1.

Kiok Loy vs. NLRC, 141 SCRA 179 , January 22, 1986 (preconditions)

Facts: In a certification election, the Pambansang Kilusan ng Paggawa (Union for short), a
legitimate labor federation, won and was subsequently certified in a resolution by the Bureau of
Labor Relations as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of
Sweden Ice Cream Plant (Company for short). The Companys motion for reconsideration of the
said resolution was denied.
Thereafter, the Union furnished the Company with two copies of its proposed collective
bargaining agreement but the same were ignored and remained unacted upon by the Company.
Left with no other alternative in its attempt to bring the Company to the bargaining table, the
Union, on filed a Notice of Strike, with the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) on ground of
unresolved economic issues in collective bargaining.
Petitioner Company now maintains that its right to procedural due process has been violated
when it was precluded from presenting further evidence in support of its stand and when its
request for further postponement was denied. Petitioner further contends that the NLRCs
finding of unfair labor practice for refusal to bargain is not supported by law and the evidence
considering that it was only on May 24, 1979 when the Union furnished them with a copy of the
proposed Collective Bargaining Agreement and it was only then that they came to know of the
Unions demands; and finally, that the CBA approved and adopted by the NLRC is unreasonable
and lacks legal basis.
Issue: Whether Sweden Ice Cream is guilty of ULP for unjustified refusal to bargain
Ruling: yes. While it is a mutual obligation of the parties to bargain, the employer, however, is
not under any legal duty to initiate contract negotiation. The mechanics of collective bargaining
is set in motion only when the following jurisdictional preconditions are present, namely, (1)
possession of the status of majority representation of the employees representative in
accordance with any of the means of selection or designation provided for by the Labor Code; (2)
proof of majority representation; and (3) a demand to bargain under Article 251, par. (a) of the
New Labor Code . . . . all of which preconditions are undisputedly present in the instant case.

On January 26, 1989, respondents PIMASUFA and NLU filed a complaint with the Arbitration
Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), charging petitioner with violation
of R.A. No. 6640.
Issue: whether the implementation of R.A. No. 6640 resulted in a wage distortion and whether
such distortion was cured or remedied by the 1987 CBA
Ruling: The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that a wage distortion occurred due to the
implementation of R.A. No. 6640. However, the same were cured or remedied when respondent
PIMASUFA entered into the 1987 CBA with petitioner after the effectivity of R.A. No. 6640. The
1987 CBA increased the monthly salaries of the supervisors by P625.00 and the foremen, by
P475.00, effective May 12, 1987. These increases re-established and broadened the gap, not only
between the supervisors and the foremen, but also between them and the rank-and-file
employees.
Such gap as re-established by virtue of the CBA is more than a substantial compliance with R.A.
No. 6640. The Court held that the Court of Appeals erred in not taking into account the
provisions of the CBA vis--vis the wage.
At this juncture, it must be stressed that a CBA constitutes the law between the parties when
freely and voluntarily entered into. Here, it has not been shown that respondent PIMASUFA was
coerced or forced by petitioner to sign the 1987 CBA. All of its thirteen (13) officers signed the
CBA with the assistance of respondent NLU. They signed it fully aware of the passage of R.A. No.
6640. The duty to bargain requires that the parties deal with each other with open and fair
minds. A sincere endeavor to overcome obstacles and difficulties that may arise, so that
employer-employee relations may be stabilized and industrial strife eliminated, must be
apparent. Respondents cannot invoke the beneficial provisions of the 1987 CBA but disregard
the concessions it voluntary extended to petitioner. The goal of collective bargaining is the
making of agreements that will stabilize business conditions and fix fair standards of working
conditions. Definitely, respondents posture contravenes this goal.
3.

From the over-all conduct of petitioner company in relation to the task of negotiation, there can
be no doubt that the Union has a valid cause to complain against its (Companys) attitude, the
totality of which is indicative of the latters disregard of, and failure to live up to, what is enjoined
by the Labor Codeto bargain in good faith.
In the case at bar, the Companys refusal to make counter proposal if considered in relation to
the entire bargaining process, may indicate bad faith and this is specially true where the Unions
request for a counter proposal is left unanswered. Even during the period of compulsory
arbitration before the NLRC, petitioner Companys approach and attitudestalling the
negotiation by a series of postponements, non-appearance at the hearing conducted, and undue
delay in submitting its financial statements, lead to no other conclusion except that it is
unwilling to negotiate and reach an agreement with the Union.
2. P.I. Manufacturing, Incorporated, vs. P.I. Manufacturing Supervisors and
Foremen Association, 543 SCRA 613 , February 04, 2008
Facts: Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture and sale of household
appliances. On the other hand, respondent (PIMASUFA) is an organization of petitioners
supervisors and foremen, joined in this case by its federation, the National Labor Union (NLU).
On December 10, 1987, the President signed into law (R.A.) No. 66402 providing an increase in
the statutory minimum wage and salary rates of employees and workers in the private sector.
Thereafter, petitioner and respondent PIMASUFA entered into a new Collective Bargaining
Agreement (1987 CBA) whereby the supervisors were granted an increase of P625.00 per month
and the foremen, P475.00 per month. The increases were made retroactive to May 12, 1987, or
prior to the passage of R.A. No. 6640, and every year thereafter until July 26, 1989.

Faculty Association of Mapua Institute of Technology (FAMIT) vs. Court of

Appeals, 524 SCRA 709 , June 15, 2007

Facts: On January 29, 2001, in the 5th CBA negotiation meeting, private respondent MIT
presented the new faculty ranking instrument to petitioner Faculty Association of Mapua
Institute of Technology (FAMIT) to which the latter agreed.
On April 17, 2001, FAMIT and MIT entered into a new CBA effective June 1, 2001.4 It
incorporated the new ranking for the college faculty in Section 8 of Article V which states that, A
new faculty ranking shall be implemented in June 2001. However, there shall be no diminution
in the existing rank and the policy same rank, same pay shall apply.
After a month, MIT called FAMITs attention to what it perceived to be flaws or omissions in the
CBA signed by the parties. But the latter rejected the proposed amendment to the CBA. It
argued that the proposed amendment in the ranking system for the college faculty revised the
point ranges earlier agreed upon by the parties and expands the 19 faculty ranks to 23.
Meanwhile, MIT instituted some changes in the curriculum during the school year 2000-2001
which resulted in changes in the number of hours for certain subjects. Thus, MIT adopted a new
formula for determining the pay rates of the high school faculty. Hence, together with the issue
pertaining to the ranking of the college faculty, FAMIT brought the matter to the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board for mediation.
Issue/s: whether MITs new proposal, regarding faculty ranking and evaluation, lawful and
consistent with the ratified CBA? And
Whether the MITs development of a new pay formula for the high school department, without
the knowledge of FAMIT, lawful and consistent with the ratified CBA?

and responsibilities of USTFU officers.

Ruling: The new point range system proposed by MIT is an unauthorized modification of
Annex C of the 2001 CBA. It is made up of a faculty classification that is substantially different
from the one originally incorporated in the current CBA between the parties. Thus, the proposed
system contravenes the existing provisions of the CBA, hence, violative of the law between the
parties.
ART. 253. Duty to bargain collectively when there exists a collective bargaining
agreement.When there is a collective bargaining agreement, the duty to bargain
collectively shall also mean that neither party shall terminate nor modify such agreement
during its lifetime. However, either party can serve a written notice to terminate or modify the
agreement at least sixty (60) days prior to its expiration date. It shall be the duty of both
parties to keep the status quo and to continue in full force and effect the terms and conditions
of the existing agreement during the 60-day period and/or until a new agreement is reached
by the parties.

Thus, USTFU filed a Manifestation with the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC informing it of the
Decision of the Court but the same was dismissed on the ground that USTFU failed to establish
with clear and convincing evidence that indeed UST was guilty of ULP. The acts of UST which
USTFU complained of as ULP were the following: (1) allegedly calling for a convocation of
faculty members which turned out to be an election of officers for the faculty union; (2)
subsequently dealing with the Gamilla Group in establishing a new CBA; and (3) the assistance
to the Gamilla Group in padlocking the USTFU office.
Issue: whether UST is guilty of unfair labor practice.
Ruling: No. In the instant case, until the decision that the Gamilla Group was not validly elected
into office, there was no reason to believe that the members of the Gamilla Group were not the
validly elected officers and directors of USTFU.

Until a new CBA is executed by and between the parties, they are duty-bound to keep the status
quo and to continue in full force and effect the terms and conditions of the existing agreement.
The law does not provide for any exception nor qualification on which economic provisions of
the existing agreement are to retain its force and effect. Therefore, it must be understood as
encompassing all the terms and conditions in the said agreement.

More important though is the fact that the records are bereft of any evidence to show that the
Mario Group informed the UST of their objections to the election of the Gamilla Group. In fact,
there is even no evidence to show that the scheduled elections that was supposed to be presided
over by the Mario Group ever pushed through. Instead, petitioner filed a complaint with the
med-arbiter praying for the nullification of the election of the Gamilla Group.

The CBA during its lifetime binds all the parties. The provisions of the CBA must be respected
since its terms and conditions constitute the law between the parties. Those who are entitled to
its benefits can invoke its provisions. In the event that an obligation therein imposed is not
fulfilled, the aggrieved party has the right to go to court and ask redress. The CBA is the norm of
conduct between petitioner and private respondent and compliance therewith is mandated by
the express policy of the law.

As such, there was no reason not to recognize the Gamilla Group as the new officers and
directors of USTFU. The UST was obligated to deal with the USTFU, as the recognized
representative of the bargaining unit, through the Gamilla Group. USTs failure to negotiate with
the USTFU would have constituted ULP.

On the second issue, the Court ruled that MIT cannot adopt its unilateral interpretation of terms
in the CBA. It is clear from the provisions of the 2001 CBA that the salary of a high school faculty
member is based on a rate per load and not on a rate per hour basis.
Thus, there is no room for unilateral change of the formula by MIT. Needless to stress, the Labor
Code is specific in enunciating that in case of doubt in the interpretation of any law or provision
affecting labor, such should be interpreted in favor of labor. The appellate court committed a
grave error in the interpretation of the CBA provision and the governing law.

It is not the duty or obligation of respondents to inquire into the validity of the election of the
Gamilla Group. Such issue is properly an intra-union controversy subject to the jurisdiction of
the med-arbiter of the DOLE. Respondents could not have been expected to stop dealing with
the Gamilla Group on the mere accusation of the Mario Group that the former was not validly
elected into office.
The subsequent ruling that the Gamilla Group was not validly elected into office cannot support
petitioners allegation of ULP. As the CA ruled correctly, until the validity of the election of the
Gamilla Group is resolved with finality, respondents could not be faulted for negotiating with
said group.
5.

4.

UST Faculty Union vs. University of Santo Tomas, 584 SCRA 648 , April
07, 2009

Facts: University of Santo Tomas Faculty Union (USTFU) wrote a letter to all its members
informing them of a General Assembly (GA). The letter contained an agenda for the GA which
included an election of officers. The then incumbent president of the USTFU was Atty. Eduardo
J. Mario, Jr.
An election was conducted among those present, and Gil Gamilla and other faculty members
(Gamilla Group) were elected as the president and officers, respectively, of the union. Such
election was communicated to the UST administration. Thus, there were two (2) groups claiming
to be the USTFU: the Gamilla Group and the group led by Atty. Mario, Jr. (Mario Group).

Union of Filipro Employees-Drug, Food and Allied Industries UnionsKilusang Mayo Uno vs. Nestl Philippines, Incorporated, 547 SCRA 323 ,
March 03, 2008

Facts: UFE-DFA-KMU was the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file
employees of Nestl belonging to the latters Alabang and Cabuyao plants.
On 4 April 2001, as the existing CBA was to end on 5 June 2001, UFE-DFA-KMU informed
Nestl of their intent to open new Collective Bargaining Negotiation for the year 2001-2004
x x x as early as June 2001.
In response thereto, Nestl informed them that it was also preparing its own counter-proposal
and proposed ground rules to govern the impending conduct of the CBA negotiations.

The Mario Group then filed a complaint for ULP against the UST praying for the nullification of
the election of the Gamilla Group as officers of the USTFU. On December 3, 1996, a CBA was
entered into by the Gamilla Group and the UST which superseded an existing CBA entered into
by the UST and USTFU which was intended for the period of June 1, 1993 to May 31, 1998.

On 29 May 2001, in another letter to the UFE-DFA-KMU (Cabuyao Division only), Nestl
reiterated its stance that unilateral grants, one-time company grants, company-initiated policies
and programs, which include, but are not limited to the Retirement Plan, Incidental Straight
Duty Pay and Calling Pay Premium, are by their very nature not proper subjects of CBA
negotiations and therefore shall be excluded therefrom.

On February 11, 1997, the med-arbiter issued a Resolution, declaring the election of the Gamilla
group as null and void and ordering that this group cease and desist from performing the duties

Conciliation proceedings proved ineffective,the UFE-DFA-KMU filed a Notice of Strike

complaining, in essence, of a bargaining deadlock pertaining to economic issues, i.e., retirement

(plan), panel composition, costs and attendance, and CBA. and another Notice of Strike, this
time predicated on Nestls alleged unfair labor practices, that is, bargaining in bad faith by
setting pre-conditions in the ground rules and/or refusing to include the issue of the Retirement
Plan in the CBA negotiations.

to the day immediately following such date and if agreed thereafter, the effectivity depends on
the agreement of the parties. On the other hand, the law is silent as to the retroactivity of a CBA
arbitral award or that granted not by virtue of the mutual agreement of the parties but by
intervention of the government. In the absence of a CBA, the Secretarys determination of the
date of retroactivity as part of his discretionary powers over arbitral awards shall control.

Issue: whether Nestls refusal to bargain on a very important CBA economic provision
constitutes unfair labor practice.
Ruling: Nestle never refused to bargain collectively with UFE-DFA-KMU. The corporation
simply wanted to exclude the Retirement Plan from the issues to be taken up during CBA
negotiations, on the postulation that such was in the nature of a unilaterally granted benefit.
The purpose of collective bargaining is the reaching of an agreement resulting in a contract
binding on the parties; but the failure to reach an agreement after negotiations have continued
for a reasonable period does not establish a lack of good faith. The statutes invite and
contemplate a collective bargaining contract, but they do not compel one. The duty to bargain
does not include the obligation to reach an agreement.
The crucial question, therefore, of whether or not a party has met his statutory duty to bargain in
good faith typically turns on the facts of the individual case. There is no per se test of good faith
in bargaining. Good faith or bad faith is an inference to be drawn from the facts. To some degree,
the question of good faith may be a question of credibility. The effect of an employers or a
unions individual actions is not the test of good-faith bargaining, but the impact of all such
occasions or actions, considered as a whole, and the inferences fairly drawn therefrom
collectively may offer a basis for the finding of the NLRC.
For a charge of unfair labor practice to prosper, it must be shown that Nestl was motivated by ill
will, bad faith, or fraud, or was oppressive to labor, or done in a manner contrary to morals,
good customs, or public policy, and, of course, that social humiliation, wounded feelings, or
grave anxiety resulted x x x in disclaiming unilateral grants as proper subjects in their collective
bargaining negotiations. While the law makes it an obligation for the employer and the
employees to bargain collectively with each other, such compulsion does not include the
commitment to precipitately accept or agree to the proposals of the other. All it contemplates is
that both parties should approach the negotiation with an open mind and make reasonable effort
to reach a common ground of agreement.
6.

MERALCO V. QUISUMBING GR. NO. 127598 JANUARY 27, 1999

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J:.

FACTS: The court directed the parties to execute a CBA incorporating the terms among which
are the following modifications among others: Wages: PhP 1,900 for 1995-1996; Retroactivity:
December 28, 1996-Dec. 1999, etc. Dissatisfied, some members of the union filed a motion for
intervention/reconsideration. Petitioner warns that is the wage increase of Php2,000.00 per
month as ordered is allowed, it would pass the cost covering such increase to the consumers
through an increase rate of electricity. On the retroactivity of the CBA arbitral award, the parties
reckon the period as when retroaction shall commence.
ISSUE: Whether retroactivity of arbitral awards shall commence at such time as granted by
Secretary.
RULING: In St. Lukes Medical vs Torres, a deadlock developed during CBA negotiations
between management unions. The Secretary assumed jurisdiction and ordered the retroaction of
the CBA to the date of expiration of the previous CBS. The Court ratiocinated thus: In the
absence of a specific provision of law prohibiting retroactive of the effectivity of arbitral awards
issued by the Secretary pursuant to article 263(g) of the Labor Code, public respondent is
deemed vested with the plenary and discretionary powers to determine the effectivity thereof.
In general, a CBA negotiated within six months after the expiration of the existing CBA retroacts

7.

RIVERA V. ESPIRITU
GR. NO. 135547 JANUARY 23, 2002
QUISUMBING, J:

FACTS: PAL was suffering from a difficult financial situation in 1998. It was faced with
bankruptcy and was forced to adopt a rehabilitation plan and downsized its labor force by more
than 1/3. PALEA (PAL Employees Association) went on a four-day strike to protest
retrenchment measures in July 1998. PAL ceased operations on Sep 23, 1998.

PALEA board again wrote the President on Sep 28, 1998. Among others, it proposed the
suspension of the PAL-PALEA CBA for a period of ten years, subject to certain conditions.
PALEA members accepted such terms through a referendum on Oct 2, 1998. PAL resumed
domestic operations on Oct 7, 1998. Seven officers and members of PALEA filed instant petition
to annul the Sep 27, 1998 agreement entered into between PAL and PALEA.

ISSUE: Whether negotiations may be suspended for 10 years.

RULING: YES. CBA negotiations may be suspended for 10 years.

The assailed PAL-PALEA agreement was the result of voluntary collective bargaining
negotiations undertaken in the light of the severe financial situation faced by the employer, with
the peculiar and unique intention of not merely promoting industrial peace at PAL, but
preventing the latters closure.
There is no conflict between said agreement and Article 253-A of the Labor Code. CBA under
Article 253-A of the Labor Code has a two-fold purpose. One is to promote industrial stability
and predictability. Inasmuch as the agreement sought to promote industrial peace, at the PAL
during its rehabilitation, said agreement satisfied the first purpose of said article. The other
purpose is to assign specific timetable, wherein negotiations become a matter of right and
requirement. Nothing in Article 253-A prohibits the parties from waiving or suspending the
mandatory timetable and agreeing on the remedies to enforce the same.

8.

PICOP RESOURCES, INC. V. TANECA

GR NO. 160828 AUGUST 9, 2010

MENDOZA, J:

FACTS: Respondents were regular rank-and-file employees of PRI and bona fide members
of Nagkahiusang Mamumuo sa PRI Southern Philippines Federation of Labor (NAMAPRISPFL), which is the collective bargaining agent for the rank-and-file employees of petitioner PRI.
PRI has a collective bargaining agreement with NAMAPRI-SPFL for a period of five years from
May 22, 1995 until May 22, 2000. The CBA contained the following union security provisions:

Applying the same provision, it can be said that while it is incumbent for the employer to
continue to recognize the majority status of the incumbent bargaining agent even after the
expiration of the freedom period, they could only do so when no petition for certification election
was filed. The reason is, with a pending petition for certification, any such agreement entered
into by management with a labor organization is fraught with the risk that such a labor union
may not be chosen thereafter as the collective bargaining representative. The provision for status
quo is conditioned on the fact that no certification election was filed during the freedom period.
Any other view would render nugatory the clear statutory policy to favor certification election as
the means of ascertaining the true expression of the will of the workers as to which labor
organization would represent them.

Article II- Union Security and Check-Off

Section 6. Maintenance of membership.
6.1 All employees within the appropriate bargaining unit who are members of the UNION at the
time of the signing of this AGREEMENT shall, as a condition of continued employment by the
COMPANY, maintain their membership in the UNION in good standing during the effectivity of
this AGREEMENT.
6.3 The COMPANY, upon the written request of the UNION and after compliance with the
requirements of the New Labor Code, shall give notice of termination of services of any employee
who shall fail to fulfill the condition provided in Section 6.1 and 6.2 of this Article
Atty. Fuentes sent a letter to the management of PRI demanding the termination of employees
who allegedly campaigned for, supported and signed the Petition for Certification Election of the
Federation of Free Workers Union (FFW) during the effectivity of the CBA. NAMAPRI-SPFL
considered said act of campaigning for and signing the petition for certification election of FFW
as an act of disloyalty and a valid basis for termination for a cause in accordance with its
Constitution and By-Laws, and the terms and conditions of the CBA, specifically Article II,
Sections 6.1 and 6.2 on Union Security Clause.
On October 16, 2000, PRI served notices of termination for causes to employees whom
NAMAPRIL-SPFL sought to be terminated on the ground of acts of disloyalty committed
against it when respondents allegedly supported and signed the Petition for Certification
Election of FFW before the freedom period during the effectivity of the CBA. A Notice dated
October 21, 2000 was also served on the DOLE, Caraga Region.
Respondents argued that at the time NAMAPRI-SPFL demanded their termination, it was no
longer the bargaining representative of the rank-and-file workers of PRI, because the CBA had
already expired on May 22, 2000. Hence, there could be no justification in PRIs act of
dismissing respondents due to acts of disloyalty.
Citing Article 253 of the Labor Code, PRI contends that as parties to the CBA, they are enjoined
to keep the status quo and continue in full force and effect the terms and conditions of the
existing CBA during the 60-day period and/or until a new agreement is reached by the parties.
ISSUE: Whether the existing CBA can be given its full force and effect in all its terms and
condition including its union security clause, even beyond the 5-year period when no new CBA
has yet been entered into.

RULING: No. Petitioner's reliance on Article 253 is misplaced. Article 256 of the Labor
Code provides that the employer shall continue to recognize the majority status of the incumbent
bargaining agent where no petition for certification election is filed at the expiration of the
freedom period.

Moreover, the last sentence of Article 253 which provides for automatic renewal pertains only to
the economic provisions of the CBA, and does not include representational aspect of the CBA. An
existing CBA cannot constitute a bar to a filing of a petition for certification election. When there
is a representational issue, the statusquo provision in so far as the need to await the creation of a
new agreement will not apply.

9.

FVCLU V. SANAMA
G.R. NO. 176249 NOVEMBER 27, 2009
BRION, J.:

FACTS: FVCLU-PTGWO, the recognized bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of the
FVC Philippines, renegotiated their CBA extending the original five-year period of the CBA by
four (4) months. Nine days before the expiration of the originally-agreed five-year CBA term, the
respondent SamaSamang Nagkakaisang Manggagawa sa FVC-Solidarity of Independent and
General Labor Organizations filed before DOLE a petition for certification election for the same
rank-and-file unit covered by the FVCLU CBA. FVCLU moved to dismiss the petition on the
ground that the certification election petition was filed outside the freedom period or outside of
the 60 days before the expiration of the CBA. The Med-Arbiter dismissed the petition on the
ground that it was filed outside the 60-day period counted from the day of the expiration of the
amended CBA. On appeal, DOLE Secretary set aside the ruling of the Med-Arbiter and ordered
the conduct of a certification election in the company. The DOLE Acting Secretary granted the
motion for reconsideration of petitioners. On appeal, CA ruled that while the parties may
renegotiate the other provisions of the CBA, this should not affect the five-year representation
aspect of the original CBA. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether extension of the CBA term also changed the unions exclusive bargaining
representation status and effectively moved the reckoning point of the 60-day freedom period
from January 30, 2003 to May 30, 2003.
RULING: While SANAMA-SIGLO has manifested its abandonment of its challenge to the
exclusive bargaining representation status of FVCLU-PTGWO, the SC will resolve the question of
law raised in the case.
Article 253-A (1) of the Labor Code provides that any Collective Bargaining Agreement that the
parties may enter into, shall, insofar as the representation aspect is concerned, be for a term of
five (5) years. No petition questioning the majority status of the incumbent bargaining agent
shall be entertained and no certification election shall be conducted by the Department of Labor
and Employment outside of the sixty day period immediately before the date of expiry of such
five-year term of the Collective Bargaining Agreement. All other provisions of the Collective
Bargaining Agreement shall be renegotiated not later than three (3) years after its execution.

This Labor Code provision is implemented through Book V, Rule VIII of the Rules Implementing
the Labor Code which states that the Med-Arbiter may dismiss the petition when the it was filed
before or after the freedom period of a duly registered collective bargaining agreement; provided
that the sixty-day period based on the original collective bargaining agreement shall not be
affected by any amendment, extension or renewal of the collective bargaining agreement.
By express provision of the above-quoted Article 253-A, the exclusive bargaining status cannot
go beyond five years and the representation status is a legal matter not for the workplace parties
to agree upon. In other words, despite an agreement for a CBA with a life of more than five
years, either as an original provision or by amendment, the bargaining unions exclusive
bargaining status is effective only for five years and can be challenged within sixty (60) days
prior to the expiration of the CBAs first five years.

10. ELISCO-ELIROL V. NORIEL

G.R. NO. L-41955 DECEMBER 29, 1977
TEEHANKEE, J.:

FACTS: Elisco-Elirol Labor Union (NAFLU) negotiated and executed a CBA with Elizalde Steel
Consolidated Inc. However, Elisco-Elirol then was not yet a registered union. In order to be able
to execute the CBA, they had the union registered, which was granted. They likewise moved to
disaffiliate themselves with their mother union, NAFLU. Elizalde, however, refused to recognize
them as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent and it dismissed the officers of the union
because of the union security clause in the CBA. Elisco-Elirol filed a complaint for unfair labor
practice with the BLR. The BLR dismissed.
ISSUE: Whether Elisco-Elirol Labor Union is the sole and exclusive bargaining agent

RULING: YES. The error of BLR is not perceiving that the employees and members of the local
union did not form a new union but merely registered the local union as was their right.
Petitioner Elisco-Elirol Labor Union-NAFLU, consisting of employees and members of the local
union was the principal party to the agreement. NAFLU as the mother union" in participating in
the execution of the bargaining agreement with respondent company acted merely as agent of
the local union, which remained the basic unit of the association existing principally and freely to
serve the common interest of all its members, including the freedom to disaffiliate when the
circumstances so warranted as in the present case.
"(T)he locals are separate and distinct units primarily designed to secure and maintain an
equality of bargaining power between the employer and their employee-members in the
economic struggle for the fruits of the joint productive effort of labor and capital; and the
association of the locals into the national union (as PAFLU) was in furtherance of the same end.
These associations are consensual entities capable of entering into such legal relations with their
members. The essential purpose was the affiliation of the local unions into a common enterprise
to increase by collective action the common bargaining power in respect of the terms and
conditions of labor. Yet the locals remained the basic units of association, free to serve their own
and the common interest of all, subject to the restraints imposed by the Constitution and ByLaws of the Association, and free also to renounce the affiliation for mutual welfare upon the
terms laid down in the agreement which brought it into existence."
11. ASSOCIATED LABOR UNIONS-VIMCONTU, THE CEBU OIL EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION, represented by its Acting President, MIGUEL C.
ALIVIADO, and THE MOBIL DAVAO/ COTABATO CHAPTER-ALU,
represented by its President, DAVID C. ONDEVILLA vs. THE NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC), MOBIL OIL PHILIPPINES,

INC., JEAN PIERRE BAILLEUX, CALTEX PHILIPPINES, INC., and MOBIL

PHILIPPINES, INC. [G.R. No. 74841 December 20, 1991]

Facts: A collective bargaining agreement was entered into between the Associated Labor
Unions-VIMCONTU and Mobil Oil Philippines, Inc. for a period of three years. During the
lifetime of the CBA, On August 5, 1983, Mobil Oil Philippines, Inc. sent letters to the employees,
notifying of (sic) the termination of their services because of the sale of the respondent firm to
Caltex Philippines, Inc. Complainant employees accepted their checks for separation pay and
signed quit-claims under protest and subject to the outcome of this case, a complaint for unfair
labor practice and breach of contract filed in the NLRC against MOPI and Caltex. LA dismissed
the case and affirmed by the NLRC on the ground that the CBA was not violated by MOPI as the
record shows and from the admission of complainants-union that the latter has (sic) knowledge
of the impending sales and closure of the firm in a series of negotiations/meetings and that as
between complainants and respondent MOPI, the situation is one of closure and not
redundancy, and therefore, Sec. 3 of Article XI is not applicable.

