Professional Documents
Culture Documents
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Baum v. City and County of Denver,
363 P.2d 688 (Colo. 1961) ..................................................................... 31
Bd. of Cnty. Commrs of Gunnison Cnty. v. BDS Intl, LLC.,
159 P.3d 773, 778 (Colo. App. 2006)................................................... 6, 8
Bd. of Cnty. Commrs, La Plata Cnty. v. Bowen/Edwards Assocs., Inc.,
830 P.2d 1045, 1056 (Colo. 1992) ................................................. passim
Bd. of Cnty. Commrs, LaPlata Cnty. v. Colorado Oil & Gas
Conservation Commn,
81 P.3d 1119, 1125 (Colo. App. 2003) ................................... 6, 19, 20, 21
Best v. La Plata Planning Commn,
701 P.2d 91, 95 (Colo. App. 1984)......................................................... 31
Blue Circle Cement, Inc. v. Bd. of Cnty. Commrs of Cnty. of Rogers,
27 F.3d 1499, 1508 n.7 (10th Cir. 1994) ............................................... 14
Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp.,
488 U.S. 204, 213 (1988) ......................................................................... 9
Churchey v. Adolph Coors Co.,
759 P.2d 1336, 1350 (Colo. 1988) ......................................................... 17
City & Cnty. of Denver v. Bd. of Cnty. Commrs,
760 P.2d 656, 660 (Colo. App. 1988) ..................................................... 31
City and County of Denver v. State,
788 P.2d 764, 771 (Colo. 1990) ............................................................. 16
City of Commerce City v. State,
40 P.3d 1273, 1280 (Colo. 2002) ..................................................... 16, 18
ii
Statutes
24-65.1-202(1)(a), C.R.S. ....................................................................... 28
3432109(6), C.R.S. .............................................................................. 8
42 U.S.C. 300f ....................................................................................... 29
42 U.S.C. 300h-2 ................................................................................... 29
Regulations
2 Colo. Code Regs. 404-1:201.................................................................. 7
40 C.F.R. 144.35(c)................................................................................ 29
Article XVI ....................................................................................... passim
Other Authorities
Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical
Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV.
793, 812-13 (2006) ................................................................................ 14
Blacks Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) .................................................. 22
iv
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
I hereby certify that this brief complies with all requirements of
C.A.R. 32, including all formatting requirements set forth in these
Rules. Specifically, the undersigned certifies that:
The Brief complies with C.A.R. 28(g) in that it contains 5,688
words.
The Brief complies with C.A.R. 28(k) because it contains under a
separate heading, a concise statement of the applicable standard of
appellate review with citation to authority; and a citation to the precise
location in the record (R.___, p. ___), not to an entire document, where
the issue was raised and ruled on.
I acknowledge that my brief may be stricken if it fails to comply
with any of the requirements of C.A.R. 28 and C.A.R. 32.
Respectfully submitted,
CITY OF LONGMONT, COLORADO
By:
ARGUMENT
I.
when the Plaintiffs argue that the Act impliedly preempts a particular
local regulation, Article XVI, even though it does not occupy a field of
regulation, they misstate the nature of implied preemption.
Although they were promulgated under the Act, the Commissions
rules cannot prove the General Assembly intended to occupy the field,
for three reasons. First, by their own terms, the Commissions rules
have no implied preemption effect. Rule 201 states, Nothing in these
rules shall establish, alter, impair, or negate the authority of local and
county governments to regulate land use related to oil and gas
operations, so long as such local regulation is not in operational conflict
with the Act or regulations promulgated thereunder. 2 Colo. Code
Regs. 404-1:201 (emphasis added).
Second, implied preemption requires a legislative intent to
completely occupy a given field, which the rules cannot create.
Bowen/Edwards, 830 P.2d at 1056 (emphasis added).
Third, local governments can regulate aspects of oil and gas
operations even when the Commission has already regulated those
same subjects. Local oil and gas laws may not be overturned based on a
7
constructed new wells with Article XVI in place. CF, pp. 665-702
(containing dates for every active Longmont well). Although the new
wells were not fracked beneath the City, they extend beneath the City
and may draw oil and gas from minerals within the Citys jurisdiction.
CF, p. 1934. Summary judgment cannot issue by comparing Article
XVI to a total ban, when those facts are competently disputed.
