PINGA vs.

HEIRS OF SANTIAGO
GR No. 170354

June 30, 2006

494 SCRA 393

TINGA, J.:
Facts:
The Heirs of Santiago filed an injunction against Pinga alleging
that Pinga had been unlawfully entering the coco lands of the
respondent cutting wood and bamboos and harvesting the fruits of
the coconut trees. As a counterclaim, Pinga contests the ownership of
the lands to which he was harvesting the fruits. However, due to
failures of Heirs of Santiago to attend the hearings, the court ordered
the dismissal of said case. Respondents thus filed a Motion for
Reconsideration to ask for the entire action to be dismissed and not to
allow petitioner to present evidence ex parte. Said motion was
granted by the RTC, hence the counterclaim was dismissed.
The lower court further ruled that compulsory counterclaims cannot
be adjudicated independently of plaintiffs cause of action vis a vis the
dismissal of the complaint carries with it the dismissal of the
counterclaim. Petitioner therefore elevated the matter to the Supreme
Court via petition for certiorari under Rule 45 on pure questions of
law also averring that respondents motive for seeking the dismissal
of their entire case is to avoid putting their ownership in controversy
in the counterclaim.
Issue:
Whether or not the dismissal of the original complaint affects
that of the compulsory counterclaim.
Held:
No, the counterclaim herein can stand on its own. The dismissal
of the complaint does not carry with it the dismissal of the
counterclaim, compulsory or otherwise. In fact, the dismissal of the
complaint is without prejudice to the right of defendants to prosecute
his counterclaim. Section 3 contemplates a dismissal not procured by
plaintiff, albeit justified by causes imputable to him and which, in the
present case, was petitioner's failure to appear at the pre-trial. This
situation is also covered by Section 3, as extended by judicial
interpretation, and is ordered upon motion of defendant or motu
proprio by the court. Here, the issue of whether defendant has a
pending counterclaim, permissive or compulsory, is not of
determinative significance. The dismissal of plaintiff's complaint is
evidently a confirmation of the failure of evidence to prove his cause
of action outlined therein, hence the dismissal is considered, as a
matter of evidence, an adjudication on the merits.
The complaint can accordingly be dismissed, but relief can
nevertheless be granted as a matter of course to defendant on his
counterclaim as alleged and proved, with or without any reservation
therefor on his part, unless from his conduct, express or implied, he

has virtually consented to the concomitant dismissal of his

counterclaim.
The present rule embodied in Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 17
ordains a more equitable disposition of the counterclaims by ensuring
that any judgment thereon is based on the merit of the counterclaim
itself and not on the survival of the main complaint. Certainly, if the
counterclaim is palpably without merit or suffers jurisdictional flaws
which stand independent of the complaint, the trial court is not
precluded from dismissing it under the amended rules, provided that
the judgment or order dismissing the counterclaim is premised on
those defects. At the same time, if the counterclaim is justified, the
amended rules now unequivocally protect such counterclaim from
peremptory dismissal by reason of the dismissal of the complaint.
Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court, as amended, provides:
If for any cause, the plaintiff fails to appear on the date of his
presentation of his evidence x x x the complaint may be dismissed
upon motion of the defendant or upon the courts own motion,
without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his
counterclaim in the same or in a separate action.