Issue: Whether labor contracts (CBA) enforceable against transferee of enterprise?

Ruling: No. We stated the rule that unless expressly assumed, labor contracts such as
employment contracts and collective bargaining agreements are not enforceable
against a transferee of an enterprise, labor contracts being in personam, thus binding only
between the parties. 26 As a general rule, there is no law requiring a bona fide purchaser of the
assets of an on-going concern to absorb in its employ the employees of the latter. However,
although the purchaser of the assets or enterprise is not legally bound to absorb in its employ the
employees of the seller of such assets or enterprise, the parties are reliable to the employees if
the transaction between the parties is colored or clothed with bad faith. The sale or disposition
must be motivated by good faith as an element of exemption from liability.

Other Syllabus:
Termination of employment due to sale of respondent firm.
The issues presently raised have already been passed upon and resolved by this Court in another
almost identical case, Mobil Employees Association, et al. vs. NLRC, et al.,m a petition which
challenged the decision dated 6 April 1987 of the NLRC Second Division, upholding a labor
arbiter's finding that MOPI was not guilty of unfair labor practice and illegal dismissal and that
the termination was accused by cessation of MOPI's business operations in the country.

Requirements under Art. 284 of the LGC as it existed in 1983 provided as follows:
Art. 284. Closure of establishment and reduction of personnel. The employer may also
terminate the employment of any employee due to the installation of labor-saving devices,

redundancy, retrenchment top prevent losses or the closing or cessation of operation of the
establishment or undertaking, unless the closing is for the purpose of circumventing the
provisions of this title by serving a written notice on the workers and the Ministry of Labor
and Employment at least one (1) month before the intended date thereof. In case of termination
due to the installation of labor-saving devices or redundany, the worker affected thereby shall be
entitled to a separation pay equivalent to least his one (1) month pay or to at least one (1) month
pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. In case of retrenchment to prevent losses
and in cases of closure or cessation of operations of establishment or undertaking not due to
serious business losses or financial reverses, the separation pay shall be equivalent to one (1)
month pay or least one-half () month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. A
fraction of at least six (6) months shall be considered one (1) whole year.

12. BENGUET CONSOLIDATED, INC. vs.BCI EMPLOYEES and WORKERS

UNION-PAFLU, PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR UNIONS,
CIPRIANO CID and JUANITO GARCIA [G.R. No. L-24711, April 30, 1968]
Facts: The Benguet-Balatoc Workers Union (BBWU), for and in behalf of all Benguet
Consolidated, Inc (BENGUET) employees in its mines and milling establishment located at
Balatoc, Antamok and Acupan, Mt. Province, entered into a Collective Bargaining Contract
(CONTRACT) with BENGUET. The CONTRACT was stipulated to be effective for a period of 41/2 years. It likewise embodied a No-Strike, No-Lockout clause. 3 years later, a certification
election was conducted by the Department of Labor among all the rank and file employees of
BENGUET in the same collective bargaining units. BCI EMPLOYEES & WORKERS UNION
(UNION) won over BBWU. Later on, the UNION filed a notice of strike against BENGUET.
UNION members who were BENGUET employees in the mining camps at Acupan, Antamok and
Balatoc, went on strike. The strike was attended by violence, some of the workers and executives
of the BENGUET were prevented from entering the premises and some of the properties of the
BENGUET were damaged as a result of the strike. Eventually, the parties agreed to end the
dispute. BENGUET and UNION executed the AGREEMENT. PAFLU placed its conformity
thereto. About a year later, a collective bargaining contract was finally executed between
UNION-PAFLU and BENGUET.
Meanwhile, BENGUET sued UNION, PAFLU and their Presidents to recover the amount the
former incurred for the repair of the damaged properties resulting from the strike. BENGUET
also argued that the UNION violated the CONTRACT which has a stipulation not to strike during
the effectivity thereof.
Defendants unions and their presidents defended that: (1) they were not bound by the
CONTRACT which BBWU, the defeated union, had executed with BENGUET; (2) the strike was
due, among others, to unfair labor practices of BENGUET; and (3) the strike was lawful and in
the exercise of the legitimate rights of UNION-PAFLU under Republic Act 875.
The trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground that the CONTRACT, particularly the NoStrike clause, did not bind defendants. BENGUET interposed the present appeal.
Issue: Whether the Collective Bargaining Contract executed between Benguet and BBWU
automatically bind UNION-PAFLU upon its certification as sole bargaining representative of all
BENGUET employees three years after?
Ruling: No. New collective bargaining agent does not automatically assume all personal
undertakings of deposed union. Substitutionary doctrine doctrine, held, inapplicable. Where the
defendants are not signatories to the contract, nor are they participants thereof, there can be no
liability on their own.
Syllabus:
Principle of Substitution.

This principle, formulated by the NLRB 7 as its initial compromise solution to the problem facing
it when there occurs a shift in employees' union allegiance after the execution of a bargaining
contract with their employer, merely states that even during the effectivity of a collective
bargaining agreement executed between employer and employees thru their agent, the
employees can change said agent but the contract continues to bind them up to its expiration
date. They may bargain however for the shortening of said expiration date.
Under subsitutionary doctrine, employees can not renege on their collective
bargaining contract.
In formulating the "substitutionary" doctrine, the only consideration involved was the
employees' interest in the existing bargaining agreement. The agent's interest never entered the
picture.
the "substitutionary" doctrine only provides that the employees cannot revoke the validly
executed collective bargaining contract with their employer by the simple expedient of changing
their bargaining agent. And it is in the light of this that the phrase "said new agent would have to
respect said contract" must be understood. It only means that the employees, thru their new
bargaining agent, cannot renege on their collective bargaining contract, except of course to
negotiate with management for the shortening thereof.
New collective bargaining agent does not automatically assume all personal
undertakings of deposed union. Substitutionary doctrine doctrine, held,
inapplicable.
The "substitutionary" doctrine, therefore, cannot be invoked to support the contention that a
newly certified collective bargaining agent automatically assumes all the personal undertakings
like the no-strike stipulation here in the collective bargaining agreement made by the
deposed union. When BBWU bound itself and its officers not to strike, it could not have validly
bound also all the other rival unions existing in the bargaining units in question. BBWU was the
agent of the employees, not of the other unions which possess distinct personalities. To consider
UNION contractually bound to the no-strike stipulation would therefore violate the legal maxim
that res inter alios nec prodest nec nocet.
Liability of labor union or board or committee members for non-fullfillment of
collective bargaining contract.
Under Art. 1704 of the Civil Code, in collective bargaining, the labor union or members of the
board or committee signing the contract shall be liable for non-fulfillment thereof. Where the
defendants are not signatories to the contract, nor are they participants thereof, there can be no
liability on their own.
No liability for damages of labor union, officers or members, in absence of clear
proof; Rule of vicarious liability, Repealed.
The rule now is that for a labor union and/or its officers and members to be liable, there must be
clear proof of actual participation in, or authorization or ratification of the illegal acts. The rule
of vicarious liability has since the passage of Republic Act 875 been expressly legilated out.
Agency; Everthing binding on agent duly authorized binds principal, not vice-vera.
Everything that is binding on a duly authorized agent, acting as such, is binding on the
prinicipal; not vice-versa, unless there is a mutual agency, or unless the agent expressly binds
himself of the party with whom he contracts, Art. 1897, Civil Cpde. As here, BBWU the previous
agent was the one that expressly bound itself to the other party, Benguet, Union, the new agent
did not assume the undertaking of BBWU.
13.

NUWHRAIN v. NLRC [NOTE: ETONG SUSUNOD NA KASO E

NAKAKALITO. BAKIT? HINDI TUGMAG YUNG TITLE SA CITATION.
DINIGEST KO NA LANG YUNG NAKALAGAY NA TITLE (NUWHRAIN v.
NLRC) SAKA YUNG KASO NA TUGMA SA CITATION (Victoriano v.
Elizalde Roper Workers Union)]
NATIONAL UNION OF WORKERS IN HOTELS, RESTAURANTS AND
ALLIED INDUSTRIESMANILA PAVILLION HOTEL CHAPTER v.

NATIONAL
LABOR
RELATIONS
COMMISSION
and
ACESITE
PHILIPPINES HOTEL CORPORATION [G.R. No. 179402, September 30,
2008]
Facts: National Union of Workers in Hotels, Restaurants and Allied Industries-Manila Pavilion
Hotel (NUWHRAIN)is a legitimate labor organization composed of rank-and-file employees of
the Manila Pavillion Hotel, while respondent Acesite Philippines Hotel Corporation is the owner
and operator of said Hotel. The Hotel entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement with HIMANILA PAVILION HOTEL LABOR UNION (HIMPHLU), the exclusive bargaining agent of the
rank-and-file employees of the Hotel. During the 60-day freedom period which preceded the
expiration of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, HIMPHLU negotiated the extension of the
provisions of the existing Collective Bargaining Agreement for two years which the parties
agreed and the employees ratified. The same was allowed by DOLE to have it registered.
NUWHRAIN was accorded by the Labor Relations Division of the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE) the status of a legitimate labor organization and the former filed a petition
for certification election.
After the lapse of the 60-day freedom period, but pending the disposition of the
Petition for Certification Election filed by NUWHRAIN, HIMPHLU demanded the hotel to
dismiss 36 employees following their explusion from HIMPHLU for alleged acts of disloyalty and
violation
of its Constitution, by-laws and CBA, paticularly the union securtiy clause. The said employees
were alleged to have joined NUWHRAIN. They were sent notices for explanation.
Section 2, Article IV of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, which provided for a union security
clause that reads:
Section
2.
DISMISSAL
PURSUANT
TO
UNION
SECURITY
CLAUSE. Accordingly, failure to join the UNION within the period specified
in the immediately preceding section or failure to maintain membership
with the UNION in good standing either through resignation or expulsion
from the UNION in accordance with the UNIONs Constitution and by-laws
due to disloyalty, joining another union or non-payment of UNION
dues shall be a ground for the UNION to demand the dismissal from
the HOTEL of the employee concerned. The demand shall be
accompanied by the UNIONs investigation report and the HOTEL
shall act accordingly subject to existing laws and jurisprudence
on the matter, provided, however, that the UNION shall hold the
HOTEL free and harmless from any and all liabilities that may
arise should the dismissed employee question in any manner the
dismissal. The HOTEL shall not, however, be compelled to act on
any such UNION demand if made within a period of sixty (60)
days prior to the expiry date of this agreement. (Emphasis provided)
NUWHRAIN proceeded to file a Notice of Strike before the National Conciliation and Mediation
Board (NCMB) on the ground of unfair labor practice wherein the Secretary of Labor intervened
and certified the case for compulsory arbitration with the NLRC. NLRC decided that there was
no unfair labor practice. NUWHRAIN appealed.
In the meantime, HIMPHLU won in thethe Certification Election for regular rank and file
employees. The CA upheld the Resolution of the NLRC. It declared that the Hotel had acted
prudently when it issued the Notices to the 36 employees after HIMPHLU demanded their
dismissal. It clarified that these Notices did not amount to the termination of the employees
concerned but merely sought their explanation on why the union security clause should not be
applied to them. Hence, the present Petition.
Issue: Whether the dismissal of the subject employees in accordance with CBAs Union
Security Clause deemed unfair labor practice?

Ruling: No. The law allows stipulations for union shop and closed shop as a means of
encouraging workers to join and support the union of their choice in the protection of their
rights and interests vis--vis the employer. the dismissal of an employee by the company
pursuant to a labor unions demand in accordance with a union security agreement does not
constitute unfair labor practice.
Syllabus:
Collective Bargaining Agreements; Union Security Clause; Closed Shop Clause;
Maintenance of Membership Clause.
Union security is a generic term which is applied to and comprehends closed
shop, union shop, maintenance of membership or any other form of
agreement which imposes upon employees the obligation to acquire or retain
union membership as a condition affecting employment. Article 248(e) of the Labor
Code recognizes theeffectivity of a union shop clause:
Art. 248. Unfair labor practices of employers.
(e) To discriminate in regard to wages, hours of work, and other terms and
conditions of employment in order to encourage or discourage membership
in any labor organization. Nothing in this Code or in any other law
shall prevent the parties from requiring membership in a
recognized collective bargaining agent as a condition for
employment, except of those employees who are already
members of another union at the time of the signing of the
collective bargaining agreement x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)

Union Shop Clause.

The law allows stipulations for union shop and closed shop as a means of
encouraging workers to join and support the union of their choice in the protection
of their rights and interests vis--vis the employer. By thus promoting unionism,
workers are able to negotiate with management on an even playing field and with more
persuasiveness than if they were to individually and separately bargain with the
employer. In Villar v. Inciong, this Court held that employees have the right to disaffiliate from
their union and form a new organization of their own; however, they must suffer the
consequences of their separation from the union under the security clause of the Collective
Bargaining Agreement.

Unfair Labor Practice; Termination of Employment.

This Court, in Malayang Samahan ng Manggagawa sa M. Greenfield v. Ramos clearly stated
the general rule: the dismissal of an employee by the company pursuant to a labor
unions demand in accordance with a union security agreement does not constitute
unfair labor practice. An employer is not considered guilty of unfair labor practice if it merely
complied in good faith with the request of the certified union for the dismissal of employees
expelled from the union pursuant to the union security clause in the Collective Bargaining
Agreement. In the case at bar, there is even less possibility of sustaining a finding of guilt for
unfair labor practice where respondent did not dismiss the 36 employees, despite the insistence
of HIMPHLU, the sole bargaining agent for the rank and file employees of the Hotel, on the basis
of the union security clause of the Collective Bargaining Agreement. The only act attributed to
the respondent is its issuance of the Notices which, contrary to being an unfair labor practice,
even afforded the employees involved a chance to be heard.

There is a presumtion of constitutionality in statues.

Evidence; Affidavits.
The members of NUWHRAIN would owe their loyalty to their union, a natural bias which
somewhat puts into question their credibility as witnesses, especially since the success of this
case would also redound to their benefit. The fact that six members of the union signed a
single statement, instead of each member presenting their sincere and individual
narrations of events, gives the impression that it was signed in a perfunctory
manner and motivated by a sense of union solidarity. The self-serving statement signed
by six of NUWHRAINs members have very little weight, even if made under oath, absent any
other independent evidence which indicates that the officers of the respondent and the Hotel
made such hostile and coercive utterances that tend to interfere or influence the employees
exercise of the right to self-organization.

BENJAMIN VICTORIANO vs.ELIZALDE ROPE WORKERS' UNION and

ELIZALDE ROPE FACTORY, INC., defendants, ELIZALDE ROPE
WORKERS' UNION [G.R. No. L-25246 September 12, 1974]

Facts: Plaintiff is a member of the Elizalde Rope Workers Union who later resigned from his
affiliation to the said union by reason of the prohibition of his religion for its members to
become affiliated with any labor organization. The union has subsisting closed shop agreement
in their collective bargaining agreement with their employer that all permanent employees of the
company must be a member of the union and later was amended by Republic Act No. 3350 with
the provision stating "but such agreement shall not cover members of any religious sects which
prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor organization". By his resignation, the
union wrote a letter to the company to separate the plaintiff from the service after which he was
informed by the company that unless he makes a satisfactory arrangement with the union he will
be dismissed from the service. The union contends that RA 3350 impairs obligation of contract
stipulated in their CBA and discriminatorily favors religious sects in providing exemption to
be affiliated with anylabor unions.

Issue: WON RA 3350 impairs the right to form association?

Ruling: No. Republic Act 3350 providing for exemption from close shop agreements does not
violate the impairment of contract clause of the constitution. Freedom of religion takes
precedent over the right against the impairment of contracts.

All presumptions are indulged in favor of constitutionality; one who attacks a statute, alleging
unconstitutionality must prove its invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt, that a law may work
hardship does not render it unconstitutional; that if any reasonable basis may be conceived
which supports the statute, it will be upheld, and the challenger must negate all possible bases;
that the courts are not concerned with the wisdom, justice, policy, or expediency of a statute; and
that a liberal interpretation of the constitution in favor of the constitutionality of legislation
should be adopted.

Right to form or join association; An employee has the right to join or not join a
labor union.
What the Constitution and the Industrial Peace Act recognize and guarantee is the "right" to
form or join associations. Notwithstanding the different theories propounded by the different
schools of jurisprudence regarding the nature and contents of a "right", it can be safely said that
whatever theory one subscribes to, a right comprehends at least two broad notions, namely: first,
liberty or freedom, i.e., the absence of legal restraint, whereby an employee may act for himself
without being prevented by law; and second, power, whereby an employee may, as he pleases,
join or refrain from Joining an association. It is, therefore, the employee who should decide for
himself whether he should join or not an association; and should he choose to join, he himself
makes up his mind as to which association he would join; and even after he has joined, he still
retains the liberty and the power to leave and cancel his membership with said organization at
any time. It is clear, therefore, that the right to join a union includes the right to abstain from
joining any union.

Impairment of Contracts; Prohibition against Impairment of Contracts is not

absolute.
The right to refrain from joining labor organizations recognized by Section 3 of the Industrial
Peace Act is, however, limited. The legal protection granted to such right to refrain from joining
is withdrawn by operation of law, where a labor union and an employer have agreed on a closed
shop, by virtue of which the employer may employ only member of the collective bargaining
union, and the employees must continue to be members of the union for the duration of the
contract in order to keep their jobs. Thus Section 4 (a) (4) of the Industrial Peace Act, before its
amendment by Republic Act No. 3350, provides that although it would be an unfair labor
practice for an employer "to discriminate in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term
or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization"
the employer is, however, not precluded "from making an agreement with a labor organization to
require as a condition of employment membership therein, if such labor organization is the
representative of the employees". By virtue, therefore, of a closed shop agreement, before the
enactment of Republic Act No. 3350, if any person, regardless of his religious beliefs, wishes to
be employed or to keep his employment, he must become a member of the collective bargaining
union. Hence, the right of said employee not to join the labor union is curtailed and withdrawn.

Syllabus: (medyo madami to. Mahaba din yung kaso e. sama ko lang ha baka may matanong e)
Test for determining whether statute violates the impairment of contract.

In order to determine whether legislation unconstitutionally impairs contract obligations, no

unchanging yardstick, applicable at all times and under all circumstances, by which the validity
of each statute may be measured or determined, has been fashioned, but every case must be
determined upon its own circumstances. Legislation impairing the obligation of contracts can be
sustained when it is enacted for the promotion of the general good of the people, and when the
means adopted to secure that end are reasonable. Both the end sought and the means adopted
must be legitimate, i.e., within the scope of the reserved power of the state construed in harmony
with the constitutional limitation of that power.

Republic Act 3350 providing for exemption from close shop agreements does not
violate the impairment of contract clause of the constition.
What then was the purpose sought to be achieved by Republic Act No. 3350? Its purpose was to
insure freedom of belief and religion, and to promote the general welfare by preventing
discrimination against those members of religious sects which prohibit their members from
joining labor unions, confirming thereby their natural, statutory and constitutional right to work,
the fruits of which work are usually the only means whereby they can maintain their own life and
the life of their dependents. It cannot be gainsaid that said purpose is legitimate.

It cannot be denied, furthermore, that the means adopted by the Act to achieve that purpose
exempting the members of said religious sects from coverage of union security agreements is
reasonable.

Religious freedom; Freedom of religion takes precedent over the right against the
impairment of contracts.
It may not be amiss to point out here that the free exercise of religious profession or belief is
superior to contract rights. In case of conflict, the latter must, therefore, yield to the former. The
Supreme Court of the United States has also declared on several occasions that the rights in the
First Amendment, which include freedom of religion, enjoy a preferred position in the
constitutional system. Religious freedom, although not unlimited, is a fundamental personal
right and liberty, and has a preferred position in the hierarchy of values. Contractual rights,
therefore, must yield to freedom of religion. It is only where unavoidably necessary to prevent an
immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community that infringement of
religious freedom may be justified, and only to the smallest extent necessary to avoid the danger.

Equal protection of the law; Republic Act 3350 does not violate equal protection of
law clause of the Constitution.
The questioned Act also provides protection to members of said religious sects against two
aggregates of group strength from which the individual needs protection. The individual
employee, at various times in his working life, is confronted by two aggregates of power
collective labor, directed by a union, and collective capital, directed by management. The union,
an institution developed to organize labor into a collective force and thus protect the individual
employee from the power of collective capital, is, paradoxically, both the champion of employee
rights, and a new source of their frustration. Moreover, when the Union interacts with
management, it produces yet a third aggregate of group strength from which the individual also
needs protection the collective bargaining relationship.

We believe that Republic Act No. 3350 satisfies the aforementioned requirements. The Act
classifies employees and workers, as to the effect and coverage of union shop security
agreements, into those who by reason of their religious beliefs and convictions cannot sign up
with a labor union, and those whose religion does not prohibit membership in labor unions. Tile
classification rests on real or substantial, not merely imaginary or whimsical, distinctions. The
classification introduced by said Act is also germane to its purpose. The purpose of the law is
precisely to avoid those who cannot, because of their religious belief, join labor unions, from
being deprived of their right to work and from being dismissed from their work because of union
shop security agreements.

The aforementioned purpose of the amendatory law is clearly seen in the Explanatory Note to
House Bill No. 5859, which later became Republic Act No. 3350, as follows:

It would be unthinkable indeed to refuse employing a person who, on

account of his religious beliefs and convictions, cannot accept membership
in a labor organization although he possesses all the qualifications for the
job. This is tantamount to punishing such person for believing in a doctrine
he has a right under the law to believe in. The law would not allow
discrimination to flourish to the detriment of those whose religion discards
membership in any labor organization. Likewise, the law would not
commend the deprivation of their right to work and pursue a modest means
of livelihood, without in any manner violating their religious faith and/or
belief.

We believe that Republic Act No. 3350 satisfies the aforementioned requirements. The Act
classifies employees and workers, as to the effect and coverage of union shop security
agreements, into those who by reason of their religious beliefs and convictions cannot sign up
with a labor union, and those whose religion does not prohibit membership in labor unions. Tile
classification rests on real or substantial, not merely imaginary or whimsical, distinctions.

Social Justice; Republic Act 3350 does not violate the concept of social justice
contained in the Consitution.
Appellant's further contention that Republic Act No. 3350 violates the constitutional provision
on social justice is also baseless. Social justice is intended to promote the welfare of all the
people. Republic Act No. 3350 promotes that welfare insofar as it looks after the welfare of those
who, because of their religious belief, cannot join labor unions; the Act prevents their being
deprived of work and of the means of livelihood. In determining whether any particular measure

is for public advantage, it is not necessary that the entire state be directly benefited it is
sufficient that a portion of the state be benefited thereby.

Republic Act 3350 does not diminish protection to labor.

There is, however, the question of whether such an exception possesses an implication that
lessens the effectiveness of state efforts to protect labor, likewise, as noted, constitutionally
ordained. Such a view, on the surface, may not be lacking in plausibility, but upon closer
analysis, it cannot stand scrutiny. Thought must be given to the freedom of association, likewise
an aspect of intellectual liberty. For the late Professor Howe a constitutionalist and in his lifetime
the biographer of the great Holmes, it even partakes of the political theory of pluralistic
sovereignty. So great is the respect for the autonomy accorded voluntary societies. 11 Such a right
implies at the very least that one can determine for himself whether or not he should join or
refrain from joining a labor organization, an institutional device for promoting the welfare of the
working man. A closed shop, on the other hand, is inherently coercive. That is why, as is
unmistakably reflected in our decisions, the latest of which is Guijarno v. Court of Industrial
Relations, 12 it is far from being a favorite of the law. For a statutory provision then to further
curtail its operation, is precisely to follow the dictates of sound public policy.

14. PAQUITO V. ANDO v. ANDRESITO Y. CAMPO, ET AL [G.R. No. 184007,

February 16, 2011]
Facts: Paquito Ando (petitioner) was the president of Premier Allied and Contracting Services,
Inc. (PACSI), an independent labor contractor. Andresito Campo and the other respondents
were hired by PACSI as pilers or haulers. Respondents were dismissed from employment.
Consequently filing a case for illegal dismissal and some money claims with the NLRC. The
Labor Arbiter ruled in respondents favor. PACSI and Ando were directed to pay a total of
P422,702.28 (for separation pay and award of attorneys fees). PACSI and Ando appealed to
NLRC, which affirmed the Labor Arbiters decision. Respondents moved for its execution. To
answer for the reward, the NLRC acting sheriff issued a Notice of Sale on Execution of Personal
Property over a property in the name of Paquito V. Ando xxx married to Erlinda S. Ando.
Prompting Ando to file an action for prohibition before the RTC. Ando claims that the property
belonged to him and his wife and not the corporation, and hence, could not be the subject of the
execution sale. RTC denied the prayer for TRO and directed him to file a claim with the NLRC
Sheriff. Instead, Ando filed a petition for certiorari before the CA. Ando argued that the property
to be levied belonged to him and his wife in their personal capacity and thus the execution
should not prosper. It was likewise denied.

