligation of the defendant; and

(c) The act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right.

If the allegations of the complaint do not aver the concurrence of these elements,
the complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to
state a cause of action.Evidently, it is not the lack or absence of a cause of action
that is a ground for the dismissal of the complaint but the fact that the complaint
states no cause of action.Failure to state a cause of action may be raised at the
earliest stages of an action through a motion to dismiss, but lack of cause of action
may be raised at any time after the questions of fact have been resolved on the
basis of the stipulations, admissions, or evidence presented.[20]

Having found that neither Exhibit C nor Exhibit E was a proper demand to vacate,
[21] considering that Exhibit C (the respondents letter dated February 11,
1998)demanded the payment of P1,101,089.90, and Exhibit E (theirletter dated
January 21, 1999) demandedthe payment of P1,600,000.00, the RTC concluded that
the demand alleged in the complaint did not constitute a demand to pay rent and to
vacate the premises necessary in an action for unlawful detainer. It was this
conclusion that caused the RTC to confuse the defect as failure of the complaint to
state a cause of action for unlawful detainer.

The RTCerred even in that regard.

To begin with, it was undeniable that Exhibit D (the respondents letter dated April
28, 1998) constitutedthedemand to vacate that validly supported their action for
unlawful detainer, because of its unmistakable tenor as a demand to vacate, which
the following portion indicates:[22]

This is to give notice that since the mortgage to your property has long expired and
that since the property is already in my name, I will be taking over the occupancy of
said property two (2) months from date of this letter.

Exhibit D, despite not explicitly using the wordvacate, relayed to the petitionerthe
respondents desire to take over the possession of the property by givingher no
alternative exceptto vacate.The word vacate,according toGolden Gate Realty
Corporation v. Intermediate Appellate Court,[23]is not a talismanic word that must
be employed in all notices to vacate.The tenantsin Golden Gate Realty

Corporationhad defaulted in the payment of rents, leading theirlessorto notify them

to pay with a warning that a case of ejectment would be filed against themshould
they not do so. The Court held that the lessor had thereby given strong notice that
you either pay your unpaid rentals or I will file a court case to have you thrown out
of my property,for therewas no other interpretation of the import of the notice due
to the alternatives being clear cut, in that the tenants must pay rentals that had
been fixed and had become payable in the past, failing in which they must move
out.[24]
Also, the demand not being to pay rent and to vacate did not render the cause of
action deficient. Based on the complaint, the petitioners possession was allegedly
based on the respondents tolerance, not on any contract between them. Hence,
thedemand to vacate sufficed.

C.
Ejectment was not proper due
to defense of ownership being established

The respondents cause of action for unlawful detainer was based on their supposed
right to possession resulting from their having acquired it through sale.

The RTCdismissed the complaint based on its following findings, to wit:

In the case at bench, there is conflict between the allegation of the complaint and
the document attached thereto.

Simply stated, plaintiff alleged that she bought the house of the defendant for
P100,000.00 on September 10, 1997 as stated in an alleged Deed of Absolute Sale
marked as Exhibit A to the complaint. Insofar as plaintiff is concerned, the best
evidence is the said Deed of Absolute Sale.

The Court is surprised why in plaintiffs letter dated February 11, 1998, marked as
Exhibit C and attached to the same complaint, she demanded from the defendant

the whooping sum of P1,101,089.90. It must be remembered that this letter was
written five (5) months after the deed of absolute sale was executed.

The same letter (Exhibit C) is not a letter of demand as contemplated by law and
jurisprudence. The plaintiff simply said that she will appreciate payment per
notarized document. There is no explanation what this document is.

Plaintiffs letter dated April 28, 1998 (Exhibit D) contradicts her allegation that she
purchased the house and lot mentioned in the complaint. Exhibit D, which is part
of the pleading and a judicial admission clearly shows that the house and lot of the
defendant was not sold but mortgaged.

Again, for purposes of emphasis and clarity, a portion of the letter (Exhibit D)
reads:

This is to give notice that since the mortgage to your property has long expired and
that since the property is already in my name, I will be taking over the occupancy of
said property two (2) months from date of this letter.

x xxx

Exhibit E, which is a letter dated January 21, 1999, shows the real transaction
between the parties in their case. To reiterate, the consideration in the deed of sale
(Exhibit A) is P100,000.00 but in their letter (Exhibit E) she is already demanding
the sum of P1,600,000.00 because somebody was going to buy it for P2,000,000.00.

There are indications that point out that the real transaction between the parties is
one of equitable mortgage and not sale.[25]

Despite holding herein that the respondents demand to vacate sufficed, we uphold
the result of the RTC decision in favor of the petitioner. This we do,because

therespondents Exhibit Cand Exhibit E, by demandingpayment from the petitioner,

respectively,of P1,101,089.90 and P1,600,000.00, revealedthe true nature of the
transaction involving the property in question as one of equitable mortgage, not a
sale.

