VI.

Constitutional Commissions
A. Constitutional safeguards to ensure independence of commissions
*The CSC, COMELEC, and the COA are equally pre-eminent in their respective spheres. Neither one may claim dominance over the
others. In case of conflicting rulings, it is the Judiciary which interprets the meaning of the law and ascertains which view shall prevail. CSC vs. Pobre, G.R. No. 160508, September 15, 2004.
*The Commission on Human Rights (CHR), although a constitutional creation is, nonetheless, not included in the genus of offices
accorded fiscal autonomy by constitutional or legislative fiat. Article IX of the Constitution states in no uncertain terms that only the
CSC, the COMELEC, and the COA be tagged as Constitutional Commissions with the appurtenant right to fiscal autonomy. Commission on Human Rights Employees Association (CHREA) vs. CHR, G.R. No. 155336, November 25, 2004.
*COMELEC Appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven (7) years without
reappointment. If however, the appointment was ad interim, a subsequent renewal of the appointment does not violate the prohibition
on reappointments because no previous appointment was confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. Furthermore, the total term
of both appointments must not exceed the seven (7) year limit. Matibag vs. Benipayo, G.R. No. 149036, April 2, 2002.
*Villarena vs. COA, G.R. Nos. 145383-84, August 6, 2003.
FACTS: The legislative body of Marikina City passed several Ordinances which approved the budget allocations for Marikina for
calendar years 1995, 1996 and 1997. Allotted in each of these were allowances and benefits granted to COA personnel assigned to
Marikina. One recipient of said allowances questions the constitutionality of Section 18 of Republic Act No. 6758 [AN ACT
PRESCRIBING A REVISED COMPENSATION AND POSITION CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM IN THE GOVERNMENT AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES] as being violative of the equal protection clause. Section 18 provides, to wit:
SECTION 18. Additional Compensation of Commission on Audit Personnel and of Other Agencies. In order to preserve the
independence and integrity of the Commission on Audit (COA), its officials and employees are prohibited from receiving
salaries, honoraria, bonuses, allowances or other emoluments from any government entity, local government unit, and
government-owned and controlled corporations, and government financial institution, except those compensation paid directly
by the COA out of its appropriations and contributions.
Government entities, including government-owned or controlled corporations including financial institutions and local
government units are hereby prohibited from assessing or billing other government entities, government-owned or controlled
corporations including financial institutions or local government units for services rendered by its officials and employees as
part of their regular functions for purposes of paying additional compensation to said officials and employees.
HELD: Section 18 is not violative of the equal protection clause. This clause does not preclude classification of individuals who may be
accorded different treatment under the law as long as the classification is reasonable and not arbitrary. Indeed, there are valid reasons
to treat COA officials differently from other national government officials. The primary function of an auditor is to prevent irregular,
unnecessary, excessive or extravagant expenditures of government funds. To be able properly to perform their constitutional mandate,
COA officials need to be insulated from unwarranted influences, so that they can act with independence and integrity. As extensively
discussed in Tejada v. Domingo, the prohibition under Section 18 of Republic Act No. 6758 was designed precisely to serve this
purpose. The removal of the temptation and enticement the extra emoluments may provide is designed to be an effective way of
vigorously and aggressively enforcing the Constitutional provision mandating the COA to prevent or disallow irregular, unnecessary,
excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures or uses of government funds and properties.
Stated otherwise, the COA personnel who have nothing to look forward to or expect from their assigned offices in terms of extra
benefits, would have no reason to accord special treatment to the latter by closing their eyes to irregular or unlawful expenditures or use
of funds or property, or conducting a perfunctory audit. The law realizes that such extra benefits could diminish the personnels
seriousness and dedication in the pursuit of their assigned tasks, affect their impartiality and provide a continuing temptation to
ingratiate themselves to the government entity, local government unit, government-owned and controlled corporations and government
financial institutions, as the case may be. In the end then, they would become ineffective auditors.