Issue: Whether the RTC has the power to issue TRO in cases involving labor disputes?
Ruling: No. There is no denying that the present controversy arose from the complaint for
illegal dismissal. The subject matter of petitioners complaint is the execution of the NLRC
decision. Execution is an essential part of the proceedings before the NLRC. Jurisdiction, once
acquired, continues until the case is finally terminated, and there can be no end to the
controversy without the full and proper implementation of the commissions directives. Further
underscoring the RTCs lack of jurisdiction over petitioners complaint is Article 254 of the Labor
Code, to wit: ART. 254. INJUNCTION PROHIBITED. No temporary or permanent injunction
or restraining order in any case involving or growing out of labor disputes shall be issued by any
court or other entity, except as otherwise provided in Articles 218 and 264 of this Code.
Syllabus:
Execution of Judgements; Jurisdiction;
The Court has long recognized that regular courts have no jurisdiction to hear and decide
questions which arise from and are incidental to the enforcement of decisions, orders, or awards
rendered in labor cases by appropriate officers and tribunals of the Department of Labor and
Employment. To hold otherwise is to sanction splitting of jurisdiction which is obnoxious to the
orderly administration of justice. Thus, it is, first and foremost, the NLRC Manual on the
Execution of Judgment that governs any question on the execution of a judgment of that body.
Petitioner need not look further than that. The Rules of Court apply only by analogy or in a
suppletory character.
Third Party Claims.
There is no doubt in our mind that petitioners complaint is a third- party claim within the
cognizance of the NLRC. Petitioner may indeed be considered a third party in relation to the
property subject of the execution vis--vis the Labor Arbiters decision. There is no question
that the property belongs to petitioner and his wife, and not to the corporation. It
can be said that the property belongs to the conjugal partnership, not to petitioner
alone. Thus, the property belongs to a third party, i.e., the conjugal partnership. At
the very least, the Court can consider that petitioners wife is a third party within
contemplation of the law.
Due Process.
The TCT of the property bears out that, indeed, it belongs to petitioner and his wife. Thus, even
if we consider petitioner as an agent of the corporation and, therefore, not a
stranger to the case such that the provision on third-party claims will not apply to
him, the property was registered not only in the name of petitioner but also of his
wife. She stands to lose the property subject of execution without ever being a party
to the case. This will be tantamount to deprivation of property without due process.
Power of NLRC to execute judgment.
The power of the NLRC, or the courts, to execute its judgment extends only to
properties unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor alone. [29] A sheriff,
therefore, has no authority to attach the property of any person except that of the
judgment debtor. Likewise, there is no showing that the sheriff ever tried to execute on the
properties of the corporation.
15. CULILI v. EASTERN TELECOMMUNICATIONS (ETPI)
FACTS: Nelson Culili was employed as a Technician, and was promoted to Senior Technician
after 15 years. In 1998, due to business troubles and losses, ETPI implemented a two-phased
Right-Sizing Program: reduction of ETPIs workforce, then a company-wide reorganization
(transfer, merger, absorption or abolition of departments). ETPI offered a Special Retirement
Program to employees who have been in service for at least 15 years. Of all the employees who
qualified, only Culili rejected the offer. The functions of Culilis unit were absorbed by another
department, and his position was abolished (and was eventually absorbed by another employee)

due to redundancy. Culili wrote to the union president in protest. He was informed of his
termination from employment through a letter from the ETPI AVP. This letter was similar to the
memo shown to Culili by the union president weeks before Culili was dismissed.
Culili claims that ETPI contracted out the services he used to perform to a
labor-only contractor, which not only proved that his functions had not become
unnecessary, but which also violated the CBA and LC. In addition, neither he nor the
DOLE were formally notified of his termination. He found out about it when he was handed a
copy of the letter, after he was barred from entering ETPIs premises. ETPI already decided to
dismiss him even prior to the AVPs letter, as evidenced by an earlier version of the letter.
ETPI denied hiring outside contractors to perform Culilis work. It also
denied singling Culili out for termination. The abolition of Culilis department and the
absorption of its functions by another department were in line with the Right-Sizing Programs
goals. Since Culili did not avail of the Special Retirement Program and his position was
subsequently declared redundant, ETPI had no choice but to terminate Culili. Because there was
no more work for him, it was constrained to serve a final notice of termination, which Culili
ignored. Culili filed a complaint for ULP, illegal dismissal, and money claims before
the LA. LA rendered ETPI guilty of illegal dismissal and ULP (affirmed by nlrc) The
contracting out of Culilis functions to non-union members violated his rights as a
union member; ETPI was not able to dispute Culilis claims of discrimination and
subcontracting. The earlier version of the letter was a telling sign of the intention to dismiss
even before declaration of redundancy. The ground that ETPI was actually invoking was
retrenchment, but ETPI stuck to redundancy since it was easier to prove. ETPI failed to present
reasonable criteria to justify declaration of redundancy.on appeal, CA rendred a valid
dismissal and no ULP. Mere contracting out of services being performed by union
members does not per se amount to ULP unless it interferes with the employees
right to self-organization. Culilis position validly abolished due to redundancy. ETPI officers
cannot be held liable absent a showing of bad faith of malice. HOWEVER, ETPI failed to observe
due process when it failed to notify both Culili and DOLE of the termination.
ISSUE: Whether Culilis dismissal can be considered as ULP
RULING: NO. However, ETPI has to pay nominal damages for non-compliance with statutory
due process, in addition to the mandatory separation pay [LC 283].
Article 247. Concept of unfair labor practice and procedure for prosecution
thereof. -- Unfair labor practices violate the constitutional right of workers and employees to
self-organization, are inimical to the legitimate interest of both labor and management,
including their right to bargain collectively and otherwise deal with each other in an
atmosphere of freedom and mutual respect, disrupt industrial peace and hinder the promotion
of healthy and stable labor-management relations.
In the past, we have ruled that unfair labor practice refers to acts that
violate the workers' right to organize. The prohibited acts are related to the workers'
right to self-organization and to the observance of a CBA. We have likewise declared that
there should be no dispute that all the prohibited acts constituting unfair labor practice in
essence relate to the workers' right to self-organization. Thus, an employer may only be
held liable for unfair labor practice if it can be shown that his acts affect in
whatever manner the right of his employees to self-organize.
There is no showing that ETPI, in implementing its Right-Sizing Program, was
motivated by ill will, bad faith or malice, or that it was aimed at interfering with its employees
right to self-organization. In fact, ETPI negotiated and consulted with the SEBA before
implementing the program. By imputing bad faith to ETPIs actuations, Culili has the burden of
proof to present substantial evidence to support the allegation of ULP. Culili failed to discharge
this burden and his bare allegations deserve no credit.
16.

Union of Filipino Employees Supra (case No. 5)

17. NESTLE V. UNION AUGUST 22, 2006 G.R. NO. G.R. NO. 158944-45
FACTS: In consideration of the impending expiration of the existing CBA between
Nestl and UFE-DFA-KMU a letter was sent by the Presidents of the Alabang and
Cabuyao Divisions of UFE-DFA-KMU, Ernesto Pasco and Diosdado Fortuna,
respectively, informed Nestl of their intent to "open our new CBA for the year
2001-2004 x x x as early as June 2001. Nestle informed UFE-DFA-KMU that it was
preparing its own counter-proposal and proposed ground rules that shall govern the conduct of
the collective bargaining negotiations. In another letter, Nestl underscored its position that
"unilateral grants, one-time company grants, company-initiated policies and programs, which
include, but are not limited to the Retirement Plan, Incidental Straight Duty Pay and Calling
Pay Premium, are by their very nature not proper subjects of CBA negotiations and therefore
shall be excluded therefrom." In addition, it clarified that with the closure of the Alabang Plant,
the CBA negotiations will only be applicable to the covered employees of the Cabuyao Plant;
hence, the Cabuyao Division of UFE-DFA-KMU became the sole bargaining unit involved in the
subject CBA negotiations.
Thereafter, dialogue between the company and the union ensued.
Nestl, claiming to have reached an impasse in said dialogue, requested the NCMB, Regional
Office No. IV, Imus, Cavite, to conduct preventive mediation proceedings between it and UFEDFA-KMU. Nestl alleged that despite fifteen (15) meetings between them, the parties failed to
reach any agreement on the proposed CBA. Conciliation proceedings nevertheless proved
ineffective. Complaining, in essence, of bargaining deadlock - pertaining to economic issues, i.e.,
"retirement (plan), panel composition, costs and attendance, and CBA," UFE-DFA-KMU filed a
Notice of Strike with the NCMB. One week later, another Notice of Strike was filed by the UFEDFA-KMU, this time predicated on Nestl's alleged unfair labor practices i.e., bargaining in bad
faith in that it was setting pre-conditions in the ground rules by refusing to include the issue of
the Retirement Plan in the CBA negotiations. A strike vote was then conducted by UFE-DFAKMU which result was an overwhelming approval of the decision to hold a strike. In view of the
looming strike, Nestl filed with the DOLE a Petition for Assumption of Jurisdiction,
fundamentally praying that the Secretary of the DOLE, Hon. Patricia A. Sto. Tomas, assume
jurisdiction over the current labor dispute. Accordingly, Sec. Sto Tomas assumes jurisdiction,
she ordered the strike or lockout is hereby enjoined and further directed to meet and convene for
the discussion of the union proposals and company counter-proposals before NCMB. UFE-DFAKMU sought reconsideration but it was denied.
An injunction from holding a strike was ordered against UFE-DFA-KMU in Sec. Sto. Tomas'
Assumption of Jurisdiction Order and conciliation efforts by the NCMB, the employee members
of UFE-DFA-KMU at the Nestl Cabuyao Plant went on strike. Notwithstanding the Return-ToWork Order, the members of UFE-DFA-KMU continued with their strike and refused to go back
to work as instructed. Frustrated with the foregoing turn of events, UFE-DFA-KMU filed a
Petition for Certiorari with application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or a
writ of preliminary injunction before the Court of Appeals.
Meanwhile, in an attempt to finally resolve the crippling labor dispute between the parties, then
Acting Secretary of the DOLE, Hon. Arturo D. Brion, came out with an Order. UFE-DFA-KMU
moved to reconsider the aforequoted position of the DOLE. Sto. Tomas, issued the last of the
assailed Orders. This order resolved to deny the preceding motion for reconsideration of UFEDFA-KMU. Undaunted still, UFE-DFA-KMU, for the second time, went to the Court of Appeals
likewise via a Petition for Certiorari seeking to annul, on the ground of grave abuse of discretion.

CA ordered Private respondent to resume the CBA negotiations with the petitioner. Dissatisfied,
both parties separately moved for the reconsideration of the abovequoted decision - with Nestl
basically assailing that part of the decision finding the DOLE Secretary to have gravely abused
her discretion when she ruled that the Retirement Plan is not a valid issue for collective
bargaining negotiations; while UFE-DFA-KMU questions, in essence, the appellate court's
decision in absolving Nestl of the charge of unfair labor practice.
ISSUE: Whther the CA correctly ruled on the Unfair Labor Practice considering theobject of
unfair labor practice should have been threshed out with the appropriate labor tribunal.
RULING: YES. The concept of "unfair labor practice" is defined by the Labor Code as:
ART. 247. CONCEPT OF UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE FOR PROSECUTION
THEREOF. - Unfair labor practices violate the constitutional right of workers and employees to
self-organization, are inimical to the legitimate interests of both labor and
management, including their right to bargain collectively and otherwise deal with
each other in an atmosphere of freedom and mutual respect, disrupt industrial peace
and hinder the promotion of healthy and stable labor-management relations.
x x x.
The same code likewise provides the acts constituting unfair labor practices committed by
employers, to wit:
ART. 248. UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES OF EMPLOYERS. - It shall be unlawful for an employer
to commit any of the following unfair labor practices:
(a) To interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to selforganization;
(b) To require as a condition of employment that a person or an employee shall not join a labor
organization or shall withdraw from one to which he belongs;
(c) To contract out services or functions being performed by union members when such will
interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization;
(d) To initiate, dominate, assist or otherwise interfere with the formation or administration of
any labor organization, including the giving of financial or other support to it or its organizers or
supporters;
(e) To discriminate in regard to wages, hours of work, and other terms and conditions of
employment in order to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization.
Nothing in this Code or in any other law shall stop the parties from requiring membership in a
recognized collective bargaining agent as a condition for employment, except those employees
who are already members of another union at the time of the signing of the collective
bargaining agreement.
18. Kiok Loy Supra (case No. 1)
19. GENERAL SANTOS COCA-COLA PLANT FREE WORKERS UNION-TUPAS,
Petitioner,
vs. COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILS., INC. (GENERAL SANTOS CITY), THE
COURT OF APPEALS and THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION, Respondents. [G.R. No. 178647, February 13, 2009]
FACTS: Sometime in the late 1990s, CCBPI experienced a significant decline in profitability due

to the Asian economic crisis, decrease in sales, and tougher competition. To curb the negative
effects on the company, it implemented three (3) waves of an Early Retirement Program and also
there was an inter-office memorandum mandating to put on hold all requests for hiring to fill in
vacancies in both regular and temporary positions in Head Office and in the Plants. This
prompted petitioner to negotiate with the Labor Management Committee for filling up the
vacancies with permanent employees. No resolution was reached on the matter. Faced with the
"freeze hiring" directive, CCBPI Gen San engaged the services of JLBP Services Corporation, a
company in the business of providing labor and manpower services, including janitorial services,
messengers, and office workers to various private and government offices.
Petitioner then filed with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board a Notice of
Strike on the ground of alleged unfair labor practice committed by CCBPI Gen San for
contracting-out services regularly performed by union members. The Secretary of Labor issued
an Order enjoining the threatened strike and certifying the dispute to the NLRC for compulsory
arbitration. The NLRC ruled that CCBPI was not guilty of unfair labor practice for contracting
out jobs to JLBP. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which the NLRC denied. The CA
also denied the petition for certiorari as well as the motion for reconsideration. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE: Whether the act of contracting-out services from JLBP constitutes unfair labor
practices?
RULING: NO. TIt is true that the NLRC erroneously concluded that the contracting- out of jobs
in CCBPI Gen San was due to the Going-to-Market system, which actually affected CCBPIs
sales and marketing departments, and had nothing to do with petitioners complaint. However,
this does not diminish the NLRCs finding that JLBP was a legitimate, independent contractor
and that CCBPI Gen San engaged the services of JLBP to meet business exigencies created by the
freeze-hiring directive of the CCBPI Head Office.
The lower court found, based on the evidence, that CCBPI did not engage
in labor-only contracting and that the companys action to contract-out the services
and functions performed by Union members was not directed at the members
right to self-organization; therefore, it was not guilty of unfair labor practice.
Unfair labor practice refers to acts that violate the workers right to organize. The
prohibited acts are related to the workers right to self-organization and to the observance of a
CBA. Without that element, the acts, even if unfair, are not unfair labor practices.
Both the NLRC and the CA found that petitioner was unable to prove its charge of unfair labor
practice. It was the that had the burden of adducing substantial evidence to support its
allegations of unfair labor practice, which burden it failed to discharge.
20. DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY and DR. CARMELITA I. QUEBENGCO v. DE
LA SALLE UNIVERSITY EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (DLSUEA-NAFTEU)
G.R. No. 177283 April 7, 2009
FACTS: In 2001, a splinter group of respondent led by one Belen Aliazas (Aliazas group) filed a
petition for conduct of elections with DOLE alleging that the then incumbent officers of
respondent had failed to call for a regular election since 1985. However, respondent claimed that
an election was conducted in 1987 but by virtue of the enactment of RA 6715, which amended the
Labor Code, the term of office of its officers was extended to 5 years or until 1992 during which a
general assembly was held affirming their hold-over tenure until the termination of collective
bargaining negotiations; and that a CBA was executed only on March 30, 2000. Acting on the
petition for the conduct of election, the DOLE-NCR held, that the holdover authority of
respondents incumbent set of officers had been extinguished by virtue of the execution of the
CBA. It accordingly ordered the conduct of elections to be placed under the control and
supervision of its Labor Relations Division and subject to pre-election conferences. These
conditions for the conduct of election imposed by the DOLE-NCR notwithstanding, respondent
called for a regular election on July 9, 2001, without prior notice to the DOLE and without the

conduct of pre-election conference, prompted the Aliazas group to file an Urgent Motion for
Intervention with the BLR of the DOLE. The BLR granted the Aliazas groups motion for
intervention three days before the intended date of election or on July 6, 2001.
The Aliazas group thereupon, via letter to the President of petitioner DLSU, requested
the University to please put on escrow all union dues/agency fees and whatever
money considerations deducted from salaries of concerned co-academic personnel
until such time that an election of union officials has been scheduled and
subsequent elections has been held. Petitioners' move to drew respondent to file a
complaint against petitioners for ULP complaint, claiming that petitioners unduly interfered
with its internal affairs and discriminated against its members.
During the pendency of its ULP complaint respondent filed its First Notice of Strike with the
Office of the Secretary of Labor charging petitioners for 1) gross violation of the CBA and 2)
bargaining in bad faith which was certified for compulsory arbitration to the NLRC (certified
case). In the meantime, Labor Arbiter dismissed respondents ULP complaint. Respondent
appealed to the NLRC (second divison) Respondent thereafter filed in the certified case which
was lodged at the NLRC Third Division a motion to have its four other cases and its ULP
complaint then pending appeal before the NLRC Second Division to have these cases
subsumed in the certified case. The NLRC Third Division granted respondents motion.
Petitioners moved to reconsider this Order but it was denied, prompting petitioners to elevate
the matter via certiorari to the Court of Appeals. This petition was raffled to the appellate courts
Tenth Division.
The NLRC Second Division, in the meantime, affirmed the dismissal by the
Arbiter of respondents ULP complaint. Respondent thus elevated the case to the Court of
Appeals via certiorar which was raffled to the appellate courts First Division. the Court of
Appeals Tenth Division, to which petitioners certiorari challenging the Third Division Order
subsuming respondents complaints including the ULP Complaint under the certified case,
REVERSED the said Order of the NLRC Third Division with respect to the subsuming of
respondents ULP complaint under the certified case, the ULP complaint having been, at the
time the NLRC Third Division Order was issued, already disposed of (dismissed) by the Arbiter
and was in fact pending appeal before the NLRC Second Division.
The Court of Appeals First Division subsequently resolving respondents petition for
certiorari (which assailed the affirmance by the NLRC Second Division of the Arbiters dismissal
of its ULP complaint), upon the sole issue of whether the NLRC [Second Division] committed
rd
grave abuse of discretion . . . in ignoring the order of the [NLRC] 3
Division declaring
subsumed or absorbed [herein respondents ULP complaint] in the certified case, answered the
same in the affirmative. It thus SET ASIDE the NLRC Second Division Order affirming the
dismissal of respondents ULP complaint and accordingly ordered said NLRC Second Division to
transmit the entire records of the ULP complaint to the NLRC Third Division to which said ULP
complaint had priorly been ordered consolidated by the latter Division with the certified case.
Hence, petitioners petition for review on certiorari at bar.
ISSUE: Whether the acts of petitioner withholding union and agency dues and suspension of
normal relations with respondents incumbent set of officers pending the intra-union dispute
constitute interference.
RULING: NO. The acts of withholding union and agency dues and suspension of normal
relations with respondents incumbent set of officers pending the intra-union dispute did not

constitute interference, the Court finds for respondent.

Pending the final resolution of the intra-union dispute, respondents officers remained duly
authorized to conduct union affairs. The clarification letter of May 16, 2003 issued by BLR
Director Hans Leo J. Cacdac enlightens:We take this opportunity to clarify that there is no void
in the DLSUEA leadership. The 19 March 2001 Decision of DOLE-NCR Regional Director
should not be construed as an automatic termination of the incumbent officers
tenure of office. As duly-elected officers of the DLSUEA, their leadership is not deemed
terminated by the expiration of their terms of office, for they shall continue their functions and
enjoy the rights and privileges pertaining to their respective positions in a hold-over capacity,
until their successors shall have been elected and qualified.
It bears noting that at the time petitioners questioned moves were adopted, a valid
and existing CBA had been entered between the parties. It thus behooved petitioners to observe
the terms and conditions thereof bearing on union dues and representation. It is axiomatic in
labor relations that a CBA entered into by a legitimate labor organization and an employer
becomes the law between the parties, compliance with which is mandated by express policy of
the law.
21. MSMG-UWP v. Ramos (G.R. No. 113907. April 20, 2001
FACTS: petitioner, Malayang Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa M. Greenfield, Inc., (B)
(MSMG), hereinafter referred to as the "local union", is an affiliate of the private respondent,
United Lumber and General Workers of the Philippines (ULGWP),
The petitioners were terminated by the company but the NLRC upheld the dismissal.
Later on, the SC reversed the decision and ordered all of them reinstated and paid full backwages
but it also held that the officers of the company shouldnt be held liable. This is the subject of this
motion for partial record as the union argues that it was the officers who made the decision to
terminate the employees.
Petitioners allege that this Court committed patent and palpable error in holding that
the respondent company officials cannot be held personally liable for damages on account of
employees dismissal because the employer corporation has a personality separate and distinct
from its officers who merely acted as its agents whereas the records clearly established that
respondent company officers Saul Tawil, Carlos T. Javelosa and Renato C. Puangco have caused
the hasty, arbitrary and unlawful dismissal of petitioners from work; that as top officials of the
respondent company who handed down the decision dismissing the petitioners, they are
responsible for acts of unfair labor practice; that these respondent corporate officers should not
be considered as mere agents of the company but the wrongdoers. Petitioners further contend
that while the case was pending before the public respondents, the respondent company, in the
early part of February 1990, began removing its machineries and equipment from its plant
located at Merville Park, Paranaque and began diverting jobs intended for the regular employees
to its sub-contractor/satellite branches; that the respondent company officials are also the
officers and incorporators of these satellite companies as shown in their articles of incorporation
and the general information sheet.
ISSUE: Whether the officers should be held liable for the illegal dismissed.
RULING: NO. The SC ruled that the officers cannot be held liable because a crop has a
personality separate and distinct from those acting in its behalf. The rule is that obligations
incurred by the corp, through its directors, officers and employees are its sole liabilities.True,
solidary liabilities may at times be incurred but only when exceptional circumstances warrant
such as, generally, in the following cases:

1. When directors and trustees or, in appropriate cases, the officers of a corporation
(a) Vote for or assent to patently unlawful acts of the corporation;
(b) act in bad faith or with gross negligence in directing the corporate affairs;
(c) are guilty of conflict of interest to the prejudice of the corporation, its
stockholders or members, and other persons.
(2) When a director or officer has consented to the issuance of watered stocks or who, having
knowledge thereof, did not forthwith file with the corporate secretary his written objection
thereto.
(3) When a director, trustee or officer has contractually agreed or stipulated to hold himself
personally and solidarily liable with the Corporation.[
(4) When a director, trustee or officer is made, by specific provision of law, personally
liable for his corporate action.
In labor cases, corporate directors and officers are solidarily liable with the
corporation for the termination of employment or corporate employees done with
malice or inbad faith. Bad faith does not connote bad judgment or negligence; it imports a
dishonest purpose of some moral obliquity and conscious doing of wrong; it means breach of a
known duty thru some motive or interest or will; it partwages of the nature of fraud. In this case,
there is nothing onrecord to show that the officers acted in patent bad faith or were guilty of
gross negligence in terminating the services of petitioners so as to warrant personal liability.
22. ALABANG COUNTRY CLUB INC. vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION
G.R. No. 157611. August 9, 2005

FACTS: Petitioner Alabang Country Club Inc. (ACCI), is a stock, non-profit corporation that
operates and maintains a country club and various sports and recreational facilities for the
exclusive use of its members. Sometime in 1993, Francisco Ferrer, then President of ACCI,
requested its Internal Auditor, to conduct a study on the profitability of ACCIs Food and
Beverage Department (F & B Department). Consequently, report showed that from 1989 to 1993,
F & B Department had been incurring substantial losses. Realizing that it was no longer
profitable for ACCI to maintain its own F & B Department, the management decided to cease
from operating the department and to open the same to a contractor, such as a concessionaire,
which would be willing to operate its own food and beverage business within the club. Thus,
ACCI sent its F & B Department employees individual letters informing them that their services
were being terminated and that they would be paid separation pay. The Union in turn, with the
authority of individual respondents, filed a complaint for illegal dismissal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the clubs right to terminate its employees for an authorized cause,
particularly to secure its continued viability and existence is valid.
HELD: When petitioner decided to cease operating its F & B Department and open the same
to a concessionaire, it did not reduce the number of personnel assigned thereat. It terminated
the employment of all personnel assigned at the department.
Petitioners failure to prove that the closure of its F & B Department was due to substantial losses
notwithstanding, the Court finds that individual respondents were dismissed on the ground of
closure or cessation of an undertaking not due to serious business losses or financial reverses,
which is allowed under Article 283 of the Labor Code. The closure of operation of an
establishment or undertaking not due to serious business losses or financial reverses includes
both the complete cessation of operations and the cessation of only part of a companys
activities.

23. GENERAL MILLING CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 146728

February 11, 2004

FACTS: General Milling Corporation employed 190 workers. All the employees were members
of a union which is a duly certified bargaining agent. The GMC and the union entered into a
collective bargaining agreement which included the issue of representation that is effective for a
term of three years which will expire on November 30, 1991. On November 29, 1991, a day before
the expiration of the CBA, the union sent GMC a proposed CBA, with a request that a counter
proposal be submitted within ten days. on October 1991, GMC received collective and individual
letters from the union members stating that they have withdrawn from their union membership.
On December 19, 1991, the union disclaimed any massive disaffiliation of its union members. On
January 13, 1992, GMC dismissed an employee who is a union member. The union protected the
employee and requested GMC to submit to the grievance procedure provided by the CBA, but
GMC argued that there was no basis to negotiate with a union which is no longer existing. The
union then filed a case with the Labor Arbiter but the latter ruled that there must first be a
certification election to determine if the union still enjoys the support of the workers.
ISSUE: Whether or not GMC is guilty of unfair labor practice for violating its duty to bargain
collectively and/or for interfering with the right of its employees to self-organization.
HELD: GMC is guilty of unfair labor practice when it refused to negotiate with the union upon
its request for the renegotiation of the economic terms of the CBA on November 29, 1991. The
unions proposal was submitted within the prescribed 3-year period from the date of effectivity
of the CBA. It was obvious that GMC had no valid reason to refuse to negotiate in good faith with
the union. The refusal to send counter proposal to the union and to bargain anew on the
economic terms of the CBA is tantamount to an unfair labor practice under Article 248 of the
Labor Code.
Under Article 252 of the Labor Code, both parties are required to perform their mutual
obligation to meet and convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of
negotiating an agreement. The union lived up to this obligation when it presented proposals for a
new CBA to GMC within 3 years from the effectivity of the original CBA. But GMC failed in its
duty under Article 252. What it did was to devise a flimsy excuse, by questioning the existence of
the union and the status of its membership to prevent any negotiation. It bears stressing that the
procedure in collective bargaining prescribed by the Code is mandatory because of the basic
interest of the state in ensuring lasting industrial peace.
The Court of Appeals found that the letters between February to June, 1993 by 13 union
members signifying their resignation from the union clearly indicated that GMC exerted
pressure on the employees. We agree with the Court of Appeals conclusion that the ill-timed
letters of resignation from the union members indicate that GMC interfered with the right of its
employee to self-organization.

24. HACIENDA FATIMA vs. NATIONAL FEDERATION OF SUGARCANE

WORKERS-FOOD AND GENERAL TRADE
G.R. No. 149440
January 28, 2003
FACTS: When complainant union (respondents) was certified as the collective bargaining
representative, petitioners refused to sit down with the union for the purpose of entering into a
CBA. The workers including complainants were not given work for more than 1month. In
protest, they staged a strike which was however settled upon the signing of a MOA.
Subsequently, alleging that complainants failed to load some wagons, petitioners reneged on its
commitment to bargain collectively and employed all means including the use of private armed
guards to prevent the organizers from entering the premises. No work assignments were given to
complainants which forced the union to stage a strike. Due to conciliation efforts by the DOLE,
another MOA was signed by the parties and they met in a conciliation meeting. When petitioners
again reneged on its commitment, complainants filed a complaint. Petitioner accused

respondents of refusing to work and being choosy in the kind of work they have to perform. The
NLRC ruled that petitioners were guilty of ULP and that the respondents were illegally
dismissed. The CA affirmed that while the work of respondents was seasonal in nature, they were
considered to be merely on leave during the off-season & were therefore still employed by
petitioners.
ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in holding that respondents, admittedly seasonal workers, were
regular employees, contrary to the clear provisions of Article 280 of the Labor Code, which
categorically state that seasonal employees are not covered by the definition of regular
employees under paragraph 1, nor covered under paragraph 2 which refers exclusively to casual
employees who have served for at least one year.
HELD: No. For respondents to be excluded from those classified as regular employees, it is
not enough that they perform work or services that are seasonal in nature. They must have also
been employed only for the duration of one season. The evidence proves the existence of the
first, but not of the second, condition. The fact that respondents repeatedly worked as sugarcane
workers for petitioners for several years is not denied by the latter. Evidently, petitioners
employed respondents for more than one season. Therefore, the general rule of regular
employment is applicable. If the employee has been performing the job for at least a year, even if
the performance is not continuous & merely intermittent, the law deems the repeated &
continuing need for its performance as sufficient evidence of the necessity if not indispensability
of that activity to the business. Hence, the employment is considered regular, but only w/respect
to such activity & while such activity exists. Seasonal workers who are called to work from time
to time & are temporarily laid off during off-season are not separated from service in said period,
but merely considered on leave until re-employed. Respondents, having performed the same
tasks for petitioners every season for several years, are considered the latter's regular employees
for their respective tasks. Petitioners' eventual refusal to use their services even if they were
ready, able and willing to perform their usual duties whenever these were available and hiring
of other workers to perform the tasks originally assigned to respondents amounted to illegal
dismissal of the latter. The Court finds no reason to disturb the CA's dismissal of what
petitioners claim was their valid exercise of a management prerogative. The sudden changes in
work assignments reeked of bad faith. These changes were implemented immediately after
respondents had organized themselves into a union and started demanding collective
bargaining. Those who were union members were effectively deprived of their jobs. Petitioners'
move actually amounted to unjustified dismissal of respondents, in violation of the Labor Code.
25. PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
G.R. No. L-39546 November 29, 1977

vs.

