Professional Documents
Culture Documents
To cite this article: Sergio Catignani (2005): The Strategic Impasse in Low-Intensity
Conflicts: The Gap Between Israeli Counter-Insurgency Strategy and Tactics During the
Al-Aqsa Intifada , Journal of Strategic Studies, 28:1, 57-75
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402390500032054
Introduction
During the past 15 years Israel has strategically and tactically
responded to local Palestinian insurgency, which has evolved from
civil disobedience to outright terrorism and guerrilla warfare,
particularly following the now-defunct Oslo peace process. Indeed,
over the past 15 years the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) has tried to
transform its conventional army and adopt low-intensity urban warfare
strategies and tactics against violent rioters, guerrilla ghters and
Correspondence Address: Sergio Catignani, Department of War Studies, Kings College
London, 138-142 Strand, London, WC2R 1HH. E-mail: Sergio.catignani@klc.ac.uk
ISSN 0140-2390 Print/ISSN 1743-937X Online/05/010057-19 # 2005 Taylor & Francis Group Ltd
DOI: 10.1080/01402390500032054
58 Sergio Catignani
terrorists. This has been particularly the case during the current AlAqsa Intifada, which began in September 2000.1
Notwithstanding the extensive and successful innovations in tactics,
weaponry and training adopted in response to Palestinian attacks, the
political nature of low-intensity insurgencies and, thus, the inherent
strategic restraint imposed by the Israeli political echelons decision to
conduct low-intensity warfare ad nauseam without seriously providing
an alternative political resolution to the current IsraeliPalestinian
conict, have prevented the IDF from imposing a clear battleeld
decision. Thus, the IDF has been unable to achieve strategic success
during the past four years of the IsraeliPalestinian conict despite the
Israeli political leaderships belief that the IDF could achieve such
objectives on its own.
Despite the enormous difculties in ghting Palestinian terror and
guerrilla elements within the villages and cities of the West Bank and
Gaza Strip, the IDF has managed to develop signicant tactical and
technological solutions to the Palestinian terrorist and insurgent threat,
albeit occasionally at the cost of collateral damage and cases of
excessive force vis-a`-vis the Palestinian civilian population. Such
tactical success, moreover, cannot yield strategic dividends without
greater political and strategic direction from the Israeli political
echelon. Whether or not such tactical successes will be used by the
political echelons to arrive at a strategic solution to the Israeli
Palestinian conict is to be seen, especially in light of the Israeli
perception that there is no serious political negotiator on the
Palestinian side.
Strategy
Strategy involves the employment of military forces to achieve a
specic political goal. Since war is an instrument of politics, limited
political aims result in the denition of limited war aims.2 However,
the use of conventional strategy to low-intensity type conicts has
always been difcult. The intermingling with enemy forces, mixing
with the civilian population, and extreme dispersion have signicantly challenged conventional armies particularly within the urban
arena of warfare.3
As shall be seen in the following sections, the IDF has struggled to
deal with Palestinian insurgency since the end of the 1980s. Even
though the IDF has adapted its tactics, particularly since the late 1990s,
to face Palestinian threats head-on within their towns, villages and
refugee camps, it has been unable to attain a battleeld decision in the
IsraeliPalestinian conict. In fact, such a goal is unattainable: a
strategic doctrine that is geared towards linear conventional threats and
Al-Aqsa Intifada 59
that has clear parameters for what constitutes battleeld decision and
victory cannot be applied to insurgencies, which for the most part, must
be resolved politically. Before elaborating such an argument, though,
the article will rst look briey at Israels strategic doctrine.
60 Sergio Catignani
Al-Aqsa Intifada 61
considered to be either hotbeds of Palestinian militancy or outright
terror. The practice of demolishing the houses belonging to terrorists or
to their closest relatives has also been considered successful by the IDF
as a deterrent for other terrorist attacks in spite of the censure expressed
by human rights organizations, by the European Union and other states
as well as by Israels closest ally, the US.
