PRE-BAR GUIDE

IN CRIMINAL LAW 1
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PROF. PEDRO T. DABU, JR.
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I. Fundamental Principles
a. Definition of Penal Law
Penal laws or statutes are those acts of the Legislature which prohibit certain acts and
establish penalties for their violation; or those that define crimes, treat of their nature,
and provide for their punishment. (Subido vs. Sandiganbayan, 266 SCRA 379,
January 20, 1997)
I. Classes of crimes: difference between mala in se and mala prohibita
1.1. Mala in se crimes are wrong per se even without a law punishing the act
or acts. Criminal intent is required in this kind of crimes. Such being the case, good
faith is a defense.
1.2. Mala prohibita- the act is illegal because of the law prohibiting it. Mere
violation of the law consummates the crime. Criminal intent is not required, hence,
good faith is not a defense.
II. Cases:
Garcia vs. CA, 484 SCRA 617, March 14, 2006
Senatorial Candidate Nene Pimentel, who lost in the 1995 election, charged the
Election Registrar of Alaminos, Pangasinan with violation of Section 27(b) of RA 6646
for allegedly reducing his votes and increasing the votes of other senatorial candidates.
The election offense reads: (b) Any member of the board of election inspectors or
board of canvassers who tampers, increases, or decreases the votes received by a
candidate in any election or any member of the board who refuses, after proper
verification and hearing, to credit the correct votes or deduct such tampered votes. It
was the position of the accused that this offense is mala in se, while the prosecution
contended it is mala prohibita. Held: Clearly, the acts prohibited in Section 27(b) are
mala in se. For otherwise, even errors and mistakes committed due to overwork and
fatigue would be punishable. Given the volume of votes to be counted and canvassed
within a limited amount of time, errors and miscalculations are bound to happen. And it
could not be the intent of the law to punish unintentional election canvass errors.
However, intentionally increasing or decreasing the number of votes received by
a candidate is inherently immoral, since it is done with malice and intent to injure
another. (Note: accused was nonetheless convicted since her act was found to be
intentional.
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2.2. Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan, 369 SCRA 394, Nov. 19, 2001
The crime of plunder is malum in se. When Congress declared plunder as a
heinous crime in 1993, it resolved that the crime of plunder be considered male in se
and it does not matter that such act is punished in a special law especially since the
predicate crimes of plunder are mainly mala in se. Accordingly, mens rea is an
element of the crime. This can be seen from the fact that the degree of responsibility
of the offender is determined by his criminal intent.
2.3. Gonzales vs. HSBC, 537 SCRA 255, October 19, 2007
The offense punished under PD No. 115 is in the nature of malum prohibitum. A mere
failure to deliver the proceeds of the sale or the goods if not sold, is estafa under Art.
315(1)(b) of the Revised Penal Code without need of proving intent to defraud.
2.4. Sps. Veroy vs. Layague, , 210 SCRA 97, June 18, l992
Sps. Veroy had already been living in Quezon City for sometime when the firearms
were found in their house in Davao. They left their house in the custody of a friend.
True, that even constructive possession is punishable. True also that there is no need
of criminal intent in mala prohibita. But there must be knowledge that the firearms
existed. Without the knowledge of voluntariness there is no crime.
2.5. Loney vs. People, 482 SCRA 194
Marcopper stored its mine waste in a pit. At the base, there is a tunnel leading to the
river but a concrete plug was placed at the end of the tunnel. But despite this, mine
waste went out of the pit and in merely a few days, the pit discharged millions of tons of
mine waste into the Boac and Makalupnit rivers. The President and other officials of
Marcopper were charged with violation of Art. 365, RPC and violation of Section 108 of
RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995. The accused moved to quash on the
ground of double jeopardy.
Ruling: Suffice it to say that a mala in se felony cannot absorb mala prohibita crimes.
What makes the former a felony is criminal intent (dolo) or negligence (culpa); what
makes the latter crimes are the special penal laws enacting them.
b. SCOPE OF APPLICATION OR CHARACTERISTICS OF PENAL LAW
1. Territoriality- penal laws cannot be applied outside of Philippine Territory. In
practice, this principle is invoked when a Filipino commits a crime outside of Philippine
territory. Example, a Filipino married for the second time in the United States. He
cannot be charged with bigamy.
But there are exceptions to this rule, which can be found in Article 2 of the
Revised Penal Code.
2. Generality-Article 14 of the New Civil Code provides that penal laws and
those of public security and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live or sojourn in
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Philippine territory. As applied, this may involve a foreigner committing a crime in the
Philippines. He cannot put up the defense that our penal laws donot apply to him
Exceptions1. Immunity of heads of states
2. Immunity of members of diplomatic corp (Ambassadors, Ministers, Ministers
Residents and Charge d affairs)
N.B. Consuls, including consul general, are not included.
3. Visiting Forces Agreement
Under the Visiting Forces Agreement, criminal jurisdiction over certain crimes is
waived in favor of the United States. These are:
1. US military authorities shall have the right to exercise within the Philippines all
criminal and disciplinary jurisdiction conferred on them by the military law of the United
States over US personnel in the Philippines.
2. US authorities exercises exclusive jurisdiction over US personnel with regard
to offenses, including offenses relating to the security of the US, punishable under the
law of the US but not under the laws of the Philippines. i.e. treason; sabotage or
violation of any law relating to national defense
3. US military authorities shall have the primary right to exercise jurisdiction over
US personnel subject to the military law of the US in relation to:
(a) offenses solely against the property or security of the US or offenses solely
against the property or person of US personnel
(b) offenses arising out of any act or omission done in the performance of official
duty.
3. Prospectivity- as a rule, penal laws apply prospectively, or those acts
committed after their effectivity. This is because no ex post facto law shall be enacted.
However, in case the penal law is favorable to the accused, it may be given retroactive
effect. (Article 21, RPC)
C. Constitutional limitations on the power of Congress to enact penal laws in the
Bill of Rights
i. equal protection
The equality guaranteed by the Constitution is legal equality or equality of all persons
before the law. It simply means that no person or class of persons shall be deprived of
the same protection of the laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in
the same place and in like circumstances.
But legislations may provide reasonable classification. Requirements of valid
classification are:
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1. Classification must rest on substantial distinctions

2. must be germane to the purpose of the law
3. must not be limited to existing conditions only
4. must apply equally to all members of the same class

ii. due process

Void for Vagueness Doctrine.
1. Estrada vs. Desierto, 369 SCRA 394, November 19, 2001.
Violative of Due process?
This doctrine requires that criminal statute state explicitly and definitely what acts are
prohibited, so as to provide fair warning and preclude arbitrary enforcement. A statute
or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application.
In such instance, it is repugnant to the constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due
process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of
what conduct to avoid and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying
out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.
But a statute is not void merely because general terms are used therein. There is no
positive constitutional or statutory command requiring the legislature to define each
and every word in an enactment.
Words of a statute will be interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary acceptations
and signification, unless the legislature intended a technical or special legal meaning to
those words.
Moreover, a facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which
is overbroad because of possible chilling effect upon protected speech. This
rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terrorem
effect resulting from their very existence and if facial challenge is allowed for this
reason alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws againsts socially
harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the
area of free speech.
The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special application only to free
speech cases. They are inapt for testing the validity of penal statutes.
2. Romualdez vs. COMELEC, 553 SCRA 370, April 30, 2008

In case the law provides for the punishment of

(j) Violation of any of the
provisions of this Act is not vague. Section 45[41] of Republic Act No. 8189 makes a
recital of election offenses under the same Act. Section 45(j) is, without doubt, crystal
in its specification that a violation of any of the provisions of Republic Act No. 8189 is
an election offense.
The language of Section 45(j) is precise. The challenged
provision renders itself to no other interpretation. A reading of the challenged provision
involves no guesswork. We do not see herein an uncertainty that makes the same
vague.
Overbreadth Doctrine
If a statute is so broadly written that it deters free expression, then it can be struck
down on its face because of its chilling effect, even if it also prohibits acts that may
legitimately be forbidden. The overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for
testing on their faces statutes in free speech cases.
iii. non imposition of cruel and unusual punishment or excessive fines
1. RA 9346-An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the
Philippines.
2. Agbanlog vs. People, et al, 222 SCRA 530, May 24, l993,
This is a case for malversation of public funds. The amount involved was P21,000.00.
Accused questions as oppressive and unconstitutional the penalty of 11 years and 1
day to 16 years, 5 months and 11 days imprisonment imposed upon him. He argues
that considering the value of the peso in 1932 when the Revised Penal Code was
enacted and the value of the peso today, the penalty for malversation of P21,000.00
should only be an imprisonment of 1 to 2 years.
Ruling: The Court can intervene and strike down the penalty as cruel, degrading or
inhuman only when it has become so flagrantly oppressive and so wholly
disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the moral senses.
Considering that malversation of public funds by a public officer is a betrayal of the
public trust, the penalty imposed upon the petitioner is not so disproportionate to the
crime committed as to shock the moral sense.
Assuming arguendo that inflation has in effect made more severe the penalty for
malversing P21,000.00, the remedy cannot come from this Court but from Congress.
iv. bill of attainder
- is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without judicial trial. Test: inflicts
punishment without judicial trial
1. People vs. Ferrer. 48 SCRA 382 (1972)
RA 1700 Or The Anti Subversion Law. This law declared the CPP as an outlawed
organization. Those who remained members of the CPP or affiliates shall be
punished. The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the law because the guilt
of the accused must still be proven in court. Justice Castro said:
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i. The law does not specify the CPP for the purpose of punishment. The term
communist party is used for definitional purposes
ii. The law does not specify the members of the CPP for the purpose of
punishment.
v. ex post facto law
i. which makes an action done before the passing of the law which and was innocent
when done criminal and punishes such action.
ii. Which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than when it was committed, or
iii. Which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law
annexed to the crime when it was committed.
iv. Which alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less or different
testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense in order to
convict the accused.

d. ARE THERE COMMON LAW CRIMES IN OUR JURISDICTION?

None, nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege

e. APPLICABILITY OF THE RPC TO SPECIAL PENAL LAWS (Art. 10)

Go Tan vs. Sps. Perfecto and Juanita Tan, September 30, 2008
Q. Can the parents-in-law be sued for violation of RA 9262 in conspiracy with their
son?
A. Yes, True that the law provides that the offender be related or connected to the
victim by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, yet it does
not preclude the application of the principle of conspiracy under the RPC.
Indeed, Section 47 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly provides for the suppletory
application of the RPC, thus:
SEC. 47. Suppletory Application. - For purposes of this Act, the Revised Penal Code
and other applicable laws, shall have suppletory application. (Emphasis supplied)
If the RPC is given suppletory application to offenses penalized by special laws even if
said special penal laws do not provide for it, with more reason, therefore, the principle
of conspiracy under Article 8 of the RPC may be applied suppletorily to R.A. No. 9262
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because of the express provision of Section 47 that the RPC shall be supplementary to
said law.

OTHER INSTANCES WHERE THE RPC WAS APPLIED TO SPL:

1. Provision on subsidiary penalty under Article 39 of the RPC was applied to
cases of violations of Act No. 3992, otherwise known as the "Revised Motor Vehicle
Law," (People v. Moreno, 60 Phil 712, 1934)
2. The rules on the service of sentences provided in Article 70 of the RPC was
applied in favor of the accused who was found guilty of multiple violations of R.A. No.
6425, otherwise known as the "Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972," considering the lack of
similar rules under the special law. (People v. Li Wai Cheung, 214 SCRA 504 (October
13, 1992
2.1. But the provisions of Articles 13, 64, 71 and 76 of the RPC could not
be given suppletory effect to drug offenses (Gallardo vs. Judge Tabamo, 232 SCRA
960, June 2, 1994)
3. Articles 17, 18 and 19 of the RPC to define the words "principal,"
"accomplices" and "accessories" under R.A. No. 8042, otherwise known as the
"Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995," because said words were not
defined therein, although the special law referred to the same terms in enumerating the
persons liable for the crime of illegal recruitment. (People v. Chowdury, 325 SCRA 572,
Feb. 15, 2000)
4. The provisions on subsidiary imprisonment under Article 39 of the RPC was
applied to Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 22, otherwise known as the "Bouncing Checks
Law," noting the absence of an express provision on subsidiary imprisonment in said
special law. (Yu v. People 438 SCRA 431, September 20, 2004)
5. The principle of conspiracy under Article 8 of the RPC was applied to B.P. Blg.
22 in the absence of a contrary provision therein. (Ladonga v. People 451 SCRA 673,
February 17, 2005)
6. The penalty for violation of PD 533 should follow the classification and
duration of penalties prescribed in the RPC since PD 533 merely modified the penalties
for qualified theft of large cattle under Article 310 of the RPC (People vs. Martinada,
February 13, 1991; Pil-ey s. People, July 9, 2007)
II. FELONIES
A. CLASSIFICATION OF FELONIES
Acts and omissions punishable by law are felonies. Felonies are committed by
means of deceit (dolo) and by means of culpa (fault). Thus, felonies are either:
1. Intentional or
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2. Culpable
1. Intentional Felonies (Dolo) - the act is performed with deliberate intent or
malice to do an injury.
a. mens rea- (guilty mind)
mens rea has been defined as a guilty mind, a guilty or wrongful purpose or
criminal intent, and essential for criminal liability. Ordinarily, evil intent must unite with
an unlawful act for there to be a crime, (Valenzuela vs. People G.R. No. 160188, June
21, 2007)
There can be no crime, large or small, without an evil mind. In other words,
punishment is the sequence of wickedness, without which it can not be. It is therefore
a principle in our legal system, as probably it is of every other, that the essence of an
offense is the wrongful intent without which it cannot exist. Actus non facit reum nisi
mens sit rea- the act itself does not make a man guilty unless his intention were so.
Actus me invito factus non est meus actus- an act done by me against my will is not
my act.
(U.S. vs. Ah Chong, 15 Phil. 488, March 19, l910)
Villareal vs. People, 664 SCRA 519, February 1, 2012:
It is not enough to do what the law prohibits. In order for an intentional felony to exist,
it is necessary that the act be committed by means of dolo or malice.
Dolo is a complex idea involving the elements of freedom, intelligence and intent.
Freedom refers to act done with deliberation and with power to choose between two
things
Intelligence concerns the ability to determine the morality of human acts as well as the
capacity to determine between the licit and an illicit act.
Intent refers to the purpose of the mind and the resolve with which a person proceeds.
On the other hand, the term felonious means malicious.
Taken together, the requirement of intent in intentional felony must refer to malicious
intent.
Homicide
Therefore the presence of an initial malicious intent to commit a felony is a vital
ingredient in establishing the commission of the intentional felony of homicide. Being
mala in se, the felony of homicide requires the existence of malice or dolo.
Intent to kill or animus intericendi should not be inferred unless there is proof beyond
reasonable doubt of such intent

Now even if there is no intent to kill but if there is malicious intent to injure (animus
iniuriandi) and as a result of the physical injuries inflicted death ensued, then the
offenders may still be liable for homicide pursuant to Article 4 (1)
But mere infliction of physical injuries does not make a person automatically liable
for an intentional felony.
Calimutan vs. People, 492 SCRA 44, February 9, 2006
Throwing a stone and hitting the victim at the left side of his back at a chance
encounter; the incident was a brief scuffle which lasted only for a few minutes: accused
hardly had the time to ponder upon the most appropriate course of action to take, he
was deemed not to have intent to kill, but it was reckless for him to do so, thus is liable
for reckless imprudence resulting to death and not the intentional felony of homicide.

People vs. Carmen, March 26, 2001

Carmen and the other members of her group are not liable for murder. They had no
criminal intent to kill the boy. They performed the ritual not to kill the boy but to cure
him of illness. Besides, the ritual performed over the victim was consented to by the
victims parents. With the permission of the victims parents, accused Carmen,
together with the other accused, proceeded to subject the boy to a treatment
calculated to drive the bad spirit from the boys body. Their liability arises from their
reckless imprudence because they ought to know that their actions would not bring
about the cure. They are, therefore, guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide and not of murder. The elements of reckless imprudence are apparent in the
acts done by the accused which, because of their lack of medical skill in treating the
victim of his alleged ailment, resulted in the latters death. As already stated, accused,
none of whom is a medical practitioner, belong to a religious group, known as the
Missionaries of Our Lady of Fatima, which is engaged in faith healing.
Bagajo vs. People, November 20, 1978
As a matter of law, Bagajo did not incur any criminal liability for her act of whipping her
pupil, Wilma, with the bamboo-stick-pointer. She did not do what she had done with
criminal intent. That she meant to punish Wilma and somehow make her feel such
punishment may be true, but the means she actually used was moderate and that she
was not motivated by ill-will, hatred or any malevolent intent. The teacher intended
merely to discipline the pupil. And it cannot be said, that Wilma did not deserve to be
discipline. In other words, it was farthest from the thought of the teacher to commit any
criminal offense. Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea.

b. motive is not intent

Motive is the moving power which impels one to action for a definite result;
whereas intent is the purpose to use a particular means to effect such results. Motive
is not an essential element of a felony while intent is an essential element of dolo.
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In some instances, however, motive and intent may be considered one and the
same. The accused is the brother in law of the victim. He and his wife lived in the
house of his parents in law together with the victim. Prior to the fateful night when
Arlenes body was discovered, accused was seen peeping through the bathroom while
Arlene was taking a bath and through the bedroom while Arlene was inside the room.
Intent to kill was duly established by the witnesses when they testified relative to the
peeping incident. Such peeping incident manifested accused evil motive. Motive and
intent may be considered one and the same, in some instances as in the present case.
( Salvador vs. People, 559 SCRA 461, 473, July 23, 2008)

c. good faith negates criminal intent

1. One who fills up his daily time record in the belief that, on the basis of the time
so indicated therein, she is merely making an honest claim for the pay corresponding
to the time so indicated, no intent to commit the crime of falsification of public
document can be ascribed to her. There was no deliberate intent to falsify because she
had rendered public service in those times that she said she was present in her office.
(Beradio vs. CA 103 SCRA 567, March 30, l981)
2. A widow who signed the name of her late husband in the checks delivered to
her by no less than the School Supervisor long after her husbands death and that she
used the proceeds of the checks to pay for the expenses of her husbands last illness
and burial and on the belief that she was entitled to the money as an advance payment
of her husbands vacation and sick leave credits cannot be said to have acted with
criminal intent.( Luage vs.. CA, 112 SCRA 97, Feb. 22, l982)
3. Even if the order is illegal if it is patently legal and the subordinate is not
aware of its illegality, the subordinate is not liable, for then there would only be a
mistake of fact committed in good faith. (Tabuena vs. Sandiganbayan, 268 SCRA
332, Feb. 17, l997)
4. The rule is that any mistake on a doubtful or difficult question of law may be
the basis of good faith. (Lecaros vs. Sandiganbayan, 305 SCRA March 25, 1999)
5. However, ignorance of the law is not an excuse because everyone is
presumed to know the law. Ignorantia legis neminem excusat. (Manuel vs. People,
476 SCRA 461)
d. mistake of fact is absence of criminal intent- A misapprehension of fact
on the part of the person causing injury to another. Such person is not criminally liable
as he acted without criminal intent.
A person is not criminally liable if by reason of a mistake as to the facts, does an
act for which he would be exempt from criminal liability if the facts were as he
supposed them to be, but which would constitute the crime of homicide if the actor had
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known the true state of facts at the time when he committed the act. Mistake of fact
cancels the presumption of intent and works an acquittal. Under such circumstances,
there is no criminal liability provided that the alleged ignorance or mistake of fact was
not due to negligence. There can be no crime, large or small, without an evil mind. In
other words, punishment is the sequence of wickedness, without which it can not be. It
is therefore a principle in our legal system, as probably it is of every other, that the
essence of an offense is the wrongful intent without which it cannot exist. this doctrine
is confirmed by the legal maxims: actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea, (the act
itself does not make a man guilty unless his intention were so) actus me invito factus
non est meus actus (an act done by me against my will is not my act). U.S. vs. Ah
Chong, 15 Phil 488
Mistake of fact not applicable if there is negligence
1. Yapyuco vs. Sandiganbayan, 624 SCRA 470, June 25, 2012
Facts: Villanueva, Flores, Calma, De Vera, Panlican and Licup were on board a
tamarraw jeep and they were traversing the road after coming from a barrio fiesta when
suddenly they met a burst of gunfire and instantly, Villanueva and Licup were both
wounded and bleeding profusely. Licup died thereafter. Villanueva survived. Members
of San Fernando PNP including barangay officials and CHDF members were at the
situs of the shooting because of their information that armed NPA were spotted at the
said place; that when they saw the tamarraw jeepney, a barangay official said that the
suspects were on board that jeepney; the PNP members flagged them down but they
did not stop and so the policemen fired at them. Accused policemen puts mistake of
fact as a defense. Decide.
Ruling:

Mistake of fact is a misapprehension of a fact which, if true, would have justified the
act or omission which is the subject of the prosecution. Mistake of fact is a defense to a
charge of crime where it negates the intent component of the crime. But as held in
People v. Oanis and Baxinela v. People, the justification of an act, which is otherwise
criminal on the basis of a mistake of fact, must preclude negligence or bad faith on the
part of the accused. Here, there was negligence on the part of the police officers
because they shot at the victims without following the rules of engagement. The rules
of engagement do not require the police officer to immediately fire his weapon if the
person to be accosted does not heed his call. Pursuit without danger should be his
next move, and not vengeance for personal feelings or a damaged pride.
2. Baxinela vs. People, 485 SCRA 331 (March 24, 2006)
3. People vs. Oanis, 74 Phil. 257.
2. Culpable felonies (culpa)
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See Calimutan vs. People, 482 SCRA 44 (2006) and People vs. Carmen discussed
above
III. CRIMINAL LIABILITY:
A. CRIMINAL OFFENDERS
1. A person committing a felony is liable for the resulting injury although not
intended. (No. 1, Article 4)
a. Proximate cause
People vs. Ilagan, 191 SCRA 643, November 26, 1990
i. Effect of supervening event ,
a. Urbano vs. IAC, 157 SCRA 1, January 7, 1988
b. Accelerating death rule
Garcia vs. People, 597 SCRA 392, August 28, 2009
Ingrained in our jurisprudence is the doctrine that: x x x where death results as a direct
consequence of the use of illegal violence, the mere fact that the diseased or
weakened condition of the injured person contributed to his death, does not relieve the
illegal aggressor of criminal responsibility.
Although the assaulted party was previously affected by some internal malady, if,
because of a blow given with the hand or the foot, his death was hastened, beyond
peradventure he is responsible therefor who produced the cause for such acceleration
as the result of a voluntary and unlawfully inflicted injury. (Emphasis supplied.)
c. Instilling fear rule- If a man creates in another persons mind, an immediate sense
of danger, which causes such person to try to escape, and in so doing, the latter injures
himself, the man who creates such state of mind is responsible for the resulting
injuries. [People vs. Toling, 62 SCRA 17,33, (1975)Peo vs. Page, 77 SCRA 348, (l977);
People vs. Castromero, 280 SCRA 421, (1997)]

2. Impossible Crime [Art. 4 (2) ]

i. Jacinto vs. People, 592 SCRA 426, July 13, 2009
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The taking of a check without the consent of the owner with intent to gain but which the
check bounced when deposited is an impossible crime, not theft of personal property
because the check has no value.
ii. Intod vs. Court of Appeals, et al 215 SCRA 52,
The killing of a person who was not at the room at the time of shooting, but was
believed to there is an impossible crime.
Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would
not amount to a crime. It would apply to those circumstances where (1) the motive,
desire and expectation is to perform an act in violation of the law; (2) there is intention
to perform the physical act; (3) there is a performance of the intended physical act; and
(4) the consequence resulting from the intended act does not amount to a crime. The
impossibility of killing a person already dead falls in this category.
Factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the
actor or beyond his control prevent the consummation of the intended crime. One
example is the man who puts his hand in the coat pocket of another with the intention
to steal the latter's wallet and finds the pocket empty.

B. Degree of participation
1. PRINCIPAL
1. By Direct Participation
a. CONSPIRACY
This topic discusses the second category.
Kinds of Multiple Conspiracies (Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan, 377 SCRA 556,
Feb. 26, 2002)
1. Wheel or circle conspiracy in which there is a single person or group (the
hub) dealing individually with two or more other persons or groups (the spokes)
2. Chain conspiracy, which involves the distribution of narcotics or other
contraband, in which there is successive communication and cooperation in much the
same way as with legitimate business operations between manufacturer and
wholesaler, then wholesaler and retailer and then retailer and consumer.
3. Enterprise Conspiracy-it is unlawful for any person employed by or associated
with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, foreign commerce, to
conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprises affairs
through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt. Racketeering
activity includes great variety of serious criminal conduct such as murder, kidnappining,
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arson, robbery, bribery, extortion and drug dealing and for there to be a pattern there
must be at least two such acts within a 10 year span. The RICO has its own
conspiracy provision.
Kinds of conspiracy under the Revised Penal Code:
1. Express Conspiracy
2. Implied Conspiracy
Doctrine of implied conspiracy
.

1. People vs. Gueverra, November 13, 1989)

1.1. While Joselito and Teofilo were walking, they were waylaid by Stalin and
Eduardo. Stalin went immediately behind Joselito, and embraced him with both
hands.; the firm embrace locked the whole body and both arms of Joselito. Facing the
hapless Joselito, Eduardo got his knife from his pocket, opened it, and thrust the
weapon at the right side of Joselito's body and he fell to the ground. Joselito died.
Held: There can be no question that the Stalins act in holding the victim from behind
immediately before the latter was stabbed by Eduardo constitutes a positive and an
overt act towards the realization of a common criminal intent, although the intent may
be classified as instantaneous. The act was impulsively done on the spur of the
moment. It sprang from the turn of events, thereby uniting with the criminal design of
the slayer immediately before the commission of the offense. That is termed as
implied conspiracy

1. 2. Subayco, et al vs. Sandiganbayan, et al., August 22, 1996

Several circumstances intersect to show a community of purpose among the accused,
that is, to fire at the demonstrators. This common purpose was pursued by the accused
who used firepower against the rallyists. As proved, the plan to disperse the
demonstrators did not include the use of guns, yet, accused did. At the first crack of
gunfire coming from CHDF Alfredo Quinatagcan (a.k.a. Pidong Bagis), accused
commenced firing at the demonstrators, as if on signal. They fired indiscriminately
toward the demonstrators who were then already lying prone on the ground. There was
no imminent danger to their safety. Not just one or a few shots were fired but several.
The firing lasted a few minutes and cost the lives and limbs of the demonstrators. The
collective acts of the accused clearly show the existence of a common design toward
the accomplishment of a united purpose.
Exceptions to the doctrine of implied conspiracy:
1. Mere signature rule
i. Macadangdang vs. Sandiganbayan, 170 SCRA 308 , February 14, 1989
14

Simply because a person in a chain of processing officers happens to sign or initial a

voucher as it is going the rounds, it does not necessarily follow that he becomes part of
a conspiracy in an illegal scheme. The guilt beyond reasonable doubt of each
supposed conspirator must be established. It is all too easy to be swept into a long
prison term simply because the guilt of some conspirators is overwhelming and
somehow it attaches to all who happen to be charged in one indictment.
Every person who signs or initials documents in the course of their transit through
standard operating procedures does not automatically become a conspirator in a crime
which transpired at a stage where he had no participation. His knowledge of the
conspiracy and his active and knowing participation therein must be proved by positive
evidence.
2. Arias vs. Sandiganbayan, 180 SCRA 309, December 19, 1989
Ruling:
There is no conspiracy by negligence. All heads of offices have to rely to a reasonable
extent on their subordinates and on the good faith of those who prepare bids, purchase
supplies or enter into negotiations

3. Pareno, vs. Sandiganbayan, 256 SCRA 242, April 17, 1996; Larin vs.
Sandiganbayan, April 17, 1996
Ruling:
There is no proof of actual agreement between the petitioners to commit the crimes
charged. The acts of petitioners and that of Evangelista may be considered concerted
only because they performed interrelated functions. Larin from the Excise Tax Office
received the letter of Tanduay and referred the matter to Pareo, as head of the
Alcohol Tax Division considering that the issue was a tax on liquor. A certification from
the RAD was requested and indorsed back to Larin who made a favorable
recommendation to the Deputy Commissioner. There is no showing that petitioners
have acted irregularly, or performed acts outside of their official functions. The
testimony of Jeanet Aurelio that she saw Larin's secretary at their office, following up
the memorandum she was typing has no probative value at all. It must be founded on
facts, not on mere inferences, conjectures and presumptions. There is actually no
proof that conspiracy exists between the parties.
It is rather apparent that under the Sandiganbayan's decision, a department secretary,
bureau chief, commission chairman, agency head, department head or chief of office
would be equally culpable for every crime arising from any transactions or held guilty of
conspiracy simply because he was the last of a long line of officials or employees who
acted upon or affixed his signature to a transaction. We cannot allow this because guilt
must be premised on a more knowing personal, and deliberate participation of each
15

individual who is charged with others as part of a conspiracy. There must be more
convincing proof which in this case is wanting.

b. mere presence or companionship rule

1. Rosario Astudillo vs. People, November 29, 2006
Mere companionship does not establish conspiracy.
2. People vs. Roland Cruz, Nov. l4, l990
The phrase andiyan na has no conclusive conspiratorial meaning.

2. Principals by inducement
Inducement may take the form of either by a command (precepto) or for a
consideration (pacto),

People vs. Dumancas, et. al ,320 SCRA 584, December 13, 1999
Dumancas was swindled in a fake gold bar transactions losing P300T to Danilo and his
cohort. Domingo and his companions abducted Danilo and his cohorts. They brought
the victims to the office of Dumancas. Dumancas investigated the two on the
whereabouts of the money and the two answered that it was already spent. It was then
that Dumancas ordered Doming to take care of the two. The following day Doming
and a companion shot the victims to death.
Ruling:
In order that a person may be convicted as principal by inducement, the following must
be present:
(1)
(2)

the inducement be made with the intention of procuring the commission of the
crime; and
such inducement be the determining cause of the commission by the material
executor ( U.S. vs. Indanan, 24 Phil. 203 [1913] ). To constitute inducement,
there must exist on the part of the inducer the most positive resolution and the
most persistent effort to secure the commission of the crime, together with the
presentation to the person induced of the strongest kind of temptation to
commit the crime.

By the foregoing standards, the remark of Dumancas to take care of the two does not
constitute the command required by law to justify a finding that she is guilty as a
16

principal by inducement. As we held in U.S. vs. Indanan, supra, a chance word

spoken without reflection, a wrong appreciation of a situation, an ironical phrase, a
thoughtless act may give birth to a thought of, or even a resolution to crime in the mind
of one for some independent reason predisposed thereto without the one who spoke
the word or performed the act having any expectation that his suggestion would be
followed or any real intention that it produce the result. In such case, while the
expression was imprudent and the results of it grave in the extreme, he (the one who
spoke the word or performed the act ) would not be guilty of the crime committed.
3. Principals by indispensable cooperation
People vs. Dina Dulay, 681 SCRA 638, September 24, 2012
Facts: Dina asked AAA to accompany her at a wake at GI San Dionisio, Paraaque
City. Before going to the said wake, they went to Bulungan Fish Port along the coastal
road to ask for some fish. Afterwards, AAA and Dina proceeded to the Kubuhan located
at the back of the Bulungan Fish Port. When they reached the Kubuhan, Dina suddenly
pulled AAA inside a room where "Speed" was waiting. AAA saw "Speed" give money
to Dina and heard "Speed" tell Dina to look for a younger girl. Thereafter, "Speed"
wielded a knife and tied AAA's hands to the papag and raped her. AAA asked for Dinas
help when she saw the latter peeping into the room while she was being raped, but
Dina did not do so.
Issue: Whether or not Dina is guilty as co-principal by indispensable cooperation in the
crime of rape.
Ruling:
(1) To be a principal by indispensable cooperation, one must participate in the criminal
resolution, a conspiracy or unity in criminal purpose and cooperation in the commission
of the offense by performing another act without which it would not have been
accomplished. Here, the acts committed by Dina are not indispensable in the
commission of the crime of rape. The events from the time Dina convinced AAA to go
with her until Dina received money from the man who allegedly raped AAA, are not
indispensable in the crime of rape. Anyone could have accompanied AAA and offered
the latter's services in exchange for money and AAA could still have been raped. Even
AAA could have offered her own services in exchange for monetary consideration and
still end up being raped. Thus, this disproves the indispensable aspect of Dina in the
crime of rape.
II. ACCOMPLICES
People vs. De Vera , 312 SCRA 640, August 18, 1999
When is a lookout deemed an accomplice and when a conspirator? What is the
distinction between the two?

17

Conspirators and accomplices have one thing in common: they know and agree with
the criminal design.
Conspirators, however, know the criminal intention because they themselves have
decided upon such course of action. Accomplices come to know about it after the
principals have reached the decision, and only then do they agree to cooperate in its
execution.
Conspirators decide that a crime should be committed; accomplices merely concur in
it. Accomplices do not decide whether the crime should be committed; they merely
assent to the plan and cooperate in its accomplishment.
Conspirators are the authors of a crime; accomplices are merely their instruments who
perform acts not essential to the perpetration of the offense.
2. Abejuela vs. People, 200 SCRA 806, August 19, 1991
Abejuela lent his passbook to a bank teller, his friend. His friend deposited the checks
of his father to Abejuelas passbook, then Abejuela withdrew what was deposited and
gave the same to his friend. His friend assured him that was alright and nothing wrong.
The deposits turned out to be simulated. Is Abejeula an accomplice.
Answer. Knowledge of the criminal intent of the principal (Glicerio Balo, Jr.) is essential
in order that Abejuela can be convicted as an accomplice in the crime of estafa thru
falsification of commercial document. To be convicted as an accomplice, there must be
cooperation in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts. However,
the cooperation which the law punishes is the assistance rendered knowingly or
intentionally, which assistance cannot be said to exist without the prior cognizance of
the offense intended to be committed. Here, Abejuela was not aware of the crime
intended to be committed.
ACCESSORIES
People vs. Vino 178 SCRA 626, October 19, 1989
I. The first issue that arises is that inasmuch as the petitioner was charged in the
information as a principal for the crime of murder, can he thereafter be convicted as an
accessory? The answer is in the affirmative.
The variance is in the participation or complicity of the petitioner. While the petitioner
was being held responsible as a principal in the information, the evidence adduced,
however, showed that his participation is merely that of an accessory. The greater
responsibility necessarily includes the lesser. An accused can be validly convicted as
an accomplice or accessory under an information charging him as a principal.
II. The next issue that must be resolved is whether or not the trial of an accessory can
proceed without awaiting the result of the separate charge against the principal. The
answer is also in the affirmative. The corresponding responsibilities of the principal,
18

accomplice and accessory are distinct from each other. As long as the commission
of the offense can be duly established in evidence, the determination of the
liability of the accomplice or accessory can proceed independently of that of the
principal. So much so that even if the principal is acquitted, the accessory may be
convicted especially so if the acquittal is predicated on reasonable doubt.
III. The third question is this-considering that the alleged principal in this case was
acquitted can the conviction of the petitioner as an accessory be maintained?
In United States vs. Villaluz and Palermo, a case involving the crime of theft, this Court
ruled that notwithstanding the acquittal of the principal due to the exempting
circumstance of minority or insanity (Article 12, Revised Penal Code), the accessory
may nevertheless be convicted if the crime was in fact established.
Corollary to this is United States vs. Mendoza, where this Court held in an arson case
that the acquittal of the principal must likewise result in the acquittal of the accessory
where it was shown that no crime was committed inasmuch as the fire was the result
of an accident. Hence, there was no basis for the conviction of the accessory.
A similar situation may be cited. The accessory was seen driving a bicycle with an
unidentified person as passenger holding a carbine fleeing from the scene of the crime
immediately after the commission of the crime of murder. The commission of the crime
and the participation of the principal or assailant, although not identified, was
established. In such case, the Court holds that the accessory can be prosecuted and
held liable independently of the assailant.

Anti Fencing Law, PD 1612

Pamintuan vs. People, July 11, l994
Fencing, as defined in Section 2 of P.D. No. 1612 (Anti-Fencing Law), is "the act of any
person who, with intent to gain for himself or for another, shall buy, receive, possess,
keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any manner deal
in any article, item, object or anything of value which he knows, or should be known to
him, to have been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft."
The elements of the crime of fencing are:
1. A crime of robbery or theft has been committed;
2. The accused, who is not a principal or accomplice in the commission of the crime of
robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or
disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article, item, object or
anything of value, which has been derived from the proceeds of the said crime;
3. The accused knows or should have known that the said article, item, object or
anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft;
and
19

4. There is, on the part of the accused, intent to gain for himself or for another.
One is deemed to know a particular fact if he has the cognizance, consciousness or
awareness thereof, or is aware of the existence of something, or has the acquaintance
with facts, or if he has something within the mind's grasp with certitude and clarity.
When knowledge of the existence of a particular fact is an element of an offense, such
knowledge is established if a person is aware of a high probability of its existence
unless he actually believes that it does not exist.
On the other hand, the words "should know" denote the fact that a person of
reasonable prudence and intelligence would ascertain the fact in performance of his
duty to another or would govern his conduct upon assumption that such fact exists
Tan vs. People
313 SCRA 220, August 26, 1999

Rosita Lim never reported the theft or even loss to the police. She admitted
that after Manuelito Mendez, her former employee, confessed to the unlawful taking of
the items, she forgave him, and did not prosecute him. Theft is a public crime. It can
be prosecuted de oficio, or even without a private complainant, but it cannot be without
a victim. As complainant Rosita Lim reported no loss to the public authorities, we
cannot hold for certain that there was committed a crime of theft. Thus, the first
element of the crime of fencing is absent, that is, a crime of robbery or theft has been
committed.
Dunlao Sr. Vs. CA, August 22, 1996
Corpus Delicti, meaning
People vs. Lorenzo 240 SCRA 624
It is the body (material substance) upon which a crime has been committed e.g.
the corpse of a murdered person or the charred remains of a house burned down. In a
derivative sense, it means the substantial fact that a crime was committed. It is made
up of two elements: (a) that a certain result has been proved, for example a man has
died or a building has been burned down and (b) that some person is criminally
responsible for the act.
People vs. Marcelino, October 1, 1999
The corpus is the body or material substance upon which a delicti has been committed.
Its two elements are: that a certain result has been proved, and that some person is
criminally responsible for the act
Producing the body of the victim, as well as proving its disposal, is not necessary for a
murder or homicide conviction. It is enough to show that a person was killed without
legal justification. In certain situations, this may even be presumed or established by
circumstantial evidence.
20

PD 1829, Decree Penalizing Obstruction of Apprehension and prosecution of Criminal

Offenders
1. Punishable acts
2. Compare with Article 20, RPC (accessories exempt from criminal liability)
IV. Stages of Execution
1. Attempted stage:
1. People vs. Lamahang, 61 Phil. 793,705-708
The attempt to commit an offense which the law punishes is that which has a logical
relation to a particular, concrete offense. The attempt to commit an indeterminate
offense, inasmuch as its nature in relation to its objective is ambiguous, is not a
juridical fact. It is necessary to prove that said beginning of execution, if carried to its
complete termination following its natural course, without desistance of the perpetrator,
will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense. Xxx There is nothing in the
record from which such purpose of the accused (to rob) may reasonably be inferred.

2. Baleros vs. People, 483 SCRA 10 (Feb. 22 2006)

Held: It would be too strained to construe petitioner's act of pressing a chemicalsoaked cloth in the mouth of Malou which would induce her to sleep as an overt act
that will logically and necessarily ripen into rape. As it were, petitioner did not
commence at all the performance of any act indicative of an intent or attempt to rape
Malou. It cannot be overemphasized that petitioner was fully clothed and that there
was no attempt on his part to undress Malou, let alone touch her private part. For what
reason petitioner wanted the complainant unconscious, if that was really his immediate
intention, is anybodys guess.

3. Rule in homicide cases

People vs. Trinidad, 169 SCRA 51

Trinidad fired two shots, one of which hit Tan on his right thigh.
Trinidad can only be convicted of attempted murder. The wound on his thigh was not
fatal and the doctrinal rule is that where the wound inflicted on the victim is not
sufficient to cause his death, the crime is only Attempted Murder, the accused not
having performed all the acts of execution that would have brought about death
21

(People vs. Phones, L-32754-5, July 21, 1978, 84 SCRA 167; People vs. Garcia, L40106, March 13, 1980, 96 SCRA 497).