Second, the Plaintiffs understood this problem at summary
judgment, and accordingly disowned the argument that Article XVI is a
de facto drilling ban. CF, p. 2052 (summary judgment order stating,
Plaintiffs no longer take the position that a ban on fracking is a de
facto ban on drilling); R. Tr. (July 9, 2014), pp. 20-21 (COGAs attorney
saying frackings alternatives are irrelevant, because we are not
arguing a de facto ban in this particular case). Plaintiffs cannot now
revive this de facto ban argument. [A]rguments not presented to or
ruled on by the district court cannot be raised for the first time on
appeal. Sterenbuch v. Goss, 266 P.3d 428, 435 (Colo. App. 2011).
Once you discard the Plaintiffs argument that Article XVI is a de
facto ban on all operations, not much remains to tie it to Voss. One
12
thing Plaintiffs try is to call Article XVI a ban, and suggest Voss
applies to all bans whereas Bowen/Edwards applies only to
particular oil and gas regulations. COGA Answer Brief, at 28-29
(emphasis in original). Nothing in either case actually says this, nor
explains what the distinction might mean in practice. So the Plaintiffs
look to the hard rock mining case, Summit County, for support. That
case says, local land use ordinances banning an activity that a statute
authorizes an agency to permit are subject to heightened scrutiny in
preemption analysis. 199 P.3d at 725 (emphasis added).
The City welcomes scrutiny. Let the trial court carefully
scrutinize the impact of Article XVI to see if it impedes or destroys state
interests. Let it conduct the detailed factual analysis necessary in this
matter of first impression. It has not yet.
Just because a law receives a high level of scrutiny does not mean
it is invalid. Even the more exacting standard of strict scrutiny says
nothing about the ultimate validity of any particular law. Johnson v.
California, 543 U.S. 499, 515 (2005). Laws routinely survive even strict
13
Unlike in Voss the only published case yet on home rule over oil
and gas the local interests here are well documented and presented,
as in Denver. Evidence shows that fracking in Longmont poses serious
risks to the health, safety, and welfare of the Citys people. City
Opening Brief, Statement of Facts, 1; see Condo v. Conners, 266 P.3d
1110, 1114 (Colo. 2011); Churchey v. Adolph Coors Co., 759 P.2d 1336,
1350 (Colo. 1988) (nonmoving partys evidence taken as true and viewed
in favorable light at summary judgment).
Yet, as even Plaintiffs amici curiae concede, the court below
reject[ed] a weighing of interests. Amici Curiae Brief of Colorado
Concern, et al., at 5. By disregarding the local interests at stake, the
trial court neglected to apply the proper home rule test. CF, p. 2050
(summary judgment order disregarding frackings risks to the City).
Furthermore, the States interest is weaker here than in Voss.
The States main interest in Voss was uniform regulation of the
location and spacing of wells. Voss, 830 P.2d at 1067. Yet, based on
the Citys undisputed evidence on technological developments since
17
Voss, the district court found that well location and spacing are no
longer as important as they were in 1992. CF, p. 2041 n.3.
The Commission despairs of the patchwork of local regulations
that could emerge if Article XVI is eventually upheld. Commission
Answer Brief, at 32. But this is always a concern when local
governments are allowed to regulate anything. Complaining of a
patchwork is less an argument against Article XVI than one against
home rule itself. For this reason, uniformity in and of itself is not a
virtue. Commerce City, 40 P.3d at 1280.
Neither the court below, nor Voss, weighed the state and local
interests presented in the instant case. This weighing of all the
circumstances of the case, which determines whether a matter is of
local concern, must be ad hoc. Id. Accordingly, no court has properly
determined whether Article XVI is within the Citys home rule
authority as a matter of local concern, and this case should be
remanded for that analysis.
18
III.
Plaintiffs are straying from established law: Take for example the most
important issue, according to Longmont, of whether Longmonts ban on
hydraulic fracturing has destroyed the state interest in oil and gas
development. This asks the wrong question. Commission Answer
Brief, at 44 (quotation marks, alteration, and citation omitted).