Nonetheless, many others have stated that such collective measures
have not had much of a deterrent effect, but have actually galvanized
the Palestinian population. For example, Zuhair Kurdi, a journalist
with Hebrons Al Amal TV station, has stated somewhat rhetorically
that, the legal father of the suicide bomber is the Israeli checkpoint,
whilst his mother is the house demolition.11
In spite of the pervasive use of IDF personnel and materiel as well as
the growing threat and lethality of Palestinian terror and guerrilla
operations within Israel and the Occupied Territories, the IDF has not
been able to address strategically the predominant and relatively new
low-intensity dynamic of the IsraeliPalestinian conict. Some Israeli
military (e.g., the former Chief of Staff [COS] and current Defense
Minister Shaul Mofaz and current COS Lieutenant-General Moshe
Yaalon) and political leaders (e.g., Prime Minister Ariel Sharon) have
come to dene as existential threats that which were regarded
traditionally as current security threats (i.e., terror, guerrilla and riot
violence).
In June 2000, for example, then Coordinator of Operations in the
Territories, Major-General Amos Gilad, declared that the purpose of
the IDFs campaign was to reduce the level of terror, which in the scope
and depth of its damage has become a strategic threat, with the rst
signs of threatening our existence in terms of our quality of life.12
There has not been, however, a major shift in the IDFs strategic
approach vis-a`-vis low-intensity-type conict scenarios and the belief
that it could impose a battleeld decision or even obtain victory was
shared initially by top ofcers of the IDF General Staff. Thus, COS
Yaalon in the most widely-read daily newspaper, Yediot Ahronot,
stated in August 2002 for example that, the only solution [to the AlAqsa Intifada] is to achieve an unequivocal victory over the
Palestinians and that such a victory would not come at a low price
or immediately.13
In fact, Israels conventional strategic goal of maintaining the status
quo through deterrent retaliatory or pre-emptive measures has been
erroneously applied to the contemporary IsraeliPalestinian conict.
Whereas in the past maintaining the status quo through deterrence was
geared towards the conventional threat and, hence, towards the
avoidance of a major conventional attack by Israels neighboring
states, which could have threatened its existence, today Israels
62 Sergio Catignani
attempts at deterring Palestinian terror and guerrilla attacks have the
very limited goal of reducing the level of violence and maintaining a
status quo. Such a status quo, though, has become unbearable for the
Palestinian population living in the Occupied Territories and has
proved increasingly costly to Israeli society.
Preserving the status quo vis-a`-vis the conventional threat was not only
essential to Israels existence, but was also a widely-held principle of the
Israeli national security consensus. Nonetheless, upholding the status
quo today has diminished dramatically the already meager Palestinian
standard of living due to extensive curfews and closures which, together
with the rampant corruption of the Palestinian Authority, have wrung
out of the Palestinian population any notable source of nancial
sustenance. It has also eroded the Israeli national security consensus14
particularly regarding the continued control of most of the territories
seized during the 1967 Six-Day War. The continuation of the conict also
has led to a major economic crisis in Israel that has affected all major
government budgets, Israeli living standards, but most crucially, the
defense budget. In fact, a recent survey of 7,200 Israelis aged 20 and over
from all regions of the country commissioned in late 2003 by the Central
Bureau of Statistics found that 35 percent of the survey sample reported
that their nancial situation had deteriorated in the past ve years.15
Furthermore, the use of the IDF to lower the level of violence as well
as to convince the Palestinians that Israel would not negotiate under re
has led to an over-emphasis on the operational and tactical use of the
IDF as a panacea for the lack of the military and political leaderships
ability to come up with a new strategic paradigm that will bring about a
strategic decision vis-a`-vis the problem of Palestinian terror and other
forms of low-intensity violence. The political echelons inability to
develop a new strategic paradigm, given the experiences of the rst
Intifada, the 1991 Gulf War and the changed strategic environment
brought about by the IsraeliPalestinian and IsraeliJordanian peace
accords, was already voiced in 1998 by a Knesset sub-committee chaired
by Knesset member Dan Meridor. The enquiry, in fact, stated that:
The Government of Israel, which is responsible for Israels
national security, has not conducted any substantial and
comprehensive discussion regarding the national security policy
and its applications. . . We have not found any integrative and
long-term thinking, examination or decisions. It is critical that
such examinations be conducted at the national level, and not only
by the military or the defense system.16
In fact, until very recently Israel has been able to afford the price of not
addressing the Palestinian problem strategically, because of the IDFs
Al-Aqsa Intifada 63
ability in providing effective short-term tactical solutions to all forms of
Palestinian violence.