B. Powers and functions of each commission
*COMELEC The prosecution of election law violators involves the exercise of the COMELEC's administrative powers. Thus, the
COMELEC en banc can directly approve the recommendation of its Law Department to file the criminal information for double
registration against violators. There is no constitutional requirement that the filing of the criminal information be first decided by any of
the divisions of the COMELEC. - Baytan vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 153945, February 4, 2003.
C. Prohibited offices and interests
D. Jurisdiction of each constitutional commission
*The COMELEC may intervene in disputes internal to a political party only when necessary to the discharge of its constitutional
functions. The COMELEC's power to register political parties necessarily involved the determination of the persons who must act on its
behalf. Thus, the COMELEC may resolve an intra-party leadership dispute, in a proper case brought before it, as an incident of its
power to register political parties. - Atienza vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 188920, February 16, 2010.
*COA The Constitution vests in the COA audit jurisdiction over government-owned and controlled corporations with original charters,

as well as government-owned or controlled corporations without original charters. GOCCs with original charters are subject to COA
pre-audit, while GOCCs without original charters are subject to COA post-audit. GOCCs without original charters refer to corporations
created under the Corporation Code but are owned or controlled by the government. The nature or purpose of the corporation is not
material in determining COA's audit jurisdiction. Neither is the manner of creation of a corporation, whether under a general law or
special law. The determining factor of COA's audit jurisdiction is government ownership or control of the corporation. - Engr. Ranulfo C.
Feliciano vs. COA, G.R. No. 147402, January 14, 2004.
*Jurisdiction over LGUs - Local Government Units (LGUs), though granted local fiscal autonomy, are still within the audit jurisdiction of
the COA. - Veloso, et al. vs. COA, G.R. No. 193677, September 6, 2011.
*Jurisdiction over coconut levy funds The Constitution, by express provision, vests the COA with the responsibility for state audit. As
an independent supreme state auditor, its audit jurisdiction cannot be undermined by any law. Indeed, under Article IX(D), Section 3 of
the 1987 Constitution, no law shall be passed exempting any entity of the Government or its subsidiary in any guise whatever, or any
investment of public funds, from the jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit. Following the mandate of the COA and the parameters set
forth by the foregoing provisions, it is clear that it has jurisdiction over the coconut levy funds, being special public funds. Conversely,
the COA has the power, authority, and duty to examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the coconut levy funds and,
consequently, to the UCPB shares purchased using the said funds. However, declaring the said funds as partaking the nature of private
funds, ergo, subject to private appropriation, removes them from the coffer of the public funds of the government, and consequently
renders them impervious to the COA audit jurisdiction. Clearly, the pertinent provisions of P.D. Nos. 961 and 1468 divest the COA of its
constitutionally-mandated function and undermine its constitutional independence. Accordingly, Article III, Section 5 of both P.D. Nos.
961 and 1468 must be struck down for being unconstitutional. - Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. (COCOFED), et al. vs.
Republic, G.R. No. 177857-58 & G.R. No. 178193, January 24, 2012.
E. Review of final orders, resolutions and decisions
1. Rendered in the exercise of quasi-judicial functions
*Certiorari Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court: Limited to decisions rendered in actions or proceedings taken cognizance of by the
Commissions in the exercise of their adjudicatory or quasi-judicial functions. It does not refer to purely executive powers. Hence,
questions arising from the award of a contract for construction of voting booths can be brought before the trial court. - Ambil vs.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 143398, October 5, 2000.
2. Rendered in the exercise of administrative functions
M. Accountability of public officers
1. Impeachment
*Not more than one impeachment proceeding shall be initiated against the same official within a period of one year. - An impeachment
case is the legal controversy that must be decided by the Senate while an impeachment proceeding is one that is initiated in the House
of Representatives. For purposes of applying the one-year bar rule, the proceeding is initiated or begins when a verified complaint is
filed and referred to the Committee on Justice for action. - Francisco, et al. vs. House of Representatives, et al. G.R. No. 160261,
November 10, 2003.
*Judicial Review of Impeachment In the case of Francisco, et al. vs. House of Representatives, et al. G.R. No. 160261, November 10,
2003, the Court resolved to pass upon the constitutionality of the House Rules on Impeachment, citing the expanded definition of its
judicial power under Sec. 1 of Article VIII as its authority in so doing.
