Donya Pierce Lawsuit Against Velda City

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI

EASTERN DIVISION
)
DONYA PIERCE et al.,
)
)
Plaintiffs,
)
)
v.
)
)
THE CITY OF VELDA CITY,
)
)
Defendant.
)
___________________________________ )
Case No. __________

Expedited Hearing Requested
(Class Action)
MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER

OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
INTRODUCTION
The named Plaintiff, Donya Pierce, is an impoverished person arrested less than 24 hours
ago for misdemeanor traffic offenses who is currently being held in a jail cell solely because she
is unable to obtain what to other people is a small sum of money. Ms. Pierce has been informed
by Velda City police officers that she will be kept in jail unless she pays $650 in cash. She has
also been told that, pursuant to City policy, she will not be brought to court for a first appearance
and that, if she still has not paid after three days, then she will be released from the custody of
Velda City for free. If Ms. Pierce could afford to pay that moneylike many other people
arrested by Velda City and charged with the same minor offenses every daythen Ms. Pierce
would be released immediately.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly articulated the fundamental principle that no person
can be kept in jail solely because of her poverty. Although that basic rule has been applied
directly to the issue presented in this case by federal and state courts, the principle is so utterly
ignored by local Velda City officials that the jailing of people solely because they cannot pay a
small amount of money to secure their release has become a normal fact of daily law
enforcement practice in Velda City.
Keeping the poor in jail because they cannot make a monetary payment violates
longstanding and fundamental principles of American law. As described in detail below, the
scheme enforced by Velda City has been rejected by the courts and by every major panel of legal
experts to study the issue over the past fifty years. Because the named Plaintiff isand because
many others in her situation will continue to beheld in jail by Velda City solely by virtue of
the amount of money that they and their families have, the Plaintiff respectfully requests that this
Court hold a hearing on this Motion in expedited fashion. Following that hearing, this Court
should issue a preliminary order preventing the continuation of this unlawful practice as soon as
possible.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
I.
Background
The facts of this case are similar to the facts discussed nearly four decades ago, when the
former Fifth Circuit condemned the jailing of indigent arrestees solely because they could not
make small cash bail payments, Pugh v. Rainwater, 572 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc), and
to the facts condemned by the United States Department of Justice less than two months ago in a
federal court case raising the same issues in the City of Clanton, Alabama. See Exhibit 1, United
States Department of Justice, Statement of Interest, Varden et al. v. City of Clanton, 15-cv-34
(M.D. Ala. 2015) (arguing on behalf of the United States government that fixed monetary bail
schedules to keep indigent arrestees in jail not only violates the Fourteenth Amendments Equal
Protection Clause, but also constitutes bad public policy.). As described below, the same
illegalities pervade the City of Velda Citys treatment of the poor every day.
A.
The Named Plaintiff
Donya Pierce is a recent arrestee of the Velda City Police Department currently being
kept in jail because she is not able to pay the $650 cash bond assessed by local officials. She
would be released immediately if she could afford the cash bond of between $150 and $350 for
each of her several traffic-related municipal ordinance violation charges.
Ms. Pierce is a 25-year-old mother of two children, ages four (4) and eight (8). She was
arrested by Velda City police in the early morning hours of April 2, 2015, leaving a Walgreens
in Velda City, Missouri. She was charged with four ordinance violation offenses, including
having a headlight out, driving while suspended, failure to produce a drivers license, and no
proof of insurance.
Ms. Pierce was taken to jail and told that she would be released if she paid a bond to
the City of Velda City of between $150 and $350 for each of her charges.1 Although her cash
bond was initially set at $800, a Velda City police officer decided to remove one of the charges.
She was therefore told that she would be kept in jail unless she paid $650. See Complaint (Doc.
1), Exhibit 1, Declaration of Donya Pierce.
Ms. Pierce is indigent and currently lives in Wellston with her two children, who depend
on her to live. In September 2014, she was homeless and entered emergency shelter for women
and children. She is now employed as a low-wage worker and participates in the supplemental
nutritional assistance program (SNAP) to help provide basic food for herself and her children.
Both of her children receive Medicaid benefits. Even with these benefits, Ms. Pierce has
effectively no money remaining after she pays her rent, utilities, and other basic necessities of
life.
1
Pursuant to the schedule, driving while suspended carries a cash bond of $350, and each of the other charges
carries a cash bond of $150.
Ms. Pierce was not told when she would be brought to court and has not been brought to
court for an initial appearance. The earliest that Pierce would be brought to court for a first
appearance is April 8, 2015, nearly a week after her arrest. Pursuant to City policy, Ms. Pierce
will likely be released for free after three days if she cannot buy her freedom. In the meantime,
she may lose her job, and she will not be able to care for her children.
B.
Velda Citys Arrest and Detention Policies and Practices
The relevant municipal policies and practices are simple. Velda City employs a postarrest detention system based on a fixed cash bail schedule. When Velda City police arrest a
person for a misdemeanor offense (including a traffic infraction as in Ms. Pierces case), they
take the person into custody and perform standard booking procedures. The person is then told
that the person can be released immediately with notice of a future court date, but only if the
person pays a pre-determined sum from a bail schedule. The bail schedule is essentially a
list containing types of offenses and corresponding dollar amounts required to pay for the
persons immediate release.
No inquiry is made into any of the persons circumstances,
including the persons indigence. No attempt is made to individualize the generic scheduled
amount: all arrestees are given the same pre-determined dollar amount without reference to their
personal characteristics. If there are multiple charges, each fixed bail amount is added together
to produce the final cumulative cash payment required for release.
Many of Velda Citys arrestees are freed almost immediately when they post these small
amounts of money without difficulty. The rest are left to languish in jail until the Citys officers
decide to let them out for free, until their families produce enough money at some point in the
intervening period, or until the Citys next court date. Because the City holds court only two
times per month, depending on the timing of a persons arrest, the person can spend over six
days in jail without a first judicial appearance. The named Plaintiff was informed that, pursuant
to City policy, she would be held for three full days if she cannot pay, and she that will then be
released for free. These practices have resulted in the ongoing confinement of the named
Plaintiff in this case.
In contrast to Velda City, many other cities and counties do not hold people in jail on
minor offenses because of their poverty.
Instead, for example, many other places release
arrestees with a signature bond or on their own recognizance. In the former, the person
promises to pay the scheduled amount of money if the person fails to appear in court. In the
latter, a person simply promises to appear, usually on penalty of an additional criminal charge for
Failure to Appear. In some places, each of these options is accompanied by the persons
agreement to other reasonable conditions of release. In none of these situations, however, is a
person kept in jail solely because she cannot afford a sum of money in advance. Indeed,
standard Velda City policy is to release a person on a recognizance bond if they do not pay cash
within three days.
ARGUMENT
A preliminary injunction is warranted if the movant demonstrates: (1) a substantial
likelihood of success on the merits; (2) that the movant will suffer irreparable harm in the
absence of an injunction, (3) that the harm suffered by the movant in the absence of an injunction
would exceed the harm suffered by the opposing party if the injunction is issued, and (4) that an
injunction would not disserve the public interest. Dataphase Sys., Inc. v. C L Sys., Inc., 640 F.2d
109, 113 (8th Cir. 1981) (en banc). The Plaintiffs easily satisfies each of these requirements.
I.
Plaintiffs Are Highly Likely to Succeed on the Merits Because the Citys
Conduct Violates Basic Equal Protection and Due Process Law
The constitutional principles at issue in this case are well-established. The Fifth Circuit
long ago identified the basic equal protection violation when reviewing Floridas post-arrest
detention procedures: At the outset we accept the principle that imprisonment solely because of
indigent status is invidious discrimination and not constitutionally permissible.
Pugh v.
Rainwater, 572 F.2d 1053, 1056 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc).
A. The Constitution Prohibits Keeping a Person in Jail Solely Because the Persons
Poverty Renders Her Unable to Afford a Monetary Payment
The rule that poverty and wealth status have no place in deciding whether a human being
should be kept in a jail cell relies on some of the most fundamental principles of American law.
See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956) (There can be no equal justice where the kind of
trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has.); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353,
355 (1963) (condemning the evil of discrimination against the indigent); Williams v. Illinois,
399 U.S. 235, 241 (1970) ([T]he Court has had frequent occasion to reaffirm allegiance to the
basic command that justice be applied equally to all persons.).2
These principles have been applied in a variety of contexts in which a government sought
to keep a person in jail solely because of the persons inability to make a monetary payment.
See, e.g., Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 398 (1971) ([T]he Constitution prohibits the State from
imposing a fine as a sentence and then automatically converting it into a jail term solely because
the defendant is indigent and cannot forthwith pay the fine in full.). In Bearden v. Georgia, 461
U.S. 660, 672-73 (1983), the Supreme Court explained that to deprive [a] probationer of his
conditional freedom simply because, through no fault of his own he cannot pay [a] fine would
be contrary to the fundamental fairness required by the Fourteenth Amendment.
2
See also Tucker v. City of Montgomery, 410 F. Supp. 494, 502 (M.D. Ala. 1976) (holding in a class action civil
rights case on behalf of indigent prisoners that the Citys practice of charging a monetary bond in order to exercise
appellate rights violated the Fourteenth Amendment).
Relying on this Supreme Court precedent, federal courts have long held that any kind of
pay-or-jail scheme is unconstitutional when it operates to jail the poor. In Frazier v. Jordan, 457
F.2d 726, 72829 (5th Cir. 1972), the court found that an alternative sentencing scheme of $17
dollars or 13 days in jail was unconstitutional as applied to those who could not immediately
afford the payment. Because those people would be sent to jail if they could not pay the $17
fine, the local courts order of imprisonment was unconstitutional. Id. at 728. Put simply,
Frazier condemned the municipal court scheme because it created a system in which [t]hose
with means avoid imprisonment [but] the indigent cannot escape imprisonment. Id.; see also
Barnett v. Hopper, 548 F.2d 550, 554 (5th Cir.1977) (To imprison an indigent when in the same
circumstances an individual of financial means would remain free constitutes a denial of equal
protection of the laws.), vacated as moot, 439 U.S. 1041 (1978); see also United States v. Hines,
88 F.3d 661, 664 (8th Cir. 1996) (A defendant may not constitutionally be incarcerated solely
because he cannot pay a fine through no fault of his own.).
The court in United States v. Flowers, 946 F. Supp. 2d 1295 (M.D. Ala. 2013), recently
reaffirmed these principles. In Flowers, the court was confronted with an analogous situation: a
criminal defendant faced imprisonment because she could not afford the cost of release on home
confinement monitoring. The court foundas the U.S. government conceded, id. at 1301that
keeping a person in jail solely because she could not afford to pay for home confinement
monitoring would be wrong and that the Constitutions guarantee of equal protection is
inhospitable to the Probation Departments policy of making monitored home confinement
available to only those who can pay for it. Id. at 1302.
In Flowers, the court began by acknowledging that the principle that wealth and poverty
have no place in sentencing decisions is nothing new.
Id.
Flowers then confronted the
constitutional implications for indigent defendants of a probation department policy that required
a probationer to pay the cost of electronic monitoring services. The court held that it could not
put a person in jail simply because the person could not afford the cost of electronic monitoring
services. Id. at 1301. The court recounted the fundamental federal precedent from a variety of
contexts, explaining that, just as it violates the Constitution's guarantee of equal protection
under the laws to convert a fine-only sentence into a prison term based on inability to pay, it
would also violate the constitution to turn a sentence of electronic monitoring into a jail sentence
simply because the defendant could not afford to pay for the service. Id. at 1300.3
If poverty status has no place in determining sentencing outcomes, it has no place in
pretrial release decisions. Just as it is unlawful to put a convicted person in jail because of her
inability to make a monetary payment, it is unlawful to put a presumptively innocent person in
jail for the same reason. Rainwater, 572 F.2d at 1057; see generally Exhibit 1, DOJ Statement of
Interest. The fundamental principles in Flowers thus apply equally to pretrial and than post-trial
home confinement. In other words, this Courts analysis in Flowers would have been the same if
As Flowers described the basic violation: [A] defendant identical to Flowers but with a thicker billfold would
receive home confinement, while Flowers would receive prison. Id. at 1301. Other federal district courts have
consistently enforced these fundamental principles. See, e.g., United States v. Waldron, 306 F. Supp. 2d 623, 629
(M.D. La. 2004) (It is well established that our law does not permit the revocation of probation for a defendants
failure to pay the amount of fines if that defendant is indigent or otherwise unable to pay. In other words, the
government may not imprison a person solely because he lacked the resources to pay a fine.); De Luna v. Hidalgo
County, 853 F. Supp. 2d 623, 647-48 (S.D. Tex. 2012) ([T]he Court finds that before a person charged with a
fine-only offense may be incarcerated by Hidalgo County for the failure to pay assessed fines and costs, this
deprivation of liberty must be preceded by some form of process that allows for a determination as to whether the
person is indigent and has made a good faith effort to discharge the fines, and whether alternatives to incarceration
are available.); Brown v. McNeil, 591 F. Supp. 2d 1245, 1260 (M.D. Fla. 2008) (granting federal habeas petition
because Petitioner did not have the ability to remain current with his supervision payments given his other financial
obligations at the time, which meant that states revocation of his conditional release constituted an unreasonable
application of clearly established federal law.).
the question was whether to jail an innocent defendant prior to trial simply because she could
not afford the U.S. Probation Departments pretrial electronic monitoring services.4
Indeed, in the context of pretrial arrestees, the rights at stake are even more significant