COURT

OF

FACTS: Araneta Coliseum Employees Association (ACEA) a legitimate labor organization in

behalf of forty-eight (48) members, instituted a case for unfair labor practice in the CIR against
Progressive Development Corporation (PDC), operating the Araneta Coliseum, Jorge Araneta,
Judy A. Roxas, Manuel B. Jover and Ramon Llorente, as officers of the corporation PDC and
Progressive Employees Union (PEU), a labor organization existing in the PDC. The complaint
alleged that the PDC, through its officers, initiated a move to disauthorize the counsel of the
complainant ACEA from appearing in a union conference with the company; that the supervisors
of PDC encouraged, and assisted in, the formation of the Progressive Employees Union
(PEU)and coerced the employees, particularly the individual complainants, to disaffiliate from
the complainant union and to affiliate with the PEU; that in July and August 1962 the
respondents, petitioners herein, discriminated against the individual complainants by either not
giving them their working schedules, lessening their number of working days and eventually
dismissing them from their employment, because of their refusal to disaffiliate from their union
and join the Progressive Employees Union. The CIR ruled that the company is guilty of unfair
labor practice hence ordered the company to ceases and desist from such unfair labor practice
and to reinstate the complainants with back wages.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners are guilty of unfair labor practice.

HELD: Yes. From the facts of record, it is clear that the individual complainants were
dismissed because they refused to resign from the Araneta Coliseum Employees Association and
to affiliate with the Progressive Employees Union which was being aided and abetted by the
Progressive Development Corporation. There is reason to believe that had the individual
complainants agreed to resign from the ACEA and to transfer to the PEU, they would not have
been separated from their work and would even have been made permanent employees.
Progressive Employees Union was organized to camouflage the petitioner corporation's dislike
for the Araneta Coliseum Employees Association and to stave off the latter's recognition. The
petitioners were correctly found to have committed acts constituting unfair labor practice.
26. FRANCISCO SALUNGA vs. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
G.R. No. L-22456
September 27, 1967

FACTS: Mr. Salunga used to be a member of a local union of San Miguel Corporation (SMB).
At first he was just an ordinary member, but through time, he became very critical of the acts of
the officers. He kept on criticizing. So the officers challenged him to resign if he was really
dissatisfied. So he resigned, he wrote a letter to the union officers. Shortly after he resigned, the
manager of SMB called him informing him of the Union Security clause, and as a condition for
continued employment, you have to be a member of the union. If you cease to become a member
of the union, the union can ask the employer to sever your employment. So he wrote a second
letter. The second letter was taking back his letter of resignation. The union demanded to the
management that Salunga be terminated, and he was terminated as the management did not
have any choice. Salunga filed an illegal dismissal complaint. He impleaded SMB and the Union.

ISSUE: Whether there was unfair labor practice.

HELD: NONE. The Company was reluctant if not unwilling to discharge the petitioner.
When the Union first informed the Company of petitioner's resignation and urged
implementation of section 3 of the bargaining contract, the Company advised petitioner of the
provision thereof, thereby intimating that he had to withdraw his resignation in order to keep his
employment. Besides, the Company notified the Union that it (the Company) would not take any
action on the case and would consider the petitioner, "still a member" of the Union. When the
latter, thereafter, insisted on petitioner's discharge, the Company still demurred and explained it
was not taking sides and that its stand was prompted merely by "humane" considerations,
springing from the belief that petitioner had resigned from the Union without realizing its effect
upon his employment. And, as the Union reiterated its demand, the Company notified petitioner
that it had no other alternative but to terminate his employment, and dismissed him from the
service, although with "regret".

Under these circumstances, the Company was not "unfair" to the petitioner. On the contrary, it
did not merely show a commendable understanding of and sympathy for his plight. It even tried
to help him, although to such extent only as was consistent with its obligation to refrain from
interfering in purely internal affairs of the Union. At the same time, the Company could not
safely inquire into the motives of the Union officers, in refusing to allow the petitioner to
withdraw his resignation. Inasmuch as the true motives were not manifest, without such inquiry,
and petitioner had concededly tendered his resignation of his own free will, the arbitrary nature
of the decision of said officers was not such as to be apparent and to justify the company in
regarding said decision unreasonable. Upon the other hand, the Company can not be blamed for
assuming the contrary, for petitioner had appealed to the National Officers of the PAFLU and the
latter had sustained the Union. The Company was justified in presuming that the PAFLU had
inquired into all relevant circumstances, including the motives of the Union Officers.

increases purportedly to avoid wage distortion.

27. MANILA MANDARIN EMPLOYEES UNION, petitioners, vs. NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, and MELBA C. BELONCIO,
respondents. G.R. No. 76989 September 29, 1987
Facts: Melba C. Beloncio, assistant head waitress at the hotel's coffee shop, was expelled from
the petitioner Manila Mandarin Employees Union for acts allegedly inimical to the interests of
the union. The union demanded the dismissal from employment of Beloncio on the basis of the
union security clause of their collective bargaining agreement and the Hotel acceded by placing
Beloncio on forced leave.
Beloncio filed a complaint for unfair labor practice and illegal dismissal against herein
petitioner-union and Manila Mandarin Hotel Inc. before the NLRC. Petitioner-union filed a
motion to dismiss on grounds that the complainant had no cause of action against it and the
NLRC had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint. The Union then appealed to
the respondent NLRC which modified the Labor Arbiter's decision as earlier stated.
Hence, this present petition.
Issue: WON PETITIONER LIABLE FOR THE PAYMENT OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S
SALARY AND FRINGE BENEFITS, AND AWARD OF 10% ATTORNEY'S FEES, AFTER
FINDING AS UNMERITORIOUS HER PRETENDED CLAIMS OR COMPLAINTS FOR UNFAIR
LABOR PRACTICE, ILLEGAL DISMISSAL, AND DAMAGES.
Held: Yes, Dismissal of the employee was through the insistence and demand of the
Union: The Hotel would not have compelled Beloncio to go on forced leave were it not for the
union's insistence and demand to the extent that because of the failure of the hotel to dismiss
Beloncio as requested, the union filed a notice of strike with the Ministry of Labor and
Employment on August 17, 1984 on the issue of unfair labor practice. The hotel was then
compelled to put Beloncio on forced leave and to stop payment of her salary from September 1,
1984.
Furthermore, as provided for in the collective bargaining agreement between the petitioner-the
Union and the Manila Mandarin Hotel "the Union shall hold the Company free and blameless
from any and all liabilities that may arise" should the employee question the dismissal, as has
happened in the case at bar. It is natural for a union to desire that all workers in a particular
company should be its dues-paying members. Since it would be difficult to insure 100 percent
membership on a purely voluntary basis and practically impossible that such total membership
would continuously be maintained purely on the merits of belonging to the union, the labor
movement has evolved the system whereby the employer is asked, on the strength of collective
action, to enter into what are now familiarly known as "union security" agreements.
28. SAMAHANG MANGGAGAWA SA TOP FORM MANUFACTURING UNITED
WORKERS OF THE PHILIPPINES (SMTFM-UWP), its officers and
members, petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION,
HON. JOSE G. DE VERA and TOP FORM MANUFACTURING PHIL., INC.,
respondents. G.R. No. 113856 September 7, 1998
Facts: Petitioner Samahang Manggagawa sa Top Form Manufacturing United Workers of the
Philippines (SMTFM) was the certified collective bargaining representative of all regular rank
and file employees of private respondent Top Form Manufacturing Philippines, Inc. February 27,
1990, A the collective bargaining negotiation was held. The parties agreed to discuss unresolved
economic issues. According to the minutes of the meeting, Article VII of the collective bargaining
agreement was discussed. In the minutes of the meeting, across the board wage increase was
tackled but it was not stated anymore in the CBA since the union dropped such proposals relying
to the undertakings made by the officials of the company. Union requested the implementation
of said wage orders. However, they demanded that the increase be on an across-the-board basis.
Private respondent refused to accede to that demand. Instead, it implemented a scheme of

Issue: Whether or not an employer committed an unfair labor practice in its refusal to grant
across-the-board increases to its employees in implementing Wage Orders Nos. 01 and 02 of the
Regional Tripartite Wages and Productivity Board of the National Capital Region (RTWPBNCR).
Held: NO. If there was indeed a promise or undertaking on the part of private respondent to
obligate itself to grant an automatic across-the-board wage increase, petitioner union should
have requested or demanded that such "promise or undertaking" be incorporated in the CBA.
After all, petitioner union has the means under the law to compel private respondent to
incorporate this specific economic proposal in the CBA. It could have invoked Article 252 of the
Labor Code defining "duty to bargain," thus, the duty includes "executing a contract
incorporating such agreements if requested by either party." Petitioner union's assertion that it
had insisted on the incorporation of the same proposal may have a factual basis considering the
allegations in the aforementioned joint affidavit of its members. However, Article 252 also states
that the duty to bargain "does not compel any party to agree to a proposal or make any
concession." Thus, petitioner union may not validly claim that the proposal embodied
in the Minutes of the negotiation forms part of the CBA that it finally entered into
with private respondent.
Hence, petitioner union's contention that the Minutes of the collective bargaining negotiation
meeting forms part of the entire agreement is pointless. The Minutes reflects the proceedings
and discussions undertaken in the process of bargaining for worker benefits in the same way that
the minutes of court proceedings show what transpired therein.
29. CALTEX REFINERY EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (CREA), petitioner, vs.
HON. JOSE S. BRILLANTES, in his capacity as Acting Secretary of the
Department of Labor and Employment, and CALTEX (PHILIPPINES),
Inc., respondents. [G.R. No. 123782. September 16, 1997]
Facts: Anticipating the expiration of their CBA on July 31, 1995, petitioner CREA and private
respondent Caltex (Philippines), Inc. negotiated, under the guidance of the NCMB and the Office
of the SOLE, the terms and conditions of employment to be contained in a new CBA. a) Some
items were amicably arrived at and agreed upon, others were left unresolved. 2. To resolve these
issues, eight meetings were held, but none were successful, prompting the petitioner to declare a
deadlock and file a notice of strike. Six further conciliation meetings held by the NCMB were
likewise unavailing, as were various meetings at the plant level. 3.During a strike vote on Aug. 16,
1995, the members of CREA opted for a walk out. Caltex thus filed with the DOLE a petition for
assumption of jurisdiction pursuant to Art. 263 (g) of the Labor Code. 4. Jose Brillantes, then Acting
SOLE, issued an order assuming jurisdiction over the labor dispute and enjoining any strike or
lockout. 5. CREA defied the order and began to strike and picket the premises of Caltex. Several
company notices directing the employees to return to work were likewise defied. 6. During the
course of the strike, DOLE Undersecretary Bienvenido Laguesma interceded and conducted
several conciliation meetings, during which he was able to convince the CREA members to
return to work and enter into a memorandum of agreement with Caltex. a) The picket was finally
lifted on Sept. 9, 1995, though both parties filed position papers on unresolved issues. 7. Because
of the strike, Caltex dismissed some officers of CREA due to the strike. As a result, the parties
failed to come to any substantial agreement and decided to refer the problem to the SOLE, Jose
S. Brillantes. 8. Brillantes issued three orders, in favor of CREA one directing that a new CBA
be executed, and one order each denying the two MRs filed by the petitioner. Hence this Special
Civic Action for Certiorari.
Issue: Whether the SOLE committed GAD in resolving the instant labor dispute as regards the
matters of:
wage Increase- no
Union Security_ yes
retirement plan- No

grievance machinery_ no
Signing bonus- no
Held:
Preliminary Matter: Certiorari in Labor Cases:
-the factual findings of quasi-judicial agencies (such as the Department of Labor and
Employment), when supported by substantial evidence, are binding on this Court and entitled to
great respect, considering the expertise of these agencies in their respective fields. It is wellestablished that findings of these administrative agencies are generally accorded not only respect
but even finality. No question of jurisdiction whatsoever is being raised and/or pleaded in the
case at bench. Instead, what is being sought is a judicial re-evaluation of the adequacy or
inadequacy of the evidence on record, which is certainly beyond the province of the
extraordinary writ of certiorari. Such demand is impermissible for it would involve this court in
determining what evidence is entitled to belief and the weight to be assigned it. As we have
reiterated countless times, judicial review by this Court in labor cases does not go so far as to
evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence upon which the proper labor officer or office based his or
its determination but is limited only to issues of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
As to wage increase:
- First, the matter of inflation rate was clearly addressed in public respondents Order dated
November 21, 1995. Contrary to petitioners undocumented claim of 11.8% inflation in
September of 1995, the truth of the matter is that the average inflation for the first ten (10)
months was only 7.496%, and Central Bank projections indicate that it will take a 13.5% inflation
for November and December to record an average inflation of 8.5% for the year. [23] Second,
private respondents financial capacity has been insufficiently explained in its Comment dated
April 16, 1996 in which it stated that the Banaba upgrading should not be construed as a
yardstick of its financial standing: [24]
It is equally amazing how the Union (petitioner) desperately justifies their demands by
comparing the upgrading cost of the Companys (private respondent) Banaba Housing
Facilities, a matter totally unrelated to the case, to the cost of their demands. The Union not
only errs in its choice of yardstick of the Companys capacity to pay, it likewise displays its
ignorance of the Banaba Housing Program.
The Banaba Housing Facility is not a benefit. It is an integral part of an indispensable
requirement for smooth Plant operations and assurance of an emergency response crew in times
of calamities and accidents. Employees who are required to stay in the housing facility are
members of the Refinerys emergency response organization. It is also not a case of upgrading.
The Banaba Housing Facility was built in 1954. A significant number of its structure are
dilapidated and in dire need of rehabilitation and preservation. Finally, Banaba is not a
yardstick of the Companys capacity to pay, but rather, an eloquent demonstration of the
Companys will to survive and remain globally competitive.
Union Security Clause:
- Petitioner contends that the foregoing disposition leaving to the parties the decision on the
union security clause issue is contrary to the whole idea of assumption of jurisdiction.
Petitioner argues that in spite of the provisions on the union security clause, it may expel a
member only on any of three grounds: non-payment of dues, subversion, or conviction for a
crime involving moral turpitude. If the employees act does not constitute any of these three
grounds, the member would continue to be employed by private respondent. Thus, the
disagreement between petitioner and private respondent on this issue is not only procedural
but also substantial. [30]
On the other hand, private respondent argues that nothing prevents petitioner from expelling its
members; however, termination of employment should be based only on these three grounds
agreed upon in the existing CBA. Further, private respondent explains that petitioners citation

of Article 249 (a) [31] of the Labor Code is out of context. It adds that the cited section provides
only for the right of a union to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition and
retention of membership, and that upholding the arguments of petitioner would make the
private respondent a policeman of the union. [32]
We agree with petitioner. The disagreement between petitioner and private respondent on the
union security clause should have been definitively resolved by public respondent. The labor
secretary should take cognizance of an issue which is not merely incidental to but essentially
involved in the labor dispute itself, or which is otherwise submitted to him for resolution. [33] In
this case, the parties have submitted the issue of the union security clause for public
respondents disposition. But the secretary of labor has given no valid reason for avoiding the
said issue; he merely points out that this issue is a procedural matter. Such vacillation clearly
sidesteps the nature of the union security clause as one intended to strengthen the contracting
union and to protect it from the fickleness or perfidy of its own members. Without such
safeguard, group solidarity becomes uncertain; the union becomes gradually weakened and
increasingly vulnerable to company machinations. In this security clause lies the strength of the
union during the enforcement of the collective bargaining agreement. It is this clause that
provides labor with substantial power in collective bargaining. The secretary of labor assumed
jurisdiction over this labor dispute in an industry indispensable to national interest, precisely to
settle once and for all the disputes over which he has jurisdiction at his level. In not performing
his duty, the secretary of labor committed a grave abuse of discretion.
Retirement plan
-Petitioner contends that 40 of its members who are still covered by the Old Retirement Plan
because they were not able to exercise the option to shift to the New Retirement Plan, for one
reason or another, when such option was given in the past are included in the New Retirement
Plan. Petitioner argues that the exclusion of forty employees from the New Plan constitutes
grave abuse of discretion for three reasons. First, it is a case of the left hand taking away, so to
speak, what the right hand had given. Second, the change was done for a very shallow
reason. The new scheme was no longer new, as the New Retirement Plan had been in place for
at least two years. Third, in not applying the New Retirement Plan to the 40 employees, public
respondent was perpetrating his departments discriminatory practice. [35]
Private respondent counters that these 40 or so employees have opted to remain covered by the
old plan despite opportunities given them in 1985 to shift to the New Plan. [36]
We hold that public respondent did not commit grave abuse of discretion in respecting the free
and voluntary decision of the employees in regard to the Provident Plan and the irrevocable onetime option provided for in the New Retirement Plan. Although the union has every right to
represent its members in the negotiation regarding the terms and conditions of their
employment, it cannot negate their wishes on matters which are purely personal and individual
to them. In this case, the forty employees freely opted to be covered by the Old Plan; their
decision should be respected. The company gave them every opportunity to choose, and they
voluntarily exercised their choice. The union cannot pretend to know better; it cannot impose its
will on them.
Grievance Machinery:
-Brillantes affirmed a resolution to shorten the periods to process/resolve machinery from 45 to
30 days first step and from 10 to 7 days at the second step, as well as removing the step of
establishing a joint council, holding that it would onlyserve to protract the proceeding and
therefore, no longer necessary. If unsettled, shall automatically referred by both parties to
voluntary arbitration pursuant to RA 6715.

We believe that the procedure described by public respondent sufficiently complies with the
minimum requirement of the law. Public respondent even provided for two steps in hearing
grievances prior to their referral to arbitration. The parties will decide on the number of
arbitrators who may hear a dispute only when the need for it arises. Even the law itself does not
specify the number of arbitrators. Their alternatives whether to have one or three arbitrators
have their respective advantages and disadvantages. In this matter, cost is not the only
consideration; full deliberation on the issues is another, and it is best accomplished in a hearing
conducted by three arbitrators. In effect, the parties are afforded the latitude to decide for
themselves the composition of the grievance machinery as they find appropriate to a particular
situation. At bottom, we cannot really impute grave abuse of discretion to public respondent on
this issue.
Signing Bonus:
-the issue of whether the signing bonus is covered under the maintenance of existing benefits
clause, we find that a clarification is indeed imperative. Despite the expressed provision for a
signing bonus in the previous CBA, we uphold the principle that the award for a signing bonus
should partake the nature of an incentive and premium for peaceful negotiations and amicable
resolution of disputes which apparently are not present in the instant case. Thus, we are
constrained to rule that the award of signing bonus is not covered by the maintenance of
existing benefits clause.
a signing bonus is not a benefit which may be demanded under the law. Rather, it is now
claimed by petitioner under the principle of maintenance of existing benefits of the old CBA.
However, as clearly explained by private respondent, a signing bonus may not be demanded as a
matter of right. If it is not agreed upon by the parties or unilaterally offered as an additional
incentive by private respondent, the condition for awarding it must be duly satisfied. In the
present case, the condition sine qua non for its grant a non strike was not complied with.
30. DIVINE WORD UNIVERSITY OF TACLOBAN VS SECRETARY OF LABOR
GR NO 91915 J. ROMERO
FACTS: On Sept 6, 1984 the med-arbiter certified the Divine Word University Employees
Union as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the Divine Word University. The union
submitted its proposals on March 7, 1985. The Universitys reply requested that a preliminary
conference be held on May 28, 1985. Before the conference the VP of the union resigned and
withdrew the proposals hence the PC was cancelled.
After three years, the affiliate of the union, Associated Labor Union, requested a conference with
the University for the purposes of continuing the bargaining negotiations. Not having heard from
the university, a follow up request was sent and warned the university from interference. The
university maintained it silence.
The union thereafter filed a notice of strike on the grounds of bargaining deadlock and ULP,
refusal to bargain, discrimination and coercion. Conferences were held after the filing of the
notice of strike and the parties came to an agreement. It was found however, that the university
filed for a petition for certification election one hour before the agreement was concluded. The
union then submitted proposals which were again ignored by the university. Marathon
conciliations were held to no avail.
The Sec of Labor assumed jurisdiction and directed that all striking workers to report back to
work within 24 hours. The med-arbiter issued an order directing the conduct of the certification
election. To Which the Sec of Labor directed to hold in abeyance. The Sec of Labor dismissed the
cases of ULP filed by the union and the university.

ISSUE: Whether or not certification election can be held after CBA was agreed upon after 5
years.
HELD: An employer who is requested to bargain collectively may file a petition for certification
election any time except upon clear showing the existence of either:
1) petition is filed within one year from the issuance of a final certification election result OR
2) when a bargaining deadlock had been submitted to conciliation or arbitration or had become
the subject of a valid notice of strike or lockout.
Deadlock is the counteraction of things producing entire stoppage: a state of inaction or of
neutralization caused by the opposition of persons or factions. There is a deadlock when there is
a complete blocking or stoppage resulting from the action of equal and opposed forces.
The records of the case shows that there was no reasonable effort at good faith bargaining on the
part of the university.
Procedure:
1) proposal
2) conference in case of differences
3) conciliation
4) the parties are prohibited from exercising acts which would impede or disrupt the early
settlement of the case
5) exert efforts for amicable settlement
The union after submitting proposals which were ignored by the university, remained passive.
Technically, the university has the right to file the petition for certification election as there was
no bargaining deadlock. However such right was forfeited by its inaction.
31. COLEGIO DE SAN JUAN DE LETRAN, petitioner, vs. ASSOCIATION OF
EMPLOYEES AND FACULTY OF LETRAN and ELEONOR AMBAS,
respondents. [G.R. No. 141471. September 18, 2000]
Facts: During the renegotiation of the respondent unions Collective Bargaining Agreement with
the petitioner, Eleonor Ambas emerged as the newly elected President of the union. Ambas
wanted to continue the renegotiation of the CBA but petitioner, through Fr. Edwin Lao, claimed
that the CBA was already prepared for signing by the parties. However, the union members
rejected the said CBA. Thereafter, petitioner accused the union officers of bargaining in bad
faith before the NLRC. The Labor Arbiter decided in favor of the petitioner. This decision was
reversed on appeal with the NLRC.
The parties later agreed to disregard the unsigned CBA and to start negotiation on new five-year
CBA. During the pendency of approval of proposals, Ambas was informed that her work schedule
was being changed. Ambas protested and requested management to submit the issue to a
grievance machinery under the old CBA.
After the petitioners inaction on the CBA, the union filed a notice to strike. After meeting with
the NCMB to discuss the ground rules for renegotiation, Ambas received a letter dismissing her
for alleged insubordination. The petitioner then ceased negotiations when it received news that
another labor organization had filed a petition for certification.

The union finally struck, but the Secretary of Labor and Employment ordered them to return to
work and for petitioner to accept them back. The Secretary of Labor and Employment later
rendered judgement that the petitioner had been guilty of unfair labor practice. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the findings of the former.
Issue: Whether petitioner is guilty of unfair labor practice by refusing to bargain with the union
when it unilaterally suspended the ongoing negotiations for a new CBA; and
Held: NO. The petitioners failure to act upon the submitted CBA proposal within the ten-day
period exemplified in Article 250 of the Labor Code is a clear violation of the governing
procedure of collective bargaining. As the Court has held in Kiok Loy vs. NLRC, the companys
refusal to make counter-proposal to the unions proposed CBA is an indication of bad faith.
Moreover, the succeeding events are obvious signs that the petitioner had merely been
employing delaying tactics to the passage of the proposed CBA. Moreover, in order to allow the
employer to validly suspend the bargaining process, there must be a valid petition for
certification election raising a legitimate representation issue. Hence, the mere filing of a
petition for certification election does not ipso facto justify the suspension of negotiation by the
employer.
32. ALBERTO S. SILVA, EDILBERTO VIRAY ANGELES BARON, CEFERINO
ROMERO, JAIME ACEVEDO, RODOLFO JUAN, ANDREW DE LA ISLA,
BAYANI PILAR, ULDARICO GARCIA, ANANIAS HERMOCILLA, WALLY
LEONES, PABLO ALULOD, RODOLFO MARIANO, HERNANI ABOROT,
CARLITO CHOSAS, VALERIANO MAUBAN, RENAN HALILI, MANOLITO
CUSTODIO, NONILON DAWAL, RICARDO ESCUETA, SEVERINO
ROSETE, ERNESTO LITADA, ERNESTO BARENG, BONIFACIO URBANO,
VICENTE SANTOS, MARIO CREDO, BERNABE GERONIMO, ERNESTO
BANAY, PASTOR VELUZ, RICARDO CUEVAS, FELOMENO BALLON,
ORLANDO MENDOZA, ANICETO ARBAN, GERONIMO ESPLANA,
VICENTE CHAVEZ, STEVE VELECINA, and RICARDO B. VENTURA,
petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and
PHILTREAD (FIRESTONE) TIRE AND RUBBER CORPORATION,
respondents.
G.R. No. 110226 | 1997-06-19
ROMERO, J:
FACTS: Petitioners, then rank-and-file employees and members of Philtread Workers Union
(PWU), volunteered for, and availed of, the retrenchment program instituted by Philtread with
the understanding that they would have priority in re-employment in the event that the company
recovers from its financial crisis. Philtread, apparently having recovered from its financial
reverses, expanded its operations and hired new personnel. Upon discovery of this development,
petitioners filed their respective applications for employment with Philtread, which however,
merely agreed to consider them for future vacancies. Subsequent demands for re-employment
made by petitioners were ignored. Petitioners lodged a complaint with the NLRC for unfair labor
practice, damages and attorney's fees against Philtread. Petitioners challenged the Philtread's
motion to dismiss, stressing that the complaint was one for unfair labor practice precipirated by
the unjust and unreasonable refusal of Philtread to re-employ them. Being one for unfair labor
practice, petitioners concluded that the NLRC had jurisdiction over the case, pursuant to Article
217 (a) (1) of the Labor Code. Labor Arbiter Edgardo M. Madriaga rendered a decision
dismissing the complaint but directing Philtread to give petitioners priority in hiring, as well as
those former employees similarly situated for available positions provided they meet the
necessary current qualifications. NLRC issued a resolution reversing the decision of the Labor
Arbiter.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is Unfair Labor Practice.