Our upholding of the result reached by the RTC rests on the following
circumstancesthat tended to show that the petitioner had not really sold the
property to the respondents, contrary to the latters averments, namely:

(a)The petitioner, as the vendor, was paid the amount of only P100,000.00,[26] a
price too inadequate in comparison with the sum of P1,600,000.00 demanded in
Exhibit E;[27]

(b) The petitioner retained possession of the property despite the supposed sale;
and

(c) The deed of sale wasexecuted as a result or by reason of the loan the
respondents extended to the petitioner,because they still allowed the petitioner to
redeem the property by paying her obligation under the loan.[28]

Submissions of the petitioner further supported the findings of the RTCon the
equitable mortgage. Firstly, there was the earlier dated instrument (deed of pactode
retro)involving the same property, albeit the consideration was only P480,000.00,
executed between the petitioner as vendor a retro and the respondent Renato
Zamora as vendee a retro.[29] Secondly, there were two receipts for the payments
the petitioner had made to the respondentstotaling P300,000.00.[30] And, thirdly,
the former secretary of respondent Melba Zamora executed an affidavit
acknowledging that the petitioner had already paid a total of P500,000.00 to the
respondents.[31] All these confirmed the petitioners claim that she remained the
owner of the property and was still entitled to its possession.

Article 1602 of the Civil Codeenumerates the instances when a contract, regardless
of its nomenclature, may be presumed to be an equitable mortgage, namely:

(a) When the price of a sale with right to repurchase is unusually inadequate;

(b) When the vendor remains in possession as lessee or otherwise;

(c) When upon or after the expiration of the right to repurchase another instrument
extending the period of redemption or granting a new period is executed;

(d)When the purchaser retains for himself a part of the purchase price;

(e)When the vendor binds himself to pay the taxes on the thing sold; and,

(f) In any other case where it may be fairly inferred that the real intention of the
parties is that the transaction shall secure the payment of a debt or the
performance of any other obligation.

The circumstances earlier mentioned were, indeed, badges of an equitable

mortgage within the context ofArticle 1602 of the Civil Code.

Nonetheless, the findingsfavorable to the petitioners ownership are neitherfinally

determinative of the title in the property, nor conclusive in any other proceeding
where ownership of the property involved herein may be more fittingly
adjudicated.Verily, where the cause of action in an ejectment suit is based
on ownership of the property, the defense that the defendantretainedtitle
or ownership is a proper subject for determination by the MTC but only for
the purpose of adjudicating the rightful possessor of the property.[32]This
is based on Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, viz:

Section 16. Resolving defense of ownership. When the defendant raises

the defense of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession
cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of
ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession.(4a)

D.
MTC committed procedural lapses
that must be noted and corrected

The Court seizes theopportunity to note and to correctseveralnoticeable procedural

lapses on the part of the MTCC, to avoid the impression that the Court condones or
tolerates the lapses.

The first lapse wasthe MTCCs granting of the respondents motion to declare the
petitioner in default following her failure to file an answer. The proper procedurewas
not for the plaintiffs to move for the declaration in default of the defendant who
failed to file the answer. Such a motion to declare in default has been expressly
prohibited under Section 13, Rule 70 of
theRules of Court.[33]Instead, the trial court, either motuproprio or on motion of the
plaintiff, should render judgment as the facts alleged in the complaint might
warrant.[34]In other words, the defendants failure to file an answer under Rule 70
of the Rules of Courtmight result to a judgment by default, not to a declaration of
default.

The second lapse wasthe MTCCsreception of the oral testimony of respondent

Melba Zamora. Rule 70 of the Rules of Courthas envisioned the submission only of
affidavits of the witnesses (not oral testimony) and other proofs on the factual
issues defined in the order issued within five days from the termination of the
preliminary conference;[35]and has permittedthe trial court, should it find the need
to clarify material facts, to thereafterissue an order during the 30-day period from
submission of the affidavits and other proofs specifying the matters to be clarified,
and requiring the parties to submit affidavits or other evidence upon such matters
within ten days from receipt of the order.[36]

The procedural lapses committed in this case are beyond comprehension.The MTCC
judge could not have been unfamiliar with the prevailing procedure, considering
that therevised version of Rule 70, although taking effect only on July 1, 1997,was
derived from the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, in effect since
November 15, 1991. It was not likely, therefore, that the MTCC judge committed the
lapses out of his unfamiliarity with the relevant rule. We discern thatthe cause of the

lapses was his lack of enthusiasm in implementingcorrect procedures in this case. If

that was the true reason, the Court can only be alarmed and concerned, for a judge
should not lack enthusiasm in applying the rules of procedure lest the worthy
objectives of their promulgation be unwarrantedly sacrificed and brushed aside. The
MTCC judge should not forget that the rules of procedure were always meant to be
implemented deliberately, not casually, and their non-compliance should only be
excused in the higher interest of the administration of justice.

It is timely, therefore, to remind all MTC judges to display full and enthusiastic
compliance with all the rules of procedure, especially those intended for expediting
proceedings.

WHEREFORE,we grant the petition for review on certiorari; set aside the decision
promulgated on July 3, 2002 by the Court of Appeals; and dismiss the complaint for
unlawful detainer for lack of a cause of action.

The respondents shall pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila

SECOND DIVISION
RUBEN C. CORPUZ, represented by Attorney-in-Fact Wenifreda C. Agullana,
Petitioner,

-versus-

Sps. HILARION AGUSTIN and

JUSTA AGUSTIN,
Respondents.