because their liberty is not diminished by criminal conviction; they are presumed innocent.
Justice Douglas, writing at the onset of the successful movement to rid the federal courts of the
use of the kind of poverty jailing now prevalent in Velda City, famously set forth the
fundamental question: To continue to demand a substantial bond which the defendant is unable
to secure raises considerable problems for the equal administration of the law. Can an
indigent be denied freedom, where a wealthy man would not, because he does not happen to
have enough property to pledge for his freedom? Bandy v. United States, 81 S. Ct. 197, 197-98
(1960).
This is the question that the former Fifth Circuit answered in Rainwater. The panel
opinion, Pugh v. Rainwater, 557 F.2d 1189, 1190 (5th Cir. 1977), had struck down the Florida
Rule of Criminal Procedure dealing with money bail because it is unconstitutional to keep an
indigent person in jail prior to trial solely because of the persons inability to make a monetary
payment. The en banc court agreed with the constitutional holding of the panel opinion but
reversed the panels facial invalidation of the entire Florida Rule. Rainwater, 572 F.2d at 1057.
Rainwaters reasoning is easy to understand and dispositive of this case. The en banc
court held that the Florida Rule itself did not require on its face the setting of monetary bail for
arrestees and explained that, if such a thing were to happen to an indigent person, it would be
unconstitutional. In other words, the court held that the Florida courts could not be expected to
enforce the new Rulewhich had been amended during the litigation in that casein a manner
4
For example, if a federal magistrate judge began telling all destitute defendants at initial misdemeanor appearances
in the Eastern District of Missouri that they would be jailed unless they could pay $100 cash, this Court would
reverse such an order immediately.
that violated the Constitution by requiring monetary payments to secure the release of an
indigent person. The court explained the binding constitutional principles at stake:
We have no doubt that in the case of an indigent, whose appearance at trial could
reasonably be assured by one of the alternate forms of release, pretrial
confinement for inability to post money bail would constitute imposition of an
excessive restraint. We do not read the State of Floridas new rule to require such
a result.
Id. at 1058.5 Summing up its reasoning, the en banc court held: The incarceration of those who
cannot [afford a cash payment], without meaningful consideration of other possible alternatives,
infringes on both due process and equal protection requirements.
Id. at 1057 (emphasis
added).6
Velda Citys scheme does exactly what Rainwater and the entire line of precedent on
which it was founded reject: it carves out jail for those who cannot afford to pay the City and
freedom for those who can. In no case is an indigent arrestee offered an alternative to posting an
immediate payment.
The City (and the State of Missouri) has determined that people
committing minor misdemeanor offenses (like the named Plaintiff and other Class members) are
eligible for immediate release after arrest. The City cannot make exercising that right to freedom
contingent solely on the ability to pay small amounts of cash. Cf. Bearden, 461 U.S. at 667-68
(holding that if [a] State determines a fine or restitution to be the appropriate and adequate
penalty for [a] crime, it may not thereafter imprison a person solely because he lacked the
resources to pay it).
Velda Citys scheme is even more irrational in that it then releases
Rainwater further explained that it refused to require a priority to be given in all casesincluding those of the nonindigentto non-monetary conditions of release. The court noted that, at least for wealthier people, some might
actually prefer monetary bail over release with certain other conditions, and that the court would not invalidate a
state Rule that allowed for those other conditions in appropriate cases. Id. at 1057.
Four circuit judges wrote a powerful dissent in Rainwater. Although they agreed with the constitutional principles
announced by the majority that the Constitution forbids jailing the poor when they cannot afford monetary bail, they
were concerned about the majoritys faith in the Florida courts not to apply the new state Rule in unconstitutional
ways to detain the indigent. Id. at 1067 (I cannot escape the conclusion that the majority has chosen too frail a
vessel for such a ponderous cargo of human rights.) (Simpson, J., Dissenting).
10
impoverished defendants for free if they have not been able to pay their cash release amount after
three days. No legitimate purpose is served by such an arbitrary, cruel, and devastating policy.
The Citys three-day poverty detention scheme has also been rejected by state courts. In
State v. Blake, 642 So. 2d 959, 968 (Ala. 1994), the Alabama Supreme Court struck down a state
statute that allowed for indigent arrestees to be held for 72 hours solely because they could not
afford monetary payments to secure their release prior to their first appearance. The Court held:
[A]n indigent defendant charged with a relatively minor misdemeanor who cannot
obtain release by cash bail, a bail bond, or property bail, must remain incarcerated
for a minimum of three days, and perhaps longer, before being able to obtain
[recognizance release]. We conclude that, as written, article VII of the Act violates
an indigent defendants equal protection rights guaranteed by the United States
Constitution, because the classification system it imposes is not rationally related
to a legitimate governmental objective.
Id (emphasis added) (quotations removed).7 In Blake, the lower court had expressed outrage at
the system of detention based on poverty that prevailed in Alabama at the time:
The pretrial detention of this defendant accused of a misdemeanor for possibly
five or six days because of defendant's lack of resources interferes with the right
of liberty, the premise of innocent until proven guilty, and shocks the conscience
of this court. If this defendant has $60 cash to pay a bondsman, he walks out of
the jail as soon as he is printed and photographed . Absent property or money,
the defendant must wait 72 hours. Putting liberty on a cash basis was never
intended by the founding fathers as the basis for release pending trial.
Id. at 966 (emphases added).8
7
Blake struck down the scheme holding indigent defendants on small cash bonds for at least 72 hours under even
rational basis review. Blake inappropriately applied rational basis review even after correctly stating the legal rule
that strict scrutiny must be applied to any government action that deprives a person of a fundamental right. The
panel decision in Rainwater, therefore, was correct in its determination that jailing a personand depriving her of
the most fundamental right to liberty, requires that strict scrutiny applied. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S.
739, 750 (1987) (recognizing fundamental nature of this right to pretrial liberty); United States v. MontalvoMurillo, 495 U.S. 711, 716 (1990) (holding that release prior to trial is a vital liberty interest); Schilb v. Kuebel,
404 U.S. 357, 365 (1971) ([A] statutory classification based upon suspect criteria or affecting fundamental rights
will encounter equal protection difficulties unless justified by a compelling governmental interest.); see also, e.g.,
Lopez-Valenzuela v. Arpaio, 770 F.3d 772, 781 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (applying strict scrutiny to strike down
Arizona bail law that required detention after arrest without individualized consideration of an arrestees
circumstances).
The difference is immaterial here, though, because the Alabama courts correctly held that jailing indigent
people who are otherwise deemed eligible for release solely because they cannot make small payments is not even
rationally related to a legitimate government objective, let alone necessary to achieve a compelling one.
11
Nearly forty years after Rainwater, these basic principles are being ignored by Velda
City. While some arrestees in Velda City hand cash to the police and are released immediately,
poor arrestees charged with the same offenses languish in a crowded jail. A City-wide system
that jails the poor and frees the rich for no reason other than their wealth is not a system
consistent with the fundamental fairness, Bearden 461 U.S. at 673, enshrined in the Fourteenth
Amendment.
B.
Velda City Has Simple, Constitutional Alternatives to Jailing the Poor
In our society liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial is the
carefully limited exception. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987). All over the
country, in the area of post-arrest procedure, jurisdictions have taken this constitutional
obligation seriously and instituted simple alternatives to the odious system of jailing the poor and
freeing the rich. For example, in Washington, D.C. arrestees are released on non-financial
conditions. In Clanton, Alabama, after being confronted with a similar federal suit in January
2015, the City adopted a new policy of releasing all arrestees on a $500 unsecured recognizance
bond, allowing every new arrestee to be released on the promise to pay that amount should the
person later fail to appear. In so doing, Clanton (and many other cities and counties) followed
the advice of the en banc court in Rainwater: Systems which incorporate a presumption
favoring personal recognizance avoid much of the difficulty inherent in the entire subject area.
Rainwater, 572 F.2d at 1057.9 Velda City could cure the illegality at the core of this case simply
8
See also, e.g., Robertson v. Goldman, 369 S.E.2d 888, 891 (W.Va. 1988) ([W]e have previously observed in a
case involving a peace bond, which we said was analogous to a bail bond, that if the appellant was placed in jail
because he was an indigent and could not furnish [bond] while a person who is not an indigent can avoid being
placed in jail by merely furnishing the bond required, he has been denied equal protection of the law.) (internal
quotes removed).
The en banc court in Rainwater also cited favorably to overwhelming academic authority outlining the
unconstitutionality of generic bail schedules, calling the academic consensus convincing. Rainwater, 572 F.2d at
1056 (The punitive and heavily burdensome nature of pretrial confinement has been the subject of convincing
commentary.).
12
by allowing arrestees to sign unsecured bonds in the same monetary amounts that it currently
uses or by releasing them on their own recognizance under penalty of a new charge for failure to
appear, which it already does anyway if the person does not pay within three days.
In Washington, D.C., the City of Clanton, and many other areas around the United
States,10 chaos in the streets has not ensued by following Rainwaters guidance and relying on
recognizance or unsecured bond.
Some areas have chosen to supplement release on
recognizance or unsecured bond with standard conditions of release that place additional
obligations on arrestees. Velda City is free to choose reasonable measures among these options
without offending the Fourteenth Amendment, but it may not adopt a blanket monetary chart as
its only criterion for determining custody or freedom. Velda Citys poverty-based post-arrest
detention scheme makes a mockery of the carefully limited circumstances, Salerno, 481 U.S.
at 755, in which continued detention of a presumptively innocent arrestee is allowed.
Like the federal courts and the Department of Justice, see Exhibit 1, the American Bar
Associations seminal Standards for Criminal Justice condemn Velda Citys policies as having
no place in American law. American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice Pretrial
Release (3rd ed. 2007) (ABA Standards).11 The ABA Standards, which have been relied on in
more than 100 Supreme Court decisions for decades, first began addressing post-arrest release
procedures in 1968. The latest revision of the ABA Standards now constitute one of the most
comprehensive and definitive statements available on the issue of post-arrest release, and they set
10
The federal government and the District of Columbia both removed money bail virtually entirely from their court
systems after the Department of Justice, Congress, and an overwhelming consensus of legal experts concluded that
the old system of post-arrest detention based on money bail was fundamentally unfair and unconstitutional. For
example, federal law explicitly forbids obtaining post-arrest detention through the use of money bail that a person
cannot meet. See 18 U.S.C. 3142(c)(2) (The judicial officer may not impose a financial condition that results in
the pretrial detention of the person.).
11
Available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/criminal_justice_
standards/pretrial_release.authcheckdam.pdf.
13
forth clear, reasonable, and simple alternatives to the unconstitutional scheme used by Velda
City.
For example, the ABA Standards call for the presumption of release on recognizance,
followed by release pursuant to the least restrictive non-financial conditions; most importantly,
they condemn the use of generic money schedules like the one used by Velda City:
Consistent with these Standards, each jurisdiction should adopt procedures
designed to promote the release of defendants on their own recognizance or, when
necessary, unsecured bond. Additional conditions should be imposed on release
only when the need is demonstrated by the facts of the individual case.
ABA Standards 10-1.4(a).12
The judicial officer should not impose a financial condition of release that results
in the pretrial detention of a defendant solely due to the defendants inability to
pay.
ABA Standards at 10-1.4(e).
Financial conditions other than unsecured bond should be imposed only when no
other less restrictive condition of release will reasonably ensure the defendants
appearance in court. The judicial officer should not impose a financial condition
that results in the pretrial detention of the defendant solely due to an inability to
pay.
ABA Standards at 10-5.3(a). According to the ABA Standards, financial conditions are only to
be used as a last resort, and they should never be used in a generic fashion as they are in Velda
City:
Financial conditions should be the result of an individualized decision taking into
account the special circumstances of each defendant, the defendants ability to
meet the financial conditions and the defendants flight risk, and should never be
set by reference to a predetermined schedule of amounts fixed according to the
nature of the charge.
12
Moreover, when financial conditions are used, the least restrictive conditions principle requires that unsecured
bond be considered first. Id. 10-1.4(c) (commentary) at 43-44. The ABA commentary goes on: If the court
finds that unsecured bond is not sufficient, it may require the defendant to post bail; however, the bail amount must
be within the financial reach of the defendant and should not be at an amount greater than necessary to assure the
defendant's appearance in court. Id. at 44.
14
ABA Standards at 10-5.3(e) (emphasis added). The National Association of Pretrial Services
Agencies (NAPSA) has also issued definitive Standards that condemn the use of generic
monetary schedules. See NAPSA, Standards on Pretrial Release (3rd Ed. 2004) at 2.5(f).13
The ABA Standards are widely viewed as authoritative in a variety of contexts,14 and
they are seen as the seminal text reflecting best practices by the leading commentators on postarrest procedures. See Department of Justice, National Institute of Corrections, Fundamentals of
Bail (2014) at 75 (discussing the importance of the ABA Standards and its rejection of
standardized financial conditions of release after arrest).
These Standards, which include
detailed treatment of all relevant policies and procedures necessary for creating a lawful and
effective post-arrest release system, have been a model for numerous jurisdictions around the
country to eliminate the antiquated and unlawful practice of detention based on small amounts of
money.
The Constitution guarantees that the poor will not face a different criminal legal system
than the system faced by wealthier people. Because the named Plaintiff and the similarly
situated impoverished arrestees that she represents are being held based solely on their inability
13
Available at, http://www.napsa.org/publications/2004napsastandards.pdf. The NAPSA Standards provide:

Financial conditions should be the result of an individualized decision taking into account the
special circumstances of each defendant, the defendants ability to meet the financial conditions
and the risk of the defendants failure to appear for court proceedings, and should never be set by
reference to a predetermined schedule of amounts based solely on the nature of the charge.
Id. at 2.5 (f). The Commentary to the NAPSA Standards further explains:
Some jurisdictions have historically used a bail schedule that establishes set bond amounts for
various charge categories and excludes consideration of other factors that may be far more
relevant to the risk of nonappearance. The practice of using a bail schedule easily leads to
detention for those too poor to post the bail amount and to the release of others for whom the
amount is relatively nominal and thus creates no incentive to return to court.
14
See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (relying on the ABA Standards to ascertain
prevailing norms of practice). As Chief Justice Burger explained when discussing an earlier version of the ABA
Standards, the ABA Standards constitute the single most comprehensive and probably the most monumental
undertaking in the field of criminal justice ever attempted by the American legal profession in our national history.
Warren E. Burger, The ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, 12 Am.Crim.L.Rev. 251 (1974).
15
to pay the generic amount of money set by the schedule used by Velda City, they are highly
likely to prevail on the merits of their constitutional claim.
II.
The Named Plaintiff and other Class Members Will Suffer Irreparable
Constitutional Harm If This Court Does Not Issue an Injunction
Without intervention from this Court, the named Plaintiff and the class of similarly
situated people that she represents will continue to suffer the serious and irreparable harm of
being jailed. Imprisoning a human being in a jail cell in violation of her constitutional rights is
undoubtedly an irreparable harm to her body and her mind. Freedom from imprisonment
from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraintlies at the heart of the
liberty that [the Due Process] Clause protects. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001);
Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992) (Freedom from bodily restraint has always been at
the core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause from arbitrary governmental
action.).
Even one additional night in jail is a harm to a person that cannot be later undone. See,
e.g., United States v. Bogle, 855 F.2d 707, 710711 (11th Cir. 1988) (holding that the
unnecessary deprivation of liberty clearly constitutes irreparable harm); Wanatee v. Ault, 120
F.Supp.2d 784, 789 (N.D. Iowa 2000) ([U]nconstitutional incarceration generally constitutes
irreparable harm to the person in such custody.); SEC v. Bankers Alliance Corp., 1995 WL
317586, *3 (D.D.C.1995) (As for the question of irreparable harm in the absence of a stay,
clearly Mr. Lee will be harmed by being incarcerated.); Lake v. Speziale, 580 F. Supp. 1318,
1335 (D. Conn. 1984) (granting preliminary injunction requiring court to inform child support
debtors of their right to counsel because unlawful incarceration would be irreparable harm);
Cobb v. Green, 574 F.Supp. 256, 262 (W.D. Mich. 1983) (There is no adequate remedy at law
for a deprivation of ones physical liberty. Thus the Court finds the harm asserted by plaintiff is
16
substantial and irreparable.).15
In Ms. Pierces case, further time in jail has disastrous
consequences because she is the mother of two young children who depend on her.
Moreover, even a few days in jail can have devastating consequences in a persons life,
such as the loss of a job or the inability to arrange safe alternate care for minor children. It also
exposes arrestees to the risk of unsanitary conditions, infection, and other medical and safety
emergencies prevalent in Missouri jails.16 Forcing people to risk all of these additional harms
because they cannot raise several hundred dollars to avoid them would only further contribute to
the unnecessary and irreparable harm visited on the Plaintiff and other Class members in this
case.
The result of the Citys current policies is that the pretrial detainees in jail in Velda City
are those who are so poor or destitute that they do not even know anyone who can come up with
the money to free them. The Plaintiff and other Class members are therefore languishing in jail
solely because they and their families do not have enough money to buy their release. The
Plaintiff asks this Court to enjoin the City, pending a final resolution of this case on the merits,
from keeping her and others similarly situated in jail because they cannot afford to pay cash up
front to secure their release.
III.
An Injunction Will Serve the Public Interest and Will Not Harm Defendant.
As numerous courts have emphasized, It is always in the public interest to prevent the
violation of a partys constitutional rights. Simms v. District of Columbia, 872 F. Supp. 2d 90,
15
Each jailing also carries with it numerous other indignities for each Class member, including intrusive body
searches and cramped, crowded, and unsanitary living conditions.
16
See, e.g., Bureau of Justice Statistics, Sexual Victimization In Prisons And Jails Reported By Inmates, 2011-12Update, available at http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=4654 (finding that 3.2% of jail inmates
reported being sexually abused during their current stay in jail); see also; Jenkins et al. v. City of Jennings, 15-cv252-CEJ, Doc. 1 (describing inhumane and unsanitary conditions in Jennings and other St. Louis County municipal
jails) https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2014/may/19/lawsuit-against-missouri-jail-proceeds-two-guards-pleadguilty/ (describing lawsuit concerning St. Louis jail guards forcing prisoners to take part in gladiator-style fights).
17
105 (D.D.C. 2012) (quoting and citing cases).
Overwhelming federal precedent treats the
amelioration of constitutional violations to be in the public interest. See Giovani Carandola v.