People vs. Tiu, December 1, l992

Otillo, was awakened by a noise outside of his house. With a flashlight, he saw that it
was a carabao that was causing the noise. He and his son tried to tie the carabao.
Suddenly, shots were fired from the direction of the road. Otillo was hit on the right
ankle joint and fell down. He then crawled towards the back of the house near the
kitchen. Held: The shooting of Otillo, also attended by treachery, was only attempted
murder because, although the intent to kill him was clearly established, he was shot
only in the ankle. The doctrinal rule is that where the wound inflicted on the victim is not
sufficient to cause his death , the accused not having performed all the acts of
execution that would have brought it about, the crime is only attempted murder.
Rule in estafa:
If only deceit and intent to cause damage were proved but not actual
damage, only attempted estafa is committed.
1. Lateo vs. People, 651 SCRA 262, June 8, 2011
At first, Lateo and Elca proposed to Lucero that she financed the titling of the 122
hectares of land located in Muntinlupa allegedly owned by Elca. Lucero released
P4.7M. But the project turned out to be hoax. When Lucero confronted Lateo, et al
and demanded from them the return of the money, Lateo and Elca instead offered a
five (5) hectare property identified as Lot 10140 of Plan Sgs 04213-000441 located at
Bacoor, Cavite allegedly owned by Elca. Elca, however, demanded an additional P2
million for the transfer of title. Lucero initially gave them P200,000.00. When Lucero
verified with the Land Management Bureau (LMB), she discovered that Elca only had a
pending application for the sales patent over a four (4) hectare area of the subject
land. Lucero charged Lateo and Elca with estafa relative to the foiled Bacoor lot
transaction where complainant parted P200,000.00.
Issue: What is the crime committed by Lateo et al?
Ruling:
Accused representation that Elca owned 14 hectares in Bacoor, Cavite, and was
offering a 5-hectare portion of it, in substitution of the Muntinlupa property, and
demanding an additional P2,000,000.00 from Lucero, constituted fraud and deceit.
Accused commenced the commission of the crime of estafa but they failed to
perform all the acts of execution which would produce the crime, not by reason of their
own spontaneous desistance but because of their apprehension by the authorities
before they could obtain the amount.
Since only the intent to cause damage and not the damage itself had been
shown, they are merely liable for attempted estafa.
22

2. Koh Tieck Heng vs. People 192 SCRA 533, where the Supreme Court held
[that] although one of the essential elements of Estafa is damage or prejudice to the
offended party, in the absence of proof thereof, the offender would x x x be guilty of
attempted estafa. Appellant commenced the commission of the crime of estafa but he
failed to perform all the acts of execution which would produce the crime not by reason
of [their] spontaneous desistance but because of his apprehension of the authorities
before they could obtain the amount. Since only the intent to cause damage and not
the damage itself has been shown respondent court correctly convicted appellant of
attempted estafa.)
2. Frustrated

Requisites:
1. Offender performs all the acts of execution which would produce the felony
2. but felony was not produced by reason of causes independent of the will of the
perpetrator.
Rule in Theft
No frustrated theft; only attempted and consummated

Valenzuela vs. People, 525 SCRA 306, June 21, 2007

On the face of the definition of theft under Article 308, there is only one operative act
of execution by the actor involved in theft the taking of personal property of
another.
Theft is already produced upon the tak[ing of] personal property of another
without the latters consent.
Theft is produced when there is deprivation of personal property due to its taking by
one with intent to gain. Viewed from that perspective, it is immaterial that the offender
is able or unable to freely dispose of the property stolen since the deprivation from the
owner alone has already ensued from such acts of execution. This conclusion is
reflected in Chief Justice Aquinos commentaries, as earlier cited, that [i]n theft or
robbery the crime is consummated after the accused had material possession of the
thing with intent to appropriate the same, although his act of making use of the thing
was frustrated.
Indeed, we have, after all, held that unlawful taking, or apoderamiento, is deemed
complete from the moment the offender gains possession of the thing, even if he has
no opportunity to dispose of the same.
Rule in rape
23

no frustrated rape, only attempted and consummated

People vs. Orita- April 3, l990
We have set the uniform rule that for the consummation of rape, perfect penetration is
not essential. Any penetration of the female organ by the male organ is sufficient. Entry
of the labia or lips of the female organ, without rupture of the hymen or laceration of the
vagina is sufficient to warrant conviction. Necessarily, rape is attempted if there is no
penetration of the female organ (People v. Tayaba, 62 Phil. 559 People v. Rabadan et
al., 53 Phil. 694; United States v. Garcia: 9 Phil. 434) because not all acts of execution
was performed. The offender merely commenced the commission of a felony directly
by overt acts. Taking into account the nature, elements and manner of execution of the
crime of rape and jurisprudence on the matter, it is hardly conceivable how the
frustrated stage in rape can ever be committed.
People vs. Alcoreza, G.R. Nos. 135452-53, October 5, 2001
There must be sufficient and convincing proof that the penis indeed touched the labias
or slid into the female organ and not merely stroked the external surface thereof for an
accused to be convicted of consummated rape. As the labias are required to be
"touched" by the penis, which are by their natural situs or location beneath the mons
pubis or the vaginal surface, to touch with the penis is to attain some degree of
penetration beneath the surface, hence the conclusion that touching the labia majora
or minora of the pudendum constitutes consummated rape."
Rule in arson
If a person had poured gasoline under the house of another and was about to
strike a match to set the house on fire but was apprehended, he was guilty only of
attempted arson.
If there was blaze, but no part of the house is burned, the crime of arson is
frustrated.
If any part of the house, no matter how small, is burned, the crime of arson is
consummated.
(Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Book I 2006 Edition, page 111)
3. Consummated
1. People vs. Salvilla, April 26, l990
From the moment the offender gained possession of the thing, even if the culprit had
no opportunity to dispose of the same, the unlawful taking is complete. The crime is
consummated when the offender acquires possession of the property, even for a short
time, and it is not necessary that the property be taken into the hands of the robber, or
that he should have actually carried the property away, out of the physical presence of
the lawful possessor, or that he should have made his escape with it.
24

2. See Valenzuela case as discussed in the topic on frustrated theft

V. Conspiracy and proposal (Article 8)
Conspiracy is either a crime or a way of committing a crime. It is a crime when
there is a law punishing it. Otherwise, it is only a way of committing a crime, and if it is
present, there is collective, rather than individual, criminal responsibility among the
actors.
To be a crime there must be a law punishing conspiracy. At present, there are
only a few conspiracies punished by the Revised Penal Code. These are (1)
Conspiracy to Commit Treason (Article 115); Conspiracy to Commit Rebellion (Art.
136); Conspiracy to Commit Coup d etat (Art. 136); conspiracy to commit sedition (Art.
142). On the other, the Human Security Act of 2007, RA 9372 punishes conspiracy to
commit terrorism (Sec. 4); PD 1612 punishes conspiracy to commit arson (Section 7)
On proposal, these are the crimes punished: (1) Proposal to commit treason (Art.
115) ; (2) proposal to commit rebellion (Art. 136); and (3) proposal to commit coup d
etat (Art 136)
Conspiracy as a way of committing a crime was discussed in the topic: Degree of
Participation under No. III
VI. Multiple Offenders
(1) Recidivism- A recidivist is one who, at the time of his trial for one crime, shall have
been previously convicted by final judgment of another crime embraced in the same
title of the Revised Penal Code.
Absolute pardon does not affect recidivism. ( People vs. Lacao, September 4, l991)
Basis- greater perversity of the offender
(2) Reitaracion (or habituality) the offender has been previously punished for an
offense to which the law attaches an equal or greater penalty or for two or more crimes
to which it attaches a lighter penalty.
Basis- greater perversity of the offender.
The offender must have served, partially or totally, the penalty imposed upon him. The
controlling factor is the penalty for the previous crime.
Reiteracion is distinguished from recidivism- In recidivism the previous offense and
crime for which he is on trial must fall under the same title of the Code, irrespective of
penalty, while in reiteracion the controlling factor is the penalty for the previous crime.
25

In recidivism, it is enough that the offender has been previously convicted by final
judgment, while in reitaracion, it is required that the offender must have served the
penalty for the previous offense.
3. Habitual Delinquency (art. 62, par. 5)
1. Within a period of 10 years from the date of his release or last conviction, he is
found guilty of any of RETFI2 a third time or oftener.
2. RETFI2 means robbery, estafa, theft, falsification, serious physical injuries and less
serious physical injuries.
3. One conviction should take place within 10 years from the last conviction or release
(People vs. Lacsamana, 70 Phil. 517)
4. Offender should undergo service of the penalty for the first offense
5. Purpose of the law, to render more effective social defense and the reformation of
the offender (People vs. Abuyen 52 Phil. 722)
6. Distinguish habitual deliquency from recidivism
4. Quasi Recidivism (Art. 160)- Any person who shall commit a felony after having
been convicted by final judgment, before beginning to serve such sentence or while
serving the same, shall be punished by the maximum period of the penalty prescribed
by law for the new felony.

VII. Complex Crimes vs. Special Complex Crimes

A complex crime exists when a single act results in two or more grave or less grave
offenses (compound crime or delito compuesto) or when an offense is a necessary
means of committing the other (complex proper or delito complejo)
Special complex crimes, the terminology not being found in law, are different in nature
since they arise from different acts and neither of which is a necessary means to
commit the other. But they are similar to complex crimes because a single penalty is
imposed by the Code. Examples are robbery with homicide ; robbery with rape;
robbery with serious physical injuries (Art. 294); kidnapping and serious illegal
detention with murder (Art. 267); arson resulting in homicide (Art. 320 as amended by
RA 7659); attempted or frustrated robbery with homicide (Article 297);
Plurality of crimes may be (i). formal (ideal) or (ii). material (real)
Formal plurality involves the same criminal intent producing two or more crimes but
with only one criminal liability. Material plurality refers to different criminal intents
producing in two or more crimes and for each of which the accused incurs criminal
liability (Regalado, Criminal Law)
26

When a complex crime under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code is charged, it is
axiomatic that the prosecution must allege in the information and prove during the trial
all the elements of all the offenses constituting the complex crime.
However, the failure of the prosecution to prove one of the component crimes and
the acquittal arising therefrom will not necessarily lead to a declaration of innocence for
the other crimes. Settled is the rule that when a complex crime is charged and the
evidence fails to establish one of the component offenses, the defendant can be
convicted of the others, so long as they are proved. (Monteverde vs. People, August
12, 20012)

Examples of compound crime (delito compuesto)

1. When Cpl. Inocencio heard a commotion from a card game downstairs, he
went down and saw Lacao with a knife. He held the latters hand. When he released
the hand, Lacao suddenly stabbed Cpl. Inocencio which caused his death. Held: Lacao
committed the crime of murder with direct assault. One single act resulted into two
grave or less grave offenses, to wit: murder and direct assault of an agent of a person
in authority. (People vs. Lacao, September 4, l991)
2. From the store, Maghanoy proceeded to the national road where he met his
other victims, Reynante Sabalino, David Baguio and Benito Pacanot who were on their
way home. Then Maghanoy, without warning, he opened fire upon them felling all
three. By sheer luck, Sabelino was hit only in the left thigh, Baguio and Pacanot died.
Held: The accused should have been prosecuted for the complex crime of double
murder and frustrated murder. The deaths of Baguio and Pacanot and the wounding of
Sabelino were the result of one single act of the accused. (People vs. Maghanoy,
December 15, l989)
3. Desalisa stabbed to death his wife who was then pregnant. Held: The
accused-appellant has committed the complex crime of parricide with unintentional
abortion. The abortion was caused by the same violence that caused the death of the
victim. It is unintentional because accused-appellant must have merely intended to kill
the victim but not necessarily to cause an abortion. (People vs. Desalisa, January 4,
1994)

6. People vs. Gaffud 566 SCRA 76, September 19, 2008; the Supreme Court
En Banc:
The single act of accused-burning the house of Manuel Salvador, with the main
objective of killing the latter and his daughter, Analyn, resulting in their deaths resulted
in the complex crime of double murder.

27

1. People vs. Guillen, 85 Phil 307 (1950). The single act of throwing a grenade at
President Roxas resulting in the death of another person and injuring four others
produced the complex crime of murder with multiple attempted murders.
2. People vs. Carpo, 356 SCRA 248 (April 24, 2001). The single act of hurling
a grenade into the bedroom of the victims causing the death of three persons and
injuries to one person constituted the complex crime of multiple murder and attempted
murder.
3. People vs. Comadre, 431 SCRA 366 (June 8, 2004). The single act of
detonating a hand grenade may quantitatively constitute a cluster of several separate
and distinct offenses, yet these component criminal offenses should be considered
only as a single crime in law because the offender was impelled by a single criminal
impulse, which shows his lesser criminal perversity.

Examples of complex crime proper (delito complejo)

1. People vs. Salvilla, April 26, l990
Robbery with serious illegal detention. The term necessary means does not
connote indispensable means for if it did then the offense as a necessary means to
commit another would be an indispensable element of the latter and would be an
ingridient thereof. The phrase necessary means merely signifies that one crime is
committed to facilitate and insure the commission of the other. In this case, the crime of
serious illegal detention was such a necessary means as it was selected by appellant
and his co accused to facilitate and carry out more effectively their evil design to stage
a robbery. The detention of the four persons facilitated the commission of the robbery.
2. People vs. Hon. Villallon, et al, December 21, 1990
The accused committed the crime of estafa thru falsification of public document. The
falsification of a public document may be a means of committing estafa because before
the falsified document is actually utilized to defraud another, the crime of falsification
has already been consumated, damage or intent to cause damage not being an
element of the crime of falsification of public, official or commercial document. The
damage to another is caused by the commission of estafa, not by the falsification of the
document, hence the falsification of the public, official or commercial document is only
a necessary means to commit estafa.
3. Domingo vs. People, October 12, 2009
Domingo committed the complex crime of Estafa through Falsification of Commercial
Document. First, encashment slips are commercial documents. It is falsification not
only because the signature of Remedios was counterfeited but also because Domingo
28

made it appear that Remedios participated in an act or proceeding when in fact she did
not.
Whenever a person carries out on a public, official, or commercial document any
of the acts enumerated in Art. 171 of the RPC as a necessary means to perpetrate
another crime, such as estafa or malversation, a complex crime is formed by the two
crimes.
The falsification of a public, official, or commercial document may be a means of
committing estafa, because before the falsified document is actually utilized to
defraud another, the crime of falsification has already been consummated,
damage or intent to cause damage not being an element of the crime of falsification of
public, official, or commercial document. In other words, the crime of falsification has
already existed. Actually utilizing that falsified public, official, or commercial
document to defraud another is estafa. But the damage is caused by the
commission of estafa, not by the falsification of the document. Therefore, the
falsification of the public, official, or commercial document is only a necessary means
to commit estafa.
4. People vs. Dawandawan, April 6, l990
Accused boxed Maria at her mid section causing her to lose consciousness.
Accused then sexually molested her . After sexually molesting her, accused slashed
Marias neck. He slapped her and boxed her in several parts of her body and stabbed
her on the left side of her breast and she again lost her consciousness. She did not
die however. Held: Accused has committed the two separate crimes of rape and
frustrated homicide. The physical injuries which could have caused victims death were
not the result of the rape committed; neither was the slashing a necessary means for
committing the rape. Independently of the slashing of the victims neck and the
stabbing, the accused was able to consumate the rape. The physical injuries were
inflicted after the rape and were not a necessary means to commit the same.

Delito Continuado
(CONTINUED/CONTINOUS CRIME not continuing crime)
People vs. De Leon, June 26, 2009 (Justice Peralta)
Six people armed with a shotgun and .38 caliber, alighted from their car. Marlon
poked a gun at Eduardo and took his wallet containing P50.00. Four of Marlons
companions went to the cashier and took the money worth P3,000 and shot the
security guard and took his revolver. Held: The accused intended only to rob one
place. That they did; and in the process, also took away by force the money and
valuables of the employees working in said gasoline station. Clearly inferred from these
circumstances are the series of acts which were borne from one criminal resolution. A
29

continued offense is a continuous, unlawful act or series of acts set on foot by a single
impulse and operated by an unintermittent force, however long a time it may occupy.
Defensor Santiago vs. Garchitorena, 228 SCRA 214, Dec. 2, 1993)
For delito continuado to exist there should be a plurality of acts performed during
a period of time, unity of penal provision violated and unity of criminal intent or purpose
which means that two or more violations of the same penal provisions are united in one
and same intent or resolution leading to the perpetration of the same criminal purpose
or aim. In appearance, a delito continuado consists of several crimes but in reality
there is only one crime in the mind of the perpetrator.
On May 1, 1991, then BID Commissioner, Miriam Defensor Santiago was
charged with 32 counts for violation of Sec. 3 (e) of R.A. 3019 by allegedly favoring
unqualified aliens with the benefits of the Alien Legalization Program. The 32
Informations stated the same date when the alleged offenses were committed. Held:
The 32 amended informations charged what is known as delito continuado or
continued crime or continous crime.
2. Other examples of delito continuado
1. The theft of 13 cows belonging to two different owners committed by the
accused at the same place and at the same period of time. (People vs. Tumlos, 67 Phil
320, l939)
2. The theft of six roosters belonging to two different owners from the same coop
and at the same period of time (People vs. Jaranillo, 55 SCRA 563, l974.
3. The theft of two roosters in the same place and on the same occasion (People
vs. de Leon, 49 Phil. 437, l926)
4. The illegal charging of fees for services rendered by a lawyer everytime he
collects veterans benefits on behalf of a client, who agreed that the attorneys fees
shall be paid out of the said benefits [People vs. Sabbun, 10 SCRA 156 (l964)]. The
collections of the legal fees were compelled by the same motive, that of collecting fees
for services rendered, and all acts of collection were made under the same criminal
impulse. [People vs. Lawas, 97 Phi. 975 (1955)]
3. Cases where crimes were not considered delito continuado
1. Two estafa cases, one of which was committed during the period from
January 19 to December 1955 and the other from January 1956 to July 1956 (People
vs. Dichupa, 113 Phil 306, l961). The said acts were comitted on different occassions.
2.
Several malversations committed in May, June and July, l936, and
falsifications to conceal the said offenses committed in August and October, l936. The
malversations and falsifications were not the result of only purpose or of only one
resolution to embezzle and falsify. (People vs. Cid, 66 Phil 354, 1938)
30

3. Two estafa cases, one committed in December, l963 involving failure of the
collector to turn over the installments for a radio and the other in June l964 invloving
the pocketing of the installments for a sewing machine (People vs. Ledesma, 73 SCRA
77 (1976]
4. 75 estafa cases committed by the conversion by the agent of collections from
customers of the employer made on different dates. (Gamboa vs. Court of Appeals, 68
SCRA 308, l975]
FOREKNOWLEDGE PRINCIPLE
The offender had advanced knowledge or could have foreseen that same event will
continuously happen.
Paera vs. People. 649 SCRA 384, May 30, 2011
The theory of fusing his criminal liability to one count of Grave Threat can be sustain
only if he had foreknowledge of A, B and Cs presence near the water tank in the
morning of 8 April 1999. But not having known in advance of A, B and Cs presence
near the water tank at the time in question, Paera could not have formed any intent to
threatened any of them until shortly before he inadvertently came across each of them.

