Analysis

April 1, 2015

Summary: Western leaders

must carefully consider new
ways and means for including
an increasingly distant Turkey
into a transatlantic framework.
They should prioritize deeper
integration of the Turkish
economy with Europe and
North America through the
Transatlantic Trade and
Investment Partnership (TTIP)
starting with the April meetings
of the IMF and World Bank in
Washington.

OFFICES

Washington, DC Berlin Paris

Brussels Belgrade Ankara
Bucharest Warsaw

Reinvigorating Turkeys Transatlantic

Enthusiasm Through TTIP
by Joshua W. Walker and Alison O. Patch
Introduction
Turkey was conspicuously absent when
the worlds elites gathered at Februarys
Munich Security Conference. At the
last minute, Turkeys delegation pulled
out after Israel was added to a joint
session on the Middle East. Beyond
the specifics of this ongoing bilateral
dispute, Turkeys absence is a broader
sign of its leaderships displeasure with
its transatlantic partners and what
Ankara sees as being taken for granted
as a geostrategic ally.
Western leaders must carefully
consider new ways and means for
including an increasingly distant
Turkey into a transatlantic framework,
since it is the only Muslim-majority
NATO member that is truly a crossregional power in its own right. As
Ukraine dominates the European
agenda and the so-called Islamic
State (ISIS) the Middle East, Turkey
continues to hold a critical geostrategic
position. At the same time, Turkey
is looking eastward toward partnerships that offer new economic and
security opportunities while European
promises have grown stale. In order to
reinvigorate Turkeys westward-facing
enthusiasm, transatlantic leaders
should prioritize deeper integration of
the Turkish economy with Europe and

North America through the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) starting with the April
meetings of the IMF and World Bank
in Washington that traditionally kicks
off global discussions on economic and
trade discussions leading to the G20
summit in November, which Turkey is
hosting this year.
A Declining Alliance?
After decades of European-facing
foreign policy, the future of TurkishEU relations is now ambiguous. For
years, Turkey has pursued a multiavenue approach to the transatlantic
alliance. In addition to being a loyal
member of NATO since 1952, Turkey
is a founding member of many
Western-led economic and political
organizations, including the OECD,
IMF, World Bank, and G20, of which it
currently holds the presidency. In the
1990s, Turkey made historic progress
toward the European Union through
joining the European Customs Union,
which helped make Turkey a vital
part of Europes business supply chain
and increase foreign investment
throughout the country. Indeed the
favorability of average Turkish citizens
toward transatlantic partnerships is
once again on the rise. According to

Analysis
the German Marshall Funds 2014 Transatlantic Trends
survey, 45 percent of polled individuals described their
perception of the EU as favorable up an astounding 10
percent since 2013. In the same poll, 53 percent deemed EU
membership desirable the first time such positive results
have been achieved since 2006. Even in the seemingly
unpopular security sector, in which the majority of Turks
are disinclined toward international leadership by any single
country, EU leadership is favored over that of any other
country.
Yet these results can be misleading given the Turkish populations notorious national prickliness, which can be rallied
by its leadership based on international events or perceived
slights. Drawn-out negotiations with the EU and the revival
of populist nationalism in Turkish domestic politics have
led Turkeys leaders to seek avenues for international cooperation that sometimes directly conflict with the transatlantic alliance. Last year, Turkey refused to allow coalition
aircraft launch access in the fight against ISIS, demanding
a broader Syrian strategy first be developed. Turkey also is
currently negotiating a missile defense system contract with
China, after rejecting bids from U.S. and European companies. And as Russias Rosatom begins building Turkeys
first nuclear power station, cooperation between these two
countries will remain pragmatic for at least the minimum
guaranteed 60-year lifespan of the power station.