64 Sergio Catignani
Intelligence
Not only did the Israeli army use overwhelming numbers, it also used
most of its highly sophisticated weaponry and intelligence-gathering
capabilities in order to maintain the initiative, something armies
entering urban theater of operations have always had trouble keeping,
because of the high-tempo and level of confusion that urban battleelds
usually create. Indeed, reiterating the importance of intelligence in the
urban battleeld, IDF COS Yaalon stated at a recent international
conference on low-intensity conict warfare that, creating intelligence
dominance is a critical factor for managing and dominating the lowintensity conict. Qualitative intelligence provides the ability to realize
military power properly and precisely.21
Hence, the decision by the IDF General Staff to form in April 2000
the Field Intelligence Corps, which includes combat intelligencegathering units trained to gather tactical intelligence and to provide it
in real-time to combat units during operations. This has enabled
information, through the increasing digitization of its armed forces, to
go faster to the troops and, in turn, has reduced the element of surprise
from looming Palestinian attacks.22 Thus, despite the greater freedom
that IDF commanders and soldiers traditionally have had on the
battleground, the improvement in the command, control and communication systems has enhanced the IDFs ability to monitor ground
operations and provides real-time operational intelligence to ground
troops.
According to an AH-1S Cobra helicopter squadron commander,
during the ghting the Israel Air Force kept four attack helicopters and
two Searcher II reconnaissance Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)
overhead at all times to ensure commanders knew where their troops
on the ground were.23 Human intelligence was also provided by
Mistararavim (i.e., to become an Arab) units, who are trained to
blend in with the local population, gather operational intelligence and
sometimes conduct targeted killings. More importantly and underlining
former GSS Chief Yaacov Peris conviction that there is no substitute
for a human source,24 the GSS had begun by the end of 2000 a large
recruitment drive for Palestinian collaborators given the fact that their
use had diminished signicantly since the start of the Oslo Peace
Process.25 Such collaborators, in fact, have been put to good use,
particularly in the targeted assassination of key terrorist leaders, such as
Hamas spiritual leader, Sheik Yassin and Hamas political leader
Abdel Aziz al-Rantissi in early 2004.
Furthermore, attack helicopters very often were used to pinpoint and
eliminate hostile forces either by using snipers or missile attacks. As one
Special Forces captain stated, for example, in Jenin I was in a
Al-Aqsa Intifada 65
helicopter above everything. I saw it happening. We were snipers; from
the helicopter we were supposed to locate a certain area and eliminate
hostile elements.26
66 Sergio Catignani
Since Operation Defensive Shield the IDF has also learnt that in
order to eliminate terror cells embedded in Palestinian towns and
villages, it does not have to show overwhelming force, due to the fact
that such large-scale invasions into Palestinian areas create
considerable international outcry and negative media exposure.31
The IDF has, in fact, learnt that low-signature operations often are
not only more effective, but also domestically and internationally less
controversial due to the stealth and rapidity with which they are
carried out.
Al-Aqsa Intifada 67
68 Sergio Catignani
problems often at the expense of long-term vision and innovation. As
one IDF organizational psychologist admitted recently in an interview:
Al-Aqsa Intifada 69
handed military operations against Palestinian terrorists because of
the substantial collateral damage caused when conducting such
operations and despite the fact that they may have negative strategic
consequences. Yaalon was quoted in Yediot Ahronot as saying that,
in our tactical decisions, we are operating contrary to our strategic
interests.48
Collateral Damage
Despite attempts to use precision-guided missiles and highly-trained
snipers to eliminate Palestinian guerrillas and terrorists while avoiding
casualties and major collateral damage, the extensive insertion of
armored and infantry elements during Operation Defensive Shield
into such a compact battleground did bring about 53 Palestinian deaths
most of whom were in any case combatants and structural damage
to over 100 homes. The dilemmas and difculties IDF soldiers went
through when trying to eliminate Palestinian ghters ghting from
inhabited civilian homes were poignantly voiced by a reservist from the
Nahal Infantry Brigade, First Sergeant Sean Sachs:
One building that I saw in particular was a three-storey building
where the bottom was still booby-trapped, the middle oor had a
family living in it and the top oor was used as a heavy
machinegun post, a 50-calibre machinegun. They were ring at
soldiers coming down one of the alleyways. How do you explain
to someone that the only way that you can take out a heavy
machinegun which is armor-piercing is that you have to call in
a helicopter and it has to be a pinpoint strike at that building? So
you hit that top oor. Just the top oor is damaged and the people
on the middle oor are ne. But a cameraman comes and shows
that building. And suddenly its a destroyed building and you are
accused of having killed people.49
Still, the IDF has on occasion conducted missile strikes with apparent
disregard for the possible collateral damage that they would entail. A
blatant example is when on 21 July 2004 the Israeli Air Force dropped
a one-ton bomb over late Hamas leader Salah Shehades home situated
in a heavily-populated residential area of Gaza City. The operation
wounded over 150 people, killed 14 civilians, including nine children
and led to an ofcial and embarrassing apology on the part of the
former IDF Chief of Operations, Major-General Dan Harel.50 The
bombings repercussions are still being felt by former Chief of the
Israeli Air Force Major-General Dan Halutz who ordered the strike and
who had to justify the morality of his order in late November 2004
70 Sergio Catignani
before the Israeli High Court of Justice prior to being appointed as IDF
Deputy Chief of Staff.