G.R. No. 183822

Present:

CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson,
PEREZ,
SERENO,
REYES, and
PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.*

Promulgated:

January 18, 2012

x-----------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

SERENO, J.:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assails the Decision[1] dated 08 January 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. SP No. 90645, which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Laoag City and its Resolution[2] dated 15 July 2008 denying the Motion for
Reconsideration. The RTC, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, affirmed the
Decision of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Laoag City, which had dismissed the
unlawful detainer case filed by herein petitioner.
The Factual Antecedents
The Court adopts the findings of fact of the CA as follows:
Ruben C. Corpuz (Ruben) filed a complaint for ejectment against Spouses
Hilarion and Justa Agustin on the allegation that he is the registered owner of two
parcels of land located in Santa Joaquina, Laoag City covered by TCT No. 12980
issued on October 29, 1976 by the Laoag City Register of Deeds and with technical
descriptions as follows:

1) A parcel of land (Lot No. 20 of the Cadastral Survey of Laoag), with

improvements thereon, situated in the barrio of Santa Joaquina, Municipality of
Laoag. Bounded x x x containing an area of five thousand seven hundred and fifty
nine (5,759) square meters more or less x x x.

2) A parcel of land (Lot No. 11711 of the Cadastral Survey of Laoag), with the
improvements thereon, situated in the barrio of Santa Joaquina, Municipality of
Laoag. Bounded x x x, containing an area of twenty thousand seven hundred and
forty five (20,745) square meters, more or less x x x.

Aforesaid parcels of land were formerly owned by Elias Duldulao in whose

name Original Certificate of Title No. O-1717 was issued. Duldulao sold said
properties on August 27, 1951 to Francisco D. Corpuz, father of Ruben C. Corpuz.
The elder Corpuz allowed spouses Agustin to occupy subject properties, the latter
being relatives.

Despite demand to vacate, the Agustins refused to leave the premises.

Ruben alleged further that he has the better right to possess subject property
having acquired the same from his father, Francisco, who executed a Deed of
Quitclaim in his favor on March 15, 1971.

Spouses Agustin, in their Answer, interposed the defense that on June 5, 1971
Francisco Corpuz, Ruben's father, disposed of subject property by executing a Deed
of Absolute Sale in their favor for a consideration of Eleven Thousand One Hundred
Fifty Pesos (P11,150.00).

The Municipal Trial Court found for the spouses Agustin and dismissed the
complaint.

In sum, considering the evidence of the defendants which shows that they
entered into and occupied Lot No. 20 and the 9,657 sq. m. portion of Lot No. 11711
as buyers or owners, disproving the allegation of the plaintiff that defendants were
merely allowed by Francisco Corpuz to occupy the subject properties, being his
relatives, and considering further the length of time that the defendants have been
in possession, as owners, of Lot No. 20 and the 9,657 sq. m. portion of Lot No.
11711, and have been continuously exercising their rights of ownership thereon,
this court is of the view and holds, in so far as this case is concerned, that the
defendants are the ones entitled to the possession of Lot No. 20 and the 9,657 sq.
m. portion of Lot No. 11711.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this case, is hereby dismissed.

SO ORDERED.

On appeal, Branch XVI, Regional Trial Court of Laoag City affirmed said
dismissal, the dispositive portion of said decision states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Appeal is hereby DISMISSED for

lack of merit and the JUDGMENT of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 01,
Laoag City is hereby AFFIRMED, with costs against the plaintiff-appellant.

SO ORDERED.[3]
Petitioner assailed the Decision of the RTC, affirming the earlier dismissal of
the case by the MTC, by instituting an appeal with the CA. On 08 January 2008, the
appellate court through its Fourteenth Division dismissed his appeal.[4] It noted that
his father engaged in a double sale when he conveyed the disputed properties to
petitioner and respondents. The Quitclaim executed by the elder Corpuz in favor of
petitioner was dated 15 March 1971, while the Deed of Sale with respondents was
later, on 15 June 1971; both documents were notarized shortly after their execution.
[5] The Quitclaim, which was subsequently inscribed at the back of Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. O-1717 on 29 October 1976,[6] resulted in the issuance
of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-12980 in the name of petitioner. The Deed
of Sale executed with respondents was, however, not annotated at the back of OCT
No. O-1717 and remained unregistered.[7]
Based on the above findings, the CA ruled that petitioner had knowledge of the sale
of the disputed real property executed between Francisco Corpuz, petitioner's
father, and respondents. Due to this conveyance by the elder Corpuz to
respondents, the latter's possession thereof was in the nature of ownership. Thus, in
the context of an unlawful detainer case instituted by petitioner against
respondents, the appellate court concluded that respondents possession of the
property was not by mere tolerance of its former owner petitioner's father but
was in the exercise of ownership.[8]
The CA noted that petitioner had knowledge of his fathers sale of the
properties to respondents as early as 1973. However, despite knowledge of the
sale, petitioner failed to initiate any action to annul it and oust respondents from the
subject properties.[9] The appellate court rejected his contention that, as registered
owner of the disputed properties, he had a better right to possession thereof,
compared to the unregistered Deed of Sale relied upon by respondents in their
defense of the same properties. The CA ruled that the inaction on his part despite
knowledge of the sale in 1973 was equivalent to registration of respondents
unregistered deed.[10] In dismissing his appeal, the CA concluded that respondents

possession was not ... anchored on mere tolerance nor on any of the grounds for
forcible entry or unlawful detainer; hence the complaint for ejectment must
fail.[11] The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby
DISMISSED. The decision of Branch XVI, Regional Trial Court of Laoag City in Civil
Case No. 13293-16 is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.[12]
The Issues
Petitioner assigns the following errors in this Petition for Review on Certiorari:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FAILING TO
CONSIDER THE LEGAL OWNERSHIP OF PETITIONER ON THE DISPUTED PROPERTY TO
CLAIM BETTER RIGHT TO POSSESSION.