Drawn-out negotiations with the

EU and the revival of populist
nationalism in Turkish domestic
politics have led Turkeys leaders
to seek avenues for international
cooperation that sometimes
directly conflict with the
transatlantic alliance.
2

Business deals with deep security implications are

becoming the norm for a Turkey increasingly divided on
the future of the countrys relationship with the West. At
the Tenth Trilateral Strategy Group Meeting organized by
The German Marshall Fund of the United States in partnership with the Ministry of Foreign Afairs of Sweden, Turkish
Industry and Business Association, and Ko Holding in
Stockholm, Turkeys diverging perspectives on transatlantic identity were made clear. For some, transatlantic
identity is the ultimate provider of international security,
economic prosperity, and democratic values. For others,
after a year of bad press for democracy on both sides of the
Atlantic from the U.S. Torture Report to the Gezi Park
protests common interests, not shared values, provide
the framework for the future of the alliance. For important constituencies in the transatlantic debates, such as the
Turkish business community, these interests must continue
to converge.
Today Turkish business needs a signal from the West about
its continuing commitment to these interests in spite of
domestic and regional developments that further complicate the political landscape. An accession plan for Turkeys
eventual inclusion in TTIP could be a tool to rally these
reliable constituencies, like the business community and the
pro-EU populace, to influence the strategic direction of the
country back toward the West. In contrast, Turkish exclusion from TTIP negotiations, despite the countrys leaders
continued expression of economic interest in the deal, has
the potential to further infuriate Turkish leaders and fortify
now declining perceptions of the West among the Turkish
population.
Turkey and TTIP
Turkeys inclusion in TTIP would be a rare win-win amidst
various zero-sum geopolitical realities that could change the
transatlantic alliance. First, Turkeys inclusion would add to
the collective economic lift being touted. TTIP advocates
claim that a successful deal would increase U.S. exports to
the EU by a third and add more than $100 billion annually to U.S. GDP. Even as Turkeys economy has slumped
in the last year, a young population eager to be the worlds
tenth largest economy by its centennial in 2023 would add
to the collective lift. In the United States, cash-strapped
consumers would benefit from cheaper Turkish textiles and

Analysis
appliances, as Europe does. In Europe, a broader framework
for Turkish-European cooperation would be established,
especially in the volatile energy sector, which could eventually breathe new life into the EU process.
Second, it would help spread free-market and democratic
ideals. Originally envisioned as a lever to open global
markets, TTIP also carries the message of economic and
political freedom. That message would be strengthened by
Turkeys inclusion. Since the outbreak of the wars in Iraq
and Syria, a growing number of U.S. and European companies have based regional operations in Turkey. Inclusion
in TTIP would expand the impact of investment already
coming from Turkey, directly contributing to economic
growth in neighboring countries. As a liberal market
economy, Turkish commercial actors would become the
main vehicle to disseminate rules and values associated
with this system. A TTIP with Turkey would build bridges
to economies that are increasingly turning to Russia and
China for investment, bringing these markets closer to the
West rather than pushing Turkey farther east.
Third, it would strengthen a waning transatlantic partnership that increasingly is being seen as rhetorical rather than
substantive. Through increased economic ties, TTIP offers
a tangible way to solidify transatlantic relations through
business-business and people-people opportunities that
will in turn strengthen existing government-government
connections. Over the last decade, Turkeys pursuit of EU
membership and closer ties with the West enjoyed strong
support from its population, support that has waned as
talks have stalled. As reflected in Ankaras occasional harsh
anti-Western rhetoric, the desire of the Turkish population
to pursue further relations with the West may not survive
another prolonged negotiation. Signaling that Turkey is
being considered for TTIP would underline shared understanding of Turkish concerns about being left out of this
historic transatlantic deal. Bringing Turkey on board earlier
rather than later creates and preserves avenues for future
dialogue that would be blocked if TTIP continues without a
clear plan for Turkeys eventual inclusion.
Fourth, Turkish exclusion from TTIP would negatively
affect the Turkish economy and potentially unbalance the
existing economic relationship between Turkey and the EU.
Due to the nature of Turkeys Customs Union with the EU,