RULING: No. With the amendments introduced by RA 6715, it can be gleaned that the Labor
Arbiter still retains jurisdiction over ULP cases. There is, however, a significant change: The
unqualified jurisdiction conferred upon the Labor Arbiter prior to the amendment by RA 6715
has been narrowed down so that violations of a Collective Bargaining Agreement, except those
which are gross in character, shall no longer be treated as unfair labor practice but as
grievances under the Collective Bargaining Agreement. It is further stated that gross
violations of Collective Bargaining Agreement shall mean flagrant and/or malicious refusal to
comply with the economic provisions of such agreement. Hence, for a ULP case to be
cognizable by the Labor Arbiter, and the NLRC to exercise its appellate
jurisdiction, the allegations in the complaint should show prima facie the concurrence of two
things, namely: (1) gross violation of the CBA; AND (2) the violation pertains to the
economic provisions of the CBA.
In several instances prior to the instant case, the Court already made its pronouncement that RA
6715 is in the nature of a curative statute. As such, we declared that it can be applied
retroactively to pending cases.
With the Briad ruling in place, the implication is that the qualified jurisdiction of the Labor
Arbiter and the NLRC should have been applied when the ULP complaint was still pending.
This means that petitioners should have been required to show in their complaint the gross
nature of the CBA violation, as well as the economic provision violated, without which the
complaint would be dismissible. Herein lies the problem. The Courts appreciation of
petitioners cause of action is that, while it would make out a case for ULP, under present law,
however, the same falls short of the special requirements necessary to make it cognizable by the
Labor Arbiter and the NLRC. Unsubstantiated conclusions of bad faith and
unjustified refusal to re-employ petitioners, to our mind, do not constitute gross
violation of the CBA for purposes of lodging jurisdiction with the Labor Arbiter
and the NLRC. Although evidentiary matters are not required (and even discouraged) to be
alleged in a complaint, still, sufficient details supporting the conclusion of bad faith and unjust
refusal to re-employ petitioners must be indicated. Furthermore, it is even doubtful if the CBA
provision on re-employment fits into the accepted notion of an economic provision of the
CBA.
Upon a careful and meticulous study of Briad, the Court holds that the rationale behind it does
not apply to the present case. There is here no overlapping of jurisdiction to speak of
because matters involving interpretation and implementation of CBA provisions, as well as
interpretation and enforcement of company personnel policies, have always been
determined by the Voluntary Arbitrator even prior to RA 6715. Similarly, all ULP
cases were exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter. What RA 6715 merely did was
to re-apportion the jurisdiction over ULP cases by conferring exclusive jurisdiction over such
ULP cases that do not involve gross violation of a CBAs economic provision upon the voluntary
arbitrator. We do not see anything in the act of re-apportioning jurisdiction curative of any
defect in the law as it stood prior to the enactment of RA 6715. The Court view it as merely a
matter of change in policy of the lawmakers, especially since the 1987 Constitution adheres to
the preferential use of voluntary modes of dispute settlement. This, instead of the inherent defect
in the law, must be the rationale that prompted the amendment. Hence, we uphold the
jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter which attached to this case at the time of its filing on December
5, 1988
Note: Should have been under the Jurisdiction of the Voluntary Arbitrator..But since it was
filed with the Labor Arbiter on December 5, 1988, the jurisdiction attached to the Labor
Arbiter.
33. STANDARD CHARTERED BANK EMPLOYEES UNION (NUBE), petitioner,
vs. The Honorable MA. NIEVES R. CONFESOR, in her capacity as
SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT; and the STANDARD
CHARTERED BANK, respondents.
G.R. No. 114974 | 2004-06-16

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

FACTS: Before the commencement of the negotiation for the new CBA between the bank and
the Union, the Union, through Divinagracia, suggested to the Banks Human Resource Manager
and head of the negotiating panel, Cielito Diokno, that the bank lawyers should be excluded from
the negotiating team. The Bank acceded. Meanwhile, Diokno(head of the negotiating team for
the bank) suggested to Divinagracia that Jose P. Umali, Jr., the President of the National Union
of Bank Employees (NUBE), the federation to which the Union was affiliated, be excluded from
the Unions negotiating panel. However, Umali was retained as a member thereof.
There was deadlock in the negotiations. Both parties alleged ULP. Bank alleged that the Union
violated its no strike- no lockout clause by filing a notice of strike before the NCMB. Considering
that the filing of notice of strike was an illegal act, the Union officers should be dismissed. Union
alleged unfair labor practice when the bank allegedly interfered with the Unions choice of
negotiator. It argued that, Dioknos suggestion that the negotiation be limited as a family affair
was tantamount to suggesting that Federation President Jose Umali, Jr. be excluded from the
Unions negotiating panel. It further argued that, damage or injury to the public interest need
not be present in order for unfair labor practice to prosper. The Union also contended that the
Bank merely went through the motions of collective bargaining without the intent to reach an
agreement
ISSUE: Whether there is unfair labor practice.
RULING: Article 248(a) of the Labor Code, considers it an unfair labor practice when
an employer interferes, restrains or coerces employees in the exercise of their
right to self-organization or the right to form association. The right to self-organization
necessarily includes the right to collective bargaining. Parenthetically, if an employer interferes
in the selection of its negotiators or coerces the Union to exclude from its panel of negotiators a
representative of the Union, and if it can be inferred that the employer adopted the said act to
yield adverse effects on the free exercise to right to self-organization or on the right to collective
bargaining of the employees, ULP under Article 248(a) in connection with Article 243 of the
Labor Code is committed.
In order to show that the employer committed ULP under the Labor Code, substantial evidence
is required to support the claim. Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. In the case at bar, the
Union bases its claim of interference on the alleged suggestions of Diokno to exclude Umali from
the Unions negotiating panel.
The circumstances that occurred during the negotiation do not show that the suggestion made by
Diokno to Divinagracia is an anti-union conduct from which it can be inferred that the Bank
consciously adopted such act to yield adverse effects on the free exercise of the right to selforganization and collective bargaining of the employees, especially considering that such was
undertaken previous to the commencement of the negotiation and simultaneously with
Divinagracias suggestion that the bank lawyers be excluded from its negotiating panel.

34. SANTA ROSA COCA-COLA PLANT EMPLOYEES UNION, DONRICO V.

SEBASTIAN, EULOGIO G. BATINO, SAMUEL A. ATANQUE, MANOLO C.
ZABALJAUREGUI, DIONISIO TENORIO, EDWIN P. RELLORES, LUIS B.
NATIVIDAD, MYRNA PETINGCO, FELICIANO TOLENTINO, RODOLFO A.
AMANTE, JR., CIPRIANO C. BELLO, RONALDO T. ESPINO, EFREN
GALAN, AND JUN CARMELITO SANTOS, VERSUS COCA-COLA
BOTTLERS PHILS., INC., RESPONDENT.
G.R. No. 164302-03 | 2007-01-24
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
FACTS: The Sta. Rosa Coca-Cola Plant Employees Union (Union) is the sole and exclusive
bargaining representative of the regular daily paid workers and the monthly paid noncommission-earning employees of the Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. (Company) in its Sta.
Rosa, Laguna plant.
Upon the expiration of the CBA, the Union informed the Company of its desire to renegotiate its
terms. The CBA meetings commenced on July 26, 1999, where the Union and the Company
discussed the ground rules of the negotiations. The Union insisted that representatives from the
Alyansa ng mga Unyon sa Coca-Cola be allowed to sit down as observers in the CBA meetings.
The Union officers and members also insisted that their wages be based on their work shift rates.
For its part, the Company was of the view that the members of the Alyansa were not members of
the bargaining unit. The Alyansa was a mere aggregate of employees of the Company in its
various plants; and is not a registered labor organization. Thus, an impasse ensued.
On August 30, 1999, the Union, its officers, directors and six shop stewards filed a Notice of
Strike with the NCMB. The Union decided to participate in a mass action organized by the
Alyansa in front of the Companys premises. Thus, the Union officers and members held a picket
along the front perimeter of the plant on September 21, 1999. As a result, all of the 14 personnel
of the Engineering Section of the Company did not report for work, and 71 production personnel
were also absent. As a result, only one of the three bottling lines operated during the day shift.
All the three lines were operated during the night shift with cumulative downtime of five (5)
hours due to lack of manning, complement and skills requirement. The volume of production for
the day was short by 60,000 physical cases versus budget.
On October 13, 1999, the Company filed a Petition to Declare Strike Illegal.
ISSUE: WON the strike, dubbed by petitioner as picketing, is illegal.
RULING: Article 212(o) of the Labor Code defines strike as a temporary stoppage of
work by the concerted action of employees as a result of an industrial or labor
dispute. In Bangalisan v. CA, the Court ruled that the fact that the conventional term strike
was not used by the striking employees to describe their common course of action is
inconsequential, since the substance of the situation, and not its appearance, will be deemed to
be controlling.

The records show that after the initiation of the collective bargaining process, with the inclusion
of Umali in the Unions negotiating panel, the negotiations pushed through. The complaint was
made only on August 16, 1993 after a deadlock was declared by the Union on June 15, 1993.

Picketing involves merely the marching to and fro at the premises of the employer,
usually accompanied by the display of placards and other signs making known the
facts involved in a labor dispute. As applied to a labor dispute, to picket means the
stationing of one or more persons to observe and attempt to observe. The purpose of pickets is
said to be a means of peaceable persuasion.

It is clear that such ULP charge was merely an afterthought. The accusation occurred after the
arguments and differences over the economic provisions became heated and the parties had
become frustrated. It happened after the parties started to involve personalities. As the public
respondent noted, passions may rise, and as a result, suggestions given under less adversarial
situations may be colored with unintended meanings. Such is what appears to have happened in
this case.

The basic elements of a strike are present in this case. They marched to and fro in front
of the companys premises during working hours. Thus, petitioners engaged in a concerted
activity which already affected the companys operations. The mass concerted activity
constituted a strike.

Hence, the parties failure to agree did not amount to ULP under Article 248(g) for
violation of the duty to bargain.

For a strike to be valid, the following procedural requisites provided by Art 263 of the Labor
Code must be observed: (a) a notice of strike filed with the DOLE 30 days before the intended
date thereof, or 15 days in case of unfair labor practice; (b) strike vote approved by a majority of

the total union membership in the bargaining unit concerned obtained by secret ballot in a
meeting called for that purpose, (c) notice given to the DOLE of the results of the voting at least
seven days before the intended strike. These requirements are mandatory and the failure of a
union to comply therewith renders the strike illegal. It is clear in this case that petitioners totally
ignored the statutory requirements and embarked on their illegal strike.
Petition denied.
35. THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD., EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATIONNATU, FGU INSURANCE GROUP WORKERS & EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION-NATU, and INSULAR LIFE BUILDING EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION-NATU, petitioners, vs. THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE
CO., LTD., FGU INSURANCE GROUP, J
G.R. No. L-25291 | 1971-01-30
CASTRO, J:
FACTS: The Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd., Employees Association-NATU, FGU Insurance
Group Workers & Employees Association-NATU, and Insular Life Building Employees
Association-NATU (hereinafter referred to as the Unions), while still members of the Federation
of Free Workers (FFW), entered into separate CBAs with the Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. and
the FGU Insurance Group (hereinafter referred to as the Companies). Two of the lawyers of the
Unions then were Felipe Enaje and Ramon Garcia; the latter was formerly the secretarytreasurer of the FFW and acting president of the Insular Life/FGU unions and the Insular Life
Building Employees Association. Garcia, as such acting president, in a circular issued in his
name and signed by him, tried to dissuade the members of the Unions from disaffiliating with
the FFW and joining the National Association of Trade Unions (NATU), to no avail.
Unions jointly submitted proposals to the Companies; negotiations were conducted on the
Unions proposals, but these were snagged by a deadlock on the issue of union shop, as a result
of which the Unions filed on January 27, 1958 a notice of strike for deadlock on collective
bargaining. The issue was dropped subsequently (in short, nagkasundo). But, the parties
negotiated on the labor demands but with no satisfactory result due to a stalemate on the matter
of salary increases. Meanwhile, 87 unionists were reclassified as supervisors without increase in
salary nor in responsibility while negotiations were going on in the Department of Labor after
the notice to strike was served on the Companies. These employees resigned from the Unions.
Incidentally, all of the more than 120 criminal charges filed against the members of the Unions,
except 3, were dismissed by the fiscals office and by the courts. These three cases involved
slight physical injuries against one striker and light coercion against two others.
At any rate, because of the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction against them as well as
the ultimatum of the Companies giving them until June 2, 1958 to return to their jobs or else be
replaced, the striking employees decided to call off their strike and to report back to work on
June 2, 1958. However, before readmitting the strikers, the Companies required them not only to
secure clearances from the City Fiscals Office of Manila but also to be screened by a
management committee among the members of which were Enage and Garcia. The screening
committee initially rejected 83 strikers with pending criminal charges. However, all non-strikers
with pending criminal charges which arose from the breakthrough incident were readmitted
immediately by the Companies without being required to secure clearances from the fiscals
office. Subsequently, when practically all the strikers had secured clearances from the fiscals
office, the Companies readmitted only some but adamantly refused readmission to 34 officials
and members of the Unions who were most active in the strike, on the ground that they
committed acts inimical to the interest of the respondents, without however stating the specific
acts allegedly committed. Some 24 of the above number were ultimately notified months later
that they were being dismissed retroactively as of June 2, 1958 and given separation pay checks
computed under Rep. Act 1787, while others (ten in number) up to now have not been
readmitted although there have been no formal dismissal notices given to them.
CIR prosecutor filed a complaint for unfair labor practice against the Companies under Republic
Act 875. The complaint specifically charged the Companies with (1) interfering with the
members of the Unions in the exercise of their right to concerted action, by sending out

individual letters to them urging them to abandon their strike and return to work, with a
promise of comfortable cots, free coffee and movies, and paid overtime, and, subsequently, by
warning them that if they did not return to work on or before June 2, 1958, they might be
replaced; and (2) discriminating against the members of the Unions as regards readmission to
work after the strike on the basis of their union membership and degree of participation in the
strike.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent company is guilty of ULP
HELD: YES
The act of an employer in notifying absent employees individually during a strike following
unproductive efforts at collective bargaining that the plant would be operated the next day and
that their jobs were open for them should they want to come in has been held to be an unfair
labor practice, as an active interference with the right of collective bargaining through dealing
with the employees individually instead of through their collective bargaining representatives.
Although the union is on strike, the employer is still under obligation to bargain with the union
as the employees bargaining representative.
Individual solicitation of the employees or visiting their homes, with the employer or his
representative urging the employees to cease union activity or cease striking, constitutes unfair
labor practice. All the above-detailed activities are unfair labor practices because they tend to
undermine the concerted activity of the employees, an activity to which they are entitled free
from the employers molestation. Indeed, when the respondents offered reinstatement and
attempted to bribe the strikers with comfortable cots, free coffee and occasional movies,
overtime pay for work performed in excess of eight hours, and arrangements for their
families, so they would abandon the strike and return to work, they were guilty of strike-breaking
and/or union-busting and, consequently, of unfair labor practice. It is equivalent to an attempt
to break a strike for an employer to offer reinstatement to striking employees individually, when
they are represented by a union, since the employees thus offered reinstatement are unable to
determine what the consequences of returning to work would be.
Ito lang po yung mga picketing:
Hiring of Enage and Garcia with attractive compensations; respondents reclassified 87
employees as supervisors without increase in salary or in responsibility, in effect compelling
these employees to resign from their unions; respondents, thru their president and manager,
respondent Jose M. Olbes, brought three truckloads of non-strikers and others, escorted by
armed men, who, despite the presence of eight entrances to the three buildings occupied by the
Companies, entered thru only one gate less than two meters wide and in the process, crashed
thru the picket line posted in front of the premises of the Insular Life Building. This resulted
in injuries on the part of the picketers and the strike-breakers; respondents brought against
the picketers criminal charges, only three of which were not dismissed, and these
three only for slight misdemeanors. As a result of these criminal actions, the respondents
were able to obtain an injunction from the court of first instance restraining the strikers from
stopping, impeding, obstructing, etc. the free and peaceful use of the Companies gates, entrance
and driveway and the free movement of persons and vehicles to and from, out and in, of the
Companies buildings.
Verily, the above actuations of the respondents before and after the issuance of the letters,
exhibit A and B, yield the clear inference that the said letters formed of the respondents scheme
to preclude if not destroy unionism within them. The respondents did not merely discriminate
against all the strikers in general. They separated the active from the less active unionists on the
basis of their militancy, or lack of it, on the picket lines. Unionists belonging to the first category
were refused readmission even after they were able to secure clearances from the competent
authorities with respect to the criminal charges filed against them.

36. ILAW AT BUKLOD NG MANGGAGAWA (IBM), petitioner, vs. NATIONAL

LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, LABOR ARBITER MANUEL P.

ASUNCION, ABUNDIO IBASCO, ANTONIO MAGSIPOC, CARLOS
VILLARANTE and BIENVENIDO RAMIREZ, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 81852-53 | 1993-03-05
MELO, J p:
FACTS: There was a wage order that caused a wage distortion within the company. Union then
proposed to the mgt. that the wage distortion be corrected by implementing a 25php wage
increase, which it later lowered to 15php. The Company, however, only effected a 7php wage
increase. The union considered the mgt.s move as the company ignoring their demands. As a
result, the union decided to work only for 8 hours per day, against the company practice for 5
years of having the workers work 10 to 14-hour work shifts. This caused the company, SMC
losses, due to diminished productivity, prompting it to file a complaint with the NLRC seeking
the declaration of the said unions activity (strike/slowdown) as illegal.
ISSUE: Whether or not said slowdown/strike is illegal
RULING: It is illegal, on several grounds.
The Court concedes the workers right to self organization and to concerted activities in exercise
of that right. The Court also pointed out that common examples are strike/temporary stoppage
of work, and picketing. However, the Court also points out that such right is not absolute and
may be limited by law. In this case, the Court pointed out that:
The legality of these activities is usually dependent on the legality of the purposes sought
to be attained and the means employed therefor. These joint or coordinated activities may
be forbidden or restricted by law or contract. In the particular instance of "distortions of the
wage structure within an establishment" resulting from "the application of any prescribed wage
increase by virtue of a law or wage order," Section 3 of Republic Act No. 6727 prescribes a
specific, detailed and comprehensive procedure for the correction thereof, thereby implicitly
excluding strikes or lockouts or other concerted activities as modes of settlement of the issue.

that the bank is prepared to take back employees who will report for work provided these
employees were/are not part of those who led or instigated or coerced their co-employees into
participating in this illegal act. Out of the 712 employees who took part in the three-day work
boycott, a total of 513 returned to work and were accepted by the bank. The remaining 199
employees insisted on defying Vistans directive, which included herein respondents Ernesto U.
Gamier, Elena R. Condevillamar, Janice L. Arriola and Ophelia C. De Guzman. For their failure
to return to work, the said 199 employees were each issued a show-cause memo directing them
to submit a written explanation within twenty-four hours why they should not be dismissed for
the illegal strike in defiance of the Assumption Order of the Secretary of Labor resulting to
grave and irreparable damage to the Bank, and placing them under preventive suspension. The
herein 129 individual respondents were among the 199 employees who were terminated for their
participation in the three-day work boycott and protest action.
Respondents Gamier, Condevillamar, Arriola and De Guzman filed separate complaints for
illegal dismissal, moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees. Labor Arbiter Potenciano S.
Caizares, Jr. dismissed the complaints of Gamier, Condevillamar, Arriola and De Guzman. It
was held that their participation in the illegal strike violated the Secretary of Labors return to
work order upon the latters assumption of the labor dispute and after directing the parties to
execute their new CBA. NLRC 2nd Division reversed the decision of Labor Arbiter Flores. The
Second Division ruled that the mass action held by the bank employees on infront of the Office of
the Secretary of Labor was not a legitimate exercise of the employees freedom of speech and
assembly. Such was a strike as defined under Article 212 (o) of the Labor Code, as amended,
which does not distinguish as to whom the action of the employees is directed against, nor the
place/location where the concerted action of the employees took place. Complainants Gamier,
Condevillamar, Arriola and De Guzman did not report for work and picketed the DOLE premises
on ; they continuously refused to report back to work until when they were issued a Notice of
Termination. It was stressed that the mass action of the bank employees was an incident of a
labor dispute, and hence the concerted work abandonment was a prohibited activity
contemplated under Article 264 (a) of the Labor Code, as amended, upon assumption of
jurisdiction by the Secretary of Labor.
Issue: Whether the action taken by the bank employees constituted a mass leave

37. Solidbank vs. Gamier, G. R. No. 159460, November 15, 2010 (Mass Leave)
Facts: Petitioner Solidbank and respondent Solidbank Employees were set to renegotiate the
economic provisions of their 1997-2001 Collective Bargaining Agreement to cover the remaining
two years thereof. Negotiations commenced on but seeing that an agreement was unlikely, the
declared a deadlock on and filed a Notice of Strike. During the collective bargaining negotiations,
some Union members staged a series of mass actions. In view of the impending actual strike,
then Secretary of Labor and Employment Bienvenido E. Laguesma assumed jurisdiction over the
labor dispute, pursuant to Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code, as amended. The assumption order
dated directed the parties to cease and desist from committing any and all acts that might
exacerbate the situation. Dissatisfied with the Secretarys ruling, the Union officers and
members decided to protest the same by holding a rally infront of the Office of the Secretary of
Labor and Employment in Intramuros, Manila, simultaneous with the filing of their motion for
reconsideration of the Order. Thus, majority of employees, including the individual respondents,
joined the mass leave and protest action at the Department of Labor and Employment office
while the banks provincial branches in , , and Naga followed suit and boycotted regular work.
The union members also picketed the banks Head Office in Binondo and Paseo de Roxas
branch.

Ruling: No. Article 212 of the Labor Code, as amended, defines strike as any temporary
stoppage of work by the concerted action of employees as a result of an industrial or labor
dispute. A labor dispute includes any controversy or matter concerning terms and conditions of
employment or the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining,
changing or arranging the terms and conditions of employment, regardless of whether or not the
disputants stand in the proximate relation of employers and employees.The term strike shall
comprise not only concerted work stoppages, but also slowdowns, mass leaves, sitdowns,
attempts to damage, destroy or sabotage plant equipment and facilities and similar
activities. Thus, the fact that the conventional term strike was not used by the striking
employees to describe their common course of action is inconsequential, since the substance of
the situation, and not its appearance, will be deemed to be controlling.

As a result of the employees concerted actions, Solidbanks business operations were paralyzed.
On the same day, then President of Solidbank, Deogracias N. Vistan, issued a memorandum
addressed to all employees calling their absence from work and demonstration infront of the
DOLE office as an illegal act, and reminding them that they have put their jobs at risk as they will
be asked to show cause why they should not be terminated for participating in the unioninstigated concerted action.The employees work abandonment/boycott lasted for three days.

After a thorough review of the records, we hold that the CA patently erred in concluding that the
concerted mass actions staged by respondents cannot be considered a strike but a legitimate
exercise of the respondents right to express their dissatisfaction with the Secretarys resolution
of the economic issues in the deadlocked CBA negotiations with petitioners. It must be stressed
that the concerted action of the respondents was not limited to the protest rally infront of the
DOLE Office on . Respondent had also picketed the Head Office and Paseo de Roxas Branch.
About 712 employees, including those in the provincial branches, boycotted and absented
themselves from work in a concerted fashion for three continuous days that virtually paralyzed
the employers banking operations. Considering that these mass actions stemmed from a
bargaining deadlock and an order of assumption of jurisdiction had already been issued by the
Secretary of Labor to avert an impending strike, there is no doubt that the concerted work
abandonment/boycott was the result of a labor dispute.

On the third day of the concerted work boycott, istan issued another memorandum, declaring

38. NUWHRAIN Dusit Hotel Nikko Chapter vs. Court of Appeals, G. R. No.

166295, November 11, 2008 (Constructive Strike)

Facts: The Union is the certified bargaining agent of the regular rank-and-file employees of
Dusit Hotel Nikko (Hotel), a five star service establishment owned and operated by Philippine
Hoteliers, Inc. located in Makati City. Chiyuki Fuijimoto and Esperanza V. Alvez are impleaded
in their official capacities as the Hotel's General Manager and Director of Human Resources,
respectively. The Union submitted its Collective Bargaining Agreement negotiation proposals to
the Hotel. As negotiations ensued, the parties failed to arrive at mutually acceptable terms and
conditions. Due to the bargaining deadlock, the Union, on December 20, 2001, filed a Notice of
Strike on the ground of the bargaining deadlock with the National Conciliation and Mediation
Board. Thereafter, conciliation hearings were conducted which proved unsuccessful.
Consequently, a Strike Vote was conducted by the Union on which it was decided that the Union
would wage a strike. The Union held a general assembly at its office located in the Hotel's
basement, where some members sported closely cropped hair or cleanly shaven heads. The next
day, more male Union members came to work sporting the same hair style. The Hotel prevented
these workers from entering the premises claiming that they violated the Hotel's Grooming
Standards.
In view of the Hotel's action, the Union staged a picket outside the Hotel premises. Later, other
workers were also prevented from entering the Hotel causing them to join the picket. For this
reason the Hotel experienced a severe lack of manpower which forced them to temporarily cease
operations in three restaurants. The Hotel terminated the services of twenty-nine Union officers
and sixty-one members; and suspended eighty-one employees for 30 days, forty-eight employees
for 15 days, four employees for 10 days, and three employees for five days. On the same day, the
Union declared a strike. Starting that day, the Union engaged in picketing the premises of the
Hotel. During the picket, the Union officials and members unlawfully blocked the ingress and
egress of the Hotel premises.
Issue: Whether the Union conducted an illegal strike.
Ruling: Yes. The Unions violation of the Hotels Grooming Standards was clearly a deliberate
and concerted action to undermine the authority of and to embarrass the Hotel and was,
therefore, not a protected action. The appearances of the Hotel employees directly reflect the
character and well-being of the Hotel, being a five-star hotel that provides service to top-notch
clients. Being bald or having cropped hair per se does not evoke negative or unpleasant feelings.
The reality that a substantial number of employees assigned to the food and beverage outlets of
the Hotel with full heads of hair suddenly decided to come to work bald-headed or with cropped
hair, however, suggests that something is amiss and insinuates a sense that something out of the
ordinary is afoot. Obviously, the Hotel does not need to advertise its labor problems with its
clients. It can be gleaned from the records before us that the Union officers and members
deliberately and in apparent concert shaved their heads or cropped their hair. This was shown by
the fact that after coming to work on January 18, 2002, some Union members even had their
heads shaved or their hair cropped at the Union office in the Hotels basement. Clearly, the
decision to violate the company rule on grooming was designed and calculated to place the Hotel
management on its heels and to force it to agree to the Unions proposals.
In view of the Unions collaborative effort to violate the Hotels Grooming Standards, it
succeeded in forcing the Hotel to choose between allowing its inappropriately hair styled
employees to continue working, to the detriment of its reputation, or to refuse them work, even if
it had to cease operations in affected departments or service units, which in either way would
disrupt the operations of the Hotel. This Court is of the opinion, therefore, that the act of the
Union was not merely an expression of their grievance or displeasure but, indeed, a calibrated
and calculated act designed to inflict serious damage to the Hotels finances or its reputation.
Thus, we hold that the Unions concerted violation of the Hotels Grooming Standards which
resulted in the temporary cessation and disruption of the Hotels operations is an unprotected
act and should be considered as an illegal strike.
39. CCBPI Postmix Workers Union vs. NLRC, G. R. No. 114521, November 27,
1998 (Effect of Non-compliance with pre-conditions)
Facts: Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils., Inc. Postmix Workers union (hereinafter referred to as the

"union") is the certified sole and exclusive bargaining agent for all regular office and sales
employees of CCBPI Postmix Division (hereinafter referred to as the "company"). With the
impending expiration of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between the parties on June
30, 1986, a series of negotiations were held for the possible renewal thereof. Since the
negotiations failed to produce any agreement, the union filed a Notice of Strike with the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) on March 9, 1987. Acting thereon, the DOLE
summoned the parties for conciliation hearings to resolve the bargaining deadlock. Still unable
to reach a common ground, the union conducted a strike vote the result of which clearly showed
the members' sentiments in favor of waging a strike. The company filed a Petition to Declare the
Strike Illegal, alleging that the union staged a strike without observing the mandatory seven-day
strike ban imposed under Art. 264 (f) of the Labor Code and that the strike was done in bad
faith, considering that the union did not exhaust the conciliation period. The strike, which lasted
for about five months, ended with the signing of the renewed CBA between the union and the
company on November 27, 1987. The CBA includes the Memorandum of Agreement drawn by
the parties and the Amendments to Memorandum of Agreement. The Labor Arbiter rendered a
Decision dismissing the Petition to Declare Strike Illegal for lack of merit, ruling that there was
substantial compliance with the mandatory seven-day strike ban, the union having struck on the
sixth day from the submission of the results of the strike vote to the NLRC. On appeal, the NLRC
reversed the Decision of the Labor Arbiter.

Issue: Whether the strike declared by the union was illegal for failure to comply with the
mandatory seven-day strike ban imposed under Art. 264 (f) of the Labor Code.

Ruling: We do not agree with the Labor Arbiter's opinion that a deficiency of one-day from the
mandatory seven-day strike ban is not a fatal defect, as to render the strike illegal. We do not
share the view that the union should be considered to have substantially complied with the strike
requirements under the law. It bears stressing that the strike requirements under Articles 264
and 265 of the Labor Code are mandatory requisites, without which, the strike will be considered
illegal. The evident intention of the law in requiring the strike notice and strike-vote report as
mandatory requirements is to reasonably regulate the right to strike, which is essential to the
attainment of legitimate policy objectives embodied in the law. Verily, substantial compliance
with a mandatory provision will not suffice. Strict adherence to the mandate of the law is
required.
40. TMPCWA vs. NLRC, G. R. No. 158786 and 158789, October 19, 2007 (When
is a strike illegal)
Facts: In May 2000, Mediator-Arbiter Ma. Zosima Lameyra issued an order certifying Toyota
Motor Philippines Corporation Workers Association as the exclusive bargaining agent of all
Toyota rank-and-file employees. Toyota filed a motion for reconsideration assailing the said
order. Lameyra denied the motion and Toyota eventually appealed the order before the DOLE
Secretary.
Meanwhile, the Union submitted its collective bargaining agreement (CBA) proposals to Toyota
but the latter refused to bargain pending its appeal before the DOLE Secretary. The Union then
filed a notice of strike with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB). The NCMB
converted the notice of strike to a preventive mediation considering that the DOLE Secretary was
yet to decide on Toyotas appeal.
In relation to Toyotas appeal, the parties were invited to a hearing. Union members were not
allowed to attend the hearing as they were aptly represented by the Union. But despite this,
many Union members and officers failed to render overtime and work on the following day
which caused Toyota to lose P53,849,991.00. The union members went to the hearing and
assembled before the Bureau of Labor Relations.
Subsequently, Toyota terminated 227 employees. The terminated employees allegedly
abandoned their work.