II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN THE
APPRECIATION OF THE ALLEGED SALE IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENTS TO RULE THAT
THEY HAVE BETTER RIGHT TO POSSESSION.

III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FAILING TO
CONSIDER THE CASE OF JACINTO CO VS. MILITAR, ET AL. (421 SCRA 455) WHICH IS
SIMILAR TO THE INSTANT CASE.

IV.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DENYING THE
PETITION FOR REVIEW RAISED BEFORE IT.[13]
Petitioner presents to this Court for resolution the core issue of his Petition:
who between the parties has the right to possession of the disputed properties -petitioner, who is the registered owner under TCT No. T-12980; or respondents, who
have a notarized yet unregistered Deed of Absolute Sale over the same properties?
The Court's Ruling
We DENY the Petition.
Although this case does not present a novel question of law, there is a need
to discuss the nature of an ejectment case for the recovery of physical possession in
relation to the Torrens system. A resolution of the issue would be relevant to the

determination of who has the better right to possession in this unlawful detainer
case.
One of the three kinds of action for the recovery of possession of real
property is accion interdictal, or an ejectment proceeding ... which may be either
that for forcible entry (detentacion) or unlawful detainer (desahucio), which is a
summary action for the recovery of physical possession where the dispossession
has not lasted for more than one year, and should be brought in the proper inferior
court.[14] In ejectment proceedings, the courts resolve the basic question of who
is entitled to physical possession of the premises, possession referring to possession
de facto, and not possession de jure.[15]
Where the parties to an ejectment case raise the issue of ownership, the courts may
pass upon that issue to determine who between the parties has the better right to
possess the property. However, where the issue of ownership is inseparably linked
to that of possession, adjudication of the ownership issue is not final and binding,
but only for the purpose of resolving the issue of possession. The adjudication of the
issue of ownership is only provisional, and not a bar to an action between the same
parties involving title to the property.[16]
In the instant case, the position of respondents is that they are occupying the
disputed properties as owners, having acquired these from petitioner's father
through a Deed of Absolute Sale executed in 1971. Respondents believe that they
cannot be dispossessed of the disputed properties, since they are the owners and
are in actual possession thereof up to this date. Petitioner, however, rebuts this
claim of ownership, contending that he has registered the disputed properties in his
name and has been issued a land title under the Torrens system. He asserts that,
having registered the properties in his name, he is the recognized owner and
consequently has the better right to possession.
Indeed, a title issued under the Torrens system is entitled to all the attributes
of property ownership, which necessarily includes possession.[17] Petitioner is
correct that as a Torrens title holder over the subject properties, he is the rightful
owner and is entitled to possession thereof. However, the lower courts and the
appellate court consistently found that possession of the disputed properties by
respondents was in the nature of ownership, and not by mere tolerance of the elder
Corpuz. In fact, they have been in continuous, open and notorious possession of the
property for more than 30 years up to this day.
Petitioner cites Jacinto Co v. Rizal Militar, et al.,[18] which has facts and legal issues
identical to those of the instant case. The petitioner therein filed an unlawful
detainer case against the respondents over a disputed property. He had a Torrens
title thereto, while the respondents as actual occupants of the property claimed
ownership thereof based on their unregistered Deeds of Sale. The principal issue

was who between the two parties had the better right to possess the subject
property.
This Court resolved the issue by upholding the title holder as the one who had the
better right to possession of the disputed property based on the following
justification:
We have, time and again, held that the only issue for resolution in an unlawful
detainer case is physical or material possession of the property involved,
independent of any claim of ownership by any of the party litigants. Moreover, an
ejectment suit is summary in nature and is not susceptible to circumvention by the
simple expedient of asserting ownership over the property.

In forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases, even if the defendant raises the
question of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be
resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the lower courts and the Court of
Appeals, nonetheless, have the undoubted competence to provisionally resolve the
issue of ownership for the sole purpose of determining the issue of Possession.

Such decision, however, does not bind the title or affect the ownership of the land
nor is conclusive of the facts therein found in a case between the same parties upon
a different cause of action involving possession.

In the instant case, the evidence showed that as between the parties, it is the
petitioner who has a Torrens Title to the property. Respondents merely showed their
unregistered deeds of sale in support of their claims. The Metropolitan Trial Court
correctly relied on the transfer certificate of title in the name of petitioner.

In Tenio-Obsequio v. Court of Appeals, it was held that the Torrens System was
adopted in this country because it was believed to be the most effective measure to
guarantee the integrity of land titles and to protect their indefeasibility once the
claim of ownership is established and recognized.

It is settled that a Torrens Certificate of title is indefeasible and binding upon the
whole world unless and until it has been nullified by a court of competent
jurisdiction. Under existing statutory and decisional law, the power to pass upon the
validity of such certificate of title at the first instance properly belongs to the
Regional Trial Courts in a direct proceeding for cancellation of title.