Bason, 303 F.3d 507, 521 (4th Cir. 2002) (The final prerequisite to the grant of a preliminary
injunction is that it serve the public interest. Again, we agree with the district court that
upholding constitutional rights surely serves the public interest.); G & V Lounge v. Michigan
Liquor Control Comm., 23 F.3d 1071, 1079 (6th Cir. 1994) ([I]t is always in the public interest
to prevent the violation of a partys constitutional rights.). It is hard to imagine anything more
in the public interest than remedying clear constitutional violations. Freedberg v. United States
Dept. of Justice, 703 F. Supp. 107, 111 (D.D.C. 1988) (And insofar as the public interest is
concerned, it was perhaps put best by another judge of this district court, in another case who
said, simply, it is in the public interest to uphold a constitutionally guaranteed right. (quotations
and citation omitted); see also, e.g., Wiley Mission v. New Jersey, Dep't of Cmty. Affairs, 2011
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96473, at * 59 (D.N.J. Aug. 25, 2011) (granting permanent injunction against
state agency in part because requiring the Department to abide by the Constitution serves the
public interest). As the Court explained in Glatts v. Superintendent Lockett, 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 1910, at *18-19 (W.D. Pa. 2011) ([O]ne must consider the other side of the scale of
public interest, which is, having a States employees follow the Federal Constitution is also in
the public interest.).
Nor would an injunction harm the Defendant. The City already offers release to every
misdemeanor arresteebut only if they can pay for it. At worst, the City would be required to
do what other cities and counties throughout the country do every day: release both rich and poor
after arrest without requiring the poor to sit in jail because of small cash payments that they
18
cannot afford.
Indeed, the City has already decided to release Ms. Pierce (and other
impoverished detainees) after three days if she cannot come up with the money before then.
Indeed, continuing to keep impoverished arrestees in jail cells because of their poverty
has significant negative consequences for the public interest. The overwhelming consensus of
experts is that the City will be safer by ceasing needlessly to detain the poor. Since the original
ABA Standards and Rainwater condemned post-arrest poverty jailing, law enforcement officials
and researchers have learned even more about the negative effects of post-arrest poverty custody.
The National Institute of Corrections at the Department of Justice (DOJ) has led the way in
highlighting both the unequal nature of generic bail schedules and their negative impacts on
community safety. See United States Department of Justice, National Institute of Corrections,
Fundamentals of Bail, at 28-29 (2014).17 Although Rainwater and Blake did not consider the
devastating effects of the 72-hour detention of indigent people when they struck that system
down decades ago, there is now overwhelming evidence that keeping indigent people in jail
even for a few days after an arresthas terrible consequences. First, it is enormously expensive
to house people in jail. Second, jailing the poor can devastate lives by disrupting stable
employment and child custody arrangements. Third, even just 72 hours in jail after an arrest
leads to worse outcomes for all involved by increasing poverty, hurting an arrestees family, and
making it more likely that an arrestee will recidivate.18
See DOJ, National Institute of
17
See also, e.g., Arnold Foundation, The Hidden Costs of Pretrial Detention (2013) at 3, available at:
http://www.arnoldfoundation.org/sites/default/files/pdf/LJAF_Report_hidden-costs_FNL.pdf (studying 153,407
defendants and finding that when held 2-3 days, low risk defendants are almost 40 percent more likely to commit
new crimes before trial than equivalent defendants held no more than 24 hours); Arnold Foundation, Pretrial
Criminal
Justice
Research
Summary
(2013)
at
5,
available
at:
http://www.arnoldfoundation.org/sites/default/files/pdf/LJAF-Pretrial-CJ-Research-brief_FNL.pdf (finding that
low-risk defendants held 2-3 days were 17 percent more likely to commit another crime within two years and that
those detained 4-7 days yielded a 35 percent increase in re-offense rates.).
18
For all of these reasons, as well as the issues of fundamental fairness that render pretrial poverty-based custody
unconstitutional, opposition to the routine use of generic bail schedules has been incorporated into the policy
positions of the major American law enforcement stakeholders. See, e.g., National Sheriffs Association, Resolution
19
Corrections, at 24-29;19 see also, e.g., International Association of Chiefs of Police, Resolution
(October 2014), 121st Annual Congress at 15-16 ([D]efendants rated low risk and detained
pretrial for longer than one day before their pretrial release are more likely to commit a new
crime once they are released, demonstrating that length of time until pretrial release has a direct
impact on public safety.).20
IV.
The Court Should Use Its Discretion Not to Require the Posting of Security
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c) provides that the court require the moving party to
post security to protect the other party from any financial harm likely to be caused by a
temporary injunction if that party is later found to have been wrongfully enjoined. Rule 65(c),
however, vest[s] broad discretion in the district court to determine the appropriate amount of an
injunction bond, DSE v. United States, 169 F.3d 21, 33 (D.C. Cir. 1999), including the
discretion to require no bond at all. Steward v. West, 449 F.2d 324, 325 (5th Cir. 1971) (finding
that no injunction bond need be posted when it is very unlikely that the defendant will suffer
any harm); RoDa Drilling v. Siegal, 552 F.3d 1203, 1215 (10th Cir. 2009) ([T]rial courts have
wide discretion under Rule 65(c) in determining whether to require security.); Donohue v.
Mangano, 886 F. Supp. 2d 126, 163 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) ([A] district court has wide discretion to
dispense with the bond requirement of Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(c) where there has been no proof of
2012-6 ([A] justice system relying heavily on financial conditions of release at the pretrial stage is inconsistent with
a fair and efficient justice system.).
19
Available at, http://static.nicic.gov/UserShared/2014-11-05_final_bail_fundamentals_september_8,_2014.pdf.