This resulted to another rally within Toyotas premises as the strikers barricaded the entrances
of Toyota preventing non-strikers from going to work.
In April 2001, the DOLE Secretary assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute and issued a
return-to-work order. The Union ended its strike in the same month. However, in May and June
2001, union members still conducted rallies and pickets.
Issue: Whether or not the strikes conducted by the Union on different occasions are illegal.
Ruling: Yes. The strike conducted before the BLR as well as the strike conducted when the 227
employees were terminated is illegal because both did not go through the proper procedure
required by the Labor Code. It cannot be said that the strike conducted before the BLR is beyond
the ambit of the strikes contemplated in the Labor Code. The Union argues that the strike is
actually a protest directed against the government and is covered by their constitutional right to
peaceably assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances. The SC disagreed
with this argument because the Union failed to provide evidence that the Mediator-Arbiter was
biased against them. Further, if this were the kind of protest they were claiming, they should
have secured a rally permit. Further still, this case involves a labor dispute. The employees may
shroud their strike as mere demonstrations covered by the constitution but in reality these are
temporary work stoppages.
The strikes conducted after the DOLE Secretary assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute are
illegal for they violated the return-to-work order.
The Supreme Court also cited the 6 categories of illegal strikes which are:
1. When it is contrary to a specific prohibition of law, such as strike by employees performing
governmental functions; or
2. When it violates a specific requirement of law, [such as Article 263 of the Labor Code on the
requisites of a valid strike]; or
3. When it is declared for an unlawful purpose, such as inducing the employer to commit an
unfair labor practice against non-union employees; or
4. When it employs unlawful means in the pursuit of its objective, such as a widespread
terrorism of non-strikers [for example, prohibited acts under Art. 264(e) of the Labor Code]; or
5. When it is declared in violation of an existing injunction, [such as injunction, prohibition, or
order issued by the DOLE Secretary and the NLRC under Art. 263 of the Labor Code]; or
6. When it is contrary to an existing agreement, such as a no-strike clause or conclusive
arbitration clause.
41. TMPCWA Supra (case No. 40)
42. Sukhotai Cuisine and Restaurant vs. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. 150437,
July 17, 2006 (Waiver of Illegality of Strike)
Facts: The majority of the employees of the petitioner organized themselves into a union which
affiliated with the Philippine Labor Alliance Council (PLAC), and was designated as PLAC Local
460 Sukhothai Restaurant Chapter. Private respondent Union filed a Notice of Strike with the
National Conciliation and Mediation Board on the ground of unfair labor practice, and
particularly, acts of harassment, fault-finding, and union busting through coercion and
interference with union affairs. In a conciliation conference, the representatives of the petitioner
agreed and guaranteed that there will be no termination of the services of private respondents
during the pendency of the case, with the reservation of the management prerogative to issue
memos to erring employees for the infraction, or violation of company policies. On the following
day, Strike Vote was conducted and supervised by NCMB personnel, and the results of the vote
were submitted to the NCMB. The petitioner and the Union entered into a Submission
Agreement, thereby agreeing to submit the issue of unfair labor practice the subject matter of
the foregoing Notice of Strike and the Strike Vote for voluntary arbitration with a view to
prevent the strike. Duing the pendency of the voluntary arbitration proceedings, the petitioner,
through its president, Ernesto Garcia, dismissed Eugene Lucente, a union member, due to an
alleged petty quarrel with a co-employee. In view of this termination, private respondent Union

filed with the NLRC a complaint for illegal dismissal. Private respondent Jose Lanorias, a union
member, was relieved from his post, and his employment as cook, terminated. Subsequently,
respondent Billy Bacus, the union vice-president, conferred with Ernesto Garcia and protested
Lanorias's dismissal. Shortly thereafter, respondents staged a "wildcat strike." Notice of Strike
was re-filed by the private respondents and the protest, according to the respondents, was
converted into a "sit-down strike and transformed to actual strike. etitioner filed a complaint for
illegal strike with the NLRC against private respondents, seeking to declare the strike illegal, and
to declare respondents, who participated in the commission of illegal acts, to have lost their
employment status. Having arrived at no amicable settlement, the parties submitted their
position papers, together with supporting documents, affidavits of witnesses, and photographs,
in compliance with the orders of the Labor Arbiter. Labor Arbiter rendered a decision and
declared that private respondents have staged an illegal strike, and the employment of union
officers and all individual respondents are deemed validly terminated in accordance with law.
Issue: Whether the strike staged by private respondents are legal
Ruling: No. This Court has held that strikes staged in violation of agreements providing for
arbitration are illegal, since these agreements must be strictly adhered to and respected if their
ends are to be achieved. The rationale of the prohibition under Article 264 is that once
jurisdiction over the labor dispute has been properly acquired by competent authority, that
jurisdiction should not be interfered with by the application of the coercive processes of a
strike. Indeed it is among the chief policies of the State to promote and emphasize the primacy of
free collective bargaining and negotiations, including voluntary arbitration, mediation, and
conciliation, as modes of settling labor, or industrial disputes.
Private respondents should have availed themselves of any of these alternative remedies instead
of resorting to a drastic and unlawful measure, specifically, the holding a wildcat strike.And
because of the fact that the Union was fully aware that the arbitration proceedings were pending,
good faith cannot be invoked as a defense.
For failing to exhaust all steps in the arbitration proceedings by virtue of the
Submission Agreement, in view of the proscription under Article 264 of the Labor Code, and the
prevailing state policy as well as its underlying rationale, this Court declares that the strike
staged by the private respondents is illegal.
43. Phimco Industries, Inc. V. Phimco Industries Labor Association
Brion, J.:
Gr 170830
Aug. 11, 2010
Facts: Petitioner is a corporation engaged in the production of matches. The respondent is a
duly organized bargaining representative of petitioners daily wage workers. When the last CBA
was about to expire, the parties negotiated for its renewal but ended deadlock. The respondent
filed a notice of strike before the NCMB. Later, respondent union staged a strike and blocked the
ingress and egress of the non-striking employees which paralyzed the operation of the petitioner.
The petitioner contended that the strike was illegal by preventing the ingress and egress of the
petitioners compound, thereby paralyzing the operation of the petitioner. The respondent
contended that it was only a moving picket and, therefore, valid.
Issue: Whether the strike is valid?
Held: No. To strike is to withhold or to stop work by the concerted action of employees as a
result of an industrial or labor dispute, which work stopped may be accompanied by picketing by
the striking employees outside of the company compound.
While the strike focuses on stoppage of work, picketing focuses on publicizing the labor
dispute and its incidents to inform the public of what is happening in the company struck
against; protected picketing does not extend to blocking ingress to and egress from the company
premises and the fact that the picket was moving, was peaceful and was not attended by actual
violence may not free it from taint of illegality if the picket blocked entry to and exit from the
company premises.

44. Escario V. NLRC

Bersamin, J.:

Gr 160302

Sept. 27,2010

Facts: Petitioners were among the regular employees and a union member of the private
respondent, a corporation engaged in manufacturing and selling of food seasoning.at 8:30 a.m.of
March 13, 1993, all officer and some members of the union walked out of private respondents
premises and proceeded to Barangay to show support for Canete, a union officer, charged with
oral defamation by several corporations personnel. As a result of the walkout, the union officers
were preventively suspended. The union filed a notice of strike and claimed that the private
respondent was guilty of union busting. The private respondent dismissed the petitioners and
charged them for Unfair Labor Practice for violating the CBA and abandonment of work by
participating in an illegal strike.

Issue: Whether the Secretary of Labor abuse his discretion in not resolving the issue of the
validity of the dismissal of the union officers?
Held: Yes. Article 263 (g) is an extraordinary and preemptive power to address an
extraordinary situation. A strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest.
This grant in not limited to the grounds cited in the notice of strike or lockout that may have
proceeded the strike or lockout. As the term assume jurisdiction, the dispute out of the strike
or lockout.
47. International Pharmaceuticals, Inc. V. Secretary of Labor
Regalado, J.:
Gr 92981
Jan. 9, 1992

Issue: Whether the dismissal or the petitioners is illegal?

Held: Yes. On the consequence of an illegal strike, the provision distinguished between union
officer and union member participating in an illegal strike. A union officer who knowingly
participates in an illegal strike is deemed to have lost his employment status, but a union
member who is merely instigated or induced to participate in the illegal strike is benignly
treated.
Part of the explanation for the benign consideration for the union members is the policy of
reinstating rank-and-file employees who are misled into supporting illegal strike.
45. Visayas Community Medical Center V. Erma Yballe
Villarama, JR,. J.:
Gr 196156
Jan 15, 2014
Facts: Respondents were hired as nurses and midwives by petitioner. The National Federation
of Labor (NFL) is the exclusive bargaining agent representative of the petitioners employees.
The parties had an existing CBA and it was about to expire. The union proposed to renew their
CBA, but ended in deadlock. Later, several union members marched around the petitioners
premises. Petitioner sent several notices requiring them to explain their side but they did not
comply. Some of the employees were terminated due to an illegal strike. Respondent contended
that they did not lost their employment when they joined the strike.
Issue: Whether the contention of the respondent is meritotious?
Held: Yes. The law makes a distinction between union members and union officers. A member
merely participating in an illegal strike may not e terminated from employment. It is only when
he commits Illegal acts during a strike. That he may be declared to have lost employment status.
In contrast, a union officer may be terminated from employment for knowingly participating in
na illegal strikeor participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike.
The law grants the employer the option of declaring a union officer who participated in an
illegal strike as having lost his employment.
46. Bagong Pagkakaisa ng Manggagawa V. Secretary of Labor
Brion, J.:
Gr 167401
July 5, 2010
Facts: The petitioner and private respondent had a CBA and is about to expire. The union
submitted proposals for its negotiation but it reached deadlock that lead to filing a notice of
strike. The company filed a notice of lockout for Unfair Labor Practice due to alleged unions
work slowdown. The union went on strike. The Secretary of Labor assumed jurisdiction over the
labor dispute and directed all striking workers to return-to-work and the company was directed
to accept them back to work. The petitioner claimed that the respondent violated the return-towork ordered by the Secretary of Labor when some of the union officers were dismissed. The
union officers filed a petition to cite the company in contempt and the reinstatement order be
issued, but the Secretary of Labor resolved issues regarding bargaining deadlock only.

Facts: Petitioner is engaged in manufacturing of drugs and pharmaceuticals, and being a

company belong to an industry indispensable to national interest. Prior to expiration of CBA
between the petitioner and the private respondent, the latter submitted to the company its
economic demands, but still it reached a deadlock. The union filed a notice of strike, but
eventually conducted a strike that completely paralyzed the petitioners operation. The case was
filed before the L.A. However, the Secretary of Labor assumed jurisdiction over the case and
issued an order directing the parties to return to status quo before the work stoppage. The
petitioner contended that the Secretarys order is null and void since it order the cessation of all
proceeding before the L.A.
Issue: Whether the order of the Secretary of Labor is correct?
Held: Yes. The Secretary of Labor was explicitly granted by Article 263(g) of the Labor Code
the authority to assume jurisdiction over labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or
lockout in an industry indispensable to national interest and decide the same accordingly.
Necessarily this authority to assume jurisdiction over the said labor dispute must include and
extend to all questions and controversies arising therefrom including cases over which the L.A.
has exclusive jurisdiction.
By virtue of Article 263(g) of the Labor Code, the Secretary of Labor has been conferred
jurisdiction over cases which would otherwise be under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of
the L.A. There was an existing labor dispute as a result of a deadlock in the negotiation for a
collective
48. EDEN GLADYS ABARIA VS NLRC
Facts: Metro Cebu Community Hospital, Inc. (MCCHI), presently known as the Visayas
Community Medical Center (VCMC). is owned by the United Church of Christ in the Philippines
(UCCP) and Rev. Gregorio P. Iyoy is the Hospital Administrator. The National Federation of
Labor (NFL) is the exclusive bargaining representative of the rank-and-file employees of
MCCHI. On December 6, 1995, the union expressed desire to renew the CBA. Atty. Alforque,
NFLs Regional Director suspended union membership of some for serious violation of the
Constitution and By-Laws. On February 26, 1996, upon the request of Atty. Alforque, MCCHI
granted one-day union leave with pay for 12 union members. The next day, several union
members led by Nava and her group launched a series of mass actions such as wearing black and
red armbands/headbands, marching around the hospital premises and putting up placards,
posters and streamers. MCCHI directed the union officers led by Nava to submit within 48 hours
a written explanation why they should not be terminated for having engaged in illegal concerted
activities amounting to strike, and placed them under immediate preventive suspension.
Responding to this directive, Nava and her group denied there was a temporary stoppage of
work, explaining only reiterating their demand for MCCHI to comply with its duty to bargain
collectively.
Union officers were ordered to appear for investigation in connection with the illegal strike
wherein they reportedly uttered slanderous and scurrilous words against the officers of the

hospital, threatening other workers and forcing them to join the strike. Said union officers,
however, invoked the grievance procedure provided in the CBA With the volatile situation
adversely affecting hospital operations and the condition of confined patients, MCCHI filed a
petition for injunction in the NLRC to which a TRO was issued. Thereafter, several complaints
for illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice were filed by the terminated employees. The
complaints for ULP were dismissed. Executive Labor Arbiter Belarmino found no basis for the
charge of unfair labor practice and declared the strike and picketing activities illegal having been
conducted by NAMA-MCCH-NFL which is not a legitimate labor organization. The termination
of union leaders Nava, Alsado, Baez, Bongcaras, Canen, Gerona and Remocaldo were upheld as
valid but MCCHI was directed to grant separation pay equivalent to one-half month for every
year of service NLRC denied complainants motion for reconsideration. CA reversed the assailed
decision. In G.R. No. 187778, petitioners Nava, et al. prayed that the CA decision be set aside
and a new judgment be entered by this Court (1) declaring private respondents guilty of unfair
labor practice and union busting; (2) directing private respondents to cease and desist from
further committing unfair labor practices against the petitioners; (3) imposing upon MCCH the
proposed CBA or, in the alternative, directing the hospital and its officers to bargain with the
local union; (4) declaring private respondents guilty of unlawfully suspending and illegally
dismissing the individual petitioners-employees; (5) directing private respondents to reinstate
petitioners-employees to their former positions, or their equivalent, without loss of seniority
rights with full backwages and benefits until reinstatement; and (6) ordering private
respondents to pay the petitioners moral damages, exemplary damages, legal interests, and
attorneys fees
ISSUE: whether MCCHI is guilty of unfair labor practice;
HELD: MCCHI not guilty of unfair labor practice Art. 248 (g) of the Labor Code, as amended,
makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer *t+o violate the duty to bargain collectively as
prescribed by the Code. The applicable provision in this case is Art. 253 which provides: ART.
253. Duty to bargain collectively when there exists a collective bargaining agreement.
When there is a collective bargaining agreement, the duty to bargain collectively shall also
mean that neither party shall terminate nor modify such agreement during its lifetime. However,
either party can serve a written notice to terminate or modify the agreement at least sixty (60)
days prior to its expiration date. It shall be the duty of both parties to keep the status quo and to
continue in full force and effect the terms and conditions of the existing agreement during the
60-day period and/or until a new agreement is reached by the parties. Records of the NCMB and
DOLE Region 7 confirmed that NAMA-MCCH-NFL had not registered as a labor organization,
having submitted only its charter certificate as an affiliate or local chapter of NFL.[37] Not being
a legitimate labor organization, NAMA-MCCH-NFL is not entitled to those rights granted to a
legitimate labor organization under Art. 242, specifically:
(a) To act as the representative of its members for the purpose of collective bargaining;
(b) To be certified as the exclusive representative of all the employees in an appropriate
collective bargaining unit for purposes of collective bargaining;
Aside from the registration requirement, it is only the labor organization designated or selected
by the majority of the employees in an appropriate collective bargaining unit which is the
exclusive representative of the employees in such unit for the purpose of collective bargaining, as
provided in Art. 255.[38] NAMA-MCCH-NFL is not the labor organization certified or
designated by the majority of the rank-and-file hospital employees to represent them in the CBA
negotiations but the NFL, as evidenced by CBAs concluded in 1987, 1991 and 1994. While it is
true that a local union has the right to disaffiliate from the national federation, NAMA-MCCHNFL has not done so as there was no any effort on its part to comply with the legal requisites for
a valid disaffiliation during the freedom period[39] or the last 60 days of the last year of the
CBA, through a majority vote in a secret balloting in accordance with Art. 241 (d).[40] Nava and
her group simply demanded that MCCHI directly negotiate with the local union which has not
even registered as one.
NAMA-MCCH-NFL at the time of submission of said proposals was not a duly registered labor

organization, hence it cannot legally represent MCCHIs rank-and-file employees for purposes of
collective bargaining. Hence, even assuming that NAMA-MCCH-NFL had validly disaffiliated
from its mother union, NFL, it still did not possess the legal personality to enter into CBA
negotiations. A local union which is not independently registered cannot, upon disaffiliation
from the federation, exercise the rights and privileges granted by law to legitimate labor
organizations; thus, it cannot file a petition for certification election Not being a legitimate labor
organization nor the certified exclusive bargaining representative of MCCHIs rank- and-file
employees, NAMA-MCCH-NFL cannot demand from MCCHI the right to bargain collectively in
their behalf.[45] Hence, MCCHIs refusal to bargain then with NAMA-MCCH-NFL cannot be
considered an unfair labor practice to justify the staging of the strike
49. YSS EMPLOYEES UNION- PHILIPPINE TRANSPORT AND GENERAL
WORKERS ORGANIZATION VS. YSS LABORATORIES INC.
FACTS: In order to arrest escalating business losses, YSS Laboratories, a domestic corporation
engaged in Pharmaceutical business implemented a retrenchment program which affected 11
employees purportedly chosen in accordance with the reasonable standards established by the
company. Of the 11 employees sought to be retrenched, nine were officers and members of
YSSEU, a duly registered labor organization and the sole and exclusive bargaining representative
of the rank-and-file employees of YSS. Claiming that YSS Laboratories was guilty of
discrimination and union-busting in carrying out the said retrenchment program, YSSEU
decided to hold a valid strike. A number of conciliation proceedings were made by the NCMBNCR but still the dispute was not resolved. This prompted the Sectary of Labor to intervene.
Finding that the labor dispute was inimical to the national interest, it certifies the case to the
NLRC for compulsory arbitration and issued two orders: first, directing all striking workers to
return to work and for the Company to accept them back under the same terms and conditions of
employment prior to the strike; second, that the nine retrenched employees be included in the
return to work order. Aggrieved, YSS Laboratories filed a petition under Rule 65 before the Court
of Appeals in which the latter reversed the orders of the Secretary of Labor and granted the
petition of YSS Laboratories. The appellate court found that YSS Laboratories validly carried out
its retrenchment program, which effectively severed the concerned employees employment with
the company. Hence, YSSEU comes to this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the retrenched employees should be excluded from the coverage of the
return-to-work- order.
HELD:The Orders of the Secretary of Labor, certifying the labor dispute involving the herein
parties to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration, and enjoining YSSEU to return to work and YSS
Laboratories to admit them under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike,
were issued pursuant to Article 263(g) of the Labor Code. Said provision reads:
Art. 263. Strikes, picketing, and lockouts.
xxxx
(g) When, in his opinion, there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout
in an industry indispensable to the national interest, the Secretary of Labor and Employment
may assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify the same to the Commission for
compulsory arbitration. Such assumption or certification shall have the effect of automatically
enjoining the intended or impending strike or lockout as specified in the assumption or
certification order. If one has already taken place at the time of assumption or certification, all
striking or locked out employees shall immediately return to work and the employer shall
immediately resume operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions
prevailing before the strike or lockout.
It should be noted that the primary reason why the strike was conducted in the first place
was to protest the implementation of the retrenchment program, which clearly discriminated
against union officers and members. YSS Laboratories vigorous insistence on the exclusion of
the retrenched employees from the coverage of the return-to-work order seriously impairs the

authority of the Secretary of Labor to forestall a labor dispute that he deems inimical to the
national economy. Accordingly, when the Secretary of Labor directed YSS Laboratories to accept
all the striking workers back to work, the Secretary did not exceed his jurisdiction, or gravely
abuse the same, said the Supreme Court. Hence, the petition is granted. The orders of the
Secretary of Labor and Employment are hereby reinstated.
50. JACKBILT INDUSTRIES, INC., Petitioner, vs. JACKBILT EMPLOYEES
WORKERS UNION-NAFLU-KMU, Respondent.
FACTS: Petitioner Jackbilt Industries, Inc. temporarily stop its business because of the adverse
effect of Asian economic crisis, and compelled most of its employees to go on leave for six
months.
Because its collective bargaining agreement with petitioner was expiring during the period of the
shutdown, respondent
Jackbilt Employees Workers Union-NAFLU-KMU protested the
temporary shutdown and its officers and members picketed petitioners main gates and
deliberately prevented persons and vehicles from going into and out of the compound.
Upon petition by the petitioner, NLRC issued a temporary restraining order directing the
respondents to refrain from preventing access to petitioners property, however, respondent
union violated the order. Thus, petitioner dismissed the concerned officers and members and
barred them from entering its premises.
Respondent then filed complaints for illegal lockout, runaway shop and damages, unfair labor
practice, illegal dismissal and attorneys fees, and refusal to bargain on behalf of its officers and
members against petitioner and its corporate officers.
In a decision, the labor arbiter dismissed the complaints for illegal lockout and unfair labor
practice for lack of merit. However, because petitioner did not file a petition to declare the strike
illegal before terminating respondents officers and employees, it was found guilty of illegal
dismissal.
Petitioner then assailed the decision of the NLRC before the Court of Appeals, whereby, the
appellate court dismissed the petition but modified the decision of the NLRC.
Petitioner was therefore guilty of unfair labor practice and, consequently, was ordered to pay
respondents officers and employees backwages.
Thus, this recourse.
ISSUE: Whether or not the filing of a petition with the labor arbiter to declare a strike illegal is a
condition sine qua non for the valid termination of employees who commit an illegal act in the
course of such strike.
RULING: The Court finds merit with the assertion of the Petitioner that the filing of a petition
to declare the strike illegal was unnecessary since the NLRC had already found that respondent
committed illegal acts in the course of the strike.
The use of unlawful means in the course of a strike renders such strike illegal. The filing of a
petition to declare the strike illegal was thus unnecessary.
Consequently, the Court also uphold the legality of the dismissal of respondents officers and
employees.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted. The decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.

51. Airline Pilots Association of the Philippines vs PAL

FACTS: The present controversy stemmed from a labor dispute between respondent Philippine
Airlines, Inc. (PAL) and ALPAP, the legitimate labor organization and exclusive bargaining agent
of all commercial pilots of PAL. Claiming that PAL committed unfair labor practice, ALPAP filed
on December 9, 1997, a notice of strike against respondent PAL with the DOLE, docketed as
NCMB NCR NS 12-514-97. Upon PALs petition and considering that its continued operation is
impressed with public interest, the DOLE Secretary assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute
per Order dated December 23, 1997. In a subsequent Order, he DOLE Secretary reiterated the
prohibition contained in the December 23, 1997 Order. Despite such reminder to the parties,
however, ALPAP went on strike on June 5, 1998. This constrained the DOLE, through then
Secretary Cresenciano B. Trajano, to issue a return-to-work order on June 7, 1998. However, it
was only on June 26, 1998 when ALPAP officers and members reported back to work as shown
in a logbook signed by each of them. As a consequence, PAL refused to accept the returning
pilots for their failure to comply immediately with the return-to-work order. ALPAP filed with
the Labor Arbiter a complaint for illegal lockout against PAL. ALPAP contended that its counsel
received a copy of the return-to-work order only on June 25, 1998, which justified their noncompliance therewith until June 26, 1998. It thus prayed that PAL be ordered to accept
unconditionally all officers and members of ALPAP without any loss of pay and seniority and to
pay whatever salaries and benefits due them pursuant to existing contracts of employment.
pending before the DOLE Secretary since the controversy presented in the lockout case is an
offshoot of the labor dispute over which the DOLE Secretary has assumed jurisdiction and
because the factual allegations in both cases are interrelated. the NLRC sustained the
consolidation of the illegal lockout case with the strike case, opining that the DOLE Secretary has
the authority to resolve all incidents attendant to his return-to-work order. DOLE Secretary
Bienvenido E. Laguesma, it declared the strike conducted by ALPAP on June 5, 1998 illegal and
pronouncing the loss of employment status of its officers and members who participated in the
strike in defiance of the June 7, 1998 return-to-work order.
Issue: Whether the dismissal of the employee is valid?
Ruling: A review of the records reveals that in NCMB NCR NS 12-514-97, the DOLE Secretary
declared the ALPAP officers and members to have lost their employment status based on either
of two grounds, viz: their participation in the illegal strike on June 5, 1998 or their defiance of
the return-to-work order of the DOLE Secretary. The records of the case unveil the names of
each of these returning pilots. The logbook[43] with the heading Return To Work Compliance/
Returnees bears their individual signature signifying their conformity that they were among
those workers who returned to work only on June 26, 1998 or after the deadline imposed by
DOLE. From this crucial and vital piece of evidence, it is apparent that each of these pilots is
bound by the judgment. Besides, the complaint for illegal lockout was filed on behalf of all these
returnees. Thus, a finding that there was no illegal lockout would be enforceable against them.
In fine, only those returning pilots, irrespective of whether they comprise the entire membership
of ALPAP, are bound by the June 1, 1999 DOLE Resolution.
ALPAP harps on the inequity of PALs termination of its officers and members considering
that some of them were on leave or were abroad at the time of the strike. Some were even merely
barred from returning to their work which excused them for not complying immediately with the
return-to-work order. Again, a scrutiny of the records of the case discloses that these allegations
were raised at a very late stage, that is, after the judgment has finally decreed that the returning
pilots termination was legal. Interestingly, these defenses were not raised and discussed when
the case was still pending before the DOLE Secretary, the CA or even before this Court. We agree
with the position taken by Sto. Tomas and Imson that from the time the return-to-work order
was issued until this Court rendered its April 10, 2002 resolution dismissing ALPAPs petition,
no ALPAP member has claimed that he was unable to comply with the return-to-work directive
because he was either on leave, abroad or unable to report for some reason. These defenses were
raised in ALPAPs twin motions only after the Resolution in G.R. No. 152306 reached finality in
its last ditch effort to obtain a favorable ruling. It has been held that a proceeding may not be
reopened upon grounds already available to the parties during the pendency of such

proceedings; otherwise, it may give way to vicious and vexatious proceedings.[44] ALPAP was
given all the opportunities to present its evidence and arguments. It cannot now complain that it
was denied due process
52. Jalie Olisa Et. Al and Malayang Samahan ng mga mangagawa sa Balanced
Food vs Danilo Escario
Facts: All the officers and some 200 members of the Union walked out of companys premises
and proceeded to the barangay office to show support for Juanito Caete, an officer of the Union
charged with oral defamation by Aurora Manor, the companys personnel manager, and Yolanda
Fabella, Manors secretary. It appears that the proceedings in the barangay resulted in a
settlement, and the officers and members of the Union all returned to work thereafter.
As a result of the walkout, PINA preventively suspended all officers of the Union because of the
walkout incident. PINA terminated the officers of the Union after a month.
PINA filed a complaint for ULP and damages. LA ruled that the incident was an illegal walkout
constituting ULP; and that all the Unions officers, except Caete, had thereby lost their
employment.
Union filed a notice of strike, claiming that PINA was guilty of union busting through the
constructive dismissal of its officers. The Union held a strike vote (June 9), at which a majority of
190 members of the Union voted to strike. The strike was held in the afternoon of June 15, 1993.
NLRC issued a TRO enjoining the Unions officers and members to cease and desist from
barricading and obstructing the entrance to and exit from PINAs premises, to refrain from
committing any and all forms of violence, and to remove all forms of obstructions such as
streamers, placards, or human barricade.
LA held the strike to be illegal. NLRC affirmed but it further rules that there was no
abandonment.
The union claimed that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in not awarding backwages
pursuant to Article 279 of the Labor Code, and in not declaring their strike as a good faith strike.
Issue: WON petitioners are illegally dismissed?
Ruling: The situation of the petitioners calls for the application of third paragraph of Article
264(a) and not Art. 279.
Art. 264- Contemplating two causes for the dismissal of an employee, that is: (a) unlawful
lockout; and (b) participation in an illegal strike, the third paragraph of Article 264(a) authorizes
the award of full backwages only when the termination of employment is a consequence of an
unlawful lockout. On the consequences of an illegal strike, the provision distinguishes between a
union officer and a union member participating in an illegal strike. A union officer who
knowingly participates in an illegal strike is deemed to have lost his employment status, but a
union member who is merely instigated or induced to participate in the illegal strike is more
benignly treated. Part of the explanation for the benign consideration for the union member is
the policy of reinstating rank-and-file workers who are misled into supporting illegal strikes,
absent any finding that such workers committed illegal acts during the period of the illegal
strikes.
The petitioners were terminated for joining a strike that was later declared to be illegal. The
NLRC ordered their reinstatement or, in lieu of reinstatement, the payment of their separation
pay, because they were mere rank-and-file workers whom the Unions officers had misled into
joining the illegal strike. They were not unjustly dismissed from work. Based on the text and
intent of the two aforequoted provisions of the Labor Code, therefore, it is plain that Article
264(a) is the applicable one.
53. ILAW AT BUKLOD NG MANGGAGAWA (IBM) VS. NLRC ET. AL. (SAN