As the registered owner, petitioner had a right to the possession of the property,
which is one of the attributes of his ownership. Respondents' argument that
petitioner is not an innocent purchaser for value and was guilty of bad faith in
having the subject land registered in his name is a collateral attack on the title of
petitioner, which is not allowed. A certificate of title cannot be subject to a collateral
attack and can be altered, modified or cancelled only in a direct proceeding in
accordance with law. [19]
The pronouncement in Co v. Militar was later reiterated in Spouses Pascual v.
Spouses Coronel[20] and in Spouses Barias v. Heirs of Bartolome Boneo, et al.,[21]
wherein we consistently held the age-old rule that the person who has a Torrens
Title over a land is entitled to possession thereof.[22]
However, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the present petitioner has
instituted an unlawful detainer case against respondents. It is an established fact
that for more than three decades, the latter have been in continuous possession of
the subject property, which, as such, is in the concept of ownership and not by mere
tolerance of petitioners father. Under these circumstances, petitioner cannot simply
oust respondents from possession through the summary procedure of an ejectment
proceeding.
Instructive on this matter is Carbonilla v. Abiera,[23] which reads thus:
Without a doubt, the registered owner of real property is entitled to its possession.
However, the owner cannot simply wrest possession thereof from whoever is in
actual occupation of the property. To recover possession, he must resort to the
proper judicial remedy and, once he chooses what action to file, he is required to
satisfy the conditions necessary for such action to prosper.
In the present case, petitioner opted to file an ejectment case against respondents.
Ejectment casesforcible entry and unlawful detainerare summary proceedings
designed to provide expeditious means to protect actual possession or the right to
possession of the property involved. The only question that the courts resolve in
ejectment proceedings is: who is entitled to the physical possession of the premises,
that is, to the possession de facto and not to the possession de jure. It does not
even matter if a partys title to the property is questionable. For this reason, an
ejectment case will not necessarily be decided in favor of one who has presented
proof of ownership of the subject property. Key jurisdictional facts constitutive of the
particular ejectment case filed must be averred in the complaint and sufficiently
proven.
The statements in the complaint that respondents possession of the building was
by mere tolerance of petitioner clearly make out a case for unlawful detainer.
Unlawful detainer involves the persons withholding from another of the possession

of the real property to which the latter is entitled, after the expiration or termination
of the formers right to hold possession under the contract, either expressed or
implied.
A requisite for a valid cause of action in an unlawful detainer case is that possession
must be originally lawful, and such possession must have turned unlawful only upon
the expiration of the right to possess. It must be shown that the possession was
initially lawful; hence, the basis of such lawful possession must be established. If, as
in this case, the claim is that such possession is by mere tolerance of the plaintiff,
the acts of tolerance must be proved. (Emphasis supplied.)
In this case, petitioner has not proven that respondents continued possession of
the subject properties was by mere tolerance of his father, except by a mere
allegation thereof. In fact, petitioner has not established when respondents
possession of the properties became unlawful a requisite for a valid cause of
action in an unlawful detainer case.
In Canlas v. Tubil,[24] we enumerated the elements that constitute the sufficiency of
a complaint for unlawful detainer, as follows:
Well-settled is the rule that what determines the nature of the action as well
as the court which has jurisdiction over the case are the allegations in the
complaint. In ejectment cases, the complaint should embody such statement of
facts as to bring the party clearly within the class of cases for which the statutes
provide a remedy, as these proceedings are summary in nature. The complaint
must show enough on its face to give the court jurisdiction without resort to parol
evidence.

Unlawful detainer is an action to recover possession of real property from one who
illegally withholds possession after the expiration or termination of his right to hold
possession under any contract, express or implied. The possession of the defendant
in unlawful detainer is originally legal but became illegal due to the expiration or
termination of the right to possess.

An unlawful detainer proceeding is summary in nature, jurisdiction of which lies in

the proper municipal trial court or metropolitan trial court. The action must be
brought within one year from the date of last demand and the issue in said case is
the right to physical possession.
...

...

...

In Cabrera v. Getaruela, the Court held that a complaint sufficiently alleges a

cause of action for unlawful detainer if it recites the following:

(1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by

tolerance of the plaintiff;

(2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to

defendant of the termination of the latters right of possession;

(3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived
the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and

(4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the
plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.
Based on the above, it is obvious that petitioner has not complied with the
requirements sufficient to warrant the success of his unlawful detainer Complaint
against respondents. The lower courts and the CA have consistently upheld the
entitlement of respondents to continued possession of the subject properties, since
their possession has been established as one in the concept of ownership. Thus, the
courts correctly dismissed the unlawful detainer case of petitioner.
We concur in the appellate courts findings that petitioners father engaged in a
double sale of the disputed properties. The records of the case show that it took
petitioner more or less five years from 1971 when he acquired the property from his
father to 1976 when petitioner registered the conveyance and caused the issuance
of the land title registered in his name under the Torrens system. Respondents, on
the other hand, continued their possession of the properties, but without bothering
to register them or to initiate any action to fortify their ownership.
We cannot, however, sustain the appellate courts conclusion that petitioner's
failure to initiate any action to annul the sale to respondents and oust them from
the disputed properties had the effect of registration of respondents unregistered
Deed of Absolute Sale. We held thus in Ruiz, Sr. v. Court of Appeals [25]:

(But) where a party has knowledge of a prior existing interest which is unregistered
at that time he acquired a right to the same land, his knowledge of that prior
unregistered interest has the effect of registration as to him. Knowledge of an
unregistered sale is equivalent to registration. As held in Fernandez v. Court of
Appeals [189 SCRA 780 (1990)],