Summarizing the current state of research, the DOJ report, id. at 29, concluded:
[R]esearchers found that low- and moderate-risk defendants held only 2 to 3 days were more
likely to commit crimes and fail to appear for court before trial than similar defendants held 24
hours or less. As the time in jail increased, the researchers found, the likelihood of defendant
misbehavior also increased. The study also found similar correlations between pretrial detention
and long-term recidivism, especially for lower risk defendants. In a field of paradoxes, the idea
that a judge setting a condition of bail intending to protect public safety might be unwittingly
increasing the danger to the publicboth short and long-termis cause for radically rethinking
the way we administer bail.
20
Available at http://www.theiacp.org/Portals/0/documents/pdfs/2014Resolutions.pdf.
20
likelihood of harm.); Council on American-Islamic Rels. v. Gaubatz, 667 F. Supp. 2d 67, 81

(D.D.C. 2009) (same). The Court should use its considerable discretion to find that no security
(or a nominal security of $1) is required in this case for several important reasons.
First, the likelihood of Velda City suffering any harm from an improperly issued
injunction requiring the City to comply with federal law is almost non-existent. See, e.g.,
Gaubatz, 667 F. Supp. 2d at 81 (requiring no bond where the defendant would not be
substantially injured by the issuance of an injunction); 11A Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller,
et al., Federal Practice and Procedure 2954 (2d ed.) ([T]he court may dispense with security
altogether if the grant of an injunction carries no risk of monetary loss to the defendant.).
Indeed, the limited injunction sought in this Motion would not even eliminate the Citys ability
to release the named Plaintiff or other future arrestees on a signature bond. The City may issue
the same bond to Ms. Pierce and other arrestees and charge them the same amount of money
should they fail to appear in court. It was planning to do so in three days anyway. Thus, no
financial harm would result from this preliminary injunction.
Second, the named Plaintiff and other Class members are all living in poverty, and the
very reason for bringing this case is their lack of financial resources. See, e.g., Mitchell et al. v.
City of Montgomery, 14-cv-186-MEF, Doc. 18 at 3, (May 1, 2014) (issuing preliminary
injunction without requiring a bond for indigent plaintiffs because they were likely to succeed on
the merits and because the City was unlikely to suffer significant financial harm); Swanson v.
Univ. of Hawaii Prof. Assembly, 269 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1261 (D. Haw. 2003) (waiving the
security requirement for public employees based on ability to pay and also because the injunction
sought enforcement of constitutional rights); Johnson v. Bd. of Police Commrs, 351 F. Supp. 2d
929, 952 (E.D. Mo. 2004) (requiring no bond for homeless plaintiffs); Wayne Chem. v.
21
Columbus Agency Serv. Corp., 567 F.2d 692, 701 (7th Cir. 1977) (requiring no bond for indigent
person); Bass v. Richardson, 338 F. Supp. 478, 490 (S.D.N.Y.1971) (It is clear to us that
indigents, suing individually or as class plaintiffs, ordinarily should not be required to post a
bond under Rule 65(c).); see also 11A Wright & Miller 2954 (courts can waive the bond
requirement in cases involving poor plaintiffs).
Finally, the Plaintiffs are overwhelmingly likely to succeed on the merits. The outcome
of any future trial, if necessary, is likely to reaffirm the basic principles that have been repeatedly
reaffirmed by the Supreme Court and federal and state courts across the country.21
CONCLUSION
This case is about Velda City jailing some of its poorest people because of their inability
to pay a small amount of money. For the reasons stated above, the Court should grant the
Plaintiffs motion for emergency relief and enjoin the City from keeping the named Plaintiff and
those similarly situated in jail without offering release on unsecured bond or recognizance.
Respectfully submitted,
21
Although this case is a prototypical situation for which the class action vehicle was created, and the class action
certification motion was contemporaneously filed with this preliminary injunction motion, this Court need not rule
on the Plaintiffs class certification motion or formally certify a class in order to issue preliminary injunctive relief.
See, e.g., Newberg on Class Actions 24:83 (4th ed. 2002) (The absence of formal certification is no barrier to
classwide preliminary injunctive relief.); Moores Federal Practice 23.50, at 23-396, 23-397 (2d ed.1990) (Prior
to the Courts determination whether plaintiffs can maintain a class action, the Court should treat the action as a
class suit.); see also, e.g., Lee v. Orr, 2013 WL 6490577 at *2 (N.D. Ill. 2013) (The court may conditionally
certify the class or otherwise order a broad preliminary injunction, without a formal class ruling, under its general
equity powers. The lack of formal class certification does not create an obstacle to classwide preliminary injunctive
relief when activities of the defendant are directed generally against a class of persons.); N.Y. State Nat. Org. For
Women v. Terry, 697 F. Supp. 1324, 1336 (S.D.N.Y.1988) (holding that the Court acted in the only reasonable
manner it could under the circumstances, ruling on the continuation of [the] temporary restraining order and leaving
the question of class certification for another day.); Leisner v. New York Tel. Co., 358 F. Supp. 359, 371
(S.D.N.Y.1973) ([R]elief as to the class is appropriate at this time even though when the preliminary injunction
motion was heard, the class action had not yet been certified.); Illinois League of Advocates for the
Developmentally, Disabled v. Illinois Dept of Human Servs., 2013 WL 3287145 at *4 (N.D. Ill. 2013) (At this
early stage in the proceedings, the class allegations in the Second Amended Complaint are sufficient to establish
Plaintiffs standing to seek immediate injunctive relief on behalf of the proposed class. At a later stage, we may
revisit whether that classwide representation is inappropriate, but until that time, we will preserve the status quo
(within the limits set forth in the TRO) with respect to all potential class members.).
22
_/s/ Alec Karakatsanis_______________

Alec Karakatsanis (E.D.Mo. Bar No. 999294DC)
Equal Justice Under Law
916 G Street, NW Suite 701
Washington, DC 20001
(202)-681-2409
alec@equaljusticeunderlaw.org
_/s/ Thomas B. Harvey__________________
Thomas B. Harvey (MBE #61734)
_/s/ Michael-John Voss________________
Michael-John Voss (MBE #61742)
ArchCity Defenders
812 N. Collins Alley
Saint Louis, MO 63102
855-724-2489
23

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
)
DONYA PIERCE et al.,
)
)
Plaintiffs,
)
)
v.
)
)
THE CITY OF VELDA CITY,
)
)
Defendant.
)
___________________________________ )
Case No. __________
ORDER
Upon consideration of Plaintiffs Motion for Temporary Restraining Order or in the
Alternative Motion for Preliminary Injunction, it is ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED.
Defendant Velda City is ORDERED to release from its custody the named Plaintiff
Donya Pierce, either on her own recognizance or subject to an unsecured bond or other
reasonable and lawful non-financial conditions.
The City of Velda City is further ORDERED to release, subject to standard booking
procedures, any other misdemeanor arrestees in its custody or who that become in its custody on
their own recognizance or on an unsecured bond in a manner consistent with state and federal
law.
Ordered this ___ day of _______________, 2015.
___________________________________
Hon. __________________, District Judge
Case 2:15-cv-00034-MHT-WC Document 26 Filed 02/13/15 Page 1 of 16

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHERN DIVISION
CHRISTY DAWN VARDEN, et al.

Plaintiffs,
v.
Case No. 2:15-cv-34-MHT-WC
THE CITY OF CLANTON,
(Class Action)
Defendant.
STATEMENT OF INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES

Incarcerating individuals solely because of their inability to pay for their release, whether
through the payment of fines, fees, or a cash bond, violates the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. See Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 398 (1971); Williams v. Illinois, 399
U.S. 235, 240-41 (1970); Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 709 (1961). In this case, Plaintiffs
allege that they are subjected to an unlawful bail scheme in Clanton, Alabama. Under this
scheme, Plaintiffs are allegedly required to pay a cash bond in a fixed dollar amount for each
misdemeanor charge faced or else remain incarcerated. Without taking a position on the factual
accuracy of Plaintiffs claims, the United States files this Statement of Interest to assist the Court
in evaluating the constitutionality of Clantons bail practices. It is the position of the United
States that, as courts have long recognized, any bail or bond scheme that mandates payment of
pre-fixed amounts for different offenses in order to gain pre-trial release, without any regard for
indigence, not only violates the Fourteenth Amendments Equal Protection Clause, but also
constitutes bad public policy.
INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES

The United States has authority to file this Statement of Interest pursuant to 28 U.S.C
517, which permits the Attorney General to attend to the interests of the United States in any
case pending in a federal court. The United States can enforce the rights of the incarcerated
pursuant to the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. 1997. The United
States uses that statute to address unconstitutional conditions of confinement, many of which are
caused by the overcrowding of prisons and jails.
The United States has a clear interest in ensuring that state and local criminal justice
systems are fair, nondiscriminatory, and rest on a strong constitutional foundation. 1
Unfortunately, that is not always the case. As noted by Attorney General Eric Holder at the
National Symposium on Pretrial Justice in 2011:
As we speak, close to three quarters of a million people reside in Americas jail
system. . . . Across the country, nearly two thirds of all inmates who crowd our
county jailsat an annual cost of roughly nine billion taxpayer dollarsare
defendants awaiting trial. . . . Many of these individuals are nonviolent, nonfelony offenders, charged with crimes ranging from petty theft to public drug use.
And a disproportionate number of them are poor. They are forced to remain in
custodyfor an average of two weeks, and at a considerable expense to taxpayers
because they simply cannot afford to post the bail required . . . . 2
For these reasons, the United States is taking an active role to provide guidance on the due
process and equal protection issues facing indigent individuals charged with state and local
crimes. For example, the United States filed Statements of Interest in Wilbur v. City of Mount
ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, Prosecution and Defense Function, Standard 3-1.2(d) (1993) (It is
an important function of the prosecutor to seek to reform and improve the administration of criminal
justice. When inadequacies or injustices in the substantive or procedural law come to the prosecutors
attention, he or she should stimulate efforts for remedial action. ).
2
Eric Holder, Atty Gen. of the United States, U.S. Dept of Justice, Speech at the National Symposium
on Pretrial Justice (June 1, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-ericholder-speaks-national-symposium-pretrial-justice.
Vernon in 2013 3 and Hurrell-Harring v. State of New York in 2014. 4 Both cases involved the
fundamental right to counsel for indigent criminal defendants and the role counsel plays in
ensuring the fairness of our justice system. 5
Accordingly, the United States files this Statement of Interest, reaffirming this countrys
commitment to the principles of fundamental fairness and to ensuring that the scales of our
legal system measure justice, not wealth. 6
BACKGROUND
It is long established that the American criminal justice system should not work
differently for the indigent and the wealthy. Indeed, as early as 1956, the Supreme Court
declared that there can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the
amount of money he has. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956). Twenty years later, the
Fifth Circuit extended that precept to incarceration: [t]o imprison an indigent when in the same
circumstances an individual of financial means would remain free constitutes a denial of equal
3
Statement of Interest of the United States, Wilbur v. City of Mount Vernon, Civ. Action No. 11-1100
(W.D. Wash., Aug. 8, 2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/wilbursoi8-1413.pdf.
4
Statement of Interest of the United States, Hurrell-Harring v. State of New York, Case No. 8866-07
(N.Y. Sup. Ct., Sept. 25, 2014), available at
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/hurrell_soi_9-25-14.pdf.
5
In both Statements of Interest, the United States did not take a position on the merits of the plaintiffs
claims. In Wilbur, the United States provided its expertise by recommending that if the court found for the
plaintiffs, it should ensure that public defender counsel have realistic workloads, sufficient resources, and
are carrying out the hallmarks of minimally effective representation. In Hurrell-Harring, the United
States provided an informed analysis of existing case law to synthesize the legal standard for constructive
denial of counsel.
6
Robert F. Kennedy, Atty Gen. of the United States, U.S. Dept of Justice, Address to the Criminal Law
Section of the American Bar Association (Aug. 10, 1964), available at
http://www.justice.gov/ag/rfkspeeches/1964/08-10-1964.pdf; see also Eric Holder, Atty Gen. of the
United States, U.S. Dept of Justice, Speech at the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers
57th Annual Meeting (Aug. 1, 2014), available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2014/agspeech-140801.html (quoting Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy).
protection of the laws. Barnett v. Hopper, 548 F.2d 550, 554 (5th Cir. 1977) 7, vacated as moot,
439 U.S. 1041 (1978). Under the clear precedent of this Circuit, imprisonment solely because of
indigent status is invidious discrimination and not constitutionally permissible. Pugh v.
Rainwater, 572 F.2d 1053, 1056 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc).
The sweeping reforms to the federal bail system during the 1960s were based on these
same constitutional principlesthat access to justice should not be predicated on financial
means. In 1962, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy called for wide-scale bail reform, noting
that [i]f justice is priced in the market place, individual liberty will be curtailed and respect for
law diminished. 8 In 1964, Attorney General Kennedy convened a National Conference on Bail
and Criminal Justice with the express purpose of understanding and improving both the federal
and state bail systems. 9 During his closing remarks at the conference, Attorney General Kennedy
declared:
[U]sually only one factor determines whether a defendant stays in jail before he
comes to trial. That factor is not guilt or innocence. It is not the nature of the
crime. It is not the character of the defendant. That factor is, simply, money. How
much money does the defendant have? 10
At the time, federal courts routinely employed cash bail schemes similar to the one alleged in
this case: bail amounts were based on the charges for which defendants were arrested, and
7
The Eleventh Circuit has adopted as precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit rendered prior to
October 1, 1981. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc).
Robert F. Kennedy, Atty Gen. of the United States, U.S. Dept of Justice, Address to the American Bar
Association (Aug. 6, 1962), available at
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ag/legacy/2011/01/20/08-06-1962%20Pro.pdf.
9
Robert F. Kennedy, Atty Gen. of the United States, U.S. Dept of Justice, Welcome Address to the
National Conference on Bail and Criminal Justice (May 27, 1964), available at
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ag/legacy/2011/01/20/05-27-1964.pdf.
10
National Criminal Justice Reference Service, Proceedings and Interim Report from the National
Conference on Bail and Criminal Justice 297 (1965), available at
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Photocopy/355NCJRS.pdf.
judicial officers routinely set cash bail amounts that some defendants simply could not afford to
pay.
Attorney General Kennedys conference on bail reform sparked wide-scale changes to
the federal pre-trial detention and bail system. Testifying before the Senate Judiciary Committee
while bail reform legislation was under consideration, Attorney General Kennedy articulated the
Departments growing concern that the rich man and the poor man do not receive equal justice
in our courts. And in no area is this more evident than in the matter of bail. 11 The main reason
for this disparity, according to Attorney General Kennedy, was that the federal bail-setting
process was unrealistic and often arbitrary. Bail was set without regard to a defendants
character, family ties, community roots or financial status. Instead, bail was frequently set based
on the nature of the crime alone. 12
Today, federal law expressly forbids that practice with a single sentence: The judicial
officer may not impose a financial condition that results in the pretrial detention of the person. 13
This concise but profound change was initiated as part of the Bail Reform Act of 1966, which
marked a significant departure from past practices. The stated purpose of the Act was to revise
the practices relating to bail to assure that all persons, regardless of their financial status, shall
not needlessly be detained pending their appearance to answer charges, to testify, or pending
appeal, when detention serves neither the ends of justice nor the public interest. 14
11
See Hearings on S. 2838, S. 2839, & S. 2840 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights and
Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong. (1964)
(Testimony by Robert F. Kennedy, Atty Gen. of the United States, U.S. Dept of Justice), available at
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ag/legacy/2011/01/20/08-04-1964.pdf.
12
Id.
13
18 U.S.C. 3142(c)(2).
14
Bail Reform Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-465, 2, 80 Stat. 214 (1966). See also Allen v. United States,
386 F.2d 634, 637 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (Bazelon, J., dissenting) (It plainly appears from the language and
The Bail Reform Act requires federal judges and magistrates to conduct an individualized
analysis of each defendant prior to ordering pretrial detention. 15 The individualized analysis
requires consideration of factors such as ties to the community, employment, and prior record
and precludes fixing bail based solely on the charge. 16 In weighing these factors, judges are to
consider 1) the extent to which pre-trial release will endanger the safety of those in the
community, and 2) what is necessary to reasonably assure that the defendant will return to court
when necessaryi.e., that the defendant will not flee or otherwise attempt to avoid justice. 17
Federal judges must also consider a wide range of conditions to be placed upon a
defendants pre-trial release that could alleviate these concerns. These conditions include regular
community reporting, establishing curfews, abstaining from drug or alcohol use, and various
types of community supervision. 18 Financial conditions, including money bonds, can be among
these measures and, in appropriate cases where an accused might be a flight risk, financial
conditions can provide strong incentives to return to court. But the imposition of financial
conditions can only be made after an individualized assessment of the particular defendant. And,
importantly, the Bail Reform Act expressly precludes any federal judge or magistrate from
history of the Bail Reform Act that its central purpose was to prevent pretrial detention because of
indigency.) (citations omitted).
15
Federal judges must make these determinations during or following detention hearings in open court, in
which defendants facing pre-trial detention are represented by counsel, either appointed or retained. 18
U.S.C. 3142(f).
16
The Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, signed into law by President Ronald Reagan, modified
several sections of the 1966 Act, but made even more explicit the requirement of an individualized
determination and the prohibition against cash bail for those who could not pay.
17
See generally, 18 U.S.C. 3142(b)-(d) (outlining factors the courts must consider in determining
whether or not to hold a defendant over until trial, or release him or her on his or her own recognizance or
pursuant to conditions).
18
18 U.S.C. 3142(c)(1)(B).
imposing money bail that an accused person cannot afford to pay and would therefore result in
that persons pretrial detention. 19
If the judge determines that no amount of conditions can reasonably secure the safety of
the community and the return of the defendant, the judge may order pretrial detention. In doing
so, the judge must provide a written statement of facts and the reasons for detention via a
detention order. 20 Reasons for or against pretrial detention include the nature and
circumstances of the defendants charges, the weight of the evidence against the defendant, the
defendants history and character (including family and community ties and employment), and
the dangerousness or risk of flight that the defendant may pose if released. 21
Essentially, the Bail Reform Acts provisions ensure that pretrial detention is based on an
objective evaluation of dangerousness and risk of flight, rather than ability to pay. Previous
critics of bail reform suggested that the Act would create a nation of fugitives, 22 but the
Department has not found that to be the case. To the contrary, the Department has found that
judicial officers are well suited to make fair, individualized determinations about the risks, if
any, of releasing a particular defendant pending his or her next court date and that they are able
to do so efficiently with the assistance of an able pretrial services staff and the input of both the
prosecutor and defense counsel. Individualized determination and the basic elements of due
19
18 U.S.C. 3142(c)(2) (The judicial officer may not impose a financial condition that results in the
pretrial detention of the person.).
20
18 U.S.C. 3142(i)(1).
21
18 U.S.C. 3142(g).
22
Hearings on S. 2838, S. 2839, & S. 2840 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights and Subcomm.
on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong. (1964) (Testimony
by George L. Will, Executive Director of the American Society of Professional Bail Bondsmen).
process help ensure that federal defendants are not detained unnecessarily or simply because they
are poor.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs in this case seek declaratory, injunctive and compensatory relief, alleging that
the mandatory imposition of a bail schedule that sets bail at a fixed amount per charge violates
due process and equal protection. If Clantons bail system indeed fixes bond amounts based
solely on the arrest charge, and does not take individual circumstances into account, the Court
should find this system to be unconstitutional. Not only are such schemes offensive to equal
protection principles, they also constitute bad public policy.
I.
Fixed-sum Bail Systems are Unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment
In general, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits
punishing a person for his poverty. Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 671 (1983). This is
especially true when it comes to depriving a person of his liberty. The Supreme Court has
considered a variety of contexts in which the government attempted to incarcerate or continue
incarceration of an individual because of his or her inability to pay a fine or fee, and in each
context, the Court has held that indigency cannot be a barrier to freedom. Tate, 401 U.S. at 398;
Williams, 399 U.S. at 240-41; Smith, 365 U.S. at 709.
Although much of the Courts jurisprudence in this area concerns sentencing or early
release schemes, the Courts Fourteenth Amendment analysis applies in equal, if not greater
force to individuals who are detained until trial because of inability to pay fixed-sum bail
amounts. Liberty is particularly salient for defendants awaiting trial, who have not been found
guilty of any crime. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750 (1987) (recognizing the
fundamental nature of the right to pretrial liberty). To be sure, pretrial detention may be
8
necessary in some circumstances including if a court finds a likelihood of future danger to