Thus, as a result of such collateral damage, the IDF has over the past
two years mapped out most Palestinian cities by developing a system
that divides the urban battleeld into precise increments and gives each
building in a city . . . an individual four-digit designation so both land
and air forces know exactly which target they are trying to hit.51 Such
detailed mapping and digital designation of Palestinian urban areas
have helped reduce to some extent the cases of operational errors,
which have led often in the past to extensive collateral damage.
Yet, despite efforts at reducing collateral damage Palestinian civilians
have suffered over the past four years; house demolitions have been a
common punitive measure used against families related to terrorists or
suspected of supporting terrorism. According to BTselem, an Israeli
human rights organization, almost half of the 628 housing units
demolished since the start of the Al-Aqsa Intifada belonged to people
who had no relation to terrorists. Such deliberate demolitions have led
to the unlawful creation of over 1,200 homeless civilians. Many more,
furthermore, were destroyed during military operations to unearth
arms smuggling tunnels.52 Operation Days of Penitence, which was
carried out during the rst two weeks of October 2004 in order to root
out Hamas Qassam rocket attacks against Israeli towns bordering the
Gaza Strip, led to the destruction of over 90 homes and to the death of
over 100 Palestinians, most of whom were combatants, but which
included also 27 youths.53
Operation Defensive Shield, successive IDF counter-terror operations, but especially the so-far partial construction of the security fencewall have managed to reduce in any case by 30 percent the number of
terrorist attacks committed against Israeli objectives (from 5,301 to
3,338) and by 50 percent the number of terror victims (from 451 to
213) between 2002 and 2003.54 Moreover, according to a senior IDF
ofcer there was a further 75 percent reduction in attempted suicide
attacks so far this year compared to the same period in 2003.55
The Strategic Impasse
And yet such tactical and operational successes have not achieved any
major strategic dividends, despite the belief of the higher political and
military echelons for example, Moshe Yaalon, Ariel Sharon and Shaul
Mofaz to the contrary. Indeed, according to Brigadier-General (Ret.)
Shlomo Brom:
On the tactical-operational level, the preparations were excellent,
but the problem was, as usual, on the strategic level, because of
Al-Aqsa Intifada 71
72 Sergio Catignani
late Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin was able to reach nally such a
conclusion after six long years of Palestinian violence and the IDFs
unsuccessful counter-insurgency efforts. Current Prime Minister Ariel
Sharon has possibly come to the same conclusion after avoiding any
major political options by relying heavily on IDF over the past three
years.
Thus, it is crucial that the Israeli political-security leadership provide
proactively alternative political solutions to the current conict,
whether through unilateral disengagement in order to kickstart the
Road Map, which could provide a two-state solution to the Israeli
Palestinian conict, the creation of a newly-modied Oslo-type
agreement or any other political resolution that will end the current
conict. Now seems a particularly auspicious moment given the fact
that the former Palestinian Authority and Palestinian Liberation
Organization leader, Yasser Arafat, has died.