Section 50 of Act No. 496 (now Sec. 51 of P.D. 1529), provides that the registration
of the deed is the operative act to bind or affect the land insofar as third persons
are concerned. But where the party has knowledge of a prior existing interest which
is unregistered at the time he acquired a right to the same land, his knowledge of
that prior unregistered interest has the effect of registration as to him. The Torrens
system cannot be used as a shield for the commission of fraud (Gustillo v. Maravilla,
48 Phil. 442). [Emphasis supplied.]
In this case, the Quitclaim executed by the elder Corpuz in favor of petitioner was
executed ahead of the Deed of Sale of respondents. Thus, the sale of the subject
properties by petitioners father to respondents cannot be considered as a prior
interest at the time that petitioner came to know of the transaction.
We also note that, based on the records, respondents do not dispute the
existence of TCT No. T-12980 registered in the name of petitioner. They allege,
though, that the land title issued to him was an act of fraud [26] on his part. We
find this argument to be equivalent to a collateral attack against the Torrens title of
petitioner an attack we cannot allow in the instant unlawful detainer case.
It is settled in jurisprudence that a Torrens certificate of title cannot be the subject
of collateral attack.[27] Such attack must be direct and not by a collateral
proceeding.[28] It is a well-established doctrine that the title represented by the
certificate cannot be changed, altered, modified, enlarged, or diminished in a
collateral proceeding.[29] Considering that this is an unlawful detainer case wherein
the sole issue to be decided is possession de facto rather than possession de jure, a
collateral attack by herein respondents on petitioner's title is proscribed.
Our ruling in the present case is only to resolve the issue of who has the better right
to possession in relation to the issue of disputed ownership of the subject
properties. Questions as to the validity of petitioner's Torrens title can be ventilated
in a proper suit instituted to directly attack its validity, an issue that we cannot
resolve definitively in this unlawful detainer case.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we deny the instant Petition for lack of merit.
The Decisions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 90645 (dated January 08,
2008), of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City in Civil Case No. 3111-13293-65, as
well as of the Municipal Trial Court of Laoag City in Civil Case No. 3111 -- all
dismissing the unlawful detainer case of petitioner are AFFIRMED.
We make no pronouncements as to attorney's fees for lack of evidence.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-2132

May 30, 1949

JUANA SAVINADA, petitioner,

vs.
J.M. TUASON & CO., INC. represented by its managing partner, GREGORIO ARANETA,
INC., and PRUDENCIO M. ENCOMIENDA, Judge of Municipal Court of Quezon City,
respondents.

Paredes, Diaz & Poblador and Jose A. Buendia for petitioner.

Araneta & Araneta for respondents.

OZAETA, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari to annul an order of the respondent judge of the
municipal court of Quezon City denying the petitioner's motion to quash a complaint
for unlawful detainer on the alleged grounds (1) that the court had no jurisdiction of
the subject of the action and cause (2) that the complaint stated no cause of action.

It appears that the respondent J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc., filed an action against the
petitioner Juan Savinada for unlawful detainer, alleging, insofar as pertinent to the
issue herein, as follows:

3. That the plaintiff is the absolute and lawful owner of that certain real estate
known as the Sta. Mesa Height Subdivision situated in Quezon City and covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 37686 issued by the register of deeds of the City of
Manila;

4. That the defendant is unlawfully withholding from the plaintiff the possession of a
portion of the above-mentioned property, said portion being described as follows:

A ricefield and vegetable tract situated in Barrio Tatalon, Quezon City, being a
portion of the Sta. Mesa Height Subdivision, covered by the above-mentioned
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 37686. Bounded on the N., by a vacant ricefield
cultivated by a certain person known only as Kierner; on the S., by a vacant ricefield
cultivated by Hermogenes Placido; on the W., by a ricefield cultivated by Jorge
Placido; on the E., by Espaa Street, containing an area of three hectares, more or
less.

The herein petitioner filed a motion to dismiss that complaint contending (1) that he
is the exclusive owner of the land in question and (2) that the complaint does not
allege the date when the defendant entered the premises in question nor the
manner of such entry.

In his order of February 14, 1948, the respondent judge sustained the second
ground of the motion and dismissed the complaint. But upon for reconsideration
filed by the plaintiff in which it invoked the decision of this court in the case of Co
Tiamco vs. Diaz (75 Phil., 672), the respondent judge reconsidered and set aside the
order of dismissal and required the defendant to answer the complaint.

The main issue involved herein is the sufficiency of the allegation of paragraph 4 of
the complaint hereinabove quoted. It is apparent that said allegation is patterned
after Form No. 1 prescribed by this Court as a model of a "complaint for ejectment"
and appended to the Rules of Court. In the above-cited of Co Tiamco vs. Diaz the
same question was raised, and this court sustained the sufficiency of such
allegation in the following language:

There is no fairness in holding a form to be insufficient after all the litigants were
told by our Rules to follow it. It is said that a form is about an illustration, a guide, or

outline containing a general idea of what may be done. But obviously, it cannot be a
good illustration when it leaves something in the dark. It cannot be a right guide
when it misguides. And it cannot be an honest outline when it is incomplete and is
deceitful. A form provided by law is a part of that law and, as such, it must be
respected, regardless of what we might desire as to how it should be. After all, our
duty is to construe the law and not our will, for in administrating the law we have no
will but the will of the law. In the instant case, the form provided by the rules is not
a figment of the mind but a partial expression of a fundamental policy. It disclose
that in an action for forcible entry a simple allegation in the complaint that
defendant turned the plaintiff out of possession is sufficient, for, undoubtedly, the
words "turned out" imply force in the taking of the possession. (Mediran vs.
Villanueva, 37 Phil., 752, 756.) And in action for unlawful detainer, a simple
allegation that defendant is lawfully withholding possession from plaintiff's made
sufficient, for the words "unlawfully withholding" imply possession on the part of the
defendant, which was legal in the beginning having no other source than a contract,
express or implied, possession which has later expired as a right and is being
withheld by defendant. Thus, a form of a pleading is devised which is brief and
concise, and through apparently too general, it is so worded as clearly to appraise
the defendant of the substance of the claim. Other details like the one-year period
within which the action should be brought, and the demand when required to be
made by the Rule, must be proved but need not be alleged in the complaint. (42
Off. Gaz., 1179.)