VII. Circumstances which Affect Criminal Liability

A. JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES
1. Defense of ones person.
Stand ground when in the right- the law does not require a person to retreat
when his assailant is rapidly advancing upon him with a deadly weapon. Reason: He
runs the risk of being attacked in the back by the aggressor.
It is axiomatic that the mere thrusting of ones hand into his pocket as if for
the purpose of drawing a weapon is not unlawful aggression. Even the cocking of
a rifle without aiming the firearm at any particular target is not sufficient to conclude
that ones life was in imminent danger. Hence, a threat, even if made with a weapon, or
the belief that a person was about to be attacked, is not sufficient. It is necessary that
the intent be ostensibly revealed by an act of aggression or by some external acts
showing the commencement of actual and material unlawful aggression. (People vs.
Rubiso, 399 SCRA 267, March 18, 2003; see also People vs. Daquipil, 240 SCRA
708)

The victim told the accused: So you are brave now you had the guts to fight
against me; go home, get your firearm because I will go home to get a gun. If you wont
go home and get a gun, I will go to your place and kill you including your parents. Held:
Such utterances cant be regarded as unlawful aggression. Such statements could not
31

reasonably inspire well grounded and reasonable belief that accused was in imminent
danger of death or bodily harm. Unlawful aggression refers to an attack that has
actually broken out or materialized or clearly imminent; it cannot consist in oral threats
or a merely threatening stance or posture (People vs. Tacan, 182 SCRA 601)
The victim addressed offensive language to the accused such as vulva of your
mother, youre talking as if you have no debts, not like me I have no debts. Held: The
victim had not acted with unlawful aggression that might have provoked the accuseds
deadly wrath. Infurious words of threats do not amount unlawful aggression. (People
vs. Agapinay, June 27, l990)
The claim of appellant that the act of the victim in reaching for a clutch bag and
slapping his fellow security guard constitute unlawful aggression is devoid of
merit. The aggression must be real or at least imminent and not merely imaginary. A
belief that a person is about to be attacked is not sufficient. Even an intimidating or
threatening attitude is by no means enough. A mere push or shove not followed by
other acts placing in real peril the life or personal safety of the accused is not unlawful
aggression. (People vs. Bautista, 254 SCRA 621, March 12, 1996)
There can be no defense where there is no aggression. Alconga had no right to
pursue, no right to kill or injure Barion for the reason that "a fleeing man is not
dangerous to the one from whom he flees. (People vs. Alconga, 78 Phil 366, April
30, 1947)
It is settled that the moment the first aggressor runs away, unlawful aggression
on his parts ceases to exist, and when unlawful aggression ceases, the defender no
longer has any right to kill or wound the former aggressor, otherwise, retaliation and not
self-defense is committed. Retaliation is not the same as self-defense. (Razon vs.
People, 525 SCRA 284, June 21, 2007 (Austria-Martinez, J)
Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the
aggression means rational equivalence not material commensurability. In rational
equivalence, what should be considered are the factors of emergency, the danger to
the life of a person and instinct more than reason impels the defense (People vs.
Gutual, 254 SCRA 37, February 22, 1986)
2. Defense of Property
The assault on ones property amounts to unlawful aggression as contemplated
by law. But the reasonableness of the resistance is doubtful. When the accused fired
his shotgun from his window, killing his two victims, his resistance was disproportionate
to the attack. (People vs. Narvaez, 121 SCRA 403, April 20, 1983)

3. Defense of Honor
32

The placing of hand by a man on the womans upper thigh is unlawful aggression
(People vs. Jaurigue 76 Phil 174)
4. Defense of Relatives
Olbinar vs. Court of Appeals, 193 SCRA 115, January 21, l991
In case the wife saw her husband on the ground, with blood on his person, and two
men were boxing and kicking him, she is not required to investigate the nature of her
husbands injuries, determine if he was in danger of death, analyze the situation and
ascertain what would be the most reasonable mode by which she could stop her
husbands mauling, but has to act and act quickly in defense of her husband. The wife
had acted in justifiable defense of her husband.

People vs. Luis Toring, et al, October 26, l990

When A was about to dance a girl, the victim stopped him, pointed his shotgun at him,
took a bullet from his jacket, showed it to A and even asked if A would like it. B, first
cousin of A, took his knife and stabbed the victim. Before this, a brother of the victim
shot, not only B but also a brother of B. Held: B is entitled to an incomplete defense
of relative only. No doubt, there was unlawful aggression on the part of the victim.
There was no provocation also on the part of B, the accused. But B cannot be given
the full credence of the justifying circumstance because he was not inspired by pure
compassion or beneficence or the lawful desire to avenge the immediate wrong
inflicted upon his cousin. Rather, he was motivated by revenge, resentment or evil
motive because of a running feud between the victim and accused brothers. Indeed
vendetta appears to have driven both camps to commit unlawful acts against each
other.
People vs. Lingatong, January 29, l990
Accused is not entitled to the benefit of a justifying circumstance of defense of a
relative. It was the accuseds brother and not the victim who was the unlawful
aggressor by his act of clubbing EJ with a kulafu bottle on the right eyebrow.
5. Defense of Strangers
Paera vs. People, 649 SCRA 384, May 30, 2011
The defense of stranger rule requires proof of (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the
victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it and (3)
absence of evil motives such as revenge and resentment.
None of the Darongs committed acts of aggression against third parties rights.
33

6. State of Necessity
People vs. Punzalan, 687 SCRA 687, December 10, 2012
Facts: Punzalan was punched by Bacosa in his right ear. To avoid further altercation,
Punzalan left the bar. When he passed by the sentry, somebody threw stones at his
van. When he alighted, Bacosa and another man boxed him. He saw four other men
approaching him. So, Punzalan went back to his car and drove it in a rushing and
zigzagging manner that hit and bumped Duclayna and Andal. Charged with double
murder, Punzalan contended that the attack against him by two men whose four
companions were also approaching created in his mind a fear of greater evil prompting
him to speed up his vehicle to avoid a greater evil or injury.
Issue: Whether or not Punzalan is entitled to the justifying circumstance of state of
necessity.
Ruling: Punzalans contention cannot be sustained. Under paragraph 4, Article 11 of
the Revised Penal Code, infliction of damage or injury to another so that a greater evil
or injury may not befall ones self may be justified only if it is taken as a last resort and
with the least prejudice to another. If there is another way to avoid the injury without
causing damage or injury to another, then such course should be taken. In this case,
the road where the incident happened was wide, some 7 meters in width, and the place
was well lighted. With this wide space, Punzalan had other way to avoid hitting the
approaching four men. He failed to resort to other practical and less harmful available
means of preventing the evil or injury he claimed to be avoiding.
People vs. Retubado, 417 SCRA 393 December 10, 2003
Retubado followed the victim up to his house when the latter refused to talk to him; the
victim, irritated, went inside his room; when he went out of his room, he had already a
gun, although the trigger finger was outside the trigger guard and the muzzle facing
downward, Retubado feared for his life and so tried to wrestle possession of the gun; in
the process the gun went off and hit the victim who died. Retubado put up defense of
state of necessity. Held: Not entitled. It is indispensable that the state of necessity
must not be brought about by the intentional provocation of the party invoking the
same. Retubado provoked the victim in getting his gun.
6.1. Compare with Pure Accident (Article 12 (4)
People vs. Nepomuceno, 298 SCRA 450, November 11, 1998
Accused was always being nagged by his wife. Because of this, he thought of
ending his life. He took the gun from their childs drawer. Their son however woke up,
walked to the space between him and his wife, he raised his arm holding the gun
passing over the left leg of his wife but the gun went off, his wife was hit and died.
Held: Accident to be exempting, presupposes that the act done is lawful. Here,
however, the act of accused of drawing a weapon in the course of a quarrel, the same
not being in self defense, is at least constitutes light threats (Art. 285, par. 1,RPC).
There is thus no room for the invocation of accident as a ground for exemption.
34

Talampas vs. People, 661 SCRA 197, November 23, 2011

Facts Talampas alighted from his bicycle and fired his revolver at Eduardo, who was hit
and took refuge behind Ernesto. Talampas fired his gun again three times, one shot hit
Ernesto at the right portion of this back causing him to fall on the ground on his back.
Ernesto died instantaneously. Charged with homicide, Talampas puts up the defense of
accident because the shot was aimed at Eduardo and not at Ernesto, the victim. Is
Talampas entitled to the exempting circumstance of accident? Explain.
Ruling: Talampas could not relieve himself of criminal liability by invoking accident as a
defense. Article 12(4) of the Revised Penal Code, contemplates a situation where a
person is in fact in the act of doing something legal, exercising due care, diligence and
prudence, but in the process produces harm or injury to someone or to something not
in the least in the mind of the actor an accidental result flowing out of a legal
act. Accident presupposes the lack of intention to commit the wrong done.
Here, Talampas brandished and poked his revolver at Eduardo and fired it,
hitting Eduardo, who then hid behind Ernesto. Then Talampas fired his revolver again
thrice. One shot hit Ernesto at the right portion of his back and another shot hit
Eduardo on the nape. Clearly, Talampas acts were not lawful, being a criminal assault
against both Eduardo and Ernesto.
The fact that the target of Talampas assault was Eduardo, not Ernesto, did not
excuse him from criminal liability. The fatal hitting of Ernesto was the natural and direct
consequence of Talampas felonious act against Eduardo. Talampas poor aim
amounted to aberratio ictus, or mistake in the blow, a circumstance that neither
exempted him from criminal responsibility nor mitigated his criminal liability. Lo que es
causa de la causa, es causa del mal causado (what is the cause of the cause is the
cause of the evil caused). Under Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability
is incurred by any person committing a felony although the wrongful act done be
different from that which he intended.
People vs. Latosa, 621 SCRA 586, June 23, 2010
Facts: Felixberto and Susan, husband and wife, were at their house on that fateful day.
When Felixberto was awaken, he asked his wife Susan to get his service pistol from
the cabinet adjacent to their bed. As she was handing the pistol to him, it suddenly
fired, hitting Felixberto at his left temple. Susan claimed that it was an accidental
shooting. Decide.
Rule: Susan is liable for parricide. To avail of the exempting circumstance of accident,
the offender must be performing a lawful act with due care. The pointing of the gun
towards her husband cannot be considered as performing a lawful act with due care.
Susan held the gun in one hand and extended it towards her husband who was still
lying in bed. Prudence dictates that when handing over a gun, the muzzle should not
be pointed to a person. Susan should have known this. Here the muzzle of the gun
was pointed at her husband. Besides, a gun does not fire unless there was pressure
on the trigger.
35

7. Performance of a duty
1. Cabanlig vs. Sandiganbayan, 464 SCRA 324 , July 28, 2005
A warning shot is not absolutely mandated at all times.
The duty to issue a warning is not absolutely mandated at all times and at all cost, to
the detriment of the life of law enforcers. The directive to issue a warning contemplates
a situation where several options are still available to the law enforcers. In exceptional
circumstances such as this case, where the threat to the life of a law enforcer is
already imminent, and there is no other option but to use force to subdue the offender,
the law enforcers failure to issue a warning is excusable.
2. Paera vs. People, 649 SCRA 384, May 30, 2011
On justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty or exercise of office under the
5th paragraph of Article 11 of the RPC lies upon proof that the offense committed was
the necessary consequence of the due performance of duty or the lawful exercise of
office. Arguably, Paera acted in the performance of his duty to ensure delivery of basic
services when he barred the Darongs access to the communal water tank.
Nevertheless, Paera exceeded the bounds of his office when he successively
chased the Darongs with a bladed weapon, threatening harm on their persons, for
violating his order. Paera ought to know that no amount of concern for the delivery of
services justifies use by local elective officials of violence or threats of violence.
3. Yapyuco vs. Sandiganbayan, 624 SCRA 470, June 25, 2012
Facts: Villanueva, Flores, Calma, De Vera, Panlican and Licup were on board a
tamarraw jeep and they were traversing the road after coming from a barrio fiesta when
suddenly they met a burst of gunfire and instantly, Villanueva and Licup were both
wounded and bleeding profusely. Licup died thereafter. Villanueva survived. Members
of San Fernando PNP including barangay officials and CHDF members were at the
situs of the shooting because of their information that armed NPA were spotted at the
said place; that when they saw the tamarraw jeepney, a barangay official said that the
suspects were on board that jeepney; the PNP members flagged them down but they
did not stop and so the policemen fired at them. Accused policemen puts up
performance of duty as a defense. Decide.
Ruling:
The policemen are not entitled to the justifying circumstance of performance of duty. To
avail of this justifying circumstance, the public officials are not only performing their
duty but that the injury was inflicted because of the due performance of duty. True, they
were at the situs of the incident because of call of duty to arrest armed NPA. But the
death of Licup and the injury inflicted on Villanueva were in violation of the rules of
36

engagement, even if the group of Licup did not stop when flagged down. The rules of
engagement do not require the police officer to immediately fire his weapon if the
person to be accosted does not heed his call. Pursuit without danger should be his
next move, and not vengeance for personal feelings or a damaged pride.
4. Mamangun vs. People, 514 SCRA 44 , February 2, 2007
Accused policeman and his two companions responded to a call to a report that
a robbery was being held in a certain house. Upon arriving at the scene, accused
Mamangun went to the rooftop of the house where the suspect was allegedly taking
refuge. There he saw a man whom he thought was the suspect. He pointed his .45
cal pistol at the man who instantly exclaimed, hindi ako, hindi ako but still Mamangun
fired his handgun once hitting the man which caused his death. The man turned out to
be Contreras who was not the robbery suspect. Held: The justifying circumstance of
fulfillment of duty under paragraph 5, Artilce 11, of the Revised Penal Code may be
invoked only after the defense successfully proves that (1) the accused acted in the
performance of a duty and (2) the injury inflicted or offense committed is the necessary
consequence of the due performance or lawful exercise of such duty. There is no
rational necessity for the killing of Contreras. Mamangun could have first fired a
warning shot before pulling the trigger against Contreras.

5. Baxinela vs. People, 485 SCRA 331, March 24, 2006

Policeman Baxinela and his co-policeman were summoned because a man was
creating trouble in a pub. Once there, they sat at a table and saw Lajo with a handgun
visibly tucked behind his waist. Then the armed man walked towards the entrance.
When he passed their table, Baxinela stood up, introduced himself as a policeman and
asked why he had a gun. The man did not respond but turned to face Baxinela,
drawing his gun. Baxinela immediately drew his firearm and beat him to the draw.
Ruling: there was negligence on the part of Baxinela. Lajo, when he was shot, was
simply turning around to see who was accosting him. Moreover, he identified himself
saying Iam MIG. These circumstances alone would not lead a reasonable and
prudent person to believe that Baxinelas life was in peril. Thus, his act of shooting
constitutes clear negligence and so mistake of fact, as held in US vs, Ah Chong,
cannot apply.

Difference between Fulfillment of Duty and self defense

Self-defense and fulfillment of duty operate on different principles. Self-defense is
based on the principle of self-preservation from mortal harm, while fulfillment of duty is
premised on the due performance of duty. A policeman in the performance of duty is
justified in using such force as is reasonably necessary to secure and detain the
offender, overcome his resistance, prevent his escape, recapture him if he escapes,
and protect himself from bodily harm. In case injury or death results from the
policemans exercise of such force, the policeman could be justified in inflicting the
37

injury or causing the death of the offender if the policeman had used necessary force.
Since a policemans duty requires him to overcome the offender, the force exerted by
the policeman may therefore differ from that which ordinarily may be offered in selfdefense. Unlike in self-defense where unlawful aggression is an element, in
performance of duty, unlawful aggression from the victim is not a requisite.
(Cabanlig vs. Sandiganbayan, 464 SCRA 324 , July 28, 2005)

8. Obedience to the order of superior

Tabuena had no other choice but to make the withdrawals, for that was what the
MARCOS Memorandum required him to do. He could not be faulted if he had to obey
and strictly comply Even if the order is illegal if it is patently legal and the subordinate is
not aware of its illegality, the subordinate is not liable, for then there would only be a
mistake of fact committed in good faith. (Tabuena vs. Sandiganbayan, 268 SCRA 332,
February 17, 1997)
10. Battered woman syndrome. Victim survivors who are found by the courts to be
suffering from battered woman syndrome do not incur criminal liability notwithstanding
the absence of any of the elements for justifying circumstances of self defense (Sec.
26, RA 9262, Anti Violence Against Women and their Children Act of 2004.)
Battered Woman Syndrome refers to a scientifically defined pattern of
psychological and behavioral symptoms found in women living in battering
relationships as a result of cumulative abuse. (Section 3 (c), RA 9262)
Battery refers to an act of inflicting physical harm upon the woman or her child
resulting to physical and psychological or emotional distress. (Section 3 (b), RA 9262
A battered woman has been defined as a woman who is repeatedly subjected to
any forceful physical or psychological behavior by a man in order to coerce her to do
something he wants her to do without concern for her rights. Battered women include
wives or women in any form of intimate relationship with men. Furthermore, in order to
be classified as a battered woman, the couple must go through the battering cycle at
least twice. Any woman may find herself in an abusive relationship with a man once. If
it occurs a second time, and she remains in the situation, she is defined as a battered
woman.(People vs. Genosa, G.R. 135981, January 15, 2004)

More graphically, the battered woman syndrome is characterized by the so-called

cycle of violence, which has three phases: (1) the tension-building phase; (2) the
acute battering incident; and (3) the tranquil, loving (or, at least, nonviolent) phase. [28]
During the tension-building phase, minor battering occurs -- it could be verbal or
slight physical abuse or another form of hostile behavior. The woman usually tries to
pacify the batterer through a show of kind, nurturing behavior; or by simply staying out
of his way.
38

The acute battering incident is said to be characterized by brutality,

destructiveness and, sometimes, death. The battered woman deems this incident as
unpredictable, yet also inevitable. During this phase, she has no control; only the
batterer may put an end to the violence. The battered woman usually realizes that she
cannot reason with him, and that resistance would only exacerbate her condition.
The final phase of the cycle of violence begins when the acute battering incident
ends. During this tranquil period, the couple experience profound relief. On the one
hand, the batterer may show a tender and nurturing behavior towards his partner. He
begs for her forgiveness and promising never to beat her again. On the other hand,
the battered woman also tries to convince herself that the battery will never happen
again; that her partner will change for the better; and that this good, gentle and caring
man is the real person whom she loves.

B. EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES
1. INSANITY
There are two tests of insanity (a) the test of cognition which is the
"complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the [criminal] act," and (b)
the test of volition "or that there be a total deprivation freedom of the will." We
follow the test of cognition. This is perhaps to be expected since a person's volition
naturally reaches out only towards that which is presented as desirable by his
intelligence, whether that intelligence be diseased or healthy. (People vs. Formigones,
G.R. No. L-3246, November 29, 1950; People vs. Rafanan, Jr. November 21, 1991;
People vs. Valledor, July 3, 2002; People vs. Dungo, July 31, 1991 ( 199 SCRA 860)
Schizophrenia has been described as a chronic mental disorder characterized
by inability to distinguish between fantasy and reality, and often accompanied by
hallucinations and delusions. Formerly called dementia praecox, it is said to be the
most common form of psychosis and usually develops between the ages 15 and 30. It
is not exempting but only mitigating. (People vs. Rafanan, Jr. November 21, 1991)
Under foreign jurisdiction, there are three major criteria in determining the
existence of insanity, namely: delusion test, irresistible impulse test, and the right and
wrong test. Insane delusion is manifested by a false belief for which there is no
reasonable basis and which would be incredible under the given circumstances to the
same person if he is of compos mentis. Under the delusion test, an insane person
believes in a state of things, the existence of which no rational person would believe. A
person acts under an irresistible impulse when, by reason of duress or mental disease,
he has lost the power to choose between right and wrong, to avoid the act in question,
his free agency being at the time destroyed. Under the right and wrong test, a person is
insane when he suffers from such perverted condition of the mental and moral faculties
as to render him incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong. (See 44 C.J.S.
2)
2. Imbecility
39

Accuseds act of cutting grass rather that guarding his victim could hardly be
indicative of imbecility. Rather, it may be considered as negligence but definitely not
childishness or even that of one completely deprived of reason or discernment and
freedom of the will.
Imbecility is defined as feeblemindedness or a mental condition approaching that
of one who is insane. It is analogous to childishness and dotage. An imbecile, within
the meaning of Article 12 is one who must be deprived completely of reason or
discernment and freedom of will at the time of committing the crime. He is one, who
while advanced in age, has a mental development comparable to that of children
between two and seven years of age.( People vs. Nunez, 276 SCRA 9)
In order that a person could be regarded as an imbecile within the meaning of
article 12 of the Revised Penal Code so as to be exempt from criminal liability, he must
be deprived completely of reason or discernment and freedom of the will at the time of
committing the crime. (People vs. Formigones, G.R. No. L-3246, November 29, 1950)

3. MINORITY
People v. Jacinto, 645, SCRA 590, March 16, 2011
A boy of 17 year old raped a child of five year old. The boy held victims hand while on
the road near the store. They walked towards the rice field. There he made her lie
down on harrowed ground, removed her panty and boxed her on the chest. Already
half-naked from waist down, he mounted on her.
Issues:

Ruling:
Sec. 6 of Republic Act No. 9344 exempts a child above fifteen (15) years but below
eighteen (18) years of age from criminal liability, unless the child is found to have acted
with discernment, in which case, "the appropriate proceedings" in accordance with the
Act shall be observed.s This means if he acted with discernment, there is criminal
liability.
Discernment is that mental capacity of a minor to fully appreciate the consequences of
his unlawful act. Such capacity may be known and should be determined by taking into
consideration all the facts and circumstances afforded by the records in each case.
The surrounding circumstances must demonstrate that the minor knew what he was
doing and that it was wrong. Such circumstance includes the gruesome nature of the
crime and the minors cunning and shrewdness.
In the present case, (1) choosing an isolated and dark place to perpetrate the crime, to
prevent detection[;] and (2) boxing the victim xxx, to weaken her defense" are
40

indicative of then seventeen (17) year-old accuseds mental capacity to fully

understand the consequences of his unlawful action.
The provision on automatic suspension of sentence makes no distinction as to the
nature of the offense committed by the child in conflict with the law. When the law does
not distinguish, we should not distinguish. Since R.A. No. 9344 does not distinguish
between a minor who has been convicted of a capital offense and another who has
been convicted of a lesser offense, the Court should also not distinguish and should
apply the automatic suspension of sentence to a child in conflict with the law who has
been found guilty of a heinous crime.
The legislative intent as reflected in the Senate deliberations is that even in heinous
crimes, the childs restoration, rehabilitation and reintegration shall be the primordial
considerations.
Madali vs. People, 595 SCRA 274, August 4, 2009
.
Raymund, 14 years old, and Rodel, 16 years old, and the victim AAA climbed the
stairs, atop of which was a reservoir. The victim AAA, ascended first; behind him were
Rodel and Raymund. As soon as they reached the reservoir, Raymund clobbered AAA
at the back of his thighs with a coconut frond. AAA wobbled. Before he could recover,
he received punches to his head and body from Rodel, who was wearing brass
knuckles. The punishments proved too much, as AAA lost consciousness and died.
Ruling:
Raymund is exempted from criminal liability. Raymund, who was only 14 years of age
at the time he committed the crime, should be exempt from criminal liability and should
be released to the custody of his parents or guardian pursuant to Sections 6 and 20 of
Republic Act No. 9344. Although the crime was committed on 13 April 1999 and
Republic Act No. 9344 took effect only on 20 May 2006, the said law should be given
retroactive effect in favor of Raymund who was not shown to be a habitual criminal.
This is based on Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code which provides:
Retroactive effect of penal laws. Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect
insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal,
as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at the time of
the publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the
convict is serving the same.
As to Rodels situation, it must be borne in mind that he was 16 years old at the time
of the commission of the crime. A determination of whether he acted with or without
discernment is necessary.
Discernment is that mental capacity of a minor to fully appreciate the consequences of
his unlawful act. Such capacity may be known and should be determined by taking into
consideration all the facts and circumstances afforded by the records in each case.
Rodel acted with discernment. Rodel, together with his cohorts, warned Jovencio not to
reveal their hideous act to anyone; otherwise, they would kill him. Rodel knew,
41

therefore, that killing AAA was a condemnable act and should be kept in secrecy. He
fully appreciated the consequences of his unlawful act.
Discernment is not the same with criminal intent
A minor was charged with reckless imprudence resulting to death; he was playing a
tanzan target shooting with his friend but instead of hitting the tanzan, he hit the body
of his friend. Since it is a case of reckless imprudence, the information recited that the
accusedvoluntarily but without intent to kill, negligently hit the victim Accused
contended that the information charges no offense, since without intent to kill means
without discernment. Held: Not correct. Intent is not the same with discernment.
Intent is defined as a design; a determination to do certain thing; an aim, the purpose
of the mind, including such knowledge as is essential to such intent. Intent is the third
element of dolo. Discernment, on the other hand, is the mental capacity of a minor to
understand the difference between right or wrong. Intent refers to the desired of ones
act, while discernment relates to the moral signnificance that person ascribes to the
said act. (Gueverra vs. Hon. Almodovar 169 SCRA 476)

Some important provisions of RA 9344

Definition of terms
Child refers to a person under the age of eighteen (18) years (Section 4 ( c ), RA 9344)
Child in Conflict with the law refers to a child who is alleged as, accused of, or
adjudged as, having committed an offense under Philippine laws (Section 4 (e), Id)
Diversion refers to an alternative, child-appropriate process of determining the
responsibility and treatment of a child in conflict with the law on the basis of
his/hersocial, cultural, economic, psychological or educational background without
resorting to formal court proceedings.(Section 4 (i) id)
Diversion Program refers to the program that the child in conflict with the law is
required to undergo after he/she is found responsible for an offense without resorting to
formal court proceedings.
Intervention refers to a series of activities which are designed to address issues that
caused the child to commit an offense. It may take the form of an individualized
treatment program which may include counseling, skills training, education, and other
activities that will enhance his/her psychological, emotional and psycho-social wellbeing (Section 4 (j)
Restorative Justice refers to a principle which requires a process of resolving conflicts
with the maximum involvement of the victim, the offender and the community. It seeks
to obtain reparation for the victim; reconciliation of the offender, the offended and the
community; and reassurance to the offender that he/she can be reintegrated into
society. It also enhances public safety by activating the offender, the victim and the
community in prevention strategies.(Section 4, (q) id)
42

Status Offenses refers to offenses which discriminate only against a child, while an
adult does not suffer any penalty for committing similar acts. These shall include
curfew violations, truancy, parental disobedience and the like. (Section 4, ( r)
Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility.
A child fifteen (15) years of age or under at the time of the commission of the offense
shall be exempt from criminal liability. (Section 6, I.d)
A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age shall likewise be
exempt from criminal liability unless he/she has acted with discernment,. The
exemption from criminal liability herein established does not include exemption from
civil liability, which shall be enforced in accordance with existing laws. (Section 6, id)
The child in conflict with the law shall enjoy the presumption of minority. He/she shall
enjoy all the rights of a child in conflict with the law until he/she is proven to be 18
years old or older. His age may be determined from his birth certificate, baptismal
certificate or any other pertinent documents. In the absence of these documents, age
may be based on information from the child himself/herself, testimonies of other
persons, the physical appearance of the child and other relevant evidence. In case of
doubt as to the age of the child, it shall be resolved in his/her favor. (Section 7, i.d)
Intervention and Diversion
A child who is exempt from criminal liability because he is 15 years old or below shall
undergo intervention program. A child who is above 15 years of age but below 18
years old and who have not acted with discernment shall also undergo intervention
program. (Section 6, Id.)
In case the child is over 15 years old but below 18 years and he acted with
discernment, he shall undergo diversion proceedings to be conducted by LEO OR PB
with the assistance of the LSWDO or by the LSWDO in case of victimless offense
where the imposable penalty for the crime committed is not more than 6 years
imprisonment. (Section 23). But where the imposable penalty for the crime committed
exceeds 6 years but not more than 12 years, diversion measures may be resorted to
only by the court.( Section 23, c) Where the maximum penalty imposed by law for the
offense with which the child in conflict with the law is charged is imprisonment of not
more than twelve (12) years, regardless of the fine or fine alone regardless of the
amount, and before arraignment of the child in conflict with the law, the court shall
determine whether or not diversion is appropriate (Section 37)
Automatic Suspension of Sentence.
Once the child who is under eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the commission
of the offense is found guilty of the offense charged, the court shall determine and
ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted from the offense committed.
However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall place the
child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence, without need of application:
Provided, however, That suspension of sentence shall still be applied even if the
juvenile is already eighteen years (18) of age or more at the time of the
pronouncement of his/her guilt. Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the
43

various circumstances of the child, the court shall impose the appropriate disposition
measures as provided in the Supreme Court Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law.
(Section 38)
Discharge of the Child in Conflict with the Law.
Upon the recommendation of the social worker who has custody of the child, the court
shall dismiss the case against the child whose sentence has been suspended and
against whom disposition measures have been issued, and shall order the final
discharge of the child if it finds that the objective of the disposition measures have
been fulfilled. The discharge of the child in conflict with the law shall not affect the civil
liability resulting from the commission of the offense, which shall be enforced in
accordance with law. (Section 39)
Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court. If the court finds that the
objective of the disposition measures imposed upon the child in conflict with the law
have not been fulfilled, or if the child in conflict with the law has willfully failed to comply
with the conditions of his/her disposition or rehabilitation program, the child in conflict
with the law shall be brought before the court for execution of judgment. If said child in
conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years of age while under suspended
sentence, the court shall determine whether to discharge the child in accordance with
this Act, to order execution of sentence, or to extend the suspended sentence for a
certain specified period or until the child reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21)
years.(Section 40)
Credit in Service of Sentence. The child in conflict with the law shall be credited in
the services of his/her sentence with the full time spent in actual commitment and
detention under this Act (Section 41)
Probation as an Alternative to Imprisonment. The court may, after it shall have
convicted and sentenced a child in conflict with the law, and upon application at any
time, place the child on probation in lieu of service of his/her sentence taking into
account the best interest of the child. For this purpose, Sec. 4 of Presidential Decree
No. 968, otherwise known as the Probation Law of 1976, is hereby amended
accordingly.(Section 42)
Exemption from Criminal Liability
Status Offenses. Any conduct not considered an offense or not penalized if
committed by an adult shall not be considered an offense and shall not be punished if
committed by a child. (Section 57)
Offenses Not Applicable to Children. Persons below eighteen (18) years of age shall
be exempt from prosecution for the crime of vagrancy and prostitution under Section
202 of the Revised Penal Code, of mendicancy under Presidential Decree No. 1563,
and sniffing of rugby under Presidential Decree No. 1619, such prosecution being
inconsistent with the United Nations Convention of the Rights of the Child: Provided,
That said persons shall undergo appropriate counseling and treatment program.
(Section 58)
Exemption from the Application of Death Penalty. The provisions of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the
44

Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, and other special laws notwithstanding,
no death penalty shall be imposed upon children in conflict with the law. (Section 59)

4. Pure Accident
See discussion on state of necessity
5. Duress
People v. Dequina, 640, SCRA 111, January 19, 2011
Charged with violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act by transporting dangerous
drugs, accused Dequina had this story to tell:
In May 1999, while the Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) members were having a
parade in Iloilo City, she met a certain Salvacion , a member of the group. She calls
her Sally. Sally convinced her to join the movement, which she did.
She and two friends were sent to Manila on a mission and this would determine if
she was really qualified to join the group. Sally told them that they will temporarily stay
in the house of her [Dequina] relative in Manila. She was further instructed that they
will go to the Philippine Rabbit Terminal in Avenida where they will be met by members
of their group who will also monitor their movements.
Dequina received the plane tickets for the three of them from Sally. However,
she noticed that instead of their true names, the tickets were in the names of other
persons. Nervous, she thought of backing out at the last minute but Sally told her that
something will happen to her child if ever she backed out from the plan. Because of the
threat, Dequina went on with the plan. Charged with illegal transport of marijuana, she
put up the defense of irresistible force.
Issue: Whether or not the alleged threat of Sally that something will happen to her
child if she will back out can be considered as irresistible force.
Ruling.
A person who acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force, like one who acts
under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury, is exempt from
criminal liability because he does not act with freedom. Actus me invito factus non est
meus actus. An act done by me against my will is not my act.
The force contemplated must be so formidable as to reduce the actor to a mere
instrument who acts not only without will but against his will.
The duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present, imminent and impending, and
of such nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily
harm if the act be done.
45

A threat of future injury is not enough. The compulsion must be of such a character as
to leave no opportunity for the accused for escape or self-defense in equal combat.

People vs. Salvatierra June 20, l996, (257 SCRA 489)

In order that duress may be validly availed of by an accused as a defense, it should
actually be anchored on a real, imminent or reasonable fear for ones own life or limb
and should not be speculative, fanciful or imagined. The compulsion employed upon
the accused must have been such character as to leave no opportunity for him to
spring an escape or to himself foist any act of defense of self preservation. Duress is
unavailing where the accused had every opportunity to run away if he had wanted to or
resist any possible aggression because he was also armed. In this case, accused
could well have disassociated himself from the criminal escapade considering that
when the group flagged down a taxicab, it did not appear at that point that accused
was being threatened at all. Again upon reaching the residence of the victim accused
had all the opportunity to escape from the time when he rang the doorbell and when
they were allowed by Elizabeth to go inside the house and especially thereafter.

OTHER ABSOLUTORY CAUSES

1. Instigation
a) But distinguish it from entrapment. Entrapment is lawful and is not an absolutory
cause.
In an entrapment, ways and means are resorted to for the purpose of traping and
capturing the law breakers in the execution of their criminal plan; whereas in
instigation, the instigator practically induces the would be defendant into the
commission of the offense and he himself becomes a co-principal. (People vs. Efren
Asio, September 01, l989)
In entrapment ways and means are resorted to for the purpose of trapping and
capturing the law breakers in the execution of their criminal plan. In instigation, on the
other hand, the instigator practically induces the would be defendant into the
commission of the offense and himself becomes a co-principal. Entrapment is no bar
to prosecution and conviction, while in instigation, the defendant would have to be
acquitted. (People vs. John Guiagui, April 25, 1990.)
The accused and his companion had a ready supply of marijuana for sale and
disposition to anyone willing to pay the price asked for the prohibited material. It
appears that the crime of illegal possession of prohibited drugs had already been
committed by the accused when the NARCOM agents resolved to entrap them into
revealing such possession and selling of prohibited drugs. (People vs. Juan Sanchez,
May 13, l989)

46

Accused Quintana was charged with violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act for
having sold 100 grams of dried marijuana leaves. Pat. Alcantara asked Quintanma to
buy marijuana leaves for him. There is here a clear case of instigation. Alcantara had
admitted that he induced Quintana to buy marijuana leaves for him. What the court
clearly sees is that Quintana did not sell but was asked by Alcantara to buy marijuana
leaves for him. (People vs. Quintana, June 30, l989)

People v. Dansico, 644, SCRA 151, February 23, 2011

On the basis of reports that the accused were engaged in peddling marijuana, the
police organized a buy-bust operation against the accused. The buy-bust team
proceeded to the nipa hut owned by accused Dansico. The confidential informant
informed the accused that he wanted to buy P5,000.00 worth of marijuana. He handed
the buy-bust money to the accused who left in a motorcycle to get the marijuana. After
three hours, more or less, the accused returned with a brick, allegedly marijuana,
wrapped in a newspaper. Accused Dansico gave it to the informant. At this point, he
gave the pre-arranged signal. The team immediately apprehended accused Dansico.
Charged in court, the accused put up the defense of Instigation.
Issue: Whether or not the accused was instigated into selling marijuana.
Ruling: There was entrapment rather than instigation.
Instigation means luring the accused into a crime that he, otherwise, had no intention
to commit, in order to prosecute him. On the other hand, entrapment is the
employment of ways and means in order to trap or capture a lawbreaker.
Instigation presupposes that the criminal intent to commit an offense originated from
the inducer and not the accused who had no intention to commit the crime and would
not have committed it were it not for the initiatives by the inducer. In entrapment, the
criminal intent or design to commit the offense charged originates in the mind of the
accused; the law enforcement officials merely facilitate the apprehension of the
criminal by employing ruses and schemes.
In instigation, the law enforcers act as active co-principals. Instigation leads to the
acquittal of the accused, while entrapment does not bar prosecution and conviction.
To determine whether there is instigation or entrapment, the conduct of the
apprehending officers and the predisposition of the accused to commit the crime
must be examined
Buy-bust operations demands that the details of the purported transaction must be
clearly and adequately shown. This must start from the (1) initial contact between the
poseur-buyer and the pusher, (2) the offer to purchase, the promise or payment of the
consideration (3) until the consummation of the sale by the delivery of the illegal drug
subject of the sale. If there is overwhelming evidence of habitual delinquency,
recidivism or plain criminal proclivity, then this must also be considered. Courts should
47

look at all factors to determine the predisposition of an accused to commit an offense in

so far as they are relevant to determine the validity of the defense of inducement.
2. In attempted felony and the accused desisted spontaneously, please see discussion
on execution of offenses.
3. Accessorial acts of those who are such with respect to their SAD-BSR, except
accessory no. 1
4. Certain relatives in the crimes of TEM

C. MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES
1. Lack of essential elements to justify or exempt from criminal liability
a. Incomplete Defense of Relatives
a.1. please read People vs. Luis Toring, et al, October 26, l990, discussed in
the defense of relatives.
b. Incomplete performance of duty; Injury is not the consequence of the due
performance of duty
please refer to our discussion under performance of duty
1. Mamangun vs. People, 514 SCRA 44 , February 2, 2007
2. Baxinela vs. People, 485 SCRA 331, March 24, 2006

3. Lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed- praeter

intentionem
1. Misappropriation by a public officer of public funds because he was impelled
by the genuine love for his brother and his family as he used the money in buying
medicines for his sick brother , there was no intention to commit so grave a wrong.
(Perez vs. People, 544 SCRA 532, February 12, 2008)
2. The frantic exclamations of petitioner Navarro after the scuffle that it was
Lingan who provoked him shows that he had no intent to kill the latter. Thus, the
mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong as that
committed should be taken into account in determining the penalty that should be
imposed on petitioner Navarro (Navarro vs. Court of Appeals, 313 SCRA 153, August
26, 1999.
3. People v. Maglian 646 SCRA 770, March 30, 2011
48

Maglian and Mary Jay, husband and wife, were having dinner at their home in
Dasmarias, Cavite when they got into a fight. Maglian did not want Mary Jay to attend
a party. Incensed, Maglian collected the clothes of and told her he would burn them all
and started pouring kerosene on the clothes. Mary tried to wrestle the can of kerosene
from him and, at the same time, warned him not to pour it on her. Despite his wife's
plea, Maglian still poured gas on her, thus setting both the clothes and his wife on fire.
The wife died soon thereafter.
The accused, in his defense, said the burning incident was completely
accidental. To spite her, he took the clothes that she had given him and told her he
would burn them all. He then got a match and a gallon of kerosene. Mary Jay caught
up with him at the dirty kitchen and took the match and kerosene from him. In the
process, they both got wet from the spilled kerosene.
Issue: (1) Whether or not the accused had no intention to commit so grave a wrong
as that committed.
Ruling:
The Revised Penal Code provides under Article 13(3) the mitigating circumstance that
the offender had no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed.
This mitigating circumstance addresses itself to the intention of the offender at the
particular moment when the offender executes or commits the criminal act. This
mitigating circumstance is obtaining when there is a notable disparity between the
means employed by the accused to commit a wrong and the resulting crime
committed. The intention of the accused at the time of the commission of the crime is
manifested from the weapon used, the mode of attack employed and the injury
sustained by the victim.
It is extremely far-fetched that accused-appellant could accidentally pour
kerosene on his wife and likewise accidentally light her up and cause third degree
burns to 90% of her body. The accused-appellant knew the fatal injuries that he could
cause when he poured kerosene all over his wife and lit a match to ignite a fire. There
was no disparity between the means he used in injuring his wife and the resulting third
degree burns on her body. He is, thus, not entitled to the mitigating circumstance
under Art. 13(3) of the Code.
4. Provocation
1. The victim told to accused: Vulva of your mother, if you are talking as if you
have no debts, not like me, I have no debts The accused should be entitled to the
mitigating circumstance of provocation (or vindication of a grave offense or passion or
obfuscation. (People vs. Agapinay, June 27, l990)

49

2. When the victim challenged the policeman to a fight; that the policeman is only
brave because of his gun, these remarks which immediately preceded the act of the
accused constituted sufficient provocation. Provocation is defined to be any unjust or
improper conduct or act of the offended party, capable of exciting, inciting, or irritating
anyone. The provocation must be sufficient and should immediately precede the act.
To be sufficient, it must be adequate to excite a person to commit the wrong, which
must accordingly be proportionate so that there is no interval between the provocation
by the offended party and the commission of the crime by the accused. (Navarro vs.
Court of Appeals, 313 SCRA 153, August 26, 1999)

5. Vindication of grave offense

1. The remarks of the victim that he would eat not until someone is killed and that
he went to the house of the accused not to eat but to have somebody killed are
considered grave offense to the accused. Thus the mitigating circumstance of having
acted in the immediate vindication of a grave offense was, likewise, properly
appreciated. Petitioner was humiliated in front of his guests and kin in his own
house. It is settled, however, that the mitigating circumstance of sufficient
provocation cannot be considered apart from the circumstance of vindication of a
grave offense. These two circumstances arose from one and the same incident so that
they should be considered as only one mitigating circumstance. (Pelonia vs. People,
521 SCRA 207, April 13, 2007)
2. When the accused learned that his father was mauled, accused took a sleep
and when he went to the store to buy cigarets he met the victim and killed him, a
sufficient interval of time had elapsed for appellant to attain a cool composure. There
can be no immediate vindication of a grave offense when the accused had sufficient
time to recover his serenity. (People vs. Sambulan, 289 SCRA 500, April 24, 1998)
3. The brother of the accused was mauled at 11:30 a.m. by the accused. The
killing took place after the lapse of 10 hours.Held: The lapse of 10 hours between the
mauling incident and the killing was more than sufficient to enable the accused to
recover his serenity. Hence, vindication of a grave offense cannot be appreciated in
favor of the accused. (People vs. Pajeres, 210 SCRA 237)
4. The word immediate in the English text is not the correct translation of the
controlling Spanish text of the Revised Penal Code, which uses the word proxima.
The Spanish text, on this point, allows a lapse of time between the grave offense and
the actual vindication. But the lapse of two (2) weeks between his discovery of his
wifes infidelity and the killing of her supposed paramour could no longer be considered
proximate. The passage of a fortnight is more than sufficient time for appellant to have
recovered his composure and assuaged the unease in his mind. The established rule
is that there can be no immediate vindication of a grave offense when the accused had
sufficient time to recover his serenity. (People vs. Ignas, September 30, 2003)
5. The offense committed on Edzel was "hitting" his ear with a stick (according to
Jesus), a bamboo pole (according to Edzel). By Edzel's own clarification, "[he] was hit
50

at [his] ear, not on [his] head." That act would certainly not be classified as "grave
offense (People vs. Bacabac, September 11, 2007)