Actually, this is the question, the central question in oil and gas
preemption cases, set forth in Bowen/Edwards and applied consistently
since: Does the local regulation materially impede or destroy the state
interests? Bowen/Edwards explained that operational conflict arises
where the effectuation of a local interest would materially impede or
destroy the state interest, and it indicated that the courts would
determine the existence of such a conflict on an ad hoc basis under a full
evidentiary record. LaPlata Cnty. v. Commn, 81 P.3d at 1123.
So, after Voss and Bowen/Edwards, this Court has understood
that to find a local oil and gas law preempted without finding that it
materially impeded or destroyed state interests would erode[] the
19
delicate balance between local interests and state interests set forth
by Bowen/Edwards. Id. at 1125.
This appeal is simple to resolve. Plaintiffs presented facts tending
to show that oil companies often frack wells, whereas the City
presented evidence that fracking in the City would be irresponsible and
economically unnecessary. The evidence in the record may raise
opposing inferences about whether Article XVI impedes or destroys
state interests. See People ex rel. S.N. v. S.N., 2014 CO 64, 16
(nonmoving party at summary judgment entitled to all favorable
inferences). Because of this simple factual dispute, a trial should ensue.
The rest is detail. The subsections below respond to the Plaintiffs
two main attempts to sidestep the operational conflict test.
A. Plaintiffs cite no express state authorization to frack.
The forbid/authorize test invalidates local laws in some subject
areas when they forbid what the state expressly and affirmatively
authorizes. Rancho Lobo, Ltd. v. Devargas, 303 F.3d 1195, 1205 (10th
Cir. 2002); Citys Opening Brief, at 31-35. The test does not apply to oil
and gas, however, and was not applied in Voss. Voss, 830 P.2d 1061; see
20
F.3d at 1205-06. Summit County agreed that local laws only may not
forbid that which the state has explicitly authorized. 199 P.3d at 725
(emphasis added); see further supporting authority in Citys Opening
Brief, at 32-33 & n.2.
Plaintiffs have therefore littered their briefs with expresses and
explicits to describe the Commissions alleged authorization of
fracking. But they seem to have lost the meaning of those words:
Clearly and unmistakably communicated; stated with
directness and clarity. Cf. implied.
Express, Blacks Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). Something is
express when it is stated directly. For example, Fracking is
permitted, or TOP Operating may frack the Longmont 8-10K well,
would count as an express and affirmative authorization.
The Plaintiffs cannot cite any such authorization. Instead they
point this Court to the rules providing that if an operator fracks, it must
give various notices and make various reports. COGA Answer Brief, at
18-19. Plaintiffs mention Commission staffs training and say the
Commission has sprinkled its rules with 41 instances of the term
hydraulic fracturing. Id. at 18. They say the Commission has decided
22
23
24
Article XVI: the Areas and Activities of State Interest Act (AASIA), and
the federal Safe Drinking Water Act (SWDA). Neither does.
27
28
29
By its own terms, the SDWA does not preempt local regulations
like Article XVI.
V.
legislation invalid. Citys Opening Brief, at 16. Local laws, like state
laws, must be proven invalid beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
Plaintiffs contend that all of the cases cited by Defendants
involve constitutional rather than preemption challenges. COGA
Answer Brief, at 8 n.1; accord TOP Answer Brief, at 34.
That is inaccurate. In Moore v. City of Boulder, a case the City
cited in its Opening Brief, at 16, this Court assessed whether a citys
zoning ordinance was invalid in light of an allegedly contradictory state
statute a preemption challenge. 29 Colo. App. 248, at 252-54 (1971)
(explaining the dispute was about an alleged conflict . . . between the
ordinance in question and the provisions of Chapter 139 of the Colorado
Statutes, as to which controls). This Court applied the proper
presumption: The Boulder Zoning ordinance in question is a legislative
30
31
CONCLUSION
This Court should reverse the district courts summary judgment
order and remand with instructions to develop a full evidentiary record
at trial, to use that record to make findings of fact, and then to apply
the correct tests for home rule authority and operational conflict to
determine whether state law preempts Article XVI.
32
33
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above and
foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT CITY OF
LONGMONT, was served this 9th day of April, 2015, by ICCES File
and Serve on the following:
Karen L. Spaulding, Esq.
Beatty & Wozniak, P.C.
216 - 16th Street, Ste. 1100
Denver, CO 80202