The Israeli political leadership will have to understand nally that
when it is xed on maintaining the status quo and the Palestinians are
set on modifying it, recurring episodes of ghting between them
become inevitable. It is imperative that the Israeli political echelon nd
a political solution to Palestinian insurgency given the fact that it is able
to negotiate from a position of strength Palestinian terror capabilities,
although not motivation, have been dramatically reduced by the IDF
and Israeli intelligence organizations and given the fact that
ultimately the occupation over and control of Palestinians will only
continue to wear out both societies and, in particular, the IDF.
When commenting on the need to continuously and creatively
address threats to Israeli security, David Ben-Gurion, Israels founding
prime minister and the father of its strategic doctrine stated that the
most dangerous enemy to Israels security is the intellectual inertia of
those who are responsible for security.60 The IDF has done its part in
trying to provide solutions to Palestinian terror and guerrilla tactics,
now it is up to the politicians to heed Ben-Gurions warning against
strategic sclerosis.
Acknowledgement
Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the American Political
Science Association Annual Meeting (2 September 2004) and at the
Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society Canada Meeting
(3 October 2004). I am grateful to Professor John Mearsheimer,
Professor Sir Lawrence Freedman and the journals anonymous referees
for their many useful comments. However, any remaining errors are my
own.
Al-Aqsa Intifada 73
Notes
1 The IDF and other Israeli security services have had a long tradition in ghting Palestinian
terrorism and insurgency both locally and internationally since the early 1950s. However, the
scope of this article will focus primarily on the period relating to the Al-Aqsa Intifada as, I
believe, it has proven to be the greatest challenge to Israeli counter-insurgency efforts since the
states establishment in 1948. For a brief historical overview of Palestinian insurgency and
Israeli counter-insurgency see: Sergio Catignani, The Security Imperative in Counterterror
Operations: The Israeli Fight Against Suicidal Terror, Terrorism and Political Violence Vol.
17/1, forthcoming.
2 Beatrice Heuser and Lawrence Freedman, Strategy in Lawrence Freedman (ed.), War
(Oxford: Oxford UP 1994) p.192.
3 Martin van Creveld, On Future War (London: Brasseys 1991) p.208.
4 See Zeev Drory, Israels Reprisal Policy, 19531956 (London: Frank Cass 2004).
5 Eliot A. Cohen et al., Knives, Tanks, and Missiles: Israels Security Revolution (Washington,
DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy 1998) p.71.
6 Avi Kober, Israeli War Objectives into an Era of Negativism, Journal of Strategic Studies 24/2
(June 2001) p.187.
7 Efraim Inbar, Israel National Security, 19731996, AAPSS 555 (Jan. 1998) p.71.
8 See Chaim Herzog, The War of Atonement: The Inside Story of the Yom Kippur War (London:
Greenhill Books 2003) pp.27091.
9 Uri Bar-Joseph, Variations on a Theme: The Conceptualization of Deterrence in Israeli
Strategic Thinking, Security Studies 7/3 (Spring 1998) p.153.
10 Public Order and Security, 13 Sept. 1993, Declaration of Principles on Interim SelfGovernment Arrangements, Article VIII, available at 5http://www.jmcc.org/research/series/
dop.html#declare4(accessed 1 July 2004).
11 Matthew Gutman, Destruction, Constructively Speaking, Jerusalem Post, 9 Jan. 2003.
12 Col. (Res.) Yehuda Wegman, Israels Security Doctrine and the Trap of Limited Conict,
Jerusalem Viewpoints 514 (1 March 2004), available at 5http://www.jcpa.org/jl/
vp514.htm4(accessed 1 May 2004).
13 Rami Hazut, The Palestinians Are an Existential Threat: Iraq Is Not, Yedioth Ahronoth, 23
Aug. 2002, Israel Resource Review, available at 5htttp://israelvisit.co.il/cgi-bin/friendly.
pl?url = Aug-23-02!IDF4(accessed 14 March 2003).
14 For an account of the demise of national security consensus, see Dan Horowitz, The Israeli
Concept of National Security in Avner Yaniv (ed.), National Security and Democracy in Israel
(London: Lynne Rienner 1993) pp.2731.
15 Moti Bassok and Eynav Ben Yehuda, Survey: 46 percent of households cannot meet monthly
outlays, Haaretz, 10 Aug. 2004.
16 Reuven Gal, The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF): A Conservative or an Adaptive Organization?,
in Daniel Maman et al. (eds.), Military, State and Society in Israel: Theoretical and
Comparative Perspectives (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers 2001) pp.3645.