MIGUEL CORPORATION) G.R. NO. 91980 JUNE 27, 1991

FACTS: IBM representing 4500 employees of SMC working at various plants, offices and
warehouses in NCR presented to the company a demand for correction of the significant
distortion in the workers wages pursuant to the Wage Rationalization Act. Demand unheeded by
company hence the union members refused to render overtime services until the distortion has
been corrected by SMC. It appears that the employees working hours/schedule has been freely
observed by the employees for the past 5 years and due to the abandonment of the longstanding
schedule of work and reversion to the eight-hour shift substantial losses were incurred by SMC.
SMC filed a complaint with arbitration branch of NLRC then before the NLRC for the
latter to declare the strike illegal. Unions contention: workers refusal to work beyond 8 hours
was a legitimate means of compelling SMC to correct distortion. SMC: The coordinated
reduction by the Unions members of the work time in order to compel SMC to yield to the
demand was an illegal and unprotected activity.
ISSUE: Whether or not the strike is illegal?
RULING: YES.
(Among the rights guaranteed to employees by the Labor Code is that of engaging in
concerted activities in order to attain their legitimate objectives. The more common of these
concerted activities as far as employees are concerned are: strikes- the temporary stoppage of
work as a result of an industrial or labor dispute. On the other hand, the counterpart activity that
management may licitly undertake is the lockout- the temporary refusal to furnish work on
account of a labor dispute, Article 263 provides that the "right of legitimate labor organizations
to strike and of employer to lockout, consistent with the national interest, shall continue to be
recognized and respected." The legality of these activities is usually dependent on the legality of
the purposes sought to be attained and the means employed therefor. It goes without saying that
these joint or coordinated activities may be forbidden or restricted by law or contract.) just an
FYI!
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 6727 prescribes a specific, detailed and comprehensive
procedure for the correction thereof, thereby implicitly excluding strikes or lockouts or other
concerted activities as modes of settlement of the issue. The provision states that:
xxx the employer and the union shall negotiate to correct the distort-ions. Any dispute arising
from wage distortions shall be resolved through the grievance procedure under their collective
bargaining agreement and, if it remains unresolved, through voluntary arbitration
Furthermore, Section 16, Chapter I of the implementing rules of said law declares that, "Any
issue involving wage distortion shall not be a ground for a strike/lockout."
Moreover, the workers concerted refusal to adhere to the work schedule in force is a
slowdown, an inherently illegal activity even in the absence of a no strike clause because while
the employees continue to work and remain at their positions and accept their wages, they at the
same time select part of the work they care to perform at their own volition or in their own
terms.
54. FIRST CITY INTERLINK TRANSPORTATION VS. MA. NIEVES ROLDANCONFESOR G.R. No. 106316, 272 SCRA 124 (MAY 5, 1997)
FACTS: Petitioner First City Interlink Transportation Co, Inc is a public utility while respondent
Nagkakaisang Manggagawa ng Fil Transit-National Federation of Labor is the labor union of Fil
Transit employees. The union filed a notice of strike with the BLR for ULP against petitioner.
The parties failed to reach an agreement so that the union went on strike. Consequently, several
workers were dismissed. The union filed another notice of strike alleging ULP, massive dismissal
of union officers and members, coercion of employees and violation of workers' rights to selforganization. Conciliation conferences were held but the union again went on strike. The MOLE
ordered the striking workers to return to work. Only 66 employees were accepted by petitioner
conditioned on the submission of certain requirements. The Secretary of Labor ruled for the
legality of the strike and awarded backwages and separation pay to the strikers. Petitioner
alleged that no strike vote was obtained, the result thereof was not reported to the MOLE, the

strikers engaged in violent, illegal and criminal acts, and it complied with the return to work
order.
ISSUE: WON the strike was illegal?
RULING: YES.
It was not shown in the pleadings that a strike vote was obtained before the
declaration of strike. The statement in the same order of the Labor Secretary that a notice of
strike had been filed because several conciliation conferences failed due to management's
consistent refusal to appear is contrary to evidence because management was duly represented
during the conciliation proceedings prior to the strike. Further, the union failed to comply with
the required 7-day strike ban. The union was in bad faith when it conducted the strike because
instead of attending the conciliation meetings with petitioner, it went on strike. The strike was
attended by pervasive and widespread violence such as the hijacking of Fil-Transit buses,
barricading of the terminal in Alabang, puncturing of tires, cutting of electric wirings, water
hoses and fan belts, use of Molotov bombs, and theft of expensive equipment such as fuel
injections. The commission of these illegal acts was neither isolated nor accidental but
deliberately employed to intimidate and harass the employer and the public. However, only the
union officers and strikers who engaged in violent, illegal and criminal acts against the employer
are deemed to have lost their employment status.
55. GRAND BOULEVARD HOTEL (FORMERLY KNOWN AS SILAHIS
INTERNATIONAL HOTEL, INC.), VS. GENUINE LABOR ORGANIZATION
OF WORKERS IN HOTEL, RESTAURANT AND ALLIED INDUSTRIES
(GLOWHRAIN) G.R. NO. 153664. JULY 18, 2003
FACTS: On June 15, 1990, the petitioner and the respondent union entered into and signed a
third CBA covering the period of July 10, 1988 to July 9, 1991. On September 27, 1990, the
respondent union filed a notice of strike. The matter was referred to the NCMB for resolution.
Meanwhile, on October 16, 1990, Michael Wilson, the petitioners general manager, wrote the
Secretary of Labor informing him of the petitioners decision to retrench seventeen less senior
employees to lessen the daily financial losses being incurred by the petitioner.
The next day, the respondent union, through its president, informed the DOLE-NCR
that the union will conduct a strike vote referendum on October 23 and 24, 1990. The members
of the respondent union voted to stage a strike. On October 25, 1990, the respondent union
informed the DOLE-NCR of the results of the strike vote referendum. On October 31, 1990, the
SOLE issued another status quo ante bellum order certifying the case to the NLRC for
compulsory arbitration and enjoining the parties from engaging in any strike or lockout.
The petitioner wrote the SOLE of its decision to implement its retrenchment program
to stem its huge losses. It terminated the employment of sixty employees and two officers of the
respondent union effective December 6, 1990. On November 7, 1990, the respondent union
protested the actions of the petitioner invoking Section 15, Article VI of the CBA. The
respondent union filed an urgent motion for a reconsideration by the SOLE of the Certification
Order dated October 31, 1990. On November 14, 1990, the petitioner terminated the
employment of eighty-six more employees effective December 14, 1990. The remaining
employees were also informed that it will close in six months. On November 14, 1990, the
petitioner terminated the employment of Kristoffer So, effective December 14, 1990.
By way of riposte, the respondent union filed on November 16, 1990 another notice of
strike because of what it perceived as the petitioners continuing unfair labor practices (ULP).
On the same day, at about 12:00 noon, the officers of the respondent union and some members
staged a picket in the premises of the hotel, obstructing the free ingress and egress thereto.
ISSUE: Was the strike held on November 16, 1990 illegal?
RULING: YES.
In this case, the respondent union filed its notice of strike with the DOLE on
November 16, 1990 and on the same day, staged a picket on the premises of the hotel, in
violation of the law. Police operatives of the Western Police District had to disperse the picketers

and take into custody Union President Rogelio Soluta and the other officers of respondent union,
Henry Babay and Dennis Cosico. The respondents cannot argue that since the notice of strike on
November 16, 1990 were for the same grounds as those contained in their notice of strike on
September 27, 1990 which complied with the requirements of the law on the cooling-off period,
strike ban, strike vote and strike vote report, the strike staged by them on November 16, 1990
was lawful. The matters contained in the notice of strike of September 27, 1990 had already
been taken cognizance of by the SOLE when he issued on October 31, 1990 a status quo ante
bellum order enjoining the respondent union from intending or staging a strike. Despite the
SOLE order, the respondent union nevertheless staged a strike on November 16, 1990
simultaneously with its notice of strike, thus violating Article 264(a) of the Labor Code of the
Philippines.
While it may be true that the petitioner itself barred the officers of the respondent
union from working and had terminated the employment of Kristoffer So, and sent out circulars
of its decision to retrench its employees effective December 16, 1990, the same were not valid
justifications for the respondents to do away with the statutory procedural requirements for a
lawful strike. It behooved the respondents to avail themselves of the remedies under the CBA or
file an illegal dismissal case in the office of the Labor Arbiter against the petitioner or by
agreement of the parties, submit the case to the grievance machinery of the CBA so that the
matter may be subjected to voluntary arbitrary proceedings instead of resorting to an immediate
strike.There was no immediate and imperative need for the respondents to stage a strike on the
very day that the notice of strike on November 16, 1990 was filed because the retrenchment
envisaged by the petitioner had yet to take effect on December 14, 1990. The grievances of the
respondent union could still very well be ordered and acted upon by the SOLE before December
14, 1990.
The respondents claim of good faith is not a valid excuse to dispense with the
procedural steps for a lawful strike. Hence, the need for a union to adhere to and comply strictly
with the procedural conditions sine qua non provided for by the law in staging a strike.
56. ASSOCIATION OF INDEPENDENT UNIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES VS
NLRC G.R. NO. 120505. MARCH 25, 1999 305 SCRA 219
FACTS: In CENAPRO Chemicals Corporation, the collective bargaining representative of all
rank and file employees was CENAPRO Employees Association (CCEA) with which respondent
company had a collective bargaining agreement. Their CBA excluded casual employees from
membership in the incumbent union. The casual employees who have rendered at least one to
six years of service sought regularization of their employment. When their demand was denied,
they formed themselves into an organization and affiliated with the Association of Independent
Unions of the Philippines. Thereafter, AIUP filed a petition for certification election, which
petition was opposed by the respondent company. The CCEA anchored its opposition on the
contract bar rule.
The union filed a notice of strike, minutes of strike vote, and the needed
documentation with the DOLE.
The union proceeded to stage a strike, in the course of which, the union perpetrated
illegal acts. The strikers padlocked the gate of the company. The areas fronting the gate of the
company were barricaded and blocked by union strikers. The strikers also prevented and coerced
other non-striking employees from reporting for work. Because of such illegal activities, the
respondent company filed a petition for injunction with the NLRC, which granted a Temporary
Restraining Order, enjoining the strikers from doing further acts of violence, coercion, or
intimidation and from blocking free ingress and egress to company premises.
The respondent company filed a complaint for illegal strike. The petitioners filed a
complaint for unfair labor practice and illegal lockout against respondent company.
ISSUE: Whether or not the strike is valid.
RULING: NO.
The strike staged by the petitioner union was illegal for the reasons that (1)the strikers
committed illegal acts in the course of the strike. (2)And violated the TRO enjoining the union
and/or its members from obstructing the company premises and ordering the removal there

from of all the barricades.

Even if the strike is valid because its objective or purpose is lawful, the strike may still
be declared invalid where the means employed are illegal.
The dismissal of the officers of the striking union was justified and valid. Their
dismissal as a consequence of the illegality of the strike staged by them finds support in Art.
264(a) of the Labor Code, pertinent portion of which provides: x x Any union officer who
knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have
lost his employment status. x x.
Union officers are duty bound to guide their members to respect the law. If instead of
doing so, the officers urge the members to violate the law and defy the duly constituted
authorities, their dismissal from the service is a just penalty or sanction for their unlawful acts.
The officers responsibility is greater than that of the members.
An ordinary striking employee can not be terminated by mere participation in an
illegal strike. There must be proof that he committed illegal acts during the strike and the striker
who participated in the commission of the illegal act must be identified.
57. LAPANDAY WORKERS UNION, ET AL. VS. NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION, ET AL. G.R. NO. 95494 SEPTEMBER 7, 1995;
248 SCRA 95
FACTS: Private respondents are sister companies engaged in the production of bananas. Their
agricultural establishments are located in Davao City.
On the other hand, petitioner Lapanday Workers' Union (Union) is the duly certified
bargaining agent of the rank and file employees of private respondents. The Union is affiliated
with the KMU-ANGLO. The other petitioners are all members of the Union.
Petitioner Union has a collective bargaining agreement with private respondents,
covering the period from December 5, 1985 to November 30, 1988. A few months before the
expiration of their CBA, private respondents initiated certain management policies which
disrupted the relationship of the parties.
Issues were discussed during a labor-management meeting held on August 2, 1988.
After private respondents explained the issues, the Union agreed to allow its members to attend
the HDIR seminar for the rank-and-filers. Nevertheless, on August 19 and 20, the Union
directed its members not to attend the seminars scheduled on said dates. Earlier on, or on
August 6, 1988, the Union, led by petitioners Arquilao Bacolod and Rene Arao, picketed the
premises of the Philippine Eagle Protectors to show their displeasure on the hiring of the guards.
Worse still, the Union filed on August 25, 1988, a Notice of Strike with the National Conciliation
and Mediation Board (NCMB). It accused the company of unfair labor practices consisting of
coercion of employees, intimidation of union members and union-busting.
The NCMB called a conciliation conference. With the apparent settlement of their
differences, private respondents notified the NCMB that there were no more bases for the notice
of strike.
Danilo Martinez, a member of the Board of Directors of the Union. The gunman was
later identified as Eledio Samson, an alleged member of the new security forces of private
respondents.
On September 9, 1988, the day after the killing, most of the members of the Union refused to
report for work. They returned to work the following day but they did not comply with the "quota
system" adopted by the management to bolster production output. Allegedly, the Union
instructed the workers to reduce their production to thirty per cent (30%). Private respondents
charged the Union with economic sabotage through slowdown.
ISSUE: Whether or not the strike staged on October 12, 1988 was illegal?
RULNG: YES.
Paragraphs (c) and (f) of Article 263 of the Labor Code, as amended by E.O. 111, provides:
xxx. In every case, the union or the employer shall furnish the Ministry the results of
the voting at least seven (7) days before the intended strike or lockout subject to the cooling-off
period herein provided.
We rule that strike conducted by the union on October 12, 1988 is plainly illegal as it
was held within the seven (7) day waiting period provided for by paragraph (f), Article 263 of the

Labor Code, as amended. The haste in holding the strike prevented the Department of Labor and
Employment from verifying whether it carried the approval of the majority of the union
members. It set to naught an important policy consideration of our law on strike. Considering
this finding, we need not exhaustively rule on the legality of the work stoppage conducted by the
union and some of their members on September 9 and 23, 1988. Suffice to state, that the ruling
of the public respondent on the matter is supported by substantial evidence.
We affirm the decision of the public respondent limiting the penalty of dismissal only to the
leaders of the illegal strike. especially the officers of the union who served as its major players.
They cannot claim good faith to exculpate themselves. They admitted knowledge of the
law on strike, including its procedure. They cannot violate the law which ironically was cast to
promote their interest.
We, likewise, agree with the public respondent that the union members who were
merely instigated to participate in the illegal strike should be treated differently from their
leaders. Part of our benign consideration for labor is the policy of reinstating rank-and-file
workers who were merely misled in supporting illegal strikes. Nonetheless, these reinstated
workers shall not be entitled to backwages as they should not be compensated for services
skipped during the illegal strike.\
58. Union of Filipro Employees-Drug, Food and Allied Industries Unions
Kilusang Mayo Uno vs. Nestl Philippines, Inc., 499 SCRA 521 , August 22,
2006
Facts: On 4 April 2001, as the existing CBA was to end on 5 June 2001, UFE-DFA-KMU
informed Nestl of their intent to open new Collective Bargaining Negotiation for the year 20012004 x x x as early as June 2001.
In response thereto, Nestl informed them that it was also preparing its own counter-proposal
and proposed ground rules to govern the impending conduct of the CBA negotiations.
On 29 May 2001, in another letter to the UFE-DFA-KMU (Cabuyao Division only), Nestl
reiterated its stance that unilateral grants, one-time company grants, company-initiated policies
and programs, which include, but are not limited to the Retirement Plan, Incidental Straight
Duty Pay and Calling Pay Premium, are by their very nature not proper subjects of CBA
negotiations and therefore shall be excluded therefrom.
Conciliation proceedings proved ineffective,the UFE-DFA-KMU filed a Notice of Strike
complaining, in essence, of a bargaining deadlock pertaining to economic issues, i.e., retirement
(plan), panel composition, costs and attendance, and CBA. and another Notice of Strike, this
time predicated on Nestls alleged unfair labor practices, that is, bargaining in bad faith by
setting pre-conditions in the ground rules and/or refusing to include the issue of the Retirement
Plan in the CBA negotiations.
Issue: whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in finding the Secretary
of Labor and Employment to have gravely abused her discretion in her pronouncement that the
Retirement Plan was not a proper subject to be included in the CBA negotiations between the
parties; hence, non-negotiable.
Ruling: In Nestl Philippines, Inc. v. NLRC, 193 SCRA 504 (1991), ironically involving the same
parties herein, Court has had the occasion to affirm that a retirement plan is consensual in
nature.
In a ruling contrary to Nestls position, the Court, through Madame Justice Grio-Aquino,
declared that:
The companys [Nestl] contention that its retirement plan is nonnegotiable, is not well-taken.
The NLRC correctly observed that the inclusion of the retirement plan in the collective
bargaining agreement as part of the package of economic benefits extended by the company to
its employees to provide them a measure of financial security after they shall have ceased to be
employed in the company, reward their loyalty, boost their morale and efficiency and promote
industrial peace, gives a consensual character to the plan so that it may not be terminated or
modified at will by either party (citation omitted).

The fact that the retirement plan is non-contributory, i.e., that the employees contribute nothing
to the operation of the plan, does not make it a non-issue in the CBA negotiations. As a matter of
fact, almost all of the benefits that the petitioner has granted to its employees under the CBA
salary increases, rice allowances, midyear bonuses, 13th and 14th month pay, seniority pay,
medical and hospitalization plans, health and dental services, vacation, sick & other leaves with
payare non-contributory benefits. Since the retirement plan has been an integral part of the
CBA since 1972, the Unions demand to increase the benefits due the employees under said plan,
is a valid CBA issue. x x x
xxxx
x x x [E]mployees do have a vested and demandable right over existing benefits voluntarily
granted to them by their employer. The latter may not unilaterally withdraw, eliminate
or diminish such benefits.
59. NATIONAL FEDERATION OF SUGAR WORKERS V. OVEJERA
G.R. NO. L-59743 MAY 31 1982
PLANA, J.:

FACTS: National Federation of Sugar Workers (NFSW) has concluded with Central Azucarera
de la Carlota (CAC) a CBA effective February 16, 1981 to February 15, 1984 which provided that
the parties agree to maintain the present practice on the grant of Christmas bonus, milling
bonus, and amelioration bonus to the extent as the latter is required by law. The Christmas and
milling bonuses amount to 1 months' salary. On November 28, 1981, NFSW struck allegedly,
to compel the payment of the 13th month pay under PD 851, in addition to the Christmas,
milling and amelioration bonuses being enjoyed by CAC workers. On January 22, 1982, NFSW
filed with the Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE) a notice of strike based on nonpayment of the 13th month pay. Six days after, NFSW struck. One day after the commencement
of the strike, a report of the strike-vote was filed by NFSW5 with MOLE. CAC filed a petition
with the Regional Arbitration Branch of MOLE to declare the strike illegal, principally for being
violative of BP 130, that is, the strike was declared before the expiration of the 15-day cooling- off
period for ULP strikes, and the strike was staged before the lapse of seven days from the
submission to MOLE of the result of the strike-vote After the submission of position papers and
hearing, Labor Arbiter Ovejara declared the strike illegal. On February 26, 1982, the NFSW, by
passing the NLRC filed the instant Petition for prohibition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the strike declared by NFSW is illegal, the resolution of which mainly
depends on the mandatory or directory character of the cooling-off period and the 7-day strike
ban after report to MOLE of the result of a strike-vote, as prescribed in the Labor Code.
HELD: When the law says "the labor union may strike" should the dispute "remain unsettled
until the lapse of the requisite number of days (cooling-off period) from the filing of the notice,"
the unmistakable implication is that the union may not strike before the lapse of the cooling-off
period. Similarly, the mandatory character of the 7-day strike ban after the report on the strikevote is manifest in the provision that "in every case," the union shall furnish the MOLE with the
results of the voting "at least seven (7) days before the intended strike, subject to the (prescribed)
cooling-off period." It must be stressed that the requirements of cooling-off period and 7-day
strike ban must both be complied with, although the labor union may take a strike vote and
report the same within the statutory cooling-off period.
If only the filing of the strike notice and the strike-vote report would be deemed mandatory, but
not the waiting periods so specifically and emphatically prescribed by law, the purposes for
which the filing of the strike notice and strike-vote report is required would not be achieved, as
when a strike is declared immediately after a strike notice is served, or when as in the instant
case the strike-vote report is filed with MOLE after the strike had actually commenced Such
interpretation of the law ought not and cannot be countenanced. It would indeed be self-

defeating for the law to imperatively require the filing on a strike notice and strike-vote report
without at the same time making the prescribed waiting periods mandatory.
60. UNION OF FILIPRO EMPLOYEES (UFE), MANUEL L. SARMIENTO,
BENJAMIN M. ALTAREJOS, RODOLFO D. PAGLINAWAN, CARMELITA
G. NUQUI, et al. vs. NESTLE PHILIPPINES, INC., NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION, HON. EDUARDO G. MAGNO, HON. ZOSIMO
T. VASALLO and HON. EVANGELINE S. LUBATON, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 88710-13 | 1990-12-19
MEDIALDEA, J.:
FACTS: On June 22, 1988, the petitioner Union of the Filipro Employees, the sole and exclusive
bargaining agent of all rank-and-file employees of Nestle Philippines, (private respondent) filed
a Notice of Strike at the DOLE raising the issues of CBA deadlock and unfair labor practice.
Private respondent assailed the legal personality of the proponents of the said notice of strike to
represent the Nestle employees, before the NCMB. This notwithstanding, the NCMB proceeded
to invite the parties to attend the conciliation meetings and to which private respondent failed to
attend contending that it will deal only with a negotiating panel duly constituted and mandated
in accordance with the UFE Constitution and By-laws. Thereafter, Company terminated from
employment all UFE Union officers, and all the members of the negotiating panel for instigating
and knowingly participating in a strike staged at the Makati, Alabang, Cabuyao and Cagayan de
Oro on September 11, 1987 without any notice of strike filed and a strike vote obtained for the
purpose. The union filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. LA upheld the validity of the
dismissal; NLRC en banc affirmed. Subsequently, company concluded separate CBAs with the
general membership of the union at Cebu/Davao and Cagayan de Oro units; Assailing the
validity of these agreements, the union filed a case of ULP against the company with the NLRCNCR Arbitration Branch Efforts to resolve the dispute amicably were taken by the NCMB but
yielded negative result. Petitioner filed a motion asking the Secretary of Labor to assume
jurisdiction over the dispute of deadlock in collective bargaining between the parties. On October
28, 1988, Labor Secretary Franklin Drilon certified to the NLRC the said dispute between the
UFE and Nestle, Philippines.. which reads as follows: xxx The NLRC is further directed to call
all the parties immediately and resolve the CBA deadlock within twenty (20) days from
submission of the case for resolution. Second Division of the NLRC promulgated a resolution
granting wage increase and other benefits to Nestles employees, ruling on non-economic issues,
as well as absolving the private respondent of the Unfair Labor Practice charge. Petitioner finds
said resolution to be inadequate and accordingly, does not agree therewith. It filed a motion for
reconsideration, denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WON WHETHER OR NOT THE SECOND DIVISION OF THE NLRC ACTED
WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN RENDERING THE ASSAILED RESOLUTION, THE SAME
BEING RENDERED ONLY BY A DIVISION OF THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT AND NOT BY EN
BANC;
HELD: This case was certified on October 28, 1988 when existing rules prescribed that, it is
incumbent upon the Commission en banc to decide or resolve a certified dispute. However, R.A.
6715 took effect during the pendency of this case. Aside from vesting upon each division the
power to adjudicate cases filed before the Commission, said Act further provides that the
divisions of the Commission shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over cases within their
respective territorial jurisdiction. Section 5 of RA 6715 provides as follows: xxxx The
Commission may sit en banc or in five (5) divisions, each composed of three (3) members. The
Commission shall sit en banc only for purposes of promulgating rules and regulations governing
the hearing and disposition of cases before any of its divisions and regional branches and
formulating policies affecting its administration and operations. The Commission shall exercise
its adjudicatory and all other powers, functions and duties through its divisions. xxxx In view of
the enactment of Republic Act 6715, the aforementioned rules requiring the Commission en banc
to decide or resolve a certified dispute have accordingly been repealed. Confirmed in
Administrative Order No. 36 (Series of 1989) promulgated by the Secretary under his delegated
rule-making power. Moreover, it is to be emphasized and it is a matter of judicial notice that