the TTIP agreement would provide the United States with

tariff-free access to the Turkish market, but leave Turkey
with continued restrictions in the U.S. market. Such a situation would create further asymmetry in U.S.-Turkey trade
and create an additional burden on Turkeys trade deficit.
Without a clear access route to TTIP membership, in the
short term, Turkey may seek out adverse ways to correct
the situation, putting the customs union between Turkey
and the EU under pressure. On the other hand, providing
an easy passage for inclusion would encourage the Turkish
leadership to actually make the various market reforms that
the United States has been pushing for all along.
Losing Turkey
The West is in danger of losing the most important constituency for its continued commitment to transatlantic relations
and champions of EU membership: the Turkish business
community. Unless the West shows that it is prepared to
honor its commitments and include Turkey in its strategic
future, we risk the continued deterioration of relations and
loss of cooperation. Turkish business needs a signal from
the West that it has a continuing commitment to partnership with Turkey in spite of domestic and regional developments that further complicate the political landscape.
Opponents of including Turkey in TTIP have fears of
complicating an already complex negotiating process,
saying a separate free-trade agreement with Turkey is a
better approach. However, these concerns fail to address
the existing situation within Turkey. Since it is already a
member of the European Customs Union, Turkey could be

The West is in danger of losing

the most important constituency
for its continued commitment
to transatlantic relations and
champions of EU membership: the
Turkish business community.

Analysis
easily integrated into a TTIP agreement, using the Customs
Union as a template. Turkey has already made great strides
improving both infrastructure and the ease of doing business to meet European standards. However, given the
current complex political climate in the EU and United
States, Turkeys leaders are skeptical that a separate agreement could be reached if the TTIP train leaves the station
without them. In the meantime, they see Western leaders as
unconcerned about the negative effects the deal would bring
to their economy. Such a TTIP risks increasing the already
considerable political backlash against the United States,
that remains Turkeys strongest anchor in the transatlantic
alliance.
Turkeys future should remain with the West. Its transatlantic value has never been more apparent as it remains
a relative island of calm in a tumultuous neighborhood.
Turkeys inclusion in a TTIP deal now would be precisely
the olive branch that is needed to restore this critical
strategic relationship. At its core, TTIP is a geostrategic
tool meant to shore up old alliances and revive the global
economy. The winners of Turkeys inclusion will not just be
weekend shoppers in Paris or Peoria, but the future of the
transatlantic alliance and the opportunity to spread the freemarket and democratic values that it represents throughout
the world. The upcoming April finance meetings in Washington offer the opportune moment to recommit Turkey as
a valuable transatlantic ally, both in security and trade, in
advance of its national elections in June and hosting its first
G20 Summit in November. This will go a long way toward
setting the tone of debates on Turkey in Ankara, Brussels,
Washington, and beyond.

The views expressed in GMF publications and commentary are the

views of the author alone.

About the Authors

Joshua W. Walker, Ph.D. is a transatlantic fellow at The German
Marshall Fund of the United States and vice-president of global
programs at APCO Worldwide, where Alison O. Patch is an energy
fellow and masters student studying security policy at George Washington Universitys Elliott School of International Affairs.

About GMF
The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) strengthens
transatlantic cooperation on regional, national, and global challenges
and opportunities in the spirit of the Marshall Plan. GMF contributes
research and analysis and convenes leaders on transatlantic issues
relevant to policymakers. GMF offers rising leaders opportunities to
develop their skills and networks through transatlantic exchange, and
supports civil society in the Balkans and Black Sea regions by fostering
democratic initiatives, rule of law, and regional cooperation. Founded
in 1972 as a non-partisan, non-profit organization through a gift from
Germany as a permanent memorial to Marshall Plan assistance, GMF
maintains a strong presence on both sides of the Atlantic. In addition
to its headquarters in Washington, DC, GMF has offices in Berlin,
Paris, Brussels, Belgrade, Ankara, Bucharest, and Warsaw. GMF also
has smaller representations in Bratislava, Turin, and Stockholm.

About the On Turkey Series

GMFs On Turkey is an ongoing series of analysis briefs about Turkeys
current political situation and its future. GMF provides regular
analysis briefs by leading Turkish, European, and U.S. writers and
intellectuals, with a focus on dispatches from on-the-ground Turkish
observers. To access the latest briefs, please visit our web site at www.
gmfus.org/turkey.