17 Steve Rodan, Interview: Lt. Gen. Shaul Mofaz, Janes Defence Weekly (17 Oct. 2001),
available at 5http:jdw.janes.com4(accessed 23 June 2004).
18 Col. Gal Hirsh, Head of the IDF Ofcers Training School, interview with author, Tel Aviv,
Israel, 6 Aug. 2003.
19 The attack killed 27 and wounded over 100 Israeli civilians celebrating the Jewish Passover at
a hotel reception in Netanya.
74 Sergio Catignani
20 Yagil Henkin, Urban Warfare and the Lessons of Jenin. Azure 15 (Summer 2003), available
at at 5http://www.shalem.org.il/azure/15-henkin.htm4(accessed 23 May 2003).
21 Brieng by the IDF Chief of The General Staff, International Conference on Low-intensity
Conict, 23 March 2004, available at 5http://www.idf.il/newsite/English/032304-4.stm4
(accessed 23 March 2004).
22 See IDF Steps up Intelligence War against Palestinians, Janes Defence Weekly (5 Jan. 2001),
available at 5http:jdw.janes.com4(accessed 23 June 2004) and Israels Digital Army,
Foreign Report (22 May 2003), available at 5http://frp.janes.com4(accessed 23 June 2004).
23 David A. Fulghum and Robert Wall, Israels Future Includes Armed, Long-Range UAVs,
Aviation Week and Space Technology (25 June 2002), available at http://www.aviationnow.
com/avnow/search/autosuggest.jsp?docid = 3864&url = http%3A%2F%2Fwww.aviationnow.
com%2Favnow%2Fnews%2Fchannel_military.jsp%3Fview%3Dstory%26id%3Dnews%2
Fmiuav0625.xml4(accessed 14 July 2002).
24 David Eshel, Israel Hones Intelligence Operations to Counter Intifada, Janes Intelligence
Review (1 Oct. 2002), available at 5http://jir.janes.com4(accessed 23 June 2004).
25 According to various estimates the GSS and Military Intelligence ran about 7,000 informers
throughout the West Bank and Gaza during the rst Intifada. See Israel Uses Intifada
Informers to Abet Assassination Campaign, Janes Intelligence Review (1 Dec. 2001),
available at 5http://jir.janes.com4(accessed 23 June 2004).
26 Capt. E., Sayeret Matkal (General Security Services Elite Commando Unit), interview with
author, Tel Aviv, Israel, 18 Aug. 2003. See also Barbara Opall-Rome, Israeli Gunships,
Troops Team for Pinpoint Strikes, Defence News, 21 April 2003, available at 5http://
www.defensenews.com/pgt.php?htd = i_story_1787859.html&tty = topnews4(accessed
20
May 2003).
27 Jeremy Gwinn, Jenin and the Fundamentals of Urban Operations, Infantry Online, 15 March
2003, available at 5http://www.benning.army.mil/OLP/InfantryOnline/issue_21/art_125.htm4(accessed 28 June 2003).
28 Ibid.
29 Col. Gal Hirsh, interview with the author, 6 Aug. 2003.
30 See Barbara Opall-Rome, Tanks Fill Wider Role in Israels Anti-Terror War, Defense News,
17 March 2003.
31 On the IDFs attempts at trying to grapple with media exposure during the Al-Aqsa Intifada,
see Baruch Nevo and Yael Shur, The IDF and the Press During Hostilities (Jerusalem: The
Israel Democracy Institute 2003).
32 Since the start of the Al-Aqsa Intifada, for example, 323 children under the age of 14 have been
killed by IDF re. See Gideon Levy, Suffer the Children, Haaretz, 2 Dec. 2004.
33 See Barbara Opall-Rome, Objective: Re-create the Fog of War, Defence News, 24 June 2002.
34 For a detailed account of the IDF Code of Conduct, see Amos Guiora, Balancing IDF Checkpoints
and International Law: Teaching the IDF Code of Conduct, Jerusalem Issue Brief 3/8 (19 Nov.
2003), available at 5http://www.jcpa.org/brief/brief3-8.htm4(accessed 11 Nov. 2004).