society or that the defendant poses a flight risk. Fixed-sum bail systems, however, such as the
one allegedly used in Clanton, Alabama, do not take these considerations into account. Such
systems are based solely on the criminal charge. Because such systems do not account for
individual circumstances of the accused, they essentially mandate pretrial detention for anyone
who is too poor to pay the predetermined fee. This amounts to mandating pretrial detention only
for the indigent.
The Fifth Circuit briefly discussed fixed-sum bail systems, otherwise referred to as bail
schedules, in Pugh v. Rainwater, 572 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc). There, the Court held
that the new bail scheme passed by the Florida legislature was not constitutionally deficient
simply because it failed to articulate a presumption against imposing cash bail. The en banc court
noted that Floridas new system allowed for six different types of pretrial releasecash bail was
but one option of many. Importantly, however, the Court pointed out that the utilization of bond
schedules, and only bond schedules, creates an injustice for individuals who cannot meet the
financial threshold:
Utilization of a master bond schedule provides speedy and convenient release for
those who have no difficulty in meeting its requirements. The incarceration of
those who cannot, without meaningful consideration of other possible
alternatives, infringes on both due process and equal protection requirements.
Pugh, 572 F.2d at1057.
As correctly noted in Plaintiffs Motion for Temporary Restraining Order or in the
Alternative Motion for Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 34), courts in this Circuit have had
occasion to address scenarios analogous to those alleged here. For example, in Frazier v. Jordan,
457 F.2d 726, 728 (5th Cir. 1972), the Fifth Circuit invalidated a sentencing scheme that offered
defendants the choice of immediately paying a $17 fine or serving a 13-day jail sentence as
9
applied to indigent defendants who could not pay the fine. As the Court noted, [t]he alternative
fine before us creates two disparately treated classes: those who can satisfy a fine immediately
upon its levy, and those who can pay only over a period of time, if then. Those with means avoid
imprisonment; the indigent cannot escape imprisonment. Id.
Similarly, in Tucker v. City of Montgomery, 410 F. Supp. 494 (M.D. Ala. 1976), this
Court held that the Citys practice of charging a bond to exercise appellate rights denied the
equal protection of the law to indigent prisoners. In so holding, the court found that [t]he
imposition by the State of financial barriers restricting the availability of appellate review for
indigent criminal defendants has no place in our heritage of Equal Justice Under Law. Id. at 502
(quoting Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252, 258 (1959)).
Finally, this Courts recent decision in United States v. Flowers, 946 F. Supp. 2d 1295
(M.D. Ala. 2013), addressed practices analytically indistinguishable from those practices
Plaintiffs allege are occurring in Clanton. In Flowers, the defendant could avoid prison only if
she paid for her home confinement, an option her poverty prevented. This Court noted correctly
that it is inequitable for indigent defendants who cannot pay for home-confinement monitoring
to be imprisoned while those who can pay to be subject to the more limited monitored home
confinement avoid prison. Id. at 1302. If Plaintiffs allegations in this case are true, indigent
defendants in Clanton face a similar problempay a monetary bond they cannot afford or go to
jail. This determination, like the sentence in Flowers, would be constitutionally infirm and
[unable to] stand. Id. at 1300.
II.
Public Policy Weighs Strongly Against Fixed Bail Systems
In addition to being unconstitutional, fixed-bail systems that do not account for a

defendants indigency are an inadequate means of securing the safety of the public or ensuring
10
the return of the defendant to the court the central rationales underlying pretrial detention.
Indeed, such schemes are driven by financial considerations, rather than legitimate public safety
concerns. This is bad public policy, and results in negative outcomes for both defendants and the
community at large.
The problems with bail systems based on financial considerations are well-documented. 23
As summarized in a recent Department of Justice publication: The two central issues
concerning money bail are: (1) its tendency to cause unnecessary incarceration of defendants
who cannot afford to pay secured financial conditions either immediately or even after some
period of time; and (2) its tendency to allow for, and sometimes foster, the release of high-risk
defendants, who should more appropriately be detained without bail. 24
When bail amounts are too high for indigent individuals to afford, fewer defendants will
be released pretrial, 25 thereby creating a burden on local jails. 26 Today, according to a Bureau of
Justice Statistics analysis, more than 60 percent of all jail inmates nationwide are in custody
awaiting an adjudication of their charges, and the majority of these pretrial detainees are charged
23
See, e.g., Timothy R. Schnacke, United States Department of Justice, National Institute of Corrections,
Fundamentals of Bail: A Resource Guide for Pretrial Practitioners and a Framework for American
Pretrial Reform (2014), available at
http://www.pretrial.org/download/research/Fundamentals%20of%20Bail%20-%20NIC%202014.pdf.
24
Id. at 15.
25
Thomas H. Cohen & Brian A. Reaves, United States Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs,
Bureau of Justice Statistics, Pretrial Release of Felony Defendants in State Courts: State Court
Processing Statistics, 1990-2004, Special Report, NCJ 214994 (2007) (study of state courts in the 75
largest counties from 1990 to 2004, finding that about 7 of 10 defendants secured release when bail was
set at less than $5,000, but only 1 in 10 secured release when bail was set at $10,000 or more), available
at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/prfdsc.pdf.
26
See generally Ram Subramaniam, et al., Vera Institute of Justice, Incarcerations Front Door: The
Misuse of Jails in America 29-35 (Feb. 2015), available at http://vera.org/pubs/incarcerations-front-doormisuse-jails-america.
11
with nonviolent offenses. 27 Jail overcrowding, in turn, can result in significant security and life
and safety risks for both inmates and staff. 28
While there is a need for continued quantitative research on the effects of pretrial
detention, it is clear that the decision to release or detain a defendant pretrial has many collateral
consequences beyond the loss of liberty. As detailed by the Supreme Court:
The time spent in jail awaiting trial has a detrimental impact on the individual. It
often means loss of a job; it disrupts family life; and it enforces idleness. Most
jails offer little or no recreational or rehabilitative programs. The time spent in
jail is simply dead time. . . Imposing those consequences on anyone who has not
yet been convicted is serious. It is especially unfortunate to impose them on those
persons who are ultimately found to be innocent.
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 532-33 (1972). Incarceration carries weighty mental and
social burdens for the accused and for those closest to them. Family obligations may go
unmet while defendants are detained, and jobs may be lost, both of which can cause
irreparable harm to the defendant, their families, and their communities.
In addition, for many reasons, the judicial decision to detain or release the accused
pretrial may be a critical factor affecting the outcome of a case. 29 Pretrial detention can impede
27
Todd D. Minton, United States Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Jail Inmates at
Midyear 2012 Statistical Tables, NCJ 241264, at 1 (2013) available at
www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/jim12st.pdf (showing that the percentage of pretrial detainees in jail has
remained unchanged since 2005); see also Donna Lyons, Predicting Pretrial Success, State Legislatures,
February 2014 at 18-19, available at
http://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/Documents/magazine/articles/2014/SLG_0214_Pretrial_1.pdf; Arthur W.
Pepin, Conference of State Court Administrators, Policy Paper: Evidence-Based Pretrial Release (2014),
available at http://www.colorado.gov/ccjjdir/Resources/Resources/Ref/EBPre-TrialRelease_2012.pdf.
28
See generally Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011) (overcrowding in California prisons created
unconstitutional conditions of confinement, including inadequate medical and mental health care); see
also Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 688 (1978) (upholding 30-day limit on confinement in isolation,
noting that overcrowding in the isolation unit contributed to violence and vandalism of cells).
29
Mary T. Phillips, New York City Criminal Justice Agency, Inc., Pretrial Detention and Case
Outcomes, Part 1: Nonfelony Cases (2007), available at http://www.nycja.org/lwdcms/docview.php?module=reports&module_id=669&doc_name=doc.
12
the preparation of a defense, such as gathering evidence and interviewing witnesses, and pretrial
detention can make it more difficult to confer with an attorney. 30 Research indicates that these
barriers have practical consequences: defendants who are detained pretrial have less favorable
outcomes than those who are not detained, notwithstanding other relevant factors such as the
charges they face or their criminal history. One contributing factor is that detained defendants are
more likely to plead guilty, if only to secure release, possibly resulting in at least some wrongful
convictions. 31 In some instances, the time someone is detained pretrial can even exceed the likely
sentence if the defendant were later found guilty. 32
For these reasons, many states have moved away from bail systems that are based
entirely on the criminal charge and towards systems that allow for different pretrial release
options based on individualized determinations of dangerousness or risk of flight. 33 The
30
Andrew D. Leipold, How the Pretrial Process Contributes to Wrongful Convictions, 42 Am. Crim. L.
Rev. 1123, 1165 (2005); see also Barker, 407 U.S. at 532-33 (noting that a defendant detained pretrial is
hindered in his ability to gather evidence, contact witnesses, or otherwise prepare his defense.).
31
Id. See also Mary T. Phillips, New York City Criminal Justice Agency, Inc., Bail, Detention, and
Felony Case Outcomes, Research Brief No. 18 (2008), available at http://www.nycja.org/lwdcms/docview.php?module=reports&module_id=597&doc_name=doc; Barker, 407 U.S. at 533, n.35.
32
See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 2463, 2492
(2004).
33
States employ a variety of bail systems that satisfy constitutional concerns. The federal model, while
constitutionally sufficient, is not the only adequate scheme. See Arizona (AR.S. Crim. Proc. Rule 7.2);
Arkansas (Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 9.2); Connecticut (C.G.S.A 54-63b(b)); Illinois
(725 ILCS 5/110-2); Maine (15 M.R.S.A 1002, 1006); Massachusetts (MGL Ch. 276, 58); Michigan
(M.C.L.A 780.62-for misdemeanors only); Minnesota (49 M.S.A, Rules Crim. Proc. 6.02(1)); Missouri
(Missouri Supreme Court Rule 33.01); Montana (MCA 46-9-108 (2)); Nebraska (Neb. Rev. Stat. 29901); New Mexico (NMRA, Rule 5-401(D)(2)); North Carolina (N.C.G.S.A. 15A-534(b)); North
Dakota (N.D.R. Crim. P. 46); Oregon (ORS 135.245(3)); Rhode Island (RI ST 12-13-1.3(e)); South
Carolina (S.C. Code 17-15-10for non-capital cases only); South Dakota(SDCL 23A-43-2for noncapital cases only); Tennessee (T. C. A 40-11-116(a)); Vermont (13 V.S.A 7554for misdemeanors
only); Washington (WA ST SUPER CT CR CrR 3.2(b)for non-capital cases only); Wisconsin (W.S.A
969.01(4)); Wyoming (WY RCRP Rule 46.1(c)(1)(B)for non-capital cases only). See generally Cynthia
E. Jones, Give Us Free: Addressing Racial Disparities in Bail Determinants, 16 N.Y.U. J. Leg. & Pub.
Poly 919, 930 (2013).
13
American Bar Associations Standards for Criminal Justice have also evolved to reflect the
importance of the presumption of pretrial release and the need for individualized determinations
before imposing pretrial detention. The Standards advocate for the imposition of the least
restrictive of release conditions necessary to ensure the defendants appearance in court. The
Standards also include guidelines to limit the use of financial conditions for pretrial release. 34
The use of a more dynamic bail scheme, such as that set forth in the federal Bail Reform
Act, not only ensures adherence to constitutional principles of due process and equal protection,
but constitutes better public policy. Individualized determinations, rather than fixed-sum
schemes that unfairly target the poor, are vital to preventing jail overcrowding, avoiding the costs
attendant to incarceration, 35 and providing equal justice for all. Consequently, in light of the
potential harmful consequences of prolonged confinement and the strain that unnecessary
confinement puts on jail conditions, the United States urges that pretrial detention be used only
when necessary, as determined by an appropriate individualized determination.
CONCLUSION
Fundamental and long-standing principles of equal protection squarely prohibit bail
schemes based solely on the ability to pay. Fixed-sum bail schemes do not meet these mandates.
By using a predetermined schedule for bail amounts based solely on the charges a defendant
faces, these schemes do not properly account for other important factors, such as the defendants
potential dangerousness or risk of flight. For these reasons, if the bail system in Clanton is as
Plaintiff describes, the system should not stand.
34
ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, Pretrial Release, Standard 10-1.4 (3d ed. 2007).
35
As noted by the Supreme Court, pretrial detention not only adversely impacts defendants it also
creates significant costs for taxpayers. See Tate, 401 U.S. at 399 (prolonged pretrial detention saddles the
State with the cost of feeding and housing [the defendant] for the period of his imprisonment.).
14
Respectfully submitted,
VANITA GUPTA
Acting Assistant Attorney General
Civil Rights Division
United States Department of Justice
MARK KAPPELHOFF
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
JONATHAN M. SMITH (DC 396578)
Chief
Special Litigation Section
GEORGE L. BECK, JR.
United States Attorney
Middle District of Alabama
Of Counsel:
Lisa Foster (CA 122178)
Director
Access to Justice Initiative
Telephone: (202) 514-7073
lisa.foster3@usdoj.gov
Jennifer Katzman (NY 4388898)