In the absence of compelling reason, we are not inclined to disturb that ruling.

With regard to petitioner's contention that the municipal court had no jurisdiction of
the subject matter of the action because the defendant alleged in his answer that
he is the owner of the land in question, suffice it to advert to the well-settled
jurisprudence that the mere filing of an answer, in an unlawful detainer case,
claiming title to the premises involved or raising a question of ownership, will not
divest the justice of the municipal court of its jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the action. (Supia vs. Quintero, 59 Phil., 312.) Said court would lose jurisdiction only
if the evidence presented during the trial should show that the question of title is
necessarily involved in the litigation and that by the nature of the proof presented
the question of possession cannot be properly determined without adjudicating the
question of title. (Torres vs. Pea, 78 Phil., 231; Pealosa vs. Garcia, 78 Phil., 245;
De Los Reyes vs. Elepao, 83 Phil., 691, and case therein cited.)

The petition is denied, with costs against the petitioner. So ordered.

Paras, Pablo, Perfecto, Bengzon, Tuason, Montemayor and Reyes, JJ., concur.
Feria, J., dissents.

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court

Manila

SECOND DIVISION

ROSA DELOS REYES,

Petitioner,

- versus -

SPOUSES FRANCISCO

ODONES and

ARWENIA ODONES,
NOEMI OTALES, and
GREGORIO RAMIREZ,

Respondents.

G.R. No. 178096

Present:

CARPIO, J.,

Chairperson,

NACHURA,

BRION,*

PERALTA, and

ABAD, JJ.

Promulgated:

March 23, 2011

x---------------------------------------------x

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

This petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks the reversal of
the February 19, 2007 Decision[1] and the May 22, 2007 Resolution[2] of the Court
of Appeals (CA), affirming the June 20, 2006 decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 68, Camiling, Tarlac, which in turn set aside the March 28, 2006
decision[4] of the Municipal Trial

Court (MTC) of Camiling, Tarlac, in a complaint for unlawful detainer, disposed as

follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against

defendants, ordering defendants, spouses Arwenia Odones and Francisco Odones,
their heirs and assigns and all persons acting in their behalves to vacate the
premises and to surrender possession thereof to the plaintiff. Defendants are
likewise ordered to pay One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos as reasonable
compensation for the use of the land and Attorneys fees in the amount of Five
Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos.

SO ORDERED.[5]

The Facts

This case emanated from a complaint for Unlawful Detainer with Preliminary
Injunction[6] filed by petitioner Rosa delos Reyes (petitioner) against respondents
spouses Arwenia and Francisco Odones, Noemi Otales, and Gregorio Ramirez
(respondents) before the MTC of Camiling, Tarlac, on July 12, 2005. The complaint
alleged these material facts:

3. That [petitioner] is the owner of a parcel of land covered x x x by Transfer

Certificate of Title No. 392430, of the Land Records for the Province of Tarlac,
located at Pao, Camiling, Tarlac, x x x.

4. That even before the document upon which the title was based, [petitioner] has
long been the owner thereof;

5. That [respondents] are staying on the said property with a house/improvements

therein, with the mere tolerance of [petitioner] only without any contract
whatsoever and for which there is an implied understanding to vacate upon the
demand;

6. That [petitioner] previously demanded verbally upon [respondents] to vacate

which they refused and for which a written notice was sent advising them to vacate
the said property within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the letter to vacate x x x.

7. That the said letter was sent by registered mail on June 17, 2005, which was duly
received x x x.[7]

In their Answer with Counterclaim,[8] respondents claimed that they are the owners
of the lot, having purchased the same by virtue of an Extrajudicial Succession of
Estate and Sale[9] dated January 29, 2004, executed by the heirs of Donata
Lardizabal, the lands original owner. Respondents denied that their occupancy of
the property was by virtue of petitioners tolerance.[10]

Respondents further argued that the basis of petitioners Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT), which is a Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 18, 1972,[11] was a forgery
because the purported vendors therein, Donata Lardizabal and Francisco Razalan,
died on June 30, 1926[12] and June 5, 1971,[13] respectively. Incidentally, the said
TCT and Deed of Absolute Sale are the subject of a pending case for annulment of
title before the RTC, Branch 68, Camiling, Tarlac.[14]

In a decision dated March 28, 2006, the MTC ruled in favor of petitioner, and
ordered respondents to vacate the property and to pay rent for the use and
occupation of the same, plus attorney's fees.

Respondents appealed[15] to the RTC, arguing that since the complaint failed to
allege how respondents entered the property or when they erected their houses
thereon, it is an improper action for unlawful detainer, and the MTC had no
jurisdiction over the same.[16]

In its June 20, 2006 decision,[17] the RTC set aside the MTCs judgment and
dismissed the complaint. The RTC held that the complaint failed to aver acts
constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer since it did not state how entry
was effected or how and when the dispossession started. Hence, the remedy should
either be accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria in the proper RTC.