35 Soldiers often nd themselves guarding checkpoints from around 8 to 12 hours a day and
dealing with up to 5,000 frustrated and hostile Palestinians. See Eitan Rabin, Army Cameras
Catch Soldiers Abuse, Maariv International, 11 July 2004.
36 See IDF Readjusts to the Needs of the Palestinian Population, IDF Spokespersons Unit, 8
July 2004, available at 5http://www.1.idf.il/DOVER/site/mainpage.asp?sl = EN&id = 7&docid = 32567.EN4(accessed 11 July 2004).
37 Barbara Opall-Rome, Israel Tests Anti-Sniper System in Combat, Defense News, 15 July
2002.
Al-Aqsa Intifada 75
38 See Dror Marom, Corner Shot Invests $2m in Weapons Systems, Globes, 15 Dec. 2003,
available at 5http://www.globes.co.il/DocsEn/did = 751435.htm4(accessed 7 April 2004).
39 See Alon Ben-David, Israel Unveils Refaim Rie Grenade System, Janes Defence Weekly 40/
11 (17 Sept. 2003) p.15.
40 See Amir Buhbut, On Target, Maariv International, 19 March 2004.
41 IDF infantry brigades usually rotate among the three Territorial Commands (North, South and
Central).
42 Amos Harel, Infantry Boosted in Leaner Army, Haaretz, 29 July 2003.
43 Cohen (note 5) p.50.
44 Major (Res.) Danny Gal, MAMDA (IDF Behavioural Sciences Unit), interview with author in
Herzliya, Israel, 12 Aug. 2004.
45 Yaakov Hasdai, Doers and Thinkers in the IDF, The Jerusalem Quarterly 24 (Summer
1982) pp.1618.
46 Lt.-Col. A., Sayeret Egoz Commander, interview with author, Shrivenham, England, 23 June
2004.
47 Due to the large budget cuts over the past four years imposed by the Ministry of Finance, the
IDFs new Shot 2008 ve-year strategic review will envisage the reduction of its ground forces
by more than 25 percent, the withdrawal of older ghting platforms and the drastic cutback in
the use of combat reservists for routine security operations amongst other things. See Alon
Ben-David, Extensive Cuts to Hit Israeli Ground Forces the Most, Janes Defence Weekly 40/
2 (16 July 2003) p.17.
48 Quoted in: Israel Needs Yaalon, Foreign Report (6 Nov. 2003), available at 5http://
frp.janes.com4(accessed 23 June 2004).
49 First Sergeant (Res.) Sean Sachs, Nahal Brigade, interview with author, Tel Aviv, Israel, 11
Aug. 2003.
50 See Pierre Klochendler, Israeli General Apologises for Civilian Deaths, CNN, 23 July 2002,
available at 5http://www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/meast/07/23/hamas.assassination4(accessed 10 Aug. 2003).
51 David A. Fulghum and Robert Wall, Israel Refocuses on Urban Warfare, Aviation Week &
Space Technology 156/19 (13 May 2002) p.25.
52 See Uri Glickman, Report: Over 4,100 Palestinian Homes Razed by IDF Since Start of
Intifada, Maariv International, 15 Nov. 2004.
53 See UNRWA Gaza Field Assessment of IDF Operation Days of Penitence, 20 Oct. 2004,
available at 5http://www.un.org/unrwa/news/incursion_oct04.pdf4(accessed 21 Dec. 2004).
54 See Margot Dudkevitch, 50% Fewer Terror Victims in 2003, The Jerusalem Post, 9 Jan.
2004.
55 Arieh OSullivan, Mofaz Terror in Decline, Pressure to Continue, The Jerusalem Post, 22
June 2004.
56 Brig.-Gen. (Ret.) Shlomo Brom, former IDF Head of the Strategic Planning Division, interview
with author, Tel Aviv, 13 June 2003.
57 Maj.-Gen. (Ret.) Yaacov Amidror, Israels Strategy for Combating Palestinian Terror, Joint
Forces Quarterly 32 (Autumn 2002) p.120.
58 Statistics quoted in Avi Kober, Has Battleeld Decision Become Obsolete? The Commitment
to the Achievement of Battleeld Decision Revisited, Contemporary Security Policy 22/2
(Aug. 2001) p.111.
59 See: Gil Merom, How Democracies Lose Small Wars (Cambridge: Cambridge UP 2003).
60 Cohen (note 5) p.142.