since the effectivity of R.A. 6715, many cases have already been decided by the 5 divisions of the
NLRC. We find no legal justification in entertaining petitioners claim considering that the clear
intent of the amendatory provision is to expedite the disposition of labor cases filed before the
Commission. To rule otherwise would not be congruous to the proper administration of justice.
Other related issues:
A strike that is undertaken despite the issuance by the Secretary of Labor of an
assumption or certification order becomes a prohibited activity and thus illegal, pursuant
to the second paragraph of Art. 264 of the Labor Code as amended (Zamboanga Wood Products,
Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. 82088, October 13, 1989; 178 SCRA 482). The Union officers and members,
as a result, are deemed to have lost their employment status for having knowingly participated in
an illegal act.
The prescribed mandatory cooling-off period and then 7day strike and after submission
of the report of strike vote at Nestl's Makati Offices and Muntinlupa and Cabuyao Plants were
not complied with (NLRC-NCR-12-4007-85 NCR-1-295-86), while no notice of strike was filed
by respondents when they staged the strike at Nestle's Cagayan de Oro Plant (RABX-2-0047-86)
contrary to the pertinent provision of Articles 263 and 264 of the Labor Code, emphasizing that
"the mandatory character of these cooling-off periods has already been categorically ruled
upon by the Supreme Court."
61. REFORMIST UNION OF R. B. LINER, INC., HEVER DETROS, ET AL., vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION G.R. No. 120482. January
27, 1997
FACTS: Petitioner union was organized in May 1989 "by affiliating itself with Lakas
Manggagawa sa Pilipinas (hereinafter Lakas)." Lakas filed a notice of strike on 13 November
1989 because of alleged acts of unfair labor practice committed by the private respondents.
Despite conciliation hearings held on 4 and 6 December 1989, the parties failed to reach an
agreement. Later, another act of unfair labor practice allegedly committed by the private
respondents impelled Reformist, with the authorization of Lakas, to go on strike on 13
December 1989 even as conciliation proceedings continued.
On 21 December 1989, R.B. Liner, Inc. petitioned then Secretary Fanklin Drilon of DOLE
to assume jurisdiction over the ongoing dispute or certify it to the NLRC. Secretary Drilon
determined that "[t]he ongoing work stoppage in the company . . . . adversely affects an
industry indispensable to the national interest;" thus he certified the dispute to the NLRC
for compulsory arbitration and issued a return-to-work order.
The certified case (NLRC Certified case No. 0542, entitled In Re: Labor Dispute at RB
Liner, Inc.) was dismissed on 13 February 1990 after the union and the company reached
all agreement on 19 January 1990 providing, among other matters, for the holding of a
certification election.
On 31 January 1990, a certification election was held where Lakas won as the collective
bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees. On 13 February 1990, Lakas presented a
proposal for a CBA to Bernita and Rodelia Dejero, but they refused to bargain. Meanwhile,
as admitted by private respondents' witness Arcile Tanjuatco, Jr., eight R.B. Liner buses
were "converted" to Sultran Lines, one "became MCL," and another "became SST Liner."
The petitioners filed with NLRC a case charging the private respondents with unfair labor
practice, i.e., illegal lock out. The private respondents countered with NLRC Case, which sought
to declare as illegal the union's 13 December 1989 strike, as well as other "work
stoppages/boycotts" staged by the petitioners. The two cases were consolidated and
simultaneously tried.
In his decision, the Labor Arbiter ruled that the evidence indicated against an illegal lockout
while finding that Reformist staged an illegal strike. On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the Labor
Arbiters finding. Reformist and its members moved to reconsider the NLRC decision, which was
however, denied. Hence, this petition for certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether there was in this case a waiver of the issue on the illegality of the strike by the
employer.
RULING: YES. The private respondents can no longer contest the legality of the strike held
by the petitioners on 13 December 1989, as the private respondents themselves
sought compulsory arbitration in order to resolve that very issue, hence their letter to
the Labor Secretary read, in part:
This is to request your good office to certify for compulsory arbitration or to
assume jurisdiction over the labor dispute (strike continuing) between R.B. Liner
Inc . . . . and the Lakas Manggagawa sa Pilipinas . . .
The current strike by Lakas which started on December 13, 1989 even before
Certification Election could be held could not be resolved by the NCR ConciliationMediation Division after six meetings/conferences between the parties.
The dispute or strike was settled when the company and the union entered
into an agreement on 19 January 1990 where the private respondents agreed to
accept all employees who by then, had not yet returned to work. By acceding to the
peaceful settlement brokered by the NLRC, the private respondents waived the
issue of the illegality of the strike.
The very nature of compulsory arbitration makes the settlement binding upon the
private respondents, for compulsory arbitration has been defined both as "the
process of settlement of labor disputes by a government agency which has the
authority to investigate and to make an award which is binding on all the parties," ]
and as a mode of arbitration where the parties are "compelled to accept the resolution of their
dispute through arbitration by a third party." Clearly then, the legality of the strike could no
longer be reviewed by the Labor Arbiter, much less by the NLRC, as this had already been
resolved. It was the sole issue submitted for compulsory arbitration by the private respondents,
as is obvious from the portion of their letter quoted above. The case certified by the Labor
Secretary to the NLRC was dismissed after the union and the company drew up the agreement
62. MSF TIRE AND RUBBER, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
PHILTREAD TIRE WORKERS UNION, respondents. [G.R. No. 128632.
August 5, 1999]
FACTS: A labor dispute arose between Philtread Tire and Rubber Corporation (Philtread) and
private respondent, Philtread Tire Workers Union (Union), as a result of which the Union filed
on May 27, 1994 a notice of strike in the National Conciliation and Mediation Board-National
Capital Region charging Philtread with unfair labor practices for allegedly engaging in unionbusting for violation of the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement.
during the pendency of the labor dispute, Philtread entered into a Memorandum of Agreement
with Siam Tyre Public Company Limited (Siam Tyre), a subsidiary of Siam Cement. Under the
Memorandum of Agreement, Philtreads plant and equipment would be sold to a new company
(petitioner MSF Tire and Rubber, Inc.), 80% of which would be owned by Siam Tyre and 20% by
Philtread, while the land on which the plant was located would be sold to another company
(Sucat Land Corporation), 60% of which would be owned by Philtread and 40% by Siam Tyre.
This was done and the Union was informed of the purchase of the plant by petitioner. Petitioner
then asked the Union to desist from picketing outside its plant and to remove the banners,
streamers, and tent which it had placed outside the plants fence.
As the Union refused petitioners request, petitioner filed on May 25, 1995 a complaint for
injunction with damages against the Union and the latters officers and directors before the

Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 59 where the case was docketed as Civil Case No. 95-770.
On June 13, 1995, the Union moved to dismiss the complaint alleging lack of jurisdiction on the
part of the trial court. It insisted that the parties were involved in a labor dispute and that
petitioner, being a mere alter ego of Philtread, was not an innocent bystander.
ISSUE: whether or not private respondent is a mere innocent bystander to the labor dispute
between Philtread and the Union or upon the issue of whether or not private respondent is a
mere dummy or continuity of Philtread is contrary to its own conclusions in the body of the
decision, which conclusions are erroneous.
HELD: Petitioner asserts that its status as an innocent bystander with respect to the labor
dispute between Philtread and the Union entitles it to a writ of injunction from the civil courts
and that the appellate court erred in not upholding its corporate personality as independent of
Philtreads.
In Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU) v. Cloribel,[11] this Court, through
Justice J.B.L. Reyes, stated the innocent bystander rule as follows:
The right to picket as a means of communicating the facts of a labor dispute is a phase of the
freedom of speech guaranteed by the constitution. If peacefully carried out, it can not be
curtailed even in the absence of employer-employee relationship.
The right is, however, not an absolute one. While peaceful picketing is entitled to
protection as an exercise of free speech, we believe the courts are not without
power to confine or localize the sphere of communication or the demonstration to
the parties to the labor dispute, including those with related interest, and to
insulate establishments or persons with no industrial connection or having
interest totally foreign to the context of the dispute. Thus the right may be
regulated at the instance of third parties or innocent bystanders if it appears that
the inevitable result of its exercise is to create an impression that a labor dispute
with which they have no connection or interest exists between them and the
picketing union or constitute an invasion of their rights.
63.

SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR

RELATIONS COMMISSION, SECOND DIVISION, AND SAN MIGUEL
CORPORATION EMPLOYEES UNION (SMCEU) - PTGWO, respondents.
[G.R. No. 99266. March 2, 1999]
PURISIMA, J.:

Facts: On july 1990, San Miguel Corp due to financial loss retrench at least 55 employees.
Consequently, the private respondent union filed several grievance cases for the said retrenched
employees, praying for the redeployment of the same to the other divisions of the company. They
held a grievance proceeding in accordance with their CBA, however, on October 2010, all
employees were redeployed and only 17 were left because there services will be terminated on
November. The said meeting adjourned when Mr. Daniel S. L. Borbon II, a representative of the
union, declared that there was nothing more to discuss in view of the deadlock.
The private respondent filed a notice of strike against the SMC before the NCMB on
the grounds of: a) bargaining deadlock; b)union busting; c) gross violation of the Collective
Bargaining Agreement (CBA), such as non-compliance with the grievance procedure; d) failure
to provide private respondent with a list of vacant positions pursuant to the parties side
agreement that was appended to the 1990 CBA; and e) defiance of voluntary arbitration
award. Petitioner on the other hand, moved to dismiss the notice of strike but the NCMB failed
to act on the motion.

On December 21, 1990, petitioner SMC filed a complaint with the respondent NLRC,
praying for: (1) the dismissal the notice of strike; (2) an order compelling the respondent union
to submit to grievance and arbitration the issue listed in the notice of strike; (3) the recovery of
the expenses of litigation.On April 16, 1991, respondent NLRC came out with a minute resolution
dismissing the complaint. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WHETHER IT IS THE POSITIVE LEGAL DUTY OF RESPONDENT NLRC TO
COMPEL ARBITRATION AND TO ENJOIN A STRIKE IN VIOLATION OF A NO STRIKE
CLAUSE.
HELD:YES. Rule XXII, Section I, of the Rules and Regulations Implementing Book V the Labor
Code reads:
Section 1. Grounds for strike and lockout. -- A strike or lockout may be declared in cases of
bargaining deadlocks and unfair labor practices. Violations of the collective bargaining
agreements, except flagrant and/or malicious refusal to comply with its economic provisions,
shall not be considered unfair labor practice and shall not be strikeable. No strike or lockout
may be declared on grounds involving inter-union and intra-union disputes or on issues
brought to voluntary or compulsory arbitration.
Collective Bargaining Deadlock is defined as the situation between the labor and the
management of the company where there is failure in the collective bargaining negotiations
resulting in a stalemate This situation, is non-existent in the present case since there is a Board
assigned on the third level (Step 3) of the grievance machinery to resolve the conflicting views of
the parties. Instead of asking the Conciliation Board composed of five representatives each from
the company and the union, to decide the conflict, petitioner declared a deadlock, and thereafter,
filed a notice of strike. For failing to exhaust all the steps in the grievance machinery and
arbitration proceedings provided in the Collective Bargaining Agreement, the notice of strike
should have been dismissed by the NLRC and private respondent union ordered to proceed with
the grievance and arbitration proceedings.
As regards the alleged violation of the CBA, we hold that such a violation is chargeable
against the private respondent union. In abandoning the grievance proceedings and stubbornly
refusing to avail of the remedies under the CBA, private respondent violated the mandatory
provisions of the collective bargaining agreement. Abolition of departments or positions in the
company is one of the recognized management prerogatives. Noteworthy is the fact that the
private respondent does not question the validity of the business move of petitioner. In the
absence of proof that the act of petitioner was ill-motivated, it is presumed that petitioner San
Miguel Corporation acted in good faith.
64. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., petitioner, vs.SECRETARY OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT, FRANKLIN M. DRILON, and PHILIPPINE AIRLINES
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (PALEA), respondents.
G.R. No. 88210 January 23, 1991
GRIO-AQUINO, J.:p
FACTS: The 1986-1989 Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between the Philippine Airlines
(PAL) and the Philippine Airlines Employees Association (PALEA) provided for pay increases for
various categories of employees in Section 1, Article V entitled "PAY SCALE." Besides the pay
increases, the CBA also provided for the formation of a PAL/PALEA Payscale Panel. The panel
conferences continued but there was no meeting of minds.On December 29, 1988, PALEA filed
with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) a notice of strike on account of: (1)
bargaining deadlock; and (2) unfair labor practice by bargaining in bad faith.
On January 3, 1989, PAL filed with the NCMB a motion to dismiss PALEA's notice of
strike for being premature as the issues raised were not strikeable since there still existed a PALPALEA CBA which would not yet expire until September 30, 1989 or with nine (9) more months
to run.

On January 12, 1989, PALEA submitted the strike vote results to the NCMB. The next
day, January 13, 1989, PAL petitioned Secretary of Labor Franklin Drilon to immediately assume
jurisdiction over the dispute in order to avert the impending strike. Secretary Drilon issued an
order assuming jurisdiction over the labor dispute which had already exploded into a full-blown
strike, ordering the strikers to lift their pickets and return to work, directing management to
accept all returning employees, and resolving the issues subject of the strike, by awarding the
following monetary benefits to the strikers, while prohibiting the company from taking
retaliatory action against them and declaring the strike valid.
Hence, this petition.
Issue: whether the Secretary of Labor has authority to order the petitioner Philippine Airlines,
Inc. to reinstate officers and members of the union who participated in an illegal strike and to
desist from taking any disciplinary or retaliatory action against them and for declaring the strike
valid.
HELD: NO. Under Art. 263 of the Labor Code, the Labor Secretary's authority to resolve a labor
dispute within 30 days from the date of assumption of jurisdiction, encompasses only the issues
in the dispute, not the legality or illegality of any strike that may have been resorted to.
The determination of the legality of a strike and lockouts is vested within the original
and exclusive power of the Labor arbiter, provided in article 217 of the Labor Code.
Since the strike was illegal, the company has a right to take disciplinary action against
the union officers who participated in it, and against any union members who committed illegal
acts during the strike, Art. 264 of the Labor Code provides:
Art. 264. Prohibited activities.. . .
Any worker whose employment has been terminated as a consequence of an unlawful lockout
shall be entitled to reinstatement with full back wages. Any union officer who knowingly
participates in an illegal strike and any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the
commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment status:
Provided, That mere participation of a worker in a lawful strike shall not constitute sufficient
ground for termination of his employment, even if a replacement had been hired by the
employer during such lawful strike. (Emphasis supplied.)
The Labor Secretary exceeded his jurisdiction when he restrained PAL from taking disciplinary
action against its guilty employees, for, under Art. 263 of the Labor Code, all that the Secretary
may enjoin is the holding of the strike, but not the company's right to take action against union
officers who participated in the illegal strike and committed illegal acts. The prohibition which
the Secretary issued to PAL constitutes an unlawful deprivation of property and denial of due
process for it prevents PAL from seeking redress for the huge property losses that it suffered as a
result of the union's illegal mass action.
The petition is granted.
65.PHILIPPINE MARINE OFFICERS' GUILD, petitioner, vs. COMPAIA
MARITIMA, PHILIPPINE STEAMSHIP NAVIGATION CO., MADRIGAL
SHIPPING CO., COURT OF AGRARIAN RELATIONS ASSOCIATE JUDGES
ARSENIO MARTINEZ, BALTAZAR VILLANUEVA, and ARMANDO
BUGAYONG, respondents. [G.R. Nos. L-20662 and L-20663
March
19, 1968]
FACTS:
The respondents Compaia Maritima, Philippine Steamship Navigation Company
and Madrigal Shipping Company [hereinafter referred to as MARITIMA, PHILSTEAM, and
MADRIGAL, respectively, and as COMPANIES jointly] are domestic corporations engaged in the
operation of motor ships and vessels in the different ports of the Philippines, while the
petitioner, Philippine Marine Officers' Guild (hereinafter referred to as PMOG), is a labor
organization composed of marine officers and engineers.

On different dates in June, 1954 PMOG sent separate letters to several shipping firms,
including MARITIMA, PHILSTEAM, and MADRIGAL, each letter containing a set of demands,
informing the addresses that PMOG represented the deck officers and engineers respectively
employed by them, and requesting a conference concerning said demands. After two meetings,
both parties have failed to settle amicably, which resulted to filing of notice of strike by the
PMOG against the three companies.
On January 14, 1955, while the strike and the picketing in Piers 4 and 8, North
Harbor, Manila, where PHILSTEAM and MARITIMA vessels regularly docked, respectively, as
well as in front of the Madrigal Building on the Escolta were still in progress, the President of the
Philippines, pursuant to Section 10 of Republic Act 875, certified the dispute to the Court of
Industrial Relations, where it was docketed as Case No. 6-IPA. On January 18, 1955 the CIR
issued a resolution ordering the "strikers to return to work immediately upon receipt of this
order, and the respondent companies to readmit them". The following day, PMOG filed a
manifestation expressing its willingness to abide by said resolution and requesting that "three
bailiffs accompany the three groups of members to their respective companies" and that the
"members of the petitioner . . . in the provinces . . . be given ten (10) days from date to report to
duty to their respective companies." However, by virtue of the injunction issued by this
Court1 the return-to-work order was not enforced.
ISSUE : whether or not the PMOG strike was legal
HELD:
Strike against Madrigal:
It appearing that the Madrigal deck officers and engineers who struck on August
24, 1954, had justifiable reason for their action, and considering that there is no
evidence of record showing that Madrigal's interests has been injured or prejudiced by
any of the unlawful acts imputed to PMOC men, the Court is of the opinion and
concludes that the strike on the whole against this employer was proper and legal.
Strike Against Philsteam:
Upon the entire record of the case, the Court, finds and so holds, that the strike
against Philsteam was not only justified but properly and lawfully carried out.
Strike Against Maritima:
It having been declared against Maritima for no cause or purpose and unlawful
means having been resorted to by some strikers and picketers in the course of the
prosecution thereof at Pier 8 for which the striking labor organization has been found
responsible, and considering further that, Maritima can not be held liable for the death
of the late Modesto Rodriguez, the Court finds, and so holds, that the PMOG strike
against this employer was illegal from its inception.
The petitioner contends that it was error for the CIR not to fix the terms and
conditions of employment after having found no solution to the dispute, citing Section
10 of Republic Act 875, which reads:
Sec. 10. Labor Disputes in Industries Indispensable to the National
Interest. When in the opinion of the President of the Philippines there
exists a labor dispute in an industry indispensable to the national interest
and when such labor dispute is certified by the President to the Court of
Industrial Relations, said Court may cause to be issued a restraining order
forbidding the employees to strike or the employer to lockout the
employees, pending an investigation by the Court, and if no other solution to
the dispute is found, the Court may issue an order fixing the terms and
conditions of employment
The contention of the petitioner that the CIR failed to find a solution to the dispute is not true.
The fact is that after ascertaining that the question of majority representation had been the cause
of misunderstanding between PMOG and the COMPANIES and after correctly analyzing the
absurdity of the whole set-up if it should fix the terms and conditions of employment before

resolving the question of majority representation, the CIR enjoined the parties to consider
holding a certification election. The proposed solution thus found by the CIR cannot be
questioned.

an Order assuming jurisdiction over the labor dispute was issued, thereby prohibiting any strike
or lockout and enjoining the parties from committing any acts which may exacerbate the
situation.

When a case is certified to the CIR by the President of the Philippines pursuant to Section
10 of Republic Act 875, the CIR is granted authority to find a solution to the industrial dispute;
and the solution which the CIR has found under the authority of presidential certification and
conformable thereto cannot be questioned

September 6, 1996, Francisco Escuadra, the NLRC process server, certified that, on September 5,
1996 at around 4:00 P.M., he attempted to serve a copy of the Assumption of Jurisdiction Order
(AJO) to the union officers but since no one was around at the strike area, he just posted copies
of the said Order at several conspicuous places within the premises of the hospital.

The second issue, that petitioner contends that there was an abuse of discretion to disallow back
wages to workers who abandoned their legal strike but were refused reinstatement in spite of
their unconditional offer to return to work.

Striking employees continued holding a strike until 12 September 1996, claiming that they had
no knowledge that the Secretary of Labor already assumed jurisdiction over the pending labor
dispute as they were not able to receive a copy of the AJO.

Accordingly, the CIR concluded that "none of the companies had discriminatorily rejected
their application for reemployment." Such findings being upon a question of fact, the same
cannot be reversed herein because they are supported by substantial evidence. On this score
alone, the claim for back wages has to be denied; hence, the CIR did not commit any abuse of
discretion in this regard.

Secretary of Labor issued another Order directing all the striking employees to return to work
and the petitioner FEU-NRMF to accept them under the same terms and conditions prevailing
before the strike. A Return to Work Agreement was executed by the disputing parties.

Under the fourth issue, petitioner poses the following question In this jurisdiction
should the Supreme Court adopt the viewpoint that labor violence is a special category of
unlawfulness, to be suffered (except in extreme cases), and to be overlooked in favor of efforts at
settling the underlying controversy giving rise to violence?
In this jurisdiction, however, acts of violence in carrying on a strike are not so easily
overlooked in the determination of its legality or illegality. To overlook them "would encourage
abuses and terrorism and would subvert the very purpose of the law which provides for
arbitration and peaceful settlement of disputes." (Liberal Labor Union vs. Phil. Can Co., 91 Phil.
78). This Court has repeatedly frowned upon the use of unlawful means in carrying out a strike.
The last proposition raised by the petitioner is that the illegality of a strike does not ipso
facto deprive a striker of the right to reinstatement if he is not personally guilty of any illegal act.
This Court has held in a number of cases that if a strike is unjustified, as when it is declared for
trivial, unjust or unreasonable purpose, the employer may not be compelled to reinstate the
strikers to their employment.
66. FAR EASTERN UNIVERSITY DR. NICANOR REYES MEDICAL
FOUNDATION (FEU-NRMF) and LILIA P. LUNA. M.D., Petitioners, versus
FEU-NRMF EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-ALLIANCE OF FILIPINO
WORKERS (FEU-NRMFEA-AFW), et al Respondents., G.R. No. 168362;
October 12, 2006
FACTS: In 1994, petitioner FEU-NRMF (a medical institution organized and existing under
the Philippine laws), and respondent union (a legitimate labor organization and is the duly
recognized representative of the rank and file employees of petitioner), entered into a CBA that
will expire on 30 April 1996. In view of the forthcoming expiry, respondent union sent a letterproposal to petitioner FEU-NRMF stating their economic and non-economic proposals for the
negotiation of the new CBA.
Petitioner FEU-NRMF rejected respondent unions demands and proposed to maintain the same
provisions of the old CBA reasoning that due to financial constraints, it cannot afford to accede
to a number of their demands. In an effort to arrive at a compromise, subsequent conciliation
proceedings were conducted before the NCMB, but the negotiation failed. Respondent union
filed a Notice of Strike before NCMB on the ground of bargaining deadlock. Union staged a
strike.
Petitioner FEU-NRMF filed a Petition for the Assumption of Jurisdiction or for Certification of
Labor Dispute with the NLRC, underscoring the fact that it is a medical institution engaged in
the business of providing health care for its patients. Secretary of Labor granted the petition and

Subsequently, petitioner FEU-NRMF filed a case before the NLRC, contending that respondent
union staged the strike in defiance of the AJO, hence, it was illegal. LA declared the strike illegal
and allowed dismissal of union officers for conducting the strike in defiance of the AJO.
Respondent union filed an Appeal before the NLRC. NLRC affirmed in toto the Decision of the
LA. Respondent union filed MR, it was denied. Respondent union brought a Petition for
Certiorari before CA. CA granted the Petition and reversed the Resolutions of NLRC. Petitioner
filed MR but it was denied. Hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether the service of the AJO was validly effected by the process server so as to bind
the respondent union and hold them liable for the acts committed subsequent to the issuance of
the said Order.
HELD: The process server resorted to posting the Order when personal service was rendered
impossible since the striking employees were not present at the strike area. This mode of service,
however, is not sanctioned by either the NLRC Revised Rules of Procedure or the Revised Rules
of Court.
The pertinent provisions of the NLRC Revised Rules of Procedure read: Section 6. Service of
Notices and Resolutions.(a) Notices or summons and copies of orders, shall be served on the
parties to the case personally by the Bailiff or duly authorized public officer within 3 days from
receipt thereof or by registered mail; Provided that in special circumstances, service of summons
may be effected in accordance with the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court; Provided
further, that in cases of decisions and final awards, copies thereof shall be served on both parties
and their counsel or representative by registered mail; Provided further, that in cases where a
party to a case or his counsel on record personally seeks service of the decision upon inquiry
thereon, service to said party shall be deemed effected upon actual receipt thereof; Provided
finally, that where parties are so numerous, service shall be made on counsel and upon such
number of complainants, as may be practicable, which shall be considered substantial
compliance with Article 224(a) of the Labor Code, as amended.
An Order issued by the Secretary of Labor assuming jurisdiction over the labor dispute is not a
final judgment for it does not dispose of the labor dispute with finality. Consequently, the rule on
service of summons and orders, and not the proviso on service of decisions and final awards,
governs the service of the Assumption of Jurisdiction Order.
Under the NLRC Revised Rules of Procedure, service of copies of orders should be made by the
process server either personally or through registered mail. However, due to the urgent nature of
the AJO and the public policy underlying the injunction carried by the issuance of the said
Order, service of copies of the same should be made in the most expeditious and effective
manner, without any delay, ensuring its immediate receipt by the intended parties as may be
warranted under the circumstances. Thus, personal service is the proper mode of serving the
AJO.

Personal service effectively ensures that the notice desired under the constitutional requirement
of due process is accomplished. If, however, efforts to find the party concerned personally would
make prompt service impossible, service may be completed by substituted service, that is, by
leaving a copy, between the hours of eight in the morning and six in the evening, at the partys or
counsels residence, if known, with a person of sufficient age and discretion then residing therein
(RULE 12 of Rev Rules of Court).
Substituted service derogates the regular method of personal service. It is therefore required that
statutory restrictions for effecting substituted service must be strictly, faithfully and fully
observed. Failure to comply with this rule renders absolutely void the substituted service along
with the proceedings taken thereafter. The underlying principle of this rigid requirement is that
the person, to whom the orders, notices or summons are addressed, is made to answer for the
consequences of the suit even though notice of such action is made, not upon the party
concerned, but upon another whom the law could only presume would notify such party of the
pending proceedings.
In the case at bar, presumption of receipt of the copies of the Assumption of Jurisdiction Order
AJO could not be taken for granted considering the adverse effect in case the parties failed to
heed to the injunction directed by such Order. Defiance of the assumption and return-to-work
orders of the Secretary of Labor after he has assumed jurisdiction is a valid ground for the loss of
employment status of any striking union officer or member. Employment is a property right of
which one cannot be deprived of without due process. Due process here would demand that the
respondent union be properly notified of the Assumption of Jurisdiction Order of the Secretary
of Labor enjoining the strike and requiring its members to return to work. Thus, there must be a
clear and unmistakable proof that the requirements prescribed by the Rules in the manner of
effecting personal or substituted service had been faithfully complied with.
Merely posting copies of the AJO does not satisfy the rigid requirement for proper service
outlined by the above stated rules. Needless to say, the manner of service made by the process
server was invalid and irregular. Respondent union could not therefore be adjudged to have
defied the said Order since it was not properly apprised thereof. Accordingly, the strike
conducted by the respondent union was valid under the circumstances.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is DENIED. Costs against the
petitioner.

67. BILFLEX PHIL. INC. LABOR UNION et al. v. FILFLEX INDUSTRIAL

ANDMANUFACTURING CORPORATION AND BILFLEX (PHILS.), INC.511
SCRA 247 (2006), THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.) Any union
officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker
or union who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts
during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment status.
Facts: Biflex Philippines Inc. Labor Union and Filflex Industrial and Manufacturing Labor
Union are the respective collective bargaining agents of the employees of the sister companies
Biflex and Filflex which are engaged in the garment business. They are situated in one big
compound and they have a common entrance. On October 24, 1990, the labor sector staged a
welga ng bayan to protest against oil price hike; the unions staged a work stoppage which lasted
for several days, prompting the companies to file a petition to declare the work stoppage illegal
for failure to comply with procedural requirements. The Labor Arbiter held that the strike is
illegal and declared the officers of the union to have lost their employment status.
ISSUE: Whether or not the staged strike is illegal and a ground for the lost of employment
status of the unionofficers
HELD: Article 264 (a) of the Labor Code states that any union officer who knowingly
participates in an illegal strike and any worker or union who knowingly participates in the
commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment
status. Thus, a union officer may be declared to have lost his employment status if he knowingly
participates in an illegal strike and in this case, the strike is declared illegal by the court because
the means employed by the union are illegal. Here, the unions blocked the egress and ingress of
the company premises thus, a violation of Article 264 (e)of the Labor Code which would affect
the strike as illegal even if assuming arguendo that the unions had complied with legal
formalities and thus, the termination of the employees was valid. The court said that the legality
of a strike is determined not only by compliance with its legal formalities but also by means by
which it is carried out.