2. Ombudsman (Sections 5 to 14, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, in relation to R.A. No. 6770, or otherwise known as "The
Ombudsman Act of 1989.")
a) Functions
*The Ombudsman is clothed with authority to conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute all criminal cases involving public officers
and employees, not only those within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan but those within the jurisdiction of the regular courts as well.
- Uy vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 105965-70, March 20, 2001.
*Includes the power to place under preventive suspension public officers and employees pending investigation. - Cabalit vs. COARegion VII, G.R. No. 180326, January 17, 2012.
*The Ombudsman can no longer institute an administrative case against an erring public officer if the latter was not a public servant at
the time the case was filed because he was forced to resign. However, if the act committed by the public official is indeed inimical to the
interests of the State, other legal mechanisms are available to redress the same. Nonetheless, he can still be prosecuted under an
administrative complaint despite his resignation if he did so either to prevent the continuation of a case already filed or to pre-empt the
imminent filing of one. - Office of the Ombudsman vs. Uldarico P. Andutan, Jr., G.R. No. 164679, July 27, 2011.
*It is settled that the Office of the Ombudsman can directly impose administrative sanctions. - Cabalit vs. COA-Region VII, G.R. No.
180326, January 17, 2012.

*The Constitution and RA 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989) has endowed the Office of the Ombudsman with a wide latitude of
investigatory and prosecutory powers virtually free from legislative, executive or judicial intervention. The Supreme Court consistently
refrains from interfering with the exercise of its powers, and respects the initiative and independence inherent in the Ombudsman who,
beholden to no one, acts as the champion of the people and the preserver of the integrity of public service. - Loquias vs. Office of the
Ombudsman, G.R. No. 139396, August 15, 2000.
*As a guaranty of its independence, the Ombudsman has the power to appoint all officials and employees in his office, except his
deputies. This power necessarily includes the power of settling, prescribing, and administering the standards for the officials and
personnel of the Office. - Office of the Ombudsman vs. CSC, G.R. No. 162215, July 30, 2007.
*The Ombudsman can impose the 6-month preventive suspension to all public officials, whether elective or appointive, who are under
investigation. On the other hand, in imposing the shorter period of sixty (60) days of preventive suspension prescribed in the Local
Government Code of 1991 on an elective local official (at any time after the issues are joined), it would be enough that:
1.
There is reasonable ground to believe that the respondent has committed the act or acts complained of;
2.
The evidence of culpability is strong;
3.
The gravity of the offense so warrants; or
4.
The continuance in office of the respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the
records and other evidence. - Jose C. Miranda vs. Sandiganbayan, et al., G.R. No. 154098, July 27, 2005.
b) Judicial review in administrative proceedings
*The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over orders, directives, and decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative
disciplinary cases only. It cannot, therefore, review the orders, directives, or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in criminal or
non-administrative cases. - Office of the Ombudsman vs. Heirs of Vda. De Ventura, G.R. No. 151800, November 5, 2009.
*Appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to the Court of Appeals
under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. It bears stressing that when Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 was declared as
unconstitutional, the provision is involved only whenever an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 is taken from a decision in an
administrative disciplinary action. It cannot be taken into account where an original action for certiorari under Rule 65 is resorted to as a
remedy for judicial review, such as from an incident in a criminal action. - Kuizon vs. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 140619-24, March 9, 2001.
c) Judicial review in penal proceedings
*Republic Act No. 6770 does not provide for the remedy of appeal from decisions of the Ombudsman in criminal or non-administrative
cases. The aggrieved party may instead avail himself of the original petition for certiorari when the circumstances would warrant the use
thereof.
The remedy of aggrieved parties from resolutions of the Office of the Ombudsman finding probable cause, or lack thereof, in criminal
cases or non-administrative cases, when tainted with grave abuse of discretion, is to file an original action for certiorari with the
Supreme Court and not with the Court of Appeals. - Estrada vs. Desierto, G.R. No. 156160, December 9, 2004.