Critical Summary

In The Case for the Use of Animals in Biomedical Research, Carl Cohen makes
the case for the use of animals in biomedical research. His position rests on the
assumption that animals have no rights. Cohen claims that animals cannot have
rights because they cannot be moral agents, and only a species of moral agents can
have rights. Cohen goes on to supports this assertion with a defense of the concept
of speciesism.
Cohen argues that a species can only have moral standing if it understands the
concept of moral agency. According to Cohen, Rights arise, and can be intelligibly
defended, only among beings who actually do, or can, make moral claims. (Cohen,
1986, 94)
But how do the rights of the morally competent and autonomous members of a
species extend to the comatose, mentally challenged, or senile? Cohen grants that
human beings with these afflictions have rights, and maintains this to be consistent
with a view that animals do not have rights: What humans retain when disabled,
animals never had. (Cohen, 1986, 96) He claims that the rubric of autonomy or
moral agency cannot be used at the individual level to assess whether a being has
rights. To justify this assertion, Cohen appeals to speciesism.
Speciesism is the idea that the moral value of an entire species depends on its
moral capabilities on the whole. Humans are of a species that is necessarily autonomous and capable of understanding general principles. Therefore, humans
have rights. Animals, however, are not of a species that is autonomous and capable of morality. Therefore, Cohen concludes, animals have no rights.
Introducing a mechanism whereby the rights of a group are arbitrarily extended
to the individuals of that group is illogical. If moral autonomy is the rubric by which
the question of whether a being has rights or not is to be resolved, how does a being
without moral autonomy (e.g., a person suffering from advanced dementia) have
rights anyway? Cohens defense rests on a mysterious system that grants rights that
apply to the whole group, to particular individuals regardless of whether or not
they themselves are in possession of morally-relevant (under Cohens system) capacities. Curiously, this system only applies to humans. Cohens reasoning seems
guided more by bias than logic, evidenced by his initial appeal to a beings kind (Cohen, 1986, 96) which is reminiscent of language in the Old Testament.

Critical Summary

This is implied by the title of Cohen's paper

itself. Consider revising.

In The Case for the Use of Animals in Biomedical Research,, Carl Cohen makes the case
for the use of animals in biomedical research. His position rests on the assertion assumption
that animals have no rights. Cohen claims that animals cannot have rights because they
cannot be moral agents, and only a species of moral agents can have rights. Cohen goes on to
supports this assertion with a defense of the concept of speciesism.

Cohen argues that a species can only have moral standing if it understands the concept
of moral agency. According to Cohen, Rights arise, and can be intelligibly defended, only
among beings who actually do, or can, make moral claims. (Cohen, 1986, 94).

But how do the rights of the morally competent and autonomous from

Isn't Cohen's
claim, rather,
that a species
can only have
moral
standing if it
possess the
capacity for
moral agency
-- not
necessarily a
conceptual
understanding
of moral
agency as
such.

amongmembers of a species translate extend to the comatose, mentally challenged, or senile?

Cohen grants that humansuch beings with these afflictions have rights, and holds maintains
this to be consistent with a view that animals do not have rights:, saying, What humans
retain when disabled, animals never had. (Cohen, 1986, 96). He claims that the rubric of
autonomy or moral agency cannot be used at the individual level to assess whether a being
has rights. To justify this assertion, Cohen appeals to speciesism.

Speciesism is the idea that the moral value of an entire species depends on its moral
capabilities on the whole. Humans are of a species that is necessarily autonomous and
capable of understanding general principles. Therefore, humans have rights. Animals,
however, are not of a species that is autonomous and capable of morality. Therefore, Cohen
concludes, animals have no rights.

Introducing a mechanism whereby the rights of a group are arbitrarily translated

extended to the individuals of that group is illogical. If moral autonomy is the rubric by

The term
"speciesism", as
Cohen uses it, is
not synonymous
with the idea
described.
Speciesism, like
racism, is a
tendency to
(broadly
speaking) weigh
the interests of
one group (in
this case,
demarcated
according to
species) more
heavily than
another.

which the question of whether a being has rights or not is to be resolved, how does a being
without moral autonomy (e.g., a senile beingperson suffering from advanced dementia) have
rights anyway? Cohens defense rests on a mysterious system that translates grants rights
from thethat apply to the whole group, to the small particular individuals regardless of
whether or not they themselves are in possession of morally-relevant (under Cohens system)
capacities. Curiously, this systemand only works forapplies to humans. Cohens reasoning
seems guided more by bias than logic, evidenced by his initial appeal to a beings kind
(Cohen, 1986, 96) which is reminiscent of language in the Old Testament.

Opponents of animal research will sometimes abandon talk of rights and claim instead
that animals should not be used in research because they are sentient, and all sentient beings
should not be harmed. For example, Peter Singer compares speciesism to sexism, racism,
etc., and argues that animals are due equal consideration to humans in questions of ethics in
biomedical research.

Is this really an aside? Please query.

As an aside, Cohen grants that just because animals do not have rights, we are not
morally free to treat them however we like. He claims that we have obligations to animals
which are not based in entitlement, just as we have obligations to other human beings.

However, Cohen rejects the appeal to animal sentience by claiming that animals lack
equal moral standing to humans (due to their nature) and finds Singers analogies specious
and egregious.

In fact, these analogies are apposite. Cohen claims that there are not rational grounds
by which to discriminate rights between races or sexes because all the races and sexes are
morally autonomous equivalent and dont differ on a fundamental level. This much is untrue
insofar as women differ from men on a biological level, and indeed, certain diseases and

Is a similarity
between the
language
Cohen uses,
and that of the
Old Testament
necessarily
indicative of
his being
guided by bias
rather than
logic?