6. Passion or obfuscation
1. After being informed that he would find his wife together with her alleged
paramour in a certain house, accused went there. He saw his wife sleeping with
another man (but not in actual sexual intercourse). He killed both of them. Held: The
stabbing incident happened because accused acted upon an impulse so powerful as
naturally to have produced passion or obfuscation.( People vs. Cabalhin, 231 SCRA
486)
2. There can no passion and obfuscation where more than five (5) hours had
elapsed between the discovery of his wifes unfaithfulness and the killing of his wife.
The accused had enough time to reflect and gain control of his self. (People vs. Sicat,
213 SCRA 603)
3. Obfuscation must originate from lawful feelings. The turmoil and unreason
which naturally result from a quarrel or fight should not be confused with the sentiment
of person injured to such a degree as to deprive him of his self control. People vs.
Bautista, March 12, 1996, 254 SCRA 621
4. Passion cannot co-exist with treachery because in passion, the offender loses
his control and reason while in treachery the means employed are consciously
adopted. One who loses his reason and self control could not deliberately employ
particular means, method or form of attack in the execution of the crime. (People vs.
Germina, May 19, l998, 290 SCRA 146)

7. Voluntary surrender
1. The mere filing of an information and/or the issuance of a warrant of arrest will
not automatically make the surrender "involuntary." In People v. Oco, the Court
appreciated the mitigating circumstance because immediately upon learning that a
warrant for his arrest was issued, and without the same having been served on him,
the accused surrendered to the police. Thus, it is clear that notwithstanding the
pendency of a warrant for his arrest, the accused may still be entitled to the mitigating
circumstance in case he surrenders, depending on the actual facts surrounding the
very act of giving himself up. (De Vera vs. De Vera, April 7, 2009; People vs. Sion,
August 11, l997, 277 SCRA 127)
2 Surrender to a Barangay Kagawad is surrender to the authorities within the
contemplation of the law. Under Section 388 of the Local Government Code of 1991,
Punong Barangay, Sangguniang Barangay members and members of the Lupong
51

Tagapamayapa shall deemed persons in authority in their jurisdiction. (People vs. Sion,
August 11, l997, 277 SCRA 127)
3 The law does not require that the perpetrator must give himself up to the
authorities in the municipality where the offense was committed. (People vs.
Magallanes, July 8, l997)
4 If the only reason for the supposed surrender is to ensure the safety of the
accused whose arrest is inevitable, the surrender is not spontaneous and hence not
voluntary. Denying to the police any personal knowledge of the crime is not a mark of
voluntary surrender. (People vs. Pinca, 318 SCRA 270, November 17, 1999; People
vs. Camahalan, et al., 241 SCRA 558; People vs. Ablao, March 26, l990)
5 To be mitigating, a surrender must have the following requisites: 1. that the
offender had not been actually arrested. 2. that the offender surrender himself to a
person in authority or his agent. 3. that the surrender was voluntary. The surrender
by the appellant and his co-accused hardly meets these requirements. They were,
indeed, asked to surrender by the police but they refused until only much later when
they knew they were completely surrounded and there was no chance of escape.
Their surrender was not spontaneous as it was motivated more by an intent to insure
their safety. (People vs. Salvilla, supra, see notes under consummated felony)
6 The fact that the accused went to the police station to report the stabbing of his
wife, not by him but by Buaco, does not constitute voluntary surrender. (People vs.
Trigo, 194 SCRA)
7 The fact that Valero yielded when he was apprehended did not operate to
mitigate the penalty because mere non-resistance to arrest is not considered voluntary
surrender. (People vs. Carmina, 193 SCRA 429)

8. Plea of guilt
Although the confession was qualified and introduction of evidence became
necessary, the qualification did not deny the accuseds guilt and what is more, was
subsequently fully justified.
It was not the defendant fault that aggravating
circumstances were erroneously alleged in the information and mitigating
circumstances omitted therefrom. If such qualification could deprive the accused of the
benefit of plea of guilty, then the prosecution could nullify this mitigating circumstance
by counteracting it with unfounded allegations of aggravating circumstances. (People
vs. Magallanes, July 8, l997)
9. Illness as would diminish the exercise of will power
9.1. People vs. Genosa discussed in the topic of BWS

52

D. AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES
Qualifying and aggravating must be alleged in the information.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

People vs. Buayaban, 400 SCRA 48

Belongbilot vs. RTC Zamboanga del Norte, 402 SCRA 221
People vs. de Castro 403 SCRA 543
People vs. de la Cruz, 406 SCRA 439
People vs. Vallejo, 416 SCRA 193
People vs. Otayde, 416 SCRA 597

1. taking advantage of public position

People vs. Ordiales, 42 SCRA 238
November 23, 1971
For abuse of public position to be appreciated, it is not only necessary that the person
committing the crime be a public official, he must also use the influence, prestige or
ascendancy which such office gives him as a means by which he realized his purpose.
The essence of the matter is presented in the inquiry: Did the accused abuse his office
in order to commit the crime?
Sazon vs. Sandiganbayan, February 10, 2009
The accused abused her public position. The fact that petitioner was Senior Forest
Management Specialist of the DENR situated her in a position to perpetrate the
offense. It was on account of petitioners authority that the complainants believed that
they could be prosecuted and the subject logs confiscated unless they gave her what
she wanted. Consequently, we find that a modification of the penalty imposed by the
Sandiganbayan is in order.

2. contempt/insult to public authority

People vs. Tacan, 182 SCRA 601
A teacher is not a public authority within the purview of Art. 14 par. 2 of the Revised
Penal Code. While the last paragraph of Art. 152 will show that a teacher is deemed a
person in authority, such teacher is so deemed only for purposes of application of
Articles 148 and 151. In marked contrast, the first paragraph of Article 152 does not
identify specific articles of the Revised Penal Code for the application of the same.
Besides a penal statute is not to be given a broader scope, therefore a teacher may
not be regarded as a public authority within the meaning of par. 2, Art. 14, RPC.

3. Disregard of respect due to offended party, etc

People vs. Ablao, March 26, 1990
53

Accused killed the barangay captain who was then the President of the ABC of
Lumban, Laguna. The aggraving circumstance of disregard or insult of rank was
present. The fact that the accused shot the victim while still in the session hall
immediately after the meeting and with other members of the Sanggunian members
still around indubitably prove that the appellant deliberately intended to disregard or
insult his rank.
People vs. Collado, 196 SCRA 519
Disregard of respect due to the offended party is not proper to consider in robbery with
homicide. This crime is primarily a crime against property. Homicide is a mere incident
of the robbery, the latter being the main purpose and object of the criminal.
4. Dwelling
People vs. Badilla, May 21, 1990
Dwelling is an aggravating circumstance even though the victim was not the owner of
the house where the crime was committed. Dwelling may mean temporary dwelling.
People vs. Uycoque, 246 SCRA 769
Dwelling is still aggravating when the victim was resting in the comfort of his home
when the accused forcibly let him out of his house and shortly before he was shot to
death. An act performed cannot be divided when the offender began the aggression in
the dwelling of the offended party and ended it in the street.

5. Nighttime
People vs. Palon, February 20, 1984, G.R. No. L-33271
There are two tests of nocturnity as an aggravating circumstance. Objective test under
which nocturnity is aggravating because it facilitates the commission of the crime.
Subjective test under which nocturnity is aggravating because it was purposely sought
by the offender. The two are to be applied in the alternative.
6. Uninhabited place
People vs. Desalisa, 229 SCRA 35
The aggravating circumstance of uninhabited place was present. The uninhabitedness
of a place is determined not by the distance of the nearest house to the scene of the
crime but whether or not in the place of commission, there was reasonable possibility
of the victim receiving some help. Considering that the killing was done during
nighttime and many fruit trees and shrubs obstruct the view of neighbors and
passersby, there was no reasonable possibility for the victim to receive any assistance.
7. Band
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7.1. People vs. Manlolo, 169 SCRA 394- stone is an arm

8. Recidivism
9. Reiteracion
See discussion on the topic of multiple offenders (under Felonies)

10. ignominy- produces moral suffering; offended party was humiliated or put
to shame because of the commission of the crime.
10. 1. offender raped the offended party in the presence of her husband (US vs.
Iglesia 21 Phil. 55.
10.2. People vs. Fernandez, March 22, 199, plastering mud on the victims
vagina right after she was raped.
The following are also qualifying circumstances which will be discussed in Article 248
E. ALTERNATIVE CIRCUMSTANCES
1. Intoxication
1. People vs. Cudal October 31, 2006
Intoxication, not habitual or intentional, is mitigating
Absent any showing then that the offenders intoxication was habitual or intentional, it
may only be considered as mitigating to correctly call for the imposition of the penalty
of reclusion perpetua, in accordance with Article 63, paragraph 2(3) of the Revised
Penal Code.
When a person considered intoxicated?
1. People vs Mondigo, January 31, 2008
Intoxication as mitigating circumstance was not proven. To be considered
mitigating, there must be showing that the accuseds drunkenness affected his
mental faculties. The evidence shows that at the time of attacked, accused drank
about 3 to 4 bottles of beer. The low alcohol content of beer, the quantity of such
liquor accused imbibed, and the absence of any independent proof that accuseds
alcohol intake affected his mental faculties all negate the finding that appellant was
intoxicated enough at the time he committed the crimes to mitigate his liability.

2. Licyayo vs. People, March 4, 2008

55

For intoxication to be considered as a mitigating circumstance, it must be shown that

the intoxication impaired the willpower of the accused and that he did not know what he
was doing or could not comprehend the wrongfulness of his acts. The person pleading
intoxication must prove that he took such quantity of alcoholic beverage, prior to the
commission of the crime, as would blur his reason. There is no plausible evidence
showing that the quantity of liquor taken by accsued was of such quantity as to affect
his mental faculties. Accused cannot avail himself of the mitigating circumstance of
intoxication merely on the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses that he was drunk
during the incident. Such testimonies do not warrant a conclusion that the degree of
petitioners intoxication had affected his faculties. There must be convincing proof of
the nature and effect of his intoxication which petitioner failed to adduce in the present
case.
2. Relationship
People vs. Capareda
May 27, 2004
Jocelyn, together with her minor daughter Rizalyn, resided in the two-storey house of
her parents, the spouses Cario and Victorina. Carino had a sister (Anita) who is
married for the second time to Emiliano, accused herein. Emiliano therefore is the step
grandfather of Rizalyn. While Rizalyn was studying her lessons, the accused entered
Rizalyns room and raped her. Held: The alternative aggravating circumstance of
relationship under Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code cannot be considered in the
instant case considering that the relationship between a step-grandniece and her
step-grandfather is not one of the relatives specifically enumerated therein.

F. Provisions of Special Penal Laws affecting criminal liability:

I. P.D. 1866 as amended by RA 8294
If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such
use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance
II. R.A. 91625 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002,
1. Use of dangerous drugs is a qualifying aggravating circumstance. Under
Section 25 of R.A. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, a
positive finding for the use of dangerous drugs is a qualifying aggravating circumstance
in the commission of a crime by the offender, and the application of the penalty
provided for in the Revised Penal Code shall be applicable.
2. Immunity from Prosecution and Punishment (Articles 33 and 34)

56

Section 33. Immunity from Prosecution and Punishment. Notwithstanding the

provisions of Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and the
provisions of Republic Act No. 6981 or the Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Act
of 1991, any person who has violated Sections 7, 11, 12, 14, 15, and 19, Article II of
this Act, who voluntarily gives information about any violation of Sections 4, 5, 6, 8, 10,
13, and 16, Article II of this Act as well as any violation of the offenses mentioned if
committed by a drug syndicate, or any information leading to the whereabouts,
identities and arrest of all or any of the members thereof; and who willingly testifies
against such persons as described above, shall be exempted from prosecution or
punishment for the offense with reference to which his/her information of testimony
were given, and may plead or prove the giving of such information and testimony in bar
of such prosecution: Provided, That the following conditions concur:
(1) The information and testimony are necessary for the conviction of the persons
described above;
(2) Such information and testimony are not yet in the possession of the State;
(3) Such information and testimony can be corroborated on its material points;
(4) the informant or witness has not been previously convicted of a crime
involving moral turpitude, except when there is no other direct evidence available
for the State other than the information and testimony of said informant or
witness; and
(5) The informant or witness shall strictly and faithfully comply without delay, any
condition or undertaking, reduced into writing, lawfully imposed by the State as
further consideration for the grant of immunity from prosecution and punishment.
Provided, further, That this immunity may be enjoyed by such informant or witness who
does not appear to be most guilty for the offense with reference to which his/her
information or testimony were given: Provided, finally, That there is no direct evidence
available for the State except for the information and testimony of the said informant or
witness.
Section 34. Termination of the Grant of Immunity. The immunity granted to the
informant or witness, as prescribed in Section 33 of this Act, shall not attach should it
turn out subsequently that the information and/or testimony is false, malicious or made
only for the purpose of harassing, molesting or in any way prejudicing the persons
described in the preceding Section against whom such information or testimony is
directed against. In such case, the informant or witness shall be subject to prosecution
and the enjoyment of all rights and benefits previously accorded him under this Act or
any other law, decree or order shall be deemed terminated.
In case an informant or witness under this Act fails or refuses to testify without just
cause, and when lawfully obliged to do so, or should he/she violate any condition
accompanying such immunity as provided above, his/her immunity shall be removed
and he/she shall likewise be subject to contempt and/or criminal prosecution, as the
case may be, and the enjoyment of all rights and benefits previously accorded him
under this Act or in any other law, decree or order shall be deemed terminated.
In case the informant or witness referred to under this Act falls under the applicability of
this Section hereof, such individual cannot avail of the provisions under Article VIII of
this Act.
3. Minors (Articles 66, 67. 68, 69, 70)
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Section 66. Suspension of Sentence of a First-Time Minor Offender. An accused

who is over fifteen (15) years of age at the time of the commission of the offense
mentioned in Section 11 of this Act, but not more than eighteen (18) years of age at the
time when judgment should have been promulgated after having been found guilty of
said offense, may be given the benefits of a suspended sentence, subject to the
following conditions:
(a) He/she has not been previously convicted of violating any provision of this
Act, or of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended; or of the Revised
Penal Code; or of any special penal laws;
(b) He/she has not been previously committed to a Center or to the care of a
DOH-accredited physician; and
(c) The Board favorably recommends that his/her sentence be suspended.
While under suspended sentence, he/she shall be under the supervision and
rehabilitative surveillance of the Board, under such conditions that the court may
impose for a period ranging from six (6) months to eighteen (18) months.
Upon recommendation of the Board, the court may commit the accused under
suspended sentence to a Center, or to the care of a DOH-accredited physician for at
least six (6) months, with after-care and follow-up program for not more than eighteen
(18) months.
In the case of minors under fifteen (15) years of age at the time of the commission of
any offense penalized under this Act, Article 192 of Presidential Decree No. 603,
otherwise known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 1179 shall apply, without prejudice to the application of the provisions of
this Section.
Section 67. Discharge After Compliance with Conditions of Suspended Sentence of a
First-Time Minor Offender. If the accused first time minor offender under suspended
sentence complies with the applicable rules and regulations of the Board, including
confinement in a Center, the court, upon a favorable recommendation of the Board for
the final discharge of the accused, shall discharge the accused and dismiss all
proceedings.
Upon the dismissal of the proceedings against the accused, the court shall enter an
order to expunge all official records, other than the confidential record to be retained by
the DOJ relating to the case. Such an order, which shall be kept confidential, shall
restore the accused to his/her status prior to the case. He/she shall not be held
thereafter to be guilty of perjury or of concealment or misrepresentation by reason of
his/her failure to acknowledge the case or recite any fact related thereto in response to
any inquiry made of him for any purpose.
Section 68. Privilege of Suspended Sentence to be Availed of Only Once by a FirstTime Minor Offender. The privilege of suspended sentence shall be availed of only
once by an accused drug dependent who is a first-time offender over fifteen (15) years
of age at the time of the commission of the violation of Section 15 of this Act but not
more than eighteen (18) years of age at the time when judgment should have been
promulgated.
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Section 69. Promulgation of Sentence for First-Time Minor Offender. If the accused
first-time minor offender violates any of the conditions of his/her suspended sentence,
the applicable rules and regulations of the Board exercising supervision and
rehabilitative surveillance over him, including the rules and regulations of the Center
should confinement be required, the court shall pronounce judgment of conviction and
he/she shall serve sentence as any other convicted person.
Section 70. Probation or Community Service for a First-Time Minor Offender in Lieu of
Imprisonment. Upon promulgation of the sentence, the court may, in its discretion,
place the accused under probation, even if the sentence provided under this Act is
higher than that provided under existing law on probation, or impose community
service in lieu of imprisonment. In case of probation, the supervision and rehabilitative
surveillance shall be undertaken by the Board through the DOH in coordination with the
Board of Pardons and Parole and the Probation Administration. Upon compliance with
the conditions of the probation, the Board shall submit a written report to the court
recommending termination of probation and a final discharge of the probationer,
whereupon the court shall issue such an order.
The community service shall be complied with under conditions, time and place as may
be determined by the court in its discretion and upon the recommendation of the Board
and shall apply only to violators of Section 15 of this Act. The completion of the
community service shall be under the supervision and rehabilitative surveillance of the
Board during the period required by the court. Thereafter, the Board shall render a
report on the manner of compliance of said community service. The court in its
discretion may require extension of the community service or order a final discharge.
In both cases, the judicial records shall be covered by the provisions of Sections 60
and 64 of this Act.
If the sentence promulgated by the court requires imprisonment, the period spent in the
Center by the accused during the suspended sentence period shall be deducted from
the sentence to be served.
4. Limited application of the Revised Penal Code (Article 98)
Section 98. Limited Applicability of the Revised Penal Code. Notwithstanding any
law, rule or regulation to the contrary, the provisions of the Revised Penal Code (Act
No. 3814), as amended, shall not apply to the provisions of this Act, except in the case
of minor offenders. Where the offender is a minor, the penalty for acts punishable by
life imprisonment to death provided herein shall be reclusion perpetua to death.

II. RA 10591 Comprehensive Firearms and Ammunition Regulation Act

(May 29,
2013)
Question: Is illegal possession of firearm a crime or merely an aggravating
circumstance?
Answer: It is either a crime or an aggravating circumstance but it cannot be both. If the
crime is committed by the person without using the loose firearm, the violation of the
law shall be considered as a distinct and separate offense.
59

Question: What is the effect of the use of loose firearm in the commission of the
crime?
Answer: As a general rule, the use of a loose firearm, when inherent in the commission
of a crime punishable under the RPC or other special laws, shall be considered as an
aggravating circumstance. This means the offender cannot be charged separately for
illegal possession of firearm.
Question: What if the maximum penalty for the crime committed with the use of
firearm is lower than that prescribed for illegal possession of firearm, what penalty shall
be imposed upon the culprit?
Answer: The penalty for illegal possession of firearm shall be imposed in lieu of the
penalty for the crime.
Question: Suppose the crime committed with the use of a loose firearm is penalized
by the law with a maximum penalty which is equal to that imposed for illegal
possession of firearms, what penalty shall be imposed upon the culprit?
Answer: The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period shall be imposed in
addition to the penalty for the crime punishable under the RPC or other special laws of
which he is found guilty.
Question: What is the effect if the violation of RA 10591 is in furtherance of, or incident
to, or in connection with the crime of rebellion or insurrection, or attempted coup d
etat?
Answer: Such violation shall be absorbed as an element of the crime of rebellion or
insurrection, or attempted coup d etat..
IX. PENALTIES
1. RA 9346-An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines
2. Protective Theory of Punishment, see Magno vs. Court of Appeals, June 26, 1992.
3. Art. 21- No felony shall be punished by any penalty not prescribed by law prior to its
commission.
This simply enunciates the general principle on non retroactivity of a penal
statute. It ordains that a penal law cannot be applied to any act that was not
punishable by law prior to its commission.
Exception:

60

Article 22 which says that penal laws shall have retroactive effect in so far as
they favor the accused. The benefit extends even if a final judgment has been
pronounced and the convict is serving the same.
Exception does not apply:
a. In case the accused is a habitual delinquent under Rule 5, Art. 62, RPC
b. In case the law expressly provides that offenses committed prior to the
enactment of the law shall be governed by the laws in force at the time of
the commission of the felony( Criminal Law, Kapunan, et al, 1990 Edition
page 191 citing People vs. Moran, 44 Phil. 387; Tavera vs. Valdez, 1 Phil.
468)
b.1. Imelda Marcos vs. Court of Appeals, Sept. 5, 1997, 278 SCRA 843
Issue: Whether or not the amendatory CB Circulars could benefit Mrs. Marcos,
et al.
Ruling: Such amendments and saving clauses are valid and were authorized
enactments under a delegated power of the Monetary Board. Section 14 of the
Central Bank Act expressly grants the MB the power to prepare and issue rules
and regulations for the effective discharge of the responsibilities and exercise of
the powers assigned to the MB and to the CB.
Administrative bodies have the authority to issue administrative regulations
which are penal in nature where the law itself makes the violation of the
administrative regulation punishable and provides for its penalty. The Central
Bank Act defined the offense and its penalty while the questioned circular
merely spelled the details of the offense.