Senior Counsel
Access to Justice
Telephone: (202) 514-7086
jenni.katzman@usdoj.gov
Robert B. Bullock (CA 219942)

Senior Counsel
Access to Justice
Telephone: (202) 514-5324
bob.bullock@usdoj.gov
/s/ Winsome G. Gayle

WINSOME G. GAYLE (DC 479887)
Special Litigation Counsel
Winsome.Gayle@usdoj.gov
/s/ Paul Killebrew
PAUL KILLEBREW (LA 32176)
Paul.Killebrew@usdoj.gov
/s/ Sharon Brett
SHARON BRETT (NY 5090279)
Trial Attorneys
Sharon.Brett@usdoj.gov
Andrew Stanner (DC 979839)

Senior Counsel
Access to Justice
Telephone: (202) 353-9024
andrew.stanner@usdoj.gov
15
/s/Robert G. Anderson
ROBERT G. ANDERSON (MSB 1589)
Assistant United States Attorney
131 Clayton Street
Montgomery, AL 36104
(334) 223-7280
Robert.Anderson@usdoj.gov
Attorneys for the United States of America
_____________________________________________________________________________
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on February 13, 2015, a copy of the foregoing Statement of Interest
was filed electronically. Notice of this filing will be sent by email to all parties by operation of
the Courts electronic filing system. Parties may access this filing through the Courts CM/ECF
System.
/s/ Robert G. Anderson

Assistant United States Attorney
16

Donya Pierce Lawsuit Against Velda City

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Donya Pierce Lawsuit Against Velda City

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI

Case No. __________

MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER

The Named Plaintiff

Velda Citys Arrest and Detention Policies and Practices

No inquiry is made into any of the persons circumstances,

Instead, for example, many other places release

Flowers then confronted the

Id. at 1057 (emphasis

Velda Citys scheme is even more irrational in that it then releases

Velda City Has Simple, Constitutional Alternatives to Jailing the Poor

Some areas have chosen to supplement release on

These Standards, which include

Available at, http://www.napsa.org/publications/2004napsastandards.pdf. The NAPSA Standards provide:

substantial and irreparable.).15

In Ms. Pierces case, further time in jail has disastrous

105 (D.D.C. 2012) (quoting and citing cases).

Overwhelming federal precedent treats the

amelioration of constitutional violations to be in the public interest. See Giovani Carandola v.

See DOJ, National Institute of

Available at, http://static.nicic.gov/UserShared/2014-11-05_final_bail_fundamentals_september_8,_2014.pdf.

likelihood of harm.); Council on American-Islamic Rels. v. Gaubatz, 667 F. Supp. 2d 67, 81

_/s/ Alec Karakatsanis_______________

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Case No. __________

Hon. __________________, District Judge

Case 2:15-cv-00034-MHT-WC Document 26 Filed 02/13/15 Page 1 of 16

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CHRISTY DAWN VARDEN, et al.

STATEMENT OF INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES

Case 2:15-cv-00034-MHT-WC Document 26 Filed 02/13/15 Page 2 of 16

INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES

Case 2:15-cv-00034-MHT-WC Document 26 Filed 02/13/15 Page 3 of 16

Case 2:15-cv-00034-MHT-WC Document 26 Filed 02/13/15 Page 4 of 16

Case 2:15-cv-00034-MHT-WC Document 26 Filed 02/13/15 Page 5 of 16

Case 2:15-cv-00034-MHT-WC Document 26 Filed 02/13/15 Page 6 of 16

Case 2:15-cv-00034-MHT-WC Document 26 Filed 02/13/15 Page 7 of 16

Case 2:15-cv-00034-MHT-WC Document 26 Filed 02/13/15 Page 8 of 16

Case 2:15-cv-00034-MHT-WC Document 26 Filed 02/13/15 Page 9 of 16

necessary in some circumstances including if a court finds a likelihood of future danger to

Case 2:15-cv-00034-MHT-WC Document 26 Filed 02/13/15 Page 10 of 16

Public Policy Weighs Strongly Against Fixed Bail Systems

In addition to being unconstitutional, fixed-bail systems that do not account for a

Case 2:15-cv-00034-MHT-WC Document 26 Filed 02/13/15 Page 11 of 16

Case 2:15-cv-00034-MHT-WC Document 26 Filed 02/13/15 Page 12 of 16

Case 2:15-cv-00034-MHT-WC Document 26 Filed 02/13/15 Page 13 of 16

Case 2:15-cv-00034-MHT-WC Document 26 Filed 02/13/15 Page 14 of 16

Case 2:15-cv-00034-MHT-WC Document 26 Filed 02/13/15 Page 15 of 16

Jennifer Katzman (NY 4388898)

Robert B. Bullock (CA 219942)

/s/ Winsome G. Gayle

Andrew Stanner (DC 979839)

Case 2:15-cv-00034-MHT-WC Document 26 Filed 02/13/15 Page 16 of 16

Attorneys for the United States of America

/s/ Robert G. Anderson

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