Aggrieved, petitioner sought recourse with the CA, asseverating that the RTC
misappreciated the allegations in the complaint and that respondents were
estopped from assailing the MTCs jurisdiction because they did not raise such issue
in the proceedings before that court. Petitioner insisted that, as the registered
owner of the lot, she has a preferential right of possession over it.[18]

On February 19, 2007, the CA affirmed the judgment of the RTC, adding that, as
pronounced in Go, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,[19] in order to justify an action for
unlawful detainer, the owners permission or tolerance must be present at the
beginning of the possession.[20] Petitioner moved for reconsideration,[21] but the
motion was denied in a Resolution dated May 22, 2007.[22] Hence, the instant
petition[23] ascribing the following errors to the CA:

THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPLYING THE CASE OF GO, JR. v. COURT
OF APPEALS.

THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE HON. MUNICIPAL TRIAL
COURT OF CAMILING, TARLAC NEVER ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE.

THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE RESPONDENTS
ARE ALREADY ESTOPPED FROM RAISING THE ISSUE OF JURISDICTION.

THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT APPLYING THE PRINCIPLE OF STARE
DECISIS.[24]

The petition is meritorious.

Well-settled is the rule that what determines the nature of the action, as well as the
court which has jurisdiction over the case, are the allegations in the complaint. In
ejectment cases, the complaint should embody such statement of facts as to bring
the party clearly within the class of cases for which the statutes provide a remedy,
as these proceedings are summary in nature. The complaint must show enough on
its face to give the court jurisdiction without resort to parol evidence.[25]

Unlawful detainer is an action to recover possession of real property from one who
illegally withholds possession after the expiration or termination of his right to hold
possession under any contract, express or implied. The possession by the defendant
in unlawful detainer is originally legal but became illegal due to the expiration or
termination of the right to possess.[26] The proceeding is summary in nature,
jurisdiction over which lies with the proper MTC or metropolitan trial court. The
action must be brought up within one year from the date of last demand, and the
issue in the case must be the right to physical possession.[27]

A complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it recites

the following:

1. initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by

tolerance of the plaintiff;

2. eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant

of the termination of the latter's right of possession;

3.
thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived
the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and

4.
within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the
plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.[28]

Contrary to the findings of the RTC and the CA, petitioners allegations in the
complaint clearly makes out a case for unlawful detainer, essential to confer
jurisdiction over the subject matter on the MTC. Petitioner alleges that she is the
owner of the lot, as shown by TCT No. 392430, issued by the Registry of Deeds of
Tarlac; that respondents are occupying the lot by virtue of petitioners tolerance;
and that petitioner sent a letter to respondents on June 17, 2005, demanding that
they vacate the property, but they failed and refused to do so. The complaint was
filed on July 12, 2005, or within one year from the time the last demand to vacate
was made.

Firm is the rule that as long as these allegations demonstrate a cause of action for
unlawful detainer, the court acquires jurisdiction over the subject matter.

The CA misapplied the ruling in Go[29] that tolerance must be present right from
the start of possession, which possession is sought to be recovered. The CA, in
affirming the RTC, likewise erroneously applied the rule that jurisdictional facts must
appear on the face of the complaint for ejectment, such that when the complaint
fails to faithfully aver facts constitutive of unlawful detainer, as where it does not
state when and how entry was effected, or how and when dispossession started, the
remedy should either be accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria in the proper
RTC.

The requirement that the complaint should aver, as jurisdictional facts, when and
how entry into the property was made by the defendants applies only when the
issue is the timeliness of the filing of the complaint before the MTC, and not when
the jurisdiction of the MTC is assailed because the case is one for accion publiciana
cognizable by the RTC.[30] This is because, in forcible entry cases, the prescriptive
period is counted from the date of defendants actual entry into the property;
whereas, in unlawful detainer cases, it is counted from the date of the last demand
to vacate. Hence, to determine whether the case was filed on time, there is a
necessity to ascertain whether the complaint is one for forcible entry or for unlawful
detainer; and since the main distinction between the two actions is when and how
defendant entered the property, the determinative facts should be alleged in the
complaint.[31]

In Go, there was evidence that the possession by the defendant was illegal at the
inception and not merely tolerated as alleged in the complaint. No such similar
finding is extant in this case. Further, one of the factual issues raised in Go was
whether the action was filed within one (1) year from the date the last demand was
made. Here, it is beyond dispute that the complaint for unlawful detainer was filed
within one (1) year from the date the demand letter was sent on June 17, 2005.

Based on the foregoing, the MTC validly acquired jurisdiction over the complaint and
we agree with its conclusion that petitioner is entitled to the physical possession of
the lot, she having been able to prove by preponderance of evidence, through the
TCT registered in her name, that she is entitled to possession of the property as
owner. The countervailing evidence presented by respondents that sought to
dispute the authenticity of petitioners TCT cannot be given weight in this case.
Settled is the rule that the validity of a certificate of title cannot be attacked in an
action for ejectment.[32]

This notwithstanding, the determination made herein as regards petitioners

ownership of the lot by virtue of TCT No. 392430 is only prima facie and only for
purposes of resolving the issue of physical possession. These pronouncements are
without prejudice to the case of annulment of the deed of sale and TCT filed by
respondents against petitioner.[33] Lastly, these pronouncements are not binding
on respondents Noemi Otales and Gregorio Ramirez over whose persons no
jurisdiction was acquired by the MTC.[34]

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The February 19, 2007 Decision and the May
22, 2007 Resolution of the Court of Appeals are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The March 28, 2006 decision of the Municipal Trial Court of Camiling, Tarlac, is
REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.