4 Pardon- its effects:

i. Pardon by the private offended party (Article 23)
a. does not extinguish criminal action. The reason for this is that in criminal
cases the real offended party is the People of the Philippines and the injured
person is only the complaining witness.
N.B. There are two situations where the pardon by the private offended
party shall extinguish the criminal actions. These are:
1. Under Art. 344
1.1. Pardon by the offended spouse in the crime of adultery and
concubinage
1.2. Pardon by the offended party in the case of seduction, acts of
lasciviousness and abduction
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1.3.

Marriage of the offender with the offended party

2. Light offenses- compromised under the Barangay Katarungan Law

2.1 People vs. Caruncho, G.R. No. 57804, Jan. 23, 1984
2.2. Urbano vs. IAC, 157 SCRA 1b. but civil liability to the injured party is extinguished by his express waiver.
ii. Pardon by the Chief Executive (Art. 36)
a. extinguish criminal liability (see Art. 89 (4)
b. does not exempt culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed
upon him by the sentence.
c. does not restore culprits right to hold public office or the right of suffrage,
unless such rights are expressly restored by the terms of the sentence.
But if pardon is granted after the culprit has served his sentence, then
the pardon restores his political rights. (Pelobello vs. Palatino, G.R. No.
48100, June 30, 1941 IX Lawyers Journal 438; 72 Phil 441:Pendon vs.
Diasnes, 79 Phil. 441)
5. Measures of prevention or safety which are not considered penalties (Art. 24)
1. arrest and temporary detention as well as detention by reason of insanity or
imbecility or illness requiring their confinement in a hospital.
2. commitment of a minor to any welfare institutions
3. suspension from employment or public office during the trial or in order to
institute proceedings.
Gonzaga vs. Sandiganbayan, September 6, 1991. Under Section 13 of RA
3091, suspension of a public officer upon the filing of a valid information
is mandatory. The petitioner questioned the constitutionality of said
provision as it violates his right to be presumed innocent. The Supreme
Court ruled that preventivesuspension is not a penalty. Article 24 of the
RPC is very clear on this. A person under preventive suspension
remains entitled to the constitutional presumption of innocence as his
culpability must still be established.
See also Bayot vs. Sandiganbayan, 128 SCRA 348
4. fines and other corrective measures that superior officials may impose
upon their subordinates
5. deprivation of rights and reparations which civil law may establish in penal
form.

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6. Period of preventive imprisonment deducted from term of imprisonment (Art. 29)

Question: What benefits are accorded to offenders who had undergone preventive
imprisonment?
Answer: Offenders who have undergone preventive imprisonment are entitled to
deductions from their term of imprisonment. They are entitled either to the full credit or
four fifths of the time they have undergone preventive imprisonment (Article 29 of the
Revised Penal Code as amended by RA 10592, May 29, 2013)
Question:
When is an offender entitled to the full credit of his preventive
imprisonment?
Answer: When the offender agrees voluntarily in writing after being informed of the
effects thereof and with the assistance of counsel to abide by the same disciplinary
rules imposed upon convicted prisoners, the actual time he had undergone preventive
imprisonment plus good conduct allowances shall be deducted from the term of his
imprisonment. However, if the offender is a recidivist or has been convicted previously
twice or more crimes or when upon being summoned for the execution of his sentence,
he failed to surrender voluntarily, he is not entitled to a full deduction. (Article 29 of the
Revised Penal Code as amended by RA 10592, May 29, 2013)

Question: When is an offender entitled only to four fifths of his preventive

imprisonement?
Answer: If the offender does not agree to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed
upon convicted prisoners, which he shall do so in writing with the assistance of a
counsel. (Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by RA 10592, May 29,
2013)
Problem: Saturnino was charged with the crime of theft of property valued at P200.
Saturnino has no money to put up his bail bond. So, he was detained at the city jail.
He has been in jail for two years and four months. If you are the pro bono lawyer of
Saturnino, what action will you take? Explain.
Answer: If I were the counsel of Saturnino, I will file a motion for his release. Under
the law whenever an offender has undergone preventive imprisonment for a period
equal to the possible maximum imprisonment of the offense charged and is case is not
yet terminated, he shall be released immediately without prejudice to the continuation
of the trial thereof or the proceeding on appeal, if the same is under review. The
computation of the preventive imprisonment shall be the actual period of detention with
good conduct allowance. However, this benefit shall not apply to recidivists, habitual
delinquents, escapees and persons charged with heinous crimes. (Article 29 of the
Revised Penal Code as amended by RA 10592, May 29, 2013)
Question: Suppose the offender who is undergoing preventive imprisonment has
committed a crime the maximum penalty of which is destierro, when shall he be
released? Explain.
63

Answer: He shall be released after thirty (30) days of preventive imprisonment.

7. Reclusion perpetua not the same with life imprisonment
People vs. Alvarez, September 9, l991
8. No medium period of reclusion perpetua
People vs. Benitez, October 4, l991
9. Reclusion perpetua imposed regardless of mitigating
People vs. Orita, April 3, l990
10. Reclusion perpetua is still indivisible despite having fixed duration.
People vs. Zulla, 323 SCRA 589, January 28, 2000
Ruling:
After deliberating on the motion and re-examining the legislative history of RA 7659,
the Court concludes that although Section 17 of the law has fixed the duration of
reclusion perpetua from 20 years and 1 day to 40 years, there was no clear legislative
intent to alter its original classification as an indivisible penalty. It shall then remain as
an indivisible penalty (This abandons People vs. Lucas, 232 SCRA 537, 1994)
11.

Minority privileged, lower penalty

People vs. Galang, June 29, l989

The accused being a minor is entitled to the privilege mitigating circumstance under
Article 68. This despite the fact that the penalty that may be imposed upon is
reclusion perpetua.
Article 68 is an exception or limitation of the first paragraph of Article 63 because first,
the said paragraph of Article 63 is a general rule, secondly Article 68 follows or comes
after and thirdly Article 68 is favorable to the accused. All these grounds are
sanctioned by well known rules of statutory construction.
12. Problem: Since Republic Act No. 9346 prohibits the imposition of the penalty of
death, what penalty should be imposed upon a minor who committed rape against a
five year old baby?
Answer: Considering that the victim was only five (5) years old at the time the offender
defiled her, the law prescribing the death penalty when rape is committed against a
child below seven (7) years old applies. But the offender is entitled to a penalty one
degree lower than that prescribed by law, pursuant to Article 68 of the Revised Penal
Code besides Republic Act No. 9346 prohibits the imposition of the penalty of death.
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However, for purposes of determining the proper penalty because of the privileged
mitigating circumstance of minority, the penalty of death is still the penalty to be
reckoned with. (People v. Jacinto, 645, SCRA 590, March 16, 2011)

13. A fine x x x shall be considered a correctional penalty if it does not exceed

P6,000.00 but is not less than P200.00 (Article 26) Compare with Art. 9, light felonies
are those infractions of law for the commission of which the penalty of arresto menor or
a fine not exceeding P200 or both is provided.
If the fine is exactly P200.00. It is a light felony but a correctional penalty.
13. Subsidiary penalty (Article 39)
Question: What is subsidiary penalty?
Answer: A subsidiary penalty is an additional penalty of imprisonment that may be
imposed by the court in case the convict is insolvent to pay the fine imposed by the
court. It should be expressly imposed by the court in the judgment of conviction. If it is
not imposed expressly, the convict can not be made to suffer an additional penalty. But
subsidiary penalty can be imposed by the judge in case the penalty, aside from fine, is
prision correctional or less. If the penalty is prision mayor or more, it is not proper to
impose it. Subsidiary penalty shall not relieve the convict from paying the fine in case
his financial condition improves. It is not an imprisonment for non-payment of debt.
This constitutional right applies only to debt ex contractu and not to debt imposed by
law.
Question: How is subsidiary imprisonment computed?
Answer: It is computed at one day for each amount equivalent to the highest minimum
wage rate prevailing in the Philippines at the time of the rendition of the judgment of
conviction. In case the principal penalty is prision correctional or arresto and fine, the
subsidiary penalty shall not exceed 1/3 of the term of the sentence or one year
whichever is lower. In case the principal penalty is fine only, the subsidiary
imprisonment should not exceed six (6) months if the culprit shall have been
prosecuted for a grave or less grave felony or shall not exceed fifteen (15) days if the
culprit shall have been prosecuted for a light felony. (Article 39 of the Revised Penal
Code as amended by R.A. 10159)
14. Accessory penalty (Arts. 73, 40 to 45, 30 to 34)
a. Article 73: whenever a penalty is imposed it is understood that accessory penalties
are also imposed
b. illustration
ARTICLE
40

PENALTY
Death

ACCESSORY
EFFECTS
Perpetual Abs. 30
Disq.
34
Civil Interdiction
65

41

Recl. Perpetua
Recl. Temporal

42

Prision Mayor

43

Prision Corr

44

Arresto

Perpetual Abs.
Disq.
Civil interdiction
Temry Abs.
Disq.
Perpetual Sp.
Disq. From the
right of suffrage
Suspsion from
p.o.,
right to follow
prof,
or calling
perp. Sp disq.
from the right of
suffrage
if duration
exceed 18 mos.
Suspension
from the right
hold office and
the right of
suffrage during
term of
sentence.

30
34
30
32

33
33
32

33

c. Article 45, confiscation and forfeiture of the proceeds or instruments of the crime
1. in favor of the government
2. return to owner if property of innocent third persons.
3. not subject to lawful commerce-destroy
15. Penalty upon principals, accomplices accessories, consumated, frustrated &
attempted. (Arts. 46, 50 to 57)
a. Art. 46, penalty prescribed by law principals and applicable to consumated felony.
b. illustration
PRINCIPAL
CONSUMATED 46
FRUSTRATED 1
ATTEMPTED
2

ACCOMPLICE
1
2
3

ACCESSORY
2
3
4

16. EFFECTS OF THE ATTENDANCE OF MITIGATING OR

CIRCUMSTANCES (ART. 62)

AGGRAVATING

66

1. Aggravating which in themselves constitute a crime.

2. Aggravating which are included by law in defining crime.
note: 1. advantage of public position- maximum penalty regardless of mitigating
2. also if committed by syndicate, two or more persons collaborating
3. Inherent aggravating circumstances
4. Aggravating or mitigating circumstances which arise from (MPP) the moral attributes
of the offender, or from his private relations with the offended party, or from any other
personal cause, shall only serve to aggravate or mitigate the liability of the principals,
accomplices and accessories as to whom such circumstances are attendant.
17. IMPOSITION OF SENTENCE: INDETERMINATE SENTENCE
1. Indeterminate sentence, mandatory
2. It consists of a maximum and minimum term
3. Maximum term shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances,
could be properly imposed under the rules of the RPC ( see rules under Articles 64 and
65)
4. Minimum term shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that
prescribed by the RPC.
5. Purpose- to uplift and redeem valuable human material and prevent
unnecessary and excessive deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness.
6. Instances where IS shall not be imposed:
1. To persons convicted of offenses punished with death penalty or life
imprisonment.
2. To those whose maximum term of imprisonment does not exceed one year.
3. To those convicted of treason, conspiracy or proposal to commit treason,
misprision of treason, rebellion, sedition or espionage.
4. Habitual delinquents
5. Those who escaped from confinement or evaded sentence.
6. Those who were granted conditional pardon, shall violate the terms thereof.
18. SERVICE OF SENTENCE (ART. 70)
1. Simultaneous, if the nature of the penalties will permit
2. Otherwise, successive
3. Arresto menor to be served ahead of destierro (7 & 8)
4. Threefold rule sentence shall not be more than three fold the length of time
corresponding to the most severe of the penalties.
-But there must be at least 4 penalties.
5. Forty year rule-the maximum period shall in no case exceed forty years.
67

19. PROBATION
i. Probation is not service of sentence, but suspension of service of sentence
Moreno vs. Comelec, 498 SCRA 547
Section 40 of the Local Government Code provides:
Section 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified
from running for any elective local positions:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral
turpitude, or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more
imprisonment, within two years after serving sentence.
Under letter (a), a person cannot run within two years after serving his sentence.
This two year bar applies to both convicted persons mentioned in letter (a). It applies
to those who have been sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral
turpitude and also to those who have been sentenced for an offense punishable by one
(1) year or more imprisonment. This is so because (T) he placing of the comma (,) in
the provision means that the phrase within two years after serving sentence modifies
both parts of Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code.
Under the two-year bar rule, a person cannot run for public office within two years
from service of sentence. What is then the meaning of service of sentence? The
phrase "service of sentence," understood in its general and common sense, means
the confinement of a convicted person in a penal facility for the period adjudged
by the court.
Do we consider probation of sentence a service of sentence? The Answer is No. The
period within which a person is under probation cannot be equated with service of
sentence. The order placing defendant on probation is not a sentence but is rather, in
effect, a suspension of the imposition of sentence; that the grant of probation to
Moreno suspended the imposition of the principal penalty of imprisonment, as well as
the accessory penalties of suspension from public office and from the right to follow a
profession or calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of
suffrage.
Two waiver rule:
1. Perfection of an appeal is a relinquishment of the alternative remedy of availing of
the probation law, the purpose of which is to prevent speculation or opportunism on the
part of the accused who, although already eligible, did not at once apply for probation,
but did so only after failing in his appeal. (Moreno vs. Comelec, 498 SCRA 547, August
10, 2006)
68

Petitioner is no longer qualified to avail of probation. Section 4 of the Probation

Law mandates that no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the
defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction. This is true even if
the appeal is taken solely to reduce the penalty. (Francisco vs. CA, et al, April 6, 1995)
Exception to the rule: In case the convicts sentence was reduced by the
appellate court making the new penalty probationable.
Problem: At around 7:00 oclock in the evening, Rufino went out to buy cigarettes at a
nearby store. From nowhere, Arnel sneaked behind and struck Rufino twice on the
head with a huge stone, about 15 inches in diameter. Rufino fell unconscious as Arnel
fled. The RTC convicted Arnel with frustrated homicide as charged and sentenced him
to suffer an imprisonment from two years and one day of prision correctional, as
minimum, to six years and one day of prision mayor, as maximum. Arnel appealed to
the Court of Appeals and later to the Supreme Court seeking conviction for the lesser
crime of attempted homicide with the consequent reduction of the penalty imposed on
him. The Supreme Court found Arnel guilty only of attempted homicide and sentenced
him to suffer a penalty of four months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years and
four months of prision correctional, as maximum. With this new penalty, is Arnel
entitled to apply for probation upon remand of the case to the trial court? Explain.
Answer. In Colinares vs. People, 662 SCRA 266, December 13, 2011, the Supreme
Court En Banc answered this question in the affirmative. With the new penalty, it would
be but fair to allow him the right to apply for probation upon remand of the case to the
lower court. To hold otherwise will make Arnel pay for the trial courts erroneous
judgment with the forfeiture of his right to apply for probation. Ang kabayo ang
nagkasala, ang hagupit ay sa kalabao (the horse errs, the carabo gets the whip). The
Probation Law never intended to deny an accused his right to probation through no
fault of his. The underlying philosophy of probation is one of liberality towards the
accused. Such philosophy is not served by a harsh and stringent interpretation of the
statutory provisions. Besides, in a real sense, the Supreme Court finding that Arnel
was guilty, not of frustrated homicide, but only of attempted homicide, is an original
conviction that for the first time imposes on him a probationable penalty.

2. Filing of probation is a waiver of the right to appeal (Section 4 of the Probation law)
Exception:
YUSI vs. MORALES
April 28, 1983
May persons who apply for the benefits of the Probation Law withdraw their application
during the period for filing an appeal and ask that their appeal from the judgment of
conviction be given due course?
Ruling: We find the strict and unyielding application of the "waiver rule" under the
Probation Law unwarranted.
69

Under the factual circumstances of the instant case, the respondent court in granting
the application for probation and denying the prayer to withdraw, failed to take into
account the fact that the petitioners' counsel of record was not present when the
petitioners applied for probation. True, they were represented by a counsel de oficio
appointed by the court on the spot but the counsel de oficio was not fully acquainted
with their case. He could not have considered fully the strength of a possible appeal
when he advised them about the effects of the application for probation.
It is in the best interests of justice that the court should take the necessary steps to
insure that the accused has been fully apprised of the full import of his application
before the court acts on it.
Qualifications/ Disqualifications
1. Multiple prison terms shall be taken separately, not added up, and so as long
as any one of them does not exceed six years, the applicant is qualified.
Multiple prison terms imposed against an accused found guilty of several offenses in
one decision are not, and should not be, added up. And the sum of the multiple prison
terms imposed against an applicant should not be determinative of his eligibility for,
nay his disqualification from, probation. The multiple prison terms are distinct from
each other, and if none of the terms exceeds the limit set out in the Probation Law i.e.
not more than six (6) years, then he is entitled to probation. The number of offenses is
immaterial as long as all the penalties imposed, taken separately, are within the
probationable period. For Section 9, par. (a) PD 968, as amended, uses the word
maximum, not total, when it says that [t]he benefits of this Decree shall not be
extended to those xxx sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more
than six years. (Francisco vs. CA, et al, April 6, 1995)

2. Applicant is not entitled to probation because she had displayed a devious and
reprehensible character in trying to evade the implementation of the execution against
her thereby rendering the judgment against her ineffective. Her issuing subject fiftyfour (54) bouncing checks is a serious offense. To allow petitioner to be placed on
probation would be to depreciate the seriousness of her malefactions. (Santos vs. CA,
319 SCRA 609, December 2, 1999 but see Santos vs. Hon. E. Cruz Pano, Jan. 17,
1983
3. On previously been convicted by final judgment of an offense... the statute relates
previous to the date of conviction, not to the date of commission of the crime. So
even if the applicant was convicted of five counts of crimes on the same day, he has
not been previously been convicted., thus still qualified to avail of probation provided
none of the sentences exceeds 5 years. (Rura vs. Leopena, June 19, 1985)
Probation is not co-terminus with its period; order of final discharge necessary
(Bala vs. Martinez, 181 SCRA 459)

70

20. EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY (Art. 89)

1. Effects of death on the:
i. Criminal Liability
ii. Pecuniary liability
People vs.. Badeo, et al., November 21, l991
Pecuniary penalties in Article 89 are extinguished if death of the convict occurs
before final judgment. These pecuniary penalties refers to fine and costs. They
should be distinguished from pecuniary liabilities in Article 38 which includes
reparation and indemnity.
iii. On the civil liability arising from crime
People vs. Bayotas, 236 SCRA 239, September 2, 1994
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his
criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice
Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates
his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on
the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore."
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of
accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than
delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from
which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission:
a) Law
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) . . .
e) Quasi-delicts
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for
recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and
subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended.
This separate civil action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or
the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same
is based as explained above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file
this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the
criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-offended party instituted together
therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is
deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with
provisions of Article 1155
of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any
apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription.
71

2. PRESCRIPTION OF THE CRIME

i. from the discovery by the offended party, the authorities or their agents.
a. meaning of offended party- State as well as the private offended party.
GARCIA vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL 266 SCRA 678, January 27, l997
It is true that bigamy is a public offense. But it is entirely incorrect to state that only the
State is the offended party in such case, as well as in other public offenses and
therefore only the States discovery of the crime could effectively commence the
running of the period of prescription therefor. Article 91 of the RPC provides that the
period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is
discovered by the offended party, the authorities or their agents. This rule makes no
distinction between a public crime and a private crime. In both cases then, the
discovery may be by the offended party, the authorities or their agents.
Art. 91 does not define the term offended party. We find its definition in Section 12,
Rule 110 of the Rules of Court as the person against whom or against whose property,
the offense was committed.
Section 12. Name of the offended party.- A complaint or information must
state the name and surname of the person against whom or against whose
property the offense was committed, or any appellation or nickname by
whish such person has been or is known, and if there is no better way of
identifying him, he must be described under a fictitious name.
More specifically, it is reasonable to assume that the offended party in the commission
of a crime, public or private, is the party to whom the offender is civilly liable, in light of
Article 100 of the RPC, which expressly provides that every person criminally liable is
also civilly liable. Invariably then, the private individual to whom the offender is civilly
liable is the offended party.
This conclusion is strengthened by Section 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court which
reads:
When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil
liability is impliedly instituted with a criminal action, unless the offended
party waives the civil action, reserves right to institute it separately or
institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
ii. In falsification involving sales/conveyances of real properties, the period of
prescription starts to run from the registration of the deed in the Register of
Deeds (constructive notice rules applies)
People vs. Reyes, 175 SCRA 597
Facts: Spouses Julio Rizare and Patricia Pampo owned a parcel of land located at
Lipa City registered in their names.
72

In June l983, complainant discovered from the records of the Register of Deeds of Lipa
City that the above mentioned property had already been transferred in the name of
Mizpah. The conveyance was effected through a notarized deed of sale executed and
signed on May 19, l961. The signature of Patricia was falsified and that accused made
an untruthful statement that she was single although she was married to one Benfari
Reyes on May 2, l950.
Issue: Whether or not the crime of falsification of public document has prescribed
already at the time the complaint was filed.
Ruling: Yes. The application of the rule on constructive notice in the construction of
Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code would or certainly be favorable to the accused
since the prescriptive period of the crime shall have to be reckoned with earlier i.e.
from the time the notarized deed of sale was registered with the Register of Deeds.
In the instant case, the notarized deed of sale was registered on May 26, l961. The
criminal information for falsification of public document having been filed on October
18, l984, or more than 10 years from May 26, l961, the crime for which the accused
was charged has prescribed.
People vs. Villalon, et al, December 21, l990
Facts: The falsified document was a notarized special power of attorney registered
with the Register of Deeds on February 13, l964. The complainant discovered the
falsification in January 1972. The information for estafa through falsification of public
document was filed on March 21, l974.
Issue: Whether or not the crime has prescribed.
Ruling: The ten year prescriptive period should be counted from the date of the
registration with the Register of Deeds. Registration in a public registry is a notice to
the whole world. The record is a constructive notice of its contents as well as all
interests, legal or equitable, included therein. All persons are charged with knowledge
of what it contains.
The application of this rule on constructive notice shall be applied in the interpretation
of Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code because that would most certainly be favorable
to the accused. This is so because the prescriptive period of the crime shall have to be
reckoned with earlier, that is from the time the question document was recorded in the
Register of Deeds.
Since the document was registered on February 13, l964 and that the information was
filed on March 29, l974, or more than 10 years thereafter, the crime has indubitably
prescribed.
iii. But the constructive notice rule does not apply to bigamous marriages even
if the second marriage contract is registered in the Local Civil Register.
Sermonia vs. Court of Appeals, 233 SCRA 155, June 14, 1994
73

The principle of constructive notice should not be applied in regard to the crime of
bigamy.
In the case of real property, the registration of any transaction involving any right or
interest therein is made in the Register of Deeds of the place where the said property is
located. Verification in the office of the Register of Deeds concerned of the transactions
involving the said property can easily be made by any interested party. In the case of a
bigamous marriage, verification by the offended person or the authorities of the same
would indeed be quite difficult as such a marriage may be entered into in a place where
the offender is not known to be still a married person.
To this we may also add that the rule on constructive notice will make de rigueur the
routinary inspection or verification of the marriages listed in the National Census Office
and in various local civil registries all over the country to make certain that no second
or even third marriage has been contracted without the knowledge of the legitimate
spouse. This is too formidable a task to even contemplate.
More importantly, while Sec. 52 of P.D. 1529 (Property Registration Decree) provides
for constructive notice to all persons of every conveyance, mortgage, lease, lien,
attachment, order, judgment, instrument or entry affecting registered land filed or
entered in the office of the Register of Deeds for the province or city where the land to
which it relates lies from the time of such registering, filing or entering, there is no
counterpart provision either in Act No. 3753 (Act to Establish a Civil Register) or in Arts.
407 to 413 of the Civil Code, which leads us to the conclusion that there is no legal
basis for applying the constructive notice rule to the documents registered in the Civil
Register.
iv. For violation of special penal laws, prescription shall begin to run from the
violation of the special penal laws, if the same is known at that time.
a. People vs. Sandiganbayan, et al, July 3, l992 (211 SCRA 241)
Ruling.
The date of the violation of the law becomes the operative date of the commencement
of the period of prescription and this would be the date when Paredes filed his
application on January 21, l976.
There are several government officials who passed upon the application of Paredes.
Aside from the Land Inspector, there was the surveyor who prepared the technical
description. There was also the Regional Director who assessed the application. The
Director of Lands prepared the free patent and the Department Secretary signed the
free patent. All these officials should have discovered that the land applied for was non
disposable public agricultural land.

blameless ignorance doctrine

74

b. Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v.

Desierto 648 SCRA 586, April 13, 2011
Respondents Mohammad Ali Dimaporo, Abdullah Dimaporo, and Amer Dianalan,
were stockholders and officers of the Mindanao Coconut Oil Mills (MINCOCO), a
domestic corporation established in 1974, while respondents Panfilo O. Domingo,
Conrado S. Reyes, Enrique M. Herboza, and Ricardo Sunga, were then officers of the
National Investment and Development Corporation (NIDC). On 10 May 1976,
MINCOCO applied for a Guarantee Loan Accommodation with the NIDC for the
amount of approximately P30,400,000.00, which the NIDCs Board of Directors
approved on 23 June 1976. The guarantee loan was, however, both undercapitalized
and under-collateralized because MINCOCOs paid capital then was only
P7,000,000.00 and its assets worth is P7,000,000.00. This notwithstanding, MINCOCO
further obtained additional Guarantee Loan Accommodations from NIDC in the amount
of P13,647,600.00 and P7,000,000.00,respectively. When MINCOCOs mortgage liens
were about to be foreclosed by the government banks due its outstanding obligations,
Eduardo Cojuangco issued a memorandum dated 18 July 1983, bearing the late
President Ferdinand E. Marcos (President Marcos) marginal note, disallowing the
foreclosure of MINCOCOs properties. The government banks were not able to recover
any amount from MINCOCO and President Marcos marginal note was construed by
the NIDC to have effectively released MINCOCO, including its owners, from all of its
financial liabilities.
In 1997 the Presidential Ad Hoc Committee on Behest Loans filed with the
Ombudsman a sworn complaint against MINCOCOs Officers and NIDCs Board of
Directors for violation of Section 3(e) and (g) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended.
By Resolution dated 9 July 1998, the Ombudsman motu prorio dismissed the
complaint on the ground that the alleged offenses had prescribed. The Ombudsman
explained:
The time as to when the prescriptive period starts to run for crimes
committed under Republic Act No. 3019, a special law, is covered by Act No.
3326, Section 2 of which provides that:
Section 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of
the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the
discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation
and punishment.
Issue: Is the Ombudsman correct?
Ruling:
Generally, the prescriptive period shall commence to run on the day the crime is
committed. That an aggrieved person entitled to an action has no knowledge of his
right to sue or of the facts out of which his right arises, does not prevent the running of
the prescriptive period.
75

An exception to this rule is the blameless ignorance doctrine, incorporated in Section

2 of Act No. 3326. Under this doctrine, the statute of limitations runs only upon
discovery of the fact of the invasion of a right which will support a cause of action. In
other words, the courts would decline to apply the statute of limitations where the
plaintiff does not know or has no reasonable means of knowing the existence of a
cause of action.
In a catena of cases it was held that if the violation of the special law was not known at
the time of its commission, the prescription begins to run only from the discovery
thereof, i.e., discovery of the unlawful nature of the constitutive act or acts.
Corollary, it is safe to conclude that the prescriptive period for the crime which is the
subject herein, commenced from the date of its discovery in 1992 after the Committee
made an exhaustive investigation. When the complaint was filed in 1997, only five
years have elapsed, and, hence, prescription has not yet set in.
The rationale for this was succinctly discussed in the 1999 Presidential Ad Hoc FactFinding Committee on Behest Loans, that it was well-high impossible for the State, the
aggrieved party, to have known these crimes committed prior to the 1986 EDSA
Revolution, because of the alleged connivance and conspiracy among involved public
officials and the beneficiaries of the loans.
In yet another pronouncement, in the 2001 Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding
Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto (G.R. No. 130817),[38] the Court held that
during the Marcos regime, no person would have dared to question the legality of
these transactions.
From the 1999 landmark case of Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on
Behest Loans v. Desierto (G.R. No. 130140),[45] to the 2008 Presidential Ad Hoc FactFinding Committee on Behest Loans v. Tabasondra (G.R. No. 133756),[46] and to the
2009 Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto (G.R.
No. 135703),[47] the same issues confronted the Court as the one presented in the
present petition and the Court is one in saying that the crime of violation of the Anti
Graft Law has not yet prescribed.

PRESIDENTIAL AD HOC FACT-FINDING COMMITTEE ON BEHEST LOANS VS.

DISIERTO, et. al, 317 SCRA 272 October 25, 1999
Since the law alleged to have been violated i.e., paragraphs (e) and (g) of section 3
R.A. No. 3019, as amended, is a special law, the applicable rule in the computation of
the prescriptive period is Section 2 of Act No. 3326, as amended, which provides:
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run form the day of the commission of
the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the
discovery thereof and institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation
and punishment.

76

The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted

against the guilty person and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are
dismissed for reasons not constituting double jeopardy.
This simply means that if the commission of the crime is known, the prescriptive
period shall commence to run on the day it was committed.
In the present case, it was well-nigh impossible for the State, the aggrieved party, to
have known the violations of R.A. No. 3019 at the time the questioned transactions
were made because, as alleged, the public officials concerned, connived or conspired
with the beneficiaries of the loans. Thus, we agree with the COMMITTEE that the
prescriptive period for the offenses x x x should be computed from the discovery of the
commission.
[N.B. Blameless ignorancedoctrine- the statute of limitation runs only upon discovery
of the fact of the invasion of a right which will support a cause of action. In other
words, courts decline to apply the statute of limitation where the plaintiff neither knew
or had reasonable means of knowing the existence of a cause of action. [this is also
known as the discovery rule]
Principle of equitable tolling- it is based on the doctrine that no prescription shall run
against a person unable to bring an action [contra non valentem agere nulla currit
praescriptio]
( see also Presidential Ad Hoc Fact Finding Committee on Behest Loans vs. Desierto,
et al, 548 SCRA 295, March 14, 2008; also Presidential Ad Hoc Fact Finding
Committee on Behest Loans vs. Ombudsman Desierto, 363 SCRA 489 (2001)
v. The period of prescription is interrupted by the filing of a complaint or
information against the guilty person
a. Is the filing of a complaint in the Fiscals office suspend the running of the
statute of limitations?
Reodica vs. CA, July 8, 1998, 292 SCRA 87
In declaring that the prescriptive period shall be interrupted by the filing of the
complaint or information, Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code does not distinguish
whether the complaint is filed for preliminary examination or investigation only, or for an
action on the merits. Thus in Francisco vs. Court of Appeals (122 SCRA 538), this
Court held that the filing of the complaint even with the Fiscals Office suspends the
running of the statute of limitations.
Section 9 of the Rule on Summary Proceedings cannot be taken to mean that the
prescriptive period is interrupted only by the filing of a complaint or information directly
with said courts.
b. Panaguiton vs. DOJ , 571 SCRA 549, November 25, 2008

77

On 8 January 1993, Cawili and Tongson jointly issued in favor of petitioner three (3)
checks in payment of the said loans. Upon presentment for payment on 18 March
1993, the checks were dishonored.
On 24 August 1995, petitioner filed a complaint against Cawili and Tongson for
violating BP 22. The Prosecutor dismissed the case against Tiongson. Petitioner
appealed to DOJ. The DOJ returned the case to Prosecutor for further investigation.
On 15 March 1999, Assistant City Prosecutor Sampaga dismissed the complaint
against Tongson. ACP Sampaga held that the case had already prescribed pursuant to
Act No. 3326, as amended, which provides that violations penalized by B.P. Blg. 22
shall prescribe after four (4) years. The filing of the complaint before the Quezon City
Prosecutor on 24 August 1995 did not interrupt the running of the prescriptive period,
as the law contemplates judicial, and not administrative proceedings.
Ruling:
The petition is meritorious.
The filing of a complaint in the Prosecutors Office, whether the case is penalized
by the RPC or the special penal law, suspends the period of prescription.
It must be pointed out that when Act No. 3326 was passed on 4 December 1926,
preliminary investigation of criminal offenses was conducted by justices of the
peace, thus, the phraseology in the law, "institution of judicial proceedings for its
investigation and punishment," and the prevailing rule at the time was that once a
complaint is filed with the justice of the peace for preliminary investigation, the
prescription of the offense is halted.
The historical perspective on the application of Act No. 3326 is illuminating. Act No.
3226 was approved on 4 December 1926 at a time when the function of conducting
the preliminary investigation of criminal offenses was vested in the justices of
the peace. Thus, the prevailing rule at the time, as shown in the cases of U.S. v.
Lazada and People v. Joson, is that the prescription of the offense is tolled once a
complaint is filed with the justice of the peace for preliminary investigation
inasmuch as the filing of the complaint signifies the institution of the criminal
proceedings against the accused. In People vs. Parao 52 Phil. 712 (1929) it was
declared that the first step taken in the investigation and examination of offenses
partakes the nature of a judicial proceeding which suspends the prescription of the
offense.
In People vs. Olarte, 19 SCRA 715, it was held that the filing of the complaint in the
Municipal Trial Court for preliminary investigation interrupts the period of prescription.
In Ingco vs. Sandiganbayan 272 SCRA 563 (1997); Sanrio Company Limited vs. Lim
546 SCRA 303, which involved violations of the Antil Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
and the Intellectual Property Code, which are both special laws, it was ruled that the
prescriptive period is interrupted by the institution of proceedings for preliminary
investigation.
In the more recent case of SEC vs. Interport Resources Corporation , it was held that
the nature and purpose of the investigation conducted by the SEC on violations of
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Revised Securities Act, another special law, is equivalent to the preliminary

investigation conducted by the DOJ in criminal cases, and thus effectively interrupts
the prescriptive period.
We rule and so hold that petitioners filing of his complaint before the Office of the City
Prosecutor signified the commencement of the proceedings for the prosecution of the
accused and thus effectively interrupted the prescriptive period for the offenses they
have been charged under BP 22.
PRESCRIPTION OF PENALTIES (Articles 92 and 93)
Pangan vs. Gatbalite 449 SCRA 144, January 21, 2005
Facts: On September 16, 1987, Pangan was convicted of simple seduction and
was sentenced to serve a penalty of two months and one day of arresto mayor.
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court, on October 24, 1988, affirmed in toto the
decision of the Municipal Trial Court.
On August 9, 1991, the case was called for promulgation of the decision in the court
of origin. Despite due notice, Pangan and his counsel failed to appear. The court
issued an order directing the recording of the decision in the criminal docket of the
court and an order of arrest against the petitioner.
On January 20, 2000 or almost 9 years later, Pangan was apprehended and
detained at the Mabalacat Detention Cell. He then filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas
Corpus. He claims that his penalty, which prescribes in five pursuant to Article 92, had
already prescribed when he was arrested nine years later. According to him, the period
for the computation of penalties under Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code begins to
run from the moment the judgment of conviction becomes final and the convict
successfully evades, eludes, and dodges arrest for him to serve sentence.
Issue: When does the period of prescription of penalties begin to run?

Ruling. The case of Tanega v. Masakayan (19 SCRA 564 (1967) falls squarely
within the issues of the present case. In that case, petitioner Adelaida Tanega failed to
appear on the day of the execution of her sentence. On the same day, respondent
judge issued a warrant for her arrest. She was never arrested. More than a year later,
petitioner through counsel moved to quash the warrant of arrest, on the ground that the
penalty had prescribed. Petitioner claimed that she was convicted for a light offense
and since light offenses prescribe in one year, her penalty had already prescribed. The
Court disagreed, thus:
xxx The period of prescription of penalties the succeeding Article 93
provides "shall commence to run from the date when the culprit should
evade the service of his sentence". What then is the concept of evasion of
service of sentence? Article 157 of the Revised Penal Code furnishes the
ready answer. Says Article 157:
"ART. 157.
Evasion of service of sentence. The penalty of
prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods shall be
imposed upon any convict who shall evade service of his sentence by
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escaping during the term of his imprisonment by reason of final

judgment. xxx"
Elements of evasion of service of sentence are: (1) the offender is a
convict by final judgment; (2) he "is serving his sentence which consists in
deprivation of liberty"; and (3) he evades service of sentence by escaping
during the term of his sentence. This must be so. For, by the express terms
of the statute, a convict evades "service of his sentence" by "escaping
during the term of his imprisonment by reason of final judgment." That
escape should take place while serving sentence, is emphasized by the
provisions of the second sentence of Article 157 which provides for a higher
penalty if such "evasion or escape shall have taken place by means of
unlawful entry, by breaking doors, windows, gates, walls, roofs, or floors, or
by using picklocks, false keys, disguise, deceit, violence or intimidation, or
through connivance with other convicts or employees of the penal
institution, . . ." Indeed, evasion of sentence is but another expression of
the term "jail breaking."
xxx
We, therefore, rule that for prescription of penalty of imprisonment
imposed by final sentence to commence to run, the culprit should escape
during the term of such imprisonment.
Adverting to the facts, we have here the case of a convict who
sentenced to imprisonment by final judgment was thereafter never
placed in confinement. Prescription of penalty, then, does not run in her
favor.
In Del Castillo v. Torrecampo (394 SCRA 221 (2002), the Court cited and reiterated
Tanega. Petitioner, Del Castillo, was charged for violation of Section 178 (nn) of the
1978 Election Code. The trial court found Del Castillo guilty beyond reasonable doubt
and sentenced him to suffer an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment of 1 year as
minimum to 3 years as maximum. On appeal the Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the trial court in toto. During the execution of judgment on October 14,
1987, petitioner was not present. The presiding Judge issued an order of arrest and
the confiscation of his bond. Petitioner was never apprehended. Ten years later,
petitioner filed a motion to quash the warrant of arrest on the ground that the penalty
imposed upon him had already prescribed. The motion was denied by the trial court.
Del Castillo, on a petition for certiorari to the Court of Appeals, questioned the denial by
the trial court. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit. Upon
denial of his Motion for Reconsideration, Del Castillo raised the matter to this Court.
The Court decided against Del Castillo and after quoting the ratio decidendi of the
Court of Appeals in full, it ratiocinated, thus:
Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code provides when the prescription of penalties
shall commence to run. Under said provision, it shall commence to run from the date
the felon evades the service of his sentence. Pursuant to Article 157 of the same Code,
evasion of service of sentence can be committed only by those who have been
convicted by final judgment by escaping during the term of his sentence.
As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, "escape" in legal parlance and for
purposes of Articles 93 and 157 of the RPC means unlawful departure of prisoner from
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the limits of his custody. Clearly, one who has not been committed to prison cannot be
said to have escaped therefrom.
In the instant case, petitioner was never brought to prison.
Consistent with the two cases cited above, this Court pronounces that the
prescription of penalties found in Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code, applies only to
those who are convicted by final judgment and are serving sentence which consists in
deprivation of liberty. The period for prescription of penalties begins only when the
convict evades service of sentence by escaping during the term of his sentence. Since
petitioner never suffered deprivation of liberty before his arrest on January 20, 2000
and as a consequence never evaded sentence by escaping during the term of his
service, the period for